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8/20/2019 MORATALLA Graft and Corruption Phil Experience
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113TH IN TE RN ATION AL TRAINI NG COU RS E
PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
* Deputy Director /Dean of Academic, Phi l ippine
Na tional P olice Academy, Philippine Public Sa fety
College, P hilippines.
1 “ I n i t i a t i v e s Ta k e n Ag a i n s t C o r r u p t i o n : Th e
P hilippine Ca se”; unpublished paper prepared by
Ledivina V. Ca riño, U niversity P rofessor and D ean,
G abriele R. Iglesias, Assistan t P rofessor, and Ma .
Fe V. Mendoza, Associate Professor, College of
P u b l i c Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e
Philippines.
GRAFT AND CORRUPTION: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE
Nelson N ogot M or atal l a*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper wi l l present a condensed
r e p o r t o n g r a f t a n d c o r r u p t i o n i n t h e
P hilippines. In forma tion w a s compiled by
t h e a u t h o r f r o m d o c u m e n t s , a r t i c l e s ,
n e w s p a p e r c l i p p i n g s a n d o t h e r d a t a
ga th ered from the report s a nd journa ls of
the Ombudsman and t he Sandiganbayan ,
tw o of the constit utional bodies ma nda ted
by P hilippine la w to investigat e an d a ct on
compla int s filed a ga inst public officia ls an d
e m p l o y e e s f o r v i o l a t i o n s o f g r a f t a n d
corr upt pra ctices. More specifica lly, this
report w ill cover input from a n un published
research pa per prepar ed by scholar s from
th e U niversity of the P hilippines, College
o f Pub l i c A dmin is t ra t io n , who m I wi l l
accordingly acknowledge in this work.1
This report wi l l genera l ly fo l low theout line a s provided. The first port ion w ill
intr oduce the th eoretical perspective a nd
cont ext of corruption in t he P hilippines. It
clarifies th e na tiona l context w ithin w hich
corru ption opera tes. It w ill look int o th e
inters ection of corru ption a nd P hilippine
history a nd cultu re. It w ill likew ise discuss
some public perceptions of corruption.
E s t i m a t e s o f t h e e x t e n t a n d l o s s e s o f
corr uption in t he P hilippines w ill be briefly
discussed. The history of th e P hilippine
fight a ga inst corruption wil l be ta ken up
i n t e r m s o f l a w , a n t i -c or r u p t i o n
c on s t i t u t i o n a l b o d i e s , a n d o t h e r
government a gencies a nd non-government
i n i t i a t i v es . F i n a l l y, t h e r e w i l l b e a n
a ssessment of the a nti-gra ft a nd corruption
programs, and recommendations on what
might be done in th e l ight of P hil ippine
democra cy, culture a nd development .
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
W e v i e w c o r r u p t i o n a s a n a g e n t ’ s
depar tu re from t he principa l’s dema nd for
th e responsible use of pow er in society. As
such, al t hough i t is centered on a public
official’s a ct a nd is indicat ed by a violat ion
of law, it does not involve the sta te a lone.
Ra th er, it is embroiled in the a ccounta bility
of public officia ls, a nd ind eed of th e sta t e,
to th e people. Thus , in a na lyz ing andcomba tin g corr uption, w e look beyond t he
s t a t e . C o r r u pt i on s h ow s u p w h a t t h e
society v iews as the responsible use o f
pow er and th us wha t i t w i ll accept a nd
support . In this l ight , any at ta ck a gainst
corr uption must come t o terms n ot only
with the law, but also with the country ’s
history, ie wha t is a ccepted by t he cultur e
a nd t he beha vior of civil society a s w ell.2
II I. THE CONTEXT OFCORRUPTION IN THE
PHILIPPINES
I n t h e l a t e 1 9 8 0 ’ s , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s
e n t e r e d t h e G u i n n e s s B o o k o f W o r l d
Records for a llegedly t he biggest corr uption
of a l l t ime, referring t o the period of the
d i ct a t o r s h i p of t h e f or m e r P r e s i d en t ,
2 Ibid, “In it ia t ives Ta ken Aga inst Corruption: The
P hilippines Ca se”; p.4
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Ferd inand Marcos . Mar cos wa s ous ted
f r o m h i s t w e n t y - y e a r p r e s i d e n c y b y a
bloodless people’s power revolution in
Febr ua ry 1986. To describe the corru pt ion
of his regime, “kleptocra cy” an d “plunder”
became par t o f the F i l ip ino ’ s po l i t i ca l
vocabula ry a nd discourse.3 “Government
b y t h i e v e r y ” d i d n o t s t o p w i t h t h e
ena ctmen t of th e Republic Act N o. 7080 in
1991, ent itled “An Act D efining P lunder ”.
