Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Libraries HQ Donovan Research Library Armor Research Library Fort Benning, Georgia Report date: 26 December 1944 – 10 February 1945 Title: Operation Report - Leyte Author: U.S. Army XXIV Corps Abstract: Supplemental Operations Report on XXIV Corps in the Battle of Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 26 December 1944 to 10 February 1945. Includes appendices and maps. Number of pages: 24 p. Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Documents collection. Call #: D793.32 .U224 Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release
Transcript
Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Libraries HQ Donovan Research Library
Armor Research Library Fort Benning, Georgia
Report date: 26 December 1944 – 10 February 1945 Title: Operation Report - Leyte Author: U.S. Army XXIV Corps Abstract: Supplemental Operations Report on XXIV Corps in the Battle of
Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 26 December 1944 to 10 February 1945. Includes appendices and maps.
Number of pages: 24 p. Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Documents collection. Call #: D793.32 .U224 Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release
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OPERAIN RPOR
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26 December 1944 - 10 February
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PART ONE
PART TWO
PART THREE
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
Intrduction
Brief Narrative of Events
Comments
Personnel and Civil Affairs
Logistics
PAGE
1-2
3--6
7
8 12
13- 17
P ONE
INTRODUCTION
I. This report covers the operations'of the XXIV Corpson LEYTE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS from 26 December 1944 to 10 Feb-ruary 1945. During this period the Corps was attached to andoperated under Eighth Army (Lieutenant General Robert L.Eichelberger),
2. The earlier phases of the operation are described in"Operation Report, XXIV Corps-- LEYTE, 20 October 1944 to 25December 1944". This report has been previously submittedthrough the Commanding General, Sixth Army (Lieutenant GeneralWalter Krueger), under whose command the Corps served duringthis period. The le'ssons learned in the campaign, with ap-propriate recommendations, are included in the above reportand for that reason are not included here.
3. The zones of action of the Corps and the divisionsand the locations of major elements on 26 December are shownon the map on page 2. These dispositions resulted from theearljier .activities of the Corps, which for the purpose ofbackground are summarizod briefly below.
a. The Sixth Army, with the X Corps (Major GeneralF. C. Sibert) and the .XXIV Corps abreast, the XXIV Corps onthe left (south), made the initial assault landing on theeast coast of LEYTE on 20 October 1944 (Inclosure No. 1Map of LEYTE, 1 to 250,000).
b. The XXIV Corps (Major General John R. Hedge)_land~ed on the cast coast of LEYTE between CATMON HILL (61-35)and MAABANG RIVER (63- 24) with the 96th Infantry Division(Major General J. L. Bradley) on the right (north) and the7th Infantry Division (Major General A. V. Arnold) on theleft. The Corps completed the seizure of its assigned beach-~headl on schedule on 30 October. Following this two addlition-al divisions were assigned the Corps (11th Ai.rborne under MajorGeneral J,. 14, Swing and 77th Infant~ry under Major General A
D. Bruce), and the Corps shifted a large part of its strengthto the west coast of LEYTE. The 7th Division attacked northfrom BAYBAY (85-93) 5 December. The 77th Division made anamphibious assault landing near ORMOC (12-33o) 7 December andattacked north. The llth Airborne and 96th Infantry Divisionswhich remained on the east coast attacked west through themountains. By 26 December our forces had reached positionsshown on the map on page 2.
NOTE: All coordinates used in this report refer toMap of LEYTE, 1 to 250,000 (Inclosure No. 1).
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-2
PART TWO
BRIEF NARRATIVE OF EVENTS
4. On 26 December, the Corps was involved in the finalphase of the LEYTE campaign as briefly outlined in Part One.The plan for continuing the operation included the followingfeatures:
a. The immediate opening of the PALOMPON (85.-33)-.LIBUNGAO (06-51) road, Thi's mission was retained by the 77thDivision.
b. Destroying remnants of Jap units in the mountains.All divisions were invclv.ed in this operation- the 7th and77th Divisions blockLng the western exits of the mountainpasses while the 96th Infantry Division and llth Airborne Div-Islon pushed aggressively through the mountains from theireastern side.
