T1ie Peopk on Stevens County 'Box 448

Cfie:weta/i, Wasliinn ton 99109

Certified Mail: 70113500000186255530

April 20, 2015

Governor Jay Inslee 7 011 3 500 0001 862 5 5 5 3 0 Office of the Governor PO Box 40002 Olympia, WA 98504-0002

Re: Washington State Auditor's Official Misconduct

Governor Inslee:

The duties of the State Auditor are found at Chapter 43.09 RCW.

It our intention to bring to your attention the failure of duty of the State Auditor to audit and insure that all public servants are collecting the requisite fees for their respective offices.

Various state and county offices have mandatory fees to be paid for filing documents. The key point in RCW 42.16.030 is in the Historical and Statutory Notes - *Reviser's note ­

The term "this section" refers to 1907 c. 56 sec. 1, of which RCW 42.16.030 is but a part. The other parts of1907 c. 56 sec. 1. as amended are codified as RCW 2.32.070 (supreme court clerk's fees), 2.14.010 (witnesses' fees), 36.18.020 (superior court clerk's fees), 36.18.040 (sheriff's fees), 36.18.010 (county audilor:~ fees), 36./8.030 (county coroner's fees), 2.36.150 Ouror's fees}, and 47.28.(J9(J notariesPftes}.

Evidence suggests that County Auditors throughout the state of Washington are exempting certain persons from paying mandatory filing fees for elected and appointed county officials. This also breaks the chain of recorded office holders at the State Archives. When a fee is not paid for filing documents required by law to be filed, the document does not reside with the State Archivist.

For example, a valid filing (RCW 65.04.015(2) ".. .for recording into the offiCial public records") will have evidence of a stamp, sticker or other printed mark showing a unique Auditor or Filing Officer Number (RCW 65.04.01S(4)), fee paid ([County Auditor] RCW 36.22.010 (1) "... other instruments in writing which by law are to be filed and recorded"; [State Auditor] RCW

43.07.030 - General duties. (3) Record all ... other papers filed in the secretary of state's office. (10) Keep a record of all fees charged or received by the secretary of state)"; and the date, time and office where the filed record can be viewed or a copy obtained.

EVIDENCE OF A PROPERLY FILED OATH OF OFFICE

Auditor File #: 2009 0007749 Rewo"ded at the request of:

RETURN ADDRESS: en 08/27/2009 at 14:47

STEVENS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT Total of 2 page(s) Paid: $ 63.00 STEVENS COUNTY. WASHINGTON

TIM GRAY, AUDITOR

Al\LLEN

DOCUMENT TITLE: OATH OF OFFICE

GRANTOR(S): Lastr Firstl Middle Initial

1. TVEIT1 GINA A.

For example, when Gina A. Tveit was appointed to serve as District Court Judge in Stevens County in 2009, she filed her Oath of Office and complied with Washington State Law. However, upon winning elections in 2010 and 2014, she did not comply with state law. This wasn't a matter of ignorance or oversight. Tveit had completed the process correctly but then chose to ignore the Legislative mandates to properly file her Oath so that it could be entered into the official public records and archived in Olympia in 2010 and 2014. [See Gina A. Tveit's 3 Oaths of Office attached].

Tveit is a BAR licensed attorney, worked in the Stevens County Prosecutor's Office as a Deputy prosecutor before becoming a District Court Judge. Tveit and all other Attorneys in Washington have sworn an Oath of Attorney [See example - Oath of Attorney for Timothy Rasmussen] and they have violated that Oath if they occupy a pubfic office in Washington and have failed to comply with every legislative mandate.

OATH OF ATTORNEY. The Oath states in part:

1. "] am fully sub;ect to the laws ofthe State of Wafihington and the laws ofthe United States and will ahide hy the same;" [Underlined emphasis]

2. "1 will support the constitution ofthe State ofWashington and the constitution ofthe United States; "

2

Washington's Supreme Court has ruled that Superior Court Judges occupy a dual position. They are both a "state officer" and a "county officer". State ex rei Edelstein v. Foley, 107 P.2d 901, 6 Wash.2d 244; in re Salary of Superior Court Judges, 82 Wash. 623, (Wash. 1914); Neal v. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 506, 550 P.2d 539 (1976). They are both State and County officials. It is yet to be found in the State of Washington a Superior Court Judge that has "duly qualified" to hold office as either a County officer or State officer. They, too, are non-compliant with State law.

