mazzei

PeacekeePing, Un Stand-by force and raPid dePloyment: a critical analySiS

BY

Cristian Mazzei

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF

The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

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PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Peacekeeping, UN Stand-by force and Rapid Deployment: a Critical Analysis

by

Cristian Mazzei

Civil Affairs OfficerMINUSTAH

Presented in partial completion of the requirements ofThe Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTSLIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................................ 3

SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................................................. 4

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5

1. THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS ........................................ 6

1.1. PEACEKEEPING RESPONDING TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT ........................................... 6

1.2. RAPID DEPLOYMENT: THE CONCERNS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................... 7

2. THE NATIONAL STUDIES ................................................................................................................................................ 8

2.1. THE NETHERLANDS STUDY ...................................................................................................................................... 8

2.2. THE CANADIAN STUDY ............................................................................................................................................... 9

3. STUDIES DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................................................... 11

3.1. THE DPKO AND THE UN SECRETARIAT .............................................................................................................. 11

3.2. UNITED NATIONS STANDBY ARRANGEMENT SYSTEM (UNSAS) ................................................................ 12

3.3. STANDBY FORCES HIGH READINESS BRIGADE (SHIRBRIG) ........................................................................ 13

3.4. UNITED NATIONS RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE MISSION HEADQUARTERS (RDMHQ) ................................ 14

4. FURTHER REFORM DEVELOPMENTS - THE BRAHIMI REPORT ..................................................................... 15

4.1. PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 16

4.2. UNSAS ............................................................................................................................................................................... 17

4.3. BUILDING “BRIGADE -SIZED FORCES” FOR UN OPERATIONS ..................................................................... 18

4.4. ON-CALL ROSTERS FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT – THE EVOLUTION OF RDMHQ .................................... 19

5. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATION OF RAPID DEPLOYABLE FORCES ............................................................ 20

5.1. ADVANTAGES OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY .................................................................................... 20

5.2. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT ...................................................................................... 20

6. PROPOSAL FOR A UN STANDING MILITARY FORCE ......................................................................................... 21

6.1. PREPARATION PHASE ................................................................................................................................................ 22

6.2. BASES ESTABLISHMENT PHASE ............................................................................................................................. 22

6.3. ASSIGNMENT PHASE .................................................................................................................................................. 22

7. THE FUTURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS .................................................................................................. 24

7.1. Rapid deployment Teams (RDT) ............................................................................................................................. 25

7.2. NEEDS TO REINFORCE UN SECRETARIAT CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE RAPID DEPLOYMENT ....... 27

7.3. NEEDS TO REINFORCE MEMBERS STATES CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE RAPID DEPLOYMENT ...... 28

8. REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 28

8.1. EMERGENCE OF NEW PARTNERS ......................................................................................................................... 28

8.2. ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ............................................................................................................... 29

CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................................................... 31

APPENDIX A .......................................................................................................................................................................... 33

THE BRAHIMI REPORT - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 33

APPENDIX B .......................................................................................................................................................................... 38

THE BRAHIMI REPORT - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 38

APPENDIX C: LIST OF CURRENT PEACEKEEPING MISSION ................................................................................ 43

BIBLIORAPHY AND REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 43

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative & Budgetary QuestionsASF African Stand-By ForcesAU African UnionCIS Commonwealth of Independent States CITS Communication and Information technology serviceDFS Department of Field ServiceDPKO Department of Peace KeepingECOWAS Economic Community of West African StatesEU the European Union MONUC United Nations Mission in CongoMOU Memorandum of UnderstandingMPS Mission Planning Service NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental OrganizationOAS Organization of American States OIC Officer in Charge OSCE Organisation of for Security and Co-operation in EuropePCC Police Contributing CountriesPLANELM Permanent Planning ElementRDL Rapid Deployment LevelRDMHQ United Nations Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters RDT Rapid deployment Teams RLU Research and Liaison Unit SHIRBRIG Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade TCC Troop Contributing Countries UN United NationsUNAMID African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in DarfurUNHQ United Nations HeadquartersUNLB UN Logistics Base UNPOL United Nations PoliceUNSAS United Nations Standby Arrangement System

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SUMMARY

Starting by a rapid background information on the context of contemporary conflict and UN peacekeeping Operations (integrated, multidimensional), the present document will explore the historical evolution of the concept of a Standing United Nations Rapid Deployment Force through the National studies ( Netherland and Canadian). Then it analyses the studies developments that leaded to the concept of establishing a United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), a Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and the United Nations Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters. Next chapter is dedicated on how the Brahimi Report contributed in further developments of the rapid deployment mechanism. In addition, the paper provides an overview on the advantages and limitation of a rapid Deployment forces, considers the progress within DPKO and identifies new proposals for an efficient UN standing military force. Some recommendations are given on how the current UN system structure can be improved, empowering the role of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) in promoting the creation and training of National Stand-by Forces, and the establishment of UN military base around the globe. Finally, particular attention is drawn on possible alternatives to the UN in dealing with peacekeeping operation such as partnership with other regional organizations (EU, NATO, ASF (African Stand-By Forces))

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INTRODUCTION

There is no higher legitimacy for the use of military forces under the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. It should be collectively recognized as a matter of honor and privilege for countries to provide forces for such peace missions.

The Rwandan genocide in 1994 is an explanatory example that indicates how political expediency and domestic compulsions will invariably determine the reactions of member states. In addition, a late reaction, namely deployment of a peace force, resulted in an uncontrolled escalation much complex and difficult to deal with. Those forces necessary to face such a depredating situation could only be put together in a certain time frame, 3 to 6 months, and expect forces available any earlier was unrealistic.

The inordinate delay in the arrival of troops in the mission area is always a most frustrating feature of the missions and sometimes reason of major security instability in the targeted country.

One of the measures capable to overcome this inadequacy is the establishment of a so called "stand by" forces by member states that will be ready at demand, to be deployed in the critical area at short notice. However, it is in doubt whether such "stand by" forces would, in fact, be available immediately on demand.

In the context of ready availability of forces for United Nations peace operations, the only real answer for meeting crisis situations that call for speedy deployment of military forces, civilian police, and some civil affairs and humanitarian aid personnel for the maintenance of international peace and security, is to raise and maintain a Standing United Nations Rapid Deployment force.

It is clear that a military force of modest dimensions, including police and other civilians personnel deployed into a conflict zone as soon as some semblance of agreement between belligerents is negotiated, can achieve many results more in terms of implementation of the terms of the agreement, than a much larger force introduced three to six months later. During which period, the political situation within the affected country can change dramatically, hostilities may have resumed, and the ground situation much changed reducing the chance of a peaceful resolution. Consequently, efforts have to be made in having a suitably organized, structured, trained and equipped force that is readily available when required. Starting by a rapid background information on the new concept of peacekeeping mission (integrated, multidimensional), the present document will explore the historical evolution of the concept of a standing United Nations Rapid Deployment Force through the some national studies and the Brahimi Report. It provides an overview of recent proposals, considers the progress within DPKO, and it identifies the potential limitations of the new arrangements. Some recommendations are given on how the current UN system structure can be improved, empowering the role Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) in promoting the creation and training of National Stand-by forces, and the establishment of UN military base around the globe. Finally, particular attention will be drawn on possible alternatives to the UN in dealing with peacekeeping operation such as partnership with other regional organizations (EU, NATO, ASF (African Stand-By Forces))

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1. The context of Contemporary Conflict and UN Peace Operations

1.1. Peacekeeping Responding to the Changing Nature of Conflict

The strategic context for UN peacekeeping changed significantly with the end of the Cold War. The Security Council started to work more actively to promote the containment and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. In some cases this opened the door to support more comprehensive peace settlements that went far beyond cease-fires and separation of forces, and sought to address the root causes of conflict. To assist with the implementation of these settlements, the UN deployed “multi-dimensional” peacekeeping operations which included in addition to a military component, a range of civilian experts to monitor and assist in areas such as human rights, policing, elections, rehabilitation of civic institutions (rules of law), and the reintegration of combatants into normal life.

While the end of the Cold War coincided with a general decline in the incidence of inter-states conflict around the world, it was also accompanied by a wave of nationalist, ethnic, and religious civil wars (intra-state conflicts). UN peacekeeping operations were engaged to address this new generation of threats to international peace and security, with some early success. Facing mounting public pressure to address increasingly visible and high-profile post-Cold War humanitarian catastrophes, the Security Council dispatched UN peacekeeping operations into conflict-zones where the existence of internal power structures and even the State itself was being challenged by those with arms (failed states).

Lightly armed peacekeepers thus found themselves deployed where there was no peace to keep, little or no consent from the key belligerents, and where studious impartiality in the face of aggression risked resembling appeasement. In these hostile environments, such as Somalia (1991), the former-Yugoslavia (1991) and Rwanda (1994), the limitations of the UN peacekeeping instrument were harshly exposed.

The failure of UN peacekeeping operations to stem the violence in several of these new post-conflict theatres led to a waning of international support for the UN as the leading actor in these international peace and security efforts. Instead, attention turned to replacing UN peacekeeping with regional organizations and ad-hoc coalitions, mandated by the Security Council and capable of quickly projecting a powerful stabilizing presence into conflict areas. These entities came to be seen as the instruments of choice in international peacekeeping operations.

Internal armed conflicts constitute the vast majority of today’s wars. While roughly 50 percent of the peacekeeping operations launched between 1948 and 1988 were deployed to internal armed conflicts, the figure since 1998 has risen to 90 percent. The vast majority of these conflicts take place in the world’s poorest countries where State capacity may be weak and where many belligerents may be motivated by economic gain as much as ideology or past grievances. International community action that fails to address the root causes fuelling the conflict is unlikely to prevent its cyclical recurrence. Indeed, evidence has shown that a large proportion of all civil wars are due to a relapse of conflict, the risks of which are particularly high in the decade following the conflict. As understandings of the complexity of conflict have become more nuanced, requirements for more comprehensive response strategies have arisen.

In an era of shrinking militaries and competing strategic demands, Member States are therefore once again looking to UN peacekeeping as a cost-effective option for providing a comprehensive response to this broad range of issues. The complex challenges posed by these violent internal conflicts place a

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premium on closer cooperation between the various parts of the UN system1 and the range of development and humanitarian partners often present in post-conflict settings. The experiences of the past 15 years have shown that a comprehensive, system-wide rapid response is required to help countries emerging from conflict break the cycle of violence and achieve a sustainable peace.

1.2. Rapid Deployment: The Concerns of International Environment

There is agreement that preventive action, through a combination of conflict resolution, diplomacy and even prompt deployments, is far more cost-effective than later, larger efforts. Similarly, many recognize that today, one essential mechanism for conflict prevention is a reliable and effective UN rapid deployment capability.

The rationale underlying recent initiatives to enhance UN rapid deployment capabilities was very persuasive. Frequent delays, vast human suffering and death, diminished credibility, opportunities lost, escalating costs are some of the tragic consequences of slow and inappropriate responses to an emergency. Constant demand for prompt UN assistance highlighted the necessity to empower existing arrangements within the Organization, as well as the commitment of member states. Most recognize the UN was denied sufficient resources, as well as appropriate mechanisms with which to respond. Fortunately, an array of complementary reforms has combined to expand the options. As expected, there are limitations and competing alternatives.

