Morales | 1

Morales | 2

Climate-Driven Permafrost Thaw Jeopardizes Alaskan Industrial Infrastructure and Community Health Jennifer Morales April 2020

Executive Summary

The consequences of global warming are diverse and interconnected. In the Arctic, temperatures are rising at 0.6 degrees Celsius per decade, twice the average global temperature rate of increase.1 This has caused sea ice and glaciers to melt, raising concerns about global sea level rise.2 A less well known consequence of rising Arctic temperatures is the thawing of permafrost, ground that has been frozen for two years or more. Because permafrost contains undecomposed frozen plant and animal material, it contains twice as much carbon as currently exists in Earth’s atmosphere.3 If enough permafrost thaws, a positive feedback loop could develop in which rising global temperatures lead to thawing permafrost, which releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, adding to the upward trend in global temperatures.4

Many studies have concluded that the carbon stores in the Arctic have the potential to significantly impact rates of global warming,5 although the range of possible effect scenarios ultimately depends on human emissions. International coordination is already underway through efforts like the 2015 Paris Agreement, a key goal of which is to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century. Preventing the triggering of a permafrost carbon feedback loop is essential to achieve worldwide goals and can only be reached through international cooperation.6 Yet the paradox of climate change is that while the mechanisms that drive it are complex and occur on a global scale, its most severe impacts are experienced as a local phenomenon. Worldwide, slowing the rate of permafrost thaw is essential to mitigate global warming. However, much of the permafrost in the Arctic is already susceptible to thawing. In Alaska, where 85% of land is covered by permafrost, negative consequences of permafrost thaw are already being seen across natural, economic, health, and security sectors.

This paper highlights Alaska as a case study for the effects of melting permafrost. In Alaska, commercial infrastructure related to oil pipelines and essential community health services are at risk from thawing permafrost. Weakened industrial infrastructure threatens the economic security of many communities, and could negatively affect the state budget which relies heavily on revenue from oil operations. Compromised health infrastructure, such as water and sewer systems, have led to increased health issues—especially for Native Alaskan communities. To effectively mitigate the effects of permafrost thaw in Alaska, proactive infrastructure adaptations need to be developed, new mechanisms for coordination between decisionmakers and scientists are required, and communities must develop planning processes that are adaptable to a changing climate.

Center for Anticipatory Intelligence

Student Research Reports

Morales | 3

Introduction: Melting Permafrost a Critical, Underappreciated Factor in Climate Change

Average temperatures throughout the Arctic are rising at about twice the rate of other parts of the globe.7 Much has been written about the loss of Arctic sea ice and the consequences of rising seas.8 Another critical but less notorious effect of rising Arctic temperatures is the thaw of permafrost, ground that has remained frozen for at least two years. Permafrost contains undecomposed frozen plant and animal matter that houses double the amount of carbon currently in the atmosphere, much of which is released when the ground thaws. 9

Permafrost covers roughly 25% of the Northern Hemisphere, or 9 million square miles, most of it concentrated in the Arctic.10 It is classified into three categories: continuous, discontinuous, and sporadic. Permafrost is considered continuous if it underlies 90-100% of the landscape; discontinuous if it underlies 50-90%, and sporadic if it underlies 10-50%.11 Since permafrost is sensitive to changes in air temperature and snow cover, and because the Arctic is warming much faster than the rest of the planet, much of the permafrost in the Northern Hemisphere is at risk of thawing and releasing carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. A 2019 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report found that thawing permafrost across the Arctic could be releasing an estimated 300-600 million tons of net carbon into the atmosphere per year.12

Roughly 70% of infrastructure in the permafrost domain is in areas with a high probability of near surface permafrost thaw.13 While much of the concern about carbon release and damage to infrastructure focuses on near surface permafrost thaw, new studies suggest that some areas of permafrost are vulnerable to thawing at greater depths than previously anticipated.14 If permafrost were to thaw not just in the top three meters, but much deeper, carbon stored in the soil for millennia has the potential to be released into the atmosphere, contributing even more to the global carbon feedback cycle than expected. Carbon release from permafrost degradation is expected to contribute 0.13-0.27 degrees Celsius to global temperatures by 2100.15

A 2018 study suggested that permafrost thaw is one of a few self-reinforcing feedback cycles that could contribute to a planetary temperature threshold that, if crossed, would cause continued global warming even if human emissions are reigned in.16 The authors of the study emphasize that in order to avoid this scenario, humans need to act now to significantly reduce emissions and suggest that we need to adapt to the unavoidable and irreversible impacts of the warming that has already occurred.

Macro-Level Climate Models Insufficient to Prepare Communities for Permafrost Melt Effects

Many government and academic models attempt to shed light on potential future climate scenarios. Among the most reputable of these models is the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), which provides several potential pathways for the global climate.17 The report covers the emissions scenarios most likely to enable the world to achieve the goal of keeping global average temperature increases below 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial temperatures and summarizes the current state of knowledge about global warming and its worldwide effects.

Morales | 4

A key component of the IPCC report is its Representative Concentration Pathways, or greenhouse gas concentration trajectories used for climate modeling. The four pathways describe possible future climate scenarios, with the average expected temperature increase across all pathways lying between 0.3 and 4.8 degrees Celsius. This ranges from very mild temperature increases that would not cause significant adverse impacts, to immense temperature increases that would return the Earth to average temperatures not seen for millions of years with potentially catastrophic effects.18 The report includes such a broad range of scenarios because climate projections have significant limitations. Scientists only have detailed and consistent data for the past few decades to centuries. In terms of global average temperature changes, this is a tiny baseline data set, and any projections made from it will have a high degree of uncertainty. Certain trends can be confidently identified, however. The IPCC report found with very high confidence that permafrost temperatures worldwide have increased to record level highs and that sea ice has been losing mass at a rapid rate. The challenge arises in predicting how these measurable changes will affect the complex global climate mechanisms over time.

