Al-Qaeda in the Land of Faith and Wisdom:

The Fall of Saleh and March on Al-Aqsa

Matthew J. Thomas

M.A. Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies

Monterey Institute of International Studies

May 2012, Candidate

Submitted on May 8, 2011

IPOL 8627 A, Seminar: Militant Islamic Movements

Professors Jeffery M. Bale and Sharad Joshi

1

The killing of Osama bin Laden marks a significant turning point for al-Qaeda. The U.S.

led counterterrorism effort in the Af-Pak region has made considerable headway in reducing the

operational capability of AQ Central. As Andrew Tian Huat Tan argues,

Al-Qaeda has lost its pre-eminent status as the pioneering vanguard of the Islamic move-ments operationally, but not ideologically. It lacks the organizational structure and the re-sources to mount global operations but is able and willing to inspire, instigate and coordi-nate operations by other groups. As al-Qaeda diminishes in size and strength, it is in-creasingly trying to rebuild and regain its influence by relying on its associate groups in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Caucasus to conduct operations. Unless and until the pressure on al-Qaeda diminishes, the group intends to survive by working together with its regional associates. The international, regional and domestic responses to the as-sociate groups will determine whether the remaining al-Qaeda will survive or perish.1

Consequently, al-Qaeda affiliates will begin bearing more responsibility in sustaining the global

Sunni jihad movement. One such al-Qaeda affiliate currently residing in Yemen has both the ide-

ological and operational capability to potentially take over the reins from AQ Central.

Historical Overview& Strategic Evolution

The organization currently known as Tanzim al-Qaeda fi Jazirat al-Arab (al-Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula, aka, AQAP) is the result of a January 2009 merger between the al-Qaeda af-

filiates of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.2 Analysts estimate AQAP currently main-

tains between 300-500 members.3 AQAP is predominantly located in the southern Yemen prov-

1 Quote taken from p. 448 in Andrew Tian Huat Tan, A Handbook of Terrorism and Insur-gency in Southeast Asia, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007).

2

inces that are dominated by tribal authority, 4 namely Abyan, Shabwah, and Jof, an area some-

times referred to as the “triangle of evil.”5 AQAP’s membership is dynamic 6including elements

of the older veteran jihadists from 1980’s Afghanistan era, recently returned jihadists from

Afghanistan and Iraq, former detainees of Guantanamo Bay and the Saudi terrorism rehabilita-

tion program, and several convicted al-Qaeda terrorists that escaped from a Yemeni prison in

2006.7 The group maintains a very complex triangular relationship with the shaky (perhaps no

longer existing after this paper is submitted) government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and

other Yemeni tribes.

Despite the 1990 unification of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Yemen

Arab Republic, the country still struggles with a powerful secessionist movement in the south

and rebellious Zaydi Shi’a group in the north. In order for AQAP to project influence in Yemen

and effectively exploit historical conflicts in its favor depends on the organization’s ability to ap-

pear non-antagonistic towards the tribes residing in territory almost exclusively void of central

government control and contiguous to the AQAP stronghold in southern Yemen. AQAP has been

directly and indirectly linked to local and international terrorist plots, including attacks against

the United States such as the November 2009 shooting by Major Nidal Hassan in Fort Hood

Texas, December 2009 Christmas Day bombing attempt aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253,

May 2010 Times Square failed car bomb, and October 2010 cargo planes bomb plot.8

Saudi Arabia and Yemen: AQAP from 2001-2009

October 7, 2001 marked the beginning of the U.S. led “Operation Enduring Freedom”

which resulted in the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and removal of a home base

and sanctuary for al-Qaeda. The U.S. military and the Afghan Northern Alliance made rapid

3

progress in forcing al-Qaeda into retreat and thus expelled several jihadists, who upon their re-

turn to Saudi Arabia began laying the groundwork for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.9 By

2003 al-Qaeda operatives were primed to establish an operational organization inside the Saudi

Kingdom under the alias of “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.”10 The Riyadh bombings of the

Al-Hamra Oasis, Jedawal and Cordoval compounds on May 12-13, 2003 forced the Saudi

regime to recognize al-Qaeda as a serious terrorist threat within the Kingdom. 11 Soon thereafter,

Saudi security forces began a harsh crackdown that ultimately defeated the Saudi al-Qaeda affili-

ate, if not dramatically reducing the group’s ability to operate. However, despite the severe oper-

ational setbacks AQAP still maintains strong ties with the Kingdom, actively recruiting jihadists

and obtaining financial support from within Saudi Arabia.12

The decline of the Saudi al-Qaeda affiliate coincided with the rise of al-Qaeda in Yemen.

However, it is important to make a distinction between the two groups. Upon achieving victory

over the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, Osama bin Laden set out to rid communist rule in his

ancestral homeland, since South Yemen at the time was the only Marxist state in the Arab

world.13 While his plan failed, this strategy nonetheless demonstrates al-Qaeda’s early ambitions

for establishing a strong foothold in Yemen.14 The Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAAA),

Yemeni Islamic Jihad, and AQY were all founded in the early 1990s and operating in Yemen

around the same time bin Laden began looking to establish a stronger presence in the country.

AQY was a part of the January 2009 merger, as was the Islamic Jihad in Yemen, a currently ac-

tive AQAP affiliate. The original Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAAA) is still in existence but

less active and possibly defunct. Also, AQAP announced in October 2010 the creation of the

group’s own Army of Aden-Abyan, which is confusing when trying to denote the difference be-

tween the old and new IAAA.

4

Indeed, the multiple group name changes and mergers may just be a ploy by AQAP and

others to confuse their adversaries and make the group seem larger and more relevant than they

are.15 However, and important to note, the current AQAP which is concentrated in southern

Yemen is not a mere carryover from the now defunct Saudi al-Qaeda. Thomas Hegghammer ex-

plains,

The rise of AQAP in Yemen in 2009 was interpreted by many observers as a sign that the Saudi AQAP had survived and that victory against it had been declared prematurely. Here was a group with the same name, the same modus operandi and roughly the same ideological discourse as the group that had shaken the Kingdom in 2003 and 2004. However, on closer inspection, it appears there is little if any continuity of personnel between the Yemeni AQAP of 2009 and its Saudi predecessor…By adopting the name AQAP in 2009, Yemeni militants sought to create an impression of continuity where there was none. It was an attempt to gloss over the very real defeat suffered by al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia in the mid-2000s.16

The domestic political environments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia are considerably different. Un-

like the former Saudi counterpart, AQAP is able to exploit tribal grievances in Yemen against

President Saleh to their own advantage, as well as pander to the interests of the southern seces-

sionists.