International efforts in this attempt focused primarily on improving peacekeeping. The larger process involves measures to organize the contributions of member states, as well as the establishment of basic mechanisms within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Several initiatives are quite promising.

Approximately twenty-seven member states, designated "Friends of Rapid Deployment," co-operated with the DPKO to secure support for developing a rapidly deployable mission headquarters (RDMHQ).

As well, since 1994 a DPKO team has organized the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) to expand the quality and quantity of resources that member states might provide. To complement this arrangement, the Danish government, in co-operation with thirteen regular troop contributors, has organized a multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).

The efforts of the UN Secretariat, the 'Friends' and member states such as Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands were laudable and deserve support. There remain a number of issues, however, required further effort and scrutiny.

Within the Secretariat, one focus is on reducing response times, for example, in implementing an awareness mechanism such as an integrated Strategic Analysis Cell. This 24/7 unit will anticipate demands for peacekeeping allows decision maker to promptly take decision in case of necessity. Other considerations must address whether these measures, when combined, contribute to provide a widely-valued service, increase confidence in the UN capacity to plan, manage, deploy, and support at short notice, alleviating the primary worries of potential troop contributors and other member states; generate wider political will and adequate financing and encouraging broad participation.2

1 The term “UN System” is used to describe the various UN departments as well as the Specialised Agencies, Funds and Programmes. 2 A number of these criteria are drawn from the Government of Canada's report, International Consultative Group “Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability”, Ottawa, Sept. 1995. See, for example, chapter 2, "Principles of the Study," pp. 8-16

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We must also ask whether the measures under way are sufficient to build an effective and reliable UN capability. Are these initial efforts likely to build a solid foundation with the capacity for modernization of the organization to the evolving environment? Alternatively, is there a risk of being locked into another ad hoc, conditional system requiring last-minute political approval and improvisation prior to each mission? Can we identify national defense reforms that would complement UN rapid deployment and conflict prevention? At the dawn of a new millennium, the question also arises as to what additional measures will be necessary to institutionalize and consolidate a dedicated UN standing capability?

2. The National Studies

Since the release in 1992 of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali “An Agenda for Peace”, there has been a wide-ranging discussion of the UN options for responding to violent conflict. Opinion on the subject of any UN capability is always mixed. The debate followed two perspectives: who favored strengthening current arrangements by reforming the structure of the UN Secretariat and available resources, and those who desired a dedicated UN standing force or standing emergency capability.

The need for a new instrument was widely recognized after the sad experiences in Bosnia, Somalia and the failure to avert the Rwandan genocide. Regrettably, only few governments were willing to implement meaningful reforms. Prior commitments tended to be followed by carefully nuanced retractions. There were exceptions, notably among regular UN troop contributors. However, even supportive governments were worried about moving ahead of public opinion, fellow member states, and their own capacity to secure more ambitious reforms.

In the early nineties, the Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark commenced studies and consultative processes to develop options for a UN rapid reaction capability. These studies were followed by concerted diplomatic efforts to organize a wider coalition of member states and secure the co-operation of the UN Secretariat. These initiatives had a double objective: offering an alternative supra-national intervention force large to deal with global security and second; in informing others partners / state members how they might best contribute to the process.

2.1. The Netherlands Study

In 1994, the Netherlands began to explore the possibility of creating a permanent, rapidly deployable brigade at the service of the United Nations Security Council. A team of experts conducted the study, and an international conference was convened to review their initial report. They then released The Netherlands Non-Paper, "A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study," According to the study; to avoid the escalate of a crisis into widespread violence, it was necessary to have dedicated units that were instantly deployable: "the sooner an international 'fire brigade' can turn out, the better the chance that the situation can be contained".

The study was focused on a permanent, rapidly deployable brigade that would guarantee the immediate availability of troops when they were urgently needed. The brigade would complement existing components in the field of peacekeeping and crisis management. Its chief value would be as a 'stop-gap' measure when a crisis was imminent, and its deployments would be of strictly limited duration.

The brigade tasks would include preventive action, peacekeeping during the interval between the Security Council decision and the arrival of an international peacekeeping force, and/or deployment in emergency humanitarian situations. The annual cost of 5,000-person brigade was projected to approximately US$300 millions. Initial procurement of its equipment, was calculated in US$500-550 millions.

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"Adoption" of the brigade by one or more member states or by an existing organization such as NATO was recommended as a means of reducing the expenses of basing, transportation, and equipment acquisitions.3

The non-paper succeeded in stimulating an international exchange of views. However, it was clear that only a less binding, less ambitious arrangement would be acceptable, at least for the immediate future. A few member states were supportive of the Dutch initiative, but the majority was opposed to any standing UN force, and even the modest expenditures outlined.

2.2. The Canadian Study

In September 1995, the Government of Canada presented to UN a report entitled, “Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations”4. The report established the need for a rapid reaction capability, stressing the importance of a number of principles such as reliability, quality, and cost-effectiveness and identifying the primary force contributors such as France, the United States5, and NATO. Among the elements considered necessary there was an early warning mechanism, an effective decision-making process, reliable transportation and infrastructure, logistical support, sufficient finances, and well-trained and equipped personnel. The UN system was then evaluated with respect to these requirements.

A range of problems spanning the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels were identified and addressed.

At the political level, among the proposals for reforms, there was the establishment of a troop contributors' committee for each operation; a troop contributors' forum to consider general issues of an operational nature, and convening informal groups of "friends" to deal with related issues.

At the strategic level, there were calls for refining the early-warning capabilities of the Secretariat and advancing co-operation with member states toward the development of an "early-warning alert" system. The report advised strengthening the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with additional military staff, developing standing contractual arrangements with suppliers, particularly with respect to the provision of strategic movement, and producing packages of equipment for generic missions. Both the Secretary-General and member states were urged to continue refining and strengthening the Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) established in 1993. Member states were asked to explore the advance identification of personnel with expertise in relevant areas to assist the UN in responding to urgent situations.6

At the operational level, however, the UN suffered a lack of related capabilities. Several new mechanisms were imperative, including a permanent operational-level rapid reaction headquarters.7

This multinational group, included thirty to fifty persons, it could increase in crisis times and it would conduct contingency planning and rapid deployment as authorized by the Security Council as well. The headquarters would have a Civil Affairs/Political Affairs branch to liaise with related UN agencies, NGOs and regional organizations.

The vanguard concept "is based on the principle in linking all levels of the UN system, especially operational headquarters and mission groups provided by member states at the tactical level. The purpose was deploying a force as rapidly as possible for a brief period, either to meet an immediate

3 Government of The Netherlands “The Netherlands Non-Paper”, “A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A preliminary study", (revised version) April 1995, p. 34 Government of Canada, International Consultative Group “Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations” Sep. 1995 p. 7 Ottawa5

6 Ibid., p. 37-427 Ibid., p. 54

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crisis or to anticipate the arrival of follow-on forces or a more traditionally-organized peacekeeping operation."8

Both, member states and Secretary-General were encouraged to organize “UN stand-by units into multinational-capability components," with appropriate training and exercising to enhance readiness. "These capability components might include some of the newer tasks of multidimensional operations (natural disaster relief, humanitarian emergencies), working in close conjunction with other sectors of the UN and other non-governmental organizations." 9

It entailed identifying national 'vanguard component groups' that might be called upon as needed. These forces would remain in their home countries under the command of national authorities until they were notified by the Secretary-General and authorized to deploy by their own national governments.

The Canadian study reaffirmed "broad support for the general directions of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat in building its peace operations capability for the future." 10 Recommendations were refined to appeal to a broad range of supportive member states. This would be an inclusive, co-operative building process with the objective of developing a unity of both purpose and effort without Charter reforms neither additional expense for the organization. In many respects, it was a compelling case for realistic change within the short to medium term. "Clearly,” the report cautioned, "the first step is to implement these ideas before embarking upon more far-reaching schemes which may in the end prove unnecessary." 11 The Danish-led Multinational Study

In January 1995, the Danish government announced their interest in explore the possibility to develop a UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Thirteen member states agreed to explore the option of a rapid deployment force within the framework of the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS).

The guiding assumption of the study was that a number of countries could, "by forming an affiliation between appropriate contributions to UNSAS, make a pre-established, multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade available to United Nations, thus, providing a rapid deployment capability for deployments of limited duration."12 The Brigade, was noted, should be reserved exclusively to provide an effective presence in peacekeeping operations. The troops would be deployed on maximum 30 days notice and be self-sustained of 180 days. Standardized training based on joint exercises on operation procedures, equipment to be used, would speed up national decision-making processes in times of crisis, considering that the mission conditions for troop contributors would be clear and well understood in advance.

Moreover, with an agreed focus on being "first in" and "first out," participants would have some assurance of the limited duration of their deployment and consequently more willing contribution with forces.

However, the nation’s right to decide whether or not to participate on a case-by-case base, would be protected. It was assumed "this would be accomplished through the maintenance of a brigade pool of 'extra' units which would 'back up' those units which might not be made available due to national decision."13, therefore, abstain from an operation without jeopardizing the brigade deployment.

8 Ibid., p. 529 Ibid., p. 5210 Ibid., p. 5511 Ibid., p. 5612 Ibid., p. 913 Ibid., p. 10-11

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As presented, the SHIRBRIG main objective was to provide a rapid reaction capacity to United Nations with immediate access to a versatile force comprising a balance of peacekeeping capabilities. The proposal soon attracted a supportive constituency within the UN Secretariat and among regular troop contributors, including Canada and the Netherlands.

3. Studies Developments

3.1. The DPKO and the UN Secretariat

Despite a persistent shortage of personnel and funds, there have been numerous heartening changes within the UN Secretariat over the past years.

A Training Unit was established in DPKO in June 1993 to increase the availability of trained military and civilian personnel for timely deployment. In 1994, the DPKO established the Mission Planning Service (MPS) for the detailed planning and co-ordination of complex operations. To enhance analysis, evaluation and institutional memory, the Lessons Learned Unit was instituted in early 1995. To improve logistics, especially in the start-up phase of an operation, the Field Administrative and Logistics Division was incorporated into DPKO. Approval was given to utilize the Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy as a centre for the management of peacekeeping assets. Aside from maintaining an inventory of UN material, it is to oversee the stockpiling and delivery of supplies and equipment for missions. Mission Start-up Kits will also be assembled at the Logistics Base.

The development of a rapid deployment mission headquarters and the expansion of the UN Standby Arrangement System are themselves part of a larger process to improve the UN capacity to promptly manage increasingly complex operations. Rapid reaction was a prominent theme within the former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace”.14 He cautioned that problems had become steadily more serious with respect to the availability of troops and equipment. Although Boutros-Ghali repeated his support for a UN rapid reaction force, he did not endorse the development of a “permanent” UN standing force. On several occasions, he stipulated that the answer was not to create a UN standing force, which he described as being "impractical and inappropriate."15 This hesitancy should, however, be understood within the context when he received little support to his earlier attempt for generating peace enforcement units and even, less enthusiasm for negotiating Article 43 type agreements. In response to the 1995 "Supplement", the President of the Security Council indicated that, "all interested Member States were invited by the Council to present further reflections on United Nations peace-keeping operations, and in particular on ways and means to improve the capacity of the United Nations for rapid deployment."16 The Security Council also narrowed the range of options, expressing its concern that the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing standby arrangements.17 Nothing was explicitly rejected, but the short-term priority was clearly stand-by rather than a standing force.