Because of the inherent uncertainty in climate change predictions, and the wide range of possible outcomes, it is difficult to identify a clear optimal path forward. It is possible to overestimate the intensity of mitigation techniques needed to prevent disaster, locking up otherwise profitable resources; but it is also possible to underestimate the mitigation actions needed and be left to cope with the increased costs of maintaining and retrofitting infrastructure affected badly by climate change. Climate change is also correlated with increased adverse outcomes like crop failure, migration, and conflict.19 Based on governmental responses to date, overreaction and unnecessary lockup of resources does not appear to be a real concern in response to climate change in comparison to the risk of underreaction.

Given that the best estimates contain such a wide range of potential scenarios, there is significant need for further regional and local modeling. Global warming affects different locales in different ways, and the responses needed to deal with its consequences vary by area. Permafrost covers the majority of the Arctic circle, across several countries and continents. This paper focuses on a case study of the US state of Alaska to get an in depth sense of the impacts of climate change in one geographic and governmental area. Understanding the immediate impacts of global warming on Alaskan communities and ecosystems can provide a starting point from which to better understand the consequences of permafrost thaw throughout the Arctic.

Substantial permafrost research and modeling has been done in Alaska, but state government reports and academic articles continue to highlight the need for additional local and regional level data. The IPCC report focuses on global climate trends and is too widely scoped to form a sufficient information foothold for Alaskan stakeholders to base local climate policies on. Rising air temperatures are the most significant driver of permafrost degradation and therefore the variable that most large scale studies rely on, but other local factors also contribute, including snow cover, vegetation thickness, and topography.20 Further research at a smaller scale is necessary to provide decisionmakers with the information necessary to prepare for changes to their own communities.21 Climate downscaling, a process in which local-level data is used in conjunction with large-scale models to get a more granular resolution, is a useful tool but requires intense computing power and can be time-consuming.22 A 2013 study compiling stakeholder-identified research needs found that the most urgent research needs were related

Morales | 5

to the human impacts of climate change, specifically infrastructure, economic effects, and safety.23 To understand why permafrost thaw is a threat that requires quick and coordinated action to remedy, the most pressing impacts of permafrost thaw are explained below, with special focus on Alaska.

Ecological Impacts of Thawing Permafrost Amplify Carbon and Methane Release

One adverse impact of permafrost thaw is thermokarst—new sinkholes, pits, and lakes caused by sudden changes in land stability. When ice-rich permafrost thaws, the ice turns to water and the ground loses stability, becoming a muddy sludge that cannot support vegetation. Often the result is a phenomenon called “drunken forests,” where trees lean in random directions. If the area does not have good drainage, the trees eventually die and plants that can survive in water-rich areas begin to replace them.24 These changes are accompanied by shifting animal populations, which can affect Native Alaskan communities, many of which still rely on hunting for much of their food. Increased incidence of thermokarst troughs has been observed in northern Alaska since at least the 1990s, corresponding to a rapid rise in regional summer air temperatures and permafrost temperatures, and affecting at least 19% of the region’s natural landscapes as of 2001.25 Thermokarst can cause partial or total destruction of an ecosystem, and instigate the transition to an entirely new ecosystem.

Plant migration due to thawing permafrost also has the potential to affect the release of greenhouses gases. When permafrost thaws in water-rich sites, entire areas can transition from forest or tundra to wetlands. Methane production from grass and shrub sites can be four times greater than in forest sites.26 While forests generally provide better insulation and thus keep permafrost from thawing, shrubs still insulate frozen ground to a lesser extent. Removal of shrubs has been shown to lead to permafrost thaw, wetter conditions, and an increase in methane emissions.27 Another input of the positive carbon feedback cycle in permafrost areas is increased incidence of wildfires. Higher average temperatures lead to increased rates of summer wildfires in Alaska.28 Wildfires remove insulating plant cover, further contributing to permafrost thaw and decreasing snow cover, and adding to the carbon feedback loop.

Together, these natural mechanisms and interconnected processes amplify the effect of rising Arctic temperatures on permafrost degradation. Much of the discontinuous permafrost in Alaska is vulnerable, often within only 1-2 degrees Celsius of thawing. The northernmost parts of Alaska are covered by continuous permafrost, which becomes discontinuous and eventually sporadic on the southern coast near Anchorage. Measurements have shown 0.5 degree Celsius increases in permafrost temperature in the high Arctic since 2008, indicating that decisionmakers will very likely need to accommodate for melting permafrost in the coming years, especially in areas underlain by discontinuous permafrost.29

Industrial Infrastructure Damage from Permafrost Thaw Threatens Alaskan Economic Stability

The Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) crosses the state of Alaska from north to south and is responsible for between a quarter and a third of the jobs in the state.30 The pipeline spans the entire state of Alaska and is used to transport petroleum from the North Slope oil fields on the Arctic coast to Valdez in the south. Alaska relied on petroleum production for most of its

Morales | 6

revenue from 1980-2016, accounting for up to 90% of General Fund revenues in some years. The General Fund provides the money for the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, a $1,000 to $2,000 check given to every Alaskan resident annually. The state continues to rely heavily on oil revenue, with private oil companies supplying $3.1 billion in state and local taxes in 2019.31

