Modern Asian Studies 34, 1 (2000), Pp. 181–221. © 2000

Modern Asian Studies 34, 1 (2000), pp. 181–221. 2000 Cambridge University PressPrinted in the United Kingdom

Kinship Politics in Post-War Philippines: TheLopez Family, 1945–1989

MINA ROCES

The University of New South Wales, Sydney

On being awarded the Legion of Honor by President CorazonAquino, Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces, publisher of The Manila Times,pleaded with the president:

Please allow me to remind you, first. That our people brought a newgovernment to power because our people felt an urgent need for change.That change was nothing more and nothing less than that of moving quicklyinto a new moral order. The people believed, and many of them still do,that when we said we would be the exact opposite of Marcos, we would bejust that. Because of that promise which the people believed, our triumphover Marcos was anchored on a principle of morality . . . . To our people, Idare propose that new moral order is best appreciated in terms of ourresponse to graft and corruption in public service. We cannot afford a gov-ernment of thieves unless we can tolerate a nation of highwaymen.1

Roces’ statement summarized a persistent theme in Philippine post-war political history: charges of graft and corruption are continuouslylevied against an administration, foreshadowing its demise at thenext election contest, only to be replaced by a similarly-disposedregime. The 1986 ‘revolution’ which brought Corazon Aquino topower found many supporters among those who believed that thecorruption and excesses of the Marcos regime had gone too far. How-ever, as the Roces speech poignantly illustrated, the Aquino regimewhich replaced it was itself guilty of similar crimes formerly attrib-uted to the Marcos years preceding it. The irony of it all was that itwas Roces who first sought the two million signatures that convincedCorazon Aquino to run for president in the first place.

Such fluctuations in Philippine politics have been an establishedpattern since independence was granted in 1946. In the republicanperiod, 1945–1972, (with the exception of President FerdinandMarcos), presidential administrations exposed for blatant graft and

1 Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces, ‘A Call for New Moral Order’, The Manila Chronicle, 27July 1988, p. 3.

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corruption, were summarily voted out of office by an outraged public,only to be replaced by an administration that eventually committedthe same sins as its predecessor. And then in 1972, President Marcosdeclared martial law and launched an authoritarian regime whichlasted until 1986. The excessive corruption of this regime has beenmuch documented, the first family and its ‘cronies’ becoming thesole beneficiaries of political and economic rewards.2 Such corruptionwhich reached hitherto unprecedented heights gave Corazon Aquinothe public support, the ‘people power’ which legitimized her ascend-ancy to the presidential office. But as the above quotation from Rocesrevealed, President Aquino was criticized for her lack of moral lead-ership, and for allowing her family (the Cojuangcos) to acquire someof the wealth previously associated with the Marcos clique.3 Themedia lamented that ‘cronyism’ has been replaced by ‘Coryism’.4

How can one explain such ‘cycles’ in Philippine post-war history?This paper proposes a framework for analysis. It argues that a con-flict between traditional social values embodied in politica de familia orkinship politics and western values inculcated in the colonial periodaccounts for these cyclical trends. Traditional, or pre-European,political organization is seen as being based on politica de familia orkinship politics. This concept is used here to mean a political processwherein the kinship groups operate for their own interests inter-acting with other kinship groups as rivals or allies. Politica de familiathrives in a setting where elite family groups and their supporterscompete with each other for political power. Once political power isgained by one family alliance, it is used relentlessly to accumulatefamily wealth and prominence, pragmatically bending the rules ofthe law to gain access to special privileges.

The colonial period introduced a number of western values (theterm western values or western institutions is used for lack of a

2 See Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making ofAmerican Policy (New York, 1987); Filemon Rodriguez, The Marcos Regime Rape of theNation (Quezon City, 1986); Sterling Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty (New York,1988); Charles McDougald, The Marcos File (San Francisco, 1987); ‘Some areSmarter than Others’, article published clandestinely by a group of Filipino busi-nessmen (Manila, 1979); and John Doherty, ‘Who Controls the Philippine Economy:Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others’, in Belinda Aquino (ed.), Cronies and Enemies:The Current Philippine Scene, Philippine Studies Occasional Paper No. 5 (Honolulu,1982).

3 ‘Moral Disorder’, Time, 22 Aug. 1988, p. 22, and Antonio C. Abaya, ‘Et TuChino?’, ‘On the Other Hand’ column, Business World, 29 July 1988, p. 2.

4 Lisa Beyer, ‘An Outcry Over Politics as Usual’, Time, 10 Oct. 1988, p. 29.

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better term to refer to non-indigenous influences introduced intothe society), which eventually became incorporated into the culturalmilieu of political behavior. Some of these values were in direct con-flict with the traditional elements of kinship politics. The set of west-ern values which penetrated and influenced Philippine political cul-ture may be classified into three categories. First, a new set of ethicsand morals, introduced in the Spanish period through the vehicle ofCatholicism, provided a novel standard with which to conduct andjudge behavior, often intruding into the established methods ofcomport. Secondly, bureaucratic professionalism inculcated in theAmerican colonial period, emphasized a different method of particip-ating in politics and business—that of utilizing impersonal norms,the assessment of people on the basis of achievement, and main-taining objectivity in major decisions involving personalities. Finally,the concept of loyalty to a nation-state, an entity far surpassing thespecific confines of the family or village, began to emerge as national-ist ideas spread throughout the archipelago from the revolutionarydays to the movement for independence in the twentieth century.

Once independence was granted and Filipinos assumed the mantleof full political leadership, tensions between these two opposing setsof values surfaced. This unreconciled tension explains the peculiarbehavior of post-war politics where there was a cyclical rise and fallof governments as each administration was voted out of office forgraft and corruption. Families who operated in the traditional stylefound themselves exposed and criticized in the free press by rivalswho used the rhetoric of western values to attack the families inpower. Having been shown to have neglected the national interestin favor of the familial one, these families failed to retain their powerbeyond one administration. In this framework, the Marcos regime(1972–1986), represents the epitome of pure kinship politics as onefamily alliance alone had monopoly of political power and ownedmost of the country’s major corporations.

This paper argues that the unresolved tension was responsible forthe ambivalent behavior exhibited by Filipino families who have usedpolitical power for familial ends. On the one hand, they sincerelybelieved from their education at school, that corruption was bad,that the western values of professionalism, ethics and morals andthe concern for the national interest should override the familialinterests in the political sphere. They used the yardstick of westernvalues to criticize other families who had in their eyes used politicalpower to build a business empire. At the same time they were blind


to their own faults—almost oblivious to their own practice of kinshippolitics. In this manner they continued to apply one set of values(western values) to their rival families, and one set of values (kinshippolitics) to themselves. I do not stipulate however that westernvalues are ‘good’ and kinship politics is ‘bad’ (or vice-versa), merelythat the tension between these conflicting values explains post-warPhilippine political behavior.

Kinship politics and western values are merely idioms used in thedynamics of political and social action; that is, a form of rhetoric.To suggest this, however, is not to deny that Filipinos also utilizesuch norms as a reflection of sincerely held beliefs. In short, kinshippolitics and western values are not fixed, immutable laws. Both kin-ship politics and western values are the symbolic messages, dis-courses, used by individuals in the ideological context of politicalrelations and political actions.

For example, Marcos claimed that martial law was the methodthrough which he could implement the reforms necessary to restorecivil order and transform the ‘precarious democracy’ into a truedemocracy. Obviously, Marcos was using western values as mererhetoric to justify the declaration of martial law. On the other hand,one cannot doubt the sincerity of those individuals who chose to risktheir lives for the restoration of democratic values during the 1986‘people power revolution’. In the realm of kinship politics, PresidentCorazon Aquino’s refusal to investigate the charges of corruptionmade against her family might be interpreted as depicting to allFilipinos her staunch but superficial adherence to family values. Butalternatively, she may have strongly felt compelled to protect herrelatives, feeling trapped by the utang ng loob relationships inscribedin traditional values.

* * *

Factionalism and patron–client ties have been isolated as the mainstructures of Philippine politics.5 In this model, scholars have rightly

5 For an analysis of personal ties and factionalism in Philippine politics see CarlLande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Yale UniversitySoutheast Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 6 (New Haven, 1965). AlfredMcCoy, ‘Yloilo: Factional Conflict in a Colonial Economy, Iloilo Province Philip-pines, 1937–1955’, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1977; and MaryHollnsteiner, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality (Quezon City, 1963).(Lande’s work is the classic model of factionalism in Philippine politics.) For ananalysis of patronage politics or patron–client ties and Philippine political behavior,see Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion (Quezon City, 1979); Willem Wolters,


observed that the two major national parties are identical in com-position and policy. Furthermore, intraparty solidarity is minimaland party switching is common. The explanation given for this phe-nomenon is the fact that the parties are composed of dyadic ties(patron–client ties). These patron–client ties which are built intolarger rival political factions are inherently unstable personalizedalliances, and are the building blocks of Philippine political behavior.

These models, however, content to describe and isolate fac-tionalism as a characteristic of Philippine behavior, do not probedeeper into what factors provoked factionalism in the first place.Although it is admitted that these dyadic ties are ‘a reflection ofbehavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship system’,6 furtherinvestigation into these ‘behavioral patterns’ which gave birth to fac-tionalism is not attempted. Hence, these models describe merely theeffects but do not diagnose the causes of Philippine politicalbehavior. What compels individuals and families to coalesce intotenuous factional alliances? Why is personalism a trademark of Phil-ippine political behavior? If ideology is not a contending factor innational politics, what is?

This paper argues that politica de familia (or the traditional valuesof Philippine society which compel individuals to think in terms offamily solidarity to the detriment of any other socio-political unitoutside the family), is what motivated political and economicbehavior in post-war Philippines. It is politica de familia that motivatesfamilies to ally into temporary factions to fulfill familial economicambitions. Traditional values ensure that the Filipino is moreinclined to perceive the world in terms of how outside resourcescould be used to improve the status of the family in socio-economicterms. Examined through this prism, factionalism and patron–clientties, elements that the above scholars have isolated as the main

Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon (Institute of Social Studies, TheHague, The Netherlands, Research Project Series No. 14, 1983); and AmandoDoronila, ‘The Rise of the Patron State in the Philippines, a Study of the Trans-formation of Patron–Client Relations and its Political Consequences’, M.A. thesis,Monash University, 1982. These studies acknowledge the importance of families asthe basic building blocks of factionalism and patron–client ties, but the treatmentof family dynamics remains peripheral to the main concerns of their work. Lande,Hollnsteiner and McCoy are more concerned with the dynamics of factionalism;Kerkvliet and Wolters with patron–client ties and the erosion of landlord–tenantrelations, and Amando Doronila on showing how patronage politics later evolvedinto the creation of a patron state under Marcos.

6 Lande, Leaders, p. 1.


structures of Philippine politics, are reduced to mere symptoms ofkinship politics or politica de familia. Kinship politics is what motiv-ated individuals and families to run for office, make or break politicalalliances, to legislate on behalf of the family, and to expose the graftand corruption of those outside their family group in the press. TheFilipino’s primary allegiance is undisputably still to the family,dwarfing any sentiments that emphasized loyalty or considerationfor the national interest. And the family’s desire to wrest politicalpower in order to promote its economic wealth, using kinship connec-tions and the interlocking network of social obligations, is the ‘stuff ’behind Philippine political behavior.

The use of cultural conflict as a framework for interpreting Philip-pine post-war history has not been attempted by historians. Althougha sufficient body of literature exists on the structure and nature ofPhilippine politics in the post-war years,7 there are only two studieswhich make the connections between the conflict of kinship politicsversus western values, and the fluctuations in administrations. JeanGrossholtz’s study on Philippine politics first observes the conflict inher analysis of Philippine political culture. In this conflict she cor-rectly perceived the dominance of traditional values over the morerecent values which opt for universalistic codes. For Grossholtz theexplanation for this dominance is rooted in the kinship structureand system of obligations: ‘The dominance of the older attitudestoward dependence on others in an alliance system conditioned bykinship and social obligations has prevented complete transition toa more complex set of quid pro quos that would hold politiciansresponsible for policy decisions more universal in scope.’8

In a 1987 article, political scientist Justin Green has studied theinconsistencies between personal values and institutional values(really politica de familia and western values respectively) in order topredict the likely success of democratic values in post-martial-lawPhilippines. He has observed that the strong hold of personal values

7 Lande, Leaders; McCoy, ‘Yloilo’; Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics; Kerkvliet, The HukRebellion; Wolters, Politics; Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines (Boston, 1964);Doronila, ‘The Rise’; Dante Simbulan, ‘A Study of the Socio-Economic Elite in Phil-ippine Politics and Government, 1946–1963’, Ph.D. dissertation, AustralianNational University, 1965; Remigio Agpalo, The Political Elite and the People A Studyof Politics in Occidental Mindoro (Manila, 1972), and David Wurfel, Filipino Politics,Development and Decay (Quezon City, 1988).