In December 1995, the new UN Secretary-General elected, Mr.Kofi Annan, reflected these concerns stating that:

“I don't think we can have a standing United Nations army. The membership is not ready for that. There are financial questions and great legal issues as to which laws would apply and where it would be stationed. But short of having a standing United Nations army, we have taken initiatives that will perhaps help us achieve what we were hoping to get out of a standing army. The real problem has been rapidity of deployment. We are now encouraging governments to set up rapidly deployable brigades

14 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A/50/60, S/1995/1, January 3, 199515 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", Foreign Affairs Vol. Winter 1992/93, p.9316 Statement by the President of the Security Council on February 22, 1995, (S/PRST/1995/9)17 See Ibid., (S/PRST/1995/9).

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http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1992/5.html

and battalions that could be moved into a theater very quickly, should the governments decide to participate in peacekeeping operations”.18

In the short term, it appeared the UN Standby Arrangement System was to be the foundation, upon which much of the potential for rapid deployment would depend.

3.2. United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS)

In 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali identified the need for a system of Standby Arrangements requiring troops to be available to the UN at short notice, capable of intervening quickly and efficiently where and when necessary. This system was specifically intended to improve the capability for rapid deployment.

As mentioned in previous paragraphs, the Standby Arrangements system (UNSAS) is based on conditional commitments by Member States of specified resources within the agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. These resources can be military formations, specialized personnel (civilian and military), services as well as material and equipment. The resources agreed-upon remain on "stand-by" in their home country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to prepare them to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. Stand-by resources are used exclusively for peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council. When specific needs arise, stand-by resources are requested by the Secretary-General and, if approved by participating Member States, are rapidly deployed to set up new peacekeeping missions or to reinforce existing ones. 19

UNSAS serves several objectives. First, it provides the UN with a precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities a member state will have available at an agreed state of readiness. Second, it facilitates planning, training and preparation for both participating Member states and UN. Third, it provides to UN not only with foreknowledge of a range of national assets, but also a list of potential

18 United Nations Press Release, GA/9212, December 18, 1996, p.9.19 Security Council, "Progress Report Of The Secretary-General On Standby Arrangements For Peacekeeping", (S/1996/1067) 24 December 1996. p.69.

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UNSAS CONCEPT“The United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) is based on

conditional commitments by Member States of specified resources within the agreed response times for UN peacekeeping operations. These resources can be

military formations, specialized personnel (civilian and military), services as well as material and equipment. The resources agreed-upon remain on "stand-by" in

their home country, where necessary preparation, including training, is conducted to prepare them to fulfil specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. Stand-by resources are used exclusively for peacekeeping

operations mandated by the Security Council. When specific needs arise, stand-by resources are requested by the Secretary-General and, if approved by participating

Member States, are rapidly deployed to set up new peacekeeping missions or to reinforce existing ones”.

www.un.org.Depts/dpko/rapid/sba.htm

http://www.un.org.Depts/dpko/rapid/sba.htm

options if a member or members refrain from participating in a given operation. Finally, although the arrangements are only conditional, it is hoped that those members who have confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources, will be more forthcoming and committed than might otherwise be the case. In short, UNSAS provides an initial commitment to serve, and a better understanding of in-field requirements, but is not a binding obligation.

By September of 1999, eighty-six member states had confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources, representing a total of 147,500 personnel ready to be called on. The majority of committed states provided detailed information on their specific capabilities. Response times were registered according to declared national capabilities. Resources were divided into four groups on the basis of their potential. Earlier reports suggested the majority (58%) of the overall pool fall into the first two categories: (1) up to 30 days, and (2) between 30 and 60 days.20 In other words, the UN has a conditional commitment of over 50,000 personnel on standby. It is assumed, that all of them have the capability of rapid deployment.

While UNSAS cannot guarantee reliable response, UN planners now have the option of developing contingency and 'fall-back' strategies when they anticipate delays. Member states are also more familiar with the system and on how they are expected to contribute. This situation has increased confidence and willingness to participate. In the words of senior DPKO official, "this is now the maximum feasible option."

National readiness is a necessary pre-requisite, but it does not provide to UN the capacity for rapid deployment. Several limitations remain. For example, many participants present a lack of capacity to provide their own support functions. The UN Organization is still confronted to shortages in a number of critical areas, including headquarters support, communications, and sea and air transportation..

3.3. Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)

In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace presented in January 1995, Boutros-Ghali also recommended to consider the idea of UN rapid deployment force, consisting in trained units coming from member states, operating under the same standards, procedures and inter-operable equipment. They must to take part in combined exercises on regular intervals in order to have forces available for a rapid deployment at short notice. A number of like-minded member states, all of them with extensive experience in the field of peacekeeping, decided to establish a working group to explore the option of creating a rapid deployment force within the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS). 21

In August 1996, a UN Planning Team, under the mandate to “develop a system of standby forces, able to be deployed as a whole or in parts anywhere in the world, within an agreed response time, for UN peace-keeping operations and missions”22 . This mandate addressed the key considerations involved in creating such force, formulating a concept and outline structure for a Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade. Its capabilities were to include an inherent ability to accomplish likely peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and to protect itself and associated UN agencies, NGOs and personnel while so engaged. As well, the possibility that one or more participating nations might decide not to contribute with troops in a current mission, implied the 20 DPKO, "Annual Update Briefing to Member States on Standby Arrangements", May 29, 1997, p.2 New York21 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, "Background Paper about establishing a Multinational UN Standby Forces Brigade at High Readiness (SHIRBRIG), New York, 26 September 199622 Louis A. Delvoie, “Enhancing the UN’s Rapid Reaction Capability: A Canadian Initiative”, S. Neil MacFarlane and Hans-George Ehhart (eds); Clementsport, Nova Scotia: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997

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necessity to establish a Brigade Pool, consisting in number of units exceeding the force requirement for the Brigade once it was deployed. Thus, the Brigade Pool would ensure the deployment of this Brigade would not be compromised if a participant nation decided to abstain from providing troops to a specific mission. The Brigade should also have the ability to operate independently at a considerable distance from the home-based support structures for its individual elements, with little or no host nation support. This last requirement therefore demanded that the contributing nation, have to take into account significant self sustain logistics capability and be able to cooperate on multinational logistics issues.23

On 15 December 1996, Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden signed a Letter of Intent with respect to cooperate in establishing a multinational SHIRBRIG. This act, was followed by the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dealing with setting up a Steering Committee to supervise the settlement of the Brigade. The MOU included a permanent planning element (PLANELM). The PLANELM, would have the responsibility of all pre-deployment functions of SHIRBRIG. During its deployment, it would become the core of deployed SHIRBRIG staff. The MOU in order to SHIRBRIG itself would complete the key list of signed documents by all contributing nations. 24

At the strategic level, members of the Contact Group are those SHIRBRIG Nations who have at least signed the MOU of the Steering Committee. The purpose of the Contact Group is to coordinate the activities of Permanent Missions in all SHIRBRIG related matters. Moreover, the Contact Group is in charge to provide a simple and easy way of communication between the United Nations and SHIRBRIG nations. The Steering Committee, also includes a political-military body responsible for the supervision of the PLANELM and all matters pertaining to the settlement of SHIRBRIG, such as enlargement of the Brigade, the managing of PLANELM and Staff, and all concepts and policy documents.25

The main objective, and the basis for co-operation, is to provide to UN, well-trained, cohesive multinational force to be deployed under Chapter VI. These kinds of operations come from the Security Council mandate, previous consent of the parties.26 At this respect, participants would have a mutual understanding of their combined capabilities, as well as their specific roles and requirements. This policy, enhance the efficiency of future deployment enhancing the safety of the troops once deployed. Common procedures and interoperability would be developed to allow better operational planning, to assure common assessment of operational requirements, to optimize movement planning and decreasing costs.

3.4. United Nations Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ)

When Security Council authorizes the deployment of a new peacekeeping operation, experience shows that it takes time to be staffed by suitable personnel, so, it reduce its crucial operational efficiency during initial deployment phase. To overcome this drawback, the concept of a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) firstly was to try in 1995 with a group of countries with Canada and the Netherlands in the lead. Recognizing the importance for UN in having such capacity, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, urged the Secretary-General to develop a rapidly deployable headquarters team. They were composed by skilled personnel in essential military and civilian headquarters functions. In December 1996, the Secretary-General announced his intention to establish the structure of RDMHQ to enable UN the rapidly deployment of a cohesive team of essential military and civilian personnel to the mission area in order to provide the mission with the necessary management and guidance in the crucial early days. 27

23 Adam Roberts, “Proposals for UN Standing Forces: History, Tasks and Obstacles”, paper presented to the International Conference on UN Rapid Reaction Capability, Montebello, Quebec, 7-8 April 1995, p. 10-11.24 Ibid., pp.11-12.25 S.G. Tait, “RCEME in the UNEF”, Canadian Army Journal, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1958, pp. 134-135.26 Ibid., p.137-138

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The concept envisages RDMHQ comprising by 61 military and civilian personnel, covering key functions of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. To attain this figure, 29 existing Headquarters staff were earmarked to be part of RDMHQ, and 32 were requested to be available by member states. Of the latter, it was proposed that eight of them, will be full-time RDMHQ staff located at UN Headquarters, while 24 will be earmarked in their home countries. Those drawn from the Secretariat will continue to perform their current functions. They will be available to RDMHQ for periodic training until deployed.

In other words, the RDMHQ will consist of three key elements:

• A core of eight persons (six military, one police and one humanitarian) based at Headquarters, New York (when not deployed they will be involved in mission-related activities, developing RDMHQ operating and staff procedures, contingency planning and supplementing the training activities);

• A second tier of 29 persons, selected and earmarked from existing Headquarters staff, who will continue in their current functions, but join the RDMHQ when it will be deployed; and,

• a third tier of 24 persons nominated by member states, who remains on standby in their home countries.

The RDMHQ would be deployed for a limited period, until the assigned mission staff arrive at the mission area and become functional. The RDMHQ will assist in developing the political, military and humanitarian strategy regarding the operation mandate, translating the strategic concept of operations into operational plans for all entities involved. Develop contingency plans based on the changing local situation or eventual changes in the mission mandate providing information to Headquarters to improve decision-making process, coordinating and liaising with national authorities on all relevant issues.

When proposed, the RDMHQ attracted broad support to UN Secretariat. In welcoming the proposal, Boutros-Ghali stated that the idea fostered a "culture of prevention" and, "even if it will not be used it is a kind of dissuasion."28 However, recruitment and staffing of this headquarters was far more controversial than initially anticipated. Despite of Secretary-General authorization to establish the RDMHQ, Pakistan succeeded in mobilizing wider resistance to this development. In 1998, Cuba denied approval to the necessary funds for RDMHQ staff in the accounts and budgetary committee (ACABQ). Unfortunately, controversy and political opposition have also diminished the momentum of the project.

