Mannheim - Person_number_and_inclusivity_in_two_And.pdf

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF

GENERAL LINGUISTICS

VOLUIVI

7

NUMBER 2

C A REITZEL COPENHAGEN 982


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PERSON NUMBER AND INCLUSIVITY

IN

TWO ANDEAN L A N G U A G E S 1 )

y

BRUCE MANNHEIM

[Received June 19821

1

The problem I wish to address here is first of all historiographic and that is the

ultima te textual provenience of the analy tic categories inclusive and exclusive as

applied to person systems. A distinction between inclusive

a sort of we including

the addressee, and

exclusive

a we excluding the addressee, is linguistically quite

com mo n, as Forchheimer s (1953) survey and William Jacobsen s areal study of

western North America (1980) demonstrate. It is of interest to the South

Americanist because, according to Mary H aas well known historiographic study

(1969), amplified by M arth a H ardman-de-B autista (1972), the terms first appeared

in colonial grammatical studies of both Aymara and Southern Peruvian Quechua.

But it is also of interest to the Indo-Europeanist because of the possibility that like

categories may be reconstructable f or Indo-E uropean (Kurylowicz, 1964: 149), and

consideration of the historiography of th e terms leads to greater analytic precision

with respect to their nature.

The inclusive and exclusive analytic labels are in fact older than has been

previously assumed, an d app ear in their present form fo r both languages in the late

sixteenth century. This raises a second problem: Can we tell whether the early

descriptions influenced o ne ano ther, and if s o, which language forced the analytic

I. Revised transcript of a talk at the Fifth International Workshop on Andean Linguistics Ithaca New

York July 29 1981. The material in this paper draws heavily on Mannheim forthcoming

a.

The

Quechua dat a is based in par t on field research carried out from 1976-1979 in the Department of Cuzco

Peru suppor ted by the Organization of American States The National Science Foundation and the

Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. I am indebted to Henning Andersen Ellen B.

Basso Wayles Browne Rosa Chillca Huallpa Wayne Harbert Martha J. Hardman-de-Bautista Diane

E. Hopkins Dell Hymes William Jacobsen Eloise Jelinek Peter Landerman Adrienne Lehrer Sally

McConnell-Ginet Aryon D. Rodrigues and Donald Sole for their advice and criticism. Thanks also to

Doris Sample for putting up with constant and innumerable revisions.

ACTA LINGUISTICA HAFN IENSIA 17.2 (1982) 139- 156


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BRUCE MANNHEIM

distinction? In order to answer that question we shall have to contrastively analyze

the manifestations of inclusivity and exclusivity in the two languages. I will

demonstrate that they are grammatically coded in different ways in the two

languages, a nd will draw conclusions from tha t fact as to the direction in which the

analysis was borrowed. This argument will direct my analysis to the final point,

which concerns the nature of person as a linguistic entity. W e are used to thinking

:

of person as a strictly indexial category that as it were picks out participants in the

speech event or alternately signals the lack thereof. That analysis of person is,

however, inadequate in that it makes wrong predictions about the combinability of

person and number and forces us to overlook substantive differences in the

gramm atical coding of person and its companion category, numb er, as indeed the

sixteenth century grammarians did. We must thus ascribe an intensional and

conc eptual na ture t o person alongside its extensiona l, indexical function.2)

2

T he inclusive/exclusive distinction was, to my knowledge, first observed by the

Dominican priest Domingo de Santo Tomas in his

1560

Quechua grammar. Santo

To ma s ma de repeated references to it in the early pages

fojas

8v., 9v.,

IOv.

15v.)

with the terms 'inc hy end o' an d 'excluyendo'. In 1583 the Tercer Concilio Limense

charged a committee of Jesuits with the translation of doctrine, catechism, and

sermons into Aymara an d Quechua, based on the manuscript materials then in use

by Jesuit missionaries (Bartra, 1967). The committee wrote an interesting set of

linguistic annotations to the translations, explaining several points of the

translation an d discussing the problem of dialect variation relative to the stand ard

adopted in the Doctrina Regarding the inclusive/exclusive distinction in the

Quechua first person they wrote that throughout the region,

... nclusion and exclusion are used in the first person plural b oth in prono uns and verbs.