RCW 42.20.030: Every person who shall falsely personate or represent any public officer, or who shall willfully intrude himself or herself into a public office to which he or she has not been duly elected or appointed, or who shall willfully exercise any ofthe functions or perform any ofthe duties ofsuch officer, without having duly qualified therefor, as required by law, or who, haVing been an executive or administrative officer, shall willfully exercise any ofthe functions ofhis or her office after his or her right to do so has ceased, or wrongfully refuse to surrender the offiCial seal or any books or papers appertaining to such office, upun the demand of his or her lawful successor, shall be guilty uf a gruss misdemeanor.

BLACK'S LAW, 6th Edition:

"Duly Qualified" "Being "duly qualified" to fill an office, in the constitutional sense and in the ordinary acceptation of the words, means that the officer shall possess every qualification; that he shall in all respects comply with every requisite before entering on the duties of the office; and that he shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, and to petform the duties ofthe office with fidelity. "

The United States Supreme Court has emphatically stated:

"We have no officers in this govemmentfrom the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, as the President, legislature and the Judiciary, exercise powers in some sense left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to fundamental law found in the Constitution, the larger portion o(them are the creation of statutory law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited by law.·· THE FLOy1) ACCEPTANCES, 74 US 666 at 676-677; (7 Wall. 666), Supreme Court 1868, Washington Law Reporter, Vol. XLII Page 297. [Bold and Underlined emphasis added]

This is background information to expose how the State Auditor has been deficient in his duty of oversight and accountability at every level of government in Washington. If you haven't grasped the magnitude of this unlawful conduct, just know that one person in Stevens County, Gina A. Tveit has deprived the State and/or County Treasury of over $130 in filing fees

3

in just two terms. Persons such as prosecutor Timothy Rasmussen, sheriff Kendle Allen, county auditor Tim Gray, county clerk Patti Chester, County Commissioners etc, school board members, city council members etc. in Stevens County alone, are persons so required by law to file their Oaths and the Appointments and Oaths of their deputies. Multiply that by thousands of city, county and state persons across Washington who are required by law to file their Appointments and Oath but the State Auditor has turned a blind eye and is allowing this violation of state law to occur unchecked.

It is believed that millions of dollars have remained uncollected over the past years and the State Auditor is primarily responsible. It is time the State Auditor's Office be audited and criminally charged if found to have committed Official Misconduct RCW 9A.80.010 or worse. When a certain class of persons are exempted from paying filing fees without authority of law it puts an undue burden upon the remainder of the people not so privileged.

For the full legal background and legislative requirements for the requisite paying of filing fees and compliance with State Law, see a sample document challenging the jurisdiction and authority of every judge and prosecutor not in compliance with State law. When prosecutors and judges have not duly qualified in every way, they have no jurisdiction, no authority and no immunity. The State Auditor's office could have corrected this situation years ago. This has created great liability for the people of '. " Washington State.

"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face." Justice Brandeis, dissenting opinion, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)

&~ L,;, R~, dJJ lGjkt.$ ~c-ru ~l We th~ PeopJe ...,. 9J::/tt.-r)~ e _-L td. . ~

1f:fi£ ~.jj;:r/d~~~ cc. State Auditor 7011 3500 0001 8625 5554 ITr~ington

79 l'Jews Media Outlets

tbdf /l'1 ~ Mt RrJh W 4

STATE OF WASHINGTON ) ss OATH OF OFFICE

County of Stevens

I, Gina A. Tveit, do solemnly swear and affirm that I am a Citizen of the United States of America and the State of Washington; that I will support the Constitution and Laws of the United States ofAmerica and the Constitution and Laws of the State of Washington, and the laws of Stevens County, and will to the best of my judgment, skill, and ability, faithfully, diligently and impartially perform the duties of the office of District Court Judge in and for the County of Stevens, Washington as such duties are prescribed by law.

Gina A. Tveit

Subscribed and sworn to before me this c17)1-1- day of December, 2010.

Tim Gray Auditor for Stevens Coun ,Washington

RECEIVED DEC 27 ZO-:J

v: -.r.