c. Continuous and aggressive action covering theentire Corps area of responsibility, to hunt down and destroyall remaining hostile forces,
d. Maintaining security of principal roads, bridgesand installations in the Corps area. of responsibility,
e. Expansion of activities to take over security ofall of LEYTE and SAMAR ISLANDS in early January,
5. Detween 26-.31 December,. the 77th Infantry Divisioncompleted its coordinated attack to secure the PALOMPON-LIBUIN-GA0 road. The reinforced battalion of the 305th Infantrywhich was located at PAL0PON attacked northeast along theroad towsard the mountain pass overlooking the west coast,Simultaneously- the remainder of the 305th Infantry attackedwest from T4~iTAG0B (,8-,4 5) e Extremely stubborn resistance wasencountered along this road where it wound through the pass.The Japs defending this r'oad consisted of the 5th Regiment of.the 8th Jap Division, reinforced by stragglers from several
other units. Weii 1dug-in along high ground commanding theroad and supportecl by artillery and heavy mortars, these Japsclung tenaciously to their positions until on the 31st ofDecember when our forces advancing both from the east and Westbroke all organized enemy resistance along the road, securedthe pass, atd made juncture on the western slopes of the mount-ains. Although organized resistatce along the PALOMPON-MATAGOBroad was broken, only protected convoys were able to make the.trip with safety for several days due to constant SL~p zgad,..numerous ambushes established by the Japs in the favorableterrain of the mountain pass.., At this time the 77th Divisionexpanded its zone of action northward in relieving elementsof the X Corps and elements of the 305th Infantry proceeded bywater up the coast to VILLABA (86-58). This town was securedwith little resistance and a strong defense established around
S3
S ~ ~ ~
S.E CR-E
It from which strong patrols probed the mountains to thenorth, east and south. Enemy activity in this area initiallyconsisted of patrols and small harassing attacks against ourpatrols and against our perzimeter. - A. second regiment off thedivision operated in the vicinity of VALENCIA (08-w45), inter-.cepting groups of Japs drivon into that area by-the activitiesof the 7th Division, and groups attempting to escape to thewest coast. The other regiment of the 77th Division remainedin the northern central part of the. division zone., cooperatingwith X Corps units in destruction of hostile forces caughtbetween the two corps. On 5 January 1945 it expanded its areanorthward to relieve the X Corps wost of the main range. Thedivision assumed responsibility for all of LEYTE east of themountains and north of the line VALENCIA-PALOMPON (both in.clusive)
6. On. 26 December, the lth Airborne Division was en-gaged in mopping up "last ditch" Japs located in almost com-pletely inaccessible positions on the southern slopes off MT.MAJUNAG (MANUNAG) (38-33). One regiment off the division-the 511th Parachute Infantry - had already forced its waythrough the 'mountains to the west coast tying in with elementsof the 7th Division and completing the isolation of an enemyforce protecting the eastern end off an unfinished supplytrail the Japs had apparently intended to push across themountains. The remainder of the 11th Airborne Division hadthis enemy isolated force practically surrounded. This force,which occupied ddep "spider holes" and mutually suppartingpillboxes located on knife-edged ridges was only destroyedafter much hand-to-hand fighting. The llth Airborne Divisionwas relieved from its area by elements of the 96th Division on29 December and withdrawn to eastern beaches to rehabilitatefor operations elsewhere.
7# On the east side of LEYTE the 96th Division with its0P noar GUINARONA (46-35) was disposed in a-wlde arc. centor-*ing generally on the area west off DAGAMI (47-o). Patrolsffrom the division constantly probed through the. mountains,dlriving the remaining scattered enemy groups to the westwith heavy losses. These patrols ranged ffar from their basesandl several off them crossed the mountains into the 7th ayid77th Division areas. The division completed relieff off allelements off the 11th Airborne Division by the end off Decemberandl on 5 January 1945 expanded north and relieved X Cor~ps •units off all tactical responsibility east off the mountains,with the exception off a staging area along the PINAMOPOAN( 08-c8)-CARIGA (21- 68).JARO (3355 ) road. At thi s time two
in fantry battalions were sent to SAMAR ISLAND (north of LEYTE)to relieve X Corps units there.,
8. The 7th Division had taken over areas from the 77thas the latter drove north and on 26 December was re'sponsiblefor the security of the entire west coastal area south ofthe line PALOMPON-VALENCIA (both exclusive). This areacontained thousands of Jap stragglers searching for food orattempting to join the group assembling in the hills cast ofORMOC or trying to get to the west coast. 7th Divisioncombat patrols- as many as forty (40) a day - combed thewest coastal plain and probed the mountains constantly,hunting clown and destroying enemy groups. In addition towandering bands of enemy throughout the area. patrols event-ually located two large and well-protected concentrationsof enemy remnants east of ORMOC in extremely difficult
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mountain terrain. One of these, 3,000-4,000 strong was inthe MT MAAGCNOC (23-33) area under Lieutenant GeneralYamagata and the other 1,500-2,000 in strength was in theMT ABUNUG (22-.36) area- under Colonel Imabore. Prisonersof war indicated that although these troops were tiredhungry and. dispirited, they were planning to attack theORMOC area. Under pressure of our troops and artillery firethis plan was abandoned and the concentrations withdrewnorthward, later breaking up into bands of 20 to 200 andattempting to withdraw westward across Highway 2 to reachthe west coast. By the end of January few Japs were lefteast of Highway 2 and thousands had been killed by the 7thand 77th Divisions during their westward withdrawal. Star-vation and disease Also took heavy toll.
