+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Ltd Lucero Up to Palanca

Ltd Lucero Up to Palanca

Date post: 16-Aug-2015
Category:

Documents
Upload: elizbalderas
View: 214 times
Download: 0 times
Download Report this document
Share this document with a friend
Description:
fulltxt
Popular Tags:
writ of possession
favor of movant
writ ofpossession shouldbe
favor ofthe registered
order ofoctober23
order ofseptember
court of land registration
nowon appeal
25
LTD 2015 1 | Page EN BANC G.R. No. L-16995 October 28, 1968 JULIO LUCERO, movant-appellee, vs. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. Ramon Gonzales for movant-appellee. Jaime L. Loot for and in his own behalf as oppositor-appellant. FERNANDO, J.: The order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the former Judge Wenceslao L. Fernan presiding, dated September 21, 1959, now on appeal before this Court, speaks to this effect: "Regarding the writ of possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered owner." 1 Accordingly, it granted a writ of possession in favor of movant, now appellee, Julio Lucero. There was an opposition on the part of oppositors, all surnamed Loot, now appellants. The lower court failed to see merit in the opposition interposed. It explained why: "The opposition interposed by the oppositors to the effect that there are defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the motion is not under oath is trivial in its nature and consequently untenable." 2 Accordingly, the writ of possession, as prayed for, was issued. There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession filed by the oppositors on September 25, 1959, 3 followed by a motion for reconsideration on October 10, 1959, 4 which was denied in an order of October 23, 1959. 5 As set forth in such order of denial: "After weighing the arguments adduced by the movant represented by Atty. Gonzales and the oppositor represented by Atty. Loot, this Court adheres to the previous ruling that inasmuch as no writ of possession has been issued in this case, it is the ministerial duty of this Court to issue one in compliance of the provisions of Act 496 as amended." There was a second motion for reconsideration filed by oppositors on November 3, 1959, 6 which was denied in an order of December 10, 1959. 7 Not satisfied, there was still another motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by oppositors on December 28, 1959, 8 which similarly met the same fate, an order of denial being issued on February 20, 1960. 9 The appeal was taken direct to us. The sore issue, therefore, is whether on the above facts, the order granting the writ of possession was in accordance with law. The answer must be in the affirmative. This appeal cannot prosper. No other view would be compatible with the pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act, 10 as uniformly interpreted by this Court. As was noted in the order of September 21, 1959, there was a final decree in a land registration case which arose from a decision promulgated in 1938, the final decree being issued on October 29, 1941. It was not incorrect for the lower court to state, therefore, that "the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the registered owner." 11 It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, ..." 12 In Pasay Estate Co. v. Del Rosario, 13 it has been made clear that the purpose of the statutory provision empowering the then Court of Land Registration, now the ordinary courts of first instance, to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees in the same way that the judiciary does is so that the winning party could be placed in possession of the property covered by such decree. Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful litigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory." There was a restatement of the above principle in Demorar v. Ibañez, 14 the closest in period of time to the challenged order of the lower court. Thus: "We have heretofore held that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant." As a matter of fact, in a 1948 decision, 15 it was held by us that "the fact that the petitioners have instituted, more than one year after the decree of registration had been issued, an ordinary action with the Court of First Instance attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of fraud, is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied for by the registered owners." A few months after the issuance of such a challenged order of September 21, 1959, Marcelo v. Mencias was decided, 16 where this Court went so far as to hold that "if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective." It is clear, therefore, to repeat, that on the facts as found, the validity of the challenged order cannot be impugned. It is equally clear that this being a direct appeal to us, no questions of fact may be raised. As was held recently in Perez v. Araneta: 17 "Nothing is better settled than that where the correctness of the findings of fact of the lower court are assailed, the Court of Appeals is the proper forum. If resort be had directly to us, then appellant must be deemed to have waived the opportunity otherwise his to inquire into such findings and to limit himself to disputing the correctness of the law applied." The problem thus confronting oppositors-appellants in bringing the matter direct to us was to show that the above two-page order on the meager but sufficient facts as found, was vitiated by error or
Transcript

