CHAPTER V MITHYËTVA IN ADVAITASIDDHI PART II Among the five definitions of mithy¡tva, the first two which are contributed by Padmap¡da and Prak¡¿¡tman are described in the earlier chapter. Prak¡¿¡tman contributed two definitions of mithy¡tva in Advaita Ved¡nta. This chapter brings out the second definition of Prak¡¿¡tman, the definition of Citsukha and the definition of Ënandabodha are clearly described. 5.1. The third definition of mithy¡tva This definition is taken from Paµcap¡dik¡vivara¸a of Prak¡¿¡tman. ‘Jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’ That means which is sublated by knowledge that is mithy¡. According to Prak¡¿¡tman 159
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CHAPTER VMITHYËTVA IN ADVAITASIDDHI
PART IIAmong the five definitions of mithy¡tva, the
first two which are contributed by Padmap¡da and Prak¡¿¡tman are described in the earlier chapter. Prak¡¿¡tman contributed two definitions of mithy¡tva in Advaita Ved¡nta. This chapter brings out the second definition of Prak¡¿¡tman, the definition of Citsukha and the definition of Ënandabodha are clearly described.5.1. The third definition of mithy¡tva
This definition is taken from
Paµcap¡dik¡vivara¸a of Prak¡¿¡tman.
‘Jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’ That means
which is sublated by knowledge that is mithy¡.
According to Prak¡¿¡tman sublation (b¡dhyatva)
is mithy¡tva.1 What is meant by this word
sublation? If this sublation means to
1 ?. P.P.V., p. 213.
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destruction, then the meaning of mithy¡, is
destroyed by knowledge. The criticism of
‘abh¡va pratiyogit¡rupamithy¡tva’ is based on
the ¿ruti ‘Neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana.’ It implies that
the world of multiplicity is eternally negated in
Brahman which is the locus of its appearance
and as such the world is false.2 It implies that
the world is false in the sense that it is cancelled
by the knowledge of Brahman. The definition–
mithy¡ is that which is contradicted by
knowledge is based on the ¿ruti which is “Vidv¡n
n¡mar£p¡dvimuktaÅ.”3 If the definition the
‘mithy¡tva is that which is ‘contradicted by
knowledge’ (jµ¡nanivartyatva) is accepted, then
it is ativy¡pti because preceding knowledge
(p£rvajµ¡na) is sublated by the succeeding
knowledge (uttarajµ¡na). The preceding 2 ?. Karu¸abha¶¶¡c¡rya, Advaitasiddhi translation, p. 115.3 ?. Sasikant pandeya, Advait Vedant mem m¡yav¡d, p. 402.
160
knowledge, which is sublated by the succeeding
knowledge, is destructive, but it is not mithy¡.
According to Advaitin the all cognitions are
ultimately false. So the preceding cognition that
gets cancelled by the succeeding cognition is
also considered to be false. That means the
special quality of one thing destroyed by the
origination of other special quality. So the first
cognition is destroyed by the second cognition
and the special quality of the second cognition
destroyed by the special quality of the third
cognition. It cleared with the example-the
knowledge of ‘pot’ is replaced by the knowledge
of ‘table’ and then the former is destroyed by
the later. But the knowledge of ‘pot’ cannot be
false. So the definition is in alakÀya, so the
defect of ativy¡pti is seen as well as
siddhas¡dhanat¡. Advaitins comment that the
opponents have misunderstood the implication
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of this definition. They said all cognitions are
ultimately false. So the preceding and
succeeding cognitions are also false. So it will
be the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡. The presence
of the hetu d¤¿yatva etc. are makes the
mithy¡tvasiddhi. Then the defects of
siddhas¡dhanat¡ occur. The opponents also
accept the sublation of cognition in the
preceding knowledge. The ativy¡pti can be seen
in the broken pot also. The pot which is
destructed by the stick, according to the
siddh¡nta pakÀa, is also mithy¡. The definition
of mithy¡tva is not suitable for destructed pot
because it is destructed by a stick and not by
knowledge.
To solve this problem Advaitins modified
the definition-‘jµ¡natvena jµ¡nanivartyatvam
v¡ mithy¡tvam.’ That means something negated
by a cognition acting its capacity as cognition.
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‘If accept the sense of jµ¡nanivartyatva then this
does not happened because it would no longer
apply to the preceding cognition getting
destroyed by its succeeding cognition. But the
succeeding cognition acts as the destroyer of
the preceding cognition not in its capacity of
being cognition- it destroys the preceding
cognition by virtue of its character of being a
special quality of the same self and coming just
after that cognition. Therefore the preceding
cognition is not to be considered as false
because of the fact that it is negated by the
succeeding cognition.’4 If the definition is told in
this way the obtained meaning is like
this-‘jµ¡natv¡vacchinnak¡ra¸at¡nir£pita k¡ryatv¡t
tanna sapratiyogitvam.’5 If this is stressed,
ativy¡pti will happen in the destructed pot. The 4 ?. Karu¸abha¶¶¡c¡rya, Advaitasiddhi translation, p. 116.5 ?. L. C., p. 160.
163
negation of the eternal negation of the gross
and the subtle form of an object due to
knowledge is false. In the case of a destruction
of pot with a stroke of stick, the gross form of
the pot is destroyed. The subtle form is
destroyed only by the knowledge of Brahman.
Like wise the mithy¡tv¡num¡na is
s¡dhyavaikalya. S¡dhyavaikalya means the
absent of s¡dhya. The knowledge of rajata is
sublated by the knowledge of ¿ukti. This type of
experience is asiddha. If said like this, the
knowledge of Brahman is not the cause of the
destruction of the universe.