Furthermore, AQAP confronts the Houthi Shi’a in an attempt to gain favor with the gov-

ernment and other tribal leaders, and to bolster the group’s Sunni credibility.17 The Houthis are a

Zaydi Shi’a entity concentrated in the Sa’ada governorate of northwestern Yemen on the border

with Saudi Arabia. Saleh accuses the Houthis of receiving financial and military support from

Iran.18 However, such claims have yet to be proven.19 Interestingly, Saleh is reportedly more con-

cerned with southern secessionists and the northern Houthi rebels than the threat of AQAP. For

instance, in the government’s recent fight against the Houthi rebels, Saleh turned to Sunni radi-

cals for help, some of whom were linked to or directly involved with AQAP.20 Essentially, there

16 Thomas Hegghammer, pp. 26-27.

5

is a unique give and take relationship between AQAP, the tribal leaders, and Saleh’s government

through which AQAP seeks to shift the balance of power in Yemen in its favor. In purely Machi-

avellian terms, it is obvious that for AQAP to achieve political dominance in Yemen, the ends

easily justify the means.

AQAP Ideology and Objectives

“Out of Aden-Abyan will come 12,000, They will give victory to the Deen of Allah, and They will be the best between me and them.” ~ Prophet Muhammad, Ahadith

According to AQAP Emir Nasir Abd al-Karim al-Wahayshi also known as Abu Basir,21

AQAP operates both locally and internationally with the stated objective of driving out the occu-

piers from the Arabian Peninsula and purify its land from them, specifically expelling all West-

ern influence and overthrowing apostate regimes in Muslim lands. Also, AQAP seeks to estab-

lish Shari’ah law and Islamic State, spread the call to the oneness of Allah, defend against the

transgressors, and help the weak.22 Like all al-Qaeda groups, AQAP is an activist Islamic funda-

mentalist organization based on Islamist principles that adhere to a very strict, puritanical, Wa-

habbist interpretation of Islam based solely upon the teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith. The

group’s revivalist and revolutionary ideology calls for a return to the pure Islam of Muhammad

and his followers from Mecca (al-Muhajiroun) and Medina (al-Ansar) throughout the era of al-

Salaf al-Salih, or the Rightously Guided Caliphs.23

21 For additional information on AQAP key leaders and figures see Appendix A.22“Our objectives are driving out the occupiers from the Arabian Peninsula and purifying its land from them, establishing the law of sharī`ah, the establishment of khilāfah, spreading the call to the oneness of Allāh جالله جل , defending against the transgressors and helping the weak,” quote taken from p.14 in “Interview with Sheik Abu Basir,” Inspire magazine, Is-sue 1, Summer 2010, pp. 13-17. Accessed April 26, 201123 The four righteously guided Caliphs are: Abu Bakr, Omar, Uthman, and ‘Ali.; “Islamism is an intrinsically radical and anti-democratic extreme right-wing political ideology, one that is not only based upon an unusually strict, puritanical interpretation of central tenets of the Is-lamic faith but is totalitarian in its very essence. Hence Islamist movements should not be seen as being comparable to Western movements like Christian Democracy, but rather as

6

As Barak Barfi observes,

Though al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has a strong and effective leadership that gives it structure, inspiration, and guidance, it is nevertheless highly decentralized…This may indicate that the leaders not only give regional field commanders great leeway, but also have minimal communication with them once they are initiated into the organization and tasked to carry out attacks.24

being similar in certain respects to Western totalitarian movements like Marxism-Leninism and fascism,” quote taken from p. 73 in Jeffrey M. Bale, “Islamism and Totalitarianism,” To-talitarian Movements and Political Religions, Volume 10, Number 2, pp. 72-96, June 2009. Available online at http://www.miis.edu/media/view/18961/original/baleislamismandtotalitarianism.pdf. Ac-cessed April 18, 2011; also, for a better understanding of al-Qaeda’s ideology see Jeffrey M. Bale “Al-Qa’ida’s ‘Strategic Thinking’: An Illustrative Example of the Impact of Ideological Ex-tremism on Terrorist ‘Rationality,’” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA., 2007, and Lee Harris, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology,” Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Policy Review, No. 114, August 1, 2002. Available online at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6232. Ac-cessed April 18, 2011.2 See OSC Feature FEA20090124809516, “Video Shows Saudi, Yemeni Al’Qa’ida Leaders An-nouncing Merger,” January 24, 2009; and, OSC Report GMP20090128666004, “Al-Qa’ida Amir in Arabian Peninsula Urges Targeting ‘Crusader’ Interests,” Al-Jazirah.net (Doha) Janu-ary 26, 2009. Accessed April 7, 2011.3 Jeremy Scahill, “The Dangerous US Game in Yemen,” The Nation Institute, March 30, 2011. Available online at http://www.nationinstitute.org/featuredwork/fellows/2087/the_dangerous_us_game_in_yemen_/. Accessed April 9, 2011.4See map of Yemen in Christopher Boucek and David Donadio, “A Nation on the Brink,” At-lantic Magazine, April 2010. Available online at http://assets.theatlantic.com/static/coma/images/issues/201004/yemen-map.jpg. Accessed April 9, 2011.5Tom Finn in Sana'a, Bill Lowther in Washington, Philip Sherwell and Colin Freeman, “Inside Yemen’s al Qaeda heartland,” The Telegraph, November 2010. Available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/8114572/Inside-Yemens-al-Qaeda-heartland.html. Accessed April 10, 2011.6 “It appears that AQAP draws on three main groups for its recruits: Yemenis, Saudis, and foreigners. According to the author's analysis, Yemenis form the majority with 56%, followed by Saudis at 37% and foreigners, 7%,” quote taken from p. 6 Murad Batal al Shishani, “An Assessment of the Anatomy of al-Qaeda in Yemen: Ideological and Social Factors,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 9, March 5, 2010. Available online at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_9_03.pdf. Accessed April 9, 2011; see also, Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker, “Al Qaeda’s Deep Tribal Ties Make Yemen a Ter-ror Hub,” Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2010. Available online at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704320104575015493304519542.html. Ac-cessed April 8, 20117 “[…] 23 of Yemen’s most wanted terrorists escaped a Public Security Organization (PSO) prison in 2006, in what many analysts believe was an inside job from within a Yemeni intelli-gence organization notorious for employing former ‘Arab Afghan’ volunteers and other ji-

7

AQAP has explicitly declared it will target the Western interests including the U.S. homeland,

and maintains the right to attack all those not defending the one true Islam. Alistair Harris appro-

priately describes the present day AQAP as “a localized threat with increasingly globalized am-

bitions.”25 Tribal integration within Yemen will be a key factor in establishing an Islamic state or

