Marja'Iyah in Iran and a. Khamenei

7/29/2019 Marja'Iyah in Iran and a. Khamenei

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/marjaiyah-in-iran-and-a-khamenei 1/13

This article was downloaded by: [Australian National University]On: 27 November 2012, At: 14:37Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Middle Eastern StudiesPublication details, including instructions

for authors and subscription information:

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20

The marja'iya in Iranand the nomination of

Khamanei in December

1994Saskia Gieling

Version of record first published: 06 Dec

2006.

To cite this article: Saskia Gieling (1997): The marja'iya in Iran and the

nomination of Khamanei in December 1994, Middle Eastern Studies, 33:4,

777-787

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263209708701180

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,

reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution inany form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied ormake any representation that the contents will be complete oraccurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae,and drug doses should be independently verified with primarysources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions,

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions



http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263209708701180

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmes20



claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with orarising out of the use of this material.

D o w n l o a d e d b y [ A

u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y ] a t 1 4 : 3 7 2 7 N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2



The Marja'iya in Iran and the Nomination of

Khamanei in December 1994

SASKIA GIELING

The death of Ayatollah Araki, the marja'-i taqlid or 'source of emulation'

for Twelver Shiites, at the end of November 1994 marked the beginning of

a short-lived propaganda campaign for the selection of Ali Khamanei as hissuccessor by parts of the Iranian media, such as the dailies Ittila 'at and

Tehran Times, and the Iranian state controlled radio and television. The

nomination of Khamanei and the propaganda campaign were criticized

immediately by Iranian dissidents, opponents of the Iranian Republic and

W estern media and the nomination was described as unacceptable and even

as a religious coup.1

The criticism concentrated on two points; first, Khamanei did not meet

in the least the required standards for the position of marja 'iya, and second,involvem ent of Iranian political authorities in religious affairs had gone too

far this time. The purpose of this article is to look into the motives for the

nomination of Khamanei.

It is important to remark that the marja'iya as it emerged in the

nineteenth century was never accompanied by a specific and strict selection

method, for instance an election procedure, through which a new marja-i

taqlid could be appointed. This was probably due to the fact that the

prerequisites for a marja '-i taqlid were difficult to test and inadequate as ameans to compare the candidates for the position because, apart from the

two most important requisites, a'lamiya (superiority of learning in the field

of religious law ), these all lay in the field of mo ral behaviour, as for instance

salahiya (righteousness).2

As a result, it occurred only a few times in history

that one person succeeded in becoming the sole marja'-i taqlid accepted by

all Shiites, the last one being Aqa Husayn Burujirdi (d.1961).3

To understand the problems surrounding the nomination of Khamanei,

we must go back to March 1989 when Ayatollah Muntaziri was forced by

Khomeini to step down as his successor as rahbar (leader) of the Islamic

Republic.4

The dismissal had consequences for the succession of Khomeini,

beca use the constitution required that the leader should also be a marja' and

am ong the clerics who followed 'the line of the Imam' and who were

therefore the only polit ically acceptable candidates for Khomeini 's

succession; no one measured up to this standard.5

Even M untaziri 's original

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.33, No.4, October 1997, pp.777-787PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

D o w n l o a d e d b y [ A u s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t y ] a t 1 4 : 3 7 2 7 N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2



77 8 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

appointment had not been without its problems. According to some sources,

Muntaziri had not belonged to the top-ranking mujtahids when he was

chosen as Khomeini's successor in 1984. Moreover, he did not publish his

risala (practical treatise on religious matters) until that year.

6

To make hissuccessor more palatable to the public, Iranian media promoted him to

Ayatollah al-'uzma (Grand Ayatollah) and his loyalty to Khomeini and his

role in the revolution were used as arguments for his appointment.7

Shariatmadari did not consider Ayatollah Muntaziri suited to become a

marja'-i taqlid either and he refused to support Muntaziri's nomination

when he was asked to do so after the revolution.8

Khomeini's succession became a burning issue when he died on 4 June

1989 and President Ali Khamanei was appointed by the Assembly of Expertsas rahbar (leader) in Khomeini's place. The Assembly of Experts had been

set up by the Iranian government to select a successor for Khomeini.