8 Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, pp. 215–16.


makes it difficult for democratic values to take root.9 Green andGrossholtz were the only scholars who looked at the conflict of valuesas an important framework for analyzing the idiosyncracies of Philip-pine political culture in the post-war period.10

This argument, however, does not deny the importance of patron-age politics, the main stranglehold of the factional model. At thesame time it does not endorse the view that a call to a more rigidapplication of western values was only mere rhetoric. The fact thatpoliticians feel compelled to declare that they are upholding thewestern values of democracy and are anti-graft and corruptionreveals that these values are prestigious in the public mind. But asthe general argument postulates, two sets of values exist side byside and are responsible for the ambivalent behavior exhibited byFilipinos. While patronage is a factor (patronage is an offshoot ofkinship politics), it appears that in major turning points in Philippinepost-war history, western values have made the difference. In therepublican period, no administration could get re-elected. Had pat-ronage politics been the sole determining factor, then we would findthe incumbent administration winning re-election almost consist-ently since it has more patronage sources in its power. Anotherexample is the 1986 ‘revolution’ where people risked their lives forthe restoration of democracy—patronage politics was not operatingthere, instead western values was the motivation.

The factional model stressing patronage politics as the sole deter-minant of political behavior leaves no room for ideology or issues asanother contending factor in political culture. (In fact, the modelargues that ideology is not a factor at all.) In a 1991 book, scholarshave questioned the applicability of the factional model in post-1972Philippines. The scholars concluding from their own research onlocal elections revised the factional model by emphasizing that pat-ronage politics was not the only factor determining politicalbehavior:

9 Justin J. Green, ‘Political Socialization, Filipino Values, and Prospects forDemocracy’, in Carl H. Lande (ed.), Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges andAmerican Policy (Washington D.C., 1987), pp. 261–78.

10 Studies on bureaucratic corruption in Asia have also focused on the conflictbetween traditional norms and legal norms as an explanation for the persistenceand tolerance of bureaucratic corruption in these societies. See Rance P. Lee, ‘Bur-eaucratic Corruption in Asia: The Problem of Incongruence between Legal Normsand Folk Norms’, in Ledivina Carino (ed.), Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia (Manila,1986), pp. 69–108.


What we conclude is that factionalism—and its corollary personalism—isbut one factor among many as people weigh their options. Issues—such asperceived benefits from Marcos-style land reform, peace and stability, or thequalities most important for holding public office—do figure significantly inpeople’s calculations.11

While those revising the factional model make a small qualificationthat applies to post-1972 Philippine local politics, the conflict hypo-thesis grapples with both the factional model and the role of ideo-logy, and offers a more lucid explanation for the ambivalence of Phil-ippine political behavior, and for the ‘cycles’ of politicaladministrations that span the three eras of post-independencehistory.

The conflict hypothesis enables us to make two important inter-pretations—the first suggests an explanation for the endless cycles,as well as the ambivalence of familial political behavior, and theother involves the nature of traditional kinship politics itself, a phe-nomenon which, though very basic to an understanding of Philippinepolitical behavior, has remained hitherto largely unexamined inscholarly literature on the Philippines (and Asia generally). Boththese interpretations challenge, or at least modify, previous modelson Philippine politics. Empirical evidence for the hypothesis and forthe mechanics of kinship politics will be provided through the casestudy of one of the most prominent families of the era—the Lopezfamily.

The term family is used here to mean the family alliance group.This group refers to the bilateral extended family, the wider circleof ritual kin, and the close friends, employees, workers, clients andallies of the family who are personally loyal to the family patriarch.For example, a journalist who works for the Lopez-owned newspaperThe Manila Chronicle is considered by all as a Lopez man and is per-sonally loyal to the Chronicle publisher Eugenio Lopez. The employeesof The Manila Times called the late publisher Joaquin ‘Chino’ Roces,‘tatay’ (father) and his sister Isabel ‘Bebeng’ Roces, ‘nanay’(mother). The elite family’s allies are directly loyal to their employer(the family patriarch) and not the family-owned company in whichthey work.

But although the family network ostensibly included the alliancegroup, the allies themselves were constantly shifting their allegiance.

11 Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares, ‘Themes in the Transition fromMarcos to Aquino: An Introduction’, in Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares


Thomas Kiefer used the adjective ‘fluid’ when he described the rela-tionship between Tausug leaders and their allies because individualsconstantly changed sides in situations of political violence. And sincein the Tausug world view whoever is not one’s friend is undisputablyone’s enemy, such fluidity accounts for extremely unstable alliances.The characteristics of politica de familia are markedly similar to thatof Tausug behavior in conflict.12 Politica de familia presupposes a con-test for power between rival elite family alliances and allies are freeto switch loyalties from one family group to the other.13 Thus, itmust be stressed that the family alliance group is composed of mem-bers both kin and non-kin who are temporarily allied with a familyleader or patriarch.

Case Study of the Lopez Family

Although by the 1960s the Lopez family had become the most prom-inent family in national politics, it was a family with a very younghistory—its origins made it barely a hundred and fifty years old atthe height of its power. Family genealogist and historian OscarLopez, traced the family’s ancestry to Basilio Lopez (a Chinesemestizo), and Sabina Jalandoni of Jaro, in the Visayan province ofIloilo, around 1834.14 One son Eugenio Lopez was responsible foracquiring the vast amount of sugar lands that became the foundationfor the Lopez family wealth and subsequent prominence in the west-ern Visayas.15

His son Benito Lopez catapulted the family into the mainstreamof the regional politics of the western Visayas when he became gov-ernor of Iloilo at the turn of the twentieth century. His politicalcareer, however, was abruptly ended when, upon re-election he fell

(eds), From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines(Manila, 1991), pp. 9–10.

12 The definition of family alliance has been influenced by Thomas Kiefer’s studyon the Tausug. See Thomas Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law in a PhilippineMoslem Society (New York, 1972), especially pp. 8, 59–75.

13 Scholars who have studied the structure of Philippine politics argued that thisfluidity has resulted in the formation of unstable political factions composed of elitefamily groups. See Lande, Leaders; McCoy, ‘Yloilo’; and Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics.

14 Oscar Lopez, The Lopez Family, Vol. 1 (Metro-Manila, 1982), pp. xxiii–xxxvii.15 Ibid., pp. xliv–xlvi. Also Oscar M. Lopez, ‘Man for All Seasons’, in First Lopez

Family Reunion, Descendants of Basilio Lopez-Sabina Jalandoni, in Jaro, Iloilo City,Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1982, Lopez Memorial Museum, Manila.


victim to assassination.16 When Benito Lopez died he left behindtwo young sons, Eugenio and Fernando. These two brothers were totransform the Lopez family from a regional power to kingmakers inPhilippine national politics, and in the process simultaneously builda formidable financial empire.

Eugenio Hofilena Lopez was born in Jaro, Iloilo, but was educatedin Manila at the Ateneo for his bachelor’s degree, and the Universityof the Philippines for a law degree; followed by a post-graduatedegree from Harvard University in the United States. On his returnfrom America, he practiced law in the firm of the most renownedlawyer at that time—Vicente J. Francisco.17 Fernando, in turn, alsoreceived his education in Manila at the Letran College, and then atthe University of Santo Tomas for law school.

Immediately after his marriage in 1928, Eugenio decided toreturn to the sugar plantation the brothers had inherited in Isabela,Negros Occidental. He gave up his law practice and began to estab-lish businesses in Iloilo-Negros together with his brother Fernando.(The company with the name E & F Lopez as co-owners started in1926.) He revived his father’s newspaper the El Tiempo (1929) andits corresponding English daily, The Iloilo Times. In 1932 he foundedIloilo Shipping Company providing a ferryboat service between Iloiloand Negros Occidental. He then expanded his transportation invest-ments to include Iloilo Transportation Company (1932), an urbanbus company (Panay Autobus), Iloilo Taxicab Company (1937) andan airline (1933), the Iloilo-Negros Air Express Company (INAEC).He dabbled in real estate under the name Lopez, Inc. (1935) andbuilt a chain of cinema houses in the City of Iloilo. He was also in

16 Not much is known about Benito Lopez (Oscar Lopez’ official history of thefamily stops with the first Eugenio Lopez). A couple of documents found in theWorcester Papers charged the governor with countenancing and protecting corruptofficials, and of buying votes at election time. See ‘Gives the Result of Investigationof Joaquin Gil, Benito Lopez, Governor of Iloilo, and of Political Situation Generallyin Iloilo, Particularly the Testimony of Quintin Salas’, Manila, P.I., November 26,1907, and ‘Report of the Chief of the Law Division in the Matter of Certain ChargesPreferred by Joaquin Gil’, found in the Worcester Philippine Collection, Documents,Vol. 1, Item No. 27, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, HarlanHatcher Library, The University of Michigan.

17 Eugenio Lopez Sr, ‘Biographical Data Focused on Highlights of His BusinessCareer’, Attachment No. 7-C Eugenio Lopez, Deceased SSAN 556–25–3321, IT-2Question 12, file, Lopez Memorial Museum, Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Manila,Philippines. Interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988, andinterview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, wife of Eugenio Lopez Sr, 17 May 1988.


the food business with the formation of Velvet Ice Cream.18 All theseinvestments made the Lopez brothers’ commercial interests the larg-est in Iloilo City by 1940.19 In the political arena the family waslinked to the Zulueta family political faction, one of the two domin-ant factions of Iloilo at the time (the other being the Confesor-Caram alliance).20

The Second World War put a temporary halt on many profitablebusiness ventures. The Lopez-owned El Tiempo was taken over andused by the Japanese for their propaganda purposes. The PanayAutobus buses were first appropriated by the Japanese and then util-ized by the USAFFE. Eugenio Lopez and his immediate family leftfor safety in the hills of Baguio and Luzon. Fernando Lopez and hisfamily however, stayed in the vicinity of Negros Occidental and Iloiloprovince.

After the war the Lopez family moved to Manila and began toexpand their business interests increasingly on a national scale. Themove to Manila became a watershed in Lopez family history as itsymbolized the family’s transition from regional elite to major prot-agonist in national politics. Business ties to Iloilo graduallyweakened, although the western Visayas would always remain themajor political foothold in electoral politics. It was inevitable thatEugenio would move to Manila, Iloilo had become too small for hiscorporate plans.21 At this time, Fernando Lopez made his politicaldebut. On September 29, 1945, President Sergio Osmena appointedhim mayor of Iloilo city.22

The political debut of Fernando Lopez which began with a mayor’sappointment in 1945 launched a political career that lasted 25 years(put to an untimely end only by the declaration of martial law byPresident Ferdinand Marcos in 1972) reaching the post of vice-presidency and the choicest cabinet position (Secretary of Agricul-ture and Natural Resources) for three terms. Thus began a symbiotic

18 Interview with Pacifico Villaluz (who has worked as treasurer for the Lopezinterests since the pre-war days, and was manager of Iloilo TransportationCompany), Manila, 5 July 1988, and Eugenio Lopez, ‘Biographical Data’, pp. 1–2.

19 McCoy, ‘Yloilo’, pp. 124 and 165.20 Alfred W. McCoy, ‘ ‘‘Politics by Other Means’’: World War II in the Western

Visayas, Philippines’, in Alfred W. McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupa-tion, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series No. 22, 1980, pp.158–203.

