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How is a tool developed for the
Aerospace Industrybeing used to prevent a leading cause of
ABO incompatible transfusions?
Jo Main
Transfusion Nurse ConsultantPeter MacCallum Cancer Centre
Justine Mizen, Linda Nolte, David Westerman
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What is the leading cause of ABO
incompatible transfusions?
Human error1
Mislabelled specimens what is therisk?
1 Dzik W. Emily Cooley Lecture 2002:Transfusion Safety in the HospitalTransfusion. 2003;43:11901199
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Peter Mac rejects ALL pre-transfusion
blood sample errors
2007
22%
69%
9%
Form Specimen Haemolysed
2008
20%
71%
9%
Form Specimen Haemolysed
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The Hospital Transfusion Committee
monitors rebleeds due to pre-transfusionblood sample errors
2008
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
%
Target % Rebleeds
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
What is it and Why use it ?
A systematic, proactive method forevaluating a process to identify where andhow it might fail and to assess the relative
impact of different failures, in order toidentify the parts of the process that are
most in need of change.2
2 Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2004
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FMEA Process
Phase 1 Understand and Describe the Process
Phase 2 Conduct Failure Mode and Risk Analysis
Phase 3 Redesign Process and Corrective actions
Phase 4 Implementation and Monitoring
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FMEA Tool
RPN = SEVERITY X OCCURRENCE X DETECTION
EFFECTS
CONSEQUENCE
CAUSES
LIKELIHOOD
CONTROLS
EFFECTIVENESS
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FMEA on the
labelling of a pre-transfusion blood sample
Sample labelled
3F. Biohazard bag sent toPathology SpecimenCollection
3A. RN collates tube andrequest form
3B. Full Pt Identifiers arecorrectly handwritten on
sample
3C. RN signs, dates and
records time of draw onsample
3D. RN signs, dates andrecords time of draw onrequest form
3E. Correct sample andcorrect request form areplaced in biohazard bag
Sub process
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Failure Modes
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Failure Mode Risk Priority Numbers
Failure Mode: Specimen tubes are difficult to write on
Severity 10 X Occurrence 9 X Detection 2 = RPN 180
Failure Mode: Human errors in positive patient identification
Severity 10 X Occurrence 6 X Detection 5 = RPN 300
Failure Mode: Physical environment privacy issues
workflow issues
Severity 10 X Occurrence 9 X Detection 7 = RPN 630
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Failure mode: Specimen tubes are difficult
to write onWhy?
Corrective action
New tube
Different pen
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Outpatient Pathology Department (OPD)Clinical Trials
Research NurseNurse
delayed
Nurse tr yingt o concentrate
Clerk w ith aquery
Constant
interruptions
No privacy forpatients
Cluttered,cramped space
Very sociable!
But.Chaotic
I n 1 hour : 32 blood samples collected12 had 0 interruptions
9 had 1 interrupt ion6 had 2 interrupt ions5 had > 2 interrupt ions
Chair 1 16 venepunctures 23 int errupt ions
Chair 2 11 venepunctures 11 int errupt ionsChair 3 4 CVAD accesses 2 int errupt ionsPneumat ic t ube accessed 4x by non OPD st aff .100% of accesses result ed in int errupt ions t o
OPD st aff .
HI GH RI SK!
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Failure mode: Physical environment
- privacy issues- workflow issues
Corrective actionRedesign
New Procedure
Signage
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Redesigning Care Team - LEAN
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Corrective Action Risk Priority Numbers
Failure Mode: Specimen tubes are difficult to write on
Severity 10 X Occurrence 2 X Detection 2 = RPN 40
Failure Mode: Human errors in positive patient identification
Severity 10 X Occurrence 3 X Detection 5 = RPN 50
Failure Mode: Physical environment privacy issues
workflow issuesSeverity 10 X Occurrence 3 X Detection 3 = RPN 90
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OPD rebleeds due to pre-transfusion blood
sample errors
2009-10
0.00
1.002.003.004.005.006.00
7.008.009.00
10.0011.0012.00
May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
%
Target % Rebleeds
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What happened in February 2010?
Change in OPD management structure
Staff attitudes
Staff changes
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What did we do?
Informed Clinical Governance
OPD staff Communication Education
No blame Accountability
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Acknowledgement
Liz Cox
Acting ManagerClinical Risk Management
VMIA
THANKYOU