The TAPS traverses 800 miles, 340 miles of which is susceptible to near-surface permafrost thaw by 2050, according to a study from the University of Alaska Fairbanks.32 The North Slope, where the oil extraction occurs, is part of the 20% of permafrost worldwide that is susceptible to thermokarst, sudden land erosion due to thawing ice. Models indicate that most of the discontinuous permafrost in Alaska is within 1-2 degrees Celsius of thawing and that the North Slope is warming at 2.6 times the rate of the continental US.33 Although typical oil pipelines run underground, more than half of the TAPS was constructed above ground using vertical supports to accommodate permafrost. As early as 2001, the Joint State-Federal Pipeline Office reported that at least 22,000 vertical TAPS supports might be experiencing problems due to climate change.34 Oil production on the North Slope occurs at Prudhoe Bay. In 1978, permafrost temperatures 65 feet underground at a Prudhoe Bay site averaged -27 degrees Celsius. In 2018, the same depth had warmed to -5 degrees Celsius.35

Many production pads and TAPS supports were constructed with refrigeration mechanisms to ensure stability if permafrost begins to thaw. However, the oil industry and rural communities in Alaska still rely on frozen ground to enable transportation by ice road during winter months. Rising annual temperatures have shortened the season when this is possible, restricting the time frame for oil profitability and increasing the cost of delivering food, fuel, and equipment.36 The Dalton Highway, a mostly gravel road and the only permanent route connecting the North Slope oil fields to interior Alaska, is already experiencing sinkholes and subsidence due to permafrost thaw just 50 miles south of Prudhoe Bay.37

Permafrost thaw also poses a challenge to pipeline infrastructure itself and to storage mechanisms used to contain drilling waste. Surface sumps, pits used to store drilling waste, are no longer used in Alaska, but below ground sumps remain common.38 Spread of waste materials from thawing in-ground sumps can affect nearby wildlife and vegetation, and potentially contaminate water sources. Although surface sumps are no longer constructed in Alaska, many old sumps remain and are at risk of thaw.39 Half of the sumps constructed in the 1970s have collapsed or are near collapse.40

A 2008 study predicted that climate change could add 10–20% to Alaska’s public infrastructure costs by 2030, with 49% of the additional costs coming from road and runway construction, and a third from maintaining water and sewer systems.41 The 2018 Fourth National Climate Assessment predicted that the overall costs of climate change in Alaska will range from $3-6 billion between 2008 and 2030.42 Because the oil production platforms and many homes and businesses that support oil production are all in this rapidly changing area, they are vulnerable to damage unless careful planning is implemented to ensure stability of infrastructure and transportation in the face of rising temperatures.

Morales | 7

Permafrost Thaw Threatens Housing and Community Stability in Native Alaskan Villages

According to a 2003 Governmental Accountability Office report, most of Alaska’s 200 plus Native villages were affected to some degree by flooding and erosion, both of which are correlated with rising temperatures.43 Riverbank, coastal, and inland erosion can be caused by melting permafrost. An Army Corps of Engineers report found that 31 communities are facing imminent threats from critical erosion problems. Twelve of those communities are currently seeking to relocate their villages due to unmanageable threats from erosion.44

Relocation is a dramatic change for any community, but can be especially difficult for Alaskan Native populations who have strong historical ties to specific locales and place-based cultural practices.45 Many communities who have decided that relocation is the only viable option are struggling to begin the process due to legal restrictions at the state and national level. In 2005, the governor of Alaska enacted an administrative order prioritizing the infrastructure needs of existing communities above proposals to create new communities, unless Congress directed a specific community to relocate (this, however, is not an actual authority Congress has). Additionally, communities facing destruction of infrastructure from erosion and flooding cannot secure federal funding because regulations require the government to defer construction in places susceptible to flooding. This regulatory catch-22 prevents communities from receiving funding to fix existing infrastructure, but also prevents them from getting funding to start the relocation process.46

The lack of coordination between state and federal agencies has led some state officials to suggest community-funded temporary relocation to multiple other locations while waiting for the new village to be built. However, a US Army Corps of Engineers study determined that “the disintegration of these people as a distinct tribe may result from splitting the community in two or more locations for many years as they relocate under their own efforts.”47

Thawing Permafrost Destabilizes Water Systems, Makes Humans Vulnerable to Disease

In recent years, permafrost has made headlines around the world because of pathogens discovered in its frozen soil. In Siberia, novel viruses have been discovered in newly thawed permafrost, and existing pathogens like smallpox and measles are known to be frozen in some areas.48 Increased human exposure to these pathogens due to permafrost thaw is a reasonable concern, as the current Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated that novel pathogens can wreak global havoc if allowed to spread. Pathogens that are new to humans and familiar diseases that have been nearly eradicated can survive in permafrost for decades, in some cases millennia.49

When humans are exposed to these pathogens by thawing permafrost, outbreaks can occur. In 2016, an anthrax outbreak in Russia killed one child and infected at least 90 people after thawing permafrost exposed the infected carcass of a reindeer.50 Despite this, a few factors make a global outbreak originating from melted permafrost unlikely. The population of the entire Arctic region is only four million and is widely dispersed. The largest city, Murmansk, has just over 300,000 residents. Fortunately, the communities most likely to come into contact with pathogens couched in permafrost are rural, even isolated, and are unlikely to be the origin of a global pandemic because most outbreaks can be contained locally. Arctic communities would be wise

Morales | 8

to develop public health practices and educational outreach to prepare residents for the risk from pathogens exposed by thawing permafrost, but these measures can generally be handled locally.