LTD 2015 1 | P a g e EN BANCG.R. No. L-16995October 28, 1968 JULIO LUCERO, movant-appellee,vs. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. Ramon Gonzales for movant-appellee. Jaime L. Loot for and in his own behalf as oppositor-appellant. FERNANDO, J.: TheorderoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofIloilo,theformerJudge WenceslaoL.Fernanpresiding,datedSeptember21,1959,nowon appeal before this Court, speaks to this effect: "Regarding the writ of possession,oncethefinaldecreehasbeenissuedtheissuanceofa writofpossessionisonlyamatterofcourseifnothinginthepast has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is no period ofprescriptionastotheissuanceofawritofpossession,and inasmuchasthefinaldecreehasalreadybeenentered,itfollows that a writ ofpossession shouldbe issued in favor ofthe registered owner."1 Accordingly, it granted a writ ofpossession in favor of movant, now appellee,JulioLucero.Therewasanoppositiononthepartof oppositors,allsurnamedLoot,nowappellants.Thelowercourt failedtoseemeritintheoppositioninterposed.Itexplainedwhy: "Theoppositioninterposedbytheoppositorstotheeffectthat therearedefectsinthereconstitutionoftherecordsandthatthe motionisnotunderoathistrivialinitsnatureandconsequently untenable."2Accordingly,thewritofpossession,asprayedfor, was issued. There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession filed by theoppositorsonSeptember25,1959,3followedbyamotionfor reconsideration on October 10, 1959,4 which was denied in an order ofOctober23,1959.5Assetforthinsuchorderofdenial:"After weighingtheargumentsadducedbythemovantrepresentedby Atty.GonzalesandtheoppositorrepresentedbyAtty.Loot,this Courtadherestothepreviousrulingthatinasmuchasnowritof possessionhasbeenissuedinthiscase,itistheministerialdutyof this Court to issue one in compliance of the provisions of Act 496 as amended."Therewasasecondmotionforreconsiderationfiledby oppositorsonNovember3,1959,6whichwasdeniedinanorderof December10,1959.7Notsatisfied,therewasstillanothermotion forreconsiderationoftheaboveorderfiledbyoppositorson December 28, 1959,8 which similarly met the same fate, an order of denialbeingissuedonFebruary20,1960.9Theappealwastaken direct to us. Thesoreissue,therefore,iswhetherontheabovefacts,theorder grantingthewritofpossessionwasinaccordancewithlaw.The answer must be in the affirmative. This appeal cannot prosper. Nootherviewwouldbecompatiblewiththepertinentprovisionof theLandRegistrationAct,10asuniformlyinterpretedbythisCourt. As was noted in the order ofSeptember 21,1959,there was a final decreeinalandregistrationcasewhicharosefromadecision promulgatedin1938,thefinaldecreebeingissuedonOctober29, 1941.Itwasnotincorrectforthelowercourttostate,therefore, that "the issuance of a writ of possession is only a matter of course if nothinginthepasthasbeenissuedinfavoroftheregistered owner."11 It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is"noperiodofprescriptionastotheissuanceofawritof possession,..."12InPasayEstateCo.v.DelRosario,13ithasbeen made clear that the purpose of the statutory provision empowering the then Court of Land Registration, now the ordinary courts of first instance,toenforceitsorders,judgmentsordecreesinthesame waythatthejudiciarydoesissothatthewinningpartycouldbe placedinpossessionofthepropertycoveredbysuchdecree. Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delayto which a successful litigant would be subjected ifhe were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory." TherewasarestatementoftheaboveprincipleinDemorarv. Ibaez,14 the closest in period of time to the challenged order of the lowercourt.Thus:"Wehaveheretoforeheldthatawritof possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeatedinaregistrationcasebutalsoagainstanyoneadversely occupyingthelandoranyportionthereofduringtheland registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of registration is part ofthe registration proceedings.In fact,it is supposed to end thesaidproceedings.Consequently,anypersonunlawfullyand adverselyoccupyingsaidlotatanytimeuptotheissuanceofthe final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant." As a matter of fact, ina1948decision,15itwasheldbyusthat"thefactthatthe petitionershaveinstituted,morethanoneyearafterthedecreeof registrationhadbeenissued,anordinaryactionwiththeCourtof FirstInstanceattackingthevalidityofthedecreeonthegroundof fraud,isnotabartotheissuanceofthewritofpossessionapplied for by the registered owners." Afewmonthsaftertheissuanceofsuchachallengedorderof September21,1959,Marcelov.Menciaswasdecided,16wherethis Court went so far as to hold that "if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the landtothesuccessfullitiganttherein,...awritofdemolitionmust, likewise,issue,especiallyconsideringthatthelatterwritisbuta complementoftheformerwhich,withoutsaidwritofdemolition, would be ineffective." Itisclear,therefore,torepeat,thatonthefactsasfound,the validityofthechallengedordercannotbeimpugned.Itisequally clearthatthisbeingadirectappealtous,noquestionsoffactmay beraised.AswasheldrecentlyinPerezv.Araneta:17"Nothingis better settled than that where the correctness of the findings of fact ofthelowercourtareassailed,theCourtofAppealsistheproper forum.Ifresortbehaddirectlytous,thenappellantmustbe deemedtohavewaivedtheopportunityotherwisehistoinquire into such findings and to limit himself to disputing the correctness of the law applied." Theproblemthusconfrontingoppositors-appellantsinbringingthe matterdirecttouswastoshowthattheabovetwo-pageorderon themeagerbutsufficientfactsasfound,wasvitiatedbyerroror LTD 2015 2 | P a g e errorsinlaw.Itwasfarfromeasy,therefore,consideringasabove shown that on the authority of applicable decisions, the lower court was left with no choice but to issue the writ of possession sought. Resoluteandundaunted,oppositorsdidtheirbesttoaccomplisha taskformidableinitscomplexity.Itseemedtheyoverdidit.They assignedtwenty-oneerrorsagreatmanyofthemfactual,and, therefore, not for us to consider, and the remaining, except the last, farfromdecisiveinviewoftherathersettledstateofthelaw concerning the issuance of a writ of possession. Nor did the twenty-first error assigned suffice to call for a reversal, as will be more fully explained.That is why, as earlier stated, the appeal was doomed to futility. Itwouldnotbeamiss,though,todiscussevenbrieflyoneofthem, thefourteenth.Invokingthreeofourpreviousdecisions,18they would impugn the issuance ofthe writ ofpossession on the ground thattheywerenotoppositorsanddefeatedpartiesintheland registrationproceeding.Theywouldignorethefact,however,that intheabovedecisionsreliedupon,thebasisfortheimproprietyof issuingawritofpossessionwasthatthepartiesadverselyaffected enteredthepropertyinquestionaftertheissuanceofthedecree. Thereisnothinginthechallengedorderthatsuchisthecasehere. Thus,theywouldraiseafactualissueamatternotproperly cognizable by us. A reminder maynotbe out ofplace.The apparent ease with which oppositors-appellantscouldconjureupsomanyallegederrors, whileitmaybeatributetotheiringenuityinmakingatwo-page orderyieldsomanyinstancesoftherankestviolationoflegal precepts,hardlycontributestothepersuasivenessoftheirbrief.As a matter of fact, the suspicion could be legitimately entertained that inthusattemptingtopaintthehighlyunrealisticpictureofaterse andbrieforderbeingsosadlyriddledwitherrors,oppositors- appellants were trying in vain to bolster what inherently was a weak case. Thatisallthatneedsbesaidaboutthisappealexceptforthe dispositionofthetwenty-firsterrorassigned,referringtothe existence of a pending case between the parties for reconveyance.19 Therewasnodenialinthebriefformovant-appelleethatsucha casewasthenpendingatthetimetherespectivebriefswerefiled. Whatisdecidedherecannotaffectwhateverfinaldecisionmight possiblyhavebeenrenderedbythistimeintheaforesaid reconveyance action.Nonetheless, the mere fact that such suitwas then pending did not oust the lower court of its jurisdiction to issue thewritofpossession.AsstatedbyourpresentChiefJusticein Agredav.Rodriguez:20"Besides,itisclearthatrespondentJudge had jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of Santiago Agreda for the issuance ofa writ ofpossession.Whether or not the motion should have beendenied,in view ofinstitution ofsaid Civil CaseNo.6267, is a matter that does not affect said jurisdiction." WHEREFORE, the order ofSeptember 21,1959,granting the writ of possessioninfavorofmovant-appellee,andtheordersofOctober 23,1959,December10,1959andFebruary20,1960,denyingthe reconsideration thereof, are affirmed. With costs against oppositors-appellants. EN BANC G.R. No. 123346 December 14, 2007 MANOTOKREALTY,INC.andMANOTOKESTATECORPORATION, Petitioners,vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 134385 ARANETAINSTITUTEOFAGRI-CULTURE,INC.,Petitioner,vs. HEIRSOFJOSEB.DIMSON,REPRESENTEDBYHISCOMPULSORY HEIRS:HISSURVIVINGSPOUSE,ROQUETAR.DIMSONANDTHEIR CHILDREN,NORMAANDCELSATIRADO,ALSONANDVIRGINIA DIMSON,LINDAANDCARLOSLAGMAN,LERMAANDRENE POLICAR,ANDESPERANZAR.DIMSON;REGISTEROFDEESOF MALABON, Respondents. R E S O L U T I O N TINGA, J.: ThestabilityofthecountrysTorrenssystemismenacedbythe infestationoffakelandtitlesanddeeds.AnydecisionofthisCourt that breathes life into spurious or inexistent titles all but contributes totheblight.Onthecontrary,thejudicialdevotionistowards purgingthesystemofillicittitles,concomitanttoourbasetaskas the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy. Thesetwopetitions1involvepropertiescoveredbyOriginal CertificateofTitle(OCT)No.994whichinturnencompasses1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate.2 The vast tract of land stretches over three(3)cities,comprisinganarealargerthanthesovereignstates ofMonacoandtheVatican.3Despitetheirprimelocationwithin Metropolitan Manila, the properties included in OCTNo.994havebeenbesetbycontroversyandsulliedby apparentfraud,cloudytitlesandshadytransfers.Itmayaswellbe renamed the "Land of Caveat Emptor." The controversy attending the lands ofOCT No.994 has not eluded thisCourt.Since1992,ourfindingsandrulinginMWSSv.Courtof Appeals4havestoodastheRosettaStoneindecipheringclaims emanatingfromOCTNo.994,aswasdoneinGonzagav.Courtof Appeals,5andintheCourtsDecisiondated29November2005 (2005 Decision) in these cases.6Yet in the course ofresolving these motionsforreconsiderationcametherevelationthatOCTNo.994 waslostintranslationfollowingMWSS.Certainimmutabletruths reflected on the face of OCT No. 994 must emerge and gain vitality, even if we ruffle feathers in the process. I. LTD 2015 3 | P a g e Arecapitulationofthefacts,whichhavealreadybeenextensively narratedinthe2005Decision,isinorder.Forclarity,wenarrate separately the antecedent facts in G.R. Nos. 123346 and 134385. A.G.R.No.123346,ManotokRealty,Inc. andManotokEstateCorporation,vs. CLT Realty Development Corporation On10August1992,CLTRealtyDevelopmentCorporation(CLT) soughttorecoverfromManotokRealty,Inc.andManotokEstate Corporation(Manotoks)thepossessionofLot26oftheMaysilo Estate in an action filedbefore the Regional Trial Court ofCaloocan City, Branch 129.7 CLTs claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013issuedinitsnamebytheCaloocanCityRegisterofDeeds, whichtitleinturnwasderivedfromEstelitaHipolito(Hipolito)by virtueofaDeedofSalewithRealEstateMortgagedated10 December1988.HipolitostitleemanatedfromJoseDimsons (Dimson) TCT No. R-15169, a title issued pursuant to an order of the CourtofFirstInstance(CFI)ofCaloocanCity,Branch33.Dimsons title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.8 For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied onbyCLT,claimingthatDimsonstitle,theproximatesourceof CLTstitle,wasirregularlyissuedand,hence,thesameand subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived itfromseveralawardeesand/orvendeesoftheNationalHousing Authority.9TheManotoktitlelikewisetracedasitsprimarysource OCTNo.994which,on9September1918,wastransferredto Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously acquired the property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an "Escritura de Venta" executedbyDonTomasArguellesandDonEnriqueLlopis.10On3 March1920,RuizandLeuteriosoldthepropertytoFrancisco Gonzalezwhoheldtitletheretountil22August1938whenthe propertywastransferredtoJoseLeonGonzalez,ConsueloSusana Gonzalez, Juana Francisca Gonzalez, Maria Clara Gonzalez, Francisco FelipeGonzalezandConcepcionMariaGonzalezunderTCTNo. 35486.Thelotwasthen,perannotationdated21November1946, subdividedintoseven(7)parcelseachinthenameofeachofthe Gonzalezes.11 Thetrialcourt,rulingforCLT,adoptedthefactualfindingsand conclusionsarrivedatbythemajoritycommissionersappointedto resolvetheconflictoftitles.Itwasestablishedthattheentire Maysilo Estate wasregisteredunder Act No.496by virtue ofwhich OCT No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal;12 that Lot 26wastransferredtoCLTbyHipolitowhosetitlewasderivedfrom theDimsontitleandthatonthebasisofthetechnicaldescriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles, the latters property indeed encroached on the property described in CLTs title.13 The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.14 Their motion for reconsideration having beendenied,15theyfiledapetitionforreviewwiththeSupreme Court,ascribingerrortotheappellatecourtinupholdingthetrial courts decision which decided the case on the basis of the majority commissioners report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioners report.16 B.G.R.No.134385,AranetaInstitute ofAgriculture,Inc.v.Heirsof Jose B. Dimson, et. al. On18December1979,DimsonfiledwiththethenCFIofRizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City a complaint for recovery of possession and damagesagainstAranetaInstituteofAgriculture,Inc.