Malabanan vs Republic of the Philippines

7/28/2019 Malabanan vs Republic of the Philippines

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EN BANC(G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009)

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

One main reason why the informal sector has notbecome formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90percent of the informal lands are not titled andregistered. This is a generalized phenomenon in theso-called Third World. And it has many consequences.

x x x

The question is: How is it that so many governments,from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, havewanted to title these people and have not been ableto do so effectively? One reason is that none of thestate systems in Asia or Latin America can gather

proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals havemeans of proving property ownership to each otherwhich are not the same means developed by theSpanish legal system. The informals have their ownpapers, their own forms of agreements, and their ownsystems of registration, all of which are very clearlystated in the maps which they use for their own

informal business transactions.

If you take a walk through the countryside, fromIndonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--ineach field a different dog is going to bark at you.Even dogs know what private property is all about.

The only one who does not know it is the government.


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The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an"informal law" which the Latin American formal legalsystem does not know how to recognize.

- Hernando De Soto1

This decision inevitably affects all untitled landscurrently in possession of persons and entities otherthan the Philippine government. The petition, whileunremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the

Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity tothe applicability and scope of original registrationproceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree. In doing so, the Courtconfronts not only the relevant provisions of thePublic Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the realityon the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of

untitled lands, as well as the problem of informalsettlement it has spawned, has unfortunately beentreated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws arehemmed in by their own circumscriptions inaddressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on ourpart is primarily to decide cases before us in accordwith the Constitution and the legal principles that

have developed our public land law, though our socialobligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye onthe endemic problems.

I.

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an

application for land registration covering a parcel ofland identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, SilangCadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabananclaimed that he had purchased the property fromEduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
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continuous adverse and peaceful possession of theland for more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Courtof (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Officeof the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated theAssistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, JoseVelazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.4 Apartfrom presenting documentary evidence, Malabananhimself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at

the hearing. Velazco testified that the property wasoriginally belonged to a twenty-two hectare propertyowned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Linohad four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo andEstebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather.Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited theproperty and divided it among themselves. But by

1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become theadministrator of all the properties inherited by theVelazco sons from their father, Lino. After the deathof Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgiliosucceeded them in administering the properties,including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to hisuncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was

sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. didnot cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He furthermanifested that he "also [knew] the property and Iaffirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr.Velazco."6 The Republic of the Philippines likewise did

not present any evidence to controvert theapplication.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan duringtrial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued bythe Community Environment & Natural ResourcesOffice, Department of Environment and Natural


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Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that thesubject property was "verified to be within theAlienable or Disposable land per Land Classification

Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A andapproved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,1982."7

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment infavor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves thisapplication for registration and thus places under theoperation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,otherwise known as Property Registration Law, thelands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand

Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters,as supported by its technical description now formingpart of the record of this case, in addition to otherproofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and withresidence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, thecorresponding decree of registration shall forthwithissue.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of

Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to provethat the property belonged to the alienable anddisposable land of the public domain, and that theRTC had erred in finding that he had been inpossession of the property in the manner and for thelength of time required by law for confirmation ofimperfect title.
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On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendereda Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing theapplication of Malabanan. The appellate court held

that under Section 14(1) of the Property RegistrationDecree any period of possession prior to theclassification of the lots as alienable and disposablewas inconsequential and should be excluded from thecomputation of the period of possession. Thus, theappellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENRcertification had verified that the property was

declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that datecould not be factored in the computation of theperiod of possession. This interpretation of the Courtof Appeals of Section 14(1) of the PropertyRegistration Decree was based on the Courts rulingin Republic v. Herbieto.9

Malabanan died while the case was pending with theCourt of Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs whoappealed the decision of the appellate court.Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling inRepublic v. Naguit,11 which was handed down just fourmonths prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the

discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals isactually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan TrialCourt therein which had directed the registration ofthe property had no jurisdiction in the first place sincethe requisite notice of hearing was published onlyafter the hearing had already begun. Naguit,petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine,

especially when the property in question isagricultural land. Therefore, with respect toagricultural lands, any possession prior to thedeclaration of the alienable property as disposablemay be counted in reckoning the period of possessionto perfect title under the Public Land Act and theProperty Registration Decree.
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The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 andon 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oralarguments. The Court formulated the principal issues

for the oral arguments, to wit:

1. In order that an alienable and disposableland of the public domain may be registeredunder Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.1529, otherwise known as the PropertyRegistration Decree, should the land be

classified as alienable and disposable as of June12, 1945 or is it sufficient that suchclassification occur at any time prior to thefiling of the applicant for registration providedthat it is established that the applicant hasbeen in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession of the land under a bona

fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 orearlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the PropertyRegistration Decree may a parcel of landclassified as alienable and disposable bedeemed private land and therefore susceptible

to acquisition by prescription in accordancewith the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established asagricultural in character either because of itsuse or because its slope is below that of forestlands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the

Property Registration Decree in relation to theprovisions of the Civil Code on acquisitiveprescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration ofthe subject land in their names under Section


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14(1) or Section 14(2) of the PropertyRegistration Decree or both?13

Based on these issues, the parties formulated theirrespective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiteratethat the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correctinterpretation of the provision. The seeminglycontradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is

submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, sincethe land registration proceedings therein was void abinitio due to lack of publication of the notice of initialhearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republicv. Bibonia,14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Courtapplied Naguit and adopted the same observationthat the preferred interpretation by the OSG of

Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, theOSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply,the land should have been classified as alienable anddisposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto,the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings inBuenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural

Trading v. Republic16and Republic v. Imperial Credit

Corporation,17

as well as the earlier case of Director ofLands v. Court of Appeals.18

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit thatopen, continuous, exclusive and notorious possessionof an alienable land of the public domain for morethan 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private

property, thus placing it under the coverage ofSection 14(2). According to them, it would not matterwhether the land sought to be registered waspreviously classified as agricultural land of the publicdomain so long as, at the time of the application, theproperty had already been "converted" into privateproperty through prescription. To bolster their
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argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect toSection 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes thatunder Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitiveprescription of properties of the State refers to"patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of"private lands." It observes that the Court has yet todecide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a

ground for application for registration, and that the30-year possession period refers to the period ofpossession under Section 48(b) of the Public LandAct, and not the concept of prescription under theCivil Code. The OSG further submits that, assumingthat the 30-year prescriptive period can run againstpublic lands, said period should be reckoned from the

time the public land was declared alienable anddisposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments withrespect to the particular factual circumstancessurrounding the subject property and the ownershipthereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the PropertyRegistration Decree. For a full understanding of theprovision, reference has to be made to the PublicLand Act.

A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the PublicLand Act, has, since its enactment, governed theclassification and disposition of lands of the publicdomain. The President is authorized, from time to


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time, to classify the lands of the public domain intoalienable and disposable, timber, or minerallands.20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain are further classified according to their usesinto (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial,industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c)educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or(d) reservations for town sites and for public andquasi-public uses.21

May a private person validly seek the registration inhis/her name of alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Actacknowledges that public lands suitable foragricultural purposes may be disposed of "byconfirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles"through "judicial legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the

Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073,supplies the details and unmistakably grants thatright, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of thePhilippines, occupying lands of the public domain orclaiming to own any such land or an interest therein,

but whose titles have not been perfected orcompleted, may apply to the Court of First Instance ofthe province where the land is located forconfirmation of their claims and the issuance of acertificate of title therefor, under the LandRegistration Act, to wit:

xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through theirpredecessors in interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession andoccupation of alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition


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of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,immediately preceding the filing of the application forconfirmation of title except when prevented by war or

force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumedto have performed all the conditions essential to aGovernment grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received itspresent wording in 1977 when the law was amended

by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments wereintroduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term"agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain." The OSGsubmits that this amendment restricted the scope ofthe lands that may be registered.23 This is not actuallythe case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,

"agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of thepublic domain alienable or open to disposition."Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the publicdomain are a larger class than only "agriculturallands."

