Middle East & North Africa Economics | 19 th Dec. 2017 Neil Shearing, Chief Emerging Markets Economist, +1 646 934 6162, [email protected]William Jackson, Senior Emerging Markets Economist, +44 (0)20 7808 4054, [email protected]Jason Tuvey, Middle East Economist, +44 (0)20 7808 4065, [email protected]MENA Chart Book Page 1 MENA CHART BOOK Daesh downfall offers respite for smaller economies • Political commentary in the region has focussed on the recent upheaval in Saudi Arabia, but one development that has received little attention is the downfall of the militant group, Islamic State (IS, also known as Daesh). Iraq’s Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, formally declared victory over the group in “all Iraqi lands” this month and it is on the brink of defeat in Syria too. Of course, there’s a lot of uncertainty over how events will unfold and, at the very least, both Syria and Iraq face huge reconstruction efforts. That said, there should be positive spillover effects for some of the smaller, neighbouring MENA economies, particularly Lebanon and Jordan. An easing of security concerns should support a recovery in key tourism sectors, encourage greater investment and slow the influx of refugees. In turn, this will ease pressure on fragile budget and current account positions. There may also be a broader regional impact if the defeat of IS reduces the risk premia demanded by investors to hold financial assets in the region. • Our GDP Tracker suggests that the downturn in Saudi Arabia’s economy has gathered pace. Weakness is concentrated in the oil sector, whereas there are signs that activity in the non-oil sector has picked up. Meanwhile, the government has announced a raft of measures, including a new “private sector stimulus” package and a fresh round of electricity price hikes, ahead of the 2018 budget. (Page 2.) • Oil output cuts also appear to have caused the UAE’s economy to slow further. (Page 3.) Qatar’s diplomatic crisis dealt a sharp blow to the economy in the middle of this year, but the worst has now passed. Imports picked up sharply in October and strains in the banking sector have eased. (Page 4.) • Activity in Kuwait remains sluggish and Bahrain’s economy has slowed. On a more encouraging note, Oman’s non-oil economy appears to be staging a recovery. (Page 5.) • The monthly activity data suggest that Egypt’s economy has lost a bit of momentum. Headline inflation dropped back sharply last month, to 26.0% y/y from 30.8% y/y in October. We expect the central bank to embark on an easing cycle when the monetary policy committee next meets in late-December. (Page 6.) • In Lebanon, political tensions have eased and financial markets have started to recover after Prime Minister Saad Hariri rescinded his resignation. Jordan’s economy appears to have strengthened in recent months. (Page 7.) Algeria is on course to record weaker growth this year than in 2016. (Page 8.) • Morocco’s economy has strengthened this year, boosted by a rebound in the agricultural sector. (Page 9.) Prospects for the country’s nascent car sector were boosted after Chinese manufacturer, BYD, announced plans to set up production in the country. The Tunisian government announced its 2018 budget this month, which is aimed at reining in the large fiscal deficit. (Page 10.)
Transcript
Middle East & North Africa Economics | 19th Dec. 2017
Jason Tuvey, Middle East Economist, +44 (0)20 7808 4065, [email protected]
MENA Chart Book Page 1
MENA CHART BOOK Daesh downfall offers respite for smaller economies • Political commentary in the region has focussed on the recent upheaval in Saudi Arabia, but one
development that has received little attention is the downfall of the militant group, Islamic State (IS, also
known as Daesh). Iraq’s Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, formally declared victory over the group in “all
Iraqi lands” this month and it is on the brink of defeat in Syria too. Of course, there’s a lot of uncertainty
over how events will unfold and, at the very least, both Syria and Iraq face huge reconstruction efforts. That
said, there should be positive spillover effects for some of the smaller, neighbouring MENA economies,
particularly Lebanon and Jordan. An easing of security concerns should support a recovery in key tourism
sectors, encourage greater investment and slow the influx of refugees. In turn, this will ease pressure on
fragile budget and current account positions. There may also be a broader regional impact if the defeat of
IS reduces the risk premia demanded by investors to hold financial assets in the region.
• Our GDP Tracker suggests that the downturn in Saudi Arabia’s economy has gathered pace. Weakness is
concentrated in the oil sector, whereas there are signs that activity in the non-oil sector has picked up.
Meanwhile, the government has announced a raft of measures, including a new “private sector stimulus”
package and a fresh round of electricity price hikes, ahead of the 2018 budget. (Page 2.)
• Oil output cuts also appear to have caused the UAE’s economy to slow further. (Page 3.) Qatar’s diplomatic
crisis dealt a sharp blow to the economy in the middle of this year, but the worst has now passed. Imports
picked up sharply in October and strains in the banking sector have eased. (Page 4.)