4. Further reform developments - The Brahimi report

The challenge to strengthen and revitalize UN peace operations effectiveness regarding rapid deployment was laid before the international community (August 2000) release of the Report of Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”), a landmark document that recommended sweeping changes on how UN peacekeeping and associated post-conflict peace building were conceived, planned, and executed.29

Deploying peace operations promptly and effectively is a fundamental challenge for the United Nations. Delayed its deployments, plagued every major complex UN peace operation started from 1991 to 1999. Long lag times occurred between the Security Council authorizations of new kind of

27 Major-General Frank Van Kappen, "Presentation on the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ)", to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 24 October 199628 Patrick A. McCarthy, "Towards an Independent United Nations Peacekeeping Capability”. The Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, June 18, 199829 UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

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missions. Subsequently, Secretariat action was to organize member states peacekeeping not only offered forces, but military observers, police, equipment and logistics. These new lags had serious consequences, often reducing the political mission impact and operational effectiveness, cooling local commitments to peace accords, and undermining their delicate political balance.

The speedy deployment of military, civilian police and civilian expertise would not help to solidify a fragile peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel were not adequately equipped and trained to do their specific job. To be effective, the mission personnel required adequate materiel (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services), and information assets (intelligence, training and briefing). U operational deployment strategy had to be settled down for operations deployed under uncertain circumstances. Military and political “centre of gravity” enough to enable for anticipating and overcoming one or more second thoughts of the parties during peace process forward.

In summary, as shown in precedent paragraphs, to provide rapid and effective deployment, the Brahimi Report proposed a series of amelioration of the already present structures like UNSAS and SHIRBRIG rapid deployment benchmarks for new missions and a number of measures needed to put in place those benchmarks. These included advance planning and spending authority; rapid selection of quality mission leadership; improved quality and availability of security forces; capable civilian staff able to deploy quickly; effective logistics; and rapidly deployable capacity for public information.

4.1. Panel recommendations

The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace talks are often the most critical ones for establishing a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation. Lost opportunities during this period are hard to regain.

The Panel recommends that UN must define "rapid and effective deployment capacity" as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of Security Council resolution, and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations.

The Panel also recommends UNSAS must be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary enabling forces, previously created by Member States working in partnership, in order create robust peacekeeping forces as Panel had advocated. The Panel recommends that Secretariat have to send a special team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to accomplish the UN requisites in training and equipment required for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not meet the requirements can not be deployed.

To support such rapid and effective deployment, the Panel recommends to turn "on-call list" of about 100 experienced, well qualified military officers, carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO previously created for UNSAS. Drawn teams taken from this list must be available on duty after seven days noticed. They must be able to translate broad strategic-level mission concepts (developed at Headquarters) into concrete operational and tactical plans for the contingent deployments. It would increase the core element of DPKO policy to be used as part of a mission start-up team.

At the same time, similar process has to be done with on-call lists of civilian police (UNPOL), international judicial experts, penitentiaries experts and human rights specialists. They must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions as needed, and should also be part of UNSAS personnel. Pre-trained teams could then be drawn from this list to precede the main body of civilian police and related specialists into a new mission area, facilitating the rapid and effective deployment of the law and order component into the mission.

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The Panel also calls upon Member States to establish enhanced national "pools" of police officers and related experts, earmarked for rapid deployment to UN peace operations. These pools help to achieve the high demand of civilian police and related criminal justice/rule of law expertise in peace operations leading on intra state conflicts.

The Panel also urges Member States to consider forming joint regional partnerships and programs for the purpose of training members of the respective national pools to UNPOL doctrine and standards.

The Secretariat should also address the needs of qualified personnel to put in place a transparent and decentralized recruitment mechanism for civilian field personnel; to improve the retention of the civilian specialists necessary in every complex peace operation; creating stand-by teams for their rapid deployment.

The Panel also urges Secretary-General to formulate and submit to the General Assembly, the approval, of global logistics support strategy governing the stockpiling of equipment reserves and standing contracts with the private sector for common goods and services. In the interim, the Panel recommends that additional "start-up kits" of essential equipment be maintained at the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy.

The Panel finally recommends to Secretary General, to trespass the authority to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to commit in advance up to US$50 million, previous to the adoption of Security Council resolution for establishing a new operation once it becomes clear an operation will be established.

4.2. UNSAS

At the time of the launched Panel’s report, 87 states were participating in UNSAS. The system had little reliability. Improvement of UNSAS was widely endorsed. The Secretary General and DPKO urged its reorganization. Reassessment was necessary to do on what member states were willing to do. To achieve the 30/90-days deployment timeline, more reliable and sophisticated accounting of capabilities of UNSAS was necessary to implement.

Under Secretary General Jean Marie Guéhenno requested member states to respond by 1st July 2001, regarding the current status of assets they had listed of UNSAS, about heir contributions to on-call lists, and their ability to provide valuable enabling forces. By late 2001, the response was lackluster. Only nine countries had submitted updated information. DPKO persisted, however, and by December 2002 Mr. Guéhenno reported they had “turned a significant corner” in the redesign of UNSAS toward the readiness envisioned by the Panel. The new organization entails quarterly updates from member states on the capabilities they have listed in UNSAS, and a fourth level of readiness has been added to indicate resources deployable within 30/90-days after Security Council mandate, with appropriate national approval:

• Level I (provision of a list of capabilities describing resources that may be made available upon request by the UN);

• Level II (provision of a detailed list describing the contribution, including a list of major equipment, a table of organization of unit(s), the level of self-sufficiency, transportation data, and data on individuals);

• Level III (signature of MOU specifying resources to be provided, time responses and conditions for employment);

• Rapid Deployment Level (RDL, established on July 2002. The MOU detailing force to be provided, with pre-deployment planning and preparation that converts agreed equipment lists into “load lists,” determines the proposed contingents’ sustainment capabilities and

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requirements, and pre-arranges support from the Brindisi Strategic Deployment Stocks as necessary).

For units offered at Levels I-III, the forces offered are considered provisional until DPKO verifies suitability. For the Rapid Deployment Level, DPKO may deploy a staff assistance team to verify the equipment pledged as well as the levels of training and self-sustainment of personnel. Where DPKO identifies equipment deficiencies, they may try to arrange for that specific need to be met by the UN or through bilateral support. As of 15 July 2003, 77 countries were participating in the system at Level I (including the United States), 11 at Level II, and 41 at Level III. States participating at Level III included Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and the UK. Only two countries, Jordan and Uruguay, had joined the Rapid Deployment Level, pledging a total of six units. By fall 2003, however, efforts were underway to have nations in SHIRBRIG join the RDL.

4.3. Building “Brigade -Sized Forces” for UN Operations

The Brahimi Report’s recommendations encouraged developed and in development states to collaborate in training and equipping peacekeepers, and urged that states collaborate to create “brigade-size forces, with the necessary enabling forces” able to meet the 30/90 day rapid deployment guidelines, and to associate them with UNSAS.30 In the newly designed UNSAS system, DPKO evaluates member states offers and, with their concurrence, will suggest brigade-size groupings using forces in UNSAS that are at least in Level II. They have been visited by a team from the DPKO Force Generation Service, they have received UN training standards and materials, and have arranged to remedy any equipment deficiencies.31

DPKO consulted with UNSAS participants about the proposed “brigade sized forces,” receiving roughly a dozen replies but no offers to form such forces. In January 2003, the SG reported that no new commitments for preformed brigade groups had been received, but welcomed offers from SHIRBRIG members to share their experience in establishing brigade level forces33 and to list their capacity as part of UNSAS. SHIRBRIG members agreed in late 2002 to consider participation in robust UN operations on a case-by-case basis and sent a planning unit to UNMIL and Sudan. The DPKO Military Handbook for UNSAS (2003) notes how creating regionally-based coherent units can utilize common procedures, reduce response time, create real rapid deployment capacity and reduce UN costs. In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defense staff adopted a policy framework for the African Union that moved in this direction, recommending the earmarking of a brigade-sized contribution to a regional stand-by arrangement from each of the five African sub-regions, starting with identifying about 500 trained military and civilian observers.32

The European Union was also creating its own military capacity for peace operations, with a small initial deployment to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The deteriorating security situation in the northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo in May-June 2003 led the EU to take the unprecedented step of committing forces outside of Europe with French-led Operation Artemis, under Chapter VII authorization from the Security Council. That force was replaced in turn by a brigade-sized, three-battalion task force made up of ground troops from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal, with protection from Indian attack helicopters, also functioning under Chapter VII. In effect, the UN has created, in this South Asia-based reinforcement for MONUC, the sort of regional multinational brigade that the Brahimi Report advocated, though not exercised in advance.

30 A/55/305, para. 11531 UNDPKO, Military Division, UN Stand-by Arrangements System Military Handbook, 9 March 2001.32 African Union, “Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I),” Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (I), Addis Ababa, 15-16 May 2003.

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4.4. On-call Rosters for Rapid Deployment – the evolution of RDMHQ

Quick and effective deployment of a complex UN operation requires a rapidly deployable command and control staff that can be in position to receive and command deploying troops. In drafting the Brahimi Report, consideration was given to broadening the UN Field Service, which currently provides technical support to field operations, to include 100 military officers on two to three year UN appointments. Their job would be to set up a new mission’s military headquarters. But cost and precedent argued instead for a revolving, stand-by roster of 100 military specialists who, ideally, would get to know UN procedures by first serving in an operational mission for 90 days before returning home to remain on call. The original concept required member states to place individuals on call.33

DPKO developed initial “profiles of expertise” for a Military On-Call List that was larger than the Panel proposed, dividing it into Group I (subject to call- up on seven days notice) and Group II (14 days notice). Group I initially contained 33 positions but was pared down by late 2002 to just nine: the mission chief of staff, the chiefs of military personnel, information, operations, and logistics, and four staff officers. Nominees for the Group I positions were to be called to headquarters when an operation seemed likely, to review preliminary concepts of operations, participate in the technical mission survey, and create the detailed mission plan in collaboration with the Military Division Mission Planning Service. Group I personnel (145 positions) would be expected to report to staging area, such as the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, within two weeks of call-up. For Group II, states were asked to fill positions in the roster, with names desirable but optional.

DPKO implementation of the on-call list resembles the earlier DPKO “Rapidly Deployable Mission headquarters” (RDMHQ) concept, but with improved specific skill sets and far more ambitious roster concept (much larger military list would be matched by comparable police/justice and civilian rosters).

Like the RDMHQ, the on-call list supports rapid deployment of one mission at a time. In a pinch, it could support a new mission every three or four months if rapid deployment elements were in place. In the spring of 2001, the Secretary General canvassed member states to support on-call list. By the end of 2001 he had 22 replies and just seven more by October 2002. 41 fewer than ten states nominated individuals. In March 2002, the Special Committee observed that, “Many delegations shared the Secretariat concern regarding the limited response to the UN stand-by arrangements system they underlined their preference for pledging expertise rather than names to the on-call lists.”34 By the end of 2002, DPKO had received “bids for positions” on the on-call list from 32 member states, covering each of the positions on the list with “at least two nominations.” Few states nominated individuals, however, posing “particular challenges, particularly in gaining coherence prior to deployment.”35 If DPKO can just find sufficient names to fill a couple sets of Group I rosters with coherent teams (all it needed was 18 names), it will have lean and an efficient design for rapid military operational planning.