21 Interview with Oscar M. Lopez, son of Eugenio Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988.22 The Times, 29 Sept. 1945, p. 1.


relationship between politics and business that thrived on thecloseness of the two brothers. With one brother in politics the Lopezfamily had the passkey to the realm of special privileges that gavethem access to the credit and franchises sealed off to familiesdeprived of political power. While one brother made political connec-tions, the other was the shrewd and ruthless businessman who util-ized these special privileges for the family business corporations.23

The unusual closeness of the brothers further guaranteed familyunity and financial success. The brothers trusted each other andnever fought. In this partnership Eugenio made all the businessdecisions and all businesses he fathered were shared equally withFernando.24 The extent of their trust was manifested in the fact thatat least one bank account was in the name of Fernando and EugenioLopez with the stipulation that either of them could withdraw anyamount.25

Fernando Lopez’ rapid rise in national politics could only bedescribed as meteoric. In 1945, President Sergio Osmena appointed

23 This paper only presents the highlights of the Lopez family history; for a morecomprehensive account see Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship Politics in Post-WarPhliippines: The Lopez Family, 1945–1989’, Ph.D. dissertation, The University ofMichigan, 1990, ch. 4.

24 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; interview with Mariquit(Maria Salvacion) Javellana Lopez, Bacolod, 16 April 1988; interview with OscarM. Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988; interview with the Eugenio Lopez family andtheir spouses during their Sunday dinner reunion, Manila, 27 March 1988(Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Oscar M. Lopez, Manuel M. Lopez, Roberto M.Lopez, Steve Psinakis, Connie Rufino Lopez, and Marites Lagdameo Lopez); inter-view with Pacita Moreno Lopez, 17 May 1988; interview with Eugenio ‘Geny’ LopezJr, Manila, 2 May 1988; interview with Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July 1988; inter-view with Marcelo Fernando, Lopez family lawyer in the 1960s, Manila, 12 April1988; interview with Alfredo Montelibano Sr, close associate of Eugenio Lopez inthe sugar bloc and cumpadre of Fernando Lopez since his son married Fernando’sdaughter Mita, Manila, 20 April 1988; and interview with Lydia M. Fullon, cashierof the Lopez family (BISCOM and PASUMIL sugar centrals) who worked with themfrom 1937 to the present, Manila, 18 March 1988.

25 The wife of Eugenio Lopez, Pacita Moreno Lopez, and his children, Presenta-cion Lopez-Psinakis and Oscar M. Lopez deny this. Interview with Pacita MorenoLopez, Manila, 17 May 1988; interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Manila,26 May 1988; and interview with Oscar M. Lopez, Manila, 27 March 1988. How-ever, Hilarion Henares Jr, who was close to the Lopezes, claimed that he had seenthis account. Interview with Hilarion Henares Jr, godchild of Fernando Lopez, eco-nomist, former vice-president of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and col-umnist of The Philippine Daily Inquirer responsible for exposing the Lopez familyscandal involving the Manila Electric Company in August 1988, Manila, 30 June1988. This observation was confirmed by Pacifico Villaluz who said both brotherscould sign any amount they wanted. Interview with Pacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July1988. (Also confirmed by one Lopez employee who wishes to remain anonymous.)


him mayor of Iloilo. A year later his successor, President ManuelRoxas re-appointed him mayor of Iloilo.26 Roxas then invited Fer-nando to join the Liberal Party (Fernando supported Osmena’s can-didacy and ran with his Nacionalista Party), and worked for his nom-ination as senatorial candidate two years later.27 Typical of mostpoliticians Lopez switched political parties as the family allianceshifted. At the end of July, 1947, Lopez launched his campaign forsenator in his home province of Iloilo, and resigned as Iloilo mayora month later in order to concentrate on the senatorial campaign.28

At this critical point in the political career of Fernando Lopez,brother Eugenio acquired a major national newspaper based inManila, The Manila Chronicle on September 27, 1947.29 This newspa-per then became the major political weapon of the Lopez family,aptly described by Lopez critics later as the ‘mouthpiece’ of EugenioLopez. The most salient point to make about The Manila Chronicle asa Lopez investment was that it never made any money.30 Why didEugenio Lopez, a hard businessman, then keep it running at a lossfor twenty-four years?

Media was a powerful weapon that could be used to attack allpolitical and business enemies, even the president of the Philippines.Applying the values of politica de familia the Lopezes consistently usedthe newspaper to serve their familial interests. The paper was notori-ous for biassed reporting. It continuously endorsed Lopez politicalcandidates and censured Lopez enemies. The paper was also used topressure political and business rivals (including the president of thePhilippines) to capitulate to demands in the interests of the Lopezfamily. During the campaigns of Fernando Lopez, every activity and

26 The Times, 3 May 1947, p. 1, and The Manila Chronicle, 4 May 1947, p. 2.27 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; and The Times, 24 July

1947, p. 1.28 The Times, 31 July 1947, p. 1; The Manila Times, 30 July 1947, pp. 1 and 24;

and The Manila Times, 1 Aug. 1947, pp. 1 and 28. In fact the entire Liberal Partysenatorial slate embarked on their campaign in Iloilo upon the invitation of Fer-nando Lopez. Lopez resigned as Iloilo mayor on 29 Aug. 1947. See The Manila Times,29 Aug. 1947, p. 5.

29 The Times, 27 Sept. 1947, p. 1.30 Interview with Conrado Sanchez Jr, economist, former governor of the Bureau

of Investments, now with the UNCTAD, Manila, 5 June 1988, and interview withPacifico Villaluz, Manila, 5 July 1988. This observation is also made by former Lopezman (who worked with Eugenio Lopez at the Meralco), Rafael Salas who laterbecame President Marcos’ Executive Secretary. See Nick Joaquin, The World of RafaelSalas (Metro-Manila, 1987), p. 83. ‘The Chronicle had been losing money for severalyears. It was known as a Lopez mouthpiece and therefore biased in favor of itsowners. Other businesses of the Lopez empire had been subsidizing the Chronicle.’


every speech no matter how trivial, was reported in The Manila Chron-icle. Furthermore, the Lopez businesses were always highly praisedin The Manila Chronicle supplements.

In just two years Fernando Lopez rose from mayor of Iloilo tosenator on December 30, 1947.31 Then, another mere two yearslater, the sugar barons groomed Lopez to be their vice-presidentialcandidate with Elpidio Quirino for president.32 Quirino himself pre-ferred to have Jose Yulo or Mariano Cuenco as his running mate.But the Visayan delegates, determined to have their way, threatenedto bolt the Liberal Party unless Lopez was selected vice-presidentialcandidate.33

The sugar barons were not only extremely wealthy but also verywell organized, complete with their own association, the NationalFederation of Sugar Planters (NFSP) which held yearly conferences.The enormous wealth and power of this elite group was predicatedon the fact that the sugar industry was undoubtedly the highestdollar earning product in the Philippine economy even before thesecond world war. The government derived no less than 43% of itsannual revenue from taxes paid by the sugar barons. The ten banksand three companies engaged in agricultural financing loaned 47%of its capital to sugar.34

After the war, priority was also given to reviving the sugar indus-try. The planters and millers were given war damage payments tocompensate for their crops, to replant sugar, and to rebuild the sugarcentrals. Credit was extended to the planters on easy repaymentterms. The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) which wasfounded to create credit facilities for the rehabilitation of agricultureand industry damaged by the war, advanced substantial sums tosugar, and the province of Negros Occidental benefitted the mostfrom the financial aid provided by the RFC.35 The RFC which later

31 The Manila Times, 30 Dec. 1947, p. 1.32 The Sunday Times Magazine, 24 April 1949, p. 35.33 For the account of the ‘battle for the vice-presidential slot’ see The Manila

Times, 1 June 1949, pp. 1 and 10; The Manila Times, 4 June 1949, pp. 1 and 12; TheManila Times, 7 June 1949, pp. 1 and 3; The Manila Times, 8 June 1949, pp. 1 and4; The Manila Times, 10 June 1949, pp. 1 and 16; Philippines Free Press, 11 June 1949,p. 1; The Manila Times, 11 June 1949, pp. 1 and 14; The Manila Chronicle, 11 June1949, pp. 1 and 4; and Philippines Free Press, 18 June 1949, p. 4.

34 E. J. C. Montilla (First Vice-President, Philippine Sugar Association), ‘ThePast, Present and Future of Our Sugar Industry’, Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila,1950), p. 12.

35 Ibid., p. 13, Eduardo Romualdez (chairman RFC Board of Directors), ‘The RFCin Philippine Rehabilitation and Reconstruction’, Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila,1955), pp. 104–6; Delfin Buencamino, ‘The Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in


became the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was theonly government banking institution which granted long-term loansto the sugar industry.36 The Philippine National Bank (PNB) pro-vided short-term crop loans which were supposed to be liquidatedafter every crop. Nonetheless the PNB was (and still is) the biggestcommercial banking institution in the Philippines and if one was inpolitical power it was easier to borrow money from the PNB. Theimportance accrued to the sugar industry was such that the PNB wasusually headed by a Negrense (one from Negros in the Visayas, thebackbone of the sugar industry).37

Eugenio Lopez’ influence emanated from his leadership of theorganization of sugar barons. Two of his closest friends (OscarLedesma and Alfredo Montelibano Sr.) served as presidents of theNFSP at some point in their careers. The group was a potentiallyformidable political force in post-war politics, so much so that presid-ential aspirants courted the planters by promising aid to the sugarindustry—beginning with the first post-war president Manuel Roxaswho in a campaign speech promised to aid the sugar industry ‘to thelimit’ if elected.38 The sugar barons’ endorsement of Fernando Lopezfor vice-president was nearly a command thrust into the lap of Quir-ino, and at the same time it carried with it the wealth and resourcesof the planters—practically a recipe for success at the polls. In theend, during the tight elections, Quirino would have no reason toregret relenting to the sugar bloc, for in the hectic campaign monthsthat followed, The Manila Chronicle not only published full-pageadvertisements for Quirino–Lopez, but also repeatedly made clearthe Visayan endorsement of the pair.39 Exercising its prerogative asan instrument of kinship politics, the newspaper did not run anyadvertisements for the opposition—the Laurel/Briones or Avelino/Francisco tickets. Such a vigorous campaign supported by the mostpowerful agricultural and industrial barons was crucial in laterobtaining the victory of Quirino and Lopez who were proclaimedpresident and vice-president on December 14, 1949.40

the Philippine Economic Blueprint’, Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila, 1950), pp. 43–4 and 57; and The Manila Chronicle, 26 Nov. 1949, pp. 7 and 10.

36 Manuel Elizalde, ‘The Philippine Sugar Industry in 1959’, Fookien Times Year-book (Manila, 1959), p. 182.

37 Interview with Conrado Sanchez Jr, Manila, 5 June 1988.38 The Manila Times, 7 Feb. 1946, p. 1.39 The Manila Chronicle, 23 Oct. 1949, p. 17; The Manila Chronicle, 30 Oct. 1949,

pp. 1 and 4; The Manila Chronicle, 5 Nov. 1949, pp. 1 and 5; The Manila Chronicle, 9Nov. 1949, p. 1; and The Manila Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1949, p. 1.

40 The Manila Times, 14 Dec. 1949, p. 1.


During Fernando Lopez’ term as vice-president and Secretary ofAgriculture and Natural Resources,41 brother Eugenio purchased, onFebruary 19, 1951, the largest sugar central in Southeast Asia, theBinalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM) in Negros. The pro-curement of the sugar central transformed the major sugar plantersheaded by Lopez into millers as well. In 1956, Eugenio Lopez boughta second sugar central, this time in Luzon—the Pampanga SugarMill (PASUMIL). His investments included Philippine PortlandCement, The Manila Chronicle, Industrial Company (which made jutebags for the sugar), in 1957, the ABS–CBN broadcasting Corpora-tion, and finally in 1961, the jewel of his financial empire—theManila Electric Company (Meralco).