• Activity in Kuwait remains sluggish and Bahrain’s economy has slowed. On a more encouraging note,
Oman’s non-oil economy appears to be staging a recovery. (Page 5.)
• The monthly activity data suggest that Egypt’s economy has lost a bit of momentum. Headline inflation
dropped back sharply last month, to 26.0% y/y from 30.8% y/y in October. We expect the central bank to
embark on an easing cycle when the monetary policy committee next meets in late-December. (Page 6.)
• In Lebanon, political tensions have eased and financial markets have started to recover after Prime Minister
Saad Hariri rescinded his resignation. Jordan’s economy appears to have strengthened in recent months.
(Page 7.) Algeria is on course to record weaker growth this year than in 2016. (Page 8.)
• Morocco’s economy has strengthened this year, boosted by a rebound in the agricultural sector. (Page 9.)
Prospects for the country’s nascent car sector were boosted after Chinese manufacturer, BYD, announced
plans to set up production in the country. The Tunisian government announced its 2018 budget this month,
which is aimed at reining in the large fiscal deficit. (Page 10.)
Middle East & North Africa Economics
MENA Chart Book Page 2
Saudi Arabia • The downturn in Saudi Arabia’s economy appears to have deepened recently. Our GDP Tracker overstated
the strength of the economy in the first half of the year, but the deterioration in our Tracker in recent months probably translates into a faster year-on-year decline in GDP (1). Economic weakness is heavily concentrated in the oil sector due to the impact of OPEC-agreed output cuts (2).
• On a more positive note, there are signs that activity in the non-oil sector has picked up. Trade data show that, in the three months to September, non-oil imports declined at their slowest pace since late-2015 (3). Meanwhile, low-profile data suggest that the reversal of cuts to civil service bonuses is finally providing some support to consumer spending (4). Consumer confidence has also picked up (5).
• Earlier this month, the authorities announced a “private sector stimulus” package, worth SAR72bn (2.8% of GDP) over the next four years. Meanwhile, the first payments of a monthly household allowance, known as the Citizen’s Account, will be made this month. This will protect the poorest households from the effects of austerity measures. A new value-added tax will be introduced at the start of 2018 and fresh subsidy cuts are on the cards. These measures will push up inflation, which stood at -0.2% y/y in October (6).
Chart 1: GDP & CE GDP Tracker (% y/y)
Chart 3: Non-Oil Imports (% y/y, 3m avg.)
Chart 5: Thomson Reuters/IPSOS Cons. Conf. Index
Chart 2: CE GDP Trackers (% y/y)
Chart 4: ATM Withdrawals & Point of Sale Transactions (% y/y, 3m avg.)
United Arab Emirates • The UAE’s economy has slowed this year. The latest quarterly GDP data showed that Abu Dhabi’s economy
– the largest of the seven emirates that make up the UAE – contracted by 0.9% y/y in Q2, compared with growth of 0.4% y/y in Q1 (1). The downturn was entirely driven by the oil sector, where output declined by 1.9% y/y. That said, growth in the non-oil sector remained extremely weak at just 0.1% y/y.
• More timely data suggest that growth in the UAE as a whole has weakened further in the second half of 2017. In year-on-year terms – which is what matters for GDP growth – oil production dropped by 6.5% in October, its steepest decline since 2009 (2). Meanwhile, there are signs that the property sector is experiencing a fresh downturn (3). On a more encouraging note, growth in passenger and cargo traffic at Dubai International Airport remains robust (4). And the ‘whole economy PMI’ (which covers the non-oil private sector) increased from 55.9 in October to 57.0 in November (5).
• Finally, headline inflation rose from 1.1% y/y in September to 2.1% y/y in October (6). The rise was fairly broad-based with food, housing and transport inflation all picking up.
Chart 1: Abu Dhabi GDP (% y/y)
Chart 3: Property Prices (% y/y)
Chart 5: UAE Whole Economy PMI
Chart 2: UAE Oil Production
Chart 4: Dubai International Airport Traffic (% y/y, 3m avg.)
Chart 6: Consumer Prices (% y/y)
Sources: CEIC, Thomson Reuters, OPEC, Capital Economics
Qatar • The worst of the hit to Qatar’s economy from its diplomatic crisis has now passed and there are even some
signs of a rebound. Oil exports have been steady and the Dolphin pipeline – which sends gas to the UAE – has remained open. More importantly, imports have started to recover from their sharp fall in the immediate aftermath of the blockade. Imports rose by 11.5% y/y in October (1) and, in levels terms, are now above their level prior to the blockade (2), suggesting that pent-up demand is now being met.