Second, the length of the requisite possession was

changed from possession for "thirty (30) yearsimmediately preceding the filing of the application" topossession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Courtin Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to

vest the right to register their title to agriculturallands of the public domain commenced from July 26,1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.1942, which provided that the bona fide claim ofownership must have been for at least thirty (30)years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public LandAct was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,


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which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) ofCom. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. SaidDecree codified the various laws relative to theregistration of property, including lands of the publicdomain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes theregistration of such lands of the public domain. The

provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following personsmay file in the proper Court of First Instance anapplication for registration of title to land, whetherpersonally or through their duly authorizedrepresentatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain under a bona fide claim of ownershipsince June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the PropertyRegistration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.Both laws commonly refer to persons or theirpredecessors-in-interest who "have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of thepublic domain under a bona fide claim of ownershipsince June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstancemay have led to the impression that one or the otheris a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the PublicLand Act has somehow been repealed or mooted.

That is not the case.


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The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public LandAct and Section 14 of the Property RegistrationDecree warrant comparison:

Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The followingdescribed citizens of the Philippines, occupying landsof the public domain or claiming to own any such landor an interest therein, but whose titles have not beenperfected or completed, may apply to the Court ofFirst Instance of the province where the land is

located for confirmation of their claims and theissuance of a certificate of title therefor, under theLand Registration Act, to wit:

x x x

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who

may apply. The following persons may file in theproper Court of First Instance an application forregistration of title to land, whether personally orthrough their duly authorized representatives:

x x x

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act ismore descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed bythe possessor than Section 14 of the PropertyRegistration Decree, which seems to presume thepre-existence of the right, rather than establishingthe right itself for the first time. It is proper to assertthat it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.

1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarilyestablished the right of a Filipino citizen who hasbeen "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession and occupation of alienable anddisposable lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,1945" to perfect or complete his title by applying with


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the proper court for the confirmation of his ownershipclaim and the issuance of the correspondingcertificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with theafore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, whichprovides that public lands suitable for agriculturalpurposes may be disposed of by confirmation ofimperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notionthat both provisions declare that it is indeed the

Public Land Act that primarily establishes thesubstantive ownership of the possessor who has beenin possession of the property since 12 June 1945. Inturn, Section 14(a) of the Property RegistrationDecree recognizes the substantive right grantedunder Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as wellprovides the corresponding original registration

procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfector incomplete title.

There is another limitation to the right granted underSection 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limitsthe period within which one may exercise the right toseek registration under Section 48. The provision has

been amended several times, most recently by Rep.Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the nextfollowing section are hereby granted time, not toextend beyond December 31, 2020 within which toavail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That

this period shall apply only where the area applied fordoes not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,further, That the several periods of time designatedby the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the landscomprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but thisSection shall not be construed as prohibiting any said


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persons from acting under this Chapter at any timeprior to the period fixed by the President.24

Accordingly under the current state of the law, thesubstantive right granted under Section 48(b) may beavailed of only until 31 December 2020.

B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public

Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of theProperty Registration Decree, the OSG has adoptedthe position that for one to acquire the right to seekregistration of an alienable and disposable land of thepublic domain, it is not enough that the applicant andhis/her predecessors-in-interest be in possessionunder a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June

1945; the alienable and disposable character of theproperty must have been declared also as of 12 June1945. Following the OSGs approach, all landscertified as alienable and disposable after 12 June1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1)of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b)of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of

such an implication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that thealienable and disposable character of the land shouldhave already been established since June 12, 1945 orearlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning ofSection 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the

provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under abonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking,qualifying words restrict or modify only the words orphrases to which they are immediately associated,and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Adproximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatursentencia.
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Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that wouldresult if we adopt petitioners position. Absent alegislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting

the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domainwhich were not declared alienable or disposablebefore June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible tooriginal registration, no matter the length ofunchallenged possession by the occupant. Suchinterpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14virtually inoperative and even precludes the

government from giving it effect even as it decides toreclassify public agricultural lands as alienable anddisposable. The unreasonableness of the situationwould even be aggravated considering that before