(Araneta). Dimsonallegedthathewastheabsoluteownerofpartofthe MaysiloEstateinMalaboncoveredbyTCTNo.R-15169ofthe RegistryofDeedsofCaloocanCity.AllegingthatAranetahadbeen illegally occupying the land and that the latter refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands, he prayed that Araneta be ordered tovacatethesameandremoveallimprovementsthereonandto returnfullpossessionthereoftohim.Aranetaforitspartadmitted occupancyofthedisputedlandbyconstructingsomebuildings thereonandsubdividingportionsthereofintheexerciseofitsright as absolute owner. He alleged that Dimsons title to the subject land was void and hence he had no cause of action.17 ThetrialcourtruledforDimsoninitsDecisiondated28May1993 with these findings: first, there were inherent technical infirmities or defects in the titles that formed each link in the chain ofownership thatculminatedintheManotoktitle,i.e.,thatthetechnical descriptionsinthetitleswerewritteninSpanishwhereasthosein theallegedmothertitle,OCTNo.994,wereinEnglish,which,an abnormal state that deviated from the usual practice in the issuance of titles; and second, it was established procedure to indicate in the certificateoftitle,whetheroriginalortransfercertificate,thedate oftheoriginalsurveyofthemothertitletogetherwiththe succeedingdateofsubdivisionorconsolidation.Thus,theabsence oftheoriginalsurveydatesofOCTNo.994onManotokschainof titles, the trial court added, should mean that OCT No.994 was not themothertitlenotonlybecausetheoriginalsurveydateswere differentbutalsobecausetheoriginalsurveydatemustalwaysbe earlierthantheissuedateoftheoriginaltitle.OCTNo.994was issuedonMay3,1917whichwasmuchaheadofthesurveydate indicated in the succeeding titles, which is December 22, 1917.18 Undaunted,AranetainterposedanappealtotheCourtofAppeals which, on 30 May 1997, affirmed the lower courts decision.19Insoholding,theappellatecourtdeclaredthatthetitle ofAranetatothedisputedlandisanullity.ItnotedthatDimsons TCT No. R-15169 was derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on April 19,1917"andthatthesamewasobtainedbyDimson simultaneouslywithothertitles,viz:TCTNos.15166,15167,and 15168byvirtueoftheDecisiondatedOctober13,1977andOrder datedOctober18,1977,inSpecialProceedingsNo.C-732.Itwas also pointed out that Aranetas TCT No. 13574 and 21343 were both derivedfrom"OCTNo.994registeredonMay3,1917"whichwas previously"declarednullandvoidbytheSupremeCourtin MetropolitanWaterworksandSewerageSystemv.Courtof Appeals."20 AranetathenfiledapetitionforreviewwiththeSupremeCourt attributing error to the Court of Appeals in failing to recognize that it LTD 2015 4 | P a g e hadabetterrightofpossessionoverthepropertythandid Dimson.21 Asbothpetitionsinvolvedinterrelatedchallengesagainstthe validityofthepartiesseparatetitlestoportionsofthegreater MaysiloEstate,they,alongwithG.R.No.14876722,were consolidated per Resolutions dated 21 April 1999 and 6 March 2002. Also in 2002, the Republic of the Philippines sought and was allowed intervention in these cases. On 29 November 2005, the Third Division of the Court rendered the 2005 Decision,23 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionsareDENIEDandtheassailed DecisionsandResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsarehereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.24 The Court acknowledged that the paramount question raised in the petitionsiswhetherthetitlesissuedinthenameofDimsonandof CLTarevalid.Notingthatthisquestionisonepurelyoffact,the Court held that the same was beyond its power to determine and so, thefactualfindingsofthetrialcourtsinthesecasesasaffirmedby theCourtofAppealsmustbeaccordedthehighestdegreeof respect and not disturbed at all. Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to discuss the absence of merit in the petitions. First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Courtupheldthevalidityofthetrialcourtsadoptionofthe commissionersmajorityreportaspartofthedecisioninasmuchas the same is allowed by Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and thatacaseofoverlappingtitlesabsolutelynecessitatesthe assistanceofexpertsinthefieldofgeodeticengineeringwho,on account of their experience and expertise, are in a better position to determine which of the contending titles is valid. For this reason, the Court emphasized, the trial court may well rely on their findings and conclusions.Second,theCourtpointedoutthatthetitlesof respondents in all three cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the RegistryofDeedsofCaloocanCityregisteredon19April1917. However, because the validity of said mother title was upheld by the CourtitselfinMWSSandreiteratedinHeirsofGonzaga,theCourt chosenottodelveanymoreintothecorrectnessofthesaid decisions which had already attained finality and immutability. TheManotoksandAranetadulyfiledtheirrespectivemotionsfor reconsideration.On5June2006,thecaseswereelevatedtothe Courtenbanc,whichheardoralargumentson1August2006.The Court formulated the issues for oral argument, thus: Fromtheabovepetitions,thefollowingprincipalissuesare gathered: I. Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid: A. Petitioners titles: 1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866,C-17272,21107,21485,26405,26406,26407, 33904,34255,C-35267,41956,63268,55896,T-1214528, 163902and165119inthenameofManotokRealty,Inc., andTCTNo.T-232568inthenameofManotokEstate Corporation; 2.TCTNos.737and13574inthenameofAraneta Institute of Agriculture; and 3.TCTNos.T-158373andT-158374inthenameofSto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. AllthesetitleswerederivedfromOriginalCertificateofTitle(OCT) No.994registeredonMay3,1917intheRegistryofDeedsof Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, same city. B. Respondents Title: 1.TCTNo.T-177013inthenameofCLTRealty Development Corporation; 2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson; and 3. TCT No. T-1770 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation/ All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or onApril19,1917,coveringthesameLotNo.26oftheMaysilo Estate. II. Can this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in Metropolitan WaterWorksandSewerageSystems(MWSS)v.CourtofAppeals (G.R.No.103558,November17,1992)andHeirsofLuisJ.Gonzaga v.CourtofAppeals(G.R.No.96259,September3,1996)sustaining thevalidityofOCTNo.994registeredonApril19,1917andnullify the same OCT No. 994 registered later, or on May 3, 1917? III. HowwilltheReportsoftheDepartmentofJusticeandtheSenate Fact-FindingCommittee,notpresentedinevidencebeforethetrial courtsconcludingthatthevalidtitleisOCTNo.994registeredon May 3, 1917, affect the disposition of these cases? Willitbenecessarytoremandthesecasestothetrialcourtsto determinewhichoftheCertificatesofTitlearevalid?Ifso,which trial court?25 Acrucialfactemergedduringtheoralarguments.TheRepublic, through the Solicitor General,26strenuously argued that contraryto the supposition reflected in the Advisory, there was, in fact, only one OCT No. 994. x x x In this particular case, it appears that on December 3, 1912, the Court of Land Registration, the Judge Norberto Romualdez presiding, LTD 2015 5 | P a g e actingonLandRegistrationCaseNo.4429renderedjudgment orderingtheGLROtoissueadecree.Pursuanttothisorder,the GLROpreparedDecreeNo.36455andissuedthesameonApril19, 1917 at 9:00 oclock in the morning, at Manila, Philippines. It may be observedthatatthefaceoftheOCT994whichwasthenonfileat theRegistryofDeedsofCaloocanandnowkeptintheLRA,the following entry can be seen. Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal this 3rd day of May 1917at7:30a.m.Obviously,April19,1917isnotthedateof inscriptionorthedateoftranscriptionofthedecreeintothe OriginalCertificateofTitle.Itappearsthatthetranscriptionofthe decreewasdoneonthedateitwasreceivedbytheRegisterof Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. There is no other date to speak of. In the records of the Land Registration Authority, there is only one OCT 994,onitsfaceappearsthedateoftranscript,May3,1917.The validitythenofallsubsequenttitlestracingtheiroriginfromOCT 994 should be tested in the light of these set of facts. x x x27 On the otherhand, the counsel for CLT stated during the same oral argument that he had seen a photocopy of an OCT No. 994 that was dated 19 April 1917,28 and manifested that he could attach the same to CLTs memorandum.29 At the same time, on even date, the Court directedtheSolicitorGeneralandcounselforCLTtosubmittothe Court "certified true copies of the Original Certificate of Title No. 994 datedMay31917andApril19,1917,respectively,onorbefore Friday, August 4, 2006."30 Inresponsetothisdirective,boththeSolicitorGeneralandthe counsel for CLT submitted their separate "Compliance" to this Court, withtheirrespectivecopiesofOCTNo.994attachedthereto.Both copiesofOCTNo.994submittedbytheSolicitorGeneralandCLT indicateontheirfacethatthedecreeofregistrationissuedon19 April 1917 was received for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on 3 May 1917. Indeed, there is no evidentvariancebetweenthecopiesofOCTNo.994submittedby theOSGandCLT,andCLTadmitsjustasmuchinitsMemorandum dated 3 September 2006.31 The claim of the Solicitor General that there is only one OCT No. 994 was duly confirmed though belatedly by CLT itself. Even the ponente ofthe2005Decisionhasrecognizedthisfact,asindicatedinher present Dissenting Opinion. The emergence of such fact, contrary as itistothecrucialpredicateunderlyingtheissuespresentedinthe CourtsAdvisory,haschangedtheessenceandcomplexionofthe controversy.Thekeytograntordenythemotionsfor reconsideration is the answer to the question: which is the true date of OCT No. 994, 17 April 1917 or 3 May 1917? II. WeturntothedateofOCTNo.994asreflectedinthequoted portion of the certified true copy thereof submitted by the Republic of the Philippines:32 Therefore,itisorderedbytheCourtthatsaidlandberegisteredin accordancewiththeprovisionsoftheLandRegistrationActinthe name of said xxx Witness:theHonorableNorbertoRomualdez,AssociateJudgeof saidCourt,the3rddayofDecember,A.D.nineteenhundredand twelve. Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M. ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS Chief of the Land Registration Office of Justice ReceivedfortranscriptionattheofficeoftheRegisterofDeedsfor theProvinceofP.I.thisthirddayofMay,nineteenhundredand seventeen at 7:30 A.M. (emphasis supplied) AsevidentonthefaceofOCTNo.994,thedecreeofregistration wasissuedon19April1917,andactually"receivedfor transcription" by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. Interestingly, evenasCLTadmitsthatthereisonlyoneOCTNo.994,thatwhich the Solicitor General had presented to the Court,33 it maintains that theOCTshouldbedeemedregisteredasofthedateofissuanceof thedecreeofregistration,19April1917,insteadofthedateitwas receivedfortranscriptionbytheRegisterofDeedson3May1917. Theargumentisbasedonthetheorythatitis"thedecreeof registration[that]produceslegaleffects,"thoughit"isentered beforethetransmittalofthesamefortranscriptionattheRegister of Deeds."34 ThisargumentmarksaradicaldeparturefromCLTsearliertheory that there were two OCTs No. 994, one dated 19 April 1917 and the other3May2007,atheorywhichwaslikewisereflectedinthe CourtsearlierAdvisoryontheissuespriortotheoralargument.35 Yet the argument smacks of plain sophistry. The process involved is what this Court called "the method of giving a paper title."36 It is spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act: SEC.41.Immediatelyupontheentryofthedecreeofregistration theclerkshallsendacertifiedcopythereof,underthesealofthe court, to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces, or city in which the land lies, andthe register ofdeeds shall transcribethe decree in a book to be- called the 'registration book,' in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title.Theentrymadebytheregisterofdeedsinthisbookineach caseshallbetheoriginalcertificateoftitle,andshallbesignedby him and sealed with theseal ofthe court.All certificates oftitle shall benumbered consecutively,beginningwithnumberone.Theregisterofdeeds shall in each case make an exact duplicate of the original certificate, includingtheseal,butputtingonitthewords'Owner'sduplicate certificate,'anddeliverthesametotheownerortohisattorney duly authorized. In case of a variance between the owner's duplicate certificateandtheoriginalcertificatetheoriginalshallprevail.The certifiedcopyofthedecreeofregistrationshallbefiledand numberedbytheregisterofdeedswithareferencenotedonitto theplaceofrecordoftheoriginalcertificateoftitle:Provided, however, That when an application includes land lying in more than one province, or one province and the city of Manila, the court shall LTD 2015 6 | P a g e causethepartlyingineachprovinceorinthecityofManilatobe describedseparatelybymetesandboundsinthedecreeof registration,andtheclerkshallsendtotheregisterofdeedsfor eachprovince,orthecityofManila,asthecasemaybe,acopyof the decree containing a description of the land within that province or city, and the register of deeds shall register the same and issue an owner's duplicate therefor, and thereafter for all matters pertaining toregistrationunderthisActtheportionineachprovinceorcity shall be treated as a separate parcel of land. SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registrationinregardtoanyparceloflandshallbeentitledinthe registrationbook'Originalcertificateoftitle,enteredpursuantto decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at' (stating time and placeofentryofdecreeandthenumberofcase).Thiscertificate shalltakeeffectuponthedateofthetranscriptionofthedecree. Subsequentcertificatesrelatingtothesamelandshallbeinlike form,butshallbeentitled'Transferfromnumber'(thenumberof the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also the words'Originallyregistered'(date,volume,andpageof registration.") Withtheplainlanguageofthelawasmooring,thisCourtintwo vintageandsoundrulingsmadeitplainthattheoriginalcertificate of title is issued on the date the decree of registration is transcribed. Inthefirstruling,itwasheldthatthereisamarkeddistinction betweentheentryofthedecreeandtheentryofthecertificateof title;theentryofthedecreeismadebythechiefclerkoftheland registrationandtheentryofthecertificateoftitleismadebythe registerofdeeds.37SuchdifferenceishighlightedbySec.31ofAct No.496asitprovidesthatthecertificateoftitleisissuedin pursuanceofthedecreeofregistration.Inthesecond,itwas stressedthatwhatstandsasthecertificateofthetitleisthe transcriptofthedecreeofregistrationmadebytheregistrarof deeds in the registry.38 Otherwisestated, what is actually issuedby the register ofdeeds is thecertificateoftitleitself,notthedecreeofregistration,asheis precisely the recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcriptionto the certificate as well as thetranscriberno less. SincewhatisnowacknowledgedastheauthenticOCTNo.994 indicatesthatitwasreceivedfortranscriptionbytheRegisterof DeedsofRizalon3May1917,itisthatdatethatisthedateof registrationsincethatwaswhenhewasabletotranscribethe decreeintheregistrationbook,suchentrymadeinthebookbeing theoriginalcertificateoftitle.39Moreover,itisonlyafterthe transcriptionofthedecreebytheregisterofdeedsthatthe certificate of title is to take effect. ThetextbookwritersandauthoritiesonLandRegistrationare unanimous on the matter. The late Commissioner Antonio Noblejas, widely acknowledged as the leading authority on