• Strains in the banking sector have also eased. Banks’ foreign liabilities fell further in October, but the decline was small compared with June and July (3). Meanwhile, private sector deposits have picked up which has eased pressure on the government to provide support to banks – public sector deposits fell last month (4).
• That said, certain sectors still seem to be struggling. For one thing, there has been a sharp decline in tourist arrivals and flights into Qatar are down by more 25% y/y (5). The uncertainty created by the blockade has also prolonged the downturn in the real estate sector. Steeper falls in housing rents have offset the impact of a sharp rise in food inflation in recent months. Headline inflation stood at 0.2% y/y in November (6).
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Kuwait, Oman & Bahrain • Kuwait’s economy appears to have slowed this year. The fall in oil output deepened to 5.8% y/y in
November, meaning that the oil sector acted as a bigger drag on economic growth than earlier in 2017 (1). On a more encouraging note, though, bank card transactions expanded at their fastest pace in Q3 since early 2016 (2). And private sector credit growth picked up in October (3).
• Meanwhile, the latest GDP data showed that Bahrain’s economy slowed in Q2. GDP expanded by 3.3% y/y, down from 3.5% y/y in Q1 (4). The hydrocarbon sector contracted at a slower pace but this was more than offset by weaker growth in the non-hydrocarbon sector. In Oman, the available data suggests that the worst of the economic slowdown has now passed. Imports – a proxy for domestic demand – jumped by close to 30% y/y in the three months to August (5).
• Headline inflation in Bahrain picked up to a 13-month high of 2.4% y/y in October, from 1.8% y/y in the previous month. Inflation also rose in Kuwait, from 0.5% y/y to 1.4% y/y. In contrast, inflation edged down in Oman, from 1.6% y/y in September to 1.2% y/y in October (6).
Chart 1: Kuwait Oil Production
Chart 3: Kuwait Bank Card Transactions (% y/y)
Chart 5: Oman Imports
Chart 2: Kuwait Private Sector Credit (% y/y)
Chart 4: Bahrain GDP (% y/y)
Chart 6: Consumer Prices (% y/y)
Sources: CEIC, Thomson Reuters, OPEC, Capital Economics
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Egypt • The latest activity data paint a mixed picture of Egypt’s economy. Growth in industrial production (which
also includes a number of services) slowed to 25.2% y/y in September, from 30.1% y/y August (1). In contrast, the whole economy PMI rose from 48.4 in October to 50.7 in November, the first reading above the 50-mark – which, in theory, separates expansion from contraction – in more than two years (2).
• The current account deficit has remained wide over the past year (3). A surge in capital inflows has helped to finance this and allowed the central bank to rebuild its foreign exchange reserves, although there are signs that this has now run its course. Indeed, foreigners have been net sellers of Egyptian stocks so far this month (4). As a result, the pound has weakened by around 1% against the dollar over the past month and now stands at 17.84/$ (5).
• Finally, headline inflation dropped to 26.0% y/y in November, from 30.8% y/y in October a 30-year high of 33.0% y/y in July (6). Against this backdrop, we expect the central bank to lower its benchmark overnight deposit rate by 100bp, to 17.75%, when the monetary policy committee meeting in late-December.
Chart 1: Industrial Production
Chart 3: Current Account Balance (4Q Sum, % of GDP)
Chart 5: Egyptian Pound (vs. US$, Inverted)
Chart 2: Whole Economy PMI
Chart 4: Net Foreign Purchases of Egyptian Stocks (EGP bn)
Chart 6: Consumer Prices (% y/y)
Sources: CEIC, Thomson Reuters, Capital Economics
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Lebanon & Jordan • Political tensions in Lebanon have eased after Prime Minister Saad Hariri rescinded his resignation earlier
this month. On the back of this, financial markets have started to recover some of their lost ground – dollar bond spreads have dropped by more than 100bp since their peak in early November and the equity market is up by around 4% from its trough (1 & 2).
• That said, Lebanon’s economy is vulnerable if tensions re-escalate. The current account deficit stands at close to 20% of GDP (3). Lebanon is heavily reliant on flighty portfolio inflows and deposits into local banks from the diaspora (the bulk of which originate in the Gulf) to fund this shortfall. A re-escalation of tensions could lead to a period of capital flight that quickly erodes FX reserves and forces the authorities to devalue the pound. This could create problems for the government in servicing its large FX debts (4).
• There is little available evidence to gauge the impact of recent developments on Lebanon’s economy. For what it’s worth, though, the ‘whole economy’ PMI rose from 45.8 in October to 46.2 in November (5). Meanwhile, in Jordan, growth appears to have strengthened in recent months. In the three months to October, industrial production expanded by 0.7% y/y, its fastest pace in a year (6).