5.1.1. Asambhava
Then the Advaita definition of falsity would
have the defect of asambhava. All
superimposed objects which are considered as
false. The above mentioned cause is
asambhava doÀayukta. How the sublation of
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the superimposition of aparokÀa happens by the
knowledge of parokÀa? In the example of
¿uktirajata, the sublation of knowledge that is
the knowledge of rajata obtained by the
realization of the locus
(adhiÀ¶h¡natatvas¡kÀ¡tk¡ra) that is the
knowledge of ¿uktik¡. Here the knowledge is not
sublated by knowledge. The mental trace is
negated by a cognition acting its capacity of
being a variant of cognition
(jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharme¸a jµ¡nanivartyatvam) is
mithy¡tvam. If it accepts the Advaita definition
of falsity from being too wide, it prevents the
definition of falsity from being applicable to the
preceding cognition which gets cancelled by the
succeeding cognition and thus saves it from
being too wide. Here also the defect of ativy¡pti
can be viewed. The cognition of acting in its
capacity of being variant is memory.
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Sm¤titvar£pa viewed in sublated by knowledge
is in mental trace. The memory is developed by
mental trace. Later the mental trace which is
originated by knowledge is destroyed. So the
mental trace is destroyed by memory. The
presence of ativy¡pti is in mental trace of
mithy¡tva which is destroyed by memory.
Memory is sublated by the trace of virtue of its
character of being memory. If it is accepted the
sublation happens by ‘¡tmavi¿eÀagu¸atvar£pa.’
It will be accepted that icch¡, dveÀa etc. are
sublated by mental trace because this is
‘¡tmaviÀeÀagu¸atvar£pa’. The prior absence of
the knowledge (Jµ¡napr¡gabh¡va) is not
mithy¡ but it is sublated by knowledge ‘vidvan
n¡mar£p¡tvimuktaÅ’- through this ¿ruti, the
cancellation (niv¤tti) of name and form is stated,
but the mithy¡tva which has name and form is
not obtained.
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The reply of Advaitin is that the sublation of
knowledge means
‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nyavirahapratiyogitva
m.’ The absolute absence of
jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nya is its pratiyogitva.
This type of pratiyogitva is mithy¡. The meaning
of the word knowledge is the knowledge of the
locus. It means that the avasthiti of the
knowledge which is
adhiÀ¶h¡natattvavy¡pakas¡m¡nya is its absolute
absence and its pratiyogitva is mithy¡.6
Avasthiti is two types svar£p¡vasthiti and
k¡ra¸¡t¡vasthiti- that is s£kÀmar£pa and
sth£lar£pa. The k¡ra¸¡vasthiti is
samsk¡rar£p¡vasthiti. The word s¡m¡nya is used
for understanding the two avasthiti.
To reject the defect of ativy¡pti Advaitins
put forward their view. In the definition they
6 ?. L.C., p. 160.
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accept the absence of avasthitis¡m¡nya. So
there is no ativy¡pti in pot which is destroyed by
of the stick. By the breaking of the pot by stick
or pole, the svar£pa is destroyed, but it exists in
k¡ra¸ar£pa. So there is no
avasthitis¡m¡nyaviraha.7 The
avasthitis¡m¡nyaviraha of pot uses the
knowledge of Brahman (brahmajµ¡naprayukta).
If jµ¡naprayukta is not accepted, in above
mentioned definition there will exist the ativy¡pti
in the hare’s horn. In actual as well as potential
state, is in hare’s horn, but it is not entailed by
knowledge. So there is no ativy¡pti in a½¢ka.
The opponents said there is no realization of
the loss of ¿uktirajata. So
‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nyavirahapratiyogitva
m’ is not in ¿uktirajata’ the example is
s¡dhyavikala. There is ativy¡pti in this definition.
7 ?. A.S., p. 161.
168
Advaitins did not accept ¿uktirajata as a½¢ka.
This is opposite to our experience. áuktirajata is
not a½¢ka like hare’s horn. There is no
experience for the hare’s horn. The
¿uktikarajata has cognition (prat¢ti), so the
pr¡tibh¡sikasatt¡ which is different from a½¢ka is
accepted. áuktikarajata is the subject of the
knowledge of pratyakÀabhrama, that is the
object of anirvacan¢ya which is produced in
tatk¡la. It is sublated by the knowledge of
sublation that is the realization of shell. The
sublation of shell-silver is obtained by
experience. So ‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nya-
virahapratiyogitvam’ is in the shell silver. So in
this definition of mithy¡tva there is no avy¡pti
and s¡dhyavaikalya.8
Madhus£dana the author of Advaitasiddhi
the definition of
8 ?. L.C, p. 169.
169
‘jµ¡naprayukt¡vasthitis¡m¡nyavirahapratiyogitva
m mithy¡tvam’ states the destruction which is
the effect itself (k¡ryasvar£pa) and the cause
itself (k¡ra¸ar£pa). The expression of V¡rtikak¡ra
and Vivara¸ak¡ra by rational thinkers is stressed
by him states as follows-‘ajµ¡nasya svak¡rye¸a
vartam¡nena pravi¢inena v¡ saha jµ¡nena
nivartirbhadhaÅ.’9 The word jµ¡nena means
jµ¡navy¡paka. Niv¤tti means absolute absence
or destruction, the sublation through knowledge
(Jµ¡nena niv¤tti) means jµ¡navy¡pakena niv¤tti.
The origin of knowledge leads to the sublation of
ignorance (ajµ¡na). So the meaning
jµ¡navy¡paka is obtained when knowledge
origins, the sublation of ignorance takes place.
This rule does not exist. There is no defect
regarding the sublation of ignorance which is
based on knowledge. At the time of the origin of
9 ?. P.V., p. 215.
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pot, the sublation of the prior absence of the pot
happens. The causes the sublation of the prior
absence of pot is based on pot. As the sublation
of the prior absence of the pot is gha¶asvar£pa,
the origin of pot is samak¡l¢na. So as the origin
is based on the samak¡l¢na of the object no
defect can be stated.10
The opinion of ajµ¡nav¡d¢ Advaitins is that
the ignorance is the only one. They do not
accept the different type of ignorance in
different things. They say that the ignorance is
one. Ignorance and the effect of ignorance are
sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. The
sublation of pr¡tibh¡sika objects like shell silver
does not happen through the shell realization. It
is so because ignorance is one and so through
ignorance all knowledge is sublated. Like this
10 ?. Gha¶¡disvar£pe tatpr¡gabh¡vaniv¤ttitvavi¿iÀ¶e gha¶¡dyadh¢natv¡t, L.C., p. 165.