. During this period the withdrawing Japs showedlittle aggressive spirit, but fought clesparately when cornered.Our patrols, ambushes and artillery fire, catching the retreat-ing bands in the open ORMOC VALLEY, were able to cause greatdestruction with comparatively few friendly casualties. Com-Ibat patrols with accompanying artillery observers and supportingCub airplanes proved most effeotive in results. Due to theJap dispersal and his refusal, to make a stand it was usuallyimpossible to make effective coordinated attacks in anystrength. Accurately adjusted artillery fire using timefuzes was particularly effective in the open.
16. In the meantime, on 15 January, 1945 the battalionof the 305th Infantry (77th Division) which had landed atVILLABA was subjected to an all-day, coordinated infantry-artillery attack from Japs apparently assembled from thoseleft in the west peninsula. The Japs participating were ingood condition and were well trained. Presumably they hadnot been hurt in combat on LEYTE prior to this time.. Ourtroops drove off this attack, inflicting heavy casualtieson the enemy. Subsequent patrolling by the VILLABA battalionlocated a strong enemy force in the mountains southeast ofVILLABA. The 77th Division using the mass of the divisiondestroyed this Jap pocket during the period 27 January-3 February by a coordinated converging attack from threedirections. The division was relieved of tactical responsi-.bility by elements of the Americal Division (X Corps) on5 February and. moved to an assembly area on the east coast.
-1. Repeated native reports of Jap atrocities againstcivilians in the CAMOTES ISLANDS (Just west of LEYTE) had.been received in December. On 15 Janua ry the 7th Divisionsent a task force composed of a reinforced battalion, 184thInfantry in LVTs and LCMs to PONSON ISLAND, the easternmostof the CAM OTES. The landing was unopposed and the islandwas occupied without resistance. Reported Jap a~trocitiesagainst Filipinos were confirmed and evidence and photoswere obtained. The Japs had evacuated the island some timebefore, probably as a result of our 155mam gunfire which hadbeen placed on the island for over a month. Two days latex'this battalion made an amphibious assault on PORO ISLAND
where fanatically resisting Japs located in excellent posi-tions near the town of PORO on the southern end of the islandwere encountered and eventually annihilated. Patrols weresent over the causeway to comb PACIJANI ISLAND but no hostileforces were encountered on that' island. The islands weresecure and the task force turned them over to guerrilla'troops on 31 January and returned to LEYTE.
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1e. By 12 February, all elements of the Corps on thewest coast except small elements of antiaircraft had beenrelieved by the Americal Division operating under X Corpsand by night 13 February had closed in staging areas on theeast coast of LEYTE. Relief of units on eastern LEYTE andon SAMAR was made progressively, and all elements finallymoved into staging areas by 15 February.
13. Throughout all operations on the western half ofLEYTE, wholehearted cooperation by the PT boats providedinvaluable support to elements of the XXIV Corps. Operatingprimarily at night, boats of the PT squadrons located atORMOC sortied continuously to the east coast of CEBU andnorth along the ' western coast of LEYTE. Many Jap barges,at least two (2) sizeable freighters and several schooners,many of which were loaded with Jap troops or equipment, were.sunk by PT boats. During these attacks PT boat crews wereoften fired upon by shore batteries of light caliber or byweapons carried in the Jap vessels. While casualties werefrequently suffered by these crews, their eagerness to closewith the enemy and furnish aid to our ground operations wasout-standing throughout their support of the XXIV Corps.
