(Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4) Harald R. Wohlrapp (auth.)-The Concept of Argument_ A...

8/17/2019 (Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4) Harald R. Wohlrapp (auth.)-The Concept of Argument_ A Philosophical Foun…

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Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4

Harald R. Wohlrapp

TheConcept of

ArgumentA Philosophical Foundation


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Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning

Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Humanitiesand Social Sciences

Volume 4

Series Editor

Shahid Rahman

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Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning

The series is developed in partnership with the Maison Européenne des Sciences de l’Homme et dela Société (MESHS) at Nord - Pas de Calais and the UMR-STL: 8163 (CNRS). Aims & Scope: The

scientific objectives of the series, where humanities and social sciences are conceived as buildinginterdisciplinary interfaces, are:

This series publishes volumes that link practices in the Humanities and Social Sciences, withtheories in Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, such as: Decision theory and Action theory,Argumentation Theories in: cognitive sciences, economy, sociology, law, logic, philosophy ofsciences. The series is open towards research from the Analytic and the Continental traditions, andhas four main focus areas: Pragmatic models and studies that develop a dynamic approach toreasoning in which argumentation is structured as an interaction or as a game, in which two ormore participants’ play moves are defined by the type of argumentation in question, communication,language and techniques of argumentation; studies between the practical and theoreticaldimensions of argumentation, as well as the relationships between argumentation and other modes

of communication, reception, persuasion and power; studies in which reasoning practice isconsidered from the point of view of its capacity to produce conviction of persuasion, and focusingon understanding what makes an argument performative; Diachronic transformations of reasoningpractices studies that emphasize the invention and renewal of reasoning forms, with respect to itsperformance and its effectiveness.

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Argumentation and Pragmatics

Marcelo Dascal (Tel Aviv)Erik Krabbe (Groningen)Frans H. van Eemeren (Amsterdam)John Woods (British Columbia/King’sCollege)

Argumentation and RhetoricFabienne Blaise (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pasde Calais)Gabriel Galvez-Behar (Lille, MESHS-NordPas de Calais)André Laks (Sorbonne, Paris IV)Ruth Webb (Lille, UMR 8163)

Decision Theory, Mathematics, Economy

Jacques Dubucs (IHPST-Paris 1)Fredéric Jouneau (Lille)

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Logic

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Political Science and Sociology

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The Concept of Argument

A Philosophical Foundation


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The translation of this work was funded by Geisteswissenschaften International – TranslationFunding for Humanities and Social Sciences from Germany, a joint initiative of the FritzThyssen Foundation, the German Federal Foreign Office, the collecting society VG WORT,and the Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels (German Publishers and BooksellersAssociation).

Translated by Tim Personn in cooperation with Michael Weh

ISSN 2214-9120 ISSN 2214-9139 (electronic) ISBN 978-94-017-8761-1 ISBN 978-94-017-8762-8 (eBook)DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

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Harald R. WohlrappProfessor emeritus of PhilosophyUniversität HamburgHamburg, Germany

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Preface to the English Edition

“Once more from the beginning” ( palin ex archès ) the Platonic Socrates says, whenevera dialogue has become so contradictory and confusing that it is no longer possiblefor anyone to get their bearings. 1 Then the matter is traced back to its beginnings:aims are ascertained anew, attempted answers examined once more, and ultimatelythe participants try to determine whether it is possible to identify certain basicconcepts or thoughts for a new beginning.

European thought about argumentation dates back to ancient Greece. Over thepast 50 years, this thought has taken the form of an academic discipline informed by

the theoretical means of the twentieth century and invigorated by a renewed effortto address old questions. Today, we face a vast and heterogeneous field that is hostto numerous, and sometimes, contradictory perspectives. It seems that scholars donot even agree on the basic structures of argumentation. All that we have regardingthe aim of argumentation—let alone the conditions and possibilities for achievingit—are merely different opinions. To be sure, these opinions are also supportedby arguments. Even arguments, however, do not seem to provide any clarity here;at best they bring a certain structure to the diversity of opinions. Positions aregrouped according to specific approaches: product approach, process approach,

dialogue approach, etc. Is this an expression of “pluralism” or is it simple relativism?Representatives of these positions take their views to be valid based on their own justifications while being fully aware that others think differently. They even engagein occasional discussions, but generally try not to get in each other’s way. To my mind,this state of affairs demonstrates a certain intellectual richness, but also a weaknesswith respect to how the matter at hand has been theoretically permeated.

Perhaps it is worthwhile to take a cue from the Platonic Socrates and at times makea new beginning in our efforts to grasp this matter. At any rate, that is how we lookedat it in Hamburg in the early 1980s. Our pursuit of issues relating to the philosophy

of science (in particular resulting from the Popper-Kuhn controversy) led to theinsight that such issues need to be addressed in the medium of argumentation.

1 Cf. e.g. Plato: Laches 198a, Gorgias 506c, Meno 79e.


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Nevertheless, there was hardly any appropriate theory for doing so. The little that wasavailable seemed to us limited by its ties to traditions (logic, rhetoric) that hadostensibly been pushed aside but still operated beneath the surface.

Complete analyses of complex, sophisticated arguments that could have had aparadigmatic function were simply not available. Consequently, we founded the“Hamburg Group on Argumentation Theory” and attempted for several years tothink through arguments—in the attitude of what Buddhists call a “beginner’s mind”.We took certain basic distinctions from philosophy (thesis, justification, opinion,knowledge, contradiction, truth) and tried to determine what really happens inverbal practice when a thesis is posited based on reasons and/or criticized withobjections. Over time, we saw the emergence of certain basic structures; of course,this was in part due to discussions with the incipient discipline of argumentationtheory. The group’s work resulted in several dissertations (as described in the

Introduction) and led me to believe that the theorization of argument proceeds alongtracks that are well worn and nevertheless of limited scope. It dawned on me that anew attempt at a philosophical foundation was required. It was this conviction thatgave birth to the present book.

In order to manage expectations, I will outline in some broad strokes what ispresented on the following pages. Let me begin by saying that I do not claim tooffer an elaborate theory of argumentation. Rather, I will just lay down, as it were,a few salient tracks on which our thinking may proceed. In the case of specificquestions, these tracks can form the basis for the development and justification of

further theoretical structures.What is new here can primarily be divided into two theoretical moves—introducing

the concept of orientation as the basic unit for the theorization of argument anddecoupling the quality of an argument from its persuasive force. Let me explain this verybriefly. Basically, argumentation is aimed at gaining or establishing “orientations”.Orientation is the pragmatic function of theories of all kinds. Anyone who wants tomove in uncharted territories, i.e. anyone living and acting, is in need of orientation—and orientation is something we obtain from theories. According to the terminologyintroduced here, theories are verbal formations that open up any domains of reality

at least to the extent that people are now able to act within them. Theories in thissense do not only exist in the sciences but also in the humanities, in philosophy, andin ordinary life. Since the world in which we live and act is constantly changing, sotoo must our orientations. This means that our theories—i.e. our knowledge, butalso our more or less fixed opinions—have to evolve in order for them to retain theirfunction as orientation. From a pragmatic point of view, then, we can distinguishbetween old theory that has already been established and new theory that has yet todemonstrate its value as orientation. Arguing is the activity by which we examinenew theories with regard to their function of providing orientation. A new theory or

a thesis may emerge as “valid” from a process of argumentation if it can be justifiedwithout a remainder of open objections. This notion of validity as applicable to theses—rather than, as is commonly the case, to (logical) schemes only—will presumablybe a great challenge to most theorists’ habitual ways of thinking (I will develop itin detail in Chap. 7).