171
through the realization of shell, the mokÀa is
obtained. Like this in the definition of mithy¡tva,
this example is not suitable.11
Advaitins takes for granted the difference of
subject in ignorance. In ¿uktirajata, with the
help of the knowledge of ¿ukti the m£laniv¤tti of
ignorance will not occur. It is so because the
ignorance which is the subject of ¿ukti exists in
s£kÀmar£pa or k¡ra¸ar£pa. The s¡m¡nyaviraha
of the state of complete ignorance is the cause
of the knowledge of Brahman.
According to Madhus£dana
‘jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharme¸a jµ¡nanivartyatvam
mithy¡tvam.’ This definition is faultless.12
According to this interpretation the false is what
is negated by cognition in its capacity of being a
variant form of cognition. The opinion of
opponents the preceding knowledge is sublated 11 ?. L.C., p. 169.12 ?. A.S., p. 171.
172
by the succeeding knowledge. If this happens
there will occur ativy¡pti. This is so because the
sublation of preceding knowledge by succeeding
knowledge is not the sublation of knowledge in
jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharma jµ¡na in its own
uttarotpanna ¡tmavi¿eÀajµ¡natva. That means
its application to the preceding cognition getting
destroyed by the succeeding cognition. The
preceding cognition is taken to be real by the
opponent. The Advaitin, of course, considers it
to be false. But he does not consider it to be
false in the sense that it gets destroyed by the
succeeding cognition. According to Advaitin all
objects are false and the cognitions being
objects are also false. If the sublation of
jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharmar£pa is accepted the
sublation of knowledge will not take place
according to ones desire of succeeding
knowledge. This knowledge which existed
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earlier should be in succeeding knowledge.
Only then the above said sublation will happen.
Desire is not the jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharmavi¿iÀ¶a.
So the sublation of desire will not take place
through k¤ti. Knowledge, desire etc. is
destructible by ¡tmavi¿iÀ¶ajµ¡nagu¸a.13 This
happens when there is ‘svottaravarti
¡tmavi¿eÀagu¸atva.’
The definition refutes, the sublation of
preceding knowledge by succeeding knowledge,
leading to the defect of ativy¡pti. The mental
trace which is memory does not have nivartaka
avacchedaka dharma. So there are the defects
of siddhas¡dhanat¡ and ativy¡pti. There is no
evidence for the memory which is destroyed by
the mental trace. But it is b¡dhakapram¡¸a. The
mental trace is not ruined by the origin of
memory. Even though, through memory and
13 ?. A.S., p. 171, 176.
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jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharma, the mental trace is
destroyed, not to sakÀ¡tk¡rar£pa. On the other
hand it becomes rigid. This type of experience
is experienced. The opponents said by the
origination of the corresponding memory mental
trace get destroyed. A mental trace gets
destroyed by the origination of corresponding
memory: Therefore the mental trace is sublated
by cognition in the sense that it is negated by
cognition in its capacity of being varient of
cognition. In that way memory and mental
trace is also sublated by knowledge. Memory is
a variant of cognition. When the mental trace
destroys the causes of memory, then it said to
memory as memory. It does not say that
memory destroys its mental trace. Anyone
agree that.
Madhus£dana said that Ved¡ntins does not
agree that the memory destroys the
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corresponding mental trace. Advaitins says that
it cannot be a rule that the vy¡p¡ra of a cause
get destroyed by the effect of that cause. Here
sense perception it finds that the sense organ is
the instrumental cause which produces the
perception through sense object contact which
is the vy¡p¡ra of the sense organ. Finally
Madhus£dana-‘s¡kÀ¡tk¡ratvena jµ¡nani-
vartyatvam mithy¡tvam’ states this as the
definition of mithy¡tva. By not stating it as
jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharme¸a, he states it as
‘s¡kÀ¡tk¡re¸a jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’
Mental trace is ruined sm¤titvar£pa and
jµ¡natvavy¡pyadharma and not by
s¡kÀ¡tk¡rar£pa. This type is absent because
mithy¡tva is ‘s¡kÀ¡tk¡ratvadharme¸a
jµ¡nanivartyatvam mithy¡tvam.’
5.2. Fourth definition of mithy¡tva.
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This definition is taken from Tattvaprad
¢pika of Citsukha. He considered the definition
of mithy¡tva as that ¿loka-
‘sarveÀ¡mapi bh¡v¡n¡m¡¿rayatvena
summate
Pratiyogitvamatyant¡bh¡vam prati
m¤À¡tamat¡.’14
That means mithy¡tva is being the
counter correlate of the absolute negation
existing in the locus where it appears to be.
Madhus£dana presented this definition as-
‘sv¡¿rayaniÀ¶ha atyant¡bh¡vapratiyogitvam
v¡ mithy¡tvam.’15 That means falsity of a thing
consists in its being absolutely negated in the
very locus in which it presents itself. When its
object is absent, there the cognition of that
object exists and this is mithy¡. The existence of
14 ?. Citsukha, Tattvaprad¢pik¡, Yogindr¡nandasv¡m¢, Benares, 1974, p. 67.
15 ?. A.S., p. 182.
177
effect (k¡ryasatt¡) is presented in the cause.
The absence of the existence of effect is in
cause is specific so it is mithy¡.
‘The Naiy¡yikas do not recognize that the
locus of a thing as also the locus of its eternal
negation. So the author Ved¡ntaparibh¡À¡ has
added the word ‘abhimata’ (assumed) when he
interprets this definition of falsity. So the word
‘thing’ in a phrase ‘locus of a thing’ should be
taken to mean the thing as assumed.’16
The opponents questioned that if the
mithy¡tva is obtained by the depending objects,
then atoms and ¡k¡¿a is not dependent. That
means this contention of the Advaitin is not
justified. If it accepts, it has to conclude that all
super senses things do not become a½¢ka.
These things through objects of indirect
16 ?. Nirod Baran Chakraborthy, The Advaita concept of falsity- a critical study, Sanskrit college, Culcutta, 1967.
178
cognitions are never objects of direct cognitions.