34. Major General J. L. Bradley of the 96th Divisionwas in temporary command of the Corps 14-25 January 1945,during the absence of the Corps Commander for a planningconference in connection with a new operation.
10. Enemy air was a constant annoyance during most ofthe period of this report but was never used in a sufficientlyconcentrated effort to interfere seriously with our activities.An attack on ORMOC just after daylight on 3 January 1945 wasthe most damaging single raid, resulting in 96 casualtiesfrom cluster antipersonnel bombs less than half of whom wereevacuated.
10, a. Counted Jap casualties during the period26 December through 10 February were:
Found Dead from Dis-Killed ease and Starvation PW ToTJ
13,221 950 .. 236 14,407
Estimated Japs remaining on island- 3,000.
b. Our own battle casualties for the same periodwcre:
KIA WIA MIA TOTAL
180 5'?? 6 763
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SEC RET
COMMENTS
17. Detailed comments and .lessons learned are made inthe Report of Operations for the period ending 25-December andwill not be repeated. With the capture of PALOION on 25 Dec-ember, it was properly announced that organized. resistance onLEYTE I5LAND had ended. The total number of enemy individualsleft on LEYTE exceeded a full division strength but with twoexceptions there was no indication of control or organizedeffort although there is strong-evidence that most elementswere in contact with a higher headquarters. Constant pressureand aggressive patrolling by, our elements frustrated any chanceof reassembly for aggressive-action and eventually reducedthe remnants to a condition in which they were of no consequenceexcept for the harassment of native communities,
18. During this phase, troops-of the infantry divisionsgainqd rich experience and much knowledge of patrolling parti-cularly in the field of combat patrolling. Greatest possibleusc was made of artillcry and its great effectiveness in moppingup operations was universally evident. -Forward observers habit-ually accompanied all combat patrols and it is believed theJaps killed by artillery fire greatly exceeded those killed byinfantry action. Artillery fire was all, observed fire placedon known targets, and was fired in short dense concentrations.Considerable timed fire was used and was especially effectiveon enomy in the open. Armored vehicles used in small groupsfor infantry support proved highly effective against enemypockets wherever the terrain all-owed, their use.
19. The most outstanding thing in the entire campaignhas been the bravery, the stability and. the durability of theAmerican soldier and junior officer and their ability to"take it" without complaint. No praise of their performancecan be too high.
JHN R. HDGE '
maj*or G neral, United Strates Army/I Commanding . 9
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SECRET 0
APPENDIX A
PERSONNEL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
1. Personnel.
a. Casualties suffered during the period 26 Decermber1944- 10 February 1945 were as follows:
BATTLE CASUALTIES
KIA0 WOEM
WIA0 WO EvM"IIA
0 weEMMIA
0 WO EMDOW
0 WOEM
Corps T's
7th Div
77th Div
96th Div
llth A/BDiv
8
60 11P7
3 1 7710
2 16 10
10
8
11 1 168 34 543 1 114
Corps Trs
7th Div
77th Div
96th Div
11th A/BDiv
NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES
SICK0 WO EM
76 6 2517
155
DEATHS0 WO EM
OTHER CAUSESo .'0 EM
11
3476
110 2 2159
81 1 2293
No Report
322
32611
19
422 9 10445 34
47
215
243
28
10
17
87
1
4 2
TO TALS
11
4
6 6 29
TOTALS 14 653
S-ECRET T
b. Grand total of casualties suffered during theentire ca'r.paicgn (20 October 1944- 10 February 1945) were asfollows:
* Organizations listed separately were reattached to Corpson or about 10 February 1945. Their final reports aresubmitted separately and are not included in Corps totals.
8
45
CorpsTrs
7thDiv
77thDiv
96thDiv
11thA/B
tepar-at e*
24
17
365
326
TOTALS
33
843
5
0 0
c. Re-pla cements were received on 31 January 1945 and wereassigned as follows:
d. Burials in Corps cemeteries curing the period 26 Dec.ember 1944- 0 February 1945 totaled 516. These added toprevious burials give the following grand total:
Includes some burials from units not under control of XXIVCorps.