Initials / Timeh /Ov~Awr Stevens County Auditor

"-. >... -- +-' 'c) c: -t:; ::::) -" .. ­... ­r-,u

STATE OF WASH~01GTON}

§ COUNTY OF STEVENS

OATH OF OFFICE

Subscribed and sworn to before me this d~ day of )J~(~V

Person administering 0

Rctu n Document to: Stevens Count)' Auditor 215 S Oak, Room 106 Colville, WA. 99114-2836 RECEIVED ,t.ro hU"J)

DEC 22 2014

BY:~

~~~~Fo~~.S~f~e: , SS.

~. (}-" ~-'_. J I, JI.tn.t(7}f.Y.. ~('('Jtd~ , , do solemnly declare:

1. 1 am fully subject to the laws of the State of Washington and the laws of the United States and will abide by the same.

2. I will support the constitution ofthe State ofWashington and the constitution of the United States.

3. 1 will abide by the Rules ofProfeSSional Conduct approved by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.

4. I will maintain the respect due to the courts ofjustice and judicial officers.

5. I will not counsel, or maintain any suit, or proceeding, which shall appear to me to be unjust, or any defense except as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law, unless it is in defense of a person charged with a public offense. 1 will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me only those means consistent with truth and honor. I will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement.

6. I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client, and will accept no compensation in connection with the business of my client unless this compensation is from or with the knowledge and approval of the client or with the approval of the court.

7. I will abstain from all offensive personalities, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged.

8. I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay unjustly the cause ofany person.

. ~..R~ ~ . _~~..(...S..::'ignature)

., ,2c1?~ ..

Judge

."

The State of Washington

________________ Court

________________ County Your County 

District or Superior

________________________, Case No._____________________ Plaintiff, v.

Motion to Dismiss and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction

________________________, Defendant

COMES NOW the Defendant, in good faith with clean hands and moves this court

to dismiss this case upon taking Judicial Notice as to this Court’s Want of Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff seeks an immediate order of dismissal for total lack of authority of persons

usurping the public offices of this County in the State of Washington. Plaintiff has a right

to justice in this court, not on appeal.

“There are in general three jurisdictional elements in every valid judgment, namely, jurisdiction of subject matter, jurisdiction of person and power or authority to render particular judgment.” Little v. Little (1981) 96 Wash.2d 183, 634 P.2d 498.

“Elements essential to give court jurisdiction of subject matter of action are that court have cognizance of class of cases to which one to be adjudged belongs, that proper parties be present, and that point to be decided be, in substance and effect,

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 1 of 12

within issues before court.” State ex rel. Troy v. Superior Court (1951) 38 Wash.2d 352, 229 P.2d 518.

As to the “power or authority to render particular judgment”

The person (i.e. judicial officer) claiming jurisdiction in this case is believed to be

knowingly and intentionally usurping the office of a duly qualified judicial officer in the

above captioned County in the State of Washington and is therefore without power or

authority to render any judgment, and further is without power or authority to confer, by

order or appointment any pro tem judge/commissioner, power or authority said person

does not possess.

RCW 2.28.030 – Judicial officer defined…

A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice.

It is believed that the judicial officer presiding over this case has failed to file an

official oath of office as prescribed by the Washington Legislature pursuant to RCW

36.18.005; 65.04.015; and 36.16.060.

RCW 36.18.005 – Definitions

The definitions set forth in this section apply throughout this chapter unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(2) “File,” “filed,” or “filing” means the act of delivering an instrument to the auditor or recording officer for recording into the official public record.

(3) “Record,” “recorded,” or “recording” means the process, such as electronic, mechanical, optical, magnetic or microfilm storage used by the auditor or recording officer after filing to incorporate the instrument into the public records.

Even though the above RCW is clear and needs no judicial determination, the legislature

went further by defining the terms again in RCW 65.04.015, so that even the most incompetent

public servant could understand.

RCW 65.04.015 - Definitions

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 2 of 12

(2) “File,” “filed,” or “filing” means the act of delivering an instrument to the auditor or recording officer for recording into the official public record.

(3) “Record,” “recorded,” or “recording” means the process, such as electronic, mechanical, optical, magnetic or microfilm storage used by the auditor or recording officer after filing to incorporate the instrument into the public records.