There fore the hare’s horn is an object of
cognition, is an indirect one, and it is eternally
non-existent every where, it must be considered
as mithy¡. Then this definition is inapplicable.
The nityaparam¡¸u and nitya ¡k¡¿a do not
depend on anything. So this definition does not
suit every where in the universe. According to
Advaitin all the objects different from Brahman
is dependent. How the rajatas are based in the
¿uktik¡ likewise all the universe is based on
Brahman. Brahman is the only one which is
non-dependent.17 So in this definition there is
no ativy¡pti. Brahman is not dependent. Even
though Brahman has t¡d¡tmy¡dhy¡sa towards
pot, Brahman is not dependent. Like this pot
etc. are in superimposition which
Brahmar£pakalpita is in cause.
17 ?. C., p. 40.
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5.2.1. Arth¡ntara
The opinion of the opponent is that,
according to Ny¡y¡m¤ta there is avy¡pyav¤tti in
conjunction (samyoga) etc. One part of an
object is conjunction and the other part is not.
Then it is said that there will be no absence of
conjunction in the locus of conjunction. Like this
the mithy¡tva is in conjunction. So there is the
defect of arth¡ntara. If the same locus is
accepted in existence and absence in universe,
then conjunction and its absence is in same
locus. Eventually the opposite is seen in the
universe. The virodha of gotva and asvatva etc.
is bh¡v¡bh¡vaprayukta virodha. Gotva and the
absence of gotva are different from each other.
There is difference in the gotv¡bh¡vavy¡pya
asatva. When the existence and absence is in
one thing and equal, then that part is not seen
where it happens. That means in the branch of a
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tree there is the conjunction of monkey and in
the root there is not. The locus and
vi¿eÀaprayukta are different because the
dharma of characteristic is different. The
contact of monkey and the tree is the
characteristic of the branch is visible and the
absence of the contact of monkey is in the root
is invisible. So there is no avy¡pti. Originally
Advaitins do not accept avy¡pyav¤tti. Contact
etc. are vy¡pyav¤tti. In the branch of the tree
there is the contact of monkey and there is the
locus of contact also. To accept the
avy¡pyav¤ttit¡ of contact etc. there is
anavasth¡ in the avacchedakaparampar¡. If the
avy¡pyav¤tti of contact etc. is agreed there is no
arth¡ntara. Then the interpretation of definition
should be thus where a particular thing is in a
particular characteristic in a particular contact,
there is pratiyogit¡ of absolute absence of that
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thing, the characteristic of that thing is
mithy¡18 or the absolute absence of a part of
mithy¡tva can be given the avacchinnav¤ttika
absolute absence. In the contact of monkey, the
arth¡ntara is mentioned. In that place there is
no absolute absence of niravacchinnav¤ttika
because absence of contact is in the
characteristic of root. So there is no arth¡ntara.
Madhva does not accept ¿uktirajata as asat.
The opinion of ny¡ya vai¿eÀika,
vy¡vah¡rikarajata is seen in another place
different from ¿uktirajata. To remove asatkhy¡ti
and anyat¡khy¡ti Citsukha gave the definition of
mithy¡ as meaning of ‘svasam¡n¡dhikara¸a
atyant¡bh¡vapratiyogitvam’ and changed it like
this ‘sv¡tyant¡bh¡-vasam¡n¡dhikara¸e eva prat
¢yam¡natvam.’ There is no defect in giving
such a meaning. The mithy¡ is one which the
18 ?. L.C., p. 183.
182
cognition of locus of absolute absence and there
is no cognition in another place. But the
opponent’s opinion is that ¿uktirajata is in a
separate existence sva atyant¡bh¡va adhikara¸a
and shop. So the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡
does not occur. The opponents another doubt in
samyogasambandha, the absence of pot hood
on the surface is absent, when the pot is there.
Like wise in the samyoga sambandha of the
parts of pot there is no absence of pot. Absolute
absence along with its pratiyog¢ and its
opposite is obtained by pram¡¸a. The mithy¡tva
pratip¡dana of pot is in whichever pratiyogi
along with its absolute absence of the same
locus is a virodha of asa´gata. According to
siddh¡nt¢, the presence of equal existence
(sam¡na satt¡) has the pratiyog¢virodha, but the
absence of different satt¡ (bhinnasatt¡bh¡va) has
no pratiyog¢virodha. This definition of Citsukha
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‘svasam¡n¡dhikara¸¡tyant¡bh¡vapratiyogitvam
mithy¡-tvam’ and the first definition of the two
definitions of Vivara¸¡c¡rya ‘pratipannop¡dhau
traik¡likaniÀedhapratiyogitvam’ the viÀeÀyap¡da
has the same meaning (sam¡n¡rtha) because
the absolute absence of the pratiyogitva and
pratiyogit¡ of the absence of past, present and
future is not different from each other. The
vi¿eÀa¸a in both these are also same. This is so
because the locus of pratiyogit¡ and the locus of
pratipatti are same. Madhus£dana changes
these definitions in such manner-‘sva
atyant¡bh¡v¡dhikara¸e eva prat¢yam¡natvam.’
It is so because to erase the repletion of the
fourth definition. In this there is difference in
m¡tr¡ viÀeÀya and vi¿eÀa¸a. If this definition is
taken as the basic, fourth definition the vi¿eÀya
is what appears in the locus, the vi¿eÀa¸a is the
character of being eternally negated in the
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locus. In the second definition viÀeÀya is what
is eternally negated. Vi¿eÀa¸a is the character
of appearing in its locus of absolute negation.
So the fourth definition is not the repetition of
the second.
After studying this definition it can conclude
that the mithy¡ has entity which has both
presence and absolute absence in the same
locus. It has shown that how this definition can
stand all objections. But it must bear in mind
that such compatibility of presence and absence
is intelligible if only they belong to different
grades of reality. The absence belongs to a
grade higher than the one to which the presence
belongs. Madhus£dana refute all objections of
the opponents in a logical way. The
compatibility of presence and absence is
intelligible if only they belong to different grades
of reality.