Khamanei only held the rank of hujjatolislam and, was not an Ayatollah, let

alone a marja'-i taqlid. Strictly speaking this appointment was

unconstitutional since the Constitution of 1979 stipulated that the leader had

to be a marja '-i taqlid. Supporters of Khamanei tried to solve this problem

in different ways . First, on the day he was nom inated, Khamanei began to be

called 'Ayatollah' by the media. Second, the necessity of having a marja' asleader was being questioned and even denied. Hujjatolislam Hashimi

Rafsanjani, in the Tehran Friday serm on of 9 June, referred to a letter which

Khom eini had sent on 29 April 1989 to Ayatollah Ali Mishkini, the presiden t

of the recently founded Constitutional Review Council. According to

Rafsanjani, Khomeini had stated in this letter that he had never believed that

being a marja' was a prerequisite for the leader of the Islamic Republic. A

just mujtahid was also acceptable.9

This letter was not published at the time

and, indeed, it was dec lared a forgery by Abulasan B ani Sad r's daily Inqilab-i islami dar hijra.

10W hatever the truth of this matter, in his decree of 24 April

1989, which had approved of a change in the constitution but had not

mentioned the marja 'iya, Khomeini had referred to rahbari (leadership) as

one of the questions which should be discussed." In his sermon of 9 June,

Hashimi Rafsanjani legitimized the nomination by saying that leadership is

above the constitution and that Khomeini regularly had given permission to

overlook the constitution. Everyone was bound to obey the leader, even

mujtahids.12 According to Hashimi Rafsanjani, Khomeini had told him twicethat there would be no leadership vacuum after his death because of

Ayatollah Kh am anei's presence. Moreover, Ahm ad Khomeini said his father

had referred to Khamini' as 'an indisputable Islamic jurisprudent'. 13 When

the Constitutional Review Council brought out its recommendation on 8 July

1989, it followed Rafsanjani's line by deleting the stipulation that the leader

had to be a marja '-/ taqlid.

D o w n l o a d e d b y [ A u

s t r a l i a n N a t i o n a l U n i v e

r s i t y ] a t 1 4 : 3 7 2 7 N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 2



THE MARJA'IYA IN IRAN AND THE NOMINATION OF KHAM ANEI 77 9

In purely religious terms, Khomeini's death did not make the selection

of a new marja '-i taqlid necessary. After the death of Ayatollah Aqa H usayn

Burujirdi in March 1961 , Khom eini was one of several mujtahids who

became accepted as marja '-i taqlid, of which Sayyid Abu'l Qasim Khu'i(d.1371-1992) in Najaf, Sayyid Shihab al-Din Marashi-Najafi

(d.1369/1990) in Qum and Muhammad Reza Gulpaygani (d.1372/1993)

also in Qum , were still alive at the time of Kh om eini's d eath. The difficulty,

however, was that these marja's did not support the Iranian government nor

favoured the institution of wilayat-i faqih (the Mandate of the Jurisprudent).

This meant that, in the case that they issued fatwa's (legal opinions) which

were not in line with the official policy of the Iranian g ove rnm ent, this could

bring forth a legitimacy crisis for the government. After all, in January 1988Khomeini himself had stated that the Islamic government was an offshoot

of the prophet's absolute mandate.14

This implied a claim to represent the

highest authority, both in the political sphere and in the religious sphere, but

the new leader Khamanei, because of his minor religious rank, lacked the

religious authority to make this claim credible whatever his political

qualifications might be.

In the government controlled press, two Ayatollahs, Muhammad Reza

Gulpaygani and Muhammad Ali Araki were recommended as new marja's

probably because neither constituted a political threat to the Iranian regim e.

These clerics had neither opposed Khomeini's innovative ideas about the

wilayat-i faqih, nor were they actively engaged in politics.15

Gulpaygani

however, had protested against the treatment of marja'-i taqlid

Shariatmadari by the government, and the fact that the government did not

place the primary ordinances of Islam above matters related to

government.16 Araki had never sought followers and lacked the necessary

networks to become a marja'." In accordance with the government line,

Araki proclaimed that the legal opinions of Khomeini could still be

followed.18

This went against all traditions that the legal opinions of a dead

marja' should not be followed. The events of 1989 seem to show that the

first steps for the subordination of the marja 'iya were already taken at that

time.'9 The fact that the decisions of a dead wali-yi amr were considered

more valid than those of a living marja' certainly confirm this.