Although all these corporations were acquired during FernandoLopez’ political career, he consistently stressed that he was in publicoffice to serve the people. His defense rested on the premise thatprior to his entrance into politics, he was a successful businessmanand was capable of earning four or five times more than his vice-president’s salary of P15,000 a year, had he chosen to stay in privatepractice.42 In public, and also in his own mind, he saw no conflict ofinterests between his presence in politics and the business corpora-tions his brother was purchasing and enlarging. As far as he wasconcerned, he himself was no longer in business and therefore‘Nobody could tell us that I am taking advantage of my position assenator, as vice-president to enhance our business—nobody’.43 Upuntil the late 1980s when asked questions about his family’s battlewith Philippine presidents and other politicians, Fernando would

41 Fernando Lopez was also awarded the choicest cabinet position—Secretary ofAgriculture and Natural Resources by Quirino who was pressured by the Lopezalliance to make the appointment. See The Manila Times, 30 April 1950, pp. 1 and5; and interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; Telegram, MayorJalandoni to Malacanan, 12 Sept. 1950; Iloilo City, Quirino Papers, General Corres-pondence, Iloilo; The Manila Times, 25 May 1950, pp. 1 and 12; The Manila Times,26 May 1950, p. 1; The Manila Times, 27 May 1950, pp. 1 and 14; The Manila Times,2 June 1950, p. 1; The Manila Times, 12 June 1950, p. 1; The Manila Times, 13 June1950, pp. 1 and 12; Philippines Free Press, 3 June 1950, p. 1; The Manila Chronicle, 19Aug. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, 10 Sept. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, 14Oct. 1950, p. 4; The Manila Chronicle, 21 Oct. 1950, p. 4; Teodoro M. Locsin, ‘TheStrange Case of Vice-President Lopez vs. President Quirino’, Philippines Free Press,29 April 1950, pp. 2–3; ‘Lopez Pleads for Moral Austerity’, Philippines Free Press, 29April 1950, p. 37; Leon O. Ty, ‘Parting of the Ways?’, Philippines Free Press, 20 May1950, p. 4; The Manila Times, 5 Sept. 1950, p. 1; and The Manila Times, 14 Sept.1950, p. 1.

42 The Sunday Times, 16 April 1950, p. 2.43 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988.


simply dismiss this with the statement that all quarrels with thepresidents were with his brother, he himself oblivious to the reasonsfor the dissent.44 Fernando’s statement was confirmed by other Lopezallies and rivals—Don Fernando was the naive, charming ‘Mr NiceGuy’ who could not hurt a fly—the quintessential politician, the manwhom no one intentionally challenged, while Don Eugenio was theshrewd businessman who controlled the family business from behindthe scenes.45

Fernando Lopez’ reactions reflected the ambivalent behavior offamilies who expressed endorsement of western values stressing theimportance of the national interest over the family, and yet continu-ing to practice kinship politics in day-to-day life. In his mind, thecontradiction was ‘resolved’ by the ‘separate’ roles that distinguishedhim from his elder brother. And yet in reality, the brothers’ interestsand identities were practically fused. The family felt compelled toadvocate western values despite the fact that in actual practice theycontinued to abide by the values of politica de familia.

That the Lopez corporations were built from the special privilegesgained through the practice of kinship politics was an undisputedfact exposed by President Diosdado Macapagal. At the very start ofhis administration President Diosdado Macapagal launched a majorattack on the Lopez family, as part of his ‘moral regeneration’ drive.Beginning with a speech warning the sugar bloc against engaging inorganized power politics as a means to promote its interests,46 hethen proceeded to show how this bloc, which he labelled the ‘Lopezsugar bloc’, used their influence to secure special bank loans. Maca-pagal’s attempt to criticize the practice of kinship politics was funda-mentally sincere—he sought to implement the western values ofethics, professionalism, and the concern for the national interest.(He did not build a family business empire though he himselfemerged a wealthy man.) The battle had raged for the entire fouryears of his presidency and cost Macapagal his re-election, since theelite families practicing kinship politics decided to, in the words ofMontelibano, ‘go for broke’ to ensure his defeat. Such a prolonged

44 Ibid.45 Interview with Hilarion Henares Jr, Manila, 30 June 1988; interview with Con-

rado Sanchez Jr, Manila, 5 June 1988; interview with Marcelo Fernando, formerlawyer of the Lopez family, Manila, 8 April 1988; and interview with PresidentDiosdado Macapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988.

46 The Manila Times, 14 Feb. 1962, pp. 1 and 12-A; and Philippines Free Press, 3March 1962, p. 1.


and systematic exposure and condemnation of the sugar bloc andthe Lopez family (some other families were also included like theYulos)47 hitherto unprecedented, would only result in the withdrawalof their financial support at election time, and Macapagal, ‘the poorboy from Lubao’ with no personal ‘family’ behind him, must havebeen aware of the risk he was taking.

Macapagal’s aim was to impose the western values of free enter-prise ‘which should make available to all businessmen and to allcitizens equal and fair opportunity to advance not through unfairtactics but according to the merits of everyone’.48 To enforce this itbecame necessary to put an end to what the president himself called‘the era of special privileges’.49 Among Macapagal’s targets werefirst: ‘those who have utilized organized political power to build busi-ness empires and vice-versa, to which category the Lopez brotherspertain’.50

In the four years of his tenure, Macapagal unleashed a continuousseries of attacks against the Lopezes. To substantiate the maintheme of the attacks, that of using political power to build a business

47 Macapagal also attacked the Yulos and exposed that Jose Yulo had acquired hisvast Canlubang sugar estate with loans obtained from the Rehabilitation FinanceCorporation (RFC) when he was chairman of the RFC. Macapagal rightly pointedout that it was both unethical and unconstitutional to be involved in a businesstransaction of this nature when one was in the government service. The case wasbrought out in the press and there were threats to oust the plantation from Yulo.A complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna where there was amove to expropriate the estate. Complaint, Republic of the Philippines, Court ofFirst Instance of Laguna, Binan branch, Republic of the Philippines versus JoseYulo, Tomas Yulo, CJ Yulo & Sons, Inc, Vicente Madrigal, Bank of the PhilippineIslands, China Banking Corporation, Commercial Bank and Trust Company, Philip-pine Bank of Communications, Development Bank of the Philippines, Luis Yulo,Teresa Jugo, Maria Elena Y. Quiros del Rio, Jose Yulo Jr, Regina Abreu, RamonYulo, Carmen de Vera, Jesus Miguel Yulo, Maria Cecilia Yulo and Leandro Locsin,Civil Case No. B-362, document given to the author by President Diosdado Macapa-gal. The case was also heard in the Supreme Court. See also The Manila Chronicle,25 Aug. 1962, pp. 1 and 9; The Manila Chronicle, 25 Jan. 1963, p. 1; The ManilaChronicle, 1 Feb. 1963, p. 12; The Manila Chronicle, 13 Feb. 1963, p. 1; The ManilaTimes, 21 Sept. 1962, p. 1; and The Manila Times, 25 Sept. 1962, p. 1.

48 Diosdado Macapagal, ‘The Big Drive’, Radio-TV Address, 28 Aug. 1962, inDiosdado Macapagal, New Hope for the Common Man, speeches and statements ofPresident Diosdado Macapagal, Vol. 2, Research and Special Projects, MalacanangPress Office, June 1963, pp. 97 and 102; Diosdado Macapagal, ‘The Big Drive’,Radio-TV Address, published in The Manila Chronicle, 29 Aug. 1962, pp. 1, 7 and 9.

49 Napoleon G. Rama, ‘The Era of Special Privileges is Over!’, Philippines FreePress, 3 March 1962, pp. 6 and 75.

50 Diosdado Macapagal, ‘The Big Drive’, p. 102, and interview with PresidentDiosdado Macapagal, Manila, 2 June 1988.


empire, Macapagal argued that during the period of their politicalactivities, the Lopez brothers and their associates in the sugar blocacquired the following choice businesses: the BISCOM, the PASU-MIL, The Manila Chronicle, the ABS and the CBN television network,and the Meralco.51 Furthermore, their political connections enabledthem to receive special loans and credits from government bankingand financial institutions, loans which enabled them to buy the hugebusinesses in the first place. Macapagal published a presumed totalbreakdown of Lopez credits to state institutions:

1. Development Bank of the Philippines:a. Binalbagan Central P32,490,000b. Pampanga Central 4,788,000c. Philippine Portland Cement 2,355,000d. Industrial Company 1,450,000e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting) 600,000f. CBN Broadcasting 2,275,000g. Southern Lines (Shipping company) 1,730,000

Total P45,688,000

2. Philippine National Bank:a. Meralco P35,000,000b. Chronicle 2,000,000c. Binalbagan Sugar Central 3,500,000d. Pampanga Sugar Mill 1,200,000e. Bolinao Electronics (Alto Broadcasting) 485,000

Total P42,185,000

3. Government Service Insurance System:a. Alto-CBN (building construction) P500,000

All of these totalled P88,373,000.52

Second: Macapagal denounced the Lopezes for their politicalinfluence in the legislature, and the judiciary. Macapagal, forexample, accused what he nicknamed the ‘Lopez sugar bloc’(composed of 36-strong men in the House with an undisclosednumber of senators under the leadership of Senate President ProTempore Fernando Lopez), of controlling the political and economic

51 The Manila Times, 24 Feb. 1962, pp. 1 and 12A.52 ‘Palace Versus the Lopezes’, Philippines Free Press, 19 Jan. 1963, p. 60; The

Manila Times, 1 March 1962, pp. 1 and 2-A; and The Manila Chronicle, 1 March 1962,p. 15.


life of the nation. The Lopezes had succeeded in obtaining thesepoliticians as allies through their practice of giving them retainerfees as ‘legal counsel’ or ‘sinecure positions’ in their business estab-lishments.53 According to the president, the Lopezes were attemptingto control both the senate (if Fernando Lopez succeeded in becomingsenate president) and the congress, through the election of DanielRomualdez as House Speaker.54 Due to their political influence theLopez bloc had also succeeded in appointing their men to top-ranking and key positions in the government, especially the financialinstitutions like the Philippine National Bank and the DevelopmentBank of the Philippines as well as the Monetary Board of the CentralBank. Their patronage extended to the judiciary where they had ahand in the appointment of key officials in the Supreme Court downto the justices of the peace and even some Manila fiscals.55

The president’s campaign was not content to limit itself to a merecatalogue of Lopez family wrongs. Two cases actually reached thecourts. One case was tax evasion (the Lopezes faced criminal chargesfor a P10 million tax evasion suit).56 The other case was a constitu-tional violation where the family purchased a lot from the PhilippineHomesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), (a lot reserved for the

53 Leoncio R. Parungao (Macapagal’s Press Secretary), ‘The Power of the LopezBrothers’, Philippines Free Press, 17 Nov. 1962, p. 2.

54 The Manila Times, 3 March 1962, pp. 1 and 2-A; The Manila Times, 10 March1962, pp. 1 and 16-A. For general comments made by the president about Lopezattempts to control the senate and congress see, The Manila Times, 26 Feb. 1962,pp. 1–2; and The Manila Times, 27 Feb. 1962, p. 1.

55 Leoncio R. Parungao, ‘The Power of the Lopez Brothers’, p. 2.56 The Lopezes were accused of falsifying their tax census, by inflating their liabil-

ities in order to pay a smaller amount in taxes. The Justice Department said thatthe Lopez brothers falsified their tax census returns for 1961 by making it appearthat the total liabilities of the brothers to the Philippine Planters Investment Com-pany Inc. was P32,261,380.25 when in the same period the corporation had a totalof only P16,377,276.56 in receivables. Therefore the Justice Department concludedthat the Lopez brothers overstated their liabilities by P15,844,103.69. The ManilaTimes, 20 Aug. 1962, p. 12-A. The Philippine Planters Co. was threatened withseizure because it neglected to pay its broker’s tax. The Manila Times, 28 Aug. 1962,pp. 1 and 2-A. Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) commissioner Jose B. Lingadcharged a P1,286,039 broker’s tax on Philippine Planters Investment Corporation, atax it failed to pay from 1954–61. In 1963, the court of tax appeals had temporarilyrestrained the BIR from executing the warrant. See The Manila Times, 3 Jan. 1963,pp. 1 and 10-A. For reportage on the P10 million tax evasion suit see The ManilaTimes, 3 Jan. 1963, pp. 1 and 10-A; The Manila Times, 7 March 1963, p. 1; TheManila Times, 9 March 1963, p. 5-A. The Lopez brothers, however, were asking theSupreme Court to restrain the City Fiscal from investigating this suit, in The ManilaTimes, 7 March 1963, p. 1; and The Manila Times, 9 March 1963, p. 5A.


residence of the underprivileged), and built their television towersthere.57 The lot was bought during Fernando Lopez’ term as senatorand was against the constitutional provision which emphasized thatno senator shall be directly interested in any contract with the gov-ernment during his term of office.58

Don Eugenio Lopez was well-known for his tremendous fightingspirit. In fact he fought with every single Philippine president(except Carlos Garcia) and many family opponents found themselvessatirized, criticized and exposed vehemently in the pages of theChronicle. The primary strategy this time, however, was to concen-trate their efforts in a presidential campaign (for 1965) that woulddefeat Macapagal at the polls. A statement attributed to EugenioLopez summed up succinctly the psychology behind such a course ofconduct: ‘We will not give in to Macapagal because we will be stillaround when the time comes that he will no longer be President.’59

The first full-blown relentless Chronicle attacks against Macapagal’sadministration began once Fernando Lopez announced his intentionto seek the Nacionalista Party’s presidential nomination for the 1965elections. From here on, the Chronicle persistently reproached thepresidential administration, particularly in the speeches of FernandoLopez who had begun an arduous campaign with NP ward leadersall over the country. From July to November 1964, Lopez conductedan aggressive campaign, traveling all over the country meeting withNacionalista leaders, giving numerous speeches hoping to entice sup-port for the NP nomination. True to family political behavior, theChronicle followed the senator throughout all his sojourns.