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The valid thesis is a “new orientation”. Material adduced to argumentativelysupport a thesis makes use of old theory, i.e. theory which has already been cor-roborated in its function as orientation. Accordingly, that theory by which we orientourselves in the practice of argumentation, i.e. argumentation theory, must make itpossible to grasp the dynamics of orientation formation. A static theory such aslogic cannot do so. In this respect, we see the emergence of a second fundamentaldimension of argumentation—behind the structural dimension, which is captured inlogic and in quasi-logical inferences.

Another new dimension that comes into view when introducing the basic conceptof orientation is the subjective one. It is clear that there is always “somebody” (anindividual or a collective) that is oriented or looking for orientation. Consideringthis subjective side of argumentation requires a willingness to recognize that all thesesbear a subjective imprint and that an argument transports this subjective character in

manifold ways. Of course, this cannot be the last word because subjectivity leads tobiases of all kinds and must therefore be worked off. But in order to do this, a theoryneeds to make room for a subjective dimension in addition to the material one.

This takes me to the second new move, the aforementioned act of decouplingargumentative quality from persuasive force. It should be obvious that the degree towhich a thesis, which has been supported by arguments, can fulfill its function asorientation depends on the quality of these arguments. This quality has priority overany possible acceptance by an audience. However, this means that the fusion ofargumentative quality and acceptance already suggested by Aristotle is to be resolved

into a succession of two aspects. Anyone who presents an argument to an audiencefaces two distinctly different questions: (1) Is my argument sufficient for presentingmy thesis as valid? (2) Can my argument persuade the audience to accept my thesis?Keeping these questions distinct seems to be a bewildering imposition. They areconnected, but in a special way: the second question is relevant for the first one onlyinsofar as the audience might put forward objections to the argument. If that is thecase, the audience adopts the role of a critical opponent—a role, however, which isalready needed in answering the first question. In general, the quality of an argument(once we move beyond simple formal inferences) can only be assessed with respect

to possible objections—and raising objections always already requires the existenceof a second instance. It follows that arguing is to be regarded as intrinsically dialogi-cal, even if it takes place as solitary reasoning with oneself. (The dialogue partner isnot an audience to be persuaded. What we expect of him or her is not acceptance,but dialogical control.)

So much for a brief overview of what is new. The German edition of the presentbook was published in 2008 and has so far received eleven reviews (in publicationsranging from philosophical journals over the German Medical Association’sofficial journal to a weekly newspaper 2 ). Five German universities have held

semester-long courses on it. In 2010, it received the award of “GeisteswissenschaftenInternational.” This award came with the funding of an English translation, whichhas now been completed.

2 There are two reviews in English: Kock (2009) and Hoppmann (2012).



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Of course, this conception of a philosophy of argument does not exist in a vacuum.Rather, I regard it as contributing to a discussion that has been going on for a longtime and in a particularly intensive way for the last half century. The present bookcontains many references, not only to argumentation theory, but also to the philosophyof science, history, and general philosophy. This should not be surprising. Afterall, the concept of argument touches on the grand old themes of truth and reality,freedom, and humanity. Nevertheless, my references are often brief and resolute,which some people have held against me. I continue to think, however, that clearstatements serve our common cause more than a practice of constant attenuationand self-relativization.

Finally, I would like to attend to the finest duty of a preface—the acknowledgments.My first word of thanks goes to the organisation “Geisteswissenschaften International”,which paid for the translation, and immediately afterwards to my university in

Hamburg, which arranged for intermediate financing.I would then like to prominently thank my translator, Tim Personn, and his

supervising editor, Michael Weh. Over 1½ years of work, with devoted perseverance,they allowed my book to go out, as it were, into the “big world”. Katharina vonRadziewsky also provided valuable research assistance.

Next, I would like to express my gratitude to those North American colleagueswho patiently and unselfishly read parts of the manuscript and provided valuablecomments and corrections: Mark Battersby, Tony Blair, Maurice Finocchiaro, JeanGoodwin, Fred Kauffeld, Bob Pinto, Chris Tindale, Mark Weinstein, and especially

Tom Fisher, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, and Ralph Johnson, who sent carefuland extensive comments on details of my concept and even discussed these with me(in the case of David and Ralph over several years).

The German edition of the book featured a long list of people who had contrib-uted in one way or another to its production. Three of them I would like to mentionagain. These are my philosophizing friends, the jurist Ralph Christensen and themusician Peter Mengel and then my wife Claudia Lühdorf. They know that the bookwould not exist without them, and of course they are aware of my gratitude. My readersshould know of it, too.

Hamburg, Germany Harald R. Wohlrapp



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Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................. xiiiThe Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory ........................ xix

Knowledge and Opinion ............................................................ xxTheory and Praxis ...................................................................... xxiAnalytics and Dialectics ............................................................ xxiiTopics and Rhetoric ................................................................... xxivTypes of Dialogue and Ways of Addressing .............................. xxv

The Formation and Deformation of Aristotelian Theory

in the Philosophical Tradition ............................................................... xxviiOn the Concepts of Knowledge and Truth ................................ xxviiOn the Concepts of Probability and Subjectivity ...................... xxviiiOn Argumentation and Rhetoric................................................ xxxi

Argumentation Theory Under Construction ......................................... xxxiiFirst New Constructions ............................................................ xxxiiSome Highlights of Contemporary Argumentation Theory ...... xliii

Sketch of the Revised Foundation of the Concept of Argument ........... lix

1 Knowledge ........................................................................................... 11.1 Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory .............................. 11.2 Action: Praxis ............................................................................. 111.3 Theory: The Pragmatic Concept of Theory ................................ 161.4 The “Substance” That Theories Are Made of ............................ 23

1.4.1 Concepts ......................................................................... 231.4.2 Propositions .................................................................... 281.4.3 Rules ............................................................................... 31

1.5 Theory Types .............................................................................. 321.5.1 Formal Theory ................................................................ 32

1.5.2 Technical Theory ............................................................ 331.5.3 Social (Cultural, Culture Forming) Theory .................... 34


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1.6 Theory as Knowledge................................................................. 361.7 Other Types of Theoretical Bases for Arguments ...................... 481.8 Access to Knowledge: Teaching and Research .......................... 51

2 Research ............................................................................................... 552.1 The Concept of Research ........................................................... 552.2 The Limit of Orientation as the Place of Research:

Question, Problem, and Quaestio............................................... 602.2.1 Are These Problems Occasions for Research? ............... 63

2.3 New Theory That Supports New Actions ................................... 662.4 The Thetic Construction ............................................................. 732.5 It’s a Small World ....................................................................... 75

2.5.1 Assessment of the Entire Construction .......................... 76

2.5.2 Assessment of the Geographical Thesis ......................... 772.6 The Genesis of Thetic Theory: The Research Project ................ 812.7 Thetic Theory in Dialogue ......................................................... 85

3 Subjectivity .......................................................................................... 933.1 The Question of the Subjective Conditions of Insight ............... 933.2 Subjectivity as a System ............................................................. 98

3.2.1 Self-Reference, Self-Relation, Self-Transparency ......... 983.2.2 Habitus and Way of Perceiving ...................................... 103

3.3 The Theoretical Level: Orientation System ............................... 107

3.4 Dynamics of Subjectivity ........................................................... 1153.5 Distance and Commitment in Thetic Speech ............................. 120

4 Basic Operations ................................................................................. 1274.1 Theory Minimalism, Concept of Argument ............................... 127

4.1.1 Two Kinds of Validity Claims ........................................ 1324.2 Asserting: The Thesis ................................................................. 1344.3 Justifying: Reasons and Justifications ........................................ 1424.4 Criticizing: Objection and Refutation ........................................ 1534.5 Interaction of the Basic Operations

in the Thetic System ................................................................... 1624.6 The Completeness of the Triad of Basic Operations .................. 165