W hen G ulpaygan i died on 9 Decem ber 1993 the Chief Justice, AyatollahMuhammad Yazdi and the Majlis Speaker Natiq Nuri, were the first to

recommend Khamanei as Gulpaygani's successor. Yazdi made it clear that

Araki was not a satisfactory marja' and that Khamanei was the only

qualified candidate. He argued that for a marja' not only is it important that

he is a jurisconsult, that he is pious and just, but also that he has political

and social consciousness so as to manage the Islamic community and

society. Furtherm ore, since the installation of the sovereignty of the Islamic







government it was not in the interest of the Islamic community that there

was more than one marja'. Islam was now being guarded by the wali-yi

amr, and he was capable of handling all kinds of issues. Yazdi warned

against the separation of religion and politics which could be avoided by

comb ining the wilayat and the marja 'iya in the person of Kham anei.20 Other

clerics affiliated with or belonging to the government, did not support Yazdi

and Nuri but supported A raki. It was stressed repeatedly that Araki had been

involved in the revolution and had always endorsed the Islamic Republic.21

The reference to political, social (and also econom ic) consciousness as a

requirement for the marja '-i taqlid is not groundless, since at times there

had been marja's who were engaged in political, social or economic

affairs.22

Some of them had had close relations with and supported thegovernment, such as the mujtahids who endorsed the two wars with Russia

in the nineteenth century. Others at times had opposed the political

authorities, like Mirza Hasan Shirazi who played a role in the resistance

against the Tobacco Concession in 1891-92.23

But the attempt to combine

political and religious authority in one person, was unprecedented. It had

been an innovation of the Islamic R epublic (with of course the exception of

the first Islamic century).

After the death of Araki on 30 Nove m ber 1994, m ore clerics made clearthat they w ere in favour of the nomination of Kh am anei for marja '-i taqlid.

The daily Ittila'at for instance published speeches of clerics who

recommended Khamanei as the successor of Araki.24

The Militant Clergy

Association presented the names of Khamanei, Muham mad Fazil Lankarani

and Mirza Jawad Aqa Tabrizi, thereby contradicting earlier reports that

Khamanei's name was not one of the names on the list of the Association.25

The statement referred to Khamanei as Ayatollah al-'uzma and said

furthermore that both Gulpaygani and Araki had supported the wilayat andimama of Khamanei. From this statement, as published in Ittila 'at, it seems

that Khamanei was now the favourite candidate of the Militant Clergy

Association. Khomeini, however, despite being dead for more than five

years, was regarded as the marja '-i taqlid par excellence, because at the end

of the statement it was stressed that in case anyone was incapable of

obtaining the fatwa's of the recom m ended persons , those of a dead mujtahid

like Khomeini could still be followed. Other dead marja's were not

mentioned.26

In an official statement, dated 2 December (11 adhar 1373), the

Association of Teachers of the Hawzeh Theological College in Qum

presented seven names, with Khamanei's name third on the list.27 Two days

later Ittila 'at published a statement by the Propaganda Office of the Haw zeh

Theological College. The statement mentioned the necessary qualities a

marja' should possess, such as political consciousness and the ability to



r s i t y ] a t 1 4 : 3 7 2 7 N o v e

m b e r 2 0 1 2




handle political and social issues. No reference was made to traditional

requirements like knowledge, piety and justice. On the contrary, a mujtahid

who excelled in matters of usul and furu' but who was not familiar with

religion as a system of economic, political, social and internationaldimensions was not learned enough to be a mujtahid. The conclusion of the

statement was that Khamanei was recommended as the suitable candidate

for the marja 'iya.2t

Although there were some supporters who referred to Khamanei's

ability to deliver legal opinions (ifta),29 most supporters spoke about the

safeguarding of Islam, the Islamic revolution and Islamic Republic against

foreign, hostile powers as the requirement for the position of marja'i-

taqlid.™ In the Tehran Friday sermon, Ayatollah Jannati, member of theAssembly of Experts, said that the safeguarding of Islam is more binding

{wajibtar) than the safeguarding of the ordinances (ahkam).^ M oreover, like

Majlis Speaker Natiq Nuri a few days later, he stated that the safeguarding

of the Islamic government of Iran is the most essential obligation.32

The

marja '-i taqlid had therefore to be prevented from being able to issue legal

decisions not in line with governm ent po licies and as a result are against the

national interest." According to Jannati the exam ple of birth control show ed

this best.34 An uncontrolled birth rate is harmful at this time, therefore theIranian government has a well-considered government policy concerning

the necessity of birth control. The issuing of fatwas with opposite advice

endangers the national interest.35

These remarks clearly show that Khamanei's nomination by several

members of the Iranian clergy was motivated primarily by a desire to ensure

that the marja'iya came under Iranian state control so as to exclude

competition or intervention in state affairs through the issuing of decrees.