Despite such an aggressive campaign (complete with the tradi-tional posture that he would not settle for the vice-presidential postand instead retire from politics if not nominated), Lopez lost to Ferd-inand Marcos in the NP convention.60 Just as it seemed that DonFernando would retire from politics greatly disappointed, MrsImelda Marcos approached him in his Manila Hotel suite and in

57 For information on the PHHC lot case see The Manila Times, 20 Aug. 1962,pp. 1 and 12-A; The Manila Times, 21 Aug. 1962, pp. 1 and 14-A; The Manila Times,5 Jan. 1963, pp. 1 and 8-A; Teodoro M. Locsin, ‘The Mills of the Gods’, PhilippinesFree Press, 12 Jan. 1963, p. 6; Edward R. Kiunisala, ‘The Boom’, Philippines Free Press,2 Feb. 1963, pp. 66–7.

58 The constitutional reference is to section 17, article 6 of the constitution.59 Interviews with President Diosdado Macapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988, and 2

June 1988.60 The Manila Chronicle, 12 Nov. 1964, pp. 1 and 15; The Manila Chronicle, 23 Nov.

1964, pp. 1 and 15; The Manila Times, 23 Nov. 1964, p. 1.


tears, begged him to run as Marcos’ vice-presidential mate.61 Fromthe point of view of Mrs Marcos the support of the Lopez politicalmachine would be absolutely crucial in facilitating a victory for herhusband. From the Lopez side it seemed that if they could not cap-ture the presidency, they would settle for the role of kingmaker andthe power behind the throne. Furthermore, given the fact that Maca-pagal’s assaults had them constantly on the defensive and bluntedtheir efforts to succeed in business, they believed they had no otherrecourse but to defeat him and place a ‘Lopez man’ in Malacanang.(In fact the Macapagal tirades against the family pressured them tosell the two sugar mills BISCOM and PASUMIL, and along withthese, two other corporations, Philippine Portland Cement andIndustrial Company.)

To the Lopez family, the Macapagal drive to put an end to theera of special privileges enjoyed by families with political power, andreplace these with western-style free enterprise, professionalism anddemocracy, only succeeded in confirming Eugenio Lopez’ axiom that‘to succeed in business, one must engage in politics’.62 Eugenio LopezJr summed up his father’s sentiments aptly:

Like dad—he always backs a candidate and he backed the wrong horsethis time so Macapagal won and Macapagal named the two brothers Filip-ino Stonehills and went after them hammer and glove, stuck the BIR onthem, many many things and then—Ah—its things like you know that giveweight to his desire to say that you need some political clout to stay inbusiness because you see—you get guys like this, they go after you and youare completely helpless.63

Ironically, the president’s desire to enforce western values elicitedthe opposite reaction from the elite families, who interpreted theloss of their privileges as a product of their lapse in political power,their decline in powerful status, driving them to be even more deter-mined than ever to resume power in order to perpetuate politica defamilia.

The Marcos–Lopez campaign was launched on January 6, 1965.During the entire year of 1965 The Manila Chronicle had almost dailyreports on the activities and the speeches of both candidates, while

61 Interview with Fernando Lopez, Manila, 8 April 1988; Bonner, Waltzing with aDictator, p. 24 , and Carmen Navarro Pedrosa, Imelda Marcos (London, 1987), p. 101.

62 The Manila Chronicle, 16 Sept. 1965, p. 1. This axiom was confirmed in inter-views with Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988, and President DiosdadoMacapagal, Manila, 16 April 1988.

63 Interview with Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988.


the Macapagal administration was continuously and ruthlesslyattacked.64 The entire Lopez family was mobilized for the very firsttime to instigate an ‘all out’ effort to defeat Macapagal at the polls.The wives of the Lopez clan, in particular, Pacita Moreno Lopez (wifeof Eugenio Lopez Sr) and daughter Presy (Presentacion) joined theBlue Ladies of Mrs Marcos and accompanied her, attired in theirblue uniforms, to the campaign sorties all over the Philippines.65 Noexpense nor effort was spared; the Lopez multi-media complex wasexploited, and the Meralco company planes were borrowed for theprovincial travels.66 At the end of the campaign (dubbed the longestcampaign in Philippine history) the Lopezes had spent a total of P14million.67 As Lopez ally Alfredo Montelibano was supposed to havesaid, the strategy was to ‘go for broke’ against Macapagal. Andindeed, the crusade was fruitful: Ferdinand Marcos and FernandoLopez took their oaths as president and vice-president respectivelyon December 30, 1965.68

The beginning of the year 1966 heralded the peak of the Lopezfamily history in terms of political power and economic empire. Thefamily was in control of Meralco, which was an extremely profitablemonopoly,69 it controlled a good segment of the media via The ManilaChronicle, two television stations (ABS–CBN) and twenty-two radiostations all over the country (all under the umbrella of the holdingcompany—Alto Broadcasting—formerly Bolinao Electronics). By thistime the family had bought also the controlling shares of the Philip-pine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and was making plansto establish the Philippine Petroleum Company which would havethe monopoly of the lubricating oil industry in the Philippines.Although the family had left the sugar milling business when theBISCOM and PASUMIL sugar centrals were sold in 1962, (alongwith Philippine Portland Cement and Industrial Company whichmanufactured the jute bags for the sugar), the family still owned thesugar lands and other real estate items managed under the family

64 See The Manila Chronicle, 9 Jan.–15 Dec. 1965.65 Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez (wife of Eugenio Lopez), Manila, 17 May

1988, and interview with Presentacion Lopez Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988.66 Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988.67 Interview with Lopez campaign manager and cousin, Vicente ‘Tiking’ Lopez

Jr, Manila, 18 May 1988.68 The Manila Times, 30 Dec. 1965, p. 1, and The Manila Chronicle, 30 Dec. 1965,

p. 1. The Manila Chronicle also put out a special supplement on the inauguration.69 Interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May 1988.


corporation BENPRES (this stood for Benito and Presentacion, theparents of Eugenio and Fernando Lopez).

At the same time the major companies like Meralco had subsidiarycompanies like Philippine Engineering Company which handled theengineering sector of the Meralco, and Meralco Securities IndustrialCorporation (MSIC) which built a pipeline to channel fuel from Bat-angas province to the various Meralco generating stations. A subsidi-ary company of the ABS–CBN broadcasting corporation, was SCAN,engaged in the business of preparing television and cinema commer-cials. Other ‘sideline’ investments included: the Agricultural FireInsurance and Surety Company Incorporated (AFISCO), founded in1956 and as a typical business expansion for a family corporation(since the companies needed to be insured, so they might as wellinsure with a family-owned insurance company), and The ManilaSheraton Hotel, renamed the Hyatt Regency Manila in 1961 (thisinvestment was relinquished later). A completely cultural investmentwas the Lopez Memorial Museum, founded by Don Eugenio in 1960in memory of his parents, today it holds one of the best collectionsof Filipiniana as well as valuable paintings. All these projects werethe creations of Eugenio and not Fernando although both brothersowned equal shares of all these corporations. The only project thatwas associated with Fernando Lopez was Iloilo University which wasinaugurated in March 1968 with Fernando Lopez as president.

Not surprisingly, in 1966 too, the Lopezes were at the height oftheir political power. Fernando Lopez was not only vice-presidentbut also immediately appointed Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources. President Marcos also named him Rice and Corn Coord-inator. Lopez’ position was very powerful since he was in charge ofdispensing lumber, timber, and logging licenses. In September 1966The San Francisco Chronicle reported that Eugenio Lopez, ‘the richestman in Manila,’ gave a grandiose party for President Marcos. Lopezwas described as ‘the most powerful man in the Philippines’ and ‘thepower behind the throne’.70

The Marcos–Lopez alliance survived one term and was viableenough to win a re-election (the first time a presidential administra-tion was re-elected in post-war history) in 1969. The tenuous alli-ance, however, broke down after a year (January 1971) when Marcosannounced his intention to destroy the ‘oligarchy’ and the ‘vestedinterests’ and began a savage attack against the Lopez family.

70 San Francisco Chronicle, 26 Sept. 1966, clipping from the scrapbook of EugenioLopez, Lopez Memorial Museum, Manila.


Although Marcos claimed that his campaign was against the‘oppressive oligarchs’ in an overall crusade to destroy the oligarchy,71

it was patently obvious that he was particularly interested in des-troying the Lopez family; an intention verified in the subsequentmartial law period. From the start, the press echoed the public con-sensus that Marcos was fundamentally insincere, and many were justcurious to sit back and watch the joust from the wings, aware thatthe consequences of the tournament would not affect them at allsince it was, after all, merely a personal and familial fight.72

The details of this quarrel are more explicitly discussed else-where73 but suffice it to say that Ferdinand Marcos argued the casefrom the standpoint of western values; that his crusade was aimedat eliminating familism (kinship politics) by preventing the Lopezfamily from its next move—the possession of the monopoly on oil inthe Philippines. Marcos continued this vendetta with ruthless vigorin the subsequent martial law period which followed twenty monthsafter his first tirade against the Lopez family.

Martial Law

In his book, Today’s Revolution: Democracy (appropriately dubbed theMarcos blue-print for the New Society even by Marcos himself74),Marcos published the first and most comprehensive rationale for the

71 Teodoro L. Locsin Jr, ‘A Fairy Tale’, Philippines Free Press, 13 Feb. 1971, p. 7.72 These articles were all taken from the personal scrapbook of Eugenio Lopez

entitled ‘Clash of Titans’, which compiled all the articles about the Lopez family’sbattle with President Marcos in 1971: Greg M. Datuin, ‘Battle to Death’, Malacan-ang Profile column, Daily Mirror, 12 Jan. 1971; Ricarte M. Baliao, ‘Blackout SpawnedNaughty Speculations’, in Passing Column, The Evenings News, 14 Jan. 1971, p. 13;Willie Ng, Column 8, Philippines Herald, 15 Jan. 1971; Amando E. Doronila, ‘A Studyof FM-DM Tactics, Fair or Foul’, Check and Balance Column, Daily Mirror, 16 Jan.1971; Amelita Reysio-Cruz, Merry-Go-Round Column, Manila Daily Bulletin, 18 Jan.1971; ‘Lopez Taxes Get Palace Attention’, Evening News, 18 Jan. 1971; Charlie T.Castaneda, ‘FM Concentrates Fire on Meralco’, Evening News, 18 Jan. 1971; DavidBidan, ‘Government Maps Moves on Meralco’, Philippines Herald, 19 Jan. 1971; LuisBeltran, ‘After Five Years of Trying, Marcos May Yet Succeed’, A Place in the SunColumn, The Sun, 9 Jan. 1971; Amelito R. Mutuc, ‘Battle of the Century’, WeeklyNation, 25 Jan. 1971; Guillermo ‘Willie’ Jurado, ‘The Battle of Titans’, a series ofsix articles in the Weekly Nation, 25 Jan., 1 Feb., 8 Feb., 15 Feb., 22 Feb., and 1March 1971. The Republic Weekly ran a series of 8 articles on the Lopezes under theheading ‘Case Studies of our Oligarchs’, found also in the scrapbook but was notdated.