4.6.1 The Supposedly Enormous Diversityof Argumentative Operations ......................................... 166

4.6.2 The False Alternative betweenJustifying and Criticizing ............................................... 169

5 Frame Structures ................................................................................ 1755.1 A Further Basic Structure........................................................... 175

5.2 Frames as Focus and Interface ................................................... 1775.2.1 Focusing ......................................................................... 1775.2.2 The Interface of Subject and Object ............................... 1795.2.3 The Theory-Practice Interface ........................................ 181

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5.3 Latency of the Frame ................................................................. 1825.3.1 Frame and Aspect ........................................................... 1825.3.2 Way of Seeing and Perspective ...................................... 184

5.4 The Subjective Constitution of the World,the Worldly Constitution of the Subject ..................................... 186

5.5 Frame Differences, Frame Change, Frame Sublation ................ 1895.6 What Does It Mean to Work? ..................................................... 1955.7 Emergence and Treatment of Frame Structures

in the Practice of Argumentation ................................................ 2015.7.1 How Do Frame Differences Emerge

and Take Effect? ............................................................. 2025.7.2 Some Strategies for Handling Heterogeneity ................. 204

5.8 A King on His Way to the Republic ........................................... 209

5.8.1 The Problem ................................................................... 2095.8.2 The Events from Mid-1791 Until the Death

of the King in January 1793 ........................................... 2125.8.3 Four Arguments .............................................................. 214

6 Dialogue Events ................................................................................... 2316.1 The System of Moves and Successive Moves ............................ 2316.2 Four Dimensions ........................................................................ 235

6.2.1 Material Dimension and Subjective Dimension ............. 236

6.2.2 Procedural Dimension and Structural Dimension .......... 2386.3 Linear and Retroflexive Argumentation ..................................... 2456.4 Discussion of Pros and Cons ...................................................... 248

6.4.1 Integration of the Process-Outcome Relationship .......... 2586.4.2 Integration of the Subject-Matter Relationship .............. 259

7 Validity ................................................................................................. 2677.1 The Intermediate Realm of the Thetic: Preliminary

Sketch of the Concept of Thetic Validity ................................... 2677.2 The Motivational Side of Validity:

Communication of Insights ........................................................ 2727.3 The Criterial Side of Validity: The Absenceof Open Objections .................................................................... 278

7.4 The Three Stages of Assessing Validity ..................................... 2847.5 The Open Forum of Arguments: Trust as the Pragmatic

Function of Validity .................................................................... 2877.6 Probable Validity? ...................................................................... 2917.7 The Concept of Validity as a Thesis ........................................... 294

7.7.1 Confronting Universalism .............................................. 295

7.7.2 Confronting Relativism .................................................. 3037.7.3 The Relationship to Pluralism ........................................ 313

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8 Argument Analysis .............................................................................. 3158.1 What Is Argument Analysis? ...................................................... 3158.2 The Problem of Interpretation .................................................... 317

8.2.1 Guide to Argument Analysis .......................................... 3218.3 Analysis of the Hüppe–Merkel Debate

About the Embryo’s Right to Life .............................................. 3248.3.1 Round 1: Main Features of the Positions and Their

Possible Roots in the Participants’ Biographies ............... 3268.3.2 Round 2: Is it Permissible to Kill Embryos

or, Rather, Human Beings to Help OtherHuman Beings? .............................................................. 331

8.3.3 Round 3: Is the Early Embryoa Human Being or Not?.................................................. 336

8.3.4 Round 4: The Issue of Abortion ..................................... 3458.3.5 Round 5: The Limits of Using Embryos ........................ 3478.3.6 Concluding Assessment of the Discussion ..................... 358

9 Reflexivity ............................................................................................ 3619.1 The Problem of Constitution ...................................................... 3619.2 The Status of Argumentation Theory:

Descriptive or Normative? ......................................................... 3679.3 What Is Reflection? .................................................................... 369

9.4 Object- and Meta-level ............................................................... 3739.5 Rational Argumentation ............................................................. 3779.6 Natural, Scientific, and Philosophical Argumentation ............... 3849.7 Normal and Radical Study of Argumentation ............................ 389

10 Transsubjectivity ................................................................................. 39310.1 What Is Reason in Argumentation? ............................................ 39310.2 The Dynamics of Thetic Theory ................................................ 40310.3 The Recognition of the Other ..................................................... 40710.4 The Transcendent Core of Secular Reason ................................ 412

References .................................................................................................... 421

Index .................................................................................................... 437

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Introduction

In “The Argument Clinic,” a sketch produced by the deservedly famous Britishcomedy group “Monty Python,” a man entering a building is asked at the receptionwhether he wants a larger or a smaller argument. The man books the smaller one—

just to get started and see how it goes—which is said to last 5 min and takes placein Room 12. He walks down a corridor and, after some calamities (which fore-shadow what is to come), he ends up in the designated room where a man behind adesk involves him in a disturbingly scant controversy. The newcomer seems to haveasked something. Yet when he is assured that, in fact, his question has already been

answered, he says “No!,” whereupon the employee counters with “Yes!” The maninsists—“No!”—this time a bit sharper, only to receive an even sharper “Yes!” Nowseriously outraged, the man repeats his negative answer: “No!” Thus it goes backand forth: “Yes!” “No!” “Yes!” “No!” “Yes!” For several long, agonizing minutes,there is nothing but a staccato of increasingly louder as well as more forcefulaffirmations and denials, during which we gradually lose sight of what this is all for.Suddenly a brief interruption ensues—which allows them to catch their breath—followed by the exchange of one or two trivial sentences and the customer’s statementthat what just took place was not a real argument after all. The employee imparts a

categorical “Yes, it was!” which is countered by “No, it wasn’t!” and immediatelythey are back again to their endless, frustrating altercation. Upon the sudden ringingof a bell, the man behind the desk declares in an authoritative voice that, well, the timebooked for a short argument has now expired. The customer protests, yet this timehe does not receive a “Yes!” as an “answer.” Instead, he is kindly asked to leave.

Monty Python’s mastery lies in their ability to present this scenario in an unspeakablyfunny manner. It seems ridiculous and miserable; at the same time, though, one cannothelp remembering, on the basis of these scenes, one’s own episodes of deraileddiscussions. What is the message? Does the Argument Clinic “cure” us of the expectation

that we could hope for arguments to offer anything but trouble and a waste of time?Apparently, the possibility of such a satire also depends on the meaning of theword “argument” in English, which connotes controversy and dispute more than,e.g. its German equivalent. Still, the sketch is clearly intended to dispel any illusionsabout the rationality of the use of arguments. What can be said about these illusions?


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Do arguments form the locus of rationality, and does the above sketch merelyillustrate an unfortunate aberration? Or is the kind of rationality that can be mobi-lized in an argument such that it simply fails when confronted with differencesof opinion that, after all, do exist? Are arguments even concerned with opinionsand the differences between them? Are they concerned with who is “in the right,” andwhat is that supposed to mean? Is the purpose of an argument to receive the addressee’sassent to an accurate or better opinion? Is it meant to identify an opinion as accurateor better? Does it achieve both? Does an opinion, if it is sufficiently supported byarguments, become knowledge? Does knowledge, by the way, emerge througharguments, or is it suitable only for their premises but in itself supported quitedifferently? Is our concept of argument sufficiently rich and diverse to answer thesequestions? What, after all, is an argument?