This was not the first time that Iranian political authorities had tried to

'anoin t' a successor to a deceased marja '. After the death of marja '-i taqlid,

Ayatollah A qa Husayn B urujirdi on 31 March 1961 , M uam ma d R eza Shah

had sent his condolances to Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim, residing in Najaf.36 In

a message after Burujirdi's death Muammad Reza Shah referred to Muhsin

Hakim and other ulama and aqayan in his condolences.37 With his

condolences, the Shah made clear that he approved of Ayatollah Hakim as

Burujirdi's successor as marja'-i taqlid. It is generally accepted that the

Shah's intervention must be seen as an effort to silence the influential and

independent institution of the marja 'iya inside Iran and especially the ulam a

in Qum.38 But, according to Ruhani, after the death of Muhsin Hakim in

1970, the shah sent his condolances to two Iranian Ayatollahs: Ahmad

Khwansari (d.1985) in Tehran and Shariatmadari, who, although from

Tabriz, resided in Qum . A second on e was sent by the court to Yusuf Hakim ,

the son of the deceased marja '.39

It is unclear how far the shah intended to





go with his involvement in religious affairs, but it is evident that he never

went as far as trying to dissolve the independent institution of the marjaiya

and make it part of the state apparatus.

There are more indications that the nomination was an attempt to bringthe marja'iya under Iranian state control. First, the role of the Iranian

Militant Clergy Association and the Association of Qum Teachers - both

associations closely linked to the regime - in the nomination was stressed,

leaving no room for independent preferences for candidates from outside

Iran, who were not mentioned at all. Natiq Nuri for instance stated that the

Association of Teachers of the Hawzeh Theological College in Qum and the

Militant Clergy Association were the bodies to be qualified to select a

marja'-i taqlid. They were praised for endorsing Khamanei as the newmarja'-i taqlid. In his speech, Natiq N uri referred to the fact that Kham anei

had been chosen by the Assembly of Experts as leader of the Islamic

Republic five years before, then he thanked the two associations for m aking

the well-considered decision to select Khamanei as marja'-i taqlid. But as

already mentioned, nomination by collective bodies was entirely without

precedent. Never was a new marja'-i taqlid selected or elected by a

commission, instead one or more persons would be gradually accepted by

the comm unity.

40

To counter this objection, Muhammad Yazdi, Head of theJudiciary explained that the two Associations had in fact taken over the

responsibility from the two just and qualified perso ns w ho were needed to

make the designation of a marja '-i taqlid acceptable.41

Second, it was stressed that condolences from both Sunni's and Shiites

outside Iran were sent to the leader of the Revolution, thus emphasizing his

importance.42 This had also been the case when the Iraqi marja' Abu' l

Qasim Khu'i died in August 1992.43 Thirdly, Khamanei still claimed to be

marja' for Shiites outside Iran even after his subsequent withdrawal as acandidate. He argued that there were enough mujtahids in Iran for Iranians

to follow but that abroad the situation was quite different. Outside Iran there

was as yet no one who could function as marja' except for himself. Once

that situation would have changed, he would be quite happy to relinquish

the marja'iya for Shiites outside Iran as well.44

A second m otive for the elevation of Kham anei, apart from the desire to

increase state control over the clergy, was to give the state a renewed basis

for its claim that it was an Islamic theocracy, in accordance with the above

mentioned statement by Khomeini that the government was a offshoot of

the prophet's absolute mandate.

The reference to the imama of Kham anei in the statem ent by the Militant

Clergy Association shows that he, like Khomeini, is considered to be

governing on behalf of the twelfth imam.45

The remarks by Muhammad

Yazdi in Decem ber 1994 confirm this. After repeating his w ords from 1993







that during a time when Islam gov erns only one person is needed who issues

decrees, he says that the religious taxes should be paid to the jurisconsult

who is guardian and w ho governs the state and not to a juriscon sult who

does not rule.46

This clearly is an attempt to challenge the status and

influence of the marja'-i taqlid, which is also based on his financial

resources coming from these religious dues.47

Even Ayatollah Azari-Qumi,

who was against the nomination of Khamanei and favoured Ayatollah

Bihjat, said that the religious dues should be paid to the leader of the

revolution for his 'executive work' in the Islamic world.48

It could be argued that Khomeini had himself set a precedent for the

primacy of social and political arguments over religious ones. According to

Momen, Khomeini had also only become a marja-i taqlid on the basis of hisreputation for his political activism and not on the basis of his superiority in

