United States Department of Labor

Mine Safety and HealthAdministration

Dennis CottonActing District Manager

District 7Coal Mine Safety and Health

September 5, 2014

KY MSHA Districts

KentuckyTotal Number of Mines

Underground 52 51 14 117 Surface 102 81 14 197 Facilities 48 61 14 123 Total Operations 202 193 42 437

Producing Operations 148 118 30 296 Non-producing Operations 54 75 12 141

Total Number of Miners in Kentucky - 11,323

D6 D7 D10 Total

Coal Fatalities NationwideCY 2014

Coal Fatalities NationwideCY 2014

Location of Accidents

9 Fatal Accidents

• 7 Underground• 2 Surface

Coal Fatalities NationwideCY 2014

Accident Classification

9 Fatal Accidents

• 4 Machinery• 2 Fall of Face/Rib/Highwall• 2 Powered Haulage• 1 Electrical

Coal Fatalities NationwideCY 2014By State

9 Fatal Accidents

• 3 WV• 2 VA• 1 WY• 1 IN• 1 MT• 1 IL

Kentucky Accidents2005 – 2014

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014D6 300 329 307 293 259 213 238 173 128 76D7 366 397 359 295 330 312 255 212 131 86

D10 183 211 156 179 204 160 155 132 173 116Totals 849 937 822 767 793 685 648 517 432 278

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014D6 3 6 2 1 3 0 2 2 0 0D7 5 9 0 5 3 4 4 2 2 0

D10 0 1 0 2 1 3 2 1 0 0Totals 8 16 2 8 7 7 8 5 2 0

Kentucky Accidents (Degree of Injury 2 - 5)

Kentucky Fatalities

366397

359

295

330312

255

212

131

86

300329

307293

259

213238

173

128

76

183211

156179

204

160 155132

173

116

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

D6

D7

D10

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #1 – January 16, 2014

Mettiki Coal WV, LLCMountain View MinePowered Haulage

On Friday, January 16, 2014, a 20-year-old general inside laborer with 2 years of mining experience was killed when he was struck by a feeder. The victim was standing between the coal rib and the feeder when the securing post dislodged, allowing the tailpiece unit to shift and pin him between the rib and the frame of the feeder. The victim had just finished connecting a chain between the feeder and the tailpiece when the accident occurred.

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #2 – February 21, 2014

Sun Coke EnergyDominion #30Machinery

On Friday, February 21, 2014, a 24-year-old continuous mining machine operator with 5½ years of mining experience was killed when he was pinned between the end of the boom of a continuous mining machine and the right coal rib. The miner was tramming the remote controlled continuous mining machine in the last open crosscut toward the Number 1 entry.

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #3 – March 25, 2014

Gibson County Coal, LLCGibson MineMachinery

On Tuesday, March 25, 2014, at approximately 1:45 a.m., a 41-year-old mechanic trainee with 23 weeks of mining experience was killed while working on a belt feeder. The victim was cutting through the inner left side plate of the crawler assembly that connects the hopper jack assemblies to the crawler frame. When the cut was completed, the crawler assembly pivoted upward, pinning the victim between the crawler track and the frame of the feeder.

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #4 and #5 – May 12, 2014

Brody Mining, LLCBrody Mine No. 1Fall of Face/Rib/Highwall

On Monday, May 12, 2014, a 48-year-old continuous mining machine operator with 26 years of mining experience, and a 46-year-old mobile roof support operator/roof bolter with 3½ years of mining experience, were fatally injured as a result of a coal rib burst. The section crew was retreat mining in the #6 entry of the 4 East Mains Panel. They were mining the second lift of the left pillar block when the accident occurred.

Location of victimsVictims Location

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #6 – May 14, 2014

M Class MiningMC #1 MineMachinery

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, a 25-year-old roof bolter operator with 1 year and 44 weeks mining experience was killed when he was pinned between a roof-bolting machine and the coal rib. The victim and another roof bolter operator were in the process of tramming the roof-bolting machine in the outby direction in the No. 3 entry on the No. 1 LongwallTailgate. They had trammed the roof bolting machine from the 151 crosscut to approximately the 89 ½ crosscut when the accident occurred. The victim was found on the left side of the roof-bolting machine between the machine and the coal rib.

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #7 – June 4, 2014

Peabody Powder River Mining, LLCNorth Antelope Rochelle MineMachinery

On Wednesday, June 4, 2014, a 25-year-old contract equipment operator with 24 weeks of experience was killed when he was crushed between the hood and frame of an impact crusher. The victim had just finished clearing a large rock from the crusher area when the accident occurred.

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #8 – June 23, 2014

Cloud Peak EnergySpring Creek MinePowered Haulage

On Monday, June 23, 2014, at approximately 7:35 p.m., a 58–year-old truck driver, with 5 years of mining experience, was killed when the haul truck he was operating traveled through a berm and descended approximately 75 feet into a spoil “V.”