the subject during his time, wrote, thus: Immediatelyupontheissuanceandentryofthedecreeof registration, the Registrar ofLand Titlestranscribes the same in the registrybookcalledthe"RegistrationBook"andissuesanowners duplicate certificate of title to the applicant upon payment by him of thenecessaryregistrationfees.TheentrymadebytheRegistrarof LandTitlesinhisregistrybookisactuallytheoriginalcopyofthe original certificate of title and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the Court and of his office. Pursuant to Rep. Act No. 113, theRegistrarofLandTitlesmaynowuseonlythesealofhisoffice, dispensing with the court seal.40 ProfessorFlorencioPonce,whowasalsoonceRegisterofDeedsof QuezonCityandDeputyRegisterofDeedsofManila,wasofthe same conviction: A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the CommissionerofLandRegistration(formerlyChief,G.L.R.O.)inthe nameoftheJudgetothefactthatthelanddescribedthereinis registeredinthenameoftheapplicantoroppositororclaimantas thecasemaybe.Whenthisistranscribedorspreadintotointhe registrationbookandsignedbytheregisterofdeeds,thepageon whichthetranscriptionismadebecomethe"originalcertificateof title," more commonly called the Torrens title. xxx Thelandbecomesaregisteredlandonlyuponthetranscriptionof the decree in the original registration book by the register of deeds, the date and time of such transcription being set forth in the process and certified to at the foot of each entry or certificate of title. xxx Theissuanceoftheoriginalandownersduplicatecertificatesare basic for the valid existence of the title. Issuance of additional copies are permissive and their non-existence does not affect the status of title.Acertificateoftitleisdeemedasregularlyissuedwiththe issuance of the original copy and owners duplicate.41 So was Professor Francisco Ventura: Immediatelyupontheissuanceandentryofthedecreeof registration, the Commissioner of Land Registration sends a certified copy thereof, under sealofthe said office, to the Register ofDeeds oftheprovincewherethelandlies,andtheregisterofDeeds transcribesthedecreeinabook,calledtheRegistrationBook,"in whichaleaf,orleaves,inconsecutiveordershouldbedevoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the Register of Deeds in said book constitutes the original certificate of title and is signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office.42 ThesameviewcamefromProfessorNarcisoPea,alsoaformer AssistantCommissioneroftheLandRegistrationCommissionand Acting Register of Deeds of Manila, as he wrote, thus: Thus,Section42ofActNo.496providesthatthecertificatefirst registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any parceloflandshallbeentitledintheregistrationbook"Original Certificate of Title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at (stating time and place of entry of decree and thenumberofthecase).Thiscertificateshalltakeeffectuponthe dateofthetranscriptionofthedecree.Subsequentcertificates relating to the same land shall be in like form,but shall beentitled. "Transfer from number (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the same land)," and also the words "Originally registered (date, volume, and page of registration).43 LTD 2015 7 | P a g e The dissent has likewise suggested that the variance between these twodatesisultimatelyinconsequential.Itcannotbesofor otherwise, the recent decision of the Court in Alfonso v. Office of the President44wouldsimplybewrong.InAlfonso,theCourtprecisely penalized Alfonso, the former register of deeds of Caloocan because she acquiesced to the change ofthe date of registration of OCT No. 994,asreflectedinseveralsubsequenttitlespurportedlyderived from that mother title, from 3 May 1917 to 19 April 1917. If indeed thedifferenceindateswere"inconsequential,"thenitshouldnot havereallymatteredthatMrs.Alfonso,asfoundbytheCourt,had invariably issued certificates of title, reflecting either the 19 April or 3Maydate,acircumstancewhich,theCourtconcluded,was irregular.ButiftheCourtweretoaccedetothedissentandagree that it did not really matter whether the date of registration of OCT No.994was3Mayor19April,thenpoorMrs.Alfonsoshouldbe spared ofthe penalty ofdismissal from the service which the Court had already affirmed. III. Even the dissent does not insist, as the 2005 Decision did, that there is an OCT No. 994 registered or dated 19 April 1917. This new stance squarelycontravenesordeviatesfromthefollowingunequivocal pronouncement in the 2005 Decision: We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in all these three (3) cases involves the validity of the parties' overlapping titles. The titles ofthe respondents inthese cases werederived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on April 19,1917.Thevalidityofsuchmothertitlehasalreadybeenupheld bythisCourtinG.R.No.103558,MWSSv.CourtofAppeals,etal. datedNovember17,1992earliercitedintheassailedDecisions. Significantly,therulinginMWSSwasreiteratedinG.R.No.96259, HeirsofLuisJ.Gonzagav.CourtofAppealsdatedSeptember3, 1996. WecannotdelveanymoreintothecorrectnessoftheDecisionof this Court in MWSS. The said Decision, confirming the validity of OCT No.994issuedonApril19,1917fromwhichthetitlesofthe respondents in the cases at bar were derived, has long become final andexecutory.Nothingismoresettledinlawthanthatoncea judgmentattainsfinalityitbecomesimmutableandunalterable.It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneousconclusionoffactorlaw,andregardlessofwhetherthe modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.45 This new conclusion likewise differs from what the Court had to say regarding OCT No. 994 "dated April 19, 1917" in the adverted MWSS v. Court of Appeals46 decision: It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the other hand, private respondents' title was derived from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917. Where twocertificates(oftitle)purporttoincludethesameland,the earlierindateprevails...Insuccessiveregistrations,wheremore thanonecertificateisissuedinrespectofaparticularestateor interestinland,thepersonclaimingunderthepriorcertificateis entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold underthepriorcertificatewhoistheholderof,orwhoseclaimis derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of theearliestcertificateissuedinrespectthereof.Hence,inpointof priorityofissuance,privaterespondents'titleprevailsoverthatof petitioner MWSS.47 Fouryearslater,theCourtpromulgatedtheGonzagav.Courtof Appeals48decision,whichessentiallyreaffirmedforegoingfactual pronouncements made in MWSS. Notwithstanding the emerging error in fact that informed the MWSS andGonzagadecisions,thedissentnowclaimsthatsaiddecisions confirmed "the validity of the OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917." ButifweexamineMWSSclosely,itappearstobebesetwith semanticconfusion.Wemakethefollowingrelevantreferences from that decision, presented sequentially: (1)"JoseB.Dimsonwastheregisteredownerofaparcel landsituatedinBalintawak,KalookanCitywithanareaof 213,012squaremeters,moreorless,andcoveredbyTCT No.C-15167whichwasregisteredonJune8,1978.Said parceloflandwasoriginallyLot28oftheMaysiloEstate (OCT)No.994whichwasregisteredonApril19,1917 pursuanttoDecreeNo.36455issuedinLandRegistration Case No. 4429."49 (2) Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it willbe noted thatpetitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both withanareaof599squaremeterswasbasedonthe CadastralSurveyofCaloocanCity,CadastralCaseNo.34, while private respondents' title was derived from OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917;50 (3) "It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS wasatransferfromTCTNo.36957whichwasderived fromOCTNo.994registeredonMay3,1917.Uponthe otherhand,privaterespondent'stitlewasderivedfrom the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917;"51 (4) "Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered andanearliercertificateforthesameisinexistence. 5 Sincethelandinquestionhasalreadybeenregistered underOCTNo.994datedApril19,1917,thesubsequent registrationofthesamelandonMay3,1917isnulland void;"52 In one (1) out ofthe four (4) times that reference was madeto the mother title of Dimson in MWSS, it was "OCT No. 994 issued on April 19,1917"whichisthelanguagepreferredbythedissentsinceit hewstothedateofissuanceofthedecreeofregistrationinthe authenticOCTNo.994.However,thesamedecisioninconsistently referstoitalsoasOCTNo.994"registeredonApril19,1917", "datedApril19,1917,"and"registeredunderOCTNo.994dated April19,1917."Notably,thecontextofMWSSinmakingthefinal citation,"registeredunderOCTNo.994datedApril19,1917,"was topointoutthatasaresult"thesubsequentregistrationofthe samelandonMay3,1917isnullandvoid;"hence,noother LTD 2015 8 | P a g e conclusioncanbereachedthanthattheCourtdeemedDimsons mother title as having been registered on a date earlier than 3 May 1917. SincethedissentandevenCLTnowacknowledgethatthereisonly oneOCTNo.994whichwasregisteredbytheRegistryofDeedsof Rizalon3May1917,theearlierfactualfindinginMWSSis indefensible.MWSSrecognizedanOCTNo.994registeredon19 April1917,atitlethatneverexistedand,evenassumingthatitdid exist, is now acknowledged as spurious. Gonzaga primarily relied on the ruling of the Court in MWSS upon a findingthatthecaseinvolved"factsthatareexactlythesameas those that we have passed and ruled upon in the [MWSS case]." The titlewhichwasaffirmedbytheCourtinGonzaga,TCTNo.C-26806 in thename ofLiliaSevilla, was"a transfer from Original Certificate ofTitle(OCT)No.994whichwasregisteredonApril19,1917 pursuanttoDecreeNo.36455."53Itwasfurtherobservedbythe Courtthat"ontheonehand,*therein+petitionerstitlesindicate original registration to have been made on May 3, 1917,but on the otherhand,privaterespondentstitleindicatesoriginalregistration to have been made on April 19, 1917."54 Itwasthetitleoriginallyregisteredon19April1917whichwas made to prevail in Gonzaga, following MWSS.Since there is no OCT No.994originallyregisteredon19April1917,asnow acknowledged,itfollowsthatGonzaga,likeMWSS,isnolonger reliable as well. The argument has been raised by the ponente ofthe 2005 Decision that the 3 May 1917 OCT No.994 must be distinguished from "OCT No.994datedMay3,1917involvedintheMWSSandGonzaga cases" because the former title was "based on the Cadastral Survey ofKalookanCityunderCadastralCaseNo.34,alsocoveringthe MaysiloEstate."Itiselementaltonotethatassumingsaid3May OCTwassomehowflawedbecauseitwasbasedonCadastralCase No.34,itdoesnotmeanthattheso-called17April1917OCTNo. 994isvalidorhadexistedinthefirstplace.Sinceeventhedissent nowdiscountstheexistenceoftheso-called17April1917OCT No. 994,itshouldnecessarilyfollowthatanytitlethatissourcedfrom the17April1917OCTisvoid.Suchconclusionisinescapable whateverquestionstheremaybeabouttheveracityofthe3May 1917 OCT based on Cadastral Case No. 34. ItwouldbeespeciallyincoherentfortheCourttoreiterateMWSS and Gonzaga when they effectuated the OCT No.994 registered on 19 April 1917 and acknowledge at the same time that the same OCT neverexisted,thegenuineOCTNo.994beingthatwhichwas registeredon3May1917.Weneednotgoasfarastorevivethe MWSSorGonzagadecisions,butcertainlywecandeclinetoinfuse furthervaliditytotheirerroneousbasicpremisethattherewasan OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. The dissent proposes that weperpetuatetheerroneouspremiseevenastheerrorisplainly acknowledged,astancethatwillnotservetheCourtwellshouldit prevail. Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions nowbeforeus.Undisputedly,thetwocasesinvolveddifferent parcelsofland.Thepresentpetitionerscouldnotbeboundbythe decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and and theirpropertieswerenotinvolvedtherein.Asweveryrecently reaffirmed,itisbasicthatnomanshallbeaffectedbyany proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.55 We can take instruction from the tack previously taken by this Court in dealing with municipalities created by executive orders. Beginning withPelaezv.AuditorGeneral,56theCourtdeclaredasageneral principlethatthePresidenthadnopowertocreatemunicipalities throughexecutiveorders.However,insteadofnullifyingthe creation of all municipalities created in the same manner, the Court onlyannulledthosemunicipalitieswhosecreationwasspecifically attacked in the petition filed by then-Vice President Pelaez.57 With respect to the other municipalities which were not annulled in Pelaez, the Court would, in the next few decades, annul onlythemunicipalitieswhichwerespecificallychallengedin petitionsraisedbeforetheCourt.58However,aftertheadoptionof the Local Government Code of 1991 that gave statutory recognition to the de facto municipalities which had not yet been annulled,the Court started to affirm the legal existence of such municipalities.59 AsinPelaez,theoperativeeffectofthe"doctrines"pronouncedin MWSSandGonzagacanextendonlytothepartiesandproperties involvedinsaidcases,evenifitcanbearguedthattherights involvingotherpartiesandpropertiesareafflictedwith inconsistencyasregardsthelegalrulingstherein,similartothe municipalitiescreatedwhichthoughcreatedbyvoidexecutive orderswerenothoweverannulled.Yetwiththeemergenceofa newfacttheenactmentoftheLocalGovernmentCodevis--vis Pelaez,orthepresentacknowledgmentthatonlythe3May1917 OCT No. 994 exists vis--vis MWSS and Gonzagasubsequent rulings would be informed primarily by the new developments, rather than by the previousprecedents thatwere not able to take into account the true or new factual premises. IV. The determinative testto resolve whether theprior decision ofthis Courtshouldbeaffirmedorsetasideiswhetherornotthetitles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from theso-calledOCTNo.994dated17April1917,thensuchtitlesare void or otherwise shouldnot berecognizedby this Court.Sincethe truebasicfactualpredicateconcerningOCTNo.994whichisthat there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS andGonzagadecisions,saidrulingshavebecomevirtuallyfunctus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents. Thisapproachimmenselydiffersfromthatpreferredbythe2005 Decisionandthedissentingview,whichdwellsinthemainonthe allegedflawsinthetitlesheldbytheManotoksandAraneta, withoutmakingasimilarinquiryintothetitlesheldbyCLTandthe HeirsofDimson.SincethedecisioninfavorofCLTandtheHeirsof Dimsonwasultimatelygroundedonafactualpredicatenow acknowledged as erroneous, it follows that the primary focus should have been whether the titles held by CLT and the Dimsons are valid andwithforceandeffect.Tothatend,weneedonlyexaminethe titles relied upon by CLT and the Dimsons. LTD 2015 9 | P a g e IntheManotokpetition,CLThadoriginallyfiledacomplaintfor annulment of the titles in the name of the Manotoks, alleging that it was the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCTNo.T-177013oftheRegistryofDeedsofCaloocanCity. ReproducedbelowiswhatappearsonthefaceofTCTNo.T-177013:60 ITISFURTHERCERTIFIEDthatsaidlandwasoriginallyregisteredon the19thdayofApril,intheyear,nineteenhundredandseventeen intheRegistrationBookoftheOfficeoftheRegisterofDeedsof Rizal,Volume36455,page____,asOriginalCertificateofTitleNo. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____ Record No. _____in the name of ___________. ThiscertificateisatransferfromTrans.CertificateofTitleNo.R-17994/T-89,whichiscancelledbyvirtuehereofinsofarasthe above-described land is concerned. Entered at City of Kalookan Philippines, on the 15th day of March In the year nineteen hundred and eighty-nine at 19:48 a.m. CLTfurtherallegedthatitderivedTCTNo.T-177013on10 December 1988 from Estelita Hipolito whose title, TCT No. R-17994, is depicted, thus:61 ITISFURTHERCERTIFIEDthatsaidlandwasoriginallyregisteredon the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, VolumeNA,pageNA,asOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429, Record No. ________. ThiscertificateisatransferfromTransferCertificateofTitleNo.R-15166/T-75,whichiscancelledbyvirtuehereofinsofarasthe above-described land is concerned. Entered at the City of Caloocan Philippines, on the 12th day of December in the year nineteen hundred and seventy-eight at 3:30 p.m. Dimsonsoriginalcomplaintforrecoveryofpossessionagainst Aranetawasfoundedontheclaimthathewastheabsoluteowner of a parcel of land located at Malabon, comprising fifty (50) hectares of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Said TCT No. R-15169 is reproduced below:62 ITISFURTHERCERTIFIEDthatsaidlandwasoriginallyregisteredon the19thdayofApril,intheyearnineteenhundredandseventeen, intheRegistrationBookoftheOfficeoftheRegisterofDeedsof Rizal,VolumeNA,page___,OriginalCertificateofTitleNo.994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455, issued in LRC Case No. 4429, Record No. __ ThisCertificateisatransferfromOriginalCertificateofTitleNo. [illegible] which is cancelled by virtue hereofin so far as the above-described land is concerned. Entered at Caloocan City Philippines, on the 8th day of June in the year nineteen hundred and seventy-eight at 10:34 a.m. It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat thepropertiestheypurporttocoverwere"originallyregisteredon the19thdayApril,intheyearnineteenhundredandseventeenin the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." Note, as earlier established, there is no such OCT No.994 originally registered on 19 April 1917. Theconclusionisreallysimple.Ontheirfaces,noneofthesethree titlescanbeaccordedrecognitionsimplybecausetheoriginaltitle commonly referred to therein never existed. To conclude otherwise would constitute deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be affirmed only ifit can beproven that OCT No.994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed.CLT and the Dimsons were given the opportunity to submit such proof before this Court, but they did not.Infact,CLThasspecificallymanifestedthattheOCTNo.994 theyconcedeastrueisalsotheonewhichtheOfficeofSolicitor General submitted as true, and that is OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. Giventhisessentialclarification,thereisnosenseinaffirmingthe 2005 Decision which sustained the complaints for annulment of title and/orrecoveryofpossessionfiledbyCLTandtheDimsonwhen theircausesofactionarebothfoundedonaninexistentmother title.Howcansuchactionsprosperatalleventotheextentof dispossessing the present possessors with title? The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called 19 April 1917 OCTfromwhichtheDimsonandCLTtitlesaresourced.Asearlier mentioned, the focus is instead placed on the purported flaws of the titlesheldbytheManotoksandAranetanotwithstandingthatsaid parties swere the defendants before the lower court and, therefore, theburden ofproofdid notlie on them.Theestablished legalprincipleinactionsforannulmentorreconveyanceoftitleis thatapartyseekingitshouldestablishnotmerelybya preponderanceofevidencebutbyclearandconvincingevidence thatthelandsoughttobereconveyedishis.63Inanactionto recover, the property must be identified, and theplaintiff must rely onthestrengthofhistitleandnotontheweaknessofthe defendant's claim.64 V. Thedissentingviewperceivesamaterialdifferencebetweenthe present acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917andthetitlesinvolvedintheGonzagaandMWSScases.It dwellsonthefactthatthetitlesdebunkedintheMWSSand Gonzagacases,whichfindoriginationfromOCTNo.994dated3 May1917,seemtohavebeenderivedfromCadastralCaseNo.34 also covering the Maysilo Estate. It is in fact the theory of the dissent thatthereare,ineffect,twocompetingsourcesoftitletheOCT No.994dated3May1917arisingfromtheissuanceofDecreeNo. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated 3 May1917basedontheCadastralSurveyofCaloocanCityin CadastralCaseNo.34.Itisfurtheropinedthattheregistrationof LTD 2015 10 | P a g e landspursuanttoCadastralCaseNo.34,evenifthedateofsuch registrationis3May1917,isvoidsincesuchregistrationcouldnot supplant the earlier decision of the land registration court. The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles inlandcases.HaditbeenadoptedbytheCourt,theeffectwould havebeentoprecipitatetheutterastonishmentoflegalscholars, professionals and students alike. Therealitythatcadastralcourtsmayhavejurisdictionoverlands alreadyregisteredinordinarylandregistrationcaseswas acknowledgedbythisCourtinPamintuanv.SanAgustin.65Such jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of technical errors inthedescriptionofthelands,providedsuchcorrectionsdonot impairthesubstantialrightsoftheregisteredowner,andthatsuch jurisdictioncannotoperatetodeprivearegisteredownerofhis title."66ItwasfurtherclarifiedinTimbolv.Diaz67thatthelimited jurisdictionofthecadastralcourtoversuchlandsevenextendsto the determination of "which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of cadastralproceedings,andmustthereforebeconsideredtobe within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings."68 The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar69 concerned the validity of an orderofacadastralcourtdirectingtheissuanceofnewcertificates oftitleinthenameofSidecoandhischildren,atSidecosown prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco.ThisCourtruledthatsuchorderwasvalidanddidnot amounttoareadjudicationofthetitle.Afterthecadastral proceedingsthereinhadbeeninitiated,thechiefsurveyorhad reportedtothecadastralcourtthatthelandwascoveredbya decree in a land registration proceeding and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor recommended that the title be cancelled and anewoneissuedinthenamesofsuchpersonsasthecourtmay determine.In ruling that thenew titles were valid, the Court stated that "[t]he proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the titlealreadyissued,ortoreadjudicatethetitleoftheland.They werepreciselypredicatedonthefinalityofthetitlealreadyissued, becauseitwastheregisteredownerwhowasaskedtoexpresshis desire with respect thereto, and the courts order precisely followed the petition of the registered owner."70 The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds, explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to ordertheissuanceofnewtitlesinplaceofthetitleissuedunder voluntary registration proceedings: "Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number, itisnecessarythatanewtitlebeissued,givingthelotitscadastral number in accordance with the cadastral survey. This does not mean thatthecourthasthepowertoalterthedecreeenteredinthe previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the said decree. It does not adjudicate the title anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for the convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him to identify hispropertyinasmuchasallthelandsbroughtunderthecadastral survey are designated by cadastral numbers."71 Whatisprohibitedinacadastralproceedingistheregistrationof land,alreadyissuedinthenameofaperson,inthenameof another, divesting the registered owner of the title already issued in his favor, or the making ofsuch changes in the title as to impairhis substantialrights.72Yetsuchprohibitiondoesnotmeanthatthe cadastralcourtwillnothavejurisdictionovertheactioninvolving thepreviouslyregisteredland,asexplainedinPamintuanand Timbol,orthatthecadastralcourtmaynotissueanewtitleatall evenifitwouldnotimpairtherightsofthepreviouslyregistered owner, as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplisticconclusionthatbecausetherewasacadastralcase coveringtheMaysiloEstatefromwhichthetitlesemanated,such titlescouldnothavebeenvalid.Itisclearthattherecouldbesuch titlesissued,andtheywouldbevalidforsolongastheydonot impairtherightsoftheoriginalregistranttowhomOCTNo.994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued. VI. Fromthesepremises,theCourtisabletomakethefollowing bindingconclusions.First,thereisonlyoneOCTNo.994.Asit appearsontherecord,thatmothertitlewasreceivedfor transcriptionbytheRegisterofDeedson3May1917,andthat shouldbethedatewhichshouldbereckonedasthedateof registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree ofregistrationon17April1917,althoughsuchdatecannotbe consideredasthedateofthetitleorthedatewhenthetitletook effect. Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917isvoid,forsuchmothertitleisinexistent.Thefactthatthe DimsonandCLTtitlesmadespecificreferencetoanOCTNo.994 dated17April1917castsdoubtonthevalidityofsuchtitlessince they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singularrelianceisplacedbythemonthedatesappearingontheir respective titles. Third.ThedecisionsofthisCourtinMWSSv.CourtofAppealsand Gonzagav.CourtofAppealscannotapplytothecasesatbar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither couldtheconclusionsinMWSSorGonzagawithrespecttoanOCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar. With these conclusions, what then is the proper course ofaction to takewithrespecttothependingmotionsforreconsideration? ConsideringthatCLTandtheDimsonsclearlyfailedtomeetthe burdenofproofreposedinthemasplaintiffsintheactionfor annulment oftitle andrecoveryofpossession, there is a case tobe madefororderingthedismissaloftheiroriginalcomplaintsbefore thetrialcourt.However,suchsolutionmaynotsatisfactorilyputto rest the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate. Morepertinently,aftertheinstantpetitionswerefiledwiththis Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, had sought tointervene.1wphi1TheRepublicdidnotparticipateasaparty whenthesecaseswerestillbeforethetrialcourtsandtheCourtof LTD 2015 11 | P a g e Appeals.WhiletheRepublichadoriginallyprayedforthegrantof the petitions filed by all the petitioners in these consolidated cases, insteaditpresentlyseeksoftheCourtthepromulgationofanew ruling upholding the validity ofOCT No.994 issued73 or registered74 onMay3,1917.Ratherthansuggestwhetherthepetitionsbe granted or denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration from this Court that it is the 3 May 1917 mother title that is valid, "a remand ofthiscasetotheCourtofAppeals,tosettlewhichamongthe privatepartiesderivedtheirtitlesfromtheexistingOCT994,is proper"75 Notably,boththeManotoksandAranetaareamenabletothe remandofthepetition,albeitunderdifferingqualifications.The Manotokssubmitthatthereshouldbearemandtothecourtof origin, consolidating all the present petitions, and that a full trial be conducted by the trial court.76 On the other hand, Araneta proposes four(4)optionsfortheCourttoconsider:(1)thedismissalofthe originalcomplaintfiledbyDimson;(2)arulinggrantingAranetas appealanddismissingDimsonscomplaint,butatthesametime remandingthecasetoanewdivisionoftheCourtofAppealsfor factual determination pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; (3) the suspension of the resolution of the present motion for reconsideration while the case is remanded to the Court ofAppeals forfactualdetermination;or(4)theremandoftheproceedingsto theCourtofAppealsforthereceptionoffurtherevidence, particularly the Senate and DOJ Reports, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47oftheRulesofCourt,andtheconsequentresolutionbythe appellate court of the instant petitions. The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the motion for reconsideration,thenChiefJusticePanganibansuggestedthata remandmayberequiredtodeterminethestatusoftheoriginal title.77ConsideringthatthegenuineOCTNo.994isthatissuedon/ registered on/dated 3 May 1917, a remand would be appropriate to determinewhichoftheparties,ifany,derivedvalidtitlefromthe saidgenuineOCTNo.994.Ontheonehand,theappreciationof factsisbeyondtheprovinceofthisCourt,sinceitisnotatrierof fact78aswellasnotcapacitatedtoappreciateevidenceatthefirst instance.Ontheotherhand,theCourtofAppealshasthe competence to engage in that undertaking. UnderSection6ofRule46,whichisapplicabletooriginalcasesfor certiorari,79theCourtmay,whenevernecessarytoresolvefactual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any ofitsmembersortoanappropriatecourt,agencyoroffice.80The delegate need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision. TheCourtofAppealsgenerallyhastheauthoritytoreviewfindings of fact.81 Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court.Itisa body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence. In fact,the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pendingbeforeittotheCourtofAppeals.InRepublicv.Courtof Appeals,82thisCourtcommissionedtheformerThirteenthDivision oftheCourtofAppealstohearandreceiveevidenceonthe controversy,moreparticularlytodetermine"theactualarea reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of theCulturalCenterComplexwhichareopenspacesand/orareas reservedforcertainpurposes,determiningintheprocessthe validityofsuchpostulatesandtherespectivemeasurementsofthe areasreferredto."83TheCourtofAppealsthereinreceivedthe evidenceofthepartiesandrendereda"CommissionersReport" shortlythereafter.84Thus,resorttotheCourtofAppealsisnota deviant procedure. The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may,motuproprio,directareferencetoacommissionerwhena question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion orotherwise,inanystageofacase,orforcarryingajudgmentor order into effect.85 The order of reference can be limited exclusively