Inclusion is when we include the person or perso ns with whom we speak in the ma tter, a s

(for example) if we were speaking to pagans we might say, 'We people are created fo r

heaven' as

(l a) aocan chic runacuna hana cpachapac camascam cachic.

Exclusion is when we exclude the person or persons with whom we speak from the

matter, as (for example) if we were speaking to pagans we might say, 'We Chistians

worship one god' as

2. It must be pointed ou t to anthropologically-oriented readers that I am using the terms 'intension' and

'extension' within the trad itio n of logical sema ntics and no t in the quite divergent sense in which

Lounsb ury (1969:29, footno te 11) reintroduc ed 'extension' into kinship sema ntics, following

Malinowski (I19291 1 2:138; 1935:14ff.; cf. H oca rt, 1937 for a critique of continuing relevance).


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PERSON, NUMBER AND INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN

141

(I b) Aocaycu chistianocuna huc Fapay Diosllactam muchaycu. )

The

1584

annotation to th e South ern Peruvian Q uechua translation th us labeled

the categories inclusion an d exclusion . Th e distinction being mad e here between

Christian s we exclusive an d hu ma ns as a whole we inclusive, priest speaking

recalls a similar example which Sa nto T om as (f.

8v.

used, in which Espa iloles we

exclusive ar e opp osed t o Y ndios we inclusive, priest speaking. Fo r all intents

an d purposes th e two categories, Espailoles and Cristianos were considered

equivalent, for evangelization was at that time culturally comprehensive, not only

religious (Duviols, 1971: 237f

. .4

T he curren tly used adjectiva l for m s inclusive an d exclusive were first used in

the annotations t o the corresponding Aym ara translation, probably in reference to

the Aymara of Juli:

Th e first person plural in demonstrative p rono uns, possessive pron oun s as well as verbs

which is used in this language for inclusion and exclusion is s follows:

(2a) hiussa, hiussan aca, hihuassana ca we inclusive

(2b) nana ca we exclusive

Our inclusive, ssa, as

(2c) apussa our lord

Our exclusive ha, adding genitive nanacana, as

(2d) nanacan a auquiha Pater noster

In verbs, what is in the conjugation serves as the first person plural inclusive. For the

exclusive the first person singular is used, adding the nominative nanaca, as

3. Aduiertase q(ue) toda esta doc trina se usa de inclusion o exclusion en las primeras personas plurales assi

de pro nabr es com o de verbos. Inclusion es qu an do incluymos en la materia a la persona, o personas, con

quien hablamos, co mo si habl ando con gentiles dixessemos, noso tros 10s hombres somos criados par a el

il

cielo, diremos, ilocanchic runacun a hanacpachapac camascam ck hi c. Exclusion es quan do excluymos

de la materia a la persona o person as con quien hablamos, com o si hab land o con 10s gentiles dixessemos

nosotros 10s christianos adoramos a vn Dios, diremos, ilocaycu christianocuna huc Fapay Diosllactam

muchay cu. (Tercer Concilio, 1584:75r.)

4 Co mpa re Co bo (1613:XIV,1:236): Las primeras p ersonas del plural de 10s verbos y el plural del

pro nom bre iloca, que significa yo y 10s prom omb res posesivos, tienen dos terminaciones, una inclusiva

y otr a exclusiva: L a terminaci6n inclusiva comprehende y significa a aque llos con quien se habla: co mo

si habland o con 10s cristianos dijksemos: Nosotros 10s cristianos conocemos a1 verdadero Dios. La

dicci6n con que esto se dice incluye a 10s que lo dicen y a aquellos con quien se habla. La exclusiva

significa n o mAs de 10s que habla n, excluye ndo a aquellos con q uien se habla; com o, si hab lando con 10s

gentiles dijksemos la misma oraci6n. la cual hariam os con diferentes p;labras que la primera vez, por que

alli era inclusiva y aq ui exclusiva; lo cual es particular desta lengua.