185
5.3. Fifth definition of mithy¡tva
The fifth definition is taken from Ny¡yad
¢p¡val¢ of Ënandabodha. It is ‘being something
different from existence.’ The existence is the
character of being certified by a pram¡¸a. The
pram¡¸a is the instrumental cause (k¡ra¸a) of a
cognition which is not due to any defect.
According to Advaitin Brahman, is the only real
one, other worldly thing are unreal, that is
different from Brahman. So they are mithy¡.
This established the following inference-
‘Viv¡dapadam mithy¡ d¤¿yatv¡t.’19 Whatever is
an object is mithy¡ as the silver superimposed
on nacre. This type of anum¡na is used to state
for mithy¡. In this occasion he tells that
saty¡viveka is mithy¡.20 In the discussion, this
definition is based on s¡dhyaprasiddhi.
19 ?. N.D., p. 1.20 ?. Saty¡vivekasya mithy¡bh¡vasya
s¡dhyatv¡nna prasiddhivi¿e-Àa¸at¡. N.D., p. 1.
186
Saty¡viveka means different from real that
means the definition of mithy¡tva is different
from real. Madhus£dana indicate this definition
in his Advaitasiddhi that is ‘sadviviktatvam
v¡ mithy¡tva.’21 The meaning of sadviviktatva is
different from sat that means the difference of
satv¡vacchinna-pratiyogita, viveka means that
which is separate. Brahman is the only sat.
Universe is different from sat Brahman. So it is
mithy¡. The lakÀya of mithy¡tva definition is
universe and so the definition is equal because
the anum¡na of mithy¡tva is ‘vimatam mithy¡ d¤
¿yatv¡t ja·atv¡t paricchinnatv¡t ¿uktir£pyavat.’
So unnecessary complication will arise, when
tried to prove this, with the help of an inference.
The world is different from Brahman is already
established.
5.3.1. Siddhas¡dhanat¡
21 ?. A.S., p. 195.
187
The doubt of opponents is-mithy¡tva is
different from sat. Then one sat pot is different
from another sat pot. So these types have
different sat. So there is ativy¡pta and therefore
the siddhas¡dhanat¡ defect can be seen. If the
false is defined as what is different from the
real, i.e. different from Brahman, then the
argument the Advaitin offers to prove the falsity
of the world would be vitiated by
siddhas¡dhanat¡. The objects of the world, like a
pot or a cloth, are different from Brahman is
accepted by the opponent as well. No argument
is necessary to prove this already established
fact.
The reply given by Advaitins is that the
meaning that should be given to, sadvivikta is
not different from sat but the absence of sat.
The sat vastu of pot is different from cloth is
accepted, and then the absence of sadr£pa in
188
pot can never be accepted because according to
opponents there is sadr£patva in cloth etc. The
definition of sattva means which is obtained by
pram¡¸a.22 Pram¡¸a means
doÀ¡sahak¤tajµ¡nakara¸atvam.23 That means
pram¡¸a is the cause of that cognition which is
not generated by any defect. What is certified
by pram¡¸a is pram¡¸asiddha that is sat. What is
different from sat as pram¡¸asiddha is false.
The cognition of an object is caused by defect.
Hence the kara¸a of such cognition is not a
pram¡¸a. There fore the object of such cognition
is not a pram¡¸a. Therefore the object of such of
such cognition is not pram¡¸asiddha. It is other
than pram¡¸asiddha. So it is false. If this is so,
which ever pratiyogita avcchedaka sattva is
there, there the character being certified by
pram¡¸a is exists. This is to be stated so, the 22 ?. A.S., p. 195.23 ?. Ibid., p. 195,197.
189
character being certified by pram¡¸a means
pram¡¸ajanyaviÀayatva and pram¡¸a is
doÀ¡janya-pram¡jµ¡nak¡ra¸aÅ. The difference
which is pram¡¸asiddhasatt¡-vacchinnapratiyog¢
then there is mithy¡. The knowledge of universe
is doÀ¡janyapram¡¸asiddha. So there is
lakÀa¸asa´gati. The knowledge, which
Ved¡ntamah¡v¡kyajanya akha¸·¡k¡rav¤tti, is said
to be the avidy¡r£padoÀ¡janya. If it is so, then
the knowledge of Brahman is also doÀ¡janya.
The reply of this is doÀ¡sahak¤ta is not due
to defect. The knowledge is Brahman, which is
from doÀar£pa is the cause of sahak¤ta. The
cause of that knowledge is accepted not to be
pram¡¸a. The antaÅkara¸av¤ttijµ¡na which
happens by the mah¡v¡kyas like Tattvamasi, in
that jµ¡na the pari¸¡m¢ gives birth to the
ignorance in the form of up¡d¡nar£pa. But there
is no avidy¡janyat¡ in the doÀ¡rupa because in
190
the doÀ¡r£pa, k¡ra¸atva is efficient cause
(nimittak¡ra¸a) not constitutive cause
(up¡d¡nak¡ra¸a.) So according to Advaitin the
akha¸·¡k¡rar£pa-v¤ttijµ¡na which is derived from
Ved¡ntamah¡v¡kya, is doÀa ajanya jµ¡na. So it is
pram¡¸ajµ¡na.24 The knowledge of universe is
avidyadoÀa janya. So the definition of mithy¡tva
is to seen in universe.Ënandabodha is defined satya as ‘satya is
ab¡dhya and its viveka is mithy¡.25
Madhus£dana used sattva for this word satya.
Another doubt of opponents is that siddh¡nt¢
opines asat is not the knowledge of ¿a¿aviÀ¡¸a.
So this definition of mithy¡tva is ativy¡pti in this a½¢ka, ¿a¿aviÀ¡¸a etc.26 Mithy¡ is ‘doÀajanya
jµ¡nak¡ra¸ajanyajµ¡naviÀayabhinnatva.’ This type of ‘bhinnatva jµ¡naviÀaya’ is not seen in ¿a¿aviÀ¡¸a etc. Some of the Ved¡ntins does not accept the ¿uddha Brahman. Their opinion is 24 ?. L.C., p. 195.25 ?. N.D., p. 1.26 ?. L.C., p. 201.