73 See Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’, pp. 152–9.74 Ferdinand E. Marcos, Notes on the New Society of the Philippines (Manila, 1973),

p. vii.


declaration of martial law in 1972. Here Marcos revealed his exigesison the evils of Philippine politics and society and proposed a remedythrough what he termed the ‘democratic revolution’ (later he dubbedit ‘revolution from the center’). Of primary relevance to this studywas his focus on the oligarchy as the major reason for the sicknessof a society characterized by a wide gap between the rich and thepoor. Marcos was perceptive enough to observe that although eachadministration fell because of its record of graft and corruption, thepattern seemed to perpetuate itself indefinitely. He argued that allthis was the result of the fact that the oligarchs were not interestedin political power as such but in the pursuit of economic gain andsocial privilege.75 Marcos laid the sole blame on the oligarchy for thepresence of social corruption.76

Martial law was the method Marcos chose to destroy the oligarchyand transform the Philippine ‘precarious democracy’ into a truedemocracy. Since Marcos had pointed out that the previous repub-lican system did not work, as it merely unleashed an endless cycle ofadministrations guilty of graft and corruption, martial law wouldrelease Filipino society from this endless quagmire. It was significantthat Marcos expressed the entire rationale in the language of west-ern values. He condemned the ‘old society’ for its rampant practiceof kinship politics. The so-called ‘democratic revolution’, one withoutviolence and unleashed ‘from above’ was the best method to initiatechanges in Philippine social structure and bring equality to themajority of the Filipinos suffering from poverty. In his treatises77

Marcos was unequivocally championing western values over that ofkinship politics as the dogma for the ‘new society’. And indeed, hiscriticism of traditional family values was very apt from the standardof western values.

Martial law equipped Marcos with unlimited powers with which tocarry out his vendetta against the oligarchic families, put a halt tothe practice of kinship politics, and thus break the endless cycles ofcorrupt administrations. Instead the reverse occurred. Whereas,prior to martial law many families competed at election time for the

75 Ferdinand Marcos, Today’s Revolution: Democracy (Manila, 1971), pp. 71–2.76 According to Marcos, ‘In the institutional sense, the oligarchs, for being privil-

eged, are guilty of bringing about this state of affairs’ (social corruption), ibid., p.74.

77 See Ferdinand Marcos, Today’s Revolution; and the following: Ferdinand Marcos,Notes, Ferdinand Marcos, Revolution from the Center (Hongkong, 1978), and FerdinandMarcos, Progress and Martial Law (Manila, 1981).


political power that would grant them access to the special privilegeswith which to build financial empires, after martial law only onefamily alliance had this unique opportunity. Since Marcos assumeddictatorial powers and elections were abolished, the Marcos familyalliance had the monopoly over the practice of kinship politics for anindefinite period. The corruption of the Marcos family alliancetermed ‘crony capitalism’ revealed that Marcos, although bran-dishing western values at the start of martial law, had fully intendedto practice kinship politics for the benefit of his own familial alliance.In this case Marcos’ call to western values was mere rhetoric, fullyaware of the prestige these values held in the public mind.

Nevertheless, the martial law powers had enabled him to destroya number of elite families and in particular his main rival—theLopez family. When Marcos declared martial law, Eugenio Lopezwas at that time vacationing abroad and his brother Fernando calledhim from Manila and advised him to remain in exile. In lieu of thefamily patriarch, Marcos imprisoned instead Eugenio ‘Geny’ LopezJr allegedly for his involvement in an assassination plot against thepresident.78 With Geny as hostage, Marcos was able to pressure Eug-enio Lopez to relinquish his family interests in the Meralco and themedia. With the declaration of martial law, the Lopez family’s for-tunes plummeted. Believing Marcos’ promise that his son would bereleased if he agreed to sell Meralco to the Meralco Foundation Inc.(MFI—the Marcoses), Eugenio Lopez signed away his biggest com-pany for a mere pittance (P133,337,511.24), with only P10,000 paidinitially. In the agreement, signed on December 27, 1973 at Honol-ulu, Hawaii, the Lopez family corporation BENPRES, sold all itsMeralco Securities Corporation shares to the Foundation. Thefoundation was to pay BENPRES in sixteen annual installments ifand when the buyer can afford to pay.79

Marcos also appropriated the Lopez media interests—The ManilaChronicle and the television stations—ABS–CBN, and PT & T, a tele-communications subsidiary of ABS–CBN. By 1974, Lopez had con-ceded all his multimillion-properties, and Geny was still in jail. InMarch of 1974, Eugenio was told that his terminal illness would only

78 Bagumbayan, Oct. 1977, p. 2.79 Stock Purchase Agreement, Annex ‘C’, Agreement between BENPRES Cor-

poration and Meralco Foundation Inc., document provided by Oscar M. Lopez, andAgreement, Annex ‘E’, Agreement between BENPRES Corporation and MeralcoFoundation Inc., document provided by Oscar M. Lopez. See also Steve Psinakis,Two Terrorists Meet (San Francisco, 1981), p. 228.


permit him a few more months of life. His last wish was to see hisson freed before he died. The dying Don Eugenio himself made thetrip to Manila to plead with the president in a humiliating act ofsurrender, but he returned empty handed.80

How did the Lopez family respond to the most brutal attemptto destroy their family empire and persecute its members? Geny’simprisonment restrained them from openly attacking Marcos withthe usual ferocity attributed to Don Eugenio’s fighting style. Butonce Geny, convinced that his father had suffered enough humili-ation, decided to put his life on the line, the family began to showsigns of standing up to the Marcos onslaught.

In November 1974, Geny decided to go on hunger strike becauseit was ‘the only way open to me to obtain justice’ and focus attentionon all the ‘thousands of detainees like me who have languished in jailfor months and years without being informed of the charges againstthem’.81 Although a major reason for the hunger strike was to extric-ate his father from the humiliation and blackmail caused by hisdetention, Geny had linked his plight with the cause of politicalprisoners in the Philippines, who were imprisoned unjustly becauseone man aspired to dictatorial power. On the tenth day of the hungerstrike, Marcos promised to concede their demands but as soon asboth prisoners recuperated (Geny Lopez was joined by his cell mateSergio ‘Serge’ Osmena III), they were returned to jail. At this pointnow fully aware that Marcos would never release his son Geny, andfaced with Marcos’ demands for a statement from the family endors-ing martial law, Eugenio decided to fight back openly at last.

In the American press, Eugenio exposed how Marcos swindled theLopez family of their corporations, while son-in-law Psinakis tried tolobby in the US congress for attention to the family’s plight, pointingto Marcos’ corruption and blackmail.82 Unfortunately, the exposureof Marcos’ treatment of the Lopezes fell on deaf ears, at least amongthe powers that be in the United States who chose to support the

80 Harvey Stockwin, ‘Amnesty, But Hardly a Ceasefire’, Far Eastern EconomicReview, 29 Nov. 1974, p. 11, interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez, Manila, 17 May1988, and interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988.

81 Harvey Stockwin, ‘Amnesty, But Hardly a Ceasefire’, p. 11, and Steve Psinakis,Two Terrorists Meet, pp. 146–7. The latter is a book written by Lopez in-law (hemarried Eugenio Lopez’ daughter Presentacion) about his meeting with ImeldaMarcos and discusses the Marcos extortion of the Lopez family.

82 Joseph Lelyveld, ‘Rich Family Loses Power in Bitter Feud with Marcos’, TheNew York Times, 22 April 1975, p. 2, and interview with Steve Psinakis, Manila, 15July 1988. See also Steve Psinakis, Two Terrorists Meet.


Marcos dictatorship and ignore its victims. Dispossessed and humili-ated, the dying Eugenio Lopez requested presidential permission tosee his two sons Oscar and Manolo in Manila. These petitions wereignored and the most powerful man in the Philippines prior to mar-tial law died a broken man in 1975, without all his children withwhom he had been so close, at his deathbed.83 He had lost the great-est battle of his life.

Shortly afterwards, Geny and his immediate family, with the helpof sister Presy Lopez-Psinakis and her husband Steve Psinakis (aGreek national with American citizenship living in the US), suc-ceeded in engineering a sensational escape from prison. The cost ofthe escape, which was entirely a family affair, amounted to around$100,000 involving the purchase of a plane and ending in the grant-ing of political asylum in the United States.84 Subsequently, Genyjoined the anti-Marcos movement in the US, but his role was con-spicuously minimal. This was not surprising since the motivationsfor the escape were not ideological but personal and familial, despiteall the publicity emphasizing the ideological reasons for Geny’s‘struggle’. Besides, the family still left behind vulnerable members,younger brothers Oscar and Manolo and their mother had to beprotected. It was brother-in-law Steve Psinakis who was more vigor-ously involved in the anti-Marcos crusade. He wrote a regular columnfor the two Filipino community newspapers: The Philippine News andThe Philippine Times. He also wrote letters and petitions to Americancongressmen exposing Marcos’ extortion of the Lopezes and otherfamilies as well as the torture of political prisoners. He joined RaulManglapus’ Movement for the Free Philippines. When Benigno

83 Interview with Eugenio ‘Geny’ Lopez Jr, Manila, 21 May 1988; interview withPacita Moreno Lopez, 17 May 1988; interview with Presentacion Lopez-Psinakis,Manila, 26 May 1988; interview with Steve Psinakis, Manila, 15 July 1988; TheWashington Post, 19 July 1975, p. B7; the Philippines Free Press, 3 May 1986, p. 23;and Bernard Wideman, ‘Goodbye to the Maker of Dollars and Men’, Far EasternEconomic Review, 25 July 1975, p. 25.

84 For a detailed account of the escape based on the notes of Augusto AlmedaLopez (Geny’s close friend who was involved in the escape) see Augusto AlmedaLopez, ‘An Exclusive Account of the Lopez–Osmena Escape: Prison Break from FortBonifacio’, serialized in Who, 6 March 1982, pp. 10–12, and 13 March 1982, pp.10–12. The author also has a copy of the handwritten notes of Augusto Almeda‘Jake’ Lopez on the escape. See also ‘The Great Escape’, Time, 17 Oct. 1977, p. 35;Newsweek, 17 Oct. 1977, p. 12; and Bagumbayan, Oct. 1977. There is also an accountof the escape in the book by Steve Psinakis, Two Terrorists Meet, pp. 158–67, a reprintof the account published in The Boston Phoenix, 8 Nov. 1977, by Stu Cohen entitled‘The Great Escape’.


‘Ninoy’ Aquino Jr, Marcos’ star prisoner and primary opponent wentto exile in the United States, he and Psinakis also became very closefriends. Psinakis convinced Geny to file a suit against Marcos in theUnited States which forced Marcos to make payments according tothe ‘purchase agreement’.85 In the end it may be surmised that theLopez family was not above dealing with the Marcos alliance howeverminimal, while simultaneously involved in criticizing the kinship pol-itics of his regime.86

Apart from the activities of the Psinakis couple, the rest of theLopez family in Manila remained quiet. The society’s acceptance ofthe rules of kinship politics may be gauged by the fact that no one,at least in the initial ten years of martial law, expressed outrage atthe methods with which Marcos extorted the Lopez fortune. Thefamily itself was ostracized: Manolo Lopez’ wife Marites Lagdameoobserved that ‘Many snubbed us!’87 and Presy Lopez-Psinakis con-fessed that many friends later treated them like lepers.88 In the Filip-ino mind the family had fallen from power; it was now another fam-ily’s turn to benefit from the opportunities of public office. Such werethe vicissitudes of politica de familia; the elite family contest for powerprovoked the rise and fall of families.

Shortly after the assassination of Benigno ‘Ninoy’ Aquino Jr whichunleashed the pent up resentment of the public against the massive-scale corruption and oppression of the regime, the Lopez familyholed up in Manila at last spoke up. Ninoy’s assassination sparkedprotest rallies as the publication of anti-Marcos newspapers mush-roomed. In January and February 1985, Mr. and Ms. publications rana series on how the Marcoses expropriated Meralco and ABS–CBNfrom the Lopez family.89 Oscar Lopez gave a press conference at theClub Filipino where he outlined the procedure in which the ABS–

85 Steve Psinakis, Two Terrorists Meet, p. 230.86 There was some tension within the Lopez family in this period since the mem-

bers in Manila continued to appeal to the Psinakis couple to ‘stop rocking the boat’.Interview with Steve Psinakis, Manila, 15 July 1988; interview with PresentacionLopez-Psinakis, Manila, 26 May 1988; and interview with Pacita Moreno Lopez,Manila, 17 May 1988.

87 Interview with the Lopez family in their Sunday dinner reunion, Manila, 27March 1988.

88 Ruby Villavicencio, ‘Growing Pains for Don Eugenio’s Only Girl’, Features,Philippine Daily Inquirer, 18 June 1989, p. 7.

89 Bernardo V. Lopez, ‘Why Lopez had to Sell Meralco’, Mr. and Ms., 8–14 Feb.1985, pp. 20–3; Augusto Almeda Lopez, ‘How Benedicto and Partners Took OverABS–CBN Without Paying a Single Centavo’, serialized in Mr. and Ms., 11–17 Jan.,pp. 9–15, and 18–24 Jan. 1985, pp. 20–5.