The legislature made it crystal clear in RCW 65.04.015 that each instrument was to

contain a unique number so that it could be located when needed and also for the purpose of

preserving it.

(4) “Recording number” means a unique number that identifies the storage location (book or volume and page, reel and frame, instrument number, auditor or recording officer file number, receiving number, electronic retrieval code, or other specific place) of each instrument in the public records accessible in the same recording office where the instrument containing the reference to the location is found.

Nothing in these definitions could possibly, by any stretch of the imagination, justify

placing official public documents into a filing cabinet in the auditor’s office, a recording

officer’s office, RCW 40.14.040, the sheriff’s office, or in any other office by anyone, period.

Full compliance with the legislative requirements is requisite. An Oath of Office or other

document void of evidence of: 1) a unique file/recording number, and 2) the required fee paid,

and 3) the date and time of filing and 4) place/office where said document can be located, affixed

or printed on the face of the document is non-compliant with state law.

“Every citizen of the United States is supposed to know the law.” Pierce v. United States, 7 Wall (74 U.S. 169) 666 (1869).

“Ignorance of the law is no excuse.” State v. Spence, 81 Wn.2d 788, 792, 506 P.2d 293, 296 (1973); “Every sane person is presumed to know the law.” State v. Patterson, 37 Wash. App. 275, 679 P.2d 416 (1984); …and mistake of law is not a defense.” State v. Takacs, 35 Wash. App. 914, 671 P.2d 263 (1983), remand for reconsideration by Court of Appeals, 102 Wn.2d 1012, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).

Every Citizen is supposed to know the law and that includes those that administer the

law. No one can claim authority to conduct judicial business while reliant upon a defective

instrument as authority for to do so would be to fail to “duly qualify” for that office. The office

holder is deprived of authority to administer the duties of the office and the office becomes

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 3 of 12

vacant. To remain in office after authority to do so have ceased, is to usurp the office and/or

intrude into office.

RCW 42.20.030 Intrusion into and refusal to surrender public office.

Every person who shall falsely personate or represent any public officer, or who shall willfully intrude himself or herself into a public office to which he or she has not been duly elected or appointed, or who shall willfully exercise any of the functions or perform any of the duties of such officer, without having duly qualified therefor, as required by law, or who, having been an executive or administrative officer, shall willfully exercise any of the functions of his or her office after his or her right to do so has ceased, or wrongfully refuse to surrender the official seal or any books or papers appertaining to such office, upon the demand of his or her lawful successor, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

The key words above are “duly”, “duly qualified” and “willfully” and these words have been

defined in law as follows:

Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition defines:

“Duly”- In due and proper form or manner; according to legal requirements. Regularly; properly; suitable; upon proper foundation, as distinguished from mere form; according to law in both form and substance.

“Duly Qualified”“Being "duly qualified" to fill an office, in the constitutional sense and in the ordinary acceptation of the words, means that the officer shall possess every qualification; that he shall in all respects comply with every requisite before entering on the duties of the office; and that he shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, and to perform the duties of the office with fidelity.”

The United States Supreme Court ruled:

“We have no officers in this government from the President down to the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, as the President, legislature and the Judiciary, exercise powers in some sense left to the more general definitions necessarily incident to fundamental law found in the Constitution, the larger portion of them are the creation of statutory law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited by law.” THE FLOYD ACCEPTANCES, 74 US 666 at 676-677; (7 Wall. 666), Supreme Court 1868, Washington Law Reporter, Vol. XLII Page 297. [Bold and Underlined emphasis added]

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 4 of 12

For anyone to be elected or appointed to a judgeship in the state of Washington, they

must first be a member of the BAR Association. Every BAR member swears and subscribes an

OATH OF ATTORNEY. The Oath states in part:

1. “I am fully subject to the laws of the State of Washington and the laws of the United States and will abide by the same;” [Underlined emphasis]

2. “I will support the constitution of the State of Washington and the constitution of the United States;”

Lawyers and judicial officers have sworn upon oath that they are required to abide by all

the laws of the state and United States as well as the Constitutions. They are not permitted to