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BRUCE MANNHEIM

(2e) nanacapampachatha we pardon them )

Th e final sixteenth century analytic attestation, the anonym ous Q uechua

rte

of

1586 treated the inclusive/exclusive distinction along the same lines as the Tercer

Concilio:

It should be noted that the pronoun Aoca has two different plurals ... Aocanchic and

Aocaycu that mean we ; Aocanchic means we including that person or people with

whom we speak, as in saying we people , we would say Aocanchic runacuna; Aocaycu

means we excluding that person or people with whom we speak, tlocaycu

Christianocuna we the Christians, excluding pagans in case we speak with them. This

same distinction is maintained in all first persons of all verbs, except the imperative

which has no exc l~s ive .~)

The analysis of the two first person forms as including and excluding the

addressee therefore dates to at least Santo T o m h Quechua Grammatica of 1560.

Th e earliest use of the now -current terminology inclusive an d exclusive appears

to be in the an notations to the Aym ara translation of the Tercer C oncilio s

Catecismo in 1584. Ludovico Bertonio, author of the most important

seventeenth-century Ay ma ra gram ma r (1603) and Diego de Gonzhlez Holguin, th e

Quec hua gra mm arian (1607), both served in the Jesuit mission in Ayma ra speaking

Juli, and were therefore necessarily familiar with the contents of the Tercer

Con cilio s Catecismo upo n w hich they drew a t least in so far a s its analysis of the

inclusive/exclusive distinction. And Bertonio and Gonzhlez Holguin were in turn

the sources of the later adoption of the terms into European grammatical

traditions.

3

Now, while it is clear that the analyses of the inclusive/exclusive distinction in

Aymara and in (Southern Peruvian) Quechua belonged to a single colonial

gramm atical tradition , it is equally clear that th e colonial gramm arian s dichotomy

5. La primera persona plural assi delos pronabres demonstratiuos, y possessiuos, como delos verbos (que

se vsa en esta lengua por inclusion y exclusion) se pone assi. Hiussa, hiussanaca, hihuassanaca, nos

inclusiue. Nanaca nos exclusiue. Noster a um, inclusiue, ssa, como apussa, nuestro senar. Noster

exclusiue ha, sobre el nombre poniendo este genetiuo nanacana, como nanacana auquiha padre nuestro.

En 10s verbos para la primera persona plural inclusiua sirue la misma que esta en la coniugacion. Para la

exclusiua sirue la primera persona singular, poniendo este nominatiuo nanaca, como nanaca

pampachatha, nosotros las perdonamos. (Tercer Concilio, 1584:78r.).

6.

...

acerca deste pronombre, Roca, es de aduertir q(ue) tiene dos plurales diferentes de 10s nombres que

haze Rocanchic, y Rocaycu, que significa nosotros, el Rocanchic significa nosotros, incluyedo a aq(ue)lla

persona o personas con quien hablamos, como para dezir, nosotros 10s hombres, diremos Rocilchic

runacuna, el Rocaycu, significa nosotros excluy5do aquella persona o personas con quien hablamos,

como Rocaycu Christianocuna, nosotros 10s Christianos, excluyendo a 10s gentiles si acaso se hable con

ellos. Esta misma diferencia tiene todos 10s verbos en todas las primeros personas del plural, except0 el

imperatiuo q(ue) no tiene exclusib. (Anonymous, 1586, cited from the 1614 re-edition, f.4v.)


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PERSON, NUMBER A ND INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN

143

did not play the same semantic role in the person systems of the two languages. In

other words, the colonial grammarians were not in fact describing the sam e object.

A comparison of the two systems would indicate how this is the case.

I

shall refer

here to modern data, since in this particular aspect both systems have been quite

stable for the last fo ur hund red years. ) Before proceeding fu rthe r, it shou ld be

pointed out that both languages are representatives of larger language families

-

.

Southern Peruvian Quechua of the peripheral branch of the Quechua family and

Aymara of the Jaqi family (Hardman-de-Bautista, 1978; Mannheim, forthcoming

b). N o genetic relationship between the two families has been established, a lthough

the particular memberlanguages with which

I

am concerned here have been in close,

long-term con tact (Hardman-de-Bau tista 19796; Man nheim, forthcoming

4.

3.1.