33 A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 110-113. The on-call list has a long and difficult pedigree. In 1995, the Special Committee called for creation of a rapidly deployable headquarters team. Two years later, the Secretariat presented plans for a Rapidly Deployable Mission headquarters (RDMHQ) of eight full-time staff, plus 29 other Secretariat staff and 24 member state personnel on stand-by to form the nucleus of a new mission headquarters. Failing to attract voluntary funding for this concept, in 1998 DPKO sought support account funds. (United Nations, Support Account for Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General , A/52/837, 29 March 1998, paras. 9 -10 and 73-76.) The ACABQ approved just two of the positions, directing that the others be found from among staff on hand. Since DPKO was rapidly losing military staff capacity at the time, such “redeployment” was infeasible and it opted instead to use the positions to manage a rapid deployment roster, which had not been implemented by the time the Brahimi Report was released.34 A/56/732, para. 2435 Guéhenno (2003), annex, 5.

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5. Advantages and limitation of Rapid Deployable Forces

5.1. Advantages of rapid deployment capability

There are numerous potential tasks for a UN rapid deployment capability. Roles and responsibilities for specific missions will vary with Security Council mandates. Of course, it will depend on what is provided and on what kind of terms. Expectations vary considerably over the tasks that should be incorporated into planning.

Many officials propose that any rapid deployment capability should assume responsibility for the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission. Deployable elements will be the first to establish security, headquarters, and services. After the first out, it has to be replaced by regular peacekeeping contingents within four to six months. Such capability is also seen as the preferred instrument for preventive deployment. Moreover, as the effectiveness of any UN rapid deployment capability will diminish once the conflict has escalated to open warfare. It’s the situation for restricting its early use for proactive and preventive measures. If it is to succeed stemming imminent crises; enduring emphasis have to be accorded to flexibility and mobility. 36

Rapid deployable forces have the advantageous role to provide UN presence in the crisis area immediately after the Security Council has decided it should be involved. If the forces are deployed in a timely manner can prevent escalate of violence by providing the emergency framework for UN efforts to resolve the conflict and commence negotiations. During first weeks in the field, it is important to assess the situation and provide first-hand information to Security Council. An informed decision can be made on the utility and feasibility of further UN involvement. Logistically, rapid deployable element tasks, is to assure a base, communications, and airfield for the subsequent arrival of the main UN forces. In a given situation, they have to provide safe areas for personnel and groups threatened by the conflict and to provide secure humanitarian relief operations.37

Rapid deployable elements should be highly qualified. They should be trained in peacekeeping and problem-solving techniques but will also have the training, expertise and esprit de corps to pursue those tasks under difficult and risky environment, even under violent and hostile circumstances." Indeed, such mechanism can be more easily justified if it can assure cost-effective and timely response to an array of challenges. 38

The prospects for preventive deployment in the critical early stages of conflict may be impeded by delays in arranging the consent of various factions and/or agreement among contributors. The experience of the past decade suggests that even supportive member states are inclined to "wait and watch" while they assess the risks, the costs, and the conditions of participation. Embryonic distant crises infrequently attract attention or necessary political will to mobilize governments into preventive action.

5.2. Potential Limitations of rapid deployment

If rapid reaction is a demanding concept, it is even more difficult to achieve. The UN must be sure of each critical element during process. Missing components and conditional agreements can only lead to delays. It may be wise, therefore, to temper the expectations by acknowledging some inherent problems.

36 Sir Brian Urquhart, "Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability," Address to the Twenty Fifth Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peace-keeping for the Next Century, Government of Austria and the International Peace Academy, Vienna, 3 Mar. 1995, p. 6.37 Ibid., p. 7.38 Ibid., p. 10.

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Stand-by arrangements for national-based units do not assure their immediate availability. As the former Secretary-General acknowledged in 1995, "a considerable effort has been made to expand and refine standby arrangements, but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation."39 He noted further that "the value of the arrangement would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency." With respect to UNSAS, there are few, if any, certainties. The promptness with which national contingents are provided will depend on the discretion of participating member states, the risks perceived, and the level of interests at stake.40

Reliability will be a key determinant of rapid deployment. In the case of UNSAS, there is no assurance that the political will exists. Critics frequently point to the refusal of member states to provide adequate forces to fight someone else wars.

Proponents of UNSAS now have grounds to argue that the system has been expanded and improved, but commitment to the system will have to be far more comprehensive and binding if it is to succeed. Member states are the one who have to demonstrate the viability of this system. 41

Once approved for deployment, standby units will have to stage independently and assemble in-theatre. For some, this will be their first experience working together, and it will likely occur under conditions of extreme stress. Some military establishments are reluctant to acknowledge the need for prior training of their personnel beyond a general combat capability. Thus, high standards of cohesiveness and interoperability will be difficult to assure in advance. Moreover, the UN will continue to confront the complex task of coordinating lift capabilities for participating elements across the world. This factors can be the reasons for low deployment. Logistics and sustainment arrangements are gradually improving, but the UN is still coming to grips with the challenge of supplying different national contingents with a wide range of equipment.

Sixty-one persons at UN RDMHQ, could provide the necessary impetus for developing and co-coordinating headquarters arrangements, but there are legitimate doubts about its ability to fulfill its primary tasks in any period of intense activity where it may face multiple operations. Even, with its full staff, it is still only the shell of an operational mission headquarters. As presently constituted, it is best seen as a necessary improvisation, an arrangement that may need to be rapidly improved or increasing.

Current plans entail a multidimensional RDMHQ for civilian and military personnel. This is to be encouraged, as it has grown out of the requirement to address the diverse needs of people in desperate circumstances. SHIRBRIG is a purely military force. While this facilitated the brigade organization, planners would be wise to expand its composition with civilians in both planning and deployable elements. There are limitations to what military forces can achieve by themselves. To assure respect, legitimacy, and consent (i.e., host nation approval) it is increasingly important, even in rapid deployment, to provide a broader range of incentives and services in the initial stages of a UN operation.

In summary, while current efforts are definitely helpful, additional arrangements and improvements will be necessary to provide reliable and effective responses to increasingly complex conflicts.

6. Proposal for a UN standing military Force

The development of a reliable and effective UN capability takes time, need a wide vision, and a coherent goal-oriented plan. This plan must be guided by a long-term sense of purpose and the prospect of contributing to a critical mechanism for conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. As we look

39 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace” 1992, p. 11, p. 4340 Ibid. p. 11, para. 44.41 Ibid. p. l8, para 43

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to the long term, it is evident that there will be a need for further measures that complement and build on the existing system. Several phases are envisaged in this development. As capabilities are consolidated at each stage, one can anticipate a parallel expansion in the scope and scale of potential activities

There are several cost-effective options that merit consideration by the United Nations, its member states, and interested parties. The following sequential proposals are intended to stimulate further discussion and analysis.

6.1. Preparation Phase

It is recommended a concerted effort to promote the national establishment of SHIRBRIG similar policies in other countries/regions. Once established, the national based brigade serves an initial trial period in peacekeeping before the member state can negotiate a new MOU facilitating deployment to more complex operations necessitating a mandate within chapter VII. Civilian elements have to be integrated into brigade to ensure provision of necessary services such as political analysts, negotiators, interpreters or human rights experts. The brigade need to research into the financing, administration, basing, equipment, and set up arrangements necessary to ensure immediate responses from co-located, standing national SHIRBRIG units.

On its side, UN initiates a parallel inquiry into the option of dedicating UN experts with particular emphasis on administration, financing, logistics, civil-military coordination and training, which will integrate the brigades at the initial phase of mission deployment.

6.2. Bases Establishment phase

Once established, the brigades need a place where to stay and stock all the logistical capacity to deploy in nearby conflict zone when necessary.

UN bases required the identification of several appropriately-dispersed regional facilities around the globe to serve as for the preparation and deployment of national units. It can be hosted in existing or redundant national military bases to provide existing infrastructure for training and equipment stock-piling, as well as nearby access to air and sea lift for prompt staging.

A next step is to develop a permanent operational-level headquarters in the UN base. This will require experienced officers, civilian experts, and qualified planners. They can be seconded to the base and co-assigned responsibility to expand the operational and tactical foundation for future efforts.

To manage a variety of complex tasks effectively, it is in the interests of all parties to decentralize integrated Rapid Deployment Team within UNHQ (New York) into flexible, and expanded operational-level headquarters at a UN base. It would also be prudent for cost-effectiveness, as well as for the obvious benefits from a military, doctrinal, and administrative perspective, to co-locate two field-deployable tactical (mission) headquarters at this base. The integrated team will be the first to be deployed in the mission area, assuring all necessary operation to let the following contingent component to work properly. The National Brigade will be deployed to assure protection and the start of military operations (reconnaissance, convoy escorts)

6.3. Assignment phaseThe National Brigades elements are assigned to the UN base for a one to two-year operation period. After this period of duty, the brigade is replaced by next country’s brigade. The response times of standing elements should be considerably quicker than the projected fifteen- to thirty-day response from home-based national SHIRBRIG elements. Tactical units and civilians would still remain under

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national political control and operational command. Locating these elements under the operational control of the permanent headquarters would improve multinational training, exercises, lift, and logistics co-ordination. Standing co-located national units would enhance overall effectiveness, increase the prospect of timely national approval and lead to faster responses

In addition, professional UN volunteers could be recruited and co-located into distinct capability component groups of both the headquarters and field-deployable elements at the initial UN base. The integration of UN volunteers into this group should be viewed as a complementary and mutually reinforcing stage in the development of an increasingly effective and integrated UN rapid deployment capability. Volunteers coming from all around the world would alleviate fears of a new supranational force. Moreover, any deployment in field mission could only be authorised by the UN Security Council and directed by the UN Secretary-General or his special representative.

A standing emergency capability with dedicated UN volunteers might respond to a crisis within twenty-four hours of a decision by the Security Council. Expanding the operational and tactical structure of this capability to include dedicated UN personnel would also expand the range of options at the political and strategic levels. As the Commission on Global Governance reported in 1995, "the very existence of an immediately available and effective UN Volunteer Force could be a deterrent in itself. It could also give important support for negotiation and the peaceful settlement of disputes.”42

The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations expressed its preference for standing UN Volunteer Force to enhance the UN performance in both time and function.43 The Carnegie Commission report acknowledged that "a standing force may well be necessary for effective prevention."44 A Canadian discussion paper on the issue acknowledges this concept.

This would provide to UN a small but totally reliable, well-trained and cohesive group available to be deployed by the Security Council in urgent situations. It breaks one of the key log-jams in the current UN system, namely the insistence by troop contributing nations to authorize the use of their national forces prior to each deployment. It also simplify command and control arrangements in UN peace support operations, and put an end to conflicts between UN commanders and contingent commanders reporting to national authorities. 45

The approved peacekeeping budget for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 was approximately US$7 billion. This represents about 0.5% of the 1% of global military spending (estimated at US$1,232 billion in 2006). When compare UN peacekeeper costs with troops deployed by the United States, NATO, other regional organizations or countries; the UN is the least expensive option by far.46

Recurring costs for a standing UN brigade have been estimated in $253 million US per annum.47

Acquiring a redundant military base might reduce the start-up costs. Ultimately, the UN will continue to lease the equipment from TCCs.

Any plan to operate a standing force presupposes adjustments at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. Many of these adjustments are now put in place. Although, no time frames were established, it seems that now we are at the mid-term of the process. It needs to be revitalized.