2. Civil Affairs.
a. On 26 December, Philippine Civil Affairs Units(PCAU.) Numbers 14, 15, 17, 26 and 27 took over responsibilityfor civil affairs in the areas indicated on the map on page i.These PCAUs relieved Numbers 4, 7, and 8 which had been withthe Corps for some time but were relieved from their duties onLEYTE in order to make them available for duty on LUZON. Al-though the change in units resulted in some unavoidable confu-sion, the generally excellent service performed by the PCAJswas continued.
b. At this time, civil conditions on the east sideof the island had become stable. On the west coast, however,thousands of civilians had been driven from their homes' by ouradvance° The town of OMOC - the largest in the area - andnumerous smaller barrios had been destroyed. In addition, anestimated 2,000 natives of the CAMOTES ISLANDS had left theirhones .. due. to the .atrocities committed by the Japs and were
'lving a±ong the beaches north of BAYBAY. The shortage- of foodand medical supplies had resulted in seriously hazardous healthconditions throughout the west coastal plain, with the exceptionof the BAYBAY area which had been restored to a reasonably,normal condition.
c.. The PCAUs operated, directly under the Corps Com-mander with lthe mission of assisting the division comanderscha-rged with tactical, control of the particular arca concernod.PCAU supplies of food, medicine, clothing and sundries werebrought to the west coast as rapidly as space in the convoys.could be made available. An organized effort to reap the un-harvested rice crop produced an appreciable addition to theimported food supplies.
d. Resettlement cf natives in their homes was accom"plished as rapidly as tactical conditions permitted, In this
10-
0
PCAU#lUSASOS
BASE K
BARRIOS IN THISAREA ARE SERVED
BY PCAU AT
JARO 8l DAGAMI
PCAU-#27
'orIc~,,I
fOI
PCAU AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITYON LEYTE, 26 DEC TO 10 FEB 45
- 11 -
connection the IPIL-ORMOC area was made off linits to native"settlement in order to avoid interference with the supply -in-.,,stallations. Ample native labor was availrqble and was freelyused on roads and in the service installations.
e. Relocation centers were. established at DEPO$ITO(17-27), BINOLJQ (19-.625) SIGUINON (20-25) and .ALBUERA (2323)for the civilians of IPIL (16-29) and ORMC. Some OPJOC in-habitants were. .. also relocated at VALENCIA '.s were a group of4,000 civilians who wrere 'released from- Jap cwstody at HOT-SPRING-- 1-j#' 46) early in January. Overall pop1ation of theserelocation centers reoached a total of 35,000. rood .supply'wascritical, although all families admitted h-aving stored provi-sions hidden away. As the tactical situation permitted, indiv-iduals were prenitted to return for these supplies.
f., During this period, evidence of Jap atrocity ap-peared in increasing frequency. Civilians who had been shotor ruthlessly bayoneted were found every day. On PONSON ISLANDover 300 people had been brutally murdered when Aerican troops.-arrived there.
go Most serious problems encountered during the periodwere supply and government.The former was solved by shippingfrom 50 to 100 tons, mostly food, with each of the five resup-ply convoys from DULAG (63-27) to IPIL. Local government con-tinued to be hanpered by the failure of the Commonwealth Govern-mont to appoint or confirm local officials. It was found thatthe Filipino returned to his former habits and way of life veryquickly, but he refused to respect officials who had only thebacking of the military.authorities. Had the Commonwealth Gov-,ernment been quick to appoint officials, local government couldhave started much sooner,
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SE CR ET
APPENDIX B
LOCTISTI CS
lGenc:o~al .
a. The Port of 1.t.s associated service in-stallations was being ope:.'atnd by SiKo- ase K on 26 December.Inclosure No. 1, Organ.tzatlon indicates the service units.whichwurt assLgned or attache. to the XXJ*V Corps at the time of thelanding (20 Octobor) and which at the time of this report wereunder the operational control of Sub*-Base K. This was the baseinstallation responsible for support of the Corps.
b,. ,The Corps had, on 29 November, established an un-loading point at ABUYOG (see map, page 14). This installation(later known as the ABUYOG Port andtDump Area) was establishedto sped up unloading oZ. Corps resupply and rear echelon ship-ping (which was far behind schedule due. to limited port fa-il-ities.) and to provide a supplemcntary stock of supplies avaii-able for shipment to west coast units, It continued function--ing thiroughout the period of this report.
c, The logistic support of west coast units was aCorps responsibility throughout the operations. A port hadbeen established at IPIL (see map, page 14) early, in Decemberand by the 26th a corresponding dump area was in opera.tion atORMOC. At this time, the 7th Division was responsible for co-ordination of all west coast logistic activities which were in-volvel in the support of some 32,000 troops located west of themoutains.