learning in the field of jurisprudence.49

Akhavi has a lso stated that, a lthough

Khomeini was a marja', he was considered to be minor in rank, probably

because he had published less than other maraji'.i0

Khomeini was well

respected for his knowledge in kalam (speculative theology), ahlaq (ethics),

'irfan (gnosis) and philosophy but these fields were considered to be

inferior to law and knowledge in these fields was not a requirement for a

marja'. Momen has also argued that Khomeini's elevation to the rank ofGrand Ayatollah took place only after his arrest in June 1963 and was a

political move by Iranian ayatollahs who thus made him immune for the

carrying ou t of the death sentence which w as proclaimed by a military cou rt

after Khomeini's involvement in the uprising of June 1963 against the

shah.51

This is doubtful, however. Ruhani does not mention this death

sentence. According to him, Khomeini was detained for one day in the

officers club in Tehran and subsequently for nineteen days in Qasr prison.

Thereafter he stayed under house arrest in Tehran until the end of the A lamgovernment in May 1964.

52Ruhani does not mention Khomeini's supposed

elevation to Ayatollah al- 'uzma after his arrest either. It is clear, however,

that the issue of immunity from prosecution played a role at the time.

According to Ruhani, ayatollah Qumi sent a letter to Shariatmadari and

three other maraji' in which he spoke about the maqam-i ruhaniyat (rank of

the clergy) and its immunity.53

Reports about the death sentence against

Khomeini are based most probably on rumours spread by anti-shah activists

to discredit his regime.34

In the end, the marja'iya proved a bridge too far for the religious

lightweigh t Kham anei - in spite of his considerable political powerbase. He

announced his withdrawal as a candidate for the marja 'iya on 14 December

1994. He explained that the burden of the leadership was too heavy to

combine it with the marja'iya and that there were more than enough

mujtahids in Qum who could issue a risala." His withdrawal must be seen







as an attempt to meet the growing crisis within the Iranian government

originating in the conflicting views about Khamanei's nomination and to

close the ranks within the Iranian elite again. There was an intensive effort

to save face. Several statements were made to deny the fact that the Iranianelite was divided over the marja 'iya affair and all negative reports over the

marjaiya were presented as fabrications of the anti-Iranian media.

Khamanei's ability as a wali-yi amr was underlined and the responsibility

and importance of the institution of the wilaya t-i faqih.56

The most striking

exam ple were the statemen ts in defence of Kham anei of Hashimi Rafsanjani

who had neither made any public com ments on Kham anei's nom ination nor

had he made his viewpoints clear until after Khamanei's withdrawal. The

fact that Hashimi Rafsanjani did not interfere publicly must be seen asevidence for his disapproval of Khamanei as a candidate for the marja 'iya.

His words 'our recognition of him as the marja" were only made after

Khamanei's withdrawal and the reports by radio Tehran that he referred to

Khamanei as 'Ayatollah al-'uzma' may not be genuine.57

Moreover,

Hashimi Rafsanjani's remarks that Khamanei had not once considered

accepting the marja'iya and that all these lies from the Zionist and

imperialist media were an injustice to the marja'iya and Khamanei make

this even more clear.

58

But there were also some who stood firm in their view that wilayat-i

faqih and marja'iya should be combined. Ayatollah Imami Kashani for

instance said that the wali-yi amr is a marja' according to fiqh and that he

has the allegiance (bay'a) of the people and the support of the imam-i

zaman.59

The conclusion m ust be that Kham anei's nom ination was not an isolated

event but part of a process which had started with the death of Khomeini in

1989. Because of his political clout, Khamanei managed to succeed

Khomeini as rahbar in spite of his low religious status and the existence of

constitutional impediments. The policy of the Iranian leadership in the

following years was to ensure that the wilaya t-i faqih was the real political

and religious authority, not only on the basis of the constitution and

Khomeini's remarks that the government was an offshoot of the mandate of

the prophet, but also on the basis of a state controlled marja 'iya. When the

opportunity arose after the death of Araki in 1994, Khamanei made a move

to get himself appointed and so to to combine in himself all the authority

which had once been Khomanei's. When the opposition to the appointment

proved too strong, the pre-eminence of the wilayat over the marjaiya was

em phasized by the regim e in an effort to limit the dam age. The w hole affair

once m ore show s that the Iranian governm ent is still in doubt and indecisive

about the consequences of the elimination of marja'iya from the

requirements for the Iranian leadership in the revised Constitution of 1989




THE MARJA'IYA IN IRAN AND THE NOMINATION OF KHAMANEI 78 5

which, as Arjomand has noted, 'resulted in a new dualism of political and

religious authority, representing a compromise between traditional and

innovative principles, between marja'iyat and welayat-e faqih in Shi'ite

Persia'.