CBN television stations were taken from them. Here he criticizedMarcos ‘crony capitalism’ of which the seizure of the ABS–CBN wasa classic example. As he denounced the ‘cronies and scoundrels’ fortheir ‘dastardly actuations’,90 Oscar was applying the yardstick ofwestern values to judge the behavior of the Marcos family whoseexcessive corruption was merely kinship politics in its purest form.

The Lopezes were echoing the general public clamor for a stop toMarcos’ excessive endorsement of kinship politics. A snap electionheld in January 1986 illustrated to the international press the extentof Marcos’ cheating and in February 1986, the people took to thestreets to defend the army faction that initiated a coup against theregime. The Lopez family supported the EDSA revolution (the Feb-ruary Revolution is fondly called EDSA revolution since EDSA is theshortened form of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue where the peopledefended the army rebels from Marcos’ retaliation) from its incep-tion, with the public press release:

Inasmuch as the Marcos martial law government illegally and forciblyseized the 5 television and 21 radio broadcasting facilities of the ABS–CBNBroadcasting Corporation scattered around the country in 1972, and sincethe Marcos government and cronies operated them to their benefit andprofit without any compensation whatsoever, the rightful owners—LopezFamily announce that they are offering the use of these facilities includingChannel 4 at Broadcasting Center, Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, to the newgovernment for the duration of the crisis.91

In this move the Lopez family declared their support of the coupd’etat-turned-people-power-revolution, that demanded a return todemocratic values and a shunning of the excessive kinship politicspracticed by President Marcos.

Although their anti-Marcos campaign, if it can be called that, wasvery limited and indulged in short spurts, the Lopez family, one ofthe prime victims of martial law, criticized Marcos in the languageof western values. Marcos was exposed for his corruption and extor-tion of rival elite families, and his detention of political prisoners ashostage for the dispossession of these families. In all their state-ments against the Marcos regime the Lopez family was making astand against the Marcos practice of kinship politics.

90 Oscar M. Lopez, Statement Given at Press Conference on ABS–CBN on 10Jan. 1985 at the Club Filipino, document provided the author by Oscar Lopez.

91 Press Statement, ABS–CBN Broadcasting Corporation, Fernando Lopez,Chairman, Oscar M. Lopez, President, 24 Feb. 1986, in the ABS–CBN file, LopezMemorial Museum, Manila.


After Febrev

When the ‘people power revolution’ of February 1986 deposed Pres-ident Marcos and ushered in a new regime that was committed to arestoration of the pre-martial law democratic system, the Lopezfamily members overseas ended their years in exile and returned tothe Philippines. Eugenio Lopez had four sons and one daughter: Eug-enio Lopez Jr (Geny), Oscar (Oskie), Manuel (Manolo), Roberto(Robie), and Presentacion (Presy) married to Steve Psinakis. In1986, Geny, Robie and the Psinakis’s returned to the Philippines,and like the other families who were victims of martial law,attempted to regain the family enterprises surrendered to theMarcos family. The family was primarily interested in the Meralco,the two television stations channels 2 (ABS) and 4 (CBN) and thePhilippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) now renamedthe Philippine Commercial and International Bank. This time thefamily was once again close to the powers that be—the new presidentCorazon Cojuangco Aquino (Cory) was the widow of Benigno Aquino,a close friend of Psinakis from the anti-Marcos crusade overseas.Family friend Jake Lopez approached presidential adviser and thencabinet minister Joker P. Arroyo asking three favors on behalf of theLopez family: that Geny would take over the ABS–CBN and thePCIB, that Oscar Lopez oversee the First Philippine Holdings Cor-poration (FPHC), the holding company of the Meralco, and thatManolo head the Meralco.92

These favors were granted, the most controversial ones beingCory’s nomination of Oscar as head of FPHC and Manolo as presid-ent of Meralco. The nominations were supposed to be transitory;that is, the men were in their positions as officers-in-charge (OIC)only until such time as ownership and management of these compan-ies were settled. The appointment of Manolo, for example, was criti-cized in the press which argued that he gained his position onlybecause he was a Lopez and not because he was competent and quali-fied for it. One journalist emphasized that Manolo was a graduatefrom University of the East, bypassing many government technocratswith Harvard or Wharton business degrees.93 Minister Arroyo alsoreorganized the MFI board, and in turn MFI itself reorganized the

92 Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Recapturing the Glorious Days of Empire’, PhilippineDaily Inquirer, 14 July 1988, p. 1.

93 Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Lopez out of Meralco, Monsod Sneaks In’, Make My DayColumn, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 Sept. 1988, p. 5.


FPHC board to include Christian Monsod, Augusto Almeda Lopez,C. D. Quiazon, Stephen Psinakis and Finance Secretary VicenteJayme, mostly Lopez men.94 (Jake Lopez was a close friend of theLopez family, while Quiazon was the family lawyer, and Psinakis wasmarried to a Lopez.)

The initial emotional euphoria that was unleashed by the 1986‘People Power’ revolution was accompanied by an aversion for thekinship politics that dominated political and economic practice forfourteen years.95 The 1986 constitution ratified a few months afterMrs Aquino took office, had distinct provisions inserted precisely toprevent the resurgence of tendencies towards the practice of kinshippolitics. For example, it stated that no family should be allowed tohave the monopoly over media and industry. Also, certain provisionswere made against the establishment of political dynasties whereseveral family members served in political office simultaneously assenators, congressmen, governors, and mayors.96 In their attempt toprevent another resurgence of Marcos’ style kinship politics, the newconstitution therefore was declaring the official adherence to westernvalues.

The constitutional delegates were not the only ones antipatheticto the possible reincarnation of kinship politics a la Marcos. Soonafter Febrev (as the 1986 revolution was fondly called) journalistsexpressed paranoia over the return to ‘oligarchy and cronyism’.97

Confronted with this public general apprehension the Lopez familypublished a clarification of its demands:

1. Members of the family seek to redress an injustice perpetrated uponthem by the martial law regime. We want nothing more than a reasonable

94 Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Meralco Deal Lopezes Air Their Side’, Philippine DailyInquirer, 16 July 1988, p. 8.

95 This aversion to family monopolies in business was manifested in the 1986constitution although subsequent events (post-1988) revealed that kinship politicshas become the status quo again.

96 The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Republic of the Philippines TheConstitutional Commission of 1986, Quezon City, 15 Oct. 1986. See provisions onpp. 6, 15–16, 29, 39, 43, 55, 59, 65, and 85.

97 ‘Oligarchy Redux’, Philippines Free Press, 15 July 1987, pp. 15 and 38; ‘TheReturn of the ‘‘Old Oligarchs’’ ’, Philippines Free Press, 3 May 1986, pp. 16, 17, 23,and 39; Luis R. Mauricio, ‘The Return of Oligarchy’, Malaya, 27 June 1987, p. 4;Luis Mauricio, ‘Defiance of the Constitution’, Malaya, 30 June 1987, p. 4; ‘The Caseof Channel 4’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 July 1987, p. 4; Luis R. Mauricio, ‘AnotherAttempt at Deception’, Malaya, 2 July 1987, p. 4; Emil P. Jurado, ‘The KBP‘‘Pawns’’ ’, Manila Standard, 7 July 1987, p. 4; ‘Back to Oligarchy’, The Manila Times,9 July 1987, p. 4.


settlement of our claims or the family-owned assets that were either forciblyseized or clearly underpaid by the Marcos government and its cronies. . . .

3. In pursuing its objectives, the Lopez family has always sought and willcontinue to seek to identify its aspirations with those of the national inter-est, being fully aware of the urgent need for the country not only to createnew wealth but to promote a more equitable distribution of that wealth asa means of achieving a stable, democratic and just society.98

In a public statement therefore, the Lopez family was formallydeclaring its endorsement of the western values which place thenational interest above the familial one. In fact it stated unequivoc-ally that the family ‘has always’ tried to converge its interests withthat of the nation. But viewed with hindsight, subsequent actions ofthe Lopez family betrayed ambivalent attitudes as the family, blindto its own faults, practised kinship politics in their strategy to regaintheir former business corporations lost to the Marcos alliance(group).

One example will illustrate the Lopez family’s reliance on themethods of kinship politics. Unfortunately for them, the rekindlingof the aggressive familial behavior which in an earlier era had wonfor them the ownership of major Philippine corporations, would bepartially blocked in the new era that was initially somewhat less toler-ant of behavior that was so reminiscent of the Marcos regime. Themanner in which the Lopezes sought to reclaim the Manila ElectricCompany cannot be described other than as the aggressive applica-tion of kinship politics.

The ‘reclaiming’ of Meralco proved to be an extremely complic-ated issue because in this case the Lopezes received compensationfor it from the Marcoses (after Psinakis filed a suit in the UnitedStates), albeit minuscule. At the same time the company itself hadexpanded its operations since 1972 with funds outside of the Lopezfamily. It would be very difficult, then, to determine just how muchof the company was still rightfully owned by them. The companyitself was heavily indebted to the Development Bank of the Philip-pines (DBP) and was unable to repay its loans. The DBP then heldthe Meralco shares mortgaged as collateral for the loans. Further-more, the new government’s attitude that no family be allowed themonopoly of major industries and businesses predicated that at leastin theory, the Lopez family would not be granted the ‘special franch-ise’ to turn such a major public utility into a family company. Presid-

98 ‘Lopez Family States Position’, Philippines Daily Express, 11 June 1986, p. 5.


ent Aquino herself, ‘in a bid to dispel fears of an underhand dealwith the Lopezes’, insisted that plans for the privatization of Meralcoshould ensure that not a single business group or family wouldreceive outright control.99 Meralco was perceived to be too strategica company to be in the hands of a dynasty or oligarchy.100

Nonetheless, in July 1988 a columnist, Hilarion ‘Larry’ HenaresJr, exposed a major scandal involving the family’s attempts to regaincontrol of the Meralco. In a series of articles for the Philippine DailyInquirer, Henares brought to public attention the ‘Meralco Deal’wherein the Lopez family acquired control of 51% of Meralco withoutputting up the capital for it.101 In a convoluted arrangement, onewhich Henares confessed was so complex that it required five hourswith a computer to figure out and which still left many puzzles, thedeal transferred 16.5 million Meralco shares (65.12% of outstandingshares) from the DBP to two Lopez companies for only P690 million,or P41.73 per share when the market value then was P190 per share.The money for the shares would not come from the Lopez coffersbut the J. P. Morgan bank and the Bank of the Philippine Islands(BPI) which would buy 11.8 million shares (46.45% outstanding) atP58.50 per share. The rest of the shares would be transferred to theLopezes ‘with absolutely no cash outlay’.102 The furtiveness in whichthe deal was concocted also violated Cory’s policy of transparency inmajor government transactions. In the national context, the hand-ling of Meralco was significant because it was to be the ‘model’ forthe privatization of the other government-owned and controlled cor-porations such as the Philippine Air Lines, the Philippine NationalOil Corporation, the Manila Hotel, Cocobank, Oriental Petroleumand the San Miguel Brewery.103

The Lopez family had criticized the Marcoses for appropriatingtheir company without just compensation. And yet once they them-selves were back in power, they would not hesitate to acquire major-ity stock without putting up the collateral. Such behavior is evidencefor the conflict between kinship politics and western values: the

99 The Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July 1988, p. 92.100 Jesus P. Estanislao, ‘A Rejoinder: The Meralco Share Dispersal Program’, Phil-

ippine Daily Inquirer, 24 July 1988, p. 9.101 See Philippine Daily Inquirer from 11 July to 17 July 1988.102 Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Are the Oligarchs Back?’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11

July 1988, p. 1.103 Hilarion Henares Jr, ‘Lopez–Meralco Deal From the Beginning was Lutong

Makaw’, Philippine Free Press, 20 Aug. 1988, p. 8.


family perceived the faults of other families who practiced politica defamilia and criticized them in the language of western cultural values,but did not apply those same values to itself. Strong family ties,clever social dynamics, and top-level political connections alwaysmotivated it to behave in the manner that would benefit the familyfirst. For not unlike the previous methods used by the Lopezes inthe past, the Meralco deal was negotiated through personal connec-tions with key individuals in the government and in the bankinginstitutions. The family’s closeness to President Aquino also gavethem the confidence that the arrangement would receive her bless-ing and support. Despite the president’s initial support of the family,the government decided to abort the transaction, and in the latercompromise agreement that followed, the Lopez family and the banksyndicate were compelled to share a good portion of their profitswith the government.104 The signing of the compromise deal did notclose the chapter on the Meralco story. The Sandiganbayan105 firsthad to resolve whether the sale of Meralco shares by the governmentwas legal.106 It took four years for the Supreme Court to lift thesequestration on the FPHC Meralco shares, and it was only on Janu-ary 9, 1992 that the shares were listed on the stock exchange forthe public market. The immediate (and predictable) result of theselling of the FPHC’s Meralco shares meant that by December 31,1992, FPHC profits rose by 74%.107

Thus although initially the general response after the 1986 coupd’etat-turned-revolution was antipathy towards kinship politics of thecrony capitalist mode, kinship politics has succeeded in reassertingitself. For despite the attempts made to block the Lopez family’sskillful use of kinship politics to recapture and expand their businessempire,108 the latest developments seem to indicate a swing towardsthe resurgence of kinship politics.109

104 For more details on the Meralco scandal see Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’,pp. 188–9.

105 The Sandiganbayan is the court established to try public officials.106 The Business Star, 29 Aug. 1989, pp. 1 and 3.107 Maria Teresa Colayco, The Cornerstone, The Story of First Philippine Holdings Cor-

poration (Pasig, 1992), p. 117. This is a book commissioned for the thirty-year anni-versary of FPHC and published by FPHC, following the Philippine tradition of pub-lishing books and hagiographies that would give prestige to family corporations.