2. Transloortat-,;0n.
a. Water transportation from the east coast to IPILwas provided by Task'Force 78,.3(7th Fleet) which sent a convoyof LSMs and LCIs to the west coast every three ,(3) days. Theseconvoys normally carried 500*-600 tons of supplies.
b. TruckX_ supplemented the available water-transpor-tation ly haUls over the narrow and mountainous MSR. Duringthe period immediately following 26 December, an average ofab~out 100 trucks daily arrived on the west coast.
c. Company B3, 592nd Engineer Boat and. Shore Regiment.operated under control of the Corps on the west coast, Thiscompany, equipped chiefly with LCMs arid LCV(P)s moved personn.el,supplies, equipzent andl casualties between points on the westcoast and were used to maintain units located in areas inacces-sible by road. In addiltion, thM rocket and flak boats of the
company were frequently called upon for supporting-fires,This unit was indispensable in the 77th'Division operations inthe PALOMPON-VILLABA area and in the 7th Divisionts assault onthe CAMOTES.
3 . . .
a. By 26 December stocks on the west coast had been.built up to a general level of 5-10 days of supply of all
SE C RET
EVACUATION
c-
LEGEND2 LANE ALL WEATHER -I LANE ALL WEATHER M-I LANE SEASONAL
NOTE:Itolicized numbers indicate
distonce in miles between asterisks
556 AMS
726 SUP TM
AM
ROAD MAP OF
LEYTEi STATUTE MILES
120 I 2 3 45 6 7 8 9I1
SUB BASE K
SUP TM (-)
PORT & DUMP
I
II
s E R E _TM0
classes. This level was maintained throughout the remainderof the operation.
b. The general plan of supply was as follows:
(1) The Corps coordinated the utilization ofthe space available on the LSM convoys.
(2) The divisions and separate units utilized.all available motor transportation tosupplement tonnage allotted on the convoys.
(3) Supplies were, in general, pooled in theTIL-0kR)OC dumps and allocated to unitsin accordance with the requirements of-the situation.
4. Medial... Suppor (Map, page 16).
a. Status of medical support on western L-ZYTE asof 26 December 1944:
(1) 35th Field Hospital was in operation at0POC o
(2) 644th Collecting Company with one (1) platoonof the 556th Ambulance Company attachedwas operating from OPMOC, with responsibilityof evacuating 7th and 77th Division ClearingStations and moving patients fromlaospitalsto beach or VALENCIA airfield for furtherevacuation. The station platoon operateda strip side holding station at VALENCIAairstrip.
(3) 69th Field Hospital, less one (1) platoon,was in process of moving to VALENCIA fromBAY3AY.
(4) One (1) platoon of the 69th Field Hospitalwas in operation at BAYDAY°
(5) 645th Collecting Company with one~l) plattoonof the 556th Ambulance Company attachedwas operating from BAYDAY with responsibilityfor land evacuation to east coa~st LEYTE,
(6) Air Transport Command, on call, was evacuatingpatients from VALENCIA airstrip.
(7) 1st Section, Ist Platoon, 589th QuartermasterLaundry Company was operating in 0RMOC*
bo Hospi tal-1ization.