toreceiveandreportevidenceonly,andthecommissionermay likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence.86 The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon thematterssubmittedtohimbytheorderofreference.87In Republic,thecommissionersreportformedthebasisofthefinal adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein. VII. TheOSGlikewiseadvertstothefindingsreachedintherespective investigationsandreportsbytheDepartmentofJusticeandthe PhilippineSenate,componentsofthetwootherco-equalbranches ofthe government. Both the DOJ Report dated 28 August 1997 and theSenateReportdated25May1998concludethatthereisonly one(1)OCTNo.994issuedorregisteredon3May1997.TheOSG argues that the contents of both of these reports may be considered as evidence. It also points out, with basis, that these reports may be taken judicial notice of by this Court, following Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules ofCourt.Indeed, it cannot be disputed that these reports fallwithintheambitof"theofficialactsofthelegislative[and] executive departments."88 ItbearsnotingthattheDOJandSenateReportswererenderedon 28August1997and25May1998respectively.Theywereissued someyearsafterthetrialcourtshadpromulgatedtheirrespective decisionsintheManotokandAranetacases,andevenafterthe CourtofAppealshandeddownitsdecisionagainsttheManotoks whichisassailedinitspresentpetition.89InAranetascase,the Court of Appeals had first ruled against Araneta in its Decision dated 30May1997,orjustshortlybeforetherenditionoftheDOJand Senate Reports. SincethisCourtisnotatrieroffact,wearenotpreparedtoadopt thefindingsmadebytheDOJandtheSenate,orevenconsider whethertheseareadmissibleasevidence,thoughsuchquestions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. The Court, in the 2005 Decision, refused to take into account thereportsontheregrettablepremisethattheycouldsomehow "override"thejudicialdecisionsearlierarrivedat.90Thereports cannotconclusivelysupersedeoroverturnjudicialdecisions,butif admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same levelastheotherpiecesofevidencesubmittedbytheparties.The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, initself,persuadethecourtstoacceptthemwithoutinquiry.The factsandargumentspresentedinthereportsmuststillundergo LTD 2015 12 | P a g e judicialscrutinyandanalysis,andcertainlythecourtswillhavethe discretion to accept or reject them. Therearemanyfactualquestionsloomingoverthepropertiesthat couldonlybethreshedoutintheremandtotheCourtofAppeals. TheManotoksandAranetaadverttocertainfactualallegations relatingtotheirtitlesandbackstoriestoadvancetheirrespective positions.Still,ifitindeedemergesfromthedeterminationofthe Court of Appeals on remand that notwithstanding the clear flaws of thetitleofrespondentsthetitlesofpetitionersarecutfromthe samecounterfeitcloth,thentheRepublicofthePhilippines,an intervenorinthesecases,isarmedanywaywithanyandall appropriateremediestosafeguardthelegitimateownersofthe properties in question. VIII. ThedefinitiveconclusionsreachedbytheCourtthusfarinthese casesarespelledoutinPartVIofthisResolution.Saidconclusions servetoguidetheCourtofAppealsinhearingthesecaseson remand. TheCourtherebyconstitutesaSpecialDivisionoftheCourtof Appeals to hear these cases on remand. The Special Division shall be composedofthreeAssociateJusticesoftheCourtofAppeals, namely;JusticeJosefinaGuevara-SalongaasChairperson;Justice LucasBersaminasSeniorMember;andAssociateJusticeJaparB. Dimaampao as Junior Member. The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommendedconclusionswithinthree(3)monthsfromfinalityof this Resolution. In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit: i.Whichofthecontendingpartiesareabletotraceback their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917? ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne bytheevidence?Assumingtheyare,aresuchflaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta? iii.Whetherthefactualandlegalbasesof1966Orderof Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are trueandvalid.Assumingtheyare,dotheseorders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor oftheDimsonsandCLTasopposedtotheclaimsof Araneta and the Manotoks? iv.Whetheranyofthesubjectpropertieshadbeenthe subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are thoseproceedings,whatarethetitlesacquiredbythe Governmentandwhetheranyofthepartiesisableto traceitstitletothetitleacquiredbytheGovernment through expropriation. v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail. WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special DivisionoftheCourtofAppealsforfurtherproceedingsin accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution. SO ORDERED. LTD 2015 13 | P a g e THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 173289 February 17, 2010 ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,vs. AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED TERESA MALABANAN, Respondents. D E C I S I O N PERALTA, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt,seekingtoreverseandsetasidethedecision1dated February28,2006oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA-G.R.CVNo. 67417,whichdismissedtheappealofpetitionerElandPhilippines, Inc. and affirmed the Resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City. The facts of the case, as shown in the records, are the following: Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa Malabanan, theheirofTiburcioMalabanan,filedaComplaint2datedMarch2, 1998forQuietingofTitlewithWritofPreliminaryInjunctionwith theRTC,BranchXVIII,TagaytayCityagainstpetitionerEland Philippines,Inc.Respondentsclaimedthattheyaretheowners,in feesimpletitle,ofaparceloflandidentifiedasLot9250Cad-355, TagaytayCadastre,PlanAp-04-008367,situatedinBarangayIruhin, TagaytayCity,containinganareaofTwoHundredForty-Four ThousandOneHundredTwelve(244,112)squaremeters,by occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b)3 of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Forhavingbeenincontinuous,public,andadversepossessionas ownersofthesaidlotforatleastthirtyyears,respondentsstated that they were not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the same lot until the time they were requesting that the lot be declared for tax purposes. They found out thatthelotwasthesubjectofalandregistrationproceedingthat had already been decided by the same court4 where their complaint wasfiled.TheyalsofoundoutthatDecreeNo.N-217313,LRC RecordNo.N-62686,wasalreadyissuedonAugust20,1997tothe petitionerpursuant to the Decision dated June 7,1994 ofthe same court.Theyaverredthattheywerenotnotifiedofthesaidland registrationcase;thus,theyclaimedthepresenceof misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic fraud. Thus, they arguedthattheywerealsoentitledtoawritofpreliminary injunction in order to restrain or enjoin petitioner, its privies, agents, representatives, and all other persons acting on its behalf, to refrain from committing acts of dispossession on the subject lot. Summons,togetherwithacopyofthecomplaint,wereservedon the petitioner on April 7, 1998. On April 29, 1998, petitioner filed an Entry ofAppearance with Motion for Extension ofTime,5 which the trial court granted6 for a period of ten (10) days within which to file aresponsivepleading.PetitionerfiledaSecondMotionfor ExtensionofTimetoFileAnswer7datedApril29,1998,whichthe trial court likewise granted.8 Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss9 dated May 9, 1998, statingthatthepleadingassertingtheclaimofrespondentsstated nocauseofaction,andthatthelatterwerenotentitledtothe issuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunction,settingthesamefor hearing on May 21, 1998. On the date of the hearing, the trial court issued an Order,10 which granted the respondents ten (10) days from thatdaytofileacomment,andsetthedateofthehearingonJuly 23,1998.RespondentsfiledaMotiontoAdmit Comment/OppositiontoDefendantEland,11togetherwiththe corresponding Comment/Opposition12 dated June 8, 1998. OnthescheduledhearingofSeptember23,1998,thetrialcourt issuedanOrder,13consideringtheMotiontoDismisssubmittedfor resolutionduetothenon-appearanceofthepartiesandtheir respectivecounsels.Thesaidmotionwaseventuallydeniedbythe trialcourtinanOrder14datedSeptember25,1998,rulingthatthe allegationsinthecomplaintestablishedacauseofactionand enjoinedpetitionerElandtofileitsanswertothecomplaintwithin ten(10)daysfromreceiptofthesame.Petitionerthenfiledtwo Motions for Extension to File an Answer.15 Petitioner,onNovember9,1998,filedaMotionfor Reconsideration16ofthetrialcourt'sOrderdatedSeptember25, 1998, denying the former's Motion to Dismiss. Again, petitioner filed aMotionforFinalExtensionofTimetoFileAnswer17dated November 6, 1998. Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition to MotionforReconsiderationdatedNovember24,1998. Subsequently,thetrialcourtdeniedpetitioner'smotionfor reconsideration in an Order18 dated January 11, 1999. Meanwhile, respondents filed aMotion to Declare Defendant Eland inDefault19datedNovember17,1998.OnDecember4,1998 PetitionerElandfileditsComment(onPlaintiff'sMotiontoDeclare DefendantElandinDefault)20datedDecember2,1998,while respondentsfiledaReplytoComment(onPlaintiff'sMotionto DeclareDefendantElandinDefault)21datedDecember29,1998. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order22 dated January 11,1999 declaringthepetitionerindefaultandallowedtherespondentsto presentevidenceexparte.PetitionerfiledaMotionfor Reconsideration(oftheOrderdated11January1999)23dated February5,1999onthetrialcourt'sdenialofitsmotiontodismiss andindeclaringitindefault.ThetrialcourtinanOrder24dated March18,1999,deniedtheformerandgrantedthelatter.Inthe sameOrder,thetrialcourtadmittedpetitioner'sAnswerAd Cautelam. Earlier,petitionerfileditsAnswerAdCautelam(WithCompulsory Counterclaim)25datedNovember12,1998.Respondentscountered byfilingaMotiontoExpungeEland'sAnswerfromtheRecords26 dated December 2, 1998. Petitioner filed its Opposition (to Plaintiff's MotiontoExpungeEland'sAnswerfromtheRecords)27dated December21,1998,aswellasaComment(onPlaintiff'sMotionto ExpungeEland'sAnswerfromtheRecords)28datedJanuary26, 1999. Consequently,respondentsfiledaMotiontoSetPresentationof Evidence Ex Parte29 dated January 18, 1999, which was granted in an Order30 dated January 22, 1999. LTD 2015 14 | P a g e OnJanuary28,1999,respondentspresentedtheirevidencebefore theClerkofCourtofthetrialcourtwhichendedonFebruary3, 1999;and,onFebruary10,1999,respondentsfiledtheirFormal OfferofEvidence.31However,petitionerfiledanUrgentMotionto SuspendPlaintiff'sExPartePresentationofEvidence32dated February8,1999.Inthatregard,thetrialcourtissuedanOrder33 dated February 11, 1999 directing the Clerk of Court to suspend the proceedings. On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Clarification34 as to whether or not the evidence presented ex parte was nullified by the admissionofpetitioner'sAnswerAdCautelam.Petitionerfiledits Comment35 dated May 13, 1999 on the said motion for clarification. A pre-trial conference was scheduled on May 27, 1999, wherein the partiessubmitted their pre-trialbriefs.36 However, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings37 dated May 24, 1999 on the ground thatthesamepetitionerhadfiledapetitionforcertiorariwiththe CA, asking for the nullification of the Order dated March 18, 1999 of thetrialcourtandfortheaffirmationofitsearlierOrderdenying petitioner'sMotiontoDismiss.Thepetitionforcertiorariwas subsequently denied; and a copy ofthe Resolution38 dated June14, 1999 was received by the trial court. Hence, in an Order39 dated July 7,1999,the trial courtruled that the reception ofevidence already presented by the respondents before the Clerk of Court remained as part of the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the right tocross-examinethewitnessandtocommentonthedocumentary exhibitsalreadypresented.Consequently,petitionerfiledaMotion forReconsideration40datedJuly19,1999,butitwasdeniedbythe trial court in an Omnibus Order41 dated September 14, 1999. Eventually,respondentsfiledaMotionforSummaryJudgment42 datedAugust5,1999,whilepetitionerfileditsOpposition43tothe MotiondatedAugust31,1999.InitsResolution44datedNovember 3,1999,thetrialcourtfoundfavorontherespondents.The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,themotionforsummary judgment is hereby GRANTED and it is hereby adjudged that: 1.Plaintiffsaretheabsoluteownersandrightful possessorsofLot9250,CAD-355,TagaytayCadastre, subjectto the rights ofoccupancy ofthe farmworkers on the one-third area thereof; 2.TheJudgmentdatedJune7,1994inLandRegistration Case No. TG-423 is set aside and the Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686 dated August 20, 1997 is null and void; 3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered to be canceled,aswellastaxdeclarationcoveringLot9250, Cad-355. SO ORDERED. PetitionerappealedtheResolutionofthetrialcourtwiththeCA, whichdismisseditinaDecisiondatedFebruary28,2006,which reads: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed ResolutiondatedNovember3,1999,oftheRTC,Branch18, TagaytayCity,inCivilCaseNo.TG-1784,isAFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. Hence, the present petition. The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the following: 5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITHLAWANDWITHTHEAPPLICABLE DECISIONSOFTHISHONORABLECOURTWHENITRULED THAT RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST 05,1999 DID NOT VIOLATE THE TEN (10)-DAYNOTICERULEUNDERSECTION3,RULE35OFTHE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 5.2 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITHLAWANDWITHTHEAPPLICABLE DECISIONSOFTHISHONORABLECOURTWHENITRULED THAT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE. 5.3 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITHLAWANDWITHTHEAPPLICABLE DECISIONSOFTHISHONORABLECOURTWHENITRULED THATTHEREARENOGENUINEFACTUALANDTRIABLE ISSUES IN CIVIL CASE NO. TG-1784. 5.4 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITHLAWANDWITHTHEAPPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THERESOLUTIONDATEDNOVEMBER03,1999OFTHE COURTAQUO,BASEDONTESTIMONIESOF RESPONDENTS'WITNESSESTAKENWITHOUTGRANTING HEREINPETITIONERTHERIGHTTOCROSS-EXAMINEAND UPONDOCUMENTARYEXHIBITSPRESENTEDBUTNOT ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE. 5.5 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITHLAWANDWITHTHEAPPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THERESOLUTIONDATEDNOVEMBER03,1999OFTHE COURT A QUO BASED ON FALSIFIED "EVIDENCE." 