Several less sensational health concerns are exacerbated by thawing permafrost, which can destabilize or render unusable water and sewer systems. The 2014 US Census Annual Housing Survey found that only 69% of Native Alaskan residents have access to running water and complete sewer systems.51 A 2005 study from the US Arctic Research Commission concluded that many water and sanitation systems in Alaska were unsustainable long-term.52 Permafrost thaw puts even more rural homes and communities at risk of facing water shortages, through damage to infrastructure and corruption of water sources. It is common in rural Alaska for water and sewer lines to be built above ground because digging through permafrost is prohibitively expensive. For communities with above ground water and sewer lines, permafrost thaw can disrupt their distribution mechanisms by causing ground erosion or slumping, compelling some villages to return to hauling water and sewage by hand.53 Thawing permafrost has also caused some river banks to erode, corrupting the rivers with sediment and affecting community water supplies.54 A 2016 study found that Alaskan Native communities without in-home water systems were more likely to have higher hospitalization rates for pneumonia and influenza, skin infections, and respiratory viruses.55

Changes in water quality due to permafrost thaw have been documented in rural Alaska, forcing some communities to abandon existing water and sewer systems. The coastal community of Kivalina closed their public shower, laundromat, and toilet system after water quality was compromised repeatedly due to erosion. The resulting lack of water access was correlated with an increase in clinic visits for skin infections.56 Native Alaskan children have some of the highest rates of water-washed disease occurrence in the world57—diseases where sanitation by water can prevent transmission. Ensuring sustainable long-term access to clean water and sewer systems is essential to reduce rates of disease.

Technical, Policy Innovation Needed to Foster Climate Resilience Among Alaskan Stakeholders

Even if the international community manages to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius, it is expected that 25% of permafrost will thaw worldwide.58 This means that communities in Alaska will have to develop strategies to plan for, adapt to, and cope with the consequences of thawing permafrost. Developing resilience will require building and maintaining infrastructure that is robust in the face of permafrost thaw and other intensifying climate effects. Adaptable decision-making processes that include input from diverse groups of stakeholders can ensure that potential problems and solutions are identified quickly. Two-way communication between local residents and government officials is essential to ensure community health and economic stability in the face of climate change.

Irreversible warming effects are already affecting daily life in Alaska, with some of the most severe consequences affecting rural villages with limited resources to deal with them. The economy of Alaska is also vulnerable. To cope with the effects of thawing permafrost, the state faces the prospect of costly but necessary retrofitting of old infrastructure, relocating villages, and losses of state revenue arising from challenges to oil production. Overall costs of climate change in Alaska are predicted to range from $3-6 billion between 2008 and 2030.59

Morales | 9

Encouragingly, many infrastructure needs already have available technical solutions. Solutions to the infrastructure challenges facing oil production and pipeline transportation include refrigeration of platforms and strut bases, measures to increase soil stability, and building design that can withstand changing temperatures.60 Waste sumps can be constructed with liners, instead of relying on frozen soil to keep hazardous materials contained. Old sumps may need to be retrofitted to prevent waste leakage. Many of these measures have already been implemented, but may need updating as warming is occurring faster than expected. Private oil companies have incentive and means to invest in these measures and to develop improved technical solutions so they can continue to profitably develop oil resources in Alaska. For local communities, there are greater obstacles to successfully solving infrastructure problems arising from thawing permafrost, including a lack of funding and technical assistance. In both private and public cases, actively anticipating future climate change scenarios during the construction process is essential to prevent major damage.

Proactive infrastructure adaptations and construction techniques can avert a significant chunk of the cost of climate change in Alaska. One study found that between now and 2080, infrastructure and construction adaptations could save anywhere from 10% to 45% of costs resulting from climate change. The study analyzed 19 categories of public infrastructure in Alaska and calculated the projected costs of building maintenance under three scenarios: infrastructure lifespan given no climate change, lifespan given moderate climate change and no adaptation, and lifespan in the case of moderate climate change with adaptive measures. In the adaptation case, additional costs are incurred to anticipate climate change, but the overall cost is less than in the case of no adaptation.61 Early investment in improved infrastructure is projected to save money in the long term, because developing climate resilient buildings and utility systems is less expensive than retrofitting failing ones. Developing statewide formal criteria for assessing climate change impacts on critical infrastructure can provide communities and state agencies a framework to begin to plan for likely changes in regional and local climate conditions.

Regulatory Obstacles Hinder Climate Resilience Project Approval and Implementation

An analysis by the Army Corps of Engineers of rural communities at risk of erosion damage pointed out that legislative requirements limit the opportunities for federal funding of infrastructure projects in Alaska. Some villages fail to qualify for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding because they have not been declared a national disaster area or because they do not have approved disaster mitigation plans.62 Some are not eligible for federal grants because unincorporated Alaska Native villages are not considered eligible units of government. Because federal projects are approved based on cost-benefit ratios, and infrastructure projects in rural Alaska have high costs with comparatively few beneficiaries, they are less likely to be approved even when the need is evident. Cost-sharing requirements also make many projects infeasible because rural Alaskan communities have little ability to afford building, maintenance, or relocation costs. Some of these challenges can be remedied by the villages themselves, for instance by developing disaster mitigation plans, which are likely a good community investment even if they fail to secure federal funding. Additionally, an Alaska-specific exemption from these requirements is a feasible legislative tool that would open up access to funding for rural Alaskan villages. Such an exemption was instituted in 2005, but was repealed in 2009.63

Morales | 10

Although the Army Corps of Engineers has identified the rural communities at greatest risk from erosion, there is no federal mandate to prioritize funding based on this assessment. Additionally, there is no designated federal program designed to assist with community relocation. Instead, various federal agencies are authorized to fund specific projects, like funding for home relocation or sewer system construction.64 The decentralized composition of available funding requires the villages to complete several federal applications. Time and resources would likely be saved if the process could be streamlined to require only one application to a designated federal relocation program.