108 The Lopez family’s attempts to reclaim channels 2 and 4 were blocked. Theyreceived channel 2 but not channel 4 which became a government channel. Thefamily’s attempts for the franchise on the telecommunications satellite was blockedin 1989. See Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’, pp. 190–203.

109 Corruption in the Aquino regime revealed evidence of the constitution beingignored as corruption a la crony capitalism continued to flourish at a pace similarto that of the Marcos regime.


* * *

Even more than Karl Marx, Filipino businessmen have always beenacutely aware that politics and business are inextricably related. TheLopez family’s strategies for success mirrored this symbiotic relation-ship between political power and the special privileges that facilit-ated the rise of an economic conglomerate: family members in thepolitical arena provided the means through which the family couldbuild up a business empire. As long as Fernando Lopez was in power,whether as senator, or vice-president, brother Eugenio was able toacquire the special privileges, particularly the preferential bankloans that generated the capital for business investments. Given thissymbiotic relationship between political power and the connectionsnecessary for business success, it was not surprising that the family’sheight of political power (vice-president for two successive terms1965–1971) coincided with the summit of their economic wealth.Once political power was completely lost in the martial law years,the family was stripped of its business corporations overnight.

While the techniques of politica de familia practically ensured thefamily’s success, it inevitably courted criticism. In crucial points ofpost-war history, such criticism caused a fall from power and sub-sequently a loss of economic wealth. The continuing rise and fall ofthe family paralleled the cycles of administrations in the post-warperiod up to contemporary times. At the same time the family’sambivalence towards kinship politics and western values was typicalof many political families of the era who continued to use kinshippolitics to build social prominence, while criticizing their rivals whomthey perceived as immoral, precisely because they were advocates ofkinship politics.

Conclusion

The conflict hypothesis explains the recurring cycles of politicaladministrations in post-war Philippines and provides a meaningfulframework with which to analyze patterns within specific periods andacross different eras—the republican period, the martial law period,and the Aquino administration. Political administrations are com-posed of family alliances in power. The conflict between the two setsof values triggers the rise and fall of family alliances, and con-sequently, these endless cycles. The conflict hypothesis also explainsthe ambivalent behavior of families who apply the yardstick of west-


ern values when criticizing their rivals but who themselves practicekinship politics. Such ambivalence was an important factor that pre-vented resolution of the conflict.

A steady deterioration of Philippine economy and politics hasoccurred at the end of each successive cycle. Instead of a linear devel-opment, a downhill trend is observed, as the Philippines declinesin prosperity and institutions reveal signs of breaking down. Therepublican period (1945–1972) witnessed the marginal prosperity ofthe Philippine economy being siphoned off by politicians and familieswho were later criticized for graft and corruption. The period experi-enced the classic oscillations wherein families entered politics,carved business empires, were criticized for such immoral behavior,then were voted out and replaced by other families who not longafter became guilty of the same sins. President Macapagal’s attemptsto end the era of special privileges only met with staunch resistancefrom the elite families who became more determined to deny himanother term of office and replace him with a president more predis-posed to the practice of kinship politics. With American support,Marcos as the first president to gain a second term of office, brokethese seemingly never ending political cycles by escalating the pat-ronage system, and crippling the country’s finances in an extravagantre-election campaign. This break was further made apparent by hisassuming dictatorial powers under martial law. But the crony capital-ism that characterized the Marcos regime merely escalated the mag-nitude of graft and corruption to unprecedented heights. The Aquinoadministration riding on a popular ‘revolution’ against crony capital-ism failed to check the magnitude of crony corruption and insteadincreased the rate at which fortunes could be amassed; the Coju-angco family (Mrs Aquino is a Cojuangco) alliance has been accusedof acquiring crony assets in less time than it took the crony capital-ists to accumulate them.110 Thus, despite the ratification of the 1986constitution which championed western values, and whose provisionsspecifically sought to bar the family alliance from excessive kinshippolitics, kinship politics is still dominant in contemporary Philip-pines. Apparently, deteriorating economic conditions have increasedthe needs of families, thereby worsening the magnitude of corrup-tion;—and the cycle continues.

110 Due to spatial constraints material on the Marcos and Cojuangco families isnot included here. See Maria Natividad Roces, ‘Kinship’, chapter five, for data onthese families.


The case study of the Lopez family presents the conflict in tangibleform. The family’s rapid rise to national prominence after the warwas largely due to its aggressiveness in applying the techniques ofpolitica de familia. Their actions were exposed and censured particu-larly by Presidents Diosdado Macapagal and Ferdinand Marcos.Throughout the period Fernando Lopez in his political speeches con-tinually reiterated his commitment to western values. Marcos in1972 declared martial law ostensibly to destroy the oligarchy andput an end to the practice of kinship politics and herald a new eraof democratic western values. Although he succeeded in vanquishinghis rivals, including the Lopez family, Marcos instead institutional-ized kinship politics as the only form of political behavior viable, withhis own family alliance becoming the only possible practitioners ofthe art. The Lopez family, clear victims of the Marcos vendettaagainst the rival family alliances, when finally roused to challengethe Marcos regime, and applying the standard of western values,accused it of kinship politics. But when in 1986 the Aquino adminis-tration replaced the Marcos regime and the Lopez family was oncemore close to the powers that be, despite their public statementsdeclaring the family’s loyalty to the national interest, the next gen-eration of Lopezes utilized kinship politics to regain former corpora-tions lost to President Marcos.

The history of the Lopez family is also a microscopic view of thelife cycle of kinship politics. The Lopez family built its entire empirethrough the use of kinship politics; by utilizing political power toacquire special privileges. The saga of the family’s rise and fall mir-rors its success and failures in implementing the techniques of pol-itica de familia. Kinship politics was the vehicle used by families tobuild a successful economic empire. Coupled with family unity andtalent it became a formidable force in the national political arena.In fact, comparatively speaking it seemed almost necessary for afamily to operate using politica de familia if it wanted to achieve suc-cess, albeit temporary. Nevertheless these families did not perceivethemselves to be champions of the precepts of kinship politics.Instead, they saw themselves as dutiful family members fulfillingtheir obligations to their family by aiding in the prosperous growthof their family’s prominence. At the same time, because they hadalso been imbued with western cultural values they insisted (andperhaps really believed) that their actions were purely altruistic, andthat they had not neglected to consider the national interest.

The case study of the Lopez family demonstrates that success


engineered by politica de familia by its very nature was temporary andephemeral. It was political power that gave the family access to spe-cial privileges used for the expansion of the family business corpora-tion: loans from government banks and financial institutions, dollarallocations, special business franchises, quotas, and tax incentives orexemptions. But eventually, the family was criticized for its neglectof the national interest and faced with a total loss of political power.Once political power was lost, the family empire, so dependent onthis artificial and arbitrary special treatment, disintegrated.

As the Lopez family history patently illustrates, kinship politics isthe underlying formidable force that propels political behavior anddecision making in Philippine political culture. For example, kinshippolitics subverts United States-style democratic elections. Since thedemocratic system in the Philippines postulates that there must betwo parties, family rival alliances have permeated the democraticstructure and placed themselves in opposition so that the result isthat both parties are not ideologically different—merely a venuethrough which kinship politics could play itself out in the politicalarena, merely a method through which family rivals can battle eachother for malakas (strong) status in the public arena, making assump-tion to power at least legally and openly justifiable. Kinship politicsturns the democratic system into a machine for its own ends. Thebehavior of the family alliance itself is more consistently driven bykinship politics despite its sporadic attempts to heed to westernvalues. Thus the outside world is perceived in terms of the family—for instance, The Manila Chronicle, the Lopez-owned newspaper, isoperated not as a profitable business but as a mouthpiece or weaponof the Lopez family interests. Similarly, the management of familycorporations is conducted according to the primary interest of thefamily, and political office is seen as the method with which to buildan economic empire for the family.

Finally, by diagnosing kinship politics as the root cause of politicaland economic behavior, and by examining the ambivalence resultingfrom the conflict between two opposing values, the approach is nota ‘history from below’, neither is it a view only from the ‘top’ or theelite point of view,111 nor is it a western interpretation of Philippine

111 This approach does not limit itself to elite family behavior alone, but thebehavior of all Filipino families. In fact, poorer families can become elite by allyingwith a politically powerful or malakas family. For example, many of the Marcos cro-nies were not originally of the elite until they allied with the Marcoses. Further-more, because of the vertical structure, the family alliance includes up to poorer


politics, but an attempt at a ‘history from within’. Philippine historyis interpreted according to Filipino cultural values and experienceswhich incorporate both the traditional ethos and the western valuesbrought in by the colonial experience. Finally, the analysis of kinshippolitics may even provide a new theoretical springboard from whichto undertake similar studies in other countries of Southeast Asia.Family dynamics was present for example in Ngo Dinh Diem’s SouthVietnam, Chiang Kai Shek’s Kuomintang regime, Suharto’s Indone-sia and even Nicaragua under Somoza.112 The conflict hypothesisitself could be used to explain not only the ambivalent behavior offamily alliances and the cycles of administrations, but one couldspeculate, quite possibly the dramatic oscillations between demo-cracy and authoritarianism that pepper the experience of post-warSoutheast Asia; Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines inparticular.

members of the alliance, all of whom identify with the elite family. Since the elitefamilies are inveterate rivals, the alliances are between the elite families and theirpoorer clients who identify with them. The Lopez employee thinks of himself aspart of the Lopez family network and the Lopez family members consider theiremployees as part of ‘family’.

112 Latin America would provide an excellent point of comparison. For example,Nicaragua under Somoza would be very similar to the Philippine case. In fact, theterm politica de familia was taken from the Latin American literature which boastsof a sophisticated body of literature on family studies. The Latin American scholarsused this term to refer to the phenomenon wherein prominent families occupiedseveral political posts, or family-based politics and kin networks, and sometimes tothe patterns wherein regional elites controlled the politics and economic activitiesof the region. Though I used the term to refer to kinship politics and the family’suse of political power to build a business empire, the Latin American studies areexcellent models of the idiosyncracies involving the actual practice of kinship polit-ics. See Diane Balmori, ‘Family and Politics: Three Generations (1790–1890)’,Journal of Family History, Vol. 10, No. 3; Linda Lewin, ‘Some Historical Implicationsof Kinship Organization for Family-Based Politics in the Brazilian Northeast’, Com-parative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 1979; Linda Lewin, Politicsand Parentela in Paraiba. A Case Study of Family-Based Oligarchy in Brazil (Princeton,1987); Billy Jaynes Chandler, The Feitosas and the Sertao dos Inhamuns. The History ofa Family and a Community in Northeast Brazil, 1700–1930 (Gainsville, 1972); MarkWasserman, Capitalists, Caciques and Revolution. The Native Elite and Foreign Enterprisein Chihuahua, Mexico, 1854–1911 (London, 1984).

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