42 Report of the Commission on Global Governance, “Our Global Neighbourhood” .New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 112.43 The Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, “The United Nations In Its Second Half-Century”, 1995, pp. 21-23.44 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report” , p.6645 DFAIT, "Improving the "UN Rapid Reaction Capability: Discussion Paper," 29 April 1995, p. 3.46 William J. Durch et al.,“The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations”, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003.47 Jean Krasno, "A United Nation's Rapid –Deployment Permanent Force: Cost Analysis", Yale University United Nations Study Program, 1994

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Member states are likely to need powerful encouragement to resume and expand this process. In this respect, there are several preliminary critical requirements.48

First the need for a wider educational process is now evident, as well as the need for a broad-based coalition and constituency of support. A new 'soft power'49 approach could help to advance both objectives. Aside from the benefits of informing member states and citizens, it might rejuvenate the 'Friends', prompt further partnerships, and activate numerous supportive NGOs and related parties. Of equal importance, it is necessary to draw the initiative back from the exclusive domain of 'high politics' between states. This would effectively entail a campaign to democratize, depoliticize and publicize/edit further discussions. By encouraging a clearer appreciation of the issues and current arrangements, there is the prospect of increasing confidence and commitment. This might also be a useful step toward acquiring wider political influence and leverage, as well as attracting powerful political leaders. The latter can only lead as far as their constituents are prepared to provide support.

Second, if rapid deployment is to succeed as a legitimate and widely-valued mechanism for conflict prevention, then will arise the need to ensure a far more comprehensive and sophisticated approach. Whereas much attention has been devoted to ensuring sufficient 'hard power' (military forces) capable of restoring security, greater efforts will have to be devoted to ensuring they are accompanied by 'soft power' as civilian elements that can restore hope and address human needs. Complex political emergencies will demand prompt attention from both components. 50

Third, it is time to restore the vision that inspired these and former efforts to empower the UN System. Regrettably, the earlier sense of opportunity and hope has faded. It was replaced by heightened cynicism and despair. Few recognize the potential to transform the wider security environment through an expansion of these capabilities. If we hope to inspire a broader base of support, then, it will be necessary to demonstrate its potential benefits. This capability should help to prevent or to avoid the escalation of violence in some conflicts.

Although, there are risks in being too ambitious at the outset, there are reasons why opponents to UN rapid deployment capability view it as a subversive process. Any demonstration of success might encourage further cooperation toward the far more ambitious objective of a cooperative security system, a pre-requisite for moving on to an era of global human security. 51

Progress in addressing the three preliminary requirements of revitalizing wider efforts, ensuring the inclusion of appropriate elements, and restoring the necessary vision, will likely depend on the extent to which officials begin to recognize the potential contribution of conflict resolution and peace studies. These are common objectives that cannot be managed in isolation. It is time for a far more inclusive, co-operative and integrated approach that draws on the respective strengths of all supportive parties.

7. The future of peacekeeping operations

In 2007, the office responsible for peacekeeping was reorganized in two Departments: the Department for Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Service (DFS), in order to improve the capacity to plan, conduct and manage peace operations. This restructuring served to co-locate, and co-ordinate, the two departments, within the political, operational, logistics, civil police, de-mining, training, personnel and administrative aspects of peace-keeping operations.48 DFAIT, "Canada Announces a Study to Improve the UN Rapid Reaction Capability," Press Release No. l, July 4, 1995, p. 4.49 The term 'soft power' has been interpreted as entailing the ability to communicate, negotiate, mobilise opinion, work within multilateral bodies and promote international initiatives. It is essentially about increasing political leverage to advance peaceful change by building new partnerships and coalitions not only between governments, but also with other elements of civil society such as NGOs, related agencies, the media and interested parties50 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in, “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power” , New York: Basic Books, 199051 "The United Nations At Fifty: A Force For The Future", The Defense Monitor , vol. XXV, no. 1, January 1, 1996

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In February 2008, DPKO and DFS established the new doctrine of rapid deployment during start-up phase.

United Nations peacekeeping operations, or missions, have three broad deployment phases:

• Phase I: Start-up (rapid deployment and mission start-up)• Phase II: Mission implementation• Phase III: Transition (handover, withdrawal and liquidation)

7.1. Rapid deployment Teams (RDT)

Mission start-up in the field begins with the notional 90-day52 rapid deployment stage. This stage involves the field deployment of a small team to begin setting up mission premises and other infrastructure and administrative systems in preparation for larger numbers of staff and contingents. During this stage, some other mission personnel may begin arriving to establish their components. For example, the United Nations standing police capacity may arrive to begin setting up the police element’s headquarters; military staff officers to begin setting up a Force Headquarters (Force HQ). TCC and PCC are also likely to be undertaking reconnaissance missions in preparation for their deployments.

The Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) is usually a small team led by a senior administrative officer who serves as the Officer in Charge (OIC) for the mission in this early stage. As this team will often have to complete many more functions than the staff normally has, it is essential that RDT personnel be able to undertake multiple functions.

As senior managers arrive in mission, they should ensure that RDT staff has enough support to complete pre-requisite tasks before the bulk of the mission arrives. RDT may not have received all the staff and in certain areas may be lagging in laying the foundation for mission deployment.

52 The 90-day rapid deployment phase is a planning target established following the “Brahimi Review” process, which relates to deploying the first elements of a mission to begin installing mission infrastructure. Political, financing, logistical or other common delays in volatile environments, means that this is a notional target only. Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations PeaceOperations, 2001. (A/55/977)

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RDT may well have been lacking senior managerial support or high-level access to government and other counterparts to overcome critical blockages or delays.

In this case, mission managers can play an important supporting role. Without these foundations in place, it will be extremely difficult to begin rapid mandate implementation. Incoming senior managers should be mindful of the demands they place on the RDT for personnel support (beyond basic transport, communications, etc.). If RDT is diverted from its core tasks, critical infrastructure may be delayed at great cost to overall mission start-up.On arrival, SRSG/HOM or OIC should discuss with RDT leader which support capacities will be available and when. She/he should also recognize that the enormity of the rapid deployment challenge places considerable competing demands on RDT.

As the RDT deploys to the mission area, substantial planning is needed to ensure they “hit the ground running.” RDT includes only those who can be self-sustaining, not other components needing immediate support.

The rapid deployment tasks are mainly these:

1. Establish essential supporting relationships and obtain authorizations, Initiating discussions with host authorities and with already present UN entities (agencies, programs)

2. Install critical mission infrastructure and logistics. Identify and obtain accommodation, install CITS equipments, establish logistics system for receipt and management of equipment

3. Establish essential administrative capacity. Priority is given to identifying finance and procurement staff from UNHQ or neighbors missions with existing procurement and finance authorities to reduce delays in these critical functions.

4. Establish finance systems, obtain banking facilities, establish procurement systems and establish personnel systems

These pre-requisites build the foundations that enable wider mission start-up. Nothing can replace the experience and expertise needed in the rapid deployment phase. In the meanwhile, other senior managers and mission personnel may begin to arrive during this stage.

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7.2. Needs to reinforce UN Secretariat capacity for Effective rapid Deployment

This slide depicts most of the structural reforms that the Brahimi Report recommended is undertaken to enable peace operations to deploy more quickly and effectively. Field experience indicates that the momentum for peace created by the signing of an accord dissipates fairly quickly if there is no visible movement to implement that accord. Yet, there were no agreed deployment benchmarks against which planners could work. This led the Panel to recommend benchmarks of 30 days to deploy a traditional peacekeeping operation (e.g., border monitoring) and 90 days to deploy a complex operation (such as the mission in East Timor and Haiti). The Security Council and the Secretariat have accepted the 30/90 day benchmarks as planning objectives and the Council has urged UN member states to work toward meeting them.

Planners also need a sense of the size, complexity, and quantity of likely future operations, which requires some institutional capability to anticipate demand for peacekeeping. It is recommended that the UN Secretariat create such capacity, consolidating several small, scattered policy analysis units and other, information-related capabilities to create an information clearinghouse and strategic analysis center serving all of the UN departments. The Development of Research and Liaison Unit (RLU) within the Situation Center can do the job. In fact, the RLU provides DPKO with a capacity to look beyond the current operation, research and analyze situations to determine trends and forecast outcomes.

Recruitment and training of civilian mission personnel have to be standardized and make heavy use of information technology for basic familiarization prior to mission deployment. Selected military and police personnel should be pre-trained and on-call in their home countries for rapid setup of headquarters for new missions, and to help train the police and other experts who come to a new mission from dozens of countries to help rebuild rule of law. Mission leadership should be drawn from pre-vetted rosters of candidates who are brought to UN headquarters early in the mission planning process to help shape the missions that they are supposed to lead. The UN Field Service, which is now a technical support group should be upgraded to provide the experienced middle management for peace operations that, is in desperately short supply today.

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7.3. Needs to reinforce Members States capacity for Effective rapid DeploymentThe end-point of all of this analysis, planning, recruiting, training, and leadership should be a field operation that is ready and able to do its part to help break the cycle of conflict in a war-torn society, under the security umbrella of peacekeeping forces provided by member states.

Member states, of course, have significant responsibility for making peace operations work, since they provide all the money, troops, police and civilians who serve in UN missions. Greater international collaboration is required to create well-trained and appropriately-equipped forces for peace operations. Willingness not only to collaborate but to commit forces to potentially risky operations requires a sense that national interests are engaged in such enterprises, as well as a good sense of the real risk involved and considerable trust in the competence of mission leaders. The UN cannot do the national interest calculations for its member states, but it could do a much better job of analyzing potential risks in a new mission and a much better job of providing competent, well-informed, trustworthy mission leadership and responsive headquarters support for its peace operations.

Operational risks can be mitigated by early warning, better advance intelligence about the mission area, by better field intelligence for the operations themselves, and by more robust operations that would cost more initially but would be better able to deter or rebuff violent challenge, thus speeding the work of peace implementation and eventual mission exit. In UN peace operations, just as in more traditional military action, gradualism increases risk and ultimately increases cost. In effect, that it is better to go in strong and draw down than to go in weak and build up; and better to invest in recruitment and training up front than to hurriedly scour the world for talent when an urgent need arises. National militaries, disaster relief teams, or other crisis response entities cannot function without preparedness; neither can the United Nations. Preparedness costs money, but in a pinch, lack of preparedness costs much more.

8. Regional Arrangements

8.1. Emergence of New Partners

The UN is no longer the only actor conducting peace operations. The number of peace operations mounted by regional organizations has doubled in the past decade. The African Union, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have all mounted major operations of their own and are making concerted efforts to increase their capacities in this area. This is a welcome development in so far as the global demand for peace operations currently outstrips the capacity of any single actor, including the UN. Efforts by regional actors to develop their own ability to plan, manage and sustain peace operations give a greater depth to response options. This has created new opportunities for the development of a more flexible and responsive system of interlocking capabilities better able to address the complex challenges posed by violent internal conflict. For example, the regional African Stand-By Forces (ASF)

Recent experience has helped to underscore the benefits of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the area of peace and security as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Regional organizations have proven their worth as first-responders where conditions may not yet be conducive to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation or where political disagreement among member states prevents the organization from acting as swiftly as it should. Similarly, regional organizations, particularly those possessing high-end military capabilities, have helped the UN overcome a major crisis or provided a stabilizing presence during the most delicate phases of a peace process.