The small size of many villages is another challenge to successful infrastructure projects. One study found that many rural communities have an insufficient economic base to support needed utility systems. The rough number needed to support a community haul water system was between 200 and 300 residents. If only two families were to discontinue service or payment, the utility would no longer be solvent and would not generate enough revenue to sustain its own maintenance.65 Here, improved technical solutions are needed to develop utility systems that are safe, effective in the unique Alaskan environment, and able to be maintained by local communities. Local population input is essential to design and implement utility systems that are viable and sustainable. In 1996, the Indian Health Service designed its own water and sewer system and installed it in the northwestern Alaskan community of Buckland; however, the system was not appropriate for local conditions. The small size of homes, the community’s unmaintained roads, and excessive electrical costs necessary to operate made the system inviable, and many locals reverted to self-hauling their own water and waste.66

Local Knowledge and Adaptive Policy Planning Essential to Manage Permafrost Thaw Effects

State officials have an opportunity to more effectively incorporate local knowledge into the planning process for infrastructure and other policy decisions. Researchers in Alaska are very actively studying climate change on the local and regional level; however, most studies focus on natural processes and phenomena linked to global warming. This was a logical first step in the research process, because it has allowed scientists to confirm that global warming is impacting important natural and human activities in Alaska. There is now a robust literature establishing the linkages between global warming and changing landscapes. A compilation of surveys on local and state level research needs from community and government stakeholders indicates that there is now a need for data on the human effects of climate change, specifically infrastructure, economic effects, and safety.67

Some valuable research has already been done in this area, but further coordination between decisionmakers, residents facing the effects of climate change, and researchers is needed to provide actionable local level findings. A statewide program facilitating a process in which local residents can define research needs then collaborate with researchers to fill those information gaps and make informed decisions could bridge the communication gap that currently exists between locals and academic researchers. Many state colleges have extension services that facilitate similar cooperation between local residents and university employees. A comparable program that includes state officials would be valuable in leveraging the

Morales | 11

considerable knowledge and skills of researchers with the location-specific knowledge of Alaskan residents and state officials’ knowledge of applicable policy tools.68

Perhaps the most important wide-scale change needed to successfully deal with the challenges of a changing climate are adaptive policy planning procedures. Because there is a wide range of future climate scenarios and because the macro-level causes of global warming will affect local communities differently based on their unique location and topography, it is difficult and time consuming to accurately predict the long-term local effects of global warming. In Alaska, many rural communities are already facing adverse circumstances associated with the effects of climate change, which force them to act now and make decisions in low-information environments. Alaskans need both short term solutions that can be enacted immediately and procedures for planning that can be effective despite uncertainty about the future.

Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways (DAPP) are a promising tool to help communities plan for uncertain future situations. Under the DAPP process, stakeholders first define what success is—the desired outcome. Then the current situation and several potential future scenarios are compared to policy objectives to identify gaps. In Alaska, this step would involve figuring out the predicted local effects of the various IPCC Representative Concentration Pathways. Possible actions are then identified that could help meet objectives, such as maintenance of sustainable utility services, and preferred policy pathways chosen. Multiple pathways are identified along with contingency plans so policymakers can switch pathways depending on how global warming advances. If changing circumstances render the first action path inadequate, there are viable alternatives available to implement. Monitoring is an essential step of this process so that policymakers can determine whether current action plans are effective, and can identify thresholds that signal a need to change to a different action plan.69

Some forums already exist to encourage the types of resiliency measures discussed above. The Rapid Arctic Transitions due to Infrastructure and Climate (RATIC) initiative is a forum sponsored by the International Arctic Science Committee for developing and sharing new methods, ideas, and best practices related to climate change in the Arctic. It specifically focuses on “assessing, responding to, and adaptively managing the cumulative effects of Arctic infrastructure and climate change.”70 Local level data on areas vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in Alaska are available through several Climate Change Vulnerability Indexes, developed by the US Geological Survey, and academic researchers.71 These resources are often used by researchers but surveys of Alaskan communities suggest that local residents may be unaware of them, or unsure how to access them.72 A mechanism for coordination between researchers and locals will help remedy this knowledge gap.

Collaborative, Adaptive Partnerships Key to Ensuring Resilience Despite Climate Uncertainty

Preventing catastrophic levels of global warming is a worldwide effort that will require international cooperation and significant changes to industrial practices. Measures to accomplish this overarching effort largely fall outside the scope of this paper, but an extensive literature exists on the topic, with a consensus that global greenhouse emissions will have to be cut drastically using a variety of methods and policy tools.

Morales | 12

Meanwhile, the effects of climate change are already being felt in various locales around the world, including Alaska. The earlier that communities, industry leaders, and state officials can begin to implement strategies to mitigate the effects of climate change and refrain from contributing more carbon to the atmosphere, the greater the chance of minimizing economic costs and loss of human life or livelihood. Success in planning for, mitigating, and adapting to climate change in Alaska will depend on cooperation and successful collaboration between state officials, local residents, and researchers. Development of formal criteria for evaluating risks from climate change and forums for cooperation between parties can help achieve these goals. Particular attention to developing infrastructure that is robust in a range of climate scenarios will ensure long-term stability of communities, business, and the Alaskan way of life.