pick and chose which ones they will be compliant with or even substantially compliant with.

They must be fully compliant for they are “fully subject to the laws”.

“When law making branch of government has spoken, courts may interpret, but cannot add to or take away from clear and unambiguous meaning of law since to do so would be legislative rather than interpretation and policy, expediency and wisdom of statute are legislative and not judicial questions.” Ranson v. South Bend (1913) 76 Wn. 396, 136 P. 365.

“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from the terms ordinary meaning.” Steinburg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2002).

“It is axiomatic that statutory definitions of the terms includes unstated meanings of that term.” Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987); see also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945).

“Definitions are integral to statutory scheme and of highest value in determining legislative intent. … To ignore section is to refuse to give legal effect to part of statutory law.” State v. Taylor, 30 Wash. App. 89, 632 P.2d 892 (1981).

“When legislative body provides definitions for statutory terms, it is that definition to which person must conform his conduct.” City of Seattle v. Koh, 26 Wash. App. 708, 614 P.2d 665 (1980).

The argument that RCW 36.18.010 does not list a fee for filing an oath of office does not

stand. It still would come under subsection (8) relating to miscellaneous records, or RCW

36.18.050 – Fees in special cases, RCW 36.18.060 – Fees payable in advance, and two other that

leave no room for doubt are RCWA 42.16.030 – Disposition of fees and RCWA 42.16.040 –

Official fees payable in advance.

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 5 of 12

But, the key point in RCW 42.16.030 is in the Historical and Statutory Notes - *Reviser’s

note –

The term “this section” refers to 1907 c. 56 sec. 1, of which RCW 42.16.030 is but a part. The other parts of 1907 c. 56 sec. 1, as amended are codified as RCW 2.32.070 (supreme court clerk’s fees), 2.14.010 (witnesses’ fees), 36.18.020 (superior court clerk’s fees), 36.18.040 (sheriff’s fees), 36.18.010 (county auditor’s fees), 36.18.030 (county coroner’s fees), 2.36.150 (juror’s fees), and 42.28.090 (notaries’ fees).

All of the RCW’s relating to “oath of office” require that they be filed. The legislature

defined the word “filed” as “recording into the public record” and all of the RCW’s relating to

fees are listed as “filing fees”, not recording fees.

Now, back to RCWA 42.16.040 above and its Notes of Decisions.

“When papers are received by officer for filing, filing will not become effective until necessary fees have been paid.” State v. Conners 91942) 12 Wash.2d 128, 120 P.2d 1002; State v. Nelson 91940) 6 Wash.2d 190, 107 P.2d 113.

“Provision requiring payment of fees in advance is mandatory.” State v. Nelson 91940) 6 Wash.2d 190, 107 P.2d 113.

“Although state is not required to pay its fees in advance, it is not relieved of liability for fees.” State ex rel Hamilton v. Ayer (1938) 194 Wash. 165, 77 P.2d 610.

As to the auditor’s defined duties – RCW 36.22.010

The county auditor:

(1) Shall be recorder of deeds and other instruments in writing which by law are to be filed and recorded in and for the county for which he or she elected.

Now, as to the duties of the secretary of state:

RCW 43.07.030 – General duties.

(3) Record all articles of incorporation, deeds, or other papers filed in the secretary of state’s office.

(10) Keep a record of all fees charged or received by the secretary of state.

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 6 of 12

There is one more issue regarding the “oath of office” and the term “officer,” the

Constitution for the united States of America, at Art. VI, cl. 3 mandates that all officers, not just

elected officers take an oath to support the Constitution.

The legislature provided for all officers not elected in RCW 1.16.065 and the state

supreme court interpreted this RCW as requiring that they are to take and file an oath of office.

See Nelson v. Troy (1895) 11 Wash. 435, 39 P. 974; McIntosh v. Hutchinson 91936) 187 Wash.

61, 59 P.2d 1117; State ex rel. Brown v. Blew (1944) 20 Wash. 2d 47, 145 P.2d 554; State ex rel

Fitts v. Gibbs 91952) 40 Wash.2d 444, 244 P.2d 241.

Under the authority of RCW 40.14, the State Records Committee in 2003 declared the

oath of office as an official Historical Document for elected and appointed officers, in document

no. 79-03-22079 REV-1, but set the retention time as 0 (zero), in other words, the oath is to be

recorded in the proper office and then sent directly to the state archives.

The legislature also addressed what happens if anyone elected to public office fails to

take, subscribe an oath of office or to secure their bond and to deposit either as required by law,

in RCW 42.12.010, which has been law and almost unchanged for over one hundred and fifty

years.

“Vacancy occurs in office by operation of statute at time event takes place.” State ex rel. Austin v. Superior Court of Whatcom County (1940) 6 Wash.2d 61, [No. 28088 Department One. Supreme Court October 28, 1940]; State ex rel Guthrie v. Chapman, 187 Wash. 327, 60 P.2d 245 (1936); State ex rel Zempel v. Twitchell, 59 Wn.2d 419, 367 P.2d 985 91962); Vanderveer v. Gormley, 53 Wash. 543, 102 Pac. 435 91909); see also AGO 63-64, no. 17, April 16, 1963; AGLO 1980 no. 2, January 11, 1980.