Coal Fatalities CY 2014

Coal Fatality #9 – August 20, 2014

CONSOL Buchanan MiningCompany, LLC

Buchanan Mine #1Electrical

On Wednesday, August 20, 2014, a 41-year-old maintenance supervisor with approximately 19 years of mining experience was killed when he came in contact with an energized component inside an explosion proof enclosure. The victim had removed the enclosure’s panel cover and was troubleshooting or performing electrical work on the 600 VAC roof bolting machine when he was electrocuted.

MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

CREW (RE)TRAINING PRIOR TO RETREAT MINING

• Roof Control Plan

• Hazard Identification

• Cut Sequence

• Personnel location during mining (red zones)

ARMPS SF (Production Pillars)

Barrier PillarStability Factor

PILLAR DESIGN

Analysis of Retreat Mining Pillar Stability (ARMPS): Version 6 (2010)

MULTIPLE SEAMMINING

Division of Safety Update

Mining Under Deep CoverDuring the past two years, three serious coal bursts have occurred at deep cover retreat mines. The events at Panther No. 1, Huff Creek No. 1, and Brody Mine No. 1 have resulted in three fatalities and two permanently disabling injuries. In all three cases the pillars were properly sized and met all the NIOSH pillar stability factor criteria. In addition, none of these three mines had ever reported a burst before.

Division of Safety UpdateMining Under Deep Cover

MSHA identified five areas to address:

1. Re-evaluations needed of any plans currently approved.2. Application of improvements identified in retreat accidents, (Huff Creek and

Panther mines) where applicable;3. Plan requirements for any early warning outbursts / bumps reported to

MSHA by mine operators with roof control plan changes as part of mining plans;

4. Requirements for mine operators to conduct risk assessments as recommended in the NIOSH recommendations following the congressional review of Crandall canyon disaster;

5. Changes in the computer modeling used for deep cover retreat mines where multiple mined out seams overlay the seam to be mined.

Division of Safety UpdateMining Under Deep Cover

ResponseAn Action Plan was developed to meet these objectives. The Action Plan identified three key tasks:1. To evaluate current deep cover retreat mining operations for bump

potential, and require changes to roof control plans as appropriate to minimize the bump risk.

2. To incorporate requirements for early warning outbursts/ bumps into roof control plans, including crew training in warning to signs to look for, monitoring to be conducted, and reporting requirements.

3. To require operators of deep cover retreat mines to conduct burst risk assessments prior to mining.

Division of Safety UpdateMining Under Deep Cover

Status Update1. Active retreat mining under deep cover was identified. Enhanced reviews

(burst risk assessments) were conducted at the identified mines and plan changes were required in about a half-dozen cases. The changes were typically relatively minor and did not require that any mine be shut down. Currently, Tech Support is continuing to conduct such reviews for mines that will conducting deep cover retreat mining during the next 6 months or so.

2. Language was developed to be included in roof control plans that addresses training, monitoring, and reporting of coal bursts. This language should be included in any mine’s plan that conducts development or retreat mining in deep cover areas.

3. A Program Information Bulletin (PIB) has been prepared that provides guidance to mine operators about how to conduct a coal burst risk assessment. The PIB is currently being reviewed.

Division of Safety UpdateMining Under Deep Cover Nationwide, 45 mines were identified to meet the criteria of having

potential to retreat mine under at least 1000 feet of cover. 23 of the deep cover retreat mines are located in District 7. District 7 sent each of these mines sample wording regarding “Retreat

Mining Zones” as well as training, monitoring and reporting of coal bursts. This wording was intended as a starting point for the type of wording to be included in Roof Control Plans.

GREEN ZONE YELLOW ZONE ORANGE ZONE

< 1000' of Cover > 1000' of Cover > 1400' of Cover with (Strong-Hard) Roof that is > 5 Feet in Thickness and WithinOR 4.25' of the Coal Seam

Overlying Gob with No Remnant

Structure

> 1000' of Cover at Close Proximity Remnant or Gob-Solid Boundaries Including Over/Under Gob Side Bleeder Pillars and Outby the Pillar Line for a Distance of

Five Times the Square Root of the OverburdenOR Severe Seam Rolls with > 1400' of Cover and Strong-Hard Roof

Underlying Gob with No Remnant

StructureOR

Weak Roof/Floor

TRAINING TRAINING TRAININGRecognizing Bump Indicators Recognizing Bump Indicators

Utilizing "A-Cuts" Utilizing "A-Cuts"No Closing in the Middle Entry Begin Cut Sequence at Inby End of Pillar and Work Sytematically Outby