191
that the so called ‘jµ¡naviÀayabhedar£pamithy¡’
is in ¿uddha Brahman. So there is ativy¡pti in ¿uddha Brahman.27
Madhus£dana replied thus to remove the defect of ativy¡pta the viÀeÀa¸a ‘satvena prat
¢yam¡natvam’ is given in this definition.28 The meaning of this is which one has the subject of cognition of sattvarupa and if the doÀ¡janyajµ¡na is viÀayabhinna that is mithy¡.
There is no ativy¡pti in ¿a¿aviÀ¡¸a and Brahman.
There is no the cognition of sattvaprak¡raka in asat vastu. One who does not accepted akha¸·¡k¡rav¤ttiviÀaya in ¿uddha Brahman, according to him ¿uddha Brahman is not the subject of cognition. So there is no ativy¡pti in
¿uddha Brahman.
The definition is modified like this ‘satvena
prat¢yam¡natve sati sadviviktatvam
mithy¡tvam.’ If this definition is accepted there
is the doÀa of repetition. This definition and the 27 ?. Ibid., p. 201.28 ?. A.S., p. 202.
192
first definition are one and same. According to
the first definition the mithy¡ is what is different
from real as well as the unreal. The unreal is
defined as ‘what is incapable of being presented
as real’ in any locus. According to this fifth
definition ‘being different from the unreal’
means ‘being presented in some locus as real.
To avoid this repetition there is a change in the
meaning of sattva. In this definition sattva is
pram¡¸asiddhatva, the meaning of sadviviktatva
is the absence of sadr£patva. The first
definition the word sat means what is cancelled.
According to Naiy¡yika where there is satt¡j¡ti
there is the sat. Their opinion is that there is no
satt¡j¡ti in Brahman because the siddh¡ntin
believes that Brahman is nirdharmaka. That
means there are no dharmas. So there is no
sadr£pa in Brahman, so there is ativy¡pti.
193
Advaitin refutes this. They say this
argumentation of the opponents is not suitable
in satt¡j¡ti there is sat. Where there is the
absence of satt¡j¡ti, there is asat. This rule is
not suitable in satt¡j¡ti. The opponents although
agree the satt¡j¡ti is satt¡¿£nya and they accept
it is sat. Satt¡j¡ti is sat because of the svar£pa
sambandha this sat because of the svar£pa
sambandha this was the siddh¡nta of
p£rvapakÀa. When there is no sadr£patva in
Brahman, then it is sat in its svar£pa. So it is
not ativy¡pti in Brahman.
5.4. Anum¡na of mithy¡tva
According to Citsukha the world is mithy¡.
But he agrees the empirical reality of the world.
The empirical reality and the apparent reality
are same. The world is different from real and
unreal. Citsukha stated the mithy¡tva of the
world through anum¡na.
194
5.4.1. Anum¡na of Citsukha
The anum¡na of Citsukha is ‘vimataÅ pa¶aÅ
etattantuniÀ¶h¡tyant¡bh¡vapratiyog¢
avayavitv¡t pa¶¡ntaravat.’29 Here the pakÀa is
‘vimataÅ pa¶aÅ’, the s¡dhya is ‘etattantuniÀ¶h¡-
tyant¡bh¡vapratiyog¢’, the hetu is ‘avayavitv¡t’,
the example is ‘pa¶¡ntaravat’. That means the
criticized cloth is the pratiyog¢ of the absolute
absence of thread, because it is avayav¢ like
other cloths. According to Advaitin avayav¢ is
mithy¡. The avayav¢ is in avayava. One which
has parts must have changes. The changing
object is mithy¡. In the example there is the
hetu which was changed. The absolute absence
of the other clothes also is in this thread. That
means in the other clothes there is the sadhya
which is ‘tantuniÀ¶h¡tyant¡bh¡vapratiyogitva.’
So the vy¡pti is obtained. Here the pakÀatva of
29 ?. Citsukhi, p. 40, 41.
195
hetu is obtained. The hetu which is
avayavitvar£pa is in the pakÀa. Here the thread
is the part of the cloth. In this thread there is
the absolute absence of cloth. Like this in the
same locus, there is the absolute absence of the
object, which is mithy¡. Through this law the
cloth is also mithy¡ because the whole object
situated is in its same locus. The opponents raised the defect of siddhas¡dhanat¡. If we accept the pakÀa as gha¶a, there is siddhas¡dhanat¡. The atyant¡bh¡vapratiyogitva is said in the anum¡na. Is this absolute absence p¡ram¡rthika or pr¡tibh¡sika? It is not accepted as pr¡m¡¸ika
because if it is accepted then it has to agree the absence is also real. That means there is an absence different from Brahman. Then dvaita
occurs. The criticism of absence is based on the criticism of pratiyogit¡. So if accept absence is pr¡m¡¸ika then pratiyog¢ is also pr¡m¡¸ika.
196
Sidh¡ntin’s reply is that if that we accept
the absence is pr¡m¡¸ika there will be no defect
in Advaita. Some advaitins said that the
absence of a thing which is sublation of avidy¡ is
also p¡ram¡rthika like Brahman. Ma¸·ana, in his
Brahmasiddhi said that the sublation of avidy¡ is
accepted as absence is different from
Brahman.30 The other philosophers do not
accept this. According to them, different from
Brahman there is no existence and absence.
Brahman is the only existence and absolute real.
The other objects like existence and absence
are mithy¡. The absolute absence which is
shown in the anum¡na has pr¡m¡¸ika. This
pr¡m¡¸ika is only vy¡vah¡rika not p¡ram¡rthika.
So it is real through the vy¡vah¡rika. But the
satt¡ of Brahman is neither vy¡vah¡rika nor 30 ?. Dvividha dharm¡Å bh¡var£p¡bh¡var£p¡¿ceti.
Tatr¡bh¡var£p¡ n¡dvaitam vighnanti. B.S., p. 41. (p. 2)
197
p¡ram¡rthika. There is no defect if the
vy¡vah¡rikasatt¡ joins with the p¡ram¡rthikasatt¡.