Not only did the legislature declare under what conditions an office became vacant, it

also declared what happens if anyone knowingly continues in office without duly qualifying.

RCW 42.20.030 has been law since 1909 and has remained unchanged. This RCW declares what

penalty applies for willfulness in performing the duties of an office without being duly qualified.

[See RCW 42.20.030 – Intrusion into and refusal to surrender public office quoted herein above]

Since RCW 42.20.030 is a criminal offence, RCW 9A.08 definitions apply.

RCW 9A.08.010 – General requirements of culpability –

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 7 of 12

(4) Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appear.

The above definitions establish that no one can duly qualify after the time set by law to

qualified has passed, as defined in RCW 29A.04.133 or RCW 29A.60.280.

Further, as shown earlier, “Ignorance of the law is no excuse”, so knowledge is

established by the act.

Because RCW 42.12.010 also lists failure to secure one’s bond and deposit it as required

by law or the office is vacant, see the following:

RCW 36.16.060 requires not only the oath to be timely filed, but also the bond.

RCW 36.18.020 does not state a charge or even mention a bond, but again, the filing

required under RCW 36.16.060 would be covered by RCW 36.18.050 and RCW 36.18.60.

But, there is more. Even though RCW 48.28.040 made the appropriate government entity

responsible for paying the premiums on its officers’ bonds, RCW 42.08.100 still requires state

officers bonds to be approved by the governor and then filed pursuant to statute.

RCW 42.08.100 also applies to counties and township officers, except county

superintendent of schools, be approved by board of county commissioners and then filed with the

proper authority, or else the office becomes vacant as stated in RCW 42.12.010 for failure to

deposit within the time prescribed by law.

There are three offices within the county that also need more clarification. 1) Offices

of superior court judge, 2) deputy prosecutors and 3) deputy sheriffs.

First, superior court judges are required to qualify according to qualifications set by

the legislature.

“…, but the court held that judges’ right to hold public office was subject to qualifications imposed by the legislature.” State ex rel Carrol v. Simmons, 61 Wn.2d 146, 377 P.2d 421 91962).

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 8 of 12

RCW 36.16.040 – Oath of office

Every person elected to county office shall…..

RCW 36.16.060 – Place of filing oaths and bonds.

Every county officer, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall file his oath of office with the county auditor and his bond in the office of the county clerk.

Oaths and bonds of deputies shall be filed in the office in which the oaths and bonds of their principals are required to be filed.

Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition defines (under subtitle – County office) “Office”- Public office filled by the electorate of the entire county.

Washington Constitution Art. 4, sec. 5 (in part) Superior Court – Election of Judges, Term of, Ect. There shall be in each of the organized counties of this state a superior court for which at least one judge shall be elected by the qualified electors of the county at the general election.

Washington Constitution Art. 4 sec. 13 (in part) Salaries of Judicial Officers – How paid, Ect.. One- half of the salary of each superior court judge shall be paid by the state, and the other one-half by the county or counties for which they are elected.

See also – amendment 21 and take note that the following cases define superior court judges as occupying a dual position, and is both a “state officer” and a “county officer”. State ex rel Edelstein v. Foley, 107 P.2d 901, 6 Wash.2d 244; in re Salary of Superior Court Judges, 82 Wash. 623, (Wash. 1914); Neal v. Wallace, 15 Wash. App. 506, 550 P.2d 539 (1976).

Second, deputy prosecutors are public officers as defined in;

State v. Cook, 84 Wn.2d 342, 525 P.2d 761 (1974) Hale, C.T. (concurring only in results) … “each deputy thus appointed shall have the same qualifications required of the prosecuting attorney.” RCW 36.27.040. Because the prosecuting attorney and his deputies hold offices created by the state constitution, they are in law public officers. Const. art. II, sec. 5”

“The term of office for a deputy prosecutor appointed under RCW 36.27.040 coincides with the term of the elected prosecutor and is, thus, a “specified term of office”. As such, the Deputy Prosecutor fits the exception found in RCW 41.56.030 (2) (b), are not “public employees”, and the Act does not apply.” Spokane County ex rel County Comm. V. State, 136 Wn.2d 644, 966 P.2d 303 (1998).

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 9 of 12

Third, Deputy Sheriffs are public officers as defined in;