Caliphate in Yemen.26 A destabilized Yemen is to AQAP’s advantage as it will allow the group

room to maneuver against Yemen’s other more powerful tribes in its quest for control of the

hadists,” quote taken from p. 8 in Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Rela-tions,” CRS Report RL34170, February 3, 2011. Available online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf. Accessed April 9, 2011.8 “Yemeni cleric al Awlaki is greatest threat to U.S.,” Homeland Security Newswire, February 14, 2011. http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/yemeni-cleric-al-awlaki-greatest-threat-us. Accessed April 8, 2011.9 “The loss of a safe haven in Afghanistan and the launch of the ‘global war on terror’ al-tered the cost-benefit analysis of preserving Saudi Arabia as a support base as opposed to a battlefront. Thus, in or around January 2002, Bin Laden formally ordered Saudi fighters in Afghanistan to return to the Kingdom and start preparing for a campaign. During the five months of 2002, between 300 and 1,000 Saudi al-Qa’ida recruits made it home via third countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. Many of them would later enter AQAP’s ranks,” quote taken from p. 12 in Thomas Hegghammer, “The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia,” Occasional Paper Series, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, February 25, 2010. Available online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/CTC_OP_Hegghammer_Final.pdf. Accessed April 9, 2011.10 “In November 2003, the group began using the name ‘al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’ for the first time. Claiming close links to the top of al-Qa’ida leadership may have been a way to compensate for setbacks on the ground and rapidly eroding direct links to al-Qa’ida central. Incidentally, this was the first case of a regional jihadi organization making ‘al-Qa’ida’ part of its official name; this has since become the standard nomenclature for al-Qa’ida affiliates,” quote taken from p. 14 in Thomas Hegghammer, Ibid.11 The al-Hamra Oasis, Jedawal and Cordoval compounds were predominantly occupied by Westerners. The dates vary between May 12 and May 13 because the attacks occurred very late at night and carried over early into the following day. These were the attacks that finally opened the eyes of the Saudi royal family to the terrorist threat within the Kingdom, and subsequently enact strong counterterrorism measures. See, pp. 5-6 in Ben Venzke, “Saudi Compound Bombings (SCB) – v1.4,” IntelCenter, May 16, 2003. Available online at http://www.intelcenter.com/SCB-v1-4.pdf. Accessed April 11, 2011.12 See subsections titled “Financing AQAP” and “The Saudi Role” pp. 6,8 in Barak Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen,” Counterterrorism Strategy Ini-tiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, pp. January 2010. Available at http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Barfi.pdf. Accessed April 11, 2011.13 “Bin Laden was enraged by the communist rule in his ancestral homeland, and he saw an opportunity to exploit his partnership with the Saudi government to purge the Arabian Peninsula of any secular influences,” quote taken from p. 174 in Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, (New York: Vintage) 2006. Accessed April 25, 201114 “As attested by the Harmony documents and other primary sources, in 1989 Bin Laden’s initial vision for al-Qa’ida’s post-Afghanistan development was to establish and arm a jihadi movement in South Yemen in order to overthrow the South’s communist regime. Bin Laden

8

country. Since most Yemenis hold allegiance to their respective tribes above the state, Saleh’s

downfall will prompt competition among Yemen’s tribes for control that could result in civil

war. If AQAP fails to achieve a decisive victory on its own in the competition for state control,

aligning with one of the more dominant tribes would be its best option. Otherwise AQAP would

be forced to come to some form of compromise or co-opt a number of smaller tribes.27

began pouring money into the country in the hopes of amassing arms and winning allies from among the leadership of Yemen’s Islamists in the North, but this effort proved to be an unmitigated failure,” quote taken from p. 80 in “Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions Within al-Qa’ida and its Periphery,” Harmony Project, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, December 16, 2010. Available online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Self-Inflicted%20Wounds.pdf. Accessed April 11, 2011.15 The three main Islamist terrorist groups in chronological order are: Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan, Yemeni Islamic Jihad, and AQY. See Danielle Sheldon, “Al-Qaeda in Yemen – Evolving Threats,” International Institute for Counterterrorism, May 5, 2010. Available online at http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/825/currentpage/2/Default.aspx. Accessed April 10, 2011; For more information on the creation of a new Army of Aden, see “Al-Qaeda Usurps Yemen’s Aden-Abyan Army,” Jamestown Foundation, Briefs, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 41, pp. 1-3, November 11, 2010. Available online at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_39354d.pdf. Accessed April 25, 2011.17 “AQAP has presented the Houthi insurgency in northern Yemen in a way that capitalizes on widespread fear of the rise of Shi’i Islam and Iranian influence,” quote taken from p. 7 in Alistair Harris, “Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Middle East Pro-gram, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Number 111, May 2010. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/exploiting_grievances.pdf. Accessed April 10, 2011.18 “The allegations, most of which originate with the Yemeni elite led by President Ali Abdul-lah Saleh, accuse the Shi’a Zaidi rebels of receiving financial and military support from Tehran,” quote taken from p. 4 in Babak Rahimi, “Iranian Leaders Weigh Support for the Houthi Rebellion in Yemen,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 35, pp. 4-6, November 20, 2009. Available online at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_007_03e073.pdf. Accessed April 27, 2011; 19 “Despite repeated ROYG accusations of Tehran’s material and financial report to the Houthi rebels in Sa’ada and increasingly belligerent media exchanges between Yemen and Iran, Iranian influence in Yemen has thus far been limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni and Iranian scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the energy and develop-ment sectors,” quote taken from “Iran in Yemen: Tehran’s Shadow Looms Large, But Foot-print Is Small,” Wikileaks cable, reference ID 09Sanaa1662, created September 12, 2009, re-leased December 3, 2010, classification Secret/Noforn, Origin Embassy in Sanaa. Available at http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/09/09SANAA1662.html. Accessed April 27, 2011. 20Mark N. Katz, “Yemen and the ‘War on Terror,’” Commentary, Middle East Policy Council, January 11, 2011. Available online at http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/yemen-and-war-terror. Accessed April 26, 201124 Barak Barfi, p.5. 25 Alistair Harris, p. 10.26 Grace Wyler, “Al Qaeda Declares Southern Yemeni Province An ‘Islamic Emirate,’” Busi-ness Insider, March 31, 2011. Available online at http://www.businessinsider.com/al-qaeda-declares-southern-yemeni-province-an-islamic-emirate-2011-3. Accessed April 9, 2011

9

AQAP’s Geo-Strategic Jihad:

AQAP is well aware of the positive implications of Yemen’s strategic location in the