(1) The 36th Field Hospital orperated at fullcapacity in ORMOC. 3 January 1945, at0645, a Jap plane dropped several anti-personnel bombs in and around the 36thField Hospital. Twenty (20) enlisted menof the hospital were wounded, of whichtwo (2) died, Sixteen (16) patients ofthe hospital received minor wounds. The
SE C ET
XSOA MAP OF";'°w LEYTE>
FR644 COLL CO _______ ._ ._1_
/ NOV-15DECtOI 44j S irm r ZRST PLAT 69®" ii" - 0o0 24 ocr
64 C oL69 F HOSPowd69 F SP (-PLAT) IONOVI14NOV,, 230CT-3DEC
0A 250DEC- FES 376 STA HOSP
4. \ OPENED 24 OCT
2 D E C - 3 JA N 0 O P EO
~~. 0, ,. OPENED 24 0 Gr644 COLL CO10 394 CLR CO
- o 2EOC r-/6 N o24 OCT- 5DEC; 20 SEC 556AM 9 -103556AM1CO
0 5DEC TO DATEW645 GOLL COo L P.: f 8 NOV-25NO V00 2DETV645 COLL CG0!36 F HOSP .,r28NOV-/2DEC
TO EAST , 7DEC-18DEC ,ST PLAT 394CLR CCCOAST 12 DEC -6 FEB
6450C L LCO jr 69 F IOSP (-PLA 3DET 69 FHOSP5DEC- FEB2 5DEC-24 DEC 17 NOV-28 NOV
IST SC556AMB l IST PLAT 69, s/17NOV-JAN 8 DEC-12 FEB
LEGEND -- "
2 LANE ALL WEATHERI LANE ALL WEATHERI LANE SEASONAL
NOTE: f*talKczed nussin iateko
dnem in m sis between astefie
-- CORPS EVAC ROUTES AMB .XXCORPS EVAC ROUTES LCM-LCVP TOW~
0 0 ARMY WATER EVAC I I
CORPS MEDICALINSTALLATIONS a EVACUATION
ROUTES
S'E CRE T
36th Field Hospital, less two(2) platoons,closed at ORMOC on 4 January 1945 andopened at VALENCIA 5 January 1945. Theremainider of the hospital was shuttledto VALENCIA. the move being completed8 January 1945. The 36th Field Hospital,less two (2) platoons, closed at VALEnCIAon 25 January and one (1) platoon closedeach three (3) days thereafter. Thehospital equipment and personnel were movedto eastern LEYTE by LSMs, three (3) daysafter closing.
(2) The 69th Field Hospital, less one (1) platoon,opened station at VALENCIA on 27 December1944., One (1) platoon, 69th Field Hospitalremained at LAYBIAY, 69th Field Hospital,less one (1) platoon, closed station atVALENCIA on 5 February 1945, the secondplatoon on 8 February 1945. Equipment wastransported to eastern LEYTE by LSM, Theplatoon of 69th Field.Hospital at fAYDAYclosed station on 11 February 1945. Thesupplies, equipment and personnel weremoved to eastern LEYTE by truck,
c. Evacuation,
(1) Beginning 28 December 1944, LCIs arrivedeach three (3) days at ORMOC. On eachoccasion, all patients that required morethan fourteen (14) days hospitalization,were evacuated., Eighth Army suppliedMedical Department personnel on the LCIsuntil 2 February 1945, Thereafter themedical units returning to eastern LEYTEfurnished the necessary Medical Departmentpersonnel. A total of 1,734 casualties(457 litter and 1,277 ambulant cases) wereevacuated by water, During the period,when the hospitals became overloaded, thecasualties were evacuated to DAYDAY byLCMs and LCV(P)s and then to the DULAGhospitals by ambulance to ADUYOG.
(2) Weather permitting, the Air Corps evacuatedby C-47s such litter cases as could! not bemoved by water, and emergency ambulatorypatients. Air evacuation was discontinued1 February 1945). A ...total of 645 (394 litterand 249 ambulant cases) were evacuated byair during the period.
. uppjes Medical supplies, were adequate duringthis pJLiase of. the operation. Supply point was set up in ORMOC.$upplies were transported to western LEYTE by truck, LSM and.LCIO. Whole blood and biologicals were delivered by Cub planeas needed. One (1) '150 cu. ft. mechanical reefer was deliveredto each field hospital on 27 December 1944.
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DI STRIBUT.ION LIST
The Adjutant General '(Thru; CG, Eighth Army) .
CG, Eighth Army7 6CG, USAFFE (2)CinCSWPA(CinC Allied N .L ?ore Lz1CG, Allied A-. L oeoC G, X C orps 1
CG, Eighth Army (1)
CG, Pacific Ocean AreasCinCPAC (1)CG, Third Amphibious Force (1)CG., Tenth Army (1)CG, IX Corps (1)CG, Pacific Ocean Areas (1)