June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet evenconsidered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1)is that it merely requires the property sought to beregistered as already alienable and disposable at thetime the application for registration of title is filed. Ifthe State, at the time the application is made, has not

yet deemed it proper to release the property foralienation or disposition, the presumption is that thegovernment is still reserving the right to utilize theproperty; hence, the need to preserve its ownershipin the State irrespective of the length of adversepossession even if in good faith. However, if theproperty has already been classified as alienable and

disposable, as it is in this case, then there is alreadyan intention on the part of the State to abdicate itsexclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation ofSection 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit.

The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed


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out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of theprovision to the point of virtual inutility since it wouldonly cover lands actually declared alienable and

disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the currentpossessor is able to establish open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fideclaim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows morepossessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to

avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titlesthan what would be feasible under Herbieto. Thisbalancing fact is significant, especially consideringour forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach ofSection 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Petitioners make the salient observation that the

contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dictasince the land registration proceedings therein is voidab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisitepublication of the notice of initial hearing. There is noneed to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices thatthe Courts acknowledgment that the particular line ofargument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is

indeed obiter.

It may be noted that in the subsequent case ofBuenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto, againstated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to thedate when the [s]ubject [property was] classified asalienable and disposable is inconsequential and

should be excluded from the computation of theperiod of possession" That statement, in thecontext of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous.Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventurashould again be considered as obiter. The applicationtherein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2).

The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not


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establish any mode of possession on their part priorto 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision

whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlementto original registration following Section 14(1), theirposition being that they had been in exclusivepossession under a bona fide claim of ownership forover fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.

Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular

ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value withrespect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratioof Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since itprecisely involved situation wherein the applicant hadbeen in exclusive possession under a bona fide claimof ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courtsinterpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to

the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to whichbetween Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word ofthe Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor ofNaguit.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguishedfrom Bracewell v. Court of Appeals27 since in the

latter, the application for registration had been filedbefore the land was declared alienable or disposable.The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as thebetter rule between the two. Yet two years afterBracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo

Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v.Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession that

extended back to 1927 over a public domain landthat was declared alienable and disposable only in1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensivelyfrom it, and following the mindset of the dissent, theattempt at registration in Ceniza should have failed.Not so.


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To prove that the land subject of an application forregistration is alienable, an applicant must establishthe existence of a positive act of the government

such as a presidential proclamation or an executiveorder; an administrative action; investigation reportsof Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative actor a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented acertification dated November 25, 1994, issued by

Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment andNatural Resources Officer in the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources Office in CebuCity, stating that the lots involved were "found to bewithin the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, LandClassification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence

to show the real character of the land subject ofprivate respondents application. Further, thecertification enjoys a presumption of regularity in theabsence of contradictory evidence, which is true inthis case. Worth noting also was the observation ofthe Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands andForestry to contest the application of appellees on theground that the property still forms part of the publicdomain. Nor is there any showing that the lots inquestion are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that

mere possession of public land for the period requiredby law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation ofimperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor ofprivate respondents as far as the first requirement inSection 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, forthey were able to overcome the burden of proving thealienability of the land subject of their application.


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As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, privaterespondents were able to prove their open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the

subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, weare bound by the factual findings of the Court ofAppeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner didnot show that this is one of them.29

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the sameeminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction

the registration under Section 48(b) of public domainlands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35)years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The tellingdifference is that in Ceniza, the application forregistration was filed nearly six (6) years after theland had been declared alienable or disposable, whilein Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years

before the land was declared alienable or disposable.That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit tocontradistinguish it from Bracewell, a differencewhich the dissent seeks to belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysiswith respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The followingpersons may file in the proper Court of First Instancean application for registration of title to land, whetherpersonally or through their duly authorized

representatives:

x x x

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over privatelands by prescription under the provisions of existinglaws.