Gulf of Aden.28 One of the world’s five energy chokepoints, the Bab al-Mandeb strait or Gate of

Tears adjoining Yemen,29 is a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean

Sea, via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. “An estimated 3.2 million bbl/d flowed through this

waterway in 2009 (vs. 4 million bbl/d in 2008) toward Europe, the United States, and Asia.”30

Bab al-Mandeb has also proven vulnerable to terrorist and pirate attacks, as demonstrated by the

previous bombings of the USS Cole in 2000 and Limburg French oil tanker in 2002.31 Yemen’s

sparse oil resources, which are concentrated in the southern half of the country, are projected to

be completely gone in the very near future. This is unfortunate for AQAP, which coincidentally

maintains a power base in the southern half of Yemen. AQAP has made its intentions to exploit

Yemen’s strategic position quite clear. If AQAP can overcome other tribal rulers and secession-

ists and dominate the state, it intends to cut off the oil lifeline from its Western enemies, and any

remnants of Saleh’s government should it by way of some miracle hold on to poser.32 As Emir

al-Wuhayshi explains:

The interest that is shown towards AQAP is because of the strategic importance of the Arabian Peninsula. This is the place of the revelation, the birthplace of Is-lām, the land of the two holy Mosques and the blood of the saĥāba runs through the veins of its sons. Because of the greed of the Americans, they have vital inter-ests in the Arabian Peninsula. The passage ways of commerce pass through its waters and oil is stolen from it. So this place is a vein of life for the Americans.33

27 “Even if al-Qaeda attempts to discursively and operationally align itself with the Yemeni tribes against the state, one of the group’s broader objectives—establishing political control—consigns tribes to a subordinate status. This exclusion would likely put AQAP in confrontation with the tribes,” quote taken from p. 5 in Sarah Phillips “What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes and State-Building,” in a Carnegie Paper Series titled “Yemen: On The Brink,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Program, Number 107, March 2010. Available online at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribes1.pdf. Accessed April 13, 2011.

10

AQAP recruits from both within the region and internationally. Yemen’s political desta-

bilization is advantageous to AQAP, as the group appeals to potential recruits disillusioned and

frustrated with Saleh’s regime. Also, in order to maintain ties with the wealthy Saudi counter-

parts, AQAP consistently seeks recruits from within the Kingdom. AQAP’s recruiting method

“uses a combination of theological and socioeconomic issues” that call for the entire Muslim

community to wage jihad, but uses messages “with specific appeals targeting Yemenis and

Saudis.”34

The organization’s international objectives of attacking the U.S. and Western interests in

general are supported by targeting individuals within the U.S. homeland, such as the Fort Hood

shooter Major Nidal Hassan and Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. The fiery

clerical leader of AQAP, Anwar al-Awlaki, having been born and raised for the majority of his

life in the U.S. is familiar with the Western culture and lifestyle. As a result, he has been able to

use this familiarity with Western society to AQAP’s advantage in recruiting and radicalizing

American Muslims. The media arm of AQAP, Sada al-Malahim (echo of epics), continues to

34 Barak Barfi, p. 6.28 “According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Bab al Mandab is one of the most strategic shipping lanes in the world, with an estimated 3 million barrels per day of oil flow,” quote taken from p. 7, Jeremy M. Sharp; also, see map of Bab al-Mandeb. Avail-able online at http://www.a-w-i-p.com/media/blogs/articles/Articles6/yemen_2002_maps.jpg. Accessed April 11, 2011.29Michael McCarthy, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Strait and Narrow: Five Energy Chokepoints,” Center for a New American Security, December 9, 2009. Available online at http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2009/12/strait-and-narrow-top-five-energy-chokepoints.html. Accessed April 11, 2011.30 Quote taken from “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Energy Information Administra-tion, Department of Energy, February 2011. Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html. Accessed April 26, 201131 “Yemen says tanker blast was terrorism.” BBC News, October 16, 2002. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm. Accessed April 12, 2011. 32Ahmed Al-Haj, “Yemen Oil Pipeline BOMBED By Suspected Al-Qaeda,” Huffington Post, No-vember 2, 2010. Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/02/yemen-oil-pipeline-bombed_n_777734.html. Accessed April 13, 2011.33 Quote taken from p. 14 in “Interview with Sheik Abu Basir,” Inspire, vol. 1, Summer 1431-2010, pp. 13-17. .Accessed April 26, 2011

11

urge Muslims to take up jihad and attack infidels wherever they may be. One interesting section

in the second issue of Inspire magazine even suggested American Muslims purchase a large

pick-up truck to mow down, or run over, as many infidels as possible. Indeed, the magazine

proves to be a valuable propaganda tool in enticing others to join AQAP’s ranks and take up the

black banner of Islam in waging armed jihad.35

AQAP maintains ties with several terrorist groups both locally and internationally. There

is documented evidence of collaboration between AQAP and other al-Qaeda affiliates. The al-

liance between AQAP and the Somali terrorist group Ḥarakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin, better

known as al-Shabab, personifies a combination of interests to uniting as one force in the Gulf of

Aden.36At one point, al-Qaeda even called for creating a united jihadist maritime force.37 The es-

tablished tie between AQAP and al-Shabab represents a considerable threat to Western interests

in the region, particularly in the Gulf of Aden.38 AQAP has, also, sought to cooperate with al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in a recently foiled plot in France.39 Indeed, AQAP coor-

dinated with another al Qaeda affiliate AQIM, to dispatch a cell of North Africans across the

Mediterranean Sea by boat from North Africa to carry out an attack France. 40

AQAP’s operational funding comes mainly from contributions through its wealthy Saudi

members and associates. By strengthening ties with members and sympathizers from Saudi Ara-

bia, AQAP is able to channel funds from wealthy donators.41 Money has even been reported to

come to AQAP by way of fellow mujahidin in Iraq.42

Also, AQAP relies on Zakat or alms giving for funding. Zakat is similar to tithing in the

Christian world and is one of the pillars of Islam.43 Several charities and front groups associated

35 “The idea is to use a pickup truck as a mowing machine, not to mow grass but mow down the enemies of Allah,” quote taken from p. 54 in Yahya Ibrahim “The Ultimate Mowing Machine,” Inspire magazine, Issue 2, pp. 53-54. Accessed April 26, 2011.