UN peacekeeping operations are increasingly deployed alongside non-UN military, police or civilian peace operations. In some cases, UN peacekeeping operations have provided a civilian and/or police

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presence, with military forces provided by an external partner under separate command and mandate. In others, troops and police deployed as part of a regional organization-led peace operation have been adapted upon the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. The Security Council has also authorised the deployment of “hybrid”53 operations, which place components of two or more organizations under UN political leadership. In some situations external organizations have taken over the responsibilities of a UN peacekeeping operation following its withdrawal.

Cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the area of peace and security normally occurs on an ad hoc basis, although new more systematic partnerships are beginning to emerge.

8.2. Role of Regional Organizations

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter defines the role of regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security. In brief, the Charter encourages regional arrangements or agencies to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council. Article 53 also states that, where appropriate, the Security Council should utilise such regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, but that no enforcement action will be undertaken without the authorisation of the Security Council. Article 54 states that the Security Council shall at all time are kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security.

With the growing need to share the burden of peacekeeping, and the reluctance of many member states to become involved in conflicts that do not directly affect their national interests, the UN is increasingly co-operating with regional organizations. Such organizations have much to contribute, and in the recent past the UN has gained a good deal of experience in working with regional organizations.

Co-operation between the UN and regional organizations can take the form of:

• Consultation: this is well established and in some cases governed by formal agreements ensuring that reports are made to the General Assembly (the purpose is to exchange views on conflicts that both intergovernmental bodies are trying to solve);

• Mutual diplomatic support: through diplomatic initiatives and/or technical input, e.g. as provided by the Organisation of for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to the UN on constitutional issues in Abkhazia, and the UN support to the OSCE in Nagorny Karabach;

• Operational support: for example, that provided by the air power from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to UNPROFOR;

• Co-deployment: such as the UN and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, and the UN and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia (both cases entailed a division of labour between the UN and a regional organization in which the latter carried the main burden); Joint operations for example, in Haiti where staffing, direction and financing were shared by the UN and Organization of American States (OAS).

The capacity of regional organizations to undertake peacekeeping activities obviously varies considerably. Nevertheless, co-operation between the UN and regional organisations should be based on certain principles such as agreed mechanisms for consultations, the primacy of the UN, and a clear division of labour.

Co-operation with regional organizations, however, also needs to be viewed in the light of the fact that members of such organizations are likely to have a stake in the outcome of the conflict, which may call into question the impartial nature of the operation. Also, regional organizations dominated by a single regional power may wield undue influence in the peace process, in a manner that benefits themselves 53 One example of hybrid operations is UNMID (UN Mission in Darfur) under UN and AU organizations (2007).

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more than the population of the country in crisis. The multinational and impartiality of UN operations, are its greatest strengths. It is much harder to achieve for a regional organization.

On the other hand, there are some crises that cannot be resolved without the active involvement of the dominant regional power. For example, it is hard to imagine conflicts resolution in Georgia-Abkhazia, Tajikistan, the Republic of Moldova or Nagorny Karabach, without the involvement of the Russian Federation. Similar situation is present in Haiti without the United States' involvement. Regional organizations also have the advantage of being much more familiar with the local conditions, culture and political environment than the UN.

However, most regional organizations do not have common military units (a notable exception being NATO, which also does not have long experience in peacekeeping), and also the lack of the institutional capacity necessary for conducting peacekeeping operations. The UN will therefore continue to play a pivotal role in peacekeeping with regional organizations playing an increasingly important complementary role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Two major aspects probably merit focus in regard to the use of regional capability for the conduction of peace operations. The first one related to the capacity of most of the regional organizations other than the European ones. They will need financial and equipment resources that they hardly afford themselves. They will also require assistance in training for military, police and civilian personnel.

The second aspect relates to procedures. Once various regional and sub-regional organizations are able to set up such capability and earmark, rapid deployment forces as envisaged in the charter of the African Union, for example, the executive organs of the respective organizations would exercise their authority to undertake all preventive action including preventive deployment, peacemaking, intervention/stabilization operations, peacekeeping and peace building. In this context, the Panel makes specific recommendations. Authorization of any regional actions of peace operations, should, in all cases, be granted by the UN Security Council. Only in some urgent situations such authorization may be sought after the operation is launched. In several cases, regional organizations may well have a role to play in the conduction of peace operations outside their specified area of responsibility. Such operations are authorized by and made accountable to the UN Security Council.

In operations where the UN has worked alongside a regional organization, certain lessons have already been learned, such as the need to develop policies, guidelines and principles that must define the relationship between the two entities, while establishing mechanisms for co-operation/integration on the ground. A clear division of tasks needs to be established, albeit for disarmament, demobilisation, monitoring, humanitarian or electoral functions.

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CONCLUSIONS

At the dawn of this new millennium, the UN will have a preliminary rapid deployment capability for peace support operations. Three middle powers: Canada, The Netherlands and Denmark, were instrumental in co-coordinating related studies and broad co-operation through national and international consultative processes, as well as the development of a supportive organizational framework. In turn the UN Secretariat and the Friends of Rapid Deployment played a pivotal role in both prompting and implementing supportive changes. The majorities of their short-term objectives were either achieved or are being implemented.

There are substantive increases in the quantity and quality of resources listed in the UN Standby Arrangement System. A UN rapid deployment mission headquarters may soon be available to assist in the critical start-up phase of new operations. A multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade is available. As previously noted, over the past five years there has been supportive innovation at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels.

As Kofi Annan wrote, "the initiatives taken by these countries have been valuable both for what they have achieved in themselves and for the way in which they have refocused the debate among peace-keeping contributors at large." He went on to note: "in the context of that wider group, however, a number of further actions will need to be taken if we are to intervene more effectively in either a preventive or curative capacity."54 Fortunately, both the UN and member states now have a base foundation on which to take further action.

The potential for wider systemic change is evident. There are cost-effective and more reliable options that merit serious consideration and action. In the last several years, there have been noteworthy attempts to model the composition of viable UN standing forces. Several of these studies have demonstrated that there are few, if any, insurmountable operational or tactical impediments. One shortcoming, that is also frequently evident in the numerous studies cited since 1945, is the inability to address how such a dedicated UN mechanism might be established. What approach or transition strategy might mobilize political will, attract wider support, increase confidence and restore the necessary momentum?

Both pragmatists and visionaries are aware that the recent political environment was not conducive to the immediate establishment of a UN standing force. Nor, in the earlier period of unprecedented activity, was the Organization prepared to manage additional, controversial capabilities. As well, 1997 the political and diplomatic enthusiasm dissipated quickly when it encountered concerns related to sovereignty, risks, representation, limited support and insufficient financing. Yet rapid changes, ongoing conflicts, and the wider challenges of interdependence, are now altering the former context. We can anticipate a review of contemporary approaches and mechanisms for preventing and resolving violent conflict, including the option of a UN standing capability or force. In the earlier words of Stephen Kinloch, "driven back, the idea will, as in the past, ineluctably re-emerge, Phoenix-like, at the most favorable opportunity." 55

Rather than await the next catastrophe, it is time to consider how additional SHIRBRIGs and dedicated UN standing elements might be introduced as a complementary expansion on current arrangements. In

54 Kofi Annan, "The Peacekeeping Prescription," in Cahill, Preventive Diplomacy , p. l86.

55 Stephen P. Kinloch, "Utopian or Pragmatic? A UN Permanent Military Volunteer Force", International Peacekeeping , vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996, p.185.

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this respect, further analysis may still be necessary to generate the ideas that can move events.[122] Further progress will likely depend on far wider educational efforts directed not only at the governments of UN member states but also at global civil society. Among the challenges that warrant considerations are:

• generating a broader public and professional understanding of current UN rapid deployment initiatives and the various options available for enhancing these efforts;

• co-ordinating a 'soft power' approach not only to refocus the Security Council and revitalise the 'Friends', but also to organise a transnational coalition and constituency of support among citizens, non-governmental organizations, related agencies and academic communities.

• Building the unity of effort and purpose necessary to co-ordinate national military and civilian units, as well as the conditions for integrating volunteers into a composite standing UN emergency capability.

Modest progress has been made since William R. Frye made the case for a planned evolution in his seminal 1957 study, A United Nations Peace Force. We have yet to achieve Frye's objective, but it is worth recalling his words:

“Establishment of a small, permanent peace force, or the machinery for one, could be the first step on the long road toward order and stability. Progress cannot be forced, but it can be helped to evolve. That which is radical one year can become conservative and accepted the next”. 56

56 William R Frye, “A United Nations Peace Force”, New York: Oceana Publications, 1957, pp. 106-107.

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APPENDIX A

THE BRAHIMI REPORT - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very significant degree it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.

The Secretary-General has asked the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building, to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change. Our recommendations focus not only on politics and strategy but also and perhaps even more so on operational and organizational areas of need.

For preventive initiatives to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States. Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed. But force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Moreover, the changes that the Panel recommends will have no lasting impact unless Member States summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace.

Each of the recommendations contained in the present report is designed to remedy a serious problem in strategic direction, decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support, and the use of modern information technology. Key assessments and recommendations are highlighted below, largely in the order in which they appear in the body of the text (the numbers of the relevant paragraphs in the main text are provided in parentheses). In addition, a summary of recommendations is contained in the annex.

Experience of the past

It should have come as no surprise to anyone that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners.

Implications for preventive action and peace-building: the need for strategy and support

The United Nations and its members face a pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, in both the long and short terms. In this context, the Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report (A/54/2000) and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000. It also encourages the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension in support of short-term crisis-preventive action.

Furthermore, the Security Council and the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, conscious that the United Nations will continue to face the prospect of having to assist communities and nations in making the transition from war to peace, have each recognized and acknowledged the key role of peace-building in complex peace operations. This will require that the United Nations system address what has hitherto been a fundamental deficiency in the way it has conceived of, funded and implemented peace-building strategies and activities. Thus, the Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) present to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.

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Among the changes that the Panel supports are: a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule of law elements in peace operations that emphasizes a team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights and helping communities coming out of a conflict to achieve national reconciliation; consolidation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations in their first phase; flexibility for heads of United Nations peace operations to fund "quick impact projects" that make a real difference in the lives of people in the mission area; and better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions.

Implications for peacekeeping: the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates

The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-State/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.

In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so. Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers.

This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situations where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behavior. It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. In particular, United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defense against violent challengers.

Moreover, United Nations peacekeepers — troops or police — who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles. However, operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out that mandate.

The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when recommending force and other resource levels for a new mission, and it must set those levels according to realistic scenarios that take into account likely challenges to implementation. Security Council mandates, in turn, should reflect the clarity that peacekeeping operations require for unity of effort when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations.

The current practice is for the Secretary-General to be given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, not knowing whether he will be given the troops and other personnel that the mission needs to function effectively, or whether they will be properly equipped. The Panel is of the view that, once realistic mission requirements have been set and agreed to, the Council should leave its authorizing resolution in draft form until the Secretary-General confirms that he has received troop and other commitments from Member States sufficient to meet those requirements.