That means there was no objection against the
joining of p¡ram¡rthikasatt¡ and
vy¡vah¡rikasatt¡ together. áuktik¡rajata is
pr¡tibh¡sika. áuktik¡ is vy¡vah¡rika. These two
objects viz., vy¡vah¡rika and pr¡tibh¡sika in the
same locus has no defect. Like this p¡ram¡rthika
sat is Brahman and vy¡vah¡rika sat is the world.
These two have same locus and so has no
defect. Abh¡va and the object of abh¡va is also
pr¡m¡¸ika. This type of rule is not seen any
where. After the knowledge of ¿uktikarajata, it
is sublated like ‘nedam rajatam’. When the
sublation happens then this absence ‘nedam
rajatam’ is pr¡m¡¸ika but the pratiyog¢
¿uktirajata is not pr¡m¡¸ika. This law is not
valid.
198
The opponents said that if we accept the
absolute absence is pr¡tibh¡sika then the
pratiyog¢ is also pr¡tibh¡sika. This law is not
valid. The opponents explain this as ‘one who
knows the rajata is not rajata, it is only conch.
This is bhramajµ¡na. Here the absence of
rajatajµ¡na is mithy¡, but the pratiyog¢ rajata is
not mithy¡. Siddh¡nt¢ replied that abh¡va is
vy¡vah¡rika. In this anum¡na absolute absence
is not pr¡tibh¡sika it is only vy¡vah¡rika.
The opponents said ‘ayam pa¶aÅ
etattantuniÀ¶h¡tyant¡-bh¡vapratiyog¢.’ in this
anum¡na if the cloth (¡¿raya) is apr¡m¡¸ika then
the defect of ¡¿ray¡siddhi occurs Then pr¡m¡¸ika
through the dharmigraha the cloth which is in
pakÀa is not mithy¡. Advaitins reply is that
there is no defect because the pakÀa is not
p¡ram¡rthikapr¡m¡¸ya, it is only
199
vyavah¡rapr¡m¡¸ya.31 Advaitins do not accept
the pakÀa is p¡ram¡rthika pram¡¸asiddha. So its
mithy¡tva is not obtained through
dharmigr¡haka pram¡¸a.
Then the opponents show that hetv¡bh¡sa
against the mithy¡tv¡num¡na. For this they
showed pratirodh¡num¡na. ‘prapaµcaÅ
satyatv¡bh¡vav¡n ¡tmatv¡bh¡vat.’ This also does
happen because there is no pram¡¸asiddhatva
hetu in the pakÀa that is prapaµca. Advaitins
show jaganmithy¡tva through the ¿rutis like
‘neha n¡n¡sti kiµcana’, aitad¡tmyamidam
sarvam’. N¤simh¡¿rama interrupted the bheda
in his Advaitad¢pik¡.32 Like this Ënandabodha
also said bheda is apr¡m¡¸ya.33
31 ?. Samvy¡vah¡rikapram¡¸opan¢tasy¡py¡¿rayatvopapatteÅ, C., p. 42.32 ?. Kiµca na
t¡vadanyony¡bh¡vobhed¡tatpratiyogino’nir£pa¸¡t tath¡ hi na t¡vadgha¶¡diÅ pratiyog¢ samsarg¡bh¡v¡sam k¡ryam prasa´g¡t. A.S., p. 9.
33 ?. Viv¡dapadam bhedasamvedanam na pram¡¸aanibandhanam anir£pitapram¡¸akatv¡t
200
5.4.2. Anum¡na of N¤simh¡¿rama
The anum¡na of N¤simh¡¿rama is- ‘vimatam
sadanyat b¡dhyatv¡t yannaivam tannaiva
yath¡ ¡tm¡.’34 That means the disputed world
which is different from sat and mithy¡ because it
is sublated. The object which is not sublated is
not mithy¡. The ja·a which is born by the defect
of avidy¡ is mithy¡ because it d¤¿ya is
¿uktirajata.5.4.3. Anum¡na of Dharmar¡j¡dhvar¢ndra The anum¡na of Dharmar¡j¡dhvar¢ndra is–‘Brahmabhinnam sarvam
mithy¡ brahmabhinnatv¡t yadevam tadevam
yath¡ ¿uktir£pyakam.’ 35 All objects different from Brahman is mithy¡ like ¿uktikarajata
because it is from mithy¡.
5.4.4. Anum¡na of Madhus£dana
bhedasamvedanatv¡dv¡ svapnabhedava-bhasan¡t. N.M., p. 55.
34 ?. Ved¡ntatatvaviveka, p. 173.35 ?. Ved¡ntaparibh¡À¡, p. 94.
hetu. Advaitins stated this with the help of yukti
and tarka. The main hetus are d¤¿yatva, ja·atva
and pariccinnatva. According to Advaita
Ved¡nta Brahman is the object of
Ved¡ntav¡kyajanya akha¸·¡k¡rav¤tti. So the d¤
¿yatva is also in Brahman. So it is forced to say
Brahman is also mithy¡. To criticize the d¤
¿yatvahetu the opponents show six alternatives.
Madhus£dana avoids one alternative that is
phalavy¡pyatva and stated the other
alternatives are faultless to the definition of d¤
¿yatva.38 He said that the pure Brahman is not
v¤ttivy¡pya, because ¿¡stra said that Brahman is
not the object of v¤tti.39 So the defect of
38 ?. Bhalavy¡pyatvavyatiriktasya sarvasy¡pi pakÀasya kÀamatv¡t. A.S., p. 239.
39 ?. Av¡´manasagocara.
203
vyabhic¡ra does not occur. The Brahman which
is v¤ttyupahita is mithy¡. V¡caspatimi¿ra also
stated this. The opponents raised another doubt.
If it is accepted that the pure Brahman is not the
v¤ttivy¡pya, then it is not obtained. If it is not
jµ¡naviÀaya, then in that subject, there will not
happen siddhi and asiddhi. Advaitins replied
that according to advaitin Brahman is
svaprak¡¿a. So there the v¤ttijµ¡na for
Brahmasiddhi is not accepted. In pure Brahman
the negation of d¤¿yatva happens through ¿ruti.