Morales | 13

Endnotes

1 E. A. G. Schuur et al., “Climate Change and the Permafrost Carbon Feedback,” Nature 520, no. 7546 (April 2015): 171–79, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14338. Alaska Public Lands Information Center, “Permafrost,” Alaska Centers, July 28, 2017, https://www.alaskacenters.gov/explore/attractions/permafrost. 2 UN intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate Summary for Policymakers,” September 24, 2019, https://report.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf. 3 UN intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate Summary for Policymakers,” September 24, 2019, https://report.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf. 4 Will Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 33 (August 6, 2018): 8252–59, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115. 5 “Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment | AMAP,” Amap.no, May 6, 2019, https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-arctic-climate-impact-assessment/796. Jennifer W. Harden et al., “Field Information Links Permafrost Carbon to Physical Vulnerabilities of Thawing,” Geophysical Research Letters 39, no. 15 (August 7, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1029/2012gl051958. T.E. Osterkamp et al., “Observations of Thermokarst and Its Impact on Boreal Forests in Alaska, U.S.A.,” Arctic. Antarctic, and Alpine Research 32, no. 3 (November 3, 2000): 303–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/15230430.2000.12003368. J. Richter-Menge, M.L. Druckenmiller, and M. Jeffries, “Arctic Report Card 2019” (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, December 2019), https://arctic.noaa.gov/Portals/7/ArcticReportCard/Documents/ArcticReportCard_full_report2019.pdf. Will Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 33 (August 6, 2018): 8252–59, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115. 6 Torben Røjle Christensen et al., “Tracing the Climate Signal: Mitigation of Anthropogenic Methane Emissions Can Outweigh a Large Arctic Natural Emission Increase,” Scientific Reports 9, no. 1 (February 4, 2019): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-37719-9. 7 E. A. G. Schuur et al., “Climate Change and the Permafrost Carbon Feedback,” Nature 520, no. 7546 (April 2015): 171–79, https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14338. Alaska Public Lands Information Center, “Permafrost,” Alaska Centers, July 28, 2017, https://www.alaskacenters.gov/explore/attractions/permafrost. 8 UN intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate Summary for Policymakers,” September 24, 2019, https://report.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf. 9 UN intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate Summary for Policymakers,” September 24, 2019, https://report.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf. 10 Renee Cho, “State of the Planet,” State of the Planet, February 20, 2019, https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/01/11/thawing-permafrost-matters/. Pewe, T L., 1982: Geologic Hazards of the Fairbanks Area. Special Report 15. Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys, College, Alaska 11 Hugues Lantuit, “What Is Permafrost?,” International Permafrost Association, February 15, 2009, https://ipa.arcticportal.org/publications/occasional-publications/what-is-permafrost. 12 J. Richter-Menge, M.L. Druckenmiller, and M. Jeffries, “Arctic Report Card 2019” (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, December 2019), https://arctic.noaa.gov/Portals/7/ArcticReportCard/Documents/ArcticReportCard_full_report2019.pdf. 13 Jan Hjort et al., “Degrading Permafrost Puts Arctic Infrastructure at Risk by Mid-Century,” Nature Communications 9, no. 1 (December 2018), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07557-4. 14 Jennifer W. Harden et al., “Field Information Links Permafrost Carbon to Physical Vulnerabilities of Thawing,” Geophysical Research Letters 39, no. 15 (August 7, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1029/2012gl051958. 15 Jennifer W. Harden et al., “Field Information Links Permafrost Carbon to Physical Vulnerabilities of Thawing,” Geophysical Research Letters 39, no. 15 (August 7, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1029/2012gl051958.

Morales | 14

16 Will Steffen et al., “Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 33 (August 6, 2018): 8252–59, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115. 17 The Core Writing Team, Rajendra Pachauri, and Leo Meyer, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report,” Ipcc (U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf. 18 Ibid. 19 “Food Security and Conflict Empirical Challenges and Future Opportunities for Research and Policy Making on Food Security and Conflict FAO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER 18-04,” 2018, http://www.fao.org/3/CA1587EN/ca1587en.pdf. 20 T. Schneider von Deimling et al., “Observation-Based Modelling of Permafrost Carbon Fluxes with Accounting for Deep Carbon Deposits and Thermokarst Activity,” Biogeosciences 12, no. 11 (June 5, 2015): 3469–88, https://doi.org/10.5194/bg-12-3469-2015. 21 T. Schneider von Deimling et al., “Observation-Based Modelling of Permafrost Carbon Fluxes with Accounting for Deep Carbon Deposits and Thermokarst Activity,” Biogeosciences 12, no. 11 (June 5, 2015): 3469–88, https://doi.org/10.5194/bg-12-3469-2015. 22 Catherine M. Cooney, “Downscaling Climate Models: Sharpening the Focus on Local-Level Changes,” Environmental Health Perspectives 120, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): a22–a28, https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.120-a22. 23 Corrine Knapp and Sarah Trainor, “Alaskan Stakeholder-Defined Research Needs in the Context of Climate Change,” Polar Geography 38, no. 1 (January 19, 2015): 42–69. 24 Olefeldt, et al. “Circumpolar distribution and carbon storage of thermokarst landscapes,” Nature Communications, Issue 7, October 11, 2016. https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms13043 T.E. Osterkamp et al., “Observations of Thermokarst and Its Impact on Boreal Forests in Alaska, U.S.A.,” Arctic. Antarctic, and Alpine Research 32, no. 3 (November 3, 2000): 303–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/15230430.2000.12003368. Osterkamp, T.E., and Jorgenson, M.T., 2009, Permafrost conditions and processes, in Young, R., and Norby, L., Geological Monitoring: Boulder, Colorado, Geological Society of America, p. 205–227 doi: 10.1130/2009.monitoring 25 AMAP, 2017. Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) 2017. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway. xiv + 269 pp Martha K. Raynolds et al., “Cumulative Geoecological Effects of 62 Years of Infrastructure and Climate Change in Ice-Rich Permafrost Landscapes, Prudhoe Bay Oilfield, Alaska,” Global Change Biology 20, no. 4 (February 11, 2014): 1211–24, https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.12500. 26 Frans-Jan W. Parmentier et al., “A Synthesis of the Arctic Terrestrial and Marine Carbon Cycles under Pressure from a Dwindling Cryosphere,” Ambio 46, no. S1 (January 23, 2017): 53–69, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-016-0872-8. 27 Nauta, A.L., M.M.P.D. Heijmans, D. Blok, J. Limpens, B. Elberling, A. Gallagher, B. Li, R.E. Petrov, et al. 2014. Permafrost collapse after shrub removal shifts tundra ecosystem to a methane source. Nature Climate Change 5: 67–70. doi:10.1038/nclimate2446. 28 UN intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate Summary for Policymakers,” September 24, 2019, J. Richter-Menge, M.L. Druckenmiller, and M. Jeffries, “Arctic Report Card 2019” (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, December 2019), https://arctic.noaa.gov/Portals/7/ArcticReportCard/Documents/ArcticReportCard_full_report2019.pdf. 29 Boris K. Biskaborn et al., “Permafrost Is Warming at a Global Scale,” Nature Communications 10, no. 1 (January 16, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-08240-4. AMAP, 2017. Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) 2017. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway. xiv + 269 pp 30 Alaska Resource Development Council, “2019 Annual Report,” https://www.akrdc.org/assets/Annual-reports/2019annualreport.pdf 31 Alaska Resource Development Council, “2019 Annual Report,” https://www.akrdc.org/assets/Annual-reports/2019annualreport.pdf 32 University of Alaska Fairbanks, “Degrading permafrost puts Arctic infrastructure at risk by mid-century,” Phys.org, December 11, 2018.

