Managing changes in Civil Aviation -India Perspective

Capt.A.Ranganathan

PAST – Imperfect

PRESENT – Tense

FUTURE – Clouded by

lack of Transparency

Mumbai Agathi

Surat

Lengpui Mangalore Kanpur

Cochin

Trichy

Lengpui

Indian Safety collage - 2011

Guwahati

Cochin

?

J. Randolph "Randy" Babbitt”

FAA Chief

“My number one priority is to focus on safety.

This is a business where one mistake is one too many."

Right Professional for the job

Former Airline pilot and the head of Air Line Pilots Association

Right Professional for the job

Former, Director of the Air Navigation Bureau at the

International Civil Aviation Organization; U.S. Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA), focusing on air traffic

management and control

A certified air transport pilot, a certified flight and

ground instructor, a licensed airframe and power plant

mechanic, and a qualified FAA control tower

operator.

William Voss CEO of the Flight Safety Foundation

NTSB Identification: OPS11IA401

WASHINGTON FLIGHT PROGRAM

Incident occurred Wednesday, March 23, 2011 in Arlington,

VA

Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/17/2011

unable to establish contact with the supervisory

controller working alone in the control tower. Two air

carrier aircraft landed during the period without tower

contact

Postincident investigation revealed that the

controller on duty had the necessary

preconditions for the development of

fatigue at the time of the event, specifically

acute sleep loss in the 24 hours before the

event and circadian disruption as a result

of working the midnight shift.

The National Transportation Safety Board

determines the probable cause(s) of this

incident as follows:

The tower controller's loss of

consciousness induced by lack of sleep,

fatigue resulting from working successive

midnight shifts, and air traffic control

scheduling practices

Proactive Action by an “Independent”

investigation board and a Safety system

where Safety is the priority

What we have is a Reactive Procrastination

where „Commercial & Political interests”

outweigh Safety

Govt. of India should recognise due importance of ATC profession and accord special status to it preferably by examining the feasibility of de-linking ATC from the normal organisational set-up and creating an independent cadre to be governed by separate provisions. Justice Lahoti

The Darkroom Boys

The responsibility of a pilot-in-command is

limited to the safety of his aircraft and passengers

on board thereon, that of the controller extends to

all the aircraft (and passengers) under his control

at any given time

Justice Lahoti

Pilots ATCOs

The Scapegoats

Ground De-Roster

What we lack

• Professionalism

• Transparency

• Quality Investigations

• Correct perspective

“Managing Safety”

Lessons from the

past left unlearned

25th June 2011

AIE flight makes a steep approach and

a hard landing at Mangalore. The

captain decides to take off again but

the copilot slams the brakes and the

aircraft manages to stop by the end of

the runway. Almost repeats the crash

sequence of AIE 812

If the aircraft had overshot the end of the

runway, this image would have repeated

The Pilot was blamed

AIE 812

Rate of Descent

4000 feet per minute

Rate of Descent

4000 feet per minute

Rate of Descent

> 1000 feet per minute

Rate of Descent

600 feet per minute

ILS Glide Path

AX 812 descends at 4000 feet per minute up to 600 feet and maintains more than

1000 feet per minute up to 60 feet before rounding off to reduce the Descent Rate

06:04:29

EGPWS Forty

06:04:30

EGPWS Thirty

06:04:31

EGPWS Twenty

06:04:32

EGPWS Ten

AX 812 descends 10 feet for every second from Forty feet up to Ten

feet but floats for the next 8 seconds before touching down

The COI chose to ignore this vital fact

The touchdown was with Power-ON

The fatigued and overworked ATCO still mans the tower

Flights are still landing beyond the Touchdown Zone

2000ft from threshold and 30ft high

The failure of the COI to be transparent in

identifying ALL the factors that contributed

to the crash, prolongs the dangerous flight

conditions

Precision Approach Radar

Polish President’s flight

10th April 2010

On track, On Glide path

The crew were experienced and the

Russian Air Force Radar controller

was highly trained

60 m above the glide path and 130 m to the left of runway centerline,

the Controller of Landing Zone called: ―

‖FOUR on track, glide path‖

4.6 km from the threshold of RWY26

35 m above the glide path and 100 m to the left of runway centerline,

the Controller of Landing Zone called: ―

‖THREE - on track, glide path‖

3.5 km from the threshold of RWY26

20 m above the glide path and 80 m to the left of runway centerline,

the Controller of Landing Zone called: ―

‖TWO - on track, glide path‖

2.5 km from the threshold of RWY26

Report of the Polish Authorities

According to the Polish report the main cause of accident was trial approach and the descent below the allowed altitude at an excessive rate of descent in bad weather conditions, in conjunction with late execution of the go-around procedure