5.6 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITHLAWANDWITHTHEAPPLICABLE DECISIONSOFTHISHONORABLECOURTWHENITFAILED TORULETHATTHECOURTAQUOPATENTLYDEPRIVED PETITIONER OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN RENDERING ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 5.7 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORDWITHLAWANDWITHTHEAPPLICABLE DECISIONSOFTHISHONORABLECOURTWHENITHELD THATTHECOURTAQUOHASJURISDICTIONTOCANCEL LTD 2015 15 | P a g e PETITIONER'SORIGINALCERTIFICATEOFTITLE(OCT)NO. 0-660 IN AN ACTION TO QUIET TITLE. Accordingtothepetitioner,amotionforsummaryjudgmentmust beservedatleastten(10)daysbeforethedatesetforhearing thereof, and that a hearing must be held to hear the parties on the proprietyofasummaryjudgment,perSec.3ofRule35ofthe RevisedRulesofCourt,whichwasnotobservedbecausethe petitioner received a copy ofthe respondents' motion for summary judgmentonlyonAugust20,1999,ortheverysamedaythatthe motionwassetforhearing.Petitionerfurtherclaimsthatthetrial courtneverconductedanyhearingonthemotionforsummary judgment. Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only available to aclaimantseekingtorecoveruponaclaim,counterclaimorcross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, and does not include cases for quietingoftitle.Furthermore,petitioneralsoaverredthata summary judgment has no place in a case where genuine factual and triableissuesexist,likeinthepresentcase.Itaddedthatthe genuine and triable issues were all raised in its Answer Ad Cautelam. Anothergroundrelieduponbypetitionerisitsfailuretocross-examine the witnesses for the respondents without fault on its part. It also stated that the trial court did not issue any order admitting in evidencethedocumentaryexhibitspresentedbytherespondents. Hence,accordingtothepetitioner,thetrialcourtgravelyerredin relyinguponthetestimoniesofthewitnessesfortherespondents, withouthavingthelattercross-examined;anduponthe documentary exhibits presented but not admitted as evidence. PetitionerfurtherclaimedthatthetrialcourtbaseditsResolution dated November 3, 1999 on falsified evidence. Lastly,petitionerraisedtheissuethatbyrenderingsummary judgment,thetrialcourtdeprivedtheformerofitsrighttodue process. Respondents,intheirComment45datedOctober16,2006, counteredthefirstissueraisedbythepetitioner,statingthattheir filingofthemotionforsummaryjudgmentfourteen(14)days before the requested hearing of the same motion was in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court. Astothesecondandthirdissues,respondentsarguedthat petitioner had a constricted perception of the coverage of the Rules of Summary Judgment, and that the latter's citation of cases decided by this Court showed the diverse causes ofaction that could be the subjectmattersofsummaryjudgment.Respondentsalsoposited thatpetitioner'sstatementsinitsAnswerAdCautelam,although denominated as SpecificDenial, were really general denials that did not comply with the provisions ofSection 10,Rule 8 ofthe Rules of Court. Anentthefourthandfifthissues,respondentsclaimedthatdespite theopportunity,ortherightallowedintheOrderdatedJuly17, 1999ofthetrialcourt,forthepetitionertocross-examine respondents'witnessesandtocommentonthedocumentary evidencepresentedexparteafterthedefaultorderagainstthe samepetitioner,thelatterevasivelymovedtosetaside respondents' evidence in order to suspend further proceedings that wereintendedtoabortthepre-trialconference.Theyaddedthat petitionerneglectedtoavailitselfof,ortocomplywith,the prescriptionoftherulesfoundinRule35oftheRulesofCourtby optingnottoavailitselfofthehearingofitsoppositiontothe summary judgment after receiving the Order dated August 20, 1999; by failing to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or admission in the records;andbynotobjectingtothedecretalportionofthesaid OrderdatedAugust20,1999,whichstatedthatthemotionfor summaryjudgmenthasbeensubmittedforresolutionwithout furtherargument.Withregardtothecontentionofthepetitioner thatthetrialcourtwronglyappreciatedfalsifiedevidence, respondentsassertedthatpetitioner'scounselfailedtostudy carefully the records ofthe proceedings for the presentation ofthe evidenceexpartetobeabletoknowthatitwasnotonlyasingle-dayproceeding,andthatmorethanonewitnesshadbeen presented. They further averred that the trial court did not only rely on thephotographs ofthe houses ofthe occupants oftheproperty in question. Finally,astothesixthandseventhissues,respondentsasseverated that their complaint alleged joint causes of action for quieting of title underArt.476oftheNewCivilCodeandforthereviewofthe decreeofregistrationpursuanttoSec.32oftheProperty RegistrationDecreeorP.D.No.1529,becausetheyare complimentary with each other. The petition is impressed with merit. ThebasiccontentionthatmustberesolvedbythisCourtisthe proprietyofthesummaryjudgmentinthisparticularcaseof quieting of title. Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof SEC.3.Motionandproceedingsthereon.-Themotionshallbe servedatleastten(10)daysbeforethetimespecifiedforthe hearing.Theadversepartypriortothedayofhearingmayserve opposing affidavits.After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be renderedforthwithifthepleading,depositions,andadmissionson file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount ofdamages,thereisnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfactand that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.46 Inthepresentcase,itwastherespondentswhomovedfora summary judgment. Petitionercontendedthattheten-daynoticerulewasviolated, becausethecopyofthemotionforsummaryjudgmentwasserved only on August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for hearing. It also added that even if the petitioner received a copy of the motion onlyonAugust20,1999,therewasnohearingconductedonthat date because the trial court issued an order giving petitioner 10 days within which to file its comment or opposition. LTD 2015 16 | P a g e Theabovespecificcontention,however,ismisguided.TheCAwas correct in its observation that there was substantial compliance with dueprocess.TheCAruled,astherecordsshow,thattheten-day noticerulewassubstantiallycompliedwithbecausewhenthe respondentsfiledthemotionforsummaryjudgmentonAugust9, 1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on the same day asshownintheregistryreceiptandthatthemotionwassetfor hearingonAugust20,1999,or10daysfromthedateofthefiling thereof. Dueprocess,aconstitutionalprecept,doesnot,therefore,always andinallsituationsatrial-typeproceeding.Theessenceofdue processisfoundinthereasonableopportunitytobeheardand submitone'sevidenceinsupportofhisdefense.Whatthelaw prohibitsisnotmerelytheabsenceofpreviousnotice,butthe absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.47 Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not proper in an actionforquietingoftitle.Thisparticularargument,however,is misplaced.ThisCourthasalreadyruledthatanyactioncanbethe subjectofasummaryjudgmentwiththesoleexceptionofactions forannulmentofmarriageordeclarationofitsnullityorforlegal separation.48 Proceedingtothemainissue,thisCourtfindsthatthegrantof summaryjudgmentwasnotproper.Asummaryjudgmentis permittedonlyifthereisnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfact andamovingpartyisentitledtoajudgmentasamatteroflaw.A summaryjudgmentisproperif,whilethepleadingsontheirface appeartoraiseissues,theaffidavits,depositions,andadmissions presentedbythemovingpartyshowthatsuchissuesarenot genuine.49 It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment, andthemovanthastheburdenofprovingsuchnonexistence.The trial court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful study of the case shows otherwise. Intheirmotionforsummaryjudgment,therespondentsfailedto clearlydemonstratetheabsenceofanygenuineissueoffact.They merelyreiteratedtheiravermentsinthecomplaintforquietingof title and opposed some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit: Nonetheless,goingbytherecordsoftheadmittedand uncontroverted facts and facts established there is no more litigious or genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of further trial on the merits. The first defense as to the identity of the subject property, the issue has already become nil because of not only the lack of seriousness in the allegations but also because the identity of the subject parcel of landLot9250wasprovenbytheapprovedplanAp-04-008367that was already presented and offered in evidence as Exhibit "B" for the plaintiffs. The second defense that plaintiffs' claim of the property is barred by priorjudgmentruleisunavailingconsideringthatthevital documentary evidence they presented in Land Registration Case No. TG-423beforethisHonorableCourtthemarkingsanddescriptions of such documents are stated in the Judgment quoted as follows: (1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit "Q"; x x x. (2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit "R"; x x x. (3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit "S"; x x x. (4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit "T" x x x. are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by the plaintiffs in seeking the review and nullity of the Decree No. 217313 issued on August 20,1997 under LRC Record No.N-62686 pursuant totheJudgmentdatedJune7,1994renderedbythisHonorable Court penned by the acting presiding Judge Eleuterio F.Guerrero in said Land Registration Case No. TG-423. Ontheotherhand,astothegravamenoftheclaimsinthe complaint,theplaintiffshavepresentedclearandconvincing evidenceasthewell-nighoralmostincontrovertibleevidenceofa registerabletitletothesubjectlandintheproceedingsconducted onthereceptionofevidenceex-partefortheplaintiffsestablishing in detail the specifications of continuous, open, exclusive possession asaspectsofacquisitiveprescriptionasconfirmedintheaffidavit herein attached as Annex "A"; Inrulingthattherewasindeednogenuineissueinvolved,thetrial court merely stated that: ThisCourt,goingbytherecords,observedkeenlythatplaintiffs cause of action for quieting of title on the disputed parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in the substitution oftheir landholdings ofLot9250,Cad355,TagaytayCadastrecontainingonlyanareaof 244,112squaremeterswithLot9121,Cad335,TagaytayCadastre, containingonlyanareaof19,356squaremeters.Whiledefendant Elandinitsanswerpracticallyandmainlyinterposedthedefenses of:(a)theparceloflandbeingclaimedbytheplaintiffsisnotthe parcel oflandsubject matter ofLand Registration CaseNo.TG-423; (b)theclaimoftheplaintiffsisbarredbypriorjudgmentofthis CourtinsaidLandRegistrationCase;and(c)plaintiffs'complaintis barred by theStatute ofLimitation since Original Certificate ofTitle No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible. Cross-referenceoftheabove-citedLandRegistrationCaseNo.TG-423 that was decided previously by this Court with the case at bench wasimperativelymadebythisCourt.BeingmindedthattheCourt hasandcantakejudicialnoticeofthesaidlandregistrationcase, this Court observed that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried onthemerits.Firstly,becausethesupposedidentitycrisisofthe controvertedparceloflandcoveredbytheLandRegistrationCase No. TG-423 with the subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap-04-006275(Exhibit"N")LRCCaseNo.423andbyPlanA04008367 (Exhibit"B"oftheplaintiffs)andtheTechnicalDescriptionofLot 9250,Cad355(Exhibit"B-1"oftheplaintiffs).Secondly,theprior judgmentrulecannotbeavailedofbydefendantElandsincenot onlyintrinsicfraudbutextrinsicfraudwereallegedinand establishedbytherecords.(HeirsofManuelRoxasv.Courtof LTD 2015 17 | P a g e Appeals,G.R.No.1184436,pro.March21,1997).Thirdly,itis incontrovertible that the complaint in this case seeking to review the judgment and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998 or within one (1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of issuance of Decree No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original Certificate ofTitleNo.0-660issuedtodefendantElandhasnotattained incontrovertibility.(HeirsofManuelRoxasv.CourtofAppeals,G.R. No. 118436, prom. March 21, 1997). Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interactionofthebasicpleadings,theobservationofthisCourtis thattheplaintiffswereabletoprovebythewell-nigh incontrovertibleevidence,theaspectsofpossessioninaccordance withSection48(b)ofCommonwealthAct141,asamended,as hereinafter illustrated. TheCA,inaffirmingtheaboveResolutionofthetrialcourt, propounded thus: Thecontentionofdefendant-appellantisuntenable.Summary judgmentisnotonlylimitedtosolvingactionsinvolvingmoney claims.UnderRule35ofthe1997RulesofCourt,exceptastothe amountofdamages,whenthereisnogenuineissueastoany materialfactandthemovingpartyisentitledtoajudgmentasa matteroflaw,summaryjudgmentmaybeallowed.Theterm "genuineissue"hasbeendefinedasanissueoffactwhichcallsfor the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham,fictitious,contrived,setupinbadfaithandpatently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Thus,undertheaforecitedrule,summaryjudgmentisappropriate whentherearenogenuineissuesoffact,whichcallforthe presentationofevidenceinafull-blowntrial.Thus,evenifontheir facethepleadingsappeartoraiseissues,butwhentheaffidavits, depositionsandadmissionsshowthatsuchissuesarenotgenuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. Itshouldbestressedthatthecourtaquowhichrenderedthe assailed resolution in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was the very court that decidedtheLRCCaseNo.TG-423.Suchbeingthecase,thecourta quo was privy to all relevant facts and rulings pertaining to LRC Case No.TG-423whichitconsideredandappliedtothiscase.Thus, whereallthefactsarewithinthejudicialknowledgeofthecourt, summary judgment may be granted as a matter of right. Onthecontrary,inpetitioner'sAnswerAdCautelam,genuine, factual and triable issues were raised, aside from specifically denying all the allegations in the complaint, thus: 2. SPECIFIC DENIALS 2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations containedinparagraphs1and3oftheComplaintinsofar as it alleges the personal circumstances of the plaintiff and oneA.F.DevelopmentCorporationforlackofknowledge orinformationsufficienttoformabeliefastothetruth thereof. 2.2 Answering defendant specifically denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief astothetruthofsaidallegations.Andiftheproperty referredtoinsaidparagraphsisthatparceloflandwhich wasthesubjectmatterofLandRegistrationCaseNo.TG-423 which was previously decided by this Honorable Court withfinalit