12

with AQAP present a façade of good-will for Islam and for the group. Funds are solicited for the

stated intent of building mosques and schools but are often diverted to support AQAP and other

terrorist organizations.44 Some of the organizations through which AQAP is able to radicalize, re-

cruit, and finance include: al-Iman University; al-Haramain Foundation; al-Islah charity; al-

Hikmah al-Yamania Charity; al-Manhal Charitable Society; Charitable Society for Social Wel-

fare; the Commission on Scientific Signs in the Quran and Sunnah.45 The use of Hawala, an in-

formal value transfer system, is a preferable AQAP financial management mechanism which op-

erates outside of the formal banking system and leaves no paper trail. The Hawala system has

come under more scrutiny since 9/11,46 and been a consistent problem in combatting terrorism fi-

nancing for al-Qaeda and its affiliates.47

Another source of AQAP funding is the black market in the failed state of Somalia. In

consort with al-Shabab, the al Qaeda affiliate in Somalia, AQAP is involved in the lucrative

drug, arms, and human trafficking trade in the region.48 Arms trafficking is big business in

Yemen and the inability of the Saleh regime to control it is indicative of just how weak the

regime is presently. A recent plot (March 2011) to smuggle 16,000 pistols from Turkey to

Yemen is a case in point. The shipment was intercepted by Dubai police but many believe other

shipments are getting through and are a harbinger of more disruption and violence.49 In such a

destabilizing scenario AQAP stands to gain in its quest for political power in Yemen. However,

to hold power the AQAP must convince, cajole, and perhaps defeat Yemen’s other powerful

tribes that value tribal allegiance above all else. Dealing with the tribes is unavoidable for AQAP

and inevitable in the case of a political revolution which becomes increasingly likely given the

number of governments to fall in the region these past few months.50

Future Analysis

13

The following quote from Faris Sanabani, creator and publisher of the English language

Observer in Yemen, accurately depicts AQAP’s gravitas in Yemen,

Al Qaida in Yemen is more than an organisation, it is a melting pot for whomever has an issue and wants to go violent. So if you have an issue that you can’t deal with, if you feel you are the victims of injustice, if you’re broke, al Qaida increasingly seems to be an op-tion.51

As Yemenis struggle to cope with the lack of basic services such as access to food and water,

employment, and education, they are finding more in common with AQAP and those tribal au-

thorities opposed to Saleh’s regime. If this situation continues to persist, Yemen—particularly

the southern half of the nation—will become almost entirely devoid of government control. Also,

AQAP’s resilience against increased U.S. operations targeting training camps in southern Yemen

has bolstered the group’s image among those who have suffered because of American airstrikes

and likewise increased AQAP’s recruiting opportunities among those disenfranchised by U.S. at-

tacks. As a result, AQAP is on the road to establishing a firm base in the highly martial tribal

provinces, and subsequently should be able to expand operations into other areas in the region

like Saudi Arabia, as well as, overseas in Europe and the U.S.52

AQAP’s previous declaration to attack Western interests and cut off America’s oil life-

line were not idle threats as demonstrated by past attacks on oil wells and pipelines in the region.

In addition, given AQAP’s strategic position in territory near the Bab al-Mandeb strait and in-

creased cooperation with al-Shabab in Somalia, it is highly plausible that AQAP could conduct

future attacks on oil shipments in the Gulf of Aden, much like the previous attack against the

French Limburg.53 AQAP’s relationship with Saudi donors in terms of recruiting and financing

51Faris Sanabani, “Why al Qaida chose Yemen,” NATO Review, Edition 5, 2010. Available on-line at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Yemen/Al-Qaeda-Yemen/EN/index.htm. Ac-cessed April 28, 2011.52 Barak Barfi, pp. 17-19.

14

is key to its calls to overthrow the apostate Saudi regime, and the August 2009 failed assassina-

tion attempt against Prince Muhammad bin Nayif suggests that AQAP related attacks might con-

tinue and possibly intensify within the Saudi Kingdom.54

AQAP is smart. It has studied and learned from the “Anbar awakening” and other al-

Qaeda in Iraq failures which resulted in the alienation of the local population. AQAP avoids

making similar mistakes and is proving an ability to adapt to Yemen’s dynamic socio-political

circumstance. Indeed, AQAP has proven more successful than other al-Qaeda affiliates by “pur-

suing a shrewd strategy” of focusing exclusively on attacking U.S., Yemeni and the Saudi gov-

ernments, while avoiding attacks against the local populace. Ultimately, the group’s success has

been in large part to the group’s patient foresight and restraint in not overextending itself in wag-

ing global jihad.55

53 Ibid.55 Barak Barfi, “AQAP’s Soft Power Strategy in Yemen,” CTC Sentinel, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, November 2010, Vol. 3, Issue 11-12, pp. 1-5. Available online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss11-12.pdf. Accessed April 13, 2011.

15

Failed States Unite: Al-Qaeda’s Regional Powerhouse in Yemen and Somalia

What effects would a failed state in Yemen have on AQAP? What are the regional and

international consequences? What is the appropriate U.S. response to a potential failed state in

Yemen? These questions are increasingly relevant demanding a deeper examination of the condi-

tions of a failed state and positive correlations with non-state actors, such as terrorist organiza-

tions.

The risk of Yemen becoming a failed state grows daily and will undoubtedly prove ad-

vantageous to AQAP’s future modus operandi. As David Carment observes,

If Yemen continues on its current trajectory it will become a failed state in the next sev-eral months. Yemen's implosion would have a significant impact on Saudi Arabia, itself feeling the direct effects of upheaval on its border with Yemen. Failure would also give al-Qaida unprecedented operational space in the south.56

The impending fall of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh coincides with an era of unprece-

dented political upheaval in the Middle East. Yemen as a failed state57 would exacerbate cross-

border issues with Saudi Arabia, allowing smugglers, refugees, illegal workers, and terrorists to

move even more freely between the two countries. The lack of border security may lead to an in-

crease in AQAP agents infiltrating into Saudi Arabia and subsequent rise in terrorist attacks

within the Kingdom. Furthermore, AQAP’s relationship with al-Shabab in neighboring Somalia

will certainly become heightened should Yemen become a failed state. The proximity of two

failed states with increased terrorist collaboration and prevalence of transnational organized

56 David Carment, “Troubled Yemen, the World’s Next Failed State,” Calgary Herald, March 30, 2011. Available online at http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/Troubled+Yemen+world+next+failed+state/4529912/story.html. Accessed May 8, 2011.

16

crime, located in the strategic Gulf of Aden is a potential doomsday scenario in which the region,

already struggling to recover from rampant political revolutions could follow Yemen into chaos.