1 shall first discuss the Aym ara case, based o n da ta presented in a detailed

historical reconstruction and semantic analysis of Jaqi person carried out by

Hard ma n-de-B autista (1976, 1979a: 127f.). Ay mara has a system of fo ur person al

pronouns based on two hierarchical intersecting oppositions

-

inclusion of

addressee/exclusion of addressee, inclusion of speaker/exclusion of speaker

-

as in

figure 3:

Fig.

3:

AYMARA PRONOMINAL SYSTEM

ADDRESSEE

INC )/EXC -)

Aymara person suffixes (see figure 4) are semantically isomorphic with lexical

person. Mo reover, three of the fo ur suffixes are identical to the final syllable of the

pronouns.

SPEAKER

INC )/EXC -)

7. The modern Aymara material reflects La Paz usage. Point-by-point comparison of the Aymara person

-

system described by Bertonio in the early seventeenth century for Juli, Peru with modern dialectal

variants is carried out by Lucy Briggs in her doctoral dissertation, Dialectal Variation in the Aymara

Language

of

Bolivia and Peru

1976) in chapter 8 section 2.1; chapter

5,

section 2.3; and most

copiously in chapter 6, section 3. The modern Quechua variety is Cuzco, either daughter to or otherwise

extremely closely related to the varieties described in the colonial materials in question. Changes from

the colonial period to the modern in the Southern Peruvian Quechua person system are largely

phonological. These are detailed in Mannheim, forthcoming, c.


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144 BRUCE MA NNH EIM

Fig 4: AYMARA NOUN S UF F IXES FOR P ERS ON

Th e opposition of 'inclusion of the addressee/exclusion of the addressee' form s the

pivot of th e system fro m th e point of view of linguistic an d cultural pragmatics. It is

crucial to Aymara conversation to iteratively and redundantly specify the

relationship of the addressee to the narrated event (Hardman-de-Bautista,

1976:445, 446, 450; 1979~:27; Briggs, 197 659 4 ff).

Num ber is not an obligatory category of the prono un system nor of either of the

suffixal person systems. No Aymara person form'in itself implies number and any

may appear with or without a plural morpheme without the lack thereof implying

singu larity (Ha rdm an-de -Bau tista 1976:434; 1979a:124f.). Th e inclusive/exclusive

dichotom y in Aym ara involves opposition of what Hymes (1972:105) referred t o as

an inclusive pers on marking the inclusion of the addressee to a first person w hich

excludes the addressee. The opposition is thus functionally integrated into the

person system completely apart from number. So, although the inclusive form is

referentially plural in that its extension set necessarily includes more than one

individ ual, it is not gra mm atically (or intensionally) plural.*) A principled d i-

stinction between these aspects of the linguistic sign is often blurred in analyses of

the person/number complex

-

even by those who invoke it elsewhere - because

person is the linguistic category which comes closest t o being a pure indexical.9)And

it is precisely at this point that the Tercer Concilio grammarians missed target,

glossing first person plu ral as 'exclusive we' an d inclusive person either with o r

without the plural as 'inclusive we'.

S P EAKER

I N C ( + ) / E X C -)

-xa (1)

-ma (2)

-pa (3)

-sa (inc.)

8. For general discussion of systems in which an inclusive person is grammatically coordinate to the

traditional three persons, see Conklin o n H anun 60 (1962). Jacobsen (1980:208-210 and 221, fo otnote

18) cites typologically pa rallel data in Northern Paiu te and raises the issue of the disjunction between the

formal grammatical status of the inclusive singular and its reference to two individuals as Sapir had

noticed earlier for Southe rn Paiute (1930:176). Th e Aymara d ata raises the question more sharply

k

because number is not an obligatory grammatical category: the inclusive form is thus grammatically

ADDRESSEE

I N C + / E X C -)

indeterminate as to n umber.

9. For t wo recent exam ples see Silverstein (1976:117 and 119) in which a rule of person -numb er interac tion

is aosited bv which non-alural inclusive wrson is ruled out and Zwicky (1977:719) which makes a like

as m ption: T he Jaqi ( ~ ~ m a r a )xample shows this not to be the case. Roman Jakobson (1956:132)

mad e the same general point as here in criticism of Biihler.