Morales | 15

33 Bieniek, P. A., J. E. Walsh, R. L. Thoman, and U. S. Bhatt, 2014: Using climate divisions to analyze variations and trends in Alaska temperature and precipitation. Journal of Climate, 27, 2800–2818. Meehl, G. A., C. Tebaldi, and D. Adams-Smith. “US daily temperature records past, present, and future.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 113 (49), 13977–13982. 2016. Walsh, J. E., R. L. Thomas, U. S. Bhatt, P. A. Bieniek, B. Brettschneider, M. Brubaker, S. Danielson, R. Lader, F. Fetterer, K. Holderied, K. Iken, A. Mahoney, M. McCammon, and J. Partain, 2018: The high latitude marine heat wave of 2016 and its impacts on Alaska. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 99 (1), S39–S43. T. E. Osterkamp, L. Viereck, Y. Shur, M. T. Jorgenson, C. Racine, A. Doyle & R. D. Boone, “Observations of Thermokarst and Its Impact on Boreal Forests,” Alaska, U.S.A., Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine Research, Vol. 32, Issue 3, pp. 303-315, 2000 EUNKYOUNG Hong, Robert Perkins, and Sarah Trainor, “Thaw Settlement Hazard of Permafrost Related to Climate Warming in Alaska,” Arctic 67, no. 1 (March 2014): 93–103, https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/24363724. 34 United States Arctic Research Commission. “Climate change, permafrost, and impacts on civil infrastructure.” Permafrost Task Force Report, Special Report 01-03, United States Arctic Research Commission, 2003, Arlington, Virginia. 35 Bradner, Tim. “Melting permafrost may make oil production nearly impossible on the North Slope,” Anchorage Press, November 26, 2019. https://www.anchoragepress.com/news/melting-permafrost-may-make-oil-production-nearly-impossible-on-the/article_6b912510-10a9-11ea-8991-6729e599710a.html 36 USGCRP, 2018: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. Maycock, and B.C. Stewart, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, Instanes, Arne, et al, “Changes to freshwater systems affecting Arctic infrastructure and natural resources,” Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 121, Issue 13, March 2016. 37 Bradner, Tim. “Melting permafrost may make oil production nearly impossible on the North Slope, “Anchorage Press, November 26, 2019. https://www.anchoragepress.com/news/melting-permafrost-may-make-oil-production-nearly-impossible-on-the/article_6b912510-10a9-11ea-8991-6729e599710a.html 38 French, Hugh M. “The Periglacial Environment, Fourth Edition,” Wiley-Blackwell, pp.415, 2017. 39 Ibid. 40 Pelley, Janet. “Mercury rule lets hazardous pollutants off the hook.” Environmental Science and Technology. June 1, 2005. https://pubs-acs-org.dist.lib.usu.edu/doi/pdf/10.1021/es053283%2B 41 Larsen, P. H., S. Goldsmith, O. Smith, M. L. Wilson, K. Strzepek, P. Chinowsky, and B. Saylor, 2008: Estimating future costs for Alaska public infrastructure at risk from climate change. Global Environmental Change 42 USGCRP, 2018: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. Maycock, and B.C. Stewart, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA 43 “Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion,” June 2009, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf. 44 “Study Findings and Technical Report Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment Erosion at the Community of Emmonak” (US Army Corps of Engineers, 2009), https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/AlaskaBaselineErosionAssessmentBEAMainReport.pdf. 45 Amber Himes-Cornell and Stephen Kasperski, “Assessing Climate Change Vulnerability in Alaska’s Fishing Communities,” Fisheries Research 162 (February 2015): 1–11, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2014.09.010. 46 Robin Bronen', “CLIMATE-INDUCED COMMUNITY RELOCATIONS: CREATING AN ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK BASED IN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTRINE,” 2012, https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_executive_committee/application/pdf/bronen_climate_induced_community_relocations_creating_an__adaptive_governance_framework_based_in_human_rights_doctrine_2011.pdf. 47 Ibid. 48 Boris Revich, Nikolai Tokarevich, and Alan J. Parkinson, “Climate Change and Zoonotic Infections in the Russian Arctic,” International Journal of Circumpolar Health 71, no. 1 (January 31, 2012): 18792, https://doi.org/10.3402/ijch.v71i0.18792.