60

N O T E S

1. See for a survey of the critical views by opponents, inside and outside Iran: W. Buchta, 'DieIslamische Republik Iran und die religios-politische Kontroverse um die marja 'iyat', Orient,Vol.36, No.4 (1995), pp.449-74. See also London based Keyhan, 24 Nov., 1 Dec. and 8Dec.1994 (FBIS, Daily Report, 20 Jan. 1995); S. Haeri, 'Kham enei's religious cou p', Middle

East International, No.490, 16 Dec. 1994, p.14; K. Foroohar, 'Kham enei d idn't m ake it', TheMiddle East, No.242 (1995), pp.12-14; H. Kaidi, 'Iran. L'irresistible ascension d'AliKhamenei', Jeune Afrique, No.1771, 15 dec.1994, pp.37-8 .

2. J. Calmard, 'Mardja'-i taklid', Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol.6, p.55 5.3. A. Kazemi Moussavi, 'The Institutionalization of Marja'-i taqlid in the Nineteenth Century

Shi'ite Community', The Muslim World,Vol.83, No.3-4 (1994), pp.279-99, pp.291-2. A.Amanat, 'In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: The Designation of ClericalLeadership in Modern Shi'ism', in S.A. Arjomand (ed.), Authority and Political Culture inShi'ism (Albany, 1988), pp.9 8-13 2, p . 124.

4. A. Schirazi, 'Die neuere Entwicklung der Verfassung in der Islamischen Republik Iran',Verfassung und R echt in Obersee, Vol.14, No.2 (1991), pp.105-22, p.106.

5. See Articles 107 and 109 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.6. Iran Focus, Vol.2, No.7 (19 89), p.4.7. S. Akhav i, 'Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Repub lic of Iran', Middle East Journal, Vol.41,

No.2 (1987), pp.1 81-20 1, p.197.8. Private comm unication from Dr Touraj Atabak i.9. This letter, dated 2 ordibehesht 1368, 29 April 1989 was published in lttila'at alongside the

sermon of Hashimi Rafsanjani. lttila'at, 20k hor dad 1368, 10 June 1989, p.15; Tehran Times,10 June 1989, Aktueller Informationsdienst Moderner Orient, Vol.15, No.13 (1989),pp.60-1; S. Tellenbach, 'Zur Anderung der Verfassung der Islamischen Republik Iran vom28.Juli 1989', Orient, Vol.31, No.l (1990), pp.45-66, p.49.

10. A. Schirazi, 'Die neuere Entwicklung der Verfassung in der Islamischen Republik', p.112n24.

11. lttila'at, 5 ordibehesht 1368, 25 April 1989, p.2.

12. lttila'at, 10 June 1989, p.15; Tehran Times, 10 June 1989, Aktueller InformationsdienstModerner Orient, Vol.15, No.13 (1989 ), p.6 1.

13. Iran Focus, Vol.2, No.7 (1989), p.4.14. See for an analysis of Khomeini's decree: J. Reissner, 'Der Imam und die Verfassung. Zur

politischen und staatsrechtlichen Bedeutung der Direktive Imam Khomeinis vom 7. Januar1988', Orient, Vol.29, No.2 (1988), pp.21 3-36 , p.223. Said Amir Arjomand, 'Constitution ofthe Islamic Republic', Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol.6, pp.1 50 -8, p.158 . S.A. Arjomand, 'TheRule of God in Iran', Social Compass, Vol.36, No.4 (1989), pp.539^48. G. Jansen,'Khomeini's Heretical delusions of Grandeur', Middle East International 23 Jan. (1988),pp.18—19. See also article 5 of the constitution of the Islamic Repu blic of Iran .

15. W. Buchta, 'Die Islamische Republik Iran und die religios-politische Kontroverse um diemarja'iyat, p.454. According to Akhavi, 'among living maraji al-taqlid (Khomeini, Kh u'i,Mar'ashi Najafi, Qumi, Gulpaygani), none had advocated revolution'. S. Akhavi, 'EliteFactionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran', p.191. The inclusion of Khomeini in thissequence seems surprising, to say the least.