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The Court in Naguit offered the following discussionconcerning Section 14(2), which we did even thenrecognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we

nonetheless refer to it as material for furtherdiscussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property RegistrationDecree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 precludethe application for registration of alienable lands ofthe public domain, possession over which

commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,considering Section 14(2) of the Property RegistrationDecree, which governs and authorizes the applicationof "those who have acquired ownership of privatelands by prescription under the provisions of existinglaws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiringownership under the Civil Code.[30 ] There is aconsistent jurisprudential rule that propertiesclassified as alienable public land may be convertedinto private property by reason of open, continuousand exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ] With such conversion, such property may now fall

within the contemplation of "private lands" underSection 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration bythose who have acquired ownership throughprescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienablepublic land commenced on a date later than June 12,1945, and such possession being been open,continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may

have the right to register the land by virtue of Section14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners havebased their registration bid primarily on thatprovision, and where the evidence definitively


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establishes their claim of possession only as far backas 1948. It is in this case that we can properlyappreciate the nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions onprescription as the possible basis for application fororiginal registration under Section 14(2). Specifically,it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for

the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men aresusceptible of prescription, unless otherwiseprovided. Property of the State or any of itssubdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not bethe object of prescription.

It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of thepublic domain are patrimonial in character, they aresusceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the otherhand, among the public domain lands that are notsusceptible to acquisitive prescription are timberlands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself

proscribes private ownership of timber or minerallands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Codeconcerning the acquisition of real property throughprescription. Ownership of real property may beacquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10)

years,

32

or through extraordinary prescription of thirty(30) years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requirespossession in good faith,34 as well as just title.35

When Section 14(2) of the Property RegistrationDecree explicitly provides that persons "who haveacquired ownership over private lands by prescription
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under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakablyrefers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for theregistration of lands. The Civil Code is the only

existing law that specifically allows the acquisition byprescription of private lands, including patrimonialproperty belonging to the State. Thus, the criticalquestion that needs affirmation is whether Section14(2) does encompass original registrationproceedings over patrimonial property of the State,which a private person has acquired through

prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequentlyreiterated jurisprudence holding that propertiesclassified as alienable public land may be convertedinto private property by reason of open, continuousand exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)

years.36

Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating toSection 14(2) and to how exactly it operates wouldemerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins ofthe thirty (30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in

1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the PublicLand Act by granting the right to seek originalregistration of alienable public lands throughpossession in the concept of an owner for at leastthirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming toown any such lands or an interest therein, but whosetitles have not been perfected or completed, mayapply to the Court of First Instance of the provincewhere the land is located for confirmation of theirclaims and the issuance of a certificate of titletherefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:


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x x x x x x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,for at least thirty years immediately preceding thefiling of the application for confirmation of title,except when prevented by war or force majeure.

These shall be conclusively presumed to haveperformed all the conditions essential to aGovernment grant and shall be entitled to acertificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.(emphasis supplied)37

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the

enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June1945 the reckoning point for the first time.Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introducedby Rep. Act No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself,

at least by implication, as it applies the rules onprescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there aretwo kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinaryacquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, iscompleted "through uninterrupted adverse

possession for thirty years, without need of title orof good faith."

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-yearperiod rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailableafter 1977. At present, the only legal basis for thethirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription


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under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section14(2). However, there is a material differencebetween how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under

Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the CivilCode.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended byRep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call intoapplication the Civil Code provisions on prescription.It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession

period immediately preceding the application forconfirmation of title, without any qualification as towhether the property should be declared alienable atthe beginning of, and continue as such, throughoutthe entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutorynor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942had mandated such a requirement,38 similar to our

earlier finding with respect to the present language ofSection 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as thepoint of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for originalregistration became Section 14(2) of the Property

Registration Decree, which entitled those "who haveacquired ownership over private lands by prescriptionunder the provisions of existing laws" to apply fororiginal registration. Again, the thirty-year period isderived from the rule on extraordinary prescriptionunder Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the sametime, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire

regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a factwhich does not hold true with respect to Section14(1).