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146 BRUCE MAN NHEIM

COMPLEMENT SUBJECT

.DDRESSEE SPEAKER

INC/EXC INC/EXC

ADDRESS-

EE

1- +3 ) 2-3) 3-3) inc.+3)

INC/EXC

SPEAKER

INC/EXC

-ta -tathird person )

I

-tan

SPEAKER I

-2) 3-2)

INC/EXC * *

second person) -sma -tam a)

ADDRESS-

EE

2+1)

3-r l )

INC/EXC

*

first person) -ista -itu

ADDRESS-

EE 2-inc.) 3-inc.)

INC/EXC

* *

incl. person) -istu

Fig.

5: AYMARA VERB SUFFIXES FOR PERSON

unmarked tense)

Of the remaining ten cells, one is unfilled, second person subject

-

inclusive

person com plement. It exists in a sister language to Aymara, Jaqa ru Hard ma n-

de-Bautista, 1966:56-58), though there it is defective in remote tenses

Hardman-de-Bautista, 1966:57f., 68). In the remaining Jaqi language, Kawki,

second person subject - inclusive complement is syncretic with second person

subject

first

person complement Ha rdma n-de-B autista, 1976:438). Returning to

Aym ara now , H ardman-de-Bautista notes that the second person subject

-

inclusive

.

person complement form expected for Aymara via prospective reconstruction

shows up with a second person subject

-

first person complement denotatum and

posits a shift. The gap, far from arbitrary, appears in the most highly marked

-

position in the person system. Finally, it must be pointed out that the first and

second person subject

-

third person complement forms both

fa

in figure 5) are


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distinct over most of the Aymara-speaking area (first person ta and second -fa

and are morphophonemically distinct in the La Paz variety reflected in the diagram

as well (Briggs, 1976:390f.; Hardman-de-Bautista, 1976:445).

3 2 1

Lexical person in the Cuzco dialect of Southern Peruvian Quechua is

partially constructed on the basis of possessor suffixes and so will be taken up

last. ) The nominal (possessor) paradigm, represented in figure 6, is a garden

variety three-person system in which the semantically unmarked third person also

restrictedly serves a definiteness function. Three plural forms immediately follow

person in the noun: -kuna pluralizes the lexical stem; -ku identical to the first

syllable of the substantival plural and mutually exclusive with it, marks the

exclusion of the addressee from the person/number complex. Adjoined to the first

person -y and the third person -n, -ku forms a first plural exclusive (-yku) and third

plural (-nku), respectively. The -chis plural, on the other hand, marks the inclusion

of the addressee in the person/number complex. It pluralizes the second person and

together with the third person -n the form unmarked for person forms an

inclusive for which there are two pragmatically governed interpretations, first

person inclusive plural and second person polite. The inclusive interpretation, the

11. For alternative accounts of Cuzco Quechua person morphology and semantics see CusihuamPn

(1976:109f.,

123ff., 161ff.). Lefebvre and Dubuisson (1977 and n.d.), Sole (ms.), and SolP and

Cusihuamhn (1967). Of the analyses the latter two differ most radically from that presented here. Soh' s

thoroughgoing effort to segment recurrent partials resulted in identification of the

n

which initiates

many verbal person morphs as 'potential aspect' (ms.5.34.1). It is not clear whether such a radical

decomposition of forms allows one to either more elegantly identify position-classes of contrastive

morphs or predict their use in actual speech. I therefore hesitate to accept it. Moreover, it is not clear

that this rather idiosyncratic use of the term 'aspect' has anything whatsoever t o do with use of that

term in grammar or in ordinary speech.

During disussion of this paper at the Fifth International Workshop on Andean Linguistics, Sola

claimed intellectual paternity for the segmentation of the

nchis

form presented here. The claim

cannot be sustained, however. That particular segmentation was already proposed in Santo TomPs'

grammar of 1560 (flOv., for instance) and GonzPlez Holguin's grammar of 1608 (1842 reprint:41).

