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Main Aerospace Meets ABO Incompatibility

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    How is a tool developed for the

    Aerospace Industrybeing used to prevent a leading cause of

    ABO incompatible transfusions?

    Jo Main

    Transfusion Nurse ConsultantPeter MacCallum Cancer Centre

    Justine Mizen, Linda Nolte, David Westerman

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    What is the leading cause of ABO

    incompatible transfusions?

    Human error1

    Mislabelled specimens what is therisk?

    1 Dzik W. Emily Cooley Lecture 2002:Transfusion Safety in the HospitalTransfusion. 2003;43:11901199

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    Peter Mac rejects ALL pre-transfusion

    blood sample errors

    2007

    22%

    69%

    9%

    Form Specimen Haemolysed

    2008

    20%

    71%

    9%

    Form Specimen Haemolysed

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    The Hospital Transfusion Committee

    monitors rebleeds due to pre-transfusionblood sample errors

    2008

    0.00

    1.00

    2.00

    3.00

    4.00

    5.00

    6.00

    Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

    %

    Target % Rebleeds

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    Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

    What is it and Why use it ?

    A systematic, proactive method forevaluating a process to identify where andhow it might fail and to assess the relative

    impact of different failures, in order toidentify the parts of the process that are

    most in need of change.2

    2 Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2004

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    FMEA Process

    Phase 1 Understand and Describe the Process

    Phase 2 Conduct Failure Mode and Risk Analysis

    Phase 3 Redesign Process and Corrective actions

    Phase 4 Implementation and Monitoring

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    FMEA Tool

    RPN = SEVERITY X OCCURRENCE X DETECTION

    EFFECTS

    CONSEQUENCE

    CAUSES

    LIKELIHOOD

    CONTROLS

    EFFECTIVENESS

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    FMEA on the

    labelling of a pre-transfusion blood sample

    Sample labelled

    3F. Biohazard bag sent toPathology SpecimenCollection

    3A. RN collates tube andrequest form

    3B. Full Pt Identifiers arecorrectly handwritten on

    sample

    3C. RN signs, dates and

    records time of draw onsample

    3D. RN signs, dates andrecords time of draw onrequest form

    3E. Correct sample andcorrect request form areplaced in biohazard bag

    Sub process

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    Failure Modes

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    Failure Mode Risk Priority Numbers

    Failure Mode: Specimen tubes are difficult to write on

    Severity 10 X Occurrence 9 X Detection 2 = RPN 180

    Failure Mode: Human errors in positive patient identification

    Severity 10 X Occurrence 6 X Detection 5 = RPN 300

    Failure Mode: Physical environment privacy issues

    workflow issues

    Severity 10 X Occurrence 9 X Detection 7 = RPN 630

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    Failure mode: Specimen tubes are difficult

    to write onWhy?

    Corrective action

    New tube

    Different pen

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    Outpatient Pathology Department (OPD)Clinical Trials

    Research NurseNurse

    delayed

    Nurse tr yingt o concentrate

    Clerk w ith aquery

    Constant

    interruptions

    No privacy forpatients

    Cluttered,cramped space

    Very sociable!

    But.Chaotic

    I n 1 hour : 32 blood samples collected12 had 0 interruptions

    9 had 1 interrupt ion6 had 2 interrupt ions5 had > 2 interrupt ions

    Chair 1 16 venepunctures 23 int errupt ions

    Chair 2 11 venepunctures 11 int errupt ionsChair 3 4 CVAD accesses 2 int errupt ionsPneumat ic t ube accessed 4x by non OPD st aff .100% of accesses result ed in int errupt ions t o

    OPD st aff .

    HI GH RI SK!

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    Failure mode: Physical environment

    - privacy issues- workflow issues

    Corrective actionRedesign

    New Procedure

    Signage

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    Redesigning Care Team - LEAN

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    Corrective Action Risk Priority Numbers

    Failure Mode: Specimen tubes are difficult to write on

    Severity 10 X Occurrence 2 X Detection 2 = RPN 40

    Failure Mode: Human errors in positive patient identification

    Severity 10 X Occurrence 3 X Detection 5 = RPN 50

    Failure Mode: Physical environment privacy issues

    workflow issuesSeverity 10 X Occurrence 3 X Detection 3 = RPN 90

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    OPD rebleeds due to pre-transfusion blood

    sample errors

    2009-10

    0.00

    1.002.003.004.005.006.00

    7.008.009.00

    10.0011.0012.00

    May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr

    %

    Target % Rebleeds

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    What happened in February 2010?

    Change in OPD management structure

    Staff attitudes

    Staff changes

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    What did we do?

    Informed Clinical Governance

    OPD staff Communication Education

    No blame Accountability

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    Acknowledgement

    Liz Cox

    Acting ManagerClinical Risk Management

    VMIA

    THANKYOU


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