Leave Pillar Blocks When Necessary Narrow Pillar Lifts (Half the Miner Head)Administrative Controls Closing in the Outside Entries

Physicals Barriers (Item 2 in Leave Pillar Blocks When Necessaryadditional info) Administrative Controls

Physicals Barriers (Items 1 & 2 in additional info)BUMP INDICATORS: Red dust and/or red slickensides at the coal and roof/floor interface, significant rib spalling or floor heave, increase in the number or intensity of small, non-reportable bursts."A-CUTS": A diligent effort will be made to utilize "A-Cuts" in Yellow & Orange Zones to mitigate stored energy in coal pillars. "A-Cuts" are the first most inby lift(s) mining in a pillar.NARROW PILLAR LIFTS: Lifts less than the cutter head width will be utilized to the extent possible in Orange Zone areas.STRONG-HARD ROOF: Will be defined by corehole/testhole data and adjusted during development of each area (i.e., strata that does not collapse or break up during mining or is not easily mined for equipment clearance).SEVERE SEAM ROLLS: Will be defined by floor elevations during development of each area where the change in floor elevation is > 15% grade in a 20' linear distance.

RETREAT MINING ZONES

Respirable Dust Rule Implementation

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

Immediate Changes Sample portal to portal for full shift regardless of

shift length Control filter required for CMDPSU samples Establish Excessive Concentration Values (ECV) Certified sampler that made on-shift checks must

sign dust data card Part 90 includes surface miners

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

Immediate Changes Medical monitoring applies to surface and

underground miners Noncompliance on MSHA samples will be based on

a single full shift measurement Shifts longer than 12 hours, certified sampler will

switch CMDPSU with a fully charged pump prior to the 13th hour

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

Immediate Changes Mine ventilation plan content:

Minimum quantity of air for each MMU Specific details of dust control for each MMU Specific type, size and maintenance of scrubber screen Maintenance of dust collectors

75.362(a)(2) exams are recorded in a secure book or electronically, verified by certified person, and countersigned by Mine Foreman

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

Immediate Changes Operators required to record shift length for each

production shift on each MMU Noncompliance based on 2 of 5 samples meeting or

exceeding the ECV Operators required to record production for each

shift on each MMU Required air measurements at the end of the line

curtain with the scrubber turned off

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

Immediate Changes Begin sampling DWPs and Part 90 miners on a

quarterly basis Production on shift sampled is 80% of last 30

production shifts Establish 0.1mg/m3 (100 µg/m3) quartz standard DWPs include highwall drill and bulldozer operators

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

After 18 Months CPDM sampling for DOs and Part 90 Establish ODOs on MMUs Sample at least 15 consecutive normal production

shifts for DOs and ODOs Noncompliance on operator collected samples will

be based on 3 of 15 required samples meeting or exceeding the ECV

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

After 18 Months The District Manager may require additional sets of

15 samples on DOs if he believes the ventilation plan is not being followed

Shifts longer than 12 hours, certified sampler will switch CPDM with a fully charged unit prior to the 13th hour

Major Changes to RespirableDust Sampling Program

After 24 Months The dust standard is reduced to 1.5mg/m3

(0.5mg/m3 on intake air and Part 90 miners)

Pleasant Hill Mine Water Drainage Systems were Damaged

Pleasant Hill Mine

Division of Safety UpdatePVC Pipe in Seals Plans for 120 psi seals with PVC water traps can be denied based on

Pleasant Hill explosion and preamble language 3 schedule 80 pipes destroyed 1 remained intact (trap not secure, provided pressure relief) Preamble (April 18, 2008, p. 21201, 75.337(h)):

“…drainage pipes must have strength properties consistent with the design strength of the seal, and the drainage system must have blast resistance equivalent to that of the seal.”

PVC pipe was not consistent with the preamble language

Division of Safety UpdatePVC Pipe in Seals Can use other non-conductive pipe (e.g., (HDPE) High-Density

Polyethylene) or means for relieving pressure Strength of the pipe must be consistent with that of the seal

Designs submitted to DM to be sent to TS Designs incorporated into Vent Plan Vent Plan revisions based on same reasons for retrofitting or

protecting current PVC traps in 120 psi seals Vent Plan route should get quicker results and innovations Anti-freeze in retrofitted/protected PVC traps – should also include

provisions for exams for degradation; may include a replacement schedule

Material other than PVC could be used for traps

Division of Safety UpdateImpoundment Upstream Construction Upstream construction is (ideally) the placement of coarse coal refuse

over an exposed delta of fine coal refuse. Where exposed deltas do not exist, coarse refuse may be pushed into the water until a work surface is formed.

Over the years, relatively minor failures of impoundment upstream pushouts have occurred.

The November 2012 Nolan Run fatality occurred on a saddle dam using the upstream construction method. In this case, coarse refuse was pushed into water and on top of very fine slurry.