An argument is a sequence of propositions that enables an addressee to rationally

accept a further proposition. Something like this would probably be an ordinaryeducated person’s answer to the question of what “argument” means. All this is easilyunderstandable, except for the expression “rationally.” What exactly does it mean?An answer to this question will require quite a few considerations. In the context ofarguments, one will probably first think of logic, i.e. of structures which should beactualized in the aforementioned “sequences of propositions” in such a manner that aconclusion follows “logically” from premises. If something follows logically, assentcan be expected. But why does such assent even belong to the concept of argument?Logic is a formal system that allows for the possibility of operating with signs. Its

validity does not depend on whether or not someone agrees. Is an argument, then,simply a syllogism that has been addressed to someone, and does its rationality dependentirely on its logical quality? Probably not: after all, the “sequence of propositions” notonly comprises logical schemes, but also substantial propositions. Such propositions,which are the premises of an inference, can be true, false, difficult, or undecidable, butalso clear, poignant, confused, misleading, inappropriate, etc. Hence the argument’srationality will presumably also depend on the quality of the premises. If these arepatently false, unclear, or nonsensical, then we would probably not say that giving one’sassent to the respective conclusion (which otherwise follows logically) is “rational.”

But do we have sufficiently general criteria to even begin to assess such mattersin a way that is as incontestable as assessing the accuracy of logical schemes? Arethere not as many different opinions as there are people about most matters, so thatan assessment of the premises in an argument is possible only in cases wheredistinct fields of knowledge are affected, in which truth and falsehood are clearlydistinguishable and, in fact, already determined in relation to the propositions inquestion? This would mean, however, that the “rational assent” possibly createdor triggered by an argument is essentially something that has its true locus in theorganized sciences.

Yet, it is not the sciences but the spheres of opinion-making in particular those ofpublicly relevant opinion making in ethics and politics, that are regarded as typicaldomains for argumentation. These domains, however, are characterized by a diversityof opinions. Most of all, “independent opinions” seem to be regarded as having aparticular value. Apparently, these are opinions that people have formed on their

Introduction


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own, which means at the very least that they understand the respective justification.Yet it is not easy to see whether “independent” and “rational” ways of opinion-makingare compatible or whether they compete. Conditions in which (more or less indepen-dently formed) opinions come into conflict with each other may be disturbing. Afterall, it cannot be ruled out that opinions may be accompanied by actions and thatdissent may lead to aggression.

Whether the practice of “rational” argumentation in the aforementionedknowledge-related sense may help (or whether we end up in the “Argument Clinic”after all) will depend on the extent to which the parties involved can be moved, onthe basis of conclusions from premises, to accept or discard opinions. Therefore, thetask at hand will in particular be to identify those premises that can be accepted.If their acceptance is supposed to be “rational” in the same sense, then we wouldhave to seek an adjustment of opinions, ideally on the basis of knowledge, for the

argumentative treatment of dissent.Is that sufficient? Do we know enough? Indeed, we know infinitely more than,

for example, the ancients. In relation to what we would have to know in order toreliably solve our major problems, however, things seem to be different. In fact, alot may be said in favor of the view that with the realization of our significantlyincreased knowledge, we have entered problems of truly gigantic proportions.Thus, relative to the knowledge we need, we actually do not know more now, butless. A properly understood concept of argument, however, enables us to mobilizethe practice of argumentation in order to improve our theories. From this vantage

point, it would be possible to state that it is precisely because we know so little thatargumentation has to play such an important role. Hence these considerations suggestthe following result: In our current era, the practice of argumentation is of centralimportance. Yet the concept of argument we employ—a concept which leads us todemand “rationality” in argumentation—does not correspond to this importance.

Anyone who is concerned with clarifying this concept will soon realize that even just talking about “the practice of argumentation” is dubious. It is far from clear whatbelongs to it, what it is about, and what procedures it requires. One of the consequencesof this heterogeneity is that the function, the importance, and the extent of the prac-

tice of argumentation are underestimated. This underestimation, in turn, means thatargumentation theory is often regarded as a secondary or tertiary discipline behindand below the sciences—as a doctrine of the (more or less) rational solicitation ofassent targeted at decision-making in commerce, law, politics, and journalism. Is this

justified? What is the real significance of the practice of argumentation? Wheredoes it occur? What do we use it for?

We live in a “culture of discussion.” This is certainly true of Western industrializedcountries and—at least when it comes to political and socioeconomic conditions—increasingly the entire world: Discussions can spring up everywhere and may concern

everything that is problematic and questionable. In political bodies, i.e. nationaland nonnational bodies, parliaments, courts, nongovernmental organizations, etc.,discussion is viewed as the hallmark of democratic procedures. It has spread toinstitutions of socialization, schools, preschools, and universities; it has even enteredcompanies, clubs, and churches. We prefer to regard this situation as expressing

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self-determination, openness, recognition, and participation in communal decisions.With the rise of individualism, an increase in the self-confidence of a greater numberof people, and the spread of democratic practices all over the globe, this culture ofdiscussion continues to thrive and become more entrenched.

Consequently, an increasing number of issues become problematic and in needof resolution. More and more people demand to participate. Since the middle of thetwentieth century, and in particular since the end of the Cold War, humanity hasentered an accelerated development with a wide open future. Capitalist commodityproduction becomes the decisive factor all over the globe even though its material“beginning,” the availability of natural resources, and its material “end,” wasteelimination, are uncertain and its effects on civilization are questionable. We havedeveloped and implemented procedures—such as energy production by nuclearfission and the optimization of organisms through genetic engineering—that

already dramatically change our living conditions, and it is uncertain whether theliving conditions of six to nine billion people can be shaped and maintained in adeliberate way. To the extent that the ideals of public and personal autonomy aresupposed to last, this at the very least results in a tremendous increase in the needfor discussion.

We are realistic enough to see that this increase in significance does notautomatically result in more rationality. After all, the culture of discussion doesnot by itself follow the frequently invoked “unforced force of the better argument.” 1 In public debates, arguments play a smaller role than power relations between the

parties involved. Instead of comprehensible reasons for a decision, here we haveacceptance management, and instead of scientifically, ethically, and legally estab-lished conclusions, we have to find compromises (which emphasize durability overvalidity). 2 Generally speaking, the public culture of discussion is only partiallyrational, in particular where it matters the most. It is fraught with illusions, errors,and fraud. Even in smaller manifestations of the practice of argumentation that canbe surveyed more easily—at round tables, in clubs, and relationships—arguing isshot through with self-promotion, self-righteousness, and more or less subtle violence. 3

On the podiums of serious theoretical work, we can expect a greater degree of

rationality. However, it is not easy to say what could act as a measure of comparison.Does the case of argumentative rationality look better at academic meetings and

1 This bon mot was coined by Jürgen Habermas; cf. Habermas (1973), and has been greeted withmuch acclaim. It expresses the aspect of the effect of arguments in a nicely paradoxical and yetone-sided way. After all, good arguments do not have to force anything. They can also simplyenrich and enlighten.2 In the case of compromises, an important question is how long the parties will be bound by them.The general answer is as long as the power relations they represent still obtain. Nevertheless, acompromise might be the best that we can achieve after all. Therefore, “negotiation” as an applicationof argumentation (which aims at consensus and, in doing so, emphasizes not only understandingbut also fear and desire) deserves to be taken seriously. For the differences between argumentationand negotiation, cf. Holzinger (2004), Provis (2004), and Prittwitz (1996), in the latter volume,particularly the essay by Saretzki (1996).3 Cf. Kienpointner’s flowering plant episode, which I quote and analyze in Chap. 2 .

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in academic journals, among think tanks, and in university departments? Or isargumentative rationality of minor importance in those institutions anyway, becausetheir main concern is scientific truth or the organized search for truth? Anyone whostill talks this way today probably holds a keynote speech at a meeting of sponsorsor at the anniversary of a research community. In the real practices of scientists andexperts, talk of truth comes up only in very special situations (most likely regardingsuch questions as to whether the coffee machine has finally been repaired or not.)This corresponds to the state of civilization that we have reached.