The U.S. needs to work towards preventing such a collapse in Yemen. Due to the com-

plex socio-dynamics in Yemen, any relapse to civil war is a pretext for AQAP to potentially

seize control of the southern half of the country. Unfortunately, the U.S. lacks the necessary rela-

tionship with the dominant tribal fabric of Yemen to project any considerable influence domesti-

cally. As a result, the U.S. needs to place greater pressure on Saudi Arabia, which has histori-

cally far more influence in the domestic affairs of Yemen.58

However, unlike the U.S., Saudi Arabia’s immediate concerns are not primarily con-

cerned with countering AQAP. Current Saudi counterterrorism efforts in Yemen place greater

emphasis on defeating the Houthi rebels considering its own internal Shi’a problem. Also, an-

other obstacle to increased U.S.-Saudi cooperation in fighting AQAP is the several southern se-

cessionists with strong Islamist tendencies that have strong ties with the royal family, namely

Brig. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Tariq al-Fadhli.59

Placing greater emphasis on Saleh to step down will force the U.S. to become more in-

volved in the domestic affairs of Yemen. However, in doing so the U.S. will embolden those op-

posed to Western meddling in Yemen, potentially radicalizing supporters and appearing hostile

to the deep-rooted tribal network. Even if the U.S. pushes for a formal transfer of power resem-

blant of the relatively peaceful transition ongoing in Egypt, the central government will still have

little to no control of the southern tribal provinces in which AQAP established a stronghold.

58 Reva Bhalla, “Islamist Militancy in a Pre- and Post-Saleh Yemen,” Stratfor, April 21, 2011. Available online at http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110420-islamist-militancy-pre-and-post-saleh-yemen. Accessed May 8, 2011. 59 Ibid.

17

APPENDIX A: Key Leaders and Figures of AQAP

Nasir Abd al-Karim al-Wahayshi (nickname Abu Basir): Emir

Abu Basir is a thirty-four year old Yemeni from a reportedly wealthy family in the southern

Yemen province al-Baida. He succeeded al-Harithi as leader and emir of AQAP, in January

2009.60 He was the former secretary of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and a

veteran of the Tora Bora battle in December 2001 after which he escaped to Iran. He was ar-

rested there and held for two years until deported to Yemen in 2003.61 He was one of a 23-per-

son contingent who escaped from a Yemen prison in 2006. Abu Basir is not “considered as

charismatic as his Saudi counterparts.”62 Specifically responsible for ordering attacks against the

36 “It’s Official: Al-Shabab Ties the Knot With Al-Qaeda,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, September 22, 2009. Available online at http://www.investigativeproject.org/1425/its-official-al-shabaab-ties-the-knot-with-al. Accessed April 14, 201137 “On April 26, 2008, the Islamist website Al-Ikhlas posted an article from Jihad Press, an e-journal reportedly linked to Al-Qaeda, which urges the mujahideen to establish naval terror cells,” quote taken from “Al-Qaeda Affiliated E-Journal: ‘The Sea is The Next Strategic Step Towards Controlling The World And Restoring The Islamic Caliphate,’” Middle East Media Re-search Institute (MEMRI), the Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, May 1, 2008. Available on-line at http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=378. Accessed April 27, 2011.38 “AQAP and Al-Shabaab Alliance; An Emerging Terrorist Threat Report by the Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI),” November 13, 2010. Available online at http://emergencynet-news.com/pdf/Terrorist_%20Alliance_%20Between_%20AQAP_%20and_Al-Shabaab2010.pdf. Accessed April 14, 2011.39 Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda’s Yemen affiliate widens search for recruits and targets,” Washington Post, November 30, 2010. Available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/29/AR2010112905459.html. Accessed April 14, 2011.40 Ibid. 41 Barak Barfi, p. 6.42Nasser Al-Illy, “Baathist to Relocate Al Qaeda Elements from Yemen to Iraqi-Iraqi aid,” Asharq Alawsat, March 1, 2010. Available online at http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=1&id=19386. Accessed April 14, 2011.43 “Collecting donations for the mujahideen and paying Zakat for them,” quote taken from an AQAP audio message titled “Who are the Mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula,” originally released May 14, 2010, republished by Administrator, Flashpoint Partners, May 22, 2010. Available online at http://www.flashpoint-intel.com/images/documents/pdf/0510/flashpoint_whoaremujaqap.pdf. Accessed April 20, 2011.

18

U.S., Saudi defense minister Muhammad bin Nayif, the Christmas Day Bomber Umar Farouk

Abdulmutallab, and others.63

Sa’id al-Shiri (nickname Abu Sayyaf): Deputy Chief of AQAP

After spending six months in the Guantanamo (GITMO) prison camp and attending a Saudi re-

habilitation camp, Sa’id al-Shiri aka Abu Sayaff eventually became the No. 2 man in AQAP.

44 “In mid-June, Yemeni authorities announced that they had arrested a top financier of al Qaeda operations in Yemen and the Saudi Arabian province of Marib, a stronghold of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The man, named Hassan Hussein bin Alwan, a Saudi national, was considered one of al Qaeda's most effective cash coordinators — an intermediary who became adept at collecting huge sums from donors in Saudi under the guise of building mosques and orphanages in Yemen,” quote taken from Khaled Wasssef, “Al Qaeda’s Feverish Hunt For Cash,” CBS News, October 14, 2009. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5383427-503543.html. Accessed April 28, 2011. 45 Danielle Sheldon, International Institute for Counterterrorism.46 “On October 31, 2001 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) released the Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing which, when combined with the FATF Forty Recom-mendations on money laundering, set out the basic framework to detect, prevent, and sup-press the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts,” quote taken from U.S. Department of Treasury, Resource Center, Terrorism and Illicit Finance, Hawala and Alternative Remittance Systems, December 3, 2010; also, see Patrick M. Jost, “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering,” U.S. Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), in cooperation with Harjit Singh Sandhu INTERPOL/FOPAC, Interpol General Secretariat, Lyon, January 2000. Available online at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf. Accessed April 28, 2011. 47 “'Hawala' bankers in Yemen could provide al Qaeda an easy way to move money,” quote taken from Meenakshi Ganguly, “A Banking System Built For Terrorism,” Time.com, October 5, 2001. Available online at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,178227,00.html.; also, see image of “Hawala Primer.” Available online at http://moneyjihad.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/hawala_wp_primer.gif. Accessed April 28, 2011.48 For a more in depth analysis of extent of smuggling and organized crime related to AQAP, see Chapter 7, pp. 77-110 in “Ungoverned Territories, Understanding and Reducing Terror-ism Risks,” Project Air Force, Rand Corporation, 2007. Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA473217. Accessed April 15, 2011.49 Shane McGinley, “Fall of Yemen’s Saleh would unleash Al Qaeda, warns analyst,” Arabi-anbusiness.com, March 29, 2011. Available online at http://www.arabianbusiness.com/fall-of-yemen-s-saleh-would-unleash-al-qaeda-warns-analyst-390718.html. Accessed April 15, 2011.50 “Central to AQAP’s ability to cement a long-term presence in Yemen will be its rela-tionship with Yemen's tribes,” quote taken from p. 1 in Sarah Phillips, “Al-Qa’ida, Tribes, and Instability in Yemen,” Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2009. Available online at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/LOWY_AlQaida_Tribes_Instability_Yemen.pdf. Accessed April 14, 2011.