16. S. Akhavi, 'E lite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran', pp . 191 -2.

17. Iran Focus, Vol.2, No.7 (1989), p.4.






786 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

18. Tehran Times, 13 June 1989, Aktueller Informationsdienst Moderner Orient, Vol.15, No.13

(1989),p.64.

19. Arjomand has already observed that the authority of the marja'-i taqlid is increasinglythreatened in Iran and that 'the institutionalization of the Mandate of the Jurist into a

monistic authority structure of the nation-state signalled the end of the traditional pluralism

of the institution of the religious leadership of the sources of imitation, and the beginning ofth e conciliar institutionalization of hierocratic authority in Shi'ite Iran'. S.A. Arjomand,'Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order. AStudy in the Modernization of PoliticalTraditions', European Journal of Sociology, Vol.33 (1992), pp.39-82, p.72.

20. Yazdi in Tehran Friday sermon, Ittila'at, 12 Dec. 1993 (21 adhar 1372). For Natiq Nun'sremarks see:FBIS, Daily Report, 20 Dec.1993.

21. See Ittila'at, 12Dec. 1993 (21adhar 1372).

22 . A. Amanat, 'In Between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: The Designation of ClericalLeadership in Modern Sh i' ism', pp.98-132, esp. p.117.

23. A.Kazemi Moussavi, 'The Institutionalization of Marja'-i taqlid in the Nineteenth Century

Shi'ite Community', p.291.24. See for instance Ittila'at, 1-5 Dec. 1994(10-15 adhar 1373).25. Iran Times, 9 Dec.1994, p.1-2. See also FBIS, Daily Report, 20 Jan.1995, citing London

based Keyhan.

26. Ittila'at, 3 Dec.1994 (12adhar 1373), p.3.

27. Ittila'at, 3 Dec.1994 (12adhar 1373), pp .1-2 .28. Ittila'at, 5 Dec.1994 (14adhar 1373), pp.1 -2.

29. Ayatullah Murtaza Bani Fazl, Ayatullah Fazil Firdawsi, Ittila'at, 3 Dec.1994 (12 adhar1373),p.2.

30 . See for these remarks by several clerics: Ittila'at, 3 Dec. 1994 (12adhar 1373),p.2.

31. Friday sermon Ayatullah Jannati, see Ittila'at, 3 Dec. 1994 (12adhar 1373).

32 . This part of Natiq Nuri's speech was not published in Ittila'at, see FBIS, Daily Report, 5

Dec.1994.33. These words are almost the same as those of Sayyid Jalaludin Madani about the role of the

marja '-i taqlid as laid down in the Constitution of 1979. These arecited by S. Saffari in The

Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979', BritishJournal of Middle Eastern Studies Vol.20, No.l (1993), pp.64-8 2, p78.

34 . Friday sermon Ayatullah Jannati, see Ittila'at, 3 Dec. 1994 (12adhar 1373), p.4.

35 . Friday sermon, Jannati, FBIS, Daily Report, 5 Dec. 1994.

36 . Ruhani (Ziyarati), Barrasi wa talili az nehzat-i imam Khomeini (Vol.1) (Tehran, 1981).(Vol.2): Nehzat-i imam Khomeini (Tehran, 1985), p.551. B.'Aqili, Ruz-i shumar-i tarikh-i

'Iran. Az mashrute ta inqilab-i islami, Vol.2 (Tihran, 1370), p.121, 10 faw.1340/30 March1961. See also R. Mottadeh, The Mantle of the Proph et. Religion andPolitics in Iran (New

York, 1985), p.242; H. Algar 'The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-CenturyIran' in N.R. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints, andSufis. Muslim Religious Institutions in the

Middle East since 1500(Berkeley, 1972), pp.231-272, p.244. According to A. Taheri, The

Spirit of Allah. Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution (London, 1985)p.117, the shah senttelegrams to several mujtahids, excluding Khomeini. Taheri, however, is not very reliable.

37 . Ruhani, Nehzat-i imam Khomeini, p.554.38. For instance: H. Algar 'The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran',

p.244. S.Akhavi, Religion andPolitics in Contem porary Iran. C lergy-State Relations in the

Pahlavi Period (Albany, 1980), p. 100.

39 . Ruhani, Nehzat-i imam Khomeini, p.554.40. Ittila'at, 4 Dec. 1994 (13 adhar 1373), pp .1-2 .