Morales | 16

49 Legendre et al, “In-depth study of Mollivirus sibericum, a new 30,000-y-old giant virus infecting Acanthamoeba” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2015 Sep 22; 112(38) 50 “Anthrax Outbreak In Russia Thought To Be Result Of Thawing Permafrost,” Npr.org, 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/08/03/488400947/anthrax-outbreak-in-russia-thought-to-be-result-of-thawing-permafrost. 51 Henessy, Thomas, and Bressler, Jonathan, “Improving health in the Arctic region through safe and affordable access to household running water and sewer services: An Arctic Council initiative,” International Journal of Circumpolar Health, Vol. 75, Issue 1, April 1, 2016. 52 “United States Arctic Research Commission Alaska Rural Water and Sanitation Working Group Water and Sanitation Alaskan Retrospective 1970-2005,” 2015, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc948989/m2/1/high_res_d/watersan_retrospective_v2_6-15.pdf. 53 “Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment | AMAP,” Amap.no, May 6, 2019, https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-arctic-climate-impact-assessment/796. 54 Thomas W. Hennessy and Jonathan M. Bressler, “Improving Health in the Arctic Region through Safe and Affordable Access to Household Running Water and Sewer Services: An Arctic Council Initiative,” International Journal of Circumpolar Health 75 (April 29, 2016), https://doi.org/10.3402/ijch.v75.31149. 55 Thomas W. Hennessy et al., “The Relationship Between In-Home Water Service and the Risk of Respiratory Tract, Skin, and Gastrointestinal Tract Infections Among Rural Alaska Natives,” American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 11 (November 1, 2008): 2072–2078, https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.115618. 56 Wenger J, Zulz T, Bruden D, Singleton R, Bruce M, Hennessy T, et al. Invasive pneumococcal disease in Alaskan children. Pediatr Infect Dis J. 2010; 29: 251–6. Thomas T, Bell J, Bruden D, Hawley M, Brubaker M. Washeteria closures, infectious disease and community health in rural Alaska: a review of clinical data in Kivalina, Alaska. Int J Circumpolar Health. 2013;72:21233. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ijch.v72i0.21233. 57 Jay D. Wenger et al., “Invasive Pneumococcal Disease in Alaskan Children,” The Pediatric Infectious Disease Journal 29, no. 3 (March 2010): 251–56, https://doi.org/10.1097/inf.0b013e3181bdbed5. 58 UN intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “The Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate Summary for Policymakers,” September 24, 2019, https://report.ipcc.ch/srocc/pdf/SROCC_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf. 59 USGCRP, 2018: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R. Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. Maycock, and B.C. Stewart, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, 60 Peter H. Larsen et al., “Estimating Future Costs for Alaska Public Infrastructure at Risk from Climate Change,” Global Environmental Change 18, no. 3 (August 2008): 442–57, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.03.005. 61 Peter H. Larsen et al., “Estimating Future Costs for Alaska Public Infrastructure at Risk from Climate Change,” Global Environmental Change 18, no. 3 (August 2008): 442–57, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.03.005. 62 “Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion,” June 2009, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf. 63 “Study Findings and Technical Report Alaska Baseline Erosion Assessment Erosion at the Community of Emmonak” (US Army Corps of Engineers, 2009), https://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/AlaskaBaselineErosionAssessmentBEAMainReport.pdf. 64 “Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion,” June 2009, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09551.pdf. 65 “United States Arctic Research Commission Alaska Rural Water and Sanitation Working Group Water and Sanitation Alaskan Retrospective 1970-2005,” 2015, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc948989/m2/1/high_res_d/watersan_retrospective_v2_6-15.pdf. 66 Ibid. 67 Corrine Knapp and Sarah Trainor, “Alaskan Stakeholder-Defined Research Needs in the Context of Climate Change,” Polar Geography 38, no. 1 (January 19, 2015): 42–69. 68 Wayne D. Rasmussen, Taking the University to the People: Seventy-Five Years of Cooperative Extension (Purdue University Press, 2002).

Morales | 17

Clare Gupta, David Campbell, and Alexandra Cole-Weiss, “Cooperative Extension Can Better Frame Its Value by Emphasizing Policy Relationships,” California Agriculture 73, no. 1 (January 2019). Theodore Grantham et al., “Building Climate Change Resilience in California through UC Cooperative Extension,” California Agriculture 71, no. 4 (October 2017). 69 Marjolijn Haasnoot et al., “Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways: A Method for Crafting Robust Decisions for a Deeply Uncertain World,” Global Environmental Change 23, no. 2 (April 2013): 485–98, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.12.006. 70 AMAP, 2017. Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic (SWIPA) 2017. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway. xiv + 269 pp 71 “Climate Change Vulnerability Index - ScienceBase-Catalog,” www.sciencebase.gov, April 6, 2012, https://www.sciencebase.gov/catalog/item/5a0aec73e4b09af898cb6303. 72 Corrine Knapp and Sarah Trainor, “Alaskan Stakeholder-Defined Research Needs in the Context of Climate Change,” Polar Geography 38, no. 1 (January 19, 2015): 42–69.