B.


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Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers tothe principles on prescription under existing laws.Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law

concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code,in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is nosimilar demand on our part in the case of Section14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of theCivil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of

its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall notbe the object of prescription." The identification whatconsists of patrimonial property is provided byArticles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of publicdominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such asroads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridgesconstructed by the State, banks, shores,roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without

being for public use, and are intended for somepublic service or for the development of thenational wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is notof the character stated in the preceding article, ispatrimonial property

It is clear that property of public dominion, whichgenerally includes property belonging to the State,cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, besubject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the publicdomain, whether declared alienable and disposable or


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not, are property of public dominion and thusinsusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code ofa declaration by the President or any duly authorizedgovernment officer of alienability and disposability oflands of the public domain. Would such lands sodeclared alienable and disposable be converted,under the Civil Code, from property of the publicdominion into patrimonial property? After all, by

connotative definition, alienable and disposable landsmay be the object of the commerce of man; Article1113 provides that all things within the commerce ofman are susceptible to prescription; and the sameprovision further provides that patrimonial property ofthe State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that"[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longerintended for public use or for public service, shallform part of the patrimonial property of the State." Itis this provision that controls how public dominionproperty may be converted into patrimonial propertysusceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,

Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property"which belong to the State, without being for publicuse, and are intended for some public service or forthe development of the national wealth" are publicdominion property. For as long as the propertybelongs to the State, although already classified asalienable or disposable, it remains property of the

public dominion if when it is "intended for somepublic service or for the development of the nationalwealth".

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration bythe State that the public dominion property is nolonger intended for public service or the development


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of the national wealth or that the property has beenconverted into patrimonial. Without such expressdeclaration, the property, even if classified as

alienable or disposable, remains property of thepublic dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thusincapable of acquisition by prescription. It is onlywhen such alienable and disposable lands areexpressly declared by the State to be no longerintended for public service or for the development ofthe national wealth that the period of acquisitive

prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shallbe in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or aPresidential Proclamation in cases where thePresident is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading ofSection 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree

limits its scope and reach and thus affects theregistrability even of lands already declared alienableand disposable to the detriment of the bona fidepossessors or occupants claiming title to the lands.

Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regaliandoctrine and its concomitant assumption that alllands owned by the State, although declared

alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought tobe used only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter.The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution andthe laws in accordance with their language andintent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the

province of the legislative branch. Congress can verywell be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree and pertinent provisionsof the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for

judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.


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The operation of the foregoing interpretation can beillustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No.7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of

Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses,etc.," is more commonly known as the BCDA law.Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certainmilitary reservations and portions of military camps inMetro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor AirBase. For purposes of effecting the sale of the militarycamps, the law mandates the President to transfer

such military lands to the Bases ConversionDevelopment Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn isauthorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41ThePresident is authorized to sell portions of the militarycamps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDAlaw itself declares that the military lands subjectthereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the

provisions of existing laws and regulations governingsales of government properties."43

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted thesubject military lands have become alienable anddisposable. However, said lands did not becomepatrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes

the reservation that these lands are to be sold inorder to raise funds for the conversion of the formerAmerican bases at Clark and Subic.44Such purposecan be tied to either "public service" or "thedevelopment of national wealth" under Article 420(2).

Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of thepublic dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding

their status as alienable and disposable. It is upontheir sale as authorized under the BCDA law to aprivate person or entity that such lands becomeprivate property and cease to be property of thepublic dominion.