The twentieth century has seen a general “erosion of the concept of truth.” WhatI mean is the following: Central fields of science have experienced episodes ofrelativization, and as a result, our confidence in the reliability of “truths” has come to berather shattered. A few brief examples will suffice to illuminate this: The twentiethcentury began with Einstein’s relativization of Newtonian physics, a discipline that

for 200 years had been known as the peak of pure and fruitful science. The humani-ties saw the triumph of historicism, i.e. the claim that (historical, but also all otherkinds of) truths are relative to different eras. Then Freudian psychology enteredpublic consciousness with the idea that individual consciousness (particularlyregarding its normative ideas) is relative to biography. In linguistics, Whorf proclaimeda “principle of linguistic relativity” in the 1930s, i.e. the assertion that people withfundamentally different linguistic backgrounds are unable to communicate and thatthere is consequently no such thing as “the language.” In the philosophy of language,Wittgenstein succeeded with the idea of linguistic meaning as relative to “language

games.” Ethnology and cultural anthropology produced countless studies that pre-sented all kinds of ideas of truth and accuracy as culturally relative. The culminationof this cascade of relativization, then, came in the 1960s with Kuhn’s account ofscientific research results as paradigm relative.

Of course, all these instances of relativization have not remained unchallenged;there have been extensive, at times acrimonious, discussions about them. Noteverything that was initially claimed has endured over time. Yet the sheer fact thatwell-established truths needed to be discussed had at first been alarming for theeducated public. But today this is no longer alarming as we have accepted that truth is

a peculiar matter. Philosophy, the ancestral home of the question of truth, now dis-cusses five to eight conceptions of truth. 4 If there is an expert report on any problem,

4 Cf. Künne (2003). Far from merely demonstrating the diversity of conceptions of truth, this bookpresents contemporary theses and arguments regarding the question of truth in an admirably com-petent and differentiated manner. Its argument leads to the author’s preferred “modest account oftruth.” According to this account, a proposition is true if things are as it says they are (336/337). I willset aside any concerns about whether this account is adequately represented by the formula MOD(350) and whether it may not turn out to be circular due to Künne’s presupposition of classicallogic. In fact, I find it remarkable that Künne is mistaken in his view that this account could suffi-

ciently capture all relevant validity claims (453). The typical validity claim for theses that one canargue for or against is of a different kind. Let us take his own claim that “MOD articulates ouractual concept of truth.” This claim cannot be true in the sense in which truth is articulated byMOD. After all, whether or not it is the case that the formula articulates our actual concept of truthdepends on the extent to which “our actual concept of truth” is a uniform and stable state of affairsin the first place. In the best-case scenario, Künne’s argument could be universally accepted, and

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finding a counter report might be merely a matter of money and information. This iswhat I meant to convey by the diagnosis of an “erosion of the concept of truth.”

The result is relativistic thinking. We cannot do without truths and the examina-tion of truth claims, yet it seems that they only ever endure until the next corner, thenext institute, the next day, and the next interlocutor. I will address this rampantrelativism in this book (Chap. 7). To my mind, as a theorist of argumentation,what is objectionable about this is the belief that, in light of such relativism, thepractice of argumentation itself is actually useless.

This is due to the concept of argument outlined above. An argument is a sche-matically representable transition from true premises to a conclusion which, conse-quently, is true as well. I call this the “formal concept of argument.” According tothis concept, the premises must be true. However, if truths are relative, then they aremere opinions, something to accept or reject at will. Arguments, then, would be

nothing more than an encouragement for people with the respective opinion thatthey are in the right because they can give a rational account of it.

This poses a precarious situation. For although it is true that the solidity and reli-ability of “truths” differ from our initial conception, the dichotomy of absolutelycertain truth and absolutely arbitrary opinion is a rash and thoughtless assumption.There is a third possibility: the reasonable argument or, in other words, the argu-mentatively valid thesis. Arguments are what we are left with; they can help ussecure truths, as far as they may reach, and can aid us in occasionally exceeding theboundaries of truths or at least in pushing them farther. Basically, given the erosion

of the concept of truth, arguments do not become less important, but more so. Theynow become, as it were, our last authority for any occasions where we make claimsto truth, accuracy, or validity of various kinds.

Hence the new and great importance of argumentation theory. For half a century,there has been a new approach to this theory. A lot has happened, which needs to betalked about. It is remarkable, however, that some very old ways of thinking aredifficult to leave behind, and that therefore the principles of a theory that would do

justice to the new significance of the practice of argumentation have certainly notyet been understood clearly and precisely. This book seeks to contribute to that task.

Thus, it begins with the most basic question: How can we arrive at an adequatetheory of argumentation?Those who believe that the practice of argumentation is simply “given” as a verbal

practice or speech activity—and, as such, could easily be investigated empiricallywith regard to its features—are mistaken. We always bring along a certain conceptof argument that determines its structures. There are linguists who really try to justlet “the thing” speak for itself; consequently, these theorists are at a loss as to what,in fact, they should pay attention to. 5 Of course, we all have preconceptions. Words

then maybe one day things will actually be the way he claims. However, what happens if it will notbe universally accepted? As long as there are no serious objections to it, his claim would be a validthesis, but not a true statement in the sense expressed by MOD.5 One of the few linguists who tried to work completely without bias is Richard Hirsch. He recordedconversations taken to be “argumentative” and demonstrated very clearly in his reports that onecan hardly tell where arguing begins and where it ends; cf. Hirsch (1989, 1995).

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like “argument,” “argumentation,” and “arguing” are part of ordinary language, wherethey have a certain meaning. But those preconceptions are not sufficient to preciselydelimit or exclude certain activities. 6 Rather, such activities appear to be embeddedin manifold verbal (and nonverbal) events. 7

Intrinsically, language has certain effects. Its structures are involved in the for-mation of opinions, orientations, and participants’ belief systems. The recording,transmitting, and processing of information takes place in a verbal medium. Itsparticipants are people who more or less engage with each other; these people havefeelings, wishes, plans, and apprehensions; they have bodies in which physiologicalprocesses take place during speaking and listening (a slip of the tongue; a bad odormay turn out to be a lasting obstacle to communication); bodily fluids are released,adrenaline, dopamine, etc. All of this may affect argumentative speech by facilitating,complicating, disturbing, or more or less submerging it—or even by completely

drowning it out.Such references to how arguments are “embedded” should suffice to state the

following: The practice of argumentation is not an objective domain that is simplyavailable for empirical investigation. Nevertheless, is it not possible to start with ourpreconceptions and then proceed further, all the while differentiating them along theway? Yes, but we run into all kinds of difficulties, in particular since these precon-ceptions contain elements that do not fit with each other. I already brought this up inthe initial question: On the one hand, arguing should be concerned with the inferen-tial form of a sequence of propositions; on the other hand, it should be concerned

with an addressee’s assent. On the one hand, the display of knowledge seems to bethe goal; on the other hand, arguing seems to aim at the dissemination of opinions.How can this be reconciled? Where do these preconceptions come from? What wasthe original arrangement of their components?

The Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory

Explicit theory formation about argumentation starts with Aristotle. This statementdoes not merely specify a historical but also a systematic beginning: Our preconcep-tions of argumentation are a relic of theoretical foundations laid down by Aristotlemore than 2,000 years ago. They continue to act on us by forcing our questions andattempts at clarification onto certain tracks. Since we do not necessarily break new

6 Jean Goodwin demonstrated this with a computer-supported corpus-linguistic investigation of thestem “argu;” cf. Goodwin (2007).7 It has been claimed recently that there is such a thing as a nonverbal kind of argumentation—in

analogy to nonverbal communication. Supposedly, the physician’s coat as well as the trial lawyer’srobe “functions” as arguments inasmuch as they indicate expertise. Can a robe be an appeal toauthority for the legal accuracy of any given statement? That is not practical. Certainly, gestures,manners, and clothes often have effects. These are the effects of the orator, which Aristotle (see below)summarized under “ethos.” Taking such effects to be arguments, however, indicates the obscurityof our basic concept of argument.