MSHA realized that additional analyses are needed in design plans to confirm stability of stages involving upstream construction, especially when exposed deltas do not exist.

Division of Safety Update

Impoundment Upstream Construction Water is present in the pore spaces of coarse and

fine coal refuse. Designers rely on the water being squeezed out of

the fine refuse as the embankment is constructed. This increases the strength of fines in the foundation.

Sometimes the slurry is so fine it doesn’t drain or embankment construction loads the material quicker than it can drain.

Division of Safety Update

Impoundment Upstream Construction The trapped water becomes pressurized resulting in

elevated pore pressures, which reduces the strength of the slurry.

Technical Support’s Mine Waste and Geotechnical Engineering Division evaluated the conditions and has drafted design requirements and internal procedures for reviewing upstream construction stages. The draft document is still under review.

This topic was presented at the 2014 Dam Safety Training for Coal.

Division of Safety Update

Impoundment Upstream Construction A Coal and TS committee will meet to discuss

the best way to disseminate the new information to MSHA districts and industry.

Possible actions are an addendum to the coal impoundment design manual along with updates to the inspection and plan review handbook.

Division of Safety Update

Refuge AlternativesSignal Peak - Bull Mountain Mine (D9)San Juan - 15 PSI (D9)

Desarado - 15 PSI (D9)

Carbonok (D7)

Strata

Kennedy RA - Retro-fits (D8 & D9)

Approximately 2 weeks away from approval, 2 citations extended

Tech Support waiting on additional information for approval, citations due 8/4/2014, 4 citations on Kennedy RAs - OK Retro-fits estimated to be completed by end of September 2014 possibly into October, delay are cylinders, valves, fittings and hardware for both the oxygen delivery and the harmful gas removal systems.

New 4500 PSI cylinders, plumbing, etc. Cylinders will take 5 weeks for delivery about August 1st. They can retrofit them at the rate of one every two weeks. So all four done about October 1. More likely November 1st due to the cylinder question. Approval plates, fire extinguishers, fire blankets and manuals shipped to distributors to be installed at mines.

Received MSHA approvals for BA, HGR, & AM, Revised zipper video and user manuals sent to NIOSH for review, Retro-fits on hold, waiting on confirmation from NIOSH might be a while

Signal Peak replacing 15 PSI with Kennedy RA, District to confirm

Division of Safety Update

Refuge Alternatives – MineShieldMODEL Extension

# Status

CF204 (6 person) 01 Approved CF227B (16 person) 02 Approved CF207F (16 person) 03 Approved CF211F (16 person) 04 Approved CF209 (8 person) 05 Approved CF220 (25 person) 06 Approved CF226 (12 person) 07 Approved CF206 (8 person) 08 Approved CF210 (8 person) 09 Approved CF201 (12 person) 10 Approved (The approval letters were just signed today) CF208 (14 person) 11 Review Complete – Submitted for indexing CF227 (20 person) 12 Review Complete – Ready for indexing CF208B (16 person) 13 Beginning the review CF207 (9 person) 14 Submitted – Not being reviewed yet CF224 (18 person) 15 Submitted – Not being reviewed yet CF228 (14 person) 16 Submitted – Not being reviewed yet CF211 (10 person) 17 Submitted – Not being reviewed yet CF216 (8 person) 18 Submitted – Not being reviewed yet CF217 (12 person) 19 Submitted – Not being reviewed yet

Division of Safety UpdateRFI-EMI Interference – CO Systems In 2009 RFI saturation created false readings on Pyott-

Boone CO sensors Pyott-Boone published a letter documenting the problem Radio frequency being transmitted in close proximity of a

CO sensor will cause an instant spike in the CO value. The false detection is not limited to Pyott-Boone CO

monitors Hazard Alert is being drafted to inform mine operators of

the issue and to contact MSHA when upgrades are made to the CO System PPL P14-V-01 addresses “…. blasting circuits and other electrical systems”

Division of Safety UpdateRFI-EMI Interference – CO Systems Once informed by the mine operators the districts

should; Contact Technical Support Update respective plans Vent or ERP (guidance will be sent

to Districts) to include steps taken by the operator to mitigate the problem. These techniques may include: Maintaining manufacturer recommendations on separation distances Using lower power levels on portable radios Researching vulnerabilities during the purchasing process Purchasing equipment that does not operate in the same frequency

range of equipment presently used at the mine Install updates as provided by the manufacturer that are immune to

RFI and EMI

Division of Safety Update

Exam Rule 75.363(e) – Mine Examiners meet with mine

operator on quarterly basis Adjustments to District Plans as needed Website tools

9 standards Rules to live By

Pattern of Violations Single Source Page

QUESTIONS???