Chart 1: JP Morgan Lebanon EMBI Index
Chart 3: Lebanon Current Account Balance (% of GDP)
Chart 5: Lebanon Whole Economy PMI
Chart 2: BLOM Equity Index
Chart 4: Government Foreign Currency Debt (% of GDP)
Chart 6: Jordan Industrial Production
Sources: CEIC, Thomson Reuters, BLOM/Markit, Capital Economics
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Algeria • Algeria’s economy is on course to record weaker growth this year than in 2016. The latest data show that
the economy grew by 1.5% y/y in Q2, down from 3.4% y/y in Q1. This was the weakest pace since 2009 (1). The slowdown was largely attributable to the hydrocarbon sector. Growth had been boosted earlier this year by the return to full capacity at the In Amenas gas facility, but this has now faded. Growth in the non-hydrocarbon sector also weakened and, at 2.1% y/y, remained sluggish by past standards (2).
• More timely data show that the year-on-year decline in oil production has gathered pace in recent months (3). The rise in oil prices since the middle of this year will have supported an increase in hydrocarbon export revenues. Even so, the country’s budget and current account deficits remain large and the central bank’s FX reserves have continued to decline at a rapid pace (4).
• The dinar has been allowed to fall by around 7.5% against its euro-dollar basket since the start of this year (5). Currency weakness has pushed up inflation which hit a seven-month high of 6.5% y/y in October (6). Food inflation, which accounts for 40% of the CPI basket, posted its highest reading since late-2014.
Sources: CEIC, Thomson Reuters, OPEC, Capital Economics
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Morocco • Morocco’s economy has strengthened this year. The latest GDP data showed that the economy expanded
by 4.2% y/y in Q2, up from 3.8% y/y in Q1 and 1.2% over 2016 as a whole (1). Stronger growth was supported in large part by the agricultural sector, which has rebounded from last year’s drought-related slump (2). Growth in the non-agricultural sector was stable at 2.5% y/y as a jump in mining output offset a slowdown in the manufacturing sector.
• More timely data suggest that the economy has continued to expand at a robust pace in the second half of this year. Growth in the manufacturing sector picked up from 1.7% y/y in Q2 to 1.9% y/y in Q3 (3). In the three months to October, exports rose by around 10% y/y and grew faster than imports (4). This has been supported by recent investments into the country’s car sector. Prospects for the sector were boosted further this month after Chinese car manufacturer, BYD, announced that it would set up production in Morocco.
• Meanwhile, tourist arrivals have continued to rise strongly (5). Finally, inflation increased from 0.4% y/y in September to 0.6% y/y in October, as food prices fell at a slower pace (6).
Tunisia • Tunisia’s economy has strengthened this year. The latest GDP data showed that output expanded by 2.1%
y/y in Q3, compared with growth of 1.7% y/y in Q2 (1). Activity strengthened in the manufacturing sector, which more than offset weaker growth in the services and agricultural sectors (2). The monthly data suggest that activity picked up towards the end of Q3. In September, industrial production expanded by 0.2% y/y, compared with a contraction of 0.9% y/y in August (3).
• Earlier this month, parliament approved the 2018 budget, which aims to rein in the budget deficit from an expected 6.0% of GDP this year to 4.9% of GDP next year (4). The subsidy cuts and tax hikes that are key components of the budget will push up inflation, which hit a four-year high of 6.3% y/y last month (5).
• The recent jump in inflation has reflected previous currency weakness – the dinar fell by 15% against the euro between April and August (6). The dinar has hovered between 2.9/€ and 3.0/€ recently, but this has come at the expense of a further drawdown of FX reserves. The good news is that the approval of the budget enabled the authorities to reach a staff-level agreement with the IMF on the disbursal of the second tranche of Tunisia’s $2.9bn Extended Fund Facility. This will provide a boost to FX reserves.
Chart 1: GDP (% y/y)
Chart 3: Industrial Production
Chart 5: Consumer Prices (% y/y)
Chart 2: GDP by Sector (% y/y)
Chart 4: Budget Balance (% of GDP)
Chart 6: Tunisian Dinar (vs. €, Inverted)
Sources: CEIC, Thomson Reuters, Capital Economics
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Background Data
Chart 1: GDP ($bn, 2016, Market Exchange Rates)
Chart 3: GDP Per Capita ($000, 2016, Market Exchange Rates)
Disclaimer: While every effort has been made to ensure that the data quoted and used for the research behind this document is reliable, there is no guarantee
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