C.
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Should public domain lands become patrimonialbecause they are declared as such in a duly enactedlaw or duly promulgated proclamation that they are

no longer intended for public service or for thedevelopment of the national wealth, would the periodof possession prior to the conversion of such publicdominion into patrimonial be reckoned in countingthe prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? Werule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades usfrom ruling that the period of possession before thepublic domain land becomes patrimonial may becounted for the purpose of completing theprescriptive period. Possession of public dominionproperty before it becomes patrimonial cannot be theobject of prescription according to the Civil Code. As

the application for registration under Section 14(2)falls wholly within the framework of prescriptionunder the Civil Code, there is no way that possessionduring the time that the land was still classified aspublic dominion property can be counted to meet therequisites of acquisitive prescription and justifyregistration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rulesfor Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is noinconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration onthe basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitlesregistration on the basis of prescription. Registrationunder Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of

theProperty Registration Decree and the Public LandAct while registration under Section 14(2) is madeavailable both by the Property Registration Decreeand the Civil Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between thethirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public


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Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and thethirty-year period available through Section 14(2) ofthe Property Registration Decree in relation to Article

1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the formerspeaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while theperiod under the latter concerns a thirty-year periodof extraordinary prescription. Registration underSection 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended byRep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years ofpossession alone without regard to the Civil Code,

while the registration under Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree is founded onextraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription underthe Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1).Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, itultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neithersuperior nor inferior to other statutes such as the PropertyRegistration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound toadhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code whenit enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests aclear intent to interrelate the registration allowed underthat provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent existswith respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework weset forth today is seeing how our land registrationprocedures correlate with our law on prescription,which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for

acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonialproperty of the State may be acquired by privatepersons through prescription. This is brought aboutby Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things whichare within the commerce of man are susceptible to


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prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or anyof its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shallnot be the object of prescription."

There are two modes of prescription through whichimmovables may be acquired under the Civil Code.

The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which,under Article 1117, requires possession in good faithand with just title; and, under Article 1134, iscompleted through possession of ten (10) years.

There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a personfrom acquiring patrimonial property of the Statethrough ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is thereany apparent reason to impose such a rule. At thesame time, there are indispensable requisitesgoodfaith and just title. The ascertainment of good faithinvolves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528,

as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45

provisionsthat more or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requiressome clarification. Under Article 1129, there is justtitle for the purposes of prescription "when theadverse claimant came into possession of the

property through one of the modes recognized by lawfor the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,but the grantor was not the owner or could nottransmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose thetransmission of ownership, and which would have

actually transferred ownership if the grantor hadbeen the owner. This vice or defect is the one curedby prescription. Examples: sale with delivery,exchange, donation, succession, and dacion inpayment.46


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The OSG submits that the requirement of just titlenecessarily precludes the applicability of ordinaryacquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The

major premise for the argument is that "the State, asthe owner and grantor, could not transmit ownershipto the possessor before the completion of therequired period of possession."47 It is evident that theOSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referredto in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the onefrom whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive

prescription derived the title, whether by sale,exchange, donation, succession or any other mode ofthe acquisition of ownership or other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinaryprescription or extraordinary prescription, the periodof possession preceding the classification of public

dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted forthe purpose of computing prescription. But after theproperty has been become patrimonial, the period ofprescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.Once the requisite period has been completed, twolegal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property isipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the

person in possession for the periods prescribed underthe Civil Code acquires ownership of the property byoperation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automaticallybecomes the owner of the converted patrimonialproperty, the ideal next step is the registration of the

property under the Torrens system. It should beremembered that registration of property is not amode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a modeof confirmation of ownership.48

Looking back at the registration regime prior to theadoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977,


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it is apparent that the registration system then didnot fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership ofpatrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the

system accommodated was the confirmation ofimperfect title brought about by the completion of aperiod of possession ordained under the Public LandAct (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, orsince 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on

the requisites for alienable public lands acquiredthrough ordinary prescription under the Civil Code,though it arguably did not preclude suchregistration.50 Still, the gap was lamentable,considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishesownership over the patrimonial property of personswho have completed the prescriptive periods

ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with theadoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977,with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizingoriginal registration in favor of persons who haveacquired ownership over private lands by prescriptionunder the provisions of existing laws, that is, the CivilCode as of now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, asfollows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the

Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) ofthe Public Land Act recognizes and confirmsthat "those who by themselves or through theirpredecessors in interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possessionand occupation of alienable and disposablelands of the public domain, under a bona fide


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claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,1945" have acquired ownership of, andregistrable title to, such lands based on the

length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requirespossession since 12 June 1945 and doesnot require that the lands should havebeen alienable and disposable during theentire period of possession, the possessor

is entitled to secure judicial confirmationof his title thereto as soon as it isdeclared alienable and disposable,subject to the timeframe imposed bySection 47 of the Public Land Act.51

(b) The right to register granted under

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act isfurther confirmed by Section 14(1) of theProperty Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree, consider thatunder the Civil Code, prescription is recognized

as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonialproperty. However, public domain landsbecome only patrimonial property not only witha declaration that these are alienable ordisposable. There must also be an expressgovernment manifestation that the property isalready patrimonial or no longer retained for

public service or the development of nationalwealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. Andonly when the property has become patrimonialcan the prescriptive period for the acquisition ofproperty of the public dominion begin to run.


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(a) Patrimonial property is privateproperty of the government. The personacquires ownership of patrimonial

property by prescription under the CivilCode is entitled to secure registrationthereof under Section 14(2) of theProperty Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription bywhich patrimonial property may be

acquired, one ordinary and otherextraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitiveprescription, a person acquires ownershipof a patrimonial property throughpossession for at least ten (10) years, ingood faith and with just title. Underextraordinary acquisitive prescription, a

persons uninterrupted adversepossession of patrimonial property for atleast thirty (30) years, regardless of goodfaith or just title, ripens into ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the caseat bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners isinsufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquiredownership over the subject property under Section48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive

evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitionersas his predecessors-in-interest have been inpossession of the property since 12 June 1945 orearlier. The earliest that petitioners can date backtheir possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularisto the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves


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of registration under Section 14(1) of the PropertyRegistration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2)as basis for registration. While the subject propertywas declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,there is no competent evidence that is no longerintended for public use service or for thedevelopment of the national evidence, conformablywith Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of

the subject property as alienable and disposable landof the public domain does not change its status asproperty of the public dominion under Article 420(2)of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible toacquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with thecorrectness of the legal doctrines established in thisdecision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over theimplications of todays ruling cannot be discounted.For, every untitled property that is occupied in thecountry will be affected by this ruling. The social

implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and theCourt would be abdicating its social responsibility tothe Filipino people if we simply levied the law withoutcomment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whetherdeclared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to

long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and iscommon among the so-called "Third World" countries.This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnectbetween a legal system and the reality on theground. The law so far has been unable to bridge thatgap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public


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domain lands, such as through homestead or freepatent, have

proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on thegrantee in the encumbrance or alienation of saidproperties.52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect titlehas emerged as the most viable, if not the mostattractive means to regularize the informalsettlement of alienable or disposable lands of thepublic domain, yet even that system, as revealed in

this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who haveindividually or exclusively held residential lands onwhich they have lived and raised their families. Manymore have tilled and made productive idle lands ofthe State with their hands. They have been regarded

for generation by their families and their communitiesas common law owners. There is much to be saidabout the virtues of according them legitimate states.

Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate intopositive law, as the law itself considered such landsas property of the public dominion. It could only be upto Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to

sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement ofsuch lands which in legal theory are lands of thepublic domain before the problem becomes insoluble.

This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, byliberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation ofimperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself toease the requisites for the conversion of public

dominion property into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses intoevery aspect of well-being not only of that individual,but also to the persons family. Once that sense ofsecurity is deprived, life and livelihood are put on


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stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcomeclosure to the long pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision ofthe Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 andResolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. Nopronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

LEONARDO A.QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIOMORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J.VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J.LEONARDO DE CASTO

Associate Justice


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ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

DIOSDADO M.PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution,it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the aboveDecision were reached in consultation before the casewas assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

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Malabanan vs Republic of the Philippines

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