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ground along these tracks, it is advisable to inspect their foundations. This is whatI would like to do briefly here. Subsequently, I will point out problems that havearisen from the continued effects of these basic insights, distinctions, and theorems.I will also begin to indicate what needs to be changed or rearticulated in order toarrive at a concept of argument that is philosophically reflected with respect to theneeds of our modern era.

It is well known that Aristotle constructs his concepts and theories on thebasis of Plato’s philosophy. He remains particularly committed to Plato in the basicdistinctions between knowledge and opinion on the one hand and theory andpractice on the other. Nevertheless, Aristotle is an independent thinker, the greatestand most prolific of ancient Greece. To this day, European science rests on hisshoulders. Hence, it is quite right to take him as the locus of the theoretical foundationsof our concept of argument. In the following, I will sketch five basic relations:

knowledge and opinion, theory and praxis, analytics and dialectics, topics and rhetoric,and types of dialogue and ways of addressing.

Knowledge and Opinion

First of all, it is the concept of “truth” (aletheia ) that Aristotle adopted from Platoand developed further. Truth is the quality of judgments which state things as they

are. There is also evidence in Aristotle that these things, insofar as they unconcealthemselves, are by themselves the truth. This need not be decided here. At any rate,truth is ultimately something immutable, something timeless with regard to natureand the cosmos, namely, what they or their components and structures really are.

Truth presents itself in “knowledge” (episteme ). Actually, there can only beknowledge of natural or cosmic relations. Hence, the great paradigm cases ofknowledge—today we talk about “science” in this context—are mathematics andastronomy. To what extent other fields can arrive at real knowledge is not clearlydecided in Aristotle’s writings. While he seems to be hopeful with respect to natural

science, this is much less the case for the practical aspects of social life. 8 Clearly, the(Platonic) dichotomy of being and becoming is at work here.Knowledge consists of a logically structured system of propositions. We owe to

Aristotle the discovery of logical structures in propositional language. No doubt,reading the books of the Analytics in which these structures are described andexplained is a rather dry and boring affair for students today (who, as participantsin introductory courses on logic, are shepherded all the way to the logical achieve-ments of the twentieth century). The reason for this is that we can no longer imaginea situation in which there is no awareness of the formal inferential relations in a

language. According to Aristotle, if something qualifies as knowledge, then it can

8 Still, some scholars claim to have discovered substantial evidence for this assumption, too. Cf.,for example, Ernst Kapp, in Kapp (1938).

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be deduced from premises by way of compelling inferences (syllogisms), which, inturn, can be deduced from more general or more abstract premises, etc. Eventually,we arrive at “first principles” (archai ) which are self-evident. As examples of such“first principles,” Aristotle listed the distinctness of categorical propositional forms(quantity, quality, locality, temporality, etc.), the eternity of matter and prime move-ment, the principle of noncontradiction, etc.

The opposite of knowledge is “opinion” (doxa ). Plato rather despised opinion,because he viewed it as resulting from simple sensory perception which is known tobe unreliable at times. Aristotle gives sense perception a bit more credit. Sometimeshe even seems to adopt an epistemological perspective which regards knowledge asan established form of opinion, but still a kind of opinion. Nevertheless, it is clearthat simple uneducated opinion is contrary to knowledge.

Opinions are not true, but they can be “probable” (eikos ). As will be seen, in

terms of our interests, this is the most promising concept in the Aristotelian theorieson argumentation. Today, this term refers to a blurry blend of plausibility (some-thing that is “somehow” evident) and relative frequency (e.g. rain probability). Themeaning of probability in the fourth-century BC Greece resembled verisimilitude.It was applicable if something had a certain appearance. An apple is probably ripeif it looks ripe; a student has probably learned if he can give a first correct answer.Issues of probability always make it appropriate to ask the question whetherthings are as they seem to be. These things may end up being mere illusions, but notnecessarily so. For one, they may turn to be true after all. It is also possible for

appearances to stubbornly persist, while even diversifying into different subjects orgroups, so that some people take one thing to be true, while others take another tobe true, etc. (Slavery seems to be right, but according to Aristotle only as a natural,not merely a legal relationship. 9 )

In the case of important issues, however, we continue to inquire into their innerworkings. Hence the possibility that probable sentences acquire a certain universality,insofar as they seem to be true to all people, or to most of them or the best of them.Probabilities thus construed are called endoxa . 10 This factual universality, whose truthhas not (yet) been established, is the central concept for argumentation theory. (On this

basis, it will be possible to form the specific concept of argumentative validity.)

Theory and Praxis

In ancient Greek, “theory” means something like “vision.” 11 The term is supposed toconvey that theory is no longer mere sensory perception; rather, in theory, we beholdwith the “mind’s eye.” In contemporary English, “theory” could be taken to mean

9 Cf. Aristotle (1950), Politics I. 2.10 Cf. Aristotle (1960), Topics, I, 1, 100b.11 The Greek word “theoria” contains three words for “seeing” or “beholding”: “theoreo,” “horao,”and “theaomai”—it is, as it were, a potentiated way of beholding.

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“comprehension.” Anyone who has a theory of planetary movements comprehendsthese movements—while the scale and depth of such comprehension might vary.(Does it allow for predictions? If so, what is their degree of accuracy? Is it embeddedinto other, possibly more general theories about movements and weight propor-tions? etc.) As I said, the Aristotelian concept of theory is guided by the idea that themind is able to peer through transient reality and arrive at an essence beyond andthat this essence, as a structure, is immutable.

“Praxis” is a term for domains in which people act—not so much technicallyin the production of certain objects (which would fall under poiesis ), but in thesocial, interactive production of their living conditions, i.e. especially in ethics,economics, and politics. In fact, these domains do not really give rise to anytheories because the essential conditions underlying them are not immutable.After all, we could manage our economies or governments differently than we do

at the moment. Hence, praxis is a domain that is not quite suitable for theory. Whatwe find here is not real knowledge—we encounter only probabilities producedless by the intellect (nous ) than by practical judgment ( phronesis ). Aristotle’s con-ception constitutes a clear departure from previous thinkers, especially fromSocrates. On his quest for people who have obtained real knowledge, Socratesfinally arrived at the craftsmen—at least this is how Plato told the story in his

Apology . The term for simple crafts and trades in ancient Greek is banausia , andthe contempt expressed therein has survived in “Banausentum,” the commonly usedGerman term for philistinism. His remarks about the existence of “knowledge”

among ordinary craftsmen made Socrates a provocateur. Aristotle did not buythis; while such people might indeed be experienced and have a certain know-how,he did not think of them as role models for people in possession of knowledge.(At this point, we already notice the two levels of knowledge that I will discuss inChap. 1: HOW-knowledge and WHY-knowledge.)

In terms of our contemporary usage of theory and practice, it is quite remarkablethat, in this conception, high, real theory—pertaining to the domain of exact knowl-edge—is completely divorced from praxis. (For the arch-observer and classifierAristotle, it was simply irrelevant that empirical investigations in physics, for exam-

ple, require experiments and, therefore, actions, and that the results of research inphysics are realized in technologies. In fact, his “pure,” contemplative conception oftheory can still be traced in scientistic clichés; hence, it is obscure to this day howthe exact sciences are always already embedded in praxis.)