“[1] The concluding sentence in Rem. Rev. Stat., sec. 4157 [cf. RCW 36.28.010] relieves the county of liability for sheriff’s acts, and this court held in Carter v. King County, 120 Wash. 536, 208 Pac. 5, that a deputy sheriff was not a servant of the county. A deputy sheriff is a public officer. Gray v. DeBretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722; Maxwell v. Andrews County, 347 Mo. 156, 146 S.W.2d 621; Scott v. Endicott, 225 Mo. App. 426, 38 S.W.2d 67; Towe v. Yancey County, 224 N.C. 579, 31 S.E.2d 754; Blake v. Allen, 221 N.C. 445, 20 S.E.2d 552; Gowens v. Alamance County, 216 N.C. 107, 3 S.E.2d 339; Borders v. Cline, 212 N.C. 472, 193 S.E. 826; Willis v. Aiken County, 203 S.C. 96, 26 S.E.2d 313; Murray v. State, 125 Tex. Crim. App. 252, 67 S.W.2d 274; Gross v. Gates, 109 Vt. 156, 194 Atl. 465” State ex rel Day v. King County, 50 Wn.2d 427 [no. 33771 Department Two. Supreme Court June 13, 1957]

Immunity Lost

“When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statute expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost.” Rankin v. Howard (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert. den.; Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S. Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L. Ed.2d 326.

“Total and inarguable absence of jurisdiction cannot be adequately remedied by appeal.” Barnes v. Thomas (1981) 96 Wash.2d 316, 635 P.2d 135.

“Parties to action cannot, by stipulation, confer upon court jurisdiction with which it is not vested.” Miles v. Chinto Mining Co. (1944) 21 Wash.2d 902, 153 P.2d 856, 156 P.2d 235.

Criminal usurpers cannot claim any immunity to civil or criminal action, nor to salaries,

benefits or pensions.

• Under the law of standing, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction without proper

pleadings by proper parties.

• Neither affidavits nor reports by a person criminally usurping the office of a police

officer can grant jurisdiction.

• Neither Informations nor pleadings filed by a person criminally usurping the office of

a prosecutor, elected or appointed, can grant jurisdiction.

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 10 of 12

• Neither rulings nor orders filed by a person usurping the office of a judge can grant

jurisdiction.

There is one RCW in particular that applies to all criminal usurpers when filing instruments

into the public record; read closely.

RCWA 40.16.030 – Offering false instrument for filing or record.

Every person who shall knowingly procure or offer any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered or recorded in such office under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than 5 years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both.

Notes of Decisions

“In this section making it a crime to knowingly file any false or forged instrument in a public office, the term “instrument” encompasses a document which is required or permitted by statute or valid regulation to be filed, registered, or recorded in a public office if the claimed falsity relates to material fact represented in the instrument and the information contained in the document is of such a nature that the government is required or permitted by law, statute or valid regulation to act in reliance thereon, or the information contained in the document materially affects significant rights or duties of third persons, when such effect is reasonably contemplated by the express or implied intent of the statute or valid regulation which requires the filing, registration, or recording of the document.” State v. Price (1980) 94 Wash.2d 810, 620 P.2d 994.

“Test for determining whether a document is an “instrument,” within meaning statute making it a crime to offer a false instrument for filing, contains three separate requirements: first, the document must be required or permitted by statute or valid regulation, that is, it must be within the literal scope of a state law; secondly, the content of the document must be scrutinized for materiality; finally, the court must consider the likelihood and extent of others’ reliance on the document.” (2001) State v. Hampton, 143 Wash.2d 789, 24 P.2d 1035.

“The substantial penalties of statute making it a crime to offer a false instrument for filing are not to be universally applicable whenever a piece of paper may be filed in a public office; the document filed must first be required or permitted by law.” State v. Hampton (2001) 143 Wash.2d 789, 24 P.2d 1035.

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 11 of 12

Motion and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction Page 12 of 12

Conclusion

As clarified by unambiguous statutes, Legislative mandates and proper and legitimate

case law, this case must be dismissed for total lack of jurisdiction. Defendant has a right to

justice in this court, not on appeal. Furthermore, appeal is not an appropriate remedy when the

facts and evidence clearly establish the total lack of jurisdiction.

Date_______________

All Rights Reserved.

__________________________ Defendant

Certificate of Service

I, _________________________, did personally deliver a true and correct copy of the above:

Motion to Dismiss and Demand for Judicial Notice ER-201(d) and a “Direct Attack” as to the Court’s Want of Jurisdiction,

to: ____________________________ ____________________________ ____________________________

On this ____ day of ________________, 20___.

__________________________