D¤¿yatva means ¿abdajanyav¤ttiviÀayatva. In
the pure Brahman there is no
¿abdajanyav¤ttiviÀayat¡. There is only
mah¡v¡kyajanyav¤ttivÀayat¡. áa¿aviÀ¡¸a is
¿abdajanyav¤ttiviÀaya. But the definition of d¤
¿yatva is saprak¡rakav¤ttiviÀayatvameva d¤
¿yatvam. The pure Brahman is not
204
saprak¡rakav¤ttiviÀaya. It is only
niÀprak¡rakav¤ttiviÀayatva.
To obtain the ja·atva hetu Madhus£dana
said three alternatives ajµ¡t¤tva, ajµ¡natva and
an¡tmatva like the opponents. If ajµ¡t¤ttva is
accepted the defect svar£p¡siddhi happens.
According to Advaitin the meaning of aham
includes the pakÀa because it is superimposed.
So it is d¤¿yatva but it is not ajµ¡t¤tva.
Aham¡rtha is jµ¡t¡, so jµ¡t¤tva is in it. So
svar£p¡siddhi occurs. According to Advaitin
¡tmas are one. The ¡tmatva which is in a person
is not j¡ti. Ënandar£pa is not ¡tmatva.
Ëtm¡ which is based on subject is mithy¡, but it
is not different. So this hetu has the defect of
svar£p¡siddha. Advaitins said that, ajµ¡natvam ja·atvam,
an¡tmatvam ja·atvam have no defects. Svaprak¡¿a is ¡tmatva. Ëtmavastu is only
205
svaprak¡¿a. So an¡tmavastu is not svapr¡k¡¿a. The object which is not svaprak¡¿a is ja·atva. So it is mithy¡.
The paricchinnatvahetu which is used in mithy¡num¡na is not defective. Here paricchinnatva is differentiated like de¿ak¤ta
paricchinnatva, k¡lak¤ta paricchinnatva and
vastuk¤taparicchinnatva. The pratiyogitva of absolute absence is de¿ak¤ta paricchinnatva,
the pratiyogitva of absence of destruction (dhvams¡bh¡va) is k¡lak¤ta paricchinnatva
anyony¡bh¡vapratiyogitvam is vastuk¤taparicci-
nnatvam. De¿ak¤taparicchinnatva means-the existence of one place and the non existence of another. K¡lak¤taparicchinnatva means the occuring of one time and the non-occurrence of another time. Vastuk¤taparicchinnatva means the unity with any object and the non-unity in all objects. All the objects in the world are combined with paricchinna. The opponents said that the definition, which is
206
de¿agataparicchinnatva, is accepted then the ativy¡pti is occurs in the ¡tm¡ because the ativy¡pti occurs in the ¡tm¡ because ¡tm¡ is not samaveta in any objects. In other way the ¡tm¡ is vibhu. So there is no absence. So the samyogasambandha does not happen. Advaitins answered that the anyony¡bh¡va
and atyant¡bh¡va if accepted as the adjective equal reality (sam¡nasatt¡) the defect does not happen.40 Ëk¡¿a is janya. 41 The object which is janya is also destructive. So pariccinnatva hetu
is also faultless. Here it can be understood that the three hetus are faultless. Among these three hetus the d¤¿yatva is very commonly used.
Mithy¡ta is defined as the non-existence of things in that which is supposed to be their
40 ?. Atyant¡bh¡ve anyony¡bh¡ve ca pratiyogisamasatt¡katvavi¿e-Àa¸ena ¡tmani vyabhic¡raparih¡r¡t. A.S., p. 312.
41 ?. Etasm¡d¡tmana ¡k¡¿aÅ sambh£taÅ.
207
abode or locus. This is commented on by Dasgupta :
Citsukha defines mithy¡tva as the non-existence of a thing in that which is considered to be its cause. He shows this by pointing out that awhole, if it is to exist anywhere, must exist in the parts of which is made, and if it does not exist even there, it does not exist anywhere and is mithy¡. Which is, however evident that a whole cannot exist in the parts, since, being a whole, it cannot be in the parts. Another argument adduced by Citsukha for the mithy¡tva of the world appearance is that it is impossible that there should be any relation between the self-revealing consciousness, the knower. And the objects which are cognized. 42
42. Dasgupta. S., A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II & IV, London Camebridge University Press, 1966, 1968.
208
5.5 ConclusionPrak¡¿¡tman contributed two definitions of
mithy¡tva. It can be understood that the same ¡c¡rya views the concept of mithy¡ in two ways. These two ways also are true. It can also be understood that this concept is deep and not easy to understand. The third definition of mithy¡tva Vy¡sat¢rtha states: Brahman is not an¡di and bh¡var£pa. Advaitins themselves show it as bh¡v¡bh¡vavilakÀa¸a. Madhus£dana replies Brahman and mithy¡ are an¡di because their ¡¿raya is an¡di. Originally, mithy¡tva is bh¡var£pa only because it is not abh¡vam¡tra.
In the fourth definition of mithy¡tva Vy¡sat¢rtha said the question that “How the presence and absence occur in one and same locus? The reply of Madhus£dana is that, Mithy¡tva has only cognition not presence. The bh¡v¡bh¡vavilakÀa¸a of mithy¡tva is a bhr¡nti
combined with virodha. Therefore the presence and absence of mithy¡tva can be seen is one
209
and the same locus. Then another objection of Vy¡sat¢rtha is the second definition put forth by Vivara¸¡c¡rya and the fourth definition put forth by Citsukha are the same and so there is no need to explain this fourth definition. To avoid this objection Madhus£dana modifies the definition like ‘sv¡tyant¡bh¡va adhikara¸e eva
prat¢yam¡natvam mithy¡tvam.’In the fifth definition, dvaitins opposed that
the ¿uktikarajata is asat. Hence the Advaitin
cannot prove the unreality of the world which consists in being different from sat and asat
using the example of ¿uktirajata. Madhus£dana replies that asat is never subjected to perception. So it may have to be treated as on the ground of being different from sat. These three definitions are faultless.