Member States that do commit formed military units to an operation should be invited to consult with the members of the Security Council during mandate formulation; such advice might usefully be institutionalized via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Troop contributors should also be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of mission personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of the mandate regarding the use of force.

New headquarters capacity for information management and strategic analysis

The Panel recommends that a new information-gathering and analysis entity be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). Without such capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution, unable to get ahead of daily events, and the ECPS will not be able to fulfill the role for which it was created.

The Panel’s proposed ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS and bring budding crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership.

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It could also propose and manage the agenda of ECPS itself, helping to transform it into the decision-making body anticipated in the Secretary-General’s initial reforms.

The Panel proposes that EISAS be created by consolidating the existing Situation Centre of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with a number of small, scattered policy planning offices, and adding a small team of military analysts, experts in international criminal networks and information systems specialists. EISAS should serve the needs of all members of ECPS.

Improved mission guidance and leadership

The Panel believes it is essential to assemble the leadership of a new mission as early as possible at United Nations Headquarters, to participate in shaping a mission’s concept of operations, support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance. To that end, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General compile, in a systematic fashion and with input from Member States, a comprehensive list of potential special representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), force commanders, civilian police commissioners, their potential deputies and potential heads of other components of a mission, representing a broad geographic and equitable gender distribution.

Rapid deployment standards and "on-call" expertise

The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain.

The Panel recommends that the United Nations define "rapid and effective deployment capacity" as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.

The Panel recommends that the United Nations standby arrangements system (UNSAS) be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary enabling forces, created by Member States working in partnership, in order to better meet the need for the robust peacekeeping forces that the Panel has advocated. The Panel also recommends that the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to meet the requisite United Nations training and equipment requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not meet the requirements must not be deployed.

To support such rapid and effective deployment, the Panel recommends that a revolving "on-call list" of about 100 experienced, well qualified military officers, carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO, be created within UNSAS. Teams drawn from this list and available for duty on seven days’ notice would translate broad, strategic-level mission concepts developed at Headquarters into concrete operational and tactical plans in advance of the deployment of troop contingents, and would augment a core element from DPKO to serve as part of a mission start-up team.

Parallel on-call lists of civilian police, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights specialists must be available in sufficient numbers to strengthen rule of law institutions, as needed, and should also be part of UNSAS. Pre-trained teams could then be drawn from this list to precede the main body of civilian police and related specialists into a new mission area, facilitating the rapid and effective deployment of the law and order component into the mission.

The Panel also calls upon Member States to establish enhanced national "pools" of police officers and related experts, earmarked for deployment to United Nations peace operations, to help meet the high demand for civilian police and related criminal justice/rule of law expertise in peace operations dealing with intra-State conflict. The Panel also urges Member States to consider forming joint regional partnerships and programs for the purpose of training members of the respective national pools to United Nations civilian police doctrine and standards.

The Secretariat should also address, on an urgent basis, the needs: to put in place a transparent and decentralized recruitment mechanism for civilian field personnel; to improve the retention of the civilian specialists that are needed in every complex peace operation; and to create standby arrangements for their rapid deployment.

Finally, the Panel recommends that the Secretariat radically alter the systems and procedures in place for peacekeeping procurement in order to facilitate rapid deployment. It recommends that responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be moved out of the Department of Management and placed in DPKO. The Panel proposes the creation of a new and distinct body of streamlined field procurement policies and procedures; increased delegation of procurement authority to the field; and greater flexibility for field missions in the management of their budgets. The Panel also urges that the Secretary-General formulate and submit to the General Assembly, for its approval, a global logistics support strategy governing the stockpiling of equipment reserves and standing contracts with the private sector for common goods and

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services. In the interim, the Panel recommends that additional "start-up kits" of essential equipment be maintained at the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy.

The Panel also recommends that the Secretary-General be given authority, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to commit up to $50 million well in advance of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new operation once it becomes clear that an operation is likely to be established.

Enhance Headquarters capacity to plan and support peace operations

The Panel recommends that Headquarters support for peacekeeping be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through the regular budget of the Organization. DPKO and other offices that plan and support peacekeeping are currently primarily funded by the Support Account, which is renewed each year and funds only temporary posts. That approach to funding and staff seems to confuse the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operations activities as core functions of the United Nations, which is obviously an untenable state of affairs.

The total cost of DPKO and related Headquarters support offices for peacekeeping does not exceed $50 million per annum, or roughly 2 per cent of total peacekeeping costs. Additional resources for those offices are urgently needed to ensure that more than $2 billion spent on peacekeeping in 2001 are well spent. The Panel therefore recommends that the Secretary-General submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining the Organization’s requirements in full.

The Panel believes that a methodical management review of DPKO should be conducted but also believes that staff shortages in certain areas are plainly obvious. For example, it is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, nine civilian police staff to identify, vet and provide guidance for up to 8,600 police, and 15 political desk officers for 14 current operations and two new ones, or to allocate just 1.25 per cent of the total costs of peacekeeping to Headquarters administrative and logistics support.

Establish Integrated Mission Task Forces for mission planning and support

The Panel recommends that Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, with staff from throughout the United Nations system seconded to them, to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment, significantly enhancing the support that Headquarters provides to the field. There is currently no integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment.

Structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular to the Military and Civilian Police Division, which should be reorganized into two separate divisions, and the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), which should be split into two divisions. The Lessons Learned Unit should be strengthened and moved into the DPKO Office of Operations. Public information planning and support at Headquarters also needs strengthening, as do elements in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), particularly the electoral unit. Outside the Secretariat, the ability of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to plan and support the human rights components of peace operations needs to be reinforced.

Consideration should be given to allocating a third Assistant Secretary-General to DPKO and designating one of them as "Principal Assistant Secretary-General", functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.

Adapting peace operations to the information age

Modern, well utilized information technology (IT) is a key enabler of many of the above-mentioned objectives, but gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede its effective use. In particular, Headquarters lacks a sufficiently strong responsibility centre for user-level IT strategy and policy in peace operations. A senior official with such responsibility in the peace and security arena should be appointed and located within EISAS, with counterparts in the offices of the SRSG in every United Nations peace operation.

Headquarters and the field missions alike also need a substantive, global, Peace Operations Extranet (POE), through which missions would have access to, among other things, EISAS databases and analyses and lessons learned.

Challenges to implementation

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The Panel believes that the above recommendations fall well within the bounds of what can be reasonably demanded of the Organization’s Member States. Implementing some of them will require additional resources for the Organization, but we do not mean to suggest that the best way to solve the problems of the United Nations is merely to throw additional resources at them. Indeed, no amount of money or resources can substitute for the significant changes that are urgently needed in the culture of the Organization.

The Panel calls on the Secretariat to heed the Secretary-General’s initiatives to reach out to the institutions of civil society; to constantly keep in mind that the United Nations they serve is the universal organization. People everywhere are fully entitled to consider that it is their organization, and as such to pass judgement on its activities and the people who serve in it.

Furthermore, wide disparities in staff quality exist and those in the system are the first to acknowledge it; better performers are given unreasonable workloads to compensate for those who are less capable. Unless the United Nations takes steps to become a true meritocracy, it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. Moreover, qualified people will have no incentive to join it. Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetence, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible.

Member States also acknowledge that they need to reflect on their working culture and methods. It is incumbent upon Security Council members, for example, and the membership at large to breathe life into the words that they produce, as did, for instance, the Security Council delegation that flew to Jakarta and Dili in the wake of the East Timor crisis in 1999, an example of effective Council action at its best: res, non verba.

We — the members of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — call on the leaders of the world assembled at the Millennium Summit, as they renew their commitment to the ideals of the United Nations, to commit as well to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to fully accomplish the mission which is, indeed, its very raison d’être: to help communities engulfed in strife and to maintain or restore peace.

While building consensus for the recommendations in the present report, we have also come to a shared vision of a United Nations, extending a strong helping hand to a community, country or region to avert conflict or to end violence. We see an SRSG ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to strengthen democracy, to secure human rights. We see, above all, a United Nations that has not only the will but also the ability to fulfil its great promise, and to justify the confidence and trust placed in it by the overwhelming majority of humankind.

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APPENDIX B

THE BRAHIMI REPORT - SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Preventive action:

(a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council’s second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to "all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion";

(b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General’s more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States’ obligations, under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give "every assistance" to such activities of the United Nations.

2. Peace-building strategy:

(a) A small percentage of a mission’s first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator;

(b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;

(c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict;

(d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.

3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy:

Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.

4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates:

(a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines;

(b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peace-building elements, from Member States;

(c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;

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(d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission’s use of force.

5. Information and strategic analysis:

The Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

6. Transitional civil administration:

The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity.

7. Determining deployment timelines:

The United Nations should define "rapid and effective deployment capacities" as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.

8. Mission leadership:

(a) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States;

(b) The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership;

(c) The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation, and whenever possible should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership.

9. Military personnel:

(a) Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations;

(b) The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be reached;

(c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy;

(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving "on-call list" of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation.

10. Civilian police personnel:

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(a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;

(b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;

(c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations;

(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days’ notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;

(e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial "rule of law" teams.

11. Civilian specialists:

(a) The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat;

(b) The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid- to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas;

(c) Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects;

(d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission start-up, and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy.

12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public information:

Additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation’s message out and build effective internal communications links.

13. Logistics support and expenditure management:

(a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of DPKO;

(b) The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. These start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them;

(c) The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution;

(d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines;

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(e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets;

(f) The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from $200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts.

14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations:

(a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full;

(b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for this purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organization;

(c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO.

15. Integrated mission planning and support:

Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies.

16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO:

(a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser;

(b) The Military Adviser’s Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured;

(c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in the United Nations peace operations;

(d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period;

(e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations;

(f) Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the "Principal Assistant Secretary-General" and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.

17. Operational support for public information:

A unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information (DPI) reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information.

18. Peace-building support in the Department of Political Affairs:

(a) The Panel supports the Secretariat’s effort to create a pilot Peace-building Unit within DPA, in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for this unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. This programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in

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paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peace-building capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General within the context of the Panel’s recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above;

(b) The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions;

(c) To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peace-building field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

19. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:

The Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets.

20. Peace operations and the information age:

(a) Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to the responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of the special representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy;

(b) EISAS, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD), should implement an enhanced peace operations element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE);

(c) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction;

(d) The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation;

(e) The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy.

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44

45

46

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BIBLIORAPHY AND REFERENCES

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Patrick A. McCarthy, "Towards an Independent United Nations Peacekeeping Capability”. The Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, June 18, 1998(space)Report of the Commission on Global Governance, “Our Global Neighbourhood” .New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

S.G. Tait, “RCEME in the UNEF”, Canadian Army Journal, Vol. XII, No. 1, January 1958.Security Council, "Progress Report Of The Secretary-General On Standby Arrangements For Peacekeeping", (S/1996/1067) 24 December 1996.

Sir Brian Urquhart, "Prospects for a UN Rapid Response Capability," Address to the Twenty Fifth Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peace-keeping for the Next Century, Government of Austria and the International Peace Academy, Vienna, 3 Mar. 1995,

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http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1992/5.html

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William R Frye, “A United Nations Peace Force”, New York: Oceana Publications, 1957.

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