Analytics and Dialectics

Under the title “analytics,” Aristotle subsumes demonstrations of logical relations,especially deductive inferences (syllogisms) between judgments that, in today’susage, we call “quantified propositions.” If all A are B, and all B are C, then all Aare also C. In more illustrative, slightly simplified terms: If all horses are living

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beings, and all living beings are mortal, then all horses are mortal. 12 The subsequenttradition, especially among the Megarians and Stoics, has further expanded logic sothat logical relations can be traced between singular propositions, as well. If A or Bhave been determined to be true, and if B is found to be false, then it follows that Ais true. It is self-evident that the understanding of logical inferences has enabledhumanity to cut some large and bright swaths through the thicket of apophanticspeech. Nevertheless, logical knowledge does not play the decisive role for thepractice of argumentation that is still mostly attributed to it.

In Aristotle, knowledge as such is demonstrated by logically deriving proposi-tions from major premises, which, in turn, follow from still higher propositions.As already stated, at the top of this structure are the first principles (archai ). These arethe irrevocable beginnings of knowledge and truth. They can no longer be logicallydemonstrated to be true themselves—rather, they are realized by the intellect (nous ).

In other words, logic is a mere technique of moving from some propositions toother propositions salva veritate. Realizing the truth of the true, however, requiressomething different.

This is the provenance of what Aristotle (following Plato’s dialektike techne )calls “dialectics.” 13 Long before Plato, dialectics had been an issue in Greekphilosophy. Zeno of Elea had specialized in giving counter-speeches to question-able theses in order to show that a state of affairs turns out to be different if viewedfrom different points of view and that, if so, theses end up alternating between beingtrue and false. Dialectics could produce an appearance of truth, but it could also

dispel mere appearances. 14 In Plato, the term “dialectics” came to represent the art ofdialogically creating or dissolving conceptual relations and thus of approximatingthe idea of the matter in question. 15 Aristotle uses “dialectics” to refer to means andways of examining or proving the truth or probability of major premises that cannotbe derived any further. In order to judge a controversial thesis, one must proceed byinferentially tracing it back to first principles that are truths or at least probabilities(in the sense of endoxa ).

In the end (i.e. once a candidate for filling the position of the first principle,arche , or endoxon has been identified), we therefore rely on inferences or a kind of

support that can no longer be logical. After all, if the intellect is not yet able torealize a particular matter, but if no further premises for logically inferring thecontroversial thesis can be found, then we require other ways for leading theintellect onto the path of understanding. In this regard, Aristotle offers figures suchas, on the one hand, “imperfect” deductions and, on the other hand, rhetoricalsignals. These allow for the construction of an insight, which takes place not only

12 Cf. Aristotle (1973), Analytica Priora, especially 25b 25 ff., where the explication of completefigures begins.

13 There is no consensus on the relationship between the syllogistic and the dialectical in Aristotle.For the purposes of this account, I follow Eric Weil’s rather convincing position; cf. Weil (1972).14 It was an “art of creating and destroying illusions;” cf. Niehues-Pröbsting (1987), 189 (emphasisin original) (Trans. T.P.).15 Cf., for example, Plato (1964), Sophistes and Politikos.

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on the tracks that we would call “cognitive” today but also as a result of affectiveand emotional influences. Dialectics in this sense is the part of Aristotle’s theorieswhich must be considered fundamental for argumentation theory.

Topics and Rhetoric

Under the title “topics,” Aristotle presents the means of dialectics, namely theidentification and examination of beginnings in discussions aimed at validity. AsI said, “perfect” syllogisms only play a subordinate role in this endeavor. Now, theprimary topical ingredients are inductive inferences or generalizations. 16 These donot result in real conclusions either; they only arrive at probable ones (however, as

I said, not in the sense of relative frequency, but in terms of verisimilitude). In addi-tion, there are inferences from conceptual determinations such as transitions fromgenus to species, to the proprium, the accident. Today, these issues concern thetheory of definition as well as analytical propositions. In terms of a concept of argu-ment, the so-called enthymemes are of particular interest. This term is derived fromthe Greek en thymo (in the guts) and refers to “imperfect” deductions. In the caseof the latter, inferences are not obviously universally true. In part, they are normalconclusions with some missing premises, which are, however, self-evident and couldbe supplemented. In other, more notable cases the inference follows no logical, but

only a semiformal schema, for instance, in the case of the a fortiori argument or theargument from analogy. Hence, it takes a judgment to assess the applicability ofthese schemes in regard to any given circumstances. (It may turn out, for example,that an analogy that was used turns out to be “skewed.”) In the case of such judgments,not only the theoretical permeation of the matter in question is significant but alsothe way in which it has been embedded affectively and emotionally.

Therefore, the enthymematic deductions of the topics flow seamlessly into theforms and figures of rhetoric. 17 When Aristotle began to work on rhetoric, there hadalready been a 100-year-old Athenian tradition of exercising and teaching professional

public speech. In politics and in court, it was indispensable to represent one’s case insuch a way that it would gain the support of a majority. The sophists had demonstratedthat rhetoric could at least partially be devised as a mere instrument for obtainingassent—even for absurd or outrageous theses. Aristotle, in turn, attempted to theoreti-cally penetrate this skill (techne , practical knowledge) by tentatively systematizingways of reinforcing the credibility of a speech in terms of affect and emotion.

He divided these forms into three branches (logos , ethos , and pathos ). Logos concerns the inferential elements of speech, so that logic now appears as a part ofrhetoric. This has caused a lot of confusion. It is true that a logically correct

16 “Induction is a passage from individuals to universals, e.g.[,] the argument that supposing theskilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilledman is the best at his particular task” Aristotle (1960), Topics I, 12, 13, 105a.17 Aristotle sometimes calls rhetorical figures “enthymemes” and even “syllogisms.”

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argument can contribute to the credibility of a speech. Yet this does not make it a“rhetorical argument.” The other two branches concern the speaker and the actualspeech. A speaker of good provenance, who knows how to present himself and isdecently dressed, etc., is more credible than a carelessly dressed person of dubiousorigin. Likewise, giving a well-structured speech, whose important sentences arewell formed and repeated so as to affect the emotions, etc., is more credible thanreeling off a few phrases that have been pieced together haphazardly. Furthermore,Aristotle detected some differences in pathos that relate to the qualities of particularaudiences. Different things will further the credibility of a speech among the old,the rich, and the educated than among the young, the poor, and the uneducated. 18 These theories were derived, on the one hand, from observations and, on the otherhand, from anthropological and psychological theories contained in Aristotle’soverall system of philosophy.

The following must be considered in any evaluation of the role of rhetoric: TheGreeks were (and are) a nation that likes to have discussions. This entrenchedculture of discussion had extremely serious aspects (as demonstrated by the trial ofSocrates, a defeat before the tribunal could have lethal consequences), but it alsospawned rhetorical battles in the marketplaces, where the sole aim was not toembarrass oneself by being forced to admit an absurd or outrageous thesis. Aristotle’srhetoric illuminates, as it were, what actually happened in such events. The actualrhetorical success was not simply regarded as evidence of the truth or probability ofthe thesis: Knowledge of some sophists’ rhetorical battles was widespread, just like

an awareness of the fact that some tribunals had ruled unjustly in the past, etc.Aristotle’s rhetoric is based on a range of supremely important insights. There wasno question, however, that it addressed the credibility of speech and that this qualitymay deviate from its truth or probability. A vestige of Plato’s warning that rhetoricwithout insights into the matter in question is a despicable and dangerous skill wasstill on Aristotle’s mind.

Types of Dialogue and Ways of Addressing

The final element of Aristotle’s theories of argumentation is a rudimentary taxonomyof ways in which speech aimed at validity can be realized. Three types of dialogueand four ways of addressing someone are distinguishable here (these are my words,but the conceptual differences are Aristotle’s).

By types of dialogue, I mean various ways of attending to the accuracy or validityof propositions. On the one hand, there are instructional dialogues. In a teaching-learning situation, a speaker conveys her knowledge to a listener. Validity is assumed

in this case, i.e. the dialogue partner is no opponent. Rather, her contributions

18 This is the so-called psychology of the audience mentioned by Düring (Düring (1966), 134 ff.).For a closer look, cf. Aristotle (1975), Rhetoric, Book II, especially Chapters 12 and 13, where thecontrast between young and old is presented in a rather embarrassing manner.