Recommended
Rosalia Lucero Portfolio

Rosalia Lucero Portfolio

Documents

Lucero - fundaciones.pdf

Lucero - fundaciones.pdf

Documents

Daniel Lucero 211 Resource Specialist

Daniel Lucero 211 Resource Specialist

Documents

Heirs of Palanca vs Republic

Heirs of Palanca vs Republic

Documents

Lucero de Vivanco

Lucero de Vivanco

Documents

SoL palanca 3 21-12

SoL palanca 3 21-12

Spiritual

Palanca awards ppt

Palanca awards ppt

Education

Steph Lucero

Steph Lucero

Documents

ENTRE LUCERO Y ARGÜELLES.

ENTRE LUCERO Y ARGÜELLES.

Documents

Door Lever Palanca de Puerta Levier de Porte · CIERRE DE LA PALANCA PALANCA EXTERIOR 1. Saque la rosa interior, el recubrimiento inferior y el borde • Saque el recubrimiento de

Door Lever Palanca de Puerta Levier de Porte · CIERRE DE LA PALANCA PALANCA EXTERIOR 1. Saque la rosa interior, el recubrimiento inferior y el borde • Saque el recubrimiento de

Documents

Descendants of Pedro Lucero and Maria de GodoyDescendants of Pedro Lucero and Maria de Godoy 1. ... Maria Guzman Anaya Almazan; (2) ... 27 v Juana 4 Lucero de Godoy, ...read.poudrelibraries.org/nmfamilies/pdf8/lucero-de-godoy.pdf ·

Descendants of Pedro Lucero and Maria de GodoyDescendants of Pedro Lucero and Maria de Godoy 1. ... Maria Guzman Anaya Almazan; (2) ... 27 v Juana 4 Lucero de Godoy, ...read.poudrelibraries.org/nmfamilies/pdf8/lucero-de-godoy.pdf ·

Documents

Lucero v Copper

Lucero v Copper

Documents

My Dream Town Lucero

My Dream Town Lucero

Education

September/ October 2009 Palanca Report

September/ October 2009 Palanca Report

Documents

Eaton’s Residential & Wiring Devices Division Guía RápidaConfiguraciones de 1, 2 o 3 polos y 1 o 2 tiros Modelos con botón actuador, palanca corta, palanca larga o palanca anti-giro

Eaton’s Residential & Wiring Devices Division Guía RápidaConfiguraciones de 1, 2 o 3 polos y 1 o 2 tiros Modelos con botón actuador, palanca corta, palanca larga o palanca anti-giro

Documents

Acient egypt lucero alvarado

Acient egypt lucero alvarado

Technology

edurado lucero

edurado lucero

Documents

García Lucero et al. v. Chile - IACHR · HALL_GARCIA LUCERO ET AL. V.CHILE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2016 2:43 PM 2016] García Lucero et al. v. Chile 1153 January 1974: Mr. García Lucero

García Lucero et al. v. Chile - IACHR · HALL_GARCIA LUCERO ET AL. V.CHILE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2016 2:43 PM 2016] García Lucero et al. v. Chile 1153 January 1974: Mr. García Lucero

Documents