Identical formal segmentation in explicit, neo-bloomfieldian frameworks were arrived at by

Masako Yokoyama (195159) and William Wonderly (1952:370 and 374), although both treated

ti

before

chis

as a conditioned alternant of the first person morpheme. Neither was acknowledged by

Sol& More surprisingly, Yokoyama's morphological sketch, quite elegant though limited by

paucity of source material, is not cited in either of the descriptive works by SolP covering much the

same ground.

Solh likewise criticized the use of the term 'inclusive' here as an external imvosition and

suggested it be replaced by 'deferential' (cf. Solh, ms. 6. 31. 22; Sola and CusihamPn.

1967:5.1222). It is clearly not invariantly 'deferential' in the ordinary sense of the term, that IS,

'yielding with courtesy', since it is quite felicitously used under the opposite circumstances, for

example, a lord ordering a group of

peones

using the imperative and

chis.

Sol& therefore

redefines 'deferential' thus: 'This plural morpheme occurs under the following semantic

conditions: (a) either the actor or the receiver of the action is second person

...

(b) 2nd person

(and the speaker) are members of a group referred to elliptically as actors or receivers of the

action.... He goes on to say that, 'the semantic condition is also satisfied in commands

addressed to more than one person ... (Sol&, 6.31.22). These conditions are exactly those

summed up by the feature

inclusion of addressee

used in the text of this article. They are,

moreover, precisely the conditions mentioned by Southern Peruvian Quechua grammarians

since the sixteenth century in their definitions of 'inclusive', which incidentally appears to have

been coined for Quechua (Haas, 1969, and conclusions of this article) and hence could hardly

be considered an 'external imposition'. Since there appear to be no empirical consequences to

using the 'deferential' label (with the SolP definition not the ordinary one) as opposed to the

commonly recognized and understood term 'inclusive', I suggest that the point is moot.


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149

statement and treats the person system as absolutely regular within each major

syntactic class from the formal point of view. Such combination of third-person

with inclusive plural is typologically uncommon, but certainly not unknown. A

comparable construction combining inclusive number forms with the third person is

found in Huave, a language isolate in Mexico (Stairs and Hollenbach, 1969:49ff;

Matthews, 1972: 106f.).

The cost of this analysis is that the semantics of person are rendered more

abstract. The resultant gap between what is actually said and what the person

expressions denote must be bridged pragmatically. As I suggested above, the first

person plural interpretation of the sequence involves inference of speaker inclusion

from explicit addressee inclusion plus plurality. The advantage of a more abstract

semantics for the chis expression is that a quite natural pragmatic account of the

second person polite interpretation now becomes feasible. There are several

possible pragmatic scenarios: First, the plural component is read as an

amplification of the social persona of the (asserted) addressee. Second, given that

the usual inference from the inclusive plural form is inclusion of both addressee and

speaker, it among the personhumber forms and because of the 0 person does

not unequivocally individuate the addressee (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978:203ff.).

In fact, the response to an intended second person polite use of the inclusive plural

in a situation in which its appropriateness has not yet been established is for the

addressee to ask, Who, me? Third, again assuming the first person inclusive

interpretation as given, use of the inclusive plural as second person subsumes the

speaker in an addressee-centered speech event. (Lefebvre, 1975, extensively

discusses the second person polite use of the inclusive plural.)

The interaction of the two plurals of person with the lexical plural is of some

interest here because of divergences between colonial and modern grammatical

descriptions and because of recent disagreement over the semantics of person in

modern Cuzco Quechua which rests precisely on that point. Santo Tomis' 1560

grammar reported that only -chis and

ku

were mutually exclusive and that the

lexical plural

kuna

could occur with either

1

lr, for example). GonzAlez Holguin

agreed in his early seventeenth century grammar (1852 [16081:47). It appears that in

the modern language the lexical plural kuna may only co-occur with the inclusive

plural -chis and is prohibited from co-occurring with

ku.

Does this reflect a change

in the language in which the interaction of number in the person system and the

lexical plural has become less regular? think not.

Over the past few years have worked fairly extensively with Quechua text from

the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and have not been able to find a

single textual attestation of the putative

ku kuna

sequence. I suspect therefore that

the examples which appear in the grammars of that period are analogical

reformulations on the part of the grammarians, and that in fact the colonial and the


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150 BRUCE MANNHEIM

modern languages do not differ in this respect.