19

He is a Saudi national and was born in 1972 or 1973. He trained in a camp in northern

Afghanistan, near Kabul,64 and at one time served as an al-Qaeda facilitator in Iran. He was ar-

rested in 2001 near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border65 and served his time as GITMO detainee

#372. After departing Saudi Arabia he capitalized on family ties within AQAP, he helped estab-

lish the organization as it is today. He is said to have positive impact on AQAP’s financing and

operational capabilities.66 His brother-in law was killed by Saudi security forces in 200567 and he

was suspected of involvement in the September 2008 attack on the US Embassy in Sanna that

killed 19 people, and the June 2009 kidnapping of nine Christian missionaries in Yemen.68

Qassim Yahya bin Mahdi al-Raymi (nickname Qassim al-Taizi, Shaykh Abu Hurairah al-

Sanaani): Military commander and spokesman69

Qassim Yahya bin Mahdi al-Raymi, aka Abu Hurairah, is a Yemeni national who was born in

Taiz in 1979. He completed primary and preparatory studies at a science institution and later at-

tended secondary schooling at a Shari’ah institute and also did some training in an Islamic Insti-

tute before going to Afghanistan to fight. 70 He trained at the al-Faruq Camp in Afghanistan twice

in 2001.71 While in Afghanistan he supposedly met Bin Laden. Al-Raymi is rumored to have

killed his brother Faris in 2007 due to allegations that Faris collaborated with the Yemeni

54Caryle Murphy, “Saudi Concern Rises Over Al Qaeda Activity in Yemen,” Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 2009. Available online at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/1019/p06s10-wome.html. Accessed April 16, 2011.57 The Crisis State Research Centre defines a failed state as “as a condition of “state col-lapse” – eg, a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence. This term is used in very contradic-tory ways in the policy community (for instance, there is a tendency to label a “poorly per-forming” state as “failed” – a tendency we reject). The opposite of a “failed state” is an “en-during state” and the absolute dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to as-certain at the margins. Even in a failed state, some elements of the state,such as local state organisations, might continue to exist,” May 4, 2006. Available online at www2.lse.ac.uk/in-ternationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/drc/FailedState.pdf. Accessed May 8, 2011.

20

regime.72 He was a former AQY member who was arrested in March 2004 and sentenced in Au-

gust 2004 for planning to assassinate the U.S. ambassador to Yemen and planning attacks on for-

eign embassies. He escaped from a Yemeni prison in 2006. 73Al-Raymi is known for his ability

to recruit new operatives and considered to be one of the most ruthless members of AQAP. He

advocates targeting U.S. and western targets74 and discourages cooperation with Yemeni regime.

He is also a key suspect in July 2007 attack on convoy of Spanish tourists.75

Shaykh Ibrahim Suleiman al-Rubaysh: Head religious ideologue, Religious Department

Al-Rubaysh was born in 1980 in Buridah, al-Qasm, Saudi Arabia. He earned B.A. in Sharia Law

from Imam Muhammed bin Sa’ud University. He has harshly criticized the Saudi regime and op-

poses Western involvement in Muslim lands.76 Like many AQAP operatives, he trained at al-

Faruq camp in Afghanistan and fought in Tora Bora. He was arrested by Pakistani authorities in

2001 and turned over to the U.S. 77 He is a former Guantanamo detainee, and after his release

participated in the Saudi rehabilitation program before fleeing to Yemen in 2006 or 2007.78

Anwar al-Awlaki: Religious Department, Head of Foreign Operations Unit.79

Al-Awlaki is the notorious American AQAP member who retains dual citizenship in Yemen and

USA. He was born in New Mexico in 1971 and earned BS, MA, and PhD degrees in the U.S. be-

fore leaving in 2002. After a brief stay in London, he settled in his family’s ancestral village in

Yemen – home to the Awlaki tribe. He has been directly linked to the Fort Hood shooter Nidal

Malik Hassan, Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, the Christmas Day bomber on NWA flight

253, and the cargo planes parcel bomb incident. He was also involved with other suspected ter-

21

rorists Paul Rockwood, Barry Bujol, Zachary Chesser, and Sharif Monley.80 Interestingly, al-

Awlaki served as an Imam at the Rabat Mosque in San Diego, California, where he became

friends with two of the September 11th hijackers, Nawafal-Hamzi and Khalid al-Mihdar. He also

served as an imam in Falls Church, Virginia, where he met Nidal Malik Hassan, the Fort Hood

shooter. As a religious leader, al-Awlaki headed the Dar al-Hijrah Islamic Center in Washington

D.C. and was the Muslim Chaplin at George Washington University. After settling in Yemen, al-

Awlaki was arrested in 2006 for alleged al-Qaeda involvement, including a plot to bomb oil and

petrol facilities. He reportedly has connections to the al-Imam University, which is a Sana’a Is-

lamic school run by Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani.81 He openly supports violence against U.S.,

using internet, twitter, Paltalk, emails, and the AQAP media, like Inspire magazine and Sada

al-Malahim.82

Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri: Expert bomb maker, Foreign Operations Unit83

Tali al-Asiri is a Saudi national born in Riyadh in April 1982. He was from a pious family, the

son of a retired soldier who had four brothers and three sisters. He was imprisoned in Saudi Ara-

bia for trying to leave for Iraq to enlist in the jihadist movement there. “The 28-year-old is be-

lieved to have built the device his younger brother used in an assassination attempt on Saudi Ara-

bia's deputy interior minister in August 2009, and the underwear bomb a young Nigerian man

tried to detonate in an aircraft over the US on Christmas Day.”84 Supposedly, he is also an expert

in preparing poisons and well-versed in martial arts.85

Uthman Ahmad Uthman Amira al Ghamdi: Sub-military commander86

22

Al Ghandi is one of AQAP’s new leaders. Like several of his colleagues, he is a former Guan-

tanamo detainee, and a participant in the Saudi rehabilitation program. He was also a former

Saudi solider, but later went to Afghanistan to train with AQ and fight the Northern Alliance.