Report of the Polish Authorities

Circumstances that led to this are

incorrect training of Polish Pilots but

also wrong work of Russian Air

Traffic Controllers who gave bad

information to crew of Tu-154m

Radar

Datum 1

Radar

Datum 2 Horizontal Aircraft

Position

Positional Discrepancy ≈ 100m -

3000m

Datum 2 Datum 1

Precision Approach Radar

Defense airfield charts are based on

EVER-MD Coordinates and not on

WGS 84 as laid down by ICAO

Use Of GPS In Non-WGS84

Reference Datum Airspace

In non-WGS 84 airspace, the local

datum (position basis) used to survey

the navigation data base position

information may result in significant

position errors from a survey done

using the WGS 84 datum

Airbus & Boeing

To the pilot, this means that the

position of runways, airports,

waypoints, or navigation aids, may not

be as accurate as depicted on the map

display and may not agree with the

GPSposition.

This navigation accuracy may not be

accurate for approaches

Srinagar

Runway 31

Are Airlines being safe and the

Regulator ensuring safety when a

Precision approach is permitted to

be conducted in unsafe conditions

with untrained crew who have no

SOPs ?

UNDERSTANDING

ENERGY MANAGEMENT

SPEED CONTROL IN ADVERSE

WEATHER CONDITIONS

MM 1000ft above

Airport

elevation

Typical Schedule for Deceleration on

Three-Degree Glide Path from Outer Marker to

Stabilisation Height ( 1000 feet )

OM

Deceleration

Segment

( 10kts / nm )

VMAX at

OM=160kts

VAPP at

1000ft= 130kts

3 6

Source- Flight Safety Foundation

SPEED PROFILE TO BE ADHERED DURING MIXED MODE OPERATIONS

10-4 NM from touchdown 160 Kts IAS

With Speed of 160 kts at 4 nm and in Tailwind

conditions, the aircraft cannot be in Stabilised

condition by 1000ft AGL

AVIATION ENVIRONMENT CIRCULAR 3 OF 2011

• 1.1 Thrust reversal, also known as reverse thrust, is a momentary process

1.3 Thrust reversers also provide additional stopping force on wet and slippery runways along with added safety and control margins during aborted takeoffs and landings.

• 5.1 The flight crew shall be mentally prepared to land without using thrust reverser and bring the aircraft at low power low drag with

clean configuration.

• 6.2 It will be the sole responsibility of the

airport operator to maintain the data pertaining

to landing of aircraft without application of

thrust reverser..

Spoilers Deployment-

Automatic or

Manual within 2 seconds

Wheel brakes within 1 second

Reverse thrust within 2 seconds

Landing Advisory data assumptions

Threshold Crossing height 50feet

Speed Vref

1000 feet

Touch down

With heavy rubber deposits in the touchdown

area at Delhi, the Environment Circular will

result in a disaster in wet conditions

Haven‟t they understood the

reasons of Runway

Excursion?

52

Air China Flight 129 15.4.2002

Calicut Airport

There was NO RESA at the end of Runway 28

Any overrun would have resulted in a disaster

Calicut continues to be an Unlicensed field

Calicut continues to be an Unlicensed field

A0372/10 – CALICUT AIRPORT IS LICENSED

FOR PUBLIC USE FM 29TH JUN 2009 AND VALID

UPTO 26TH JUN 2011. 25 FEB 12:50 2010 UNTIL

PERM CREATED 25 FEB 14:03 2010

Safety Audits and Inspections by AAI and DGCA

Were they honest

and Transparent?

"Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College”

"Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise."

Thomas Gray's poem (1742)

We need a new

perspective a mindset

change to prevent the

Horoscope from

becoming a

Horrorscope

Mumbai Agathi

Surat

Lengpui Mangalore Kanpur

Cochin

Trichy

Lengpui

Guwahati

Cochin

?

We need Horses for the Courses

Pilots cannot be replaced from the cockpit AND It is time the Government recognised that the Air Traffic Control is “Unique” and ATM is best handled by the ATCOs