Indeed, a l though both la w s an d agencies
to comba t corrupt ion ha ve increa sed in the
post-Marcos period, it remains one of the
pr ime pro b lems co mpla ined o f by the
people. The curr ency a nd gra vity of th eproblem ar e ma nifested in th e fol low ing
clippings fr om a Sept ember 7, 1998 issue
of the P hilippine Da ily Inquirer:
“On b oa r d a Ph i l i p p i n e A i r l i n es
ch a r t er ed f l i g h t t o M an i l a f r om
M i nd anao wh er e he inspected on-
goi n g gover nm en t i n f r a st r u ct u r e
pr ojects, Presi dent J oseph E j er cit o
E st r a d a . . . t h ou g h t of a s l o ga n
r em in di ng Fi li pin os that h e is ser ious in f ight ing graft and corr upt ion in the
gover nm ent. D ubbed “Supi li n, pi gil in
ang pagnanakaw sa pam aha laan,”
( “W i n o v er , st o p t h i ev er y i n
gover nm ent ”), he th ought of pu tt i ng-
up such a m essage on bil l boar ds, huge
poster s and th e l i ke to rem ind people
i n gover nm ent and th e pr i vat e sector
not t o succum b to th e “evi l s of steal i ng
fr om gover nm ent coffer s.” Steal i ng,
i f a g g r e g a t ed w i t h o t h e r m i sdemeanor s of pu bl i c ser vi ce and
th ei r “tr an sactees,” he sai d, w oul d
sum up to about 20 per cent of t he
nat i onal budget . Wit h a pr oposed
budget o f more than 500 bi l l ion i n
1999, “th i s means roughl y 100 bi l l i on
pesos w i l l go to waste i f cor r upt i on
r emai ns un checked.”
While the figure cited a bove is a ba llpark
figure tha t ca nnot be validat ed, the concern
of President Estra da is certainly wa rra nted
by th e f indings of this research. I t is also
not a recent phenomenon but one tha t h a s
b e e n i d e n t i f i e d a n d d e c r i e d s i n c e t h e
Spa nish coloniza tion in the 16th centu ry.
A. Filipino Culture and CorruptionC o r r u p t i o n h a s b e e n v i e w e d a s a
“cul tu r al an d psychologi cal ph enomenon in
a coun tr y mar ked by in compati ble legal and
cu l tu ra l norm s” (Ta pa les 1995:407). The
f o r m e r e m p h a s i z e s “r a t i on a l i t y a n d
un i ver sal pr i ncipl es of act i on ” a s aga inst
a nd in conflict w ith “r el i ance and obli gation
toward k in sh ip , f r iendsh ip and p r i mar y
groups” (B a ut ista 1982). This conflict is
highlight ed in the use of the a libi of a gift -
g i v i n g c u l t u r e t o j u s t i f y b r i b e r y a n d
extor t ion , or t he Fi l ip ino regar d for th e
o t h e r (pa k i k i p a g kapwa - t a o ) to jus t i f y
g i v i n g b e n e f i t s t o u n q u a l i f i e d b u tpersonally known recipients.
This i s a rea l problem, but i t can be
overblow n. For insta nce, both culture and
la w sim ilar ly define ca ses of corruption an d
r e c t i t u d e . O n e ’s k i n m a y o s t r a c iz e a
bureaucrat w ho chooses to sta y w ithin the
law. The sta te ma y, how ever, leave them
a lone, provided th ey do not compromise
th eir official role. Another ca se is w hen a n
officia l pa rt icipat es in a decision involvingkin, even if th ey vote a ga inst t ha t person’s
interest , tha t officia l (under t he Republic
A c t 3 0 1 9 ) c a n s t i l l b e c h a r g e d w i t h
c or r u p t i o n . F o r a n o ff i ci a l s i m i l a r l y
situat ed, but w ho bends over ba ckwa rds to
m a k e s u r e t h e i r k i n g e t s a p r i z e d
government cont ra ct enga ges in so called
“fa vour corr upt ion” . This is indeed th e
quint essentia l conflict between culture a nd
law.
3 Lengthy discussion