Like many other AQAP leaders, he trained at al-Farouq camp where he claims to have met Bin

Laden.87

60“Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” Al-Jazeera. December 29, 2009. http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/12/2009122935812371810.html. Ac-cessed April 11, 2011.61“FACTBOX: AQAP, Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based wing,” Reuters, Tuesday, March 22, 2011. Available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/us-yemen-president-aqap-idUSTRE72L3QK20110322. Accessed April 9, 2011.62 See “Profiles of Current AQAP Leaders and Other Radical Yemeni Islamists” pp.18-20 in Jeremy M. Sharp, CRS Report RL34170.63 “Q3: The first operation for AQAP outside of Yemen targeted Muĥammad bin Nayif, the Saudi Assistant Minister of Defense. Why Muĥammad bin Nayif? And what are the results of the operation? All praise is due to Allāh, the targeting of Muĥammad bin Nayif was part of our effort to purify the Arabian Peninsula from the traitors,” quote taken from p. 14 in “Inter-view with Shaykh Abu Basir,” Inspire magazine, Issue 1, pp. 13-17, Summer 2010. Accessed April 12, 2011. 64Danielle Sheldon, International Institute for Counterterrorism.65 Barak Barfi, p. 3.66 Jeremy M. Sharp, p. 14.67 Ibid.68Stephen Kurczy, “Five Key Members of Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP),” Christian Science Monitor, November 2, 2010. Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1102/Five-key-members-of-Al-Qaeda-in-Yemen-AQAP/Nasir-al-Wuhayshi-head-of-AQAP. Accessed April 12, 2011.69 Barak Barfi, “How attacking AQAP influenced its strategy,” NATO Review, Edition 5, 2010. Available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/Yemen/Yemen_AQAP/EN/index.htm. Accessed April 7, 2011. 70 “My primary and preparatory studies was in a Science institution. My secondary school-ing was in one of the shari’ah institutes. I used to take advantage of summer vacations by going to some of the centers of shari’ah. I was later enrolled in one of the Islamic universi-ties but left it at the middle of the first year and went to Afghanistan,” quote taken from p. 26 in “Interview with Shaykh Abu Hurairah ,” Inspire magazine, Issue 5, pp. 26-28, Spring 2011. Accessed, April 5, 2011.71 Thomas Joscelyn, “US State Department Designates Two Al Qaeda Leaders in Yemen,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 13, 2010. Available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11790323&Itemid=0. Accessed April 27, 2011. 72 Barak Barfi, p.3.73 Danielle Sheldon, International Institute for Counterterrorism74 Jeremy M. Sharp, p.14.75Stephen Kurczy, Christian Science Monitor.76Danielle Sheldon, International Institute for Counterterrorism.77 Barak Barfi, p.3.

23

Abd al Majid al Zidani: Member of the Religious Deparment

Al Zidani is a leading figure in the Islah Party, the main opposition party in Yemen. He was a

founder and leader of the al-Iman University, a Sunni religious school founded in 1993 in

Yemen.88 He is also a member of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, and is reported to be a one-

time spiritual leader to bin Laden.89 He was an organizer of the Afghan-Arab mujahidin and

founded the Charitable Society for Social Welfare and the Commission on Scientific Signs in the

Quran and Sunnah.90 He has links to the Saudi al-Haramain Foundation, a charitable organization

accused of giving money to bin Laden,91 and the Muslim World League, a Saudi NGO whose

philosophy is based on an extremist interpretation of Islam. The Muslim World League and sev-

eral affiliated groups and individuals have been linked to terrorist-related activity.92 Al Zidani

advocates jihad against the U.S., 93 and is very eccentric in that he claims to have found a cure

for HIV/AIDS and scientific proof that women cannot act alone as witnesses in a court of law.94

Samir Khan: Head of Inspire magazine, Foreign Operations Unit95

78 Jeremy M. Sharp, p.14.79Thomas Hegghammer, “The case for chasing al-Awlaki,” Foreign Policy, November 24, 2010. Available online at http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_case_for_chasing_al_awlaki. Ac-cessed April 12, 2011. 80 See “A Profile of Yemeni-American Terrorist Anwar Al Awlaki” p.16 in John Rollins, “Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Pol-icy,” CRS Report R41070, January 25, 2011. Available online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf. Accessed April 10, 2011.81Danielle Sheldon, International Institute for Counterterrorism.82 Barak Barfi, p.4.83 See Thomas Hegghammer, Foreign Policy.84 Profile: Al-Qaeda ‘bomb maker’ Ibrahim al-Asiri,” BBC News, October 31, 2010. Available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11662143. Accessed April 12, 201185 Ibid.86 “The Guantanamo Docket,” New York Times, March 24, 2011. Available online at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/184-othman-ahmed-othman-al-omairah/documents/1/pages/206#1. Accessed April 11, 2011.

24

Background: Issue 2 of Inspire magazine confirms he is head of magazine, which is produced

out of Yemen.96

88 Stephen Erlanger, “At Yemen College, Scholarship and Jihadist Ideas,” New York Times, January 18, 2010. Available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/world/middleeast/19yemen.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1. Accessed April 26, 201189 “Yemeni President Says U.S. and Israel Behind Unrest,” The European Union Times, March 3, 2011. Available online at http://www.eutimes.net/2011/03/yemeni-president-says-us-and-israel-behind-unrest/. Accessed April 26, 201190 Josh Devon, “Yemeni Sheikh of Hate,” National Review Online, January 7, 2003. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/205426/yemeni-sheikh-hate/josh-devon. Accessed April 13, 2011. 91 Bootie Cosgove Mather, “Al Qaeda Skimming Charity Money,” CBS News, June 7, 2004. Available online at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/06/07/terror/main621621.shtml. Accessed April 26, 201192 “Muslim World League,” Anti-Defamation League, May 19, 2009. Available online at http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Muslim_World_League_Backgrounder.htm. Accessed April 26, 201193Danielle Sheldon, International Institute for Counterterrorism.94 Heather Murdock, “Yemen’s controversial Abdul Majid al-Zindani,” Global Post, February 9, 2010. http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/middle-east/100206/abdul-majid-al-zindani-yemen. Accessed April 14, 2011.96 “For a start, the second issue confirms that the magazine is produced out of Yemen by Samir Khan, the online propagandist who was based in the United States until October 2009,” quote taken from Thomas Hegghammer, Inspire 2, Jihadica, October 12, 2010. Avail-able online at http://www.jihadica.com/inspire-2/. Accessed April 27, 2011.; also, for more background on Samir Khan see “I am proud to be a traitor to America,” Inspire magazine, Is-sue 2, Fall 2010, pp. 45-49.

25

87 Jeremy M. Sharp, p. 14.95 Thomas Hegghammer, Foreign Policy.

26