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articulate her state of comprehension; they are either responses to questions posedby the teacher in order to test this comprehension or inquiries into the teacher’sexplanations. Secondly, there are genuine dialogues, in which validity claims areexamined with respect to their validity. In this case, the dialogue partner is a criticalopponent. He checks the validity of the thesis and of the reasons given, comparesthese reasons in terms of their internal coherence, and confronts the thesis and itsreasons with his own knowledge and beliefs. 19 The third type is the eristic dialogue(from eris , i.e. strife). In this case, the goal is neither the dissemination of knowledgenor the examination of validity claims, but the crude enforcement of claims.No matter whether they represent the speaker’s idiosyncrasies or whether they arealtogether foolish and paradoxical, the only objective here is to compel the inter-locutor to agree with them. These three types revolve around the second one. Aninstructional dialogue is actually not yet a dialogue, while eristic speech has ceased

to be one.Parallel to these categories is a distinction in Aristotle’s system between four ways

of addressing a speech. I would like to call these “monologue,” “dyad,” “tribunal,” and“oratory” (again, these are my terms, but Aristotle’s concepts). In a “monologue,” ahuman being, as Plato would still have had it, converses with his soul. 20 In Aristotle,this is not an explicitly recognized form; however, soliloquies were of course familiardevices in Greek tragedy. In our times of heightened individualization, mono-logues are considerably more significant than in ancient Greece. Therefore, we needto remind ourselves emphatically that this contemplative way of deliberating with

oneself has a dialogical structure. The second form is the “dyad.” In this case,address is reciprocal. It involves two speakers (or groups of speakers) who have aconversation with or against each other in one way or another. The third form is the“tribunal,” where two speakers struggle over the validity of a proposition and addressthis struggle to a third party (which might consist of multiple people; in fact, in ancientAthens, it could have consisted of a few thousand). After a phase of listening, thisthird party decides who is right or what is valid. The two parties may be in opposi-tion to one another, but not to the judge. The fourth way of addressing speech is“oratory.” In this case, an orator speaks to listeners, usually a larger crowd, whose

assent he or she desires. Speakers using this form are concerned with evaluatingmatters (e.g. the commendation or reprimand of a politician). The listeners are noopponents—they either give their assent to a speech or they do not.

Obviously, these types of dialogue and ways of addressing speech can be com-bined. As I said, it is possible to think through the validity of theses and argumentsmonologically. Even instructional dialogues can take place in the form of amonologue (if we try to learn something from a book), while this is impossible inthe case of eristic dialogues. An instructional dialogue can be realized as oratory(in so-called chalk and talk teaching), even if doing so has only a few useful

19 In this context, Aristotle also distinguishes a cooperative from an agonal type; cf. Aristotle(1960), Topics, IX 2, 165a 38 ff.20 Plato (1964), Sophistes 263e, Theaetetus 189e–190a.

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applications. It is also possible for an instructional dialogue to take place as a tribunal(in the case of sample lessons in front of a teaching evaluation committee), etc.

It should be clear that for our present pursuit of theorizing the practice ofargumentation, the most significant form is the dyad aimed at testing validity(which, in this book, I will call “argumentative dialogue”). Furthermore, tribunalsaimed at validity (as in a court of law) and oratory aimed at validity (as a form whichde facto occurs in all kinds of presentations, and which must therefore be mastered)are of great importance as well.

The Formation and Deformation of Aristotelian Theory

in the Philosophical Tradition

Every educated person knows that this title could adorn a weighty tome. Since I donot have enough time to write that book as well, I would at least like to do the following:I will briefly point to some aspects of the Aristotelian foundations of argumentationtheory that have been emphasized, developed further, reinterpreted, and reshapedby the tradition in order to improve our current understanding of argument—sometimes this will mean that we see matters more sharply; at other times they willseem to us slightly different. I will highlight three themes, namely the lack of dyna-mism in the concepts of knowledge and truth, the modification of the concept of

verisimilitude, and the relationship between argumentation and rhetoric.

On the Concepts of Knowledge and Truth

As mentioned before, Aristotle’s concept of knowledge targeted primarily thedomain presently called “exact sciences,” i.e. formal sciences as well as the theo-retical foundations of the natural sciences. In ancient Greece, this ideal of theory

and knowledge—articulated in the demonstration of logical structures, in succes-sive deductions from beginnings—was still observed in an exemplary manner byEuclid. 21 This account of geometry, in which the beginnings are definitions andprinciples from which all relevant propositions are deduced, has had a tremendousappeal for the entire subsequent history of thought and science. To this day, we arestill wrestling with the corresponding “axiomatic ideal of theory.” While Aristotlerefrained from propagating this ideal in relation to knowledge formation in practicalareas, the tradition did not follow him in this regard. Rather, it has producedaxiomatic representations of ethics (Spinoza) as well as politics (Hobbes). It isnot uncommon for today’s relevant scientists working in practical areas (politics,economics, psychology, etc.) to believe that they only do serious science if they takethe natural sciences as a guide.

21 Cf. Euclid (1956).

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Like I said, there is a rift separating Aristotle’s concepts of theory and knowledgefrom praxis. Knowledge, for example, the knowledge of physics, was gained throughobservation and contemplation, not in practical actions (in experiments). 22 This con-ception was in part due to the state of science at the time, but it also depended on anunderstanding of data that simply conceived of them as something receptive in the sameway in astronomy, stars were simply observed. Over the course of history, since theRenaissance at the latest, it has become apparent that even the theories of physics havea practical foundation (which is manifest in the skills of craftspeople and engi-neers). In modern times, the integration of scientific knowledge into technology andindustry has highlighted the relevance of praxis in the form of applications of know-ledge (its progress, its foci, etc.). Nevertheless, it is a fact that the link to practicehas been neglected in conceptions of theoretical knowledge to this day—hence I willpresent a concept of knowledge in Chap. 1 that attempts to revise this bias—and this

fact is presumably a consequence of the effect of the Aristotelian ideal of theory.There is a second, closely related characteristic of our concept of theory: The latter

is concerned with being and thus seems to be something static. It is formed as wellas justified, and following these processes it has become valid, i.e. it is knowledge.If it grows, however, then suddenly former knowledge is no longer knowledge atall, but mere error and mistake. Depending on one’s predilections, one may havenothing but deep-seated contempt for the ancient Greek assumption that the Earth isflat (something that, incidentally, Aristotle did not believe; however, this flatnesswas the geomorphic knowledge of a time when distances were incomparably greater

than they are for us). In this sense, the Aristotelian (“ontological”) concept of truthis still in effect today. Truth is seen as something static, not as “a becoming” andknowledge is not seen as transitory; things are simply as they are, and we only rec-ognize them gradually. Anytime we recognize something new, we recognize at thesame time that our predecessors were wrong. This conception, too, is not adequateand has to be understood differently.

On the Concepts of Probability and Subjectivity

As I said before, Aristotle regarded the discussion of any given thesis as guided bythe directive that it must be traced back to its major premises, which will be eithertrue or probable. The Roman rhetoricians of antiquity (Cicero, Quintilian) in turndeveloped only the topical and dialectical content of those Aristotelian theories thatfocused on achieving assent in political speech. Their point was not so much theidentification of content that is universally true, but the presentation of each party’s

22 In zoology, Aristotle comes up with a plethora of (sometimes fantastic) details about animals’outer and inner structures. Scholars believe that at least some of these observations are based onhis own dissections. Are these, then, the beginnings of research activities? Yes, but there is adifference between an activity that merely renders an object accessible and an activity that in itsel

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