Second, it has recently been alleged that while the lexical plural

kuna

may

co-occur with the nchis sequence (zero person, inclusive plural) it may not co-occur

with the nkichis (second person, inclusive plural) sequence (Dubuisson and

Lefebvre, 1979:4ff.). This in turn motivated a claim that nchis is morphologically

unsegmentable and hence a four-person analysis of Southern Peruvian Quechua as

isomorphic to the Aymara system discussed earlier. But this is simply not the case.

Pluralization of a lexical stem marked with a second person, inclusive plural

number is in fact grammatical. Thus, wawaykichiskuna your (plural) children ,

despite the claims of Dubuisson and Lefebvre, is perfectly well-formed and

interpretable. There is therfore no distributional reason to analyze

chis

differently

in the sequences nchis (zero person, inclusive plural) and nkichis (second person,

inclusive plural).

3 2 2 The pattern of the subject verbal paradigm is identical to that of the nominal

(see figure 7). The close formal relationship between the two paradigms, preserved

in all of the Quechuan languages, leads to the assumption of a common pattern

prior to the break-up of Proto-Quechua. Well understood reanalysis of verbal

person of the sort studied by Watkins (e.g., 1962:90ff.) and others whereby the

semantically zero third person was interpreted repeatedly as a zero form and spread

through the paradigm, subject to government by tense and mood, appears to have

been at work here as hope to show in future work.


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152 BRUCE MANNHEIM

inclusive plural position V is pluralized; in

-wa-nki-ku,

second person subject,

first person obje ct, exclusive plural position I is pluralized; and

-wa-n-ku,

third

person su bject, first person objec t, exclusive plural is amb iguo us between a reading

in which I is pluralized and one in which V is pluralized.

Th e inclusive/exclusive dichotomy is less well-installed (in William Jacobsen s

perspicacious term) in lexical person. The same three-person pattern is evidenced

here. Second and third person are pluralized as any substantive, with -kuna:

qan-kuna

and

pay-kuna,

respectively. But the inclusive/exclusive split is retained by

adjoin ing th e respective first person nominal suffix to the first person lexical stem:

nuqa-n-chis first person plural inclusive ; nuqa-y-ku first person plural exclusive .

The

nuqanchis

form unequivocally designates the first person plural inclusive .

It can no t be used with a second p erson polite reading as can the +chis sequence.

This fact supplies a n ad ditiona l argum ent fo r the analysis of t he semantics of +chis

presented above. Were we to treat the second person polite usage of -nchis as a

pragm atic disp lacemen t of a fo rm w hich is semantically first person, we would need

to explain why

nuqanchis,

with an explicit first person, can never be interpreted as

second person polite. This fact follows automatically from the account here in

which -nchis is a vague zero person-inclusive plural pragm atically filled in as first

person inclusive plural or as a second person polite.

4.

In my discussion of early use of the categories inclusive an d exclusive

concluded that the analytic distinction between inclusive and exclusive in person

systems appears to date to sixteenth century missionary grammars and religious

translations in two Andean languages, Aymara and (Southern Peruvian)

Quechua.l3) It is evident that missionary priests working with both languages drew

o n a comm on tradition in their linguistic work a nd o n a comm on terminology, on e

which was developed in response to Andean experiences and was not merely a

slavish imitation of Nebrija or other continental grammarians (cf. Rowe,

1974:365). Yet the common terminology developed in an American context could

just as surely lead them to misidentify grammatical categories in

one

language on

the basis of another. And the inclusive/exclusive distinction is a case in point.

While both Q uech ua and Aym ara encode inclusiveness in their grammatical

systems, the contrastive analyses in section 3 show that it is quite differently

installed in each: Aymara encodes the inclusive/exclusive dichotomy in its

person

system; Quechua in its number system. Extending Hymes terminological

suggestion, Aymara has an inclusive

person ,

but Quechua an inclusive

13. Aryon D. Rodrigues pointed out to me that an analytical distinction between inclusive and exclusive

appears in sixteenth century Brazil in the Tupian grammar of Anchieta, published in 1595. Dr.