41. Friday sermon, Ma'at, 10 Dec. 1994 (19 adhar 1373), p.4. See also several remarks by

Khamanei'i in lila'at, Dec. 1993.

42. See lila'at, 12Dec. 1993 (21adhar 1372), 1 Dec.1994 (10adhar 1273). FB IS, Daily Report,1 Dec. 1994.

43. Ittila'at, 19Aug. 1992 (29 mordad 1371).

44. Ittila'at, 15Dec. 1994 (24adhar 1373) pp.1 -2,4. During thehostilities between Iran and Iraqwhich preceded the Iran-Iraq war, it was said that Khomeini was accepted as a marja' in






THE MARJA'IYA IN IRAN AND THE NOM INATION OF KHAM ANEI 78 7

particular by Iraqi Muslims; The Imam and the Ommat. The Selected Messages of ImamKhom eini C oncerning Iraq and the War Iraq Imposed upon Iran (Tehran, 1981), p.39.

45. lttila'at, 3 Dec . 1994 (12 adhar 1373), p. 3.

46. Friday sermon, lttila'at, 19 Nov., 10 Dec. 1994 (19 adhar 1373), p.4.47. A.K.S. Lambton, 'A Reconsideration of the position of the Marja' Al-Taqlid and the

Religious Institution', Studia Islamica, Vol.20 (1964), pp.132-3.48. The Echo of Iran, Vol.42, No.80 (1994), p.19.

49. M. Momen, An Introd uction to Shi'i Islam (New Haven, 1985), p.255. See also N.R. K eddie,RooK of Revolution. An Interpretive History of M odern Iran (New Haven, 1981), p.157.

50 . Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Iran, p.100-1.

51. Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, p.254.

52. Ruhani, Barrasi wa tahlili az nehzat-i imam Khomeini (Vol.1), p.473, 740. See also M.Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton, 1971), p.45. Other sources do not mention adeath sentence but say that after Khomeini's arrest, an agreement was reached between thesecurity forces and Khomeini that he would refrain from political activism, he was then put

under house arrest; N.R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution. An Interpretive History of ModernIran (New Haven, 1981), p.159. This was denied by Khomeini. See his 'IslamicGovernment', in Islam and Revolution. Writings and D eclarations of Imam Khom eini.Trans l. and ann. by H. Algar (Be rkeley, 1981) p.139. Ervand Abraham ian also denies that anagreement was reached. According to him these were rumours spread by the regime andexposed by Khomeini in 1964 through continuing opposition against the shah; E.Abrahamian, Khomeinism (London, 1993), pp.10—11.

53. Other ulama in letters to each other also mentioned the fact that immunity for 'ulama' is laiddown in the Constitution. Ruhani, Barrasi wa tahlili az nehzat-i imam K homeini, p.751. Healso states on the same page that Shari'atmadari, after Khomeini's arrest, declared that Shi'aIslam was the state religion and that Khomeini represented her.

54. Private communication from Touraj Atabaki.55. lttila'at, 15 Dec. 1994 (24 adhar 1373), pp.1-2,4 .56. See for instance the Friday sermons in lttila'at by Imami Kashani, 18 Dec. 1994 (27 adhar

1373); Hashim i Rafsanjani, 1 Jan. 1995 (11 dey 1373), pp.1,2,4 ; Janna ti, 24 Feb . 1995 (3bahman 1373).

57. 'our recognition of him as the ma rja": Friday sermon in lttila'at, 1 Jan. 1995 (11 dey 1373).Tehran Voice of the Islamic Repub lic of Iran on 30 Nov. 1994, FB IS, Daily Report, 30 Nov.1994.

58 Friday sermon, lttila'at, 1 Jan. 1995 (11 dey 1373).59 . Friday sermon Ayatullah Imami Kashani, lttila'at, 18 Dec. 1994 (27 adhar 1373), p.4. After

Khamanei was chosen as Khomeini's successor in June 1989, lttila'at also mentioned thefact that Khamanei had the allegiance of all sections of society.

60. Quotation from Said Amir Arjomand, 'Constitution of the Islamic Rep ublic', EncyclopaediaIranica, Vol.VI, ed. by E.Yarshater (Costa Mesa), pp .150 -8, p.158.




Date post:	03-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	aftab-bismi
View:	220 times
Download:	0 times

Marja'Iyah in Iran and a. Khamenei

Documents