Rodrigues observes that A nchieta s grammar was actually comp osed ap proxim ately three decades

earlier, making it roughly contem poraneo us to Do mingo d e Santo TomBs grammar. This fact places

the ultimate Peruvian precedence of the analytic distinction in some d oubt, and certainly requires and

merits further research.


17/22

PERSON, NU MBER AN D INCLUSIVITY IN ANDEAN

53

numb er'.14) (The lexical pronom inal first person inclusive referred t o in

3.2.2

is a

complex expression which presupposes the substantival person-number system.)lS)

The passage which I cited from the annotation to the Aymara translation of the

Do ctrina of th e Tercer Concilio of

1583

in which num ber

is

inappropriatel brought

in, suggests that the Aymara analysis was calqued on sixteenth century works on

Qu echu a, in which the con flation of 'inclusion'/'exclusion' an d 'plural' was

entirely appropriate.I6)

Th e lesson of their misconstrual of the categorial seman tics of the Aym ara person

system is still current. The illusion that person functions in natural language as a

mere index of particip ants in the speech event and lacks any concep tual properties

in relation to the gram ma tical system is a pervasive on e and is difficult to overcome .

But if we stubbo rnly cling to th at illusion, we misinterpret the nature of th e Aym ara

non-plural inclusive person as a 'dual ' category which has n o status in the Ayma ra

gramm atical system, an d maintain t ha t the Ay ma ra language is somehow bizarre in

treating as singular a form which indexes two speech-act participants, or falsely

predict tha t such states-of-affairs are impossible. 17

Likewise, the viewpoint that person functions purely indexically makes the

Cuzco-Quechua second person polite use of the (zero person-) inclusive plural

-nchis an arbitrary attachm ent of the use to the form and makes the otherwise quite

transparent verbal and nominal person-number systems appear morphologically

irregular and opaque. In an analysis in which more abstract conceptual properties

are assigned to both person and number, the first person inclusive plural and

second-person polite strategies fall-out quite naturally as alternate pragmatic

inferences. A co herent accou nt of these facts requires us to ascribe a conceptual an d

intensional nature t o person, alongside its extensional indexical function .'@

14. G ilij (1965[17821) used the expression 'inclusive num ber' in speak ing of Ch iqu ito (20512461). but it is

clear from the context that he intended it to refer to the phenomenon of distinguishing inclusive and

exclusive as a whole. (Other mentions include Tamanaca (15811811) and Quechua, the latter after

Ga spar Xuarez (198I2361); cf. Haas 1969).

IS. The analysis presented here, of course, crucially presupposes that grammatical morphology (entirely

suffixal) is a conceptual prime, alongside the word, in Southern Peruvian Quechua gram mar. Although

it is not possible to elicit free citation forms of grammatical formatives, the entire synchronic and

diachronic set of the language toward transpar ent agglutination seems to bear ou t this assumption.

16. It must be stressed here that-I am referring to the southernmost members of the Quechua family. (On

classification o f the Q uechua languages, see Mannheim, forthcoming, b . The Central branch and some

of the Northern languages have a Jaqi-like four person system with a morphologically unsegmentable

cognate to Cuzco

-nchis

as the inclusive person. The present inclusive number system may well have

been an innovation in the non-central languages despite Forchheimer's claim (1953:98) that inclusive

forms always develop from the narrowing of one of two competing plural forms. Curiously, these

include the very Quechua varieties which most show the areal influence of the Jaqi languages

(Mannheim, forthcoming,

d .

17. Cf. Matthews, 1972:105, 117. See also footnote 9.

18.

1

am unc omm itted a s to the precise relationship between the gram matical categories (concepts) assigned

to person and the intension assigned to account for its (indexical) extensions. I suggest that in the

person system the intension in the formal, carnapian sense in which it is determinate of a set of

extensions is quite closely tied t o its conceptual specification. See Partee (1979) and Dow ty (1979, Ch .

8) for theoretical discussions of th e problems raised by the relationship between concept and intension,

but notice that the problem of underdetermination of semantic concepts exists also in the analysis of

any other representational system (e.g., phonology, syntax, social structure).


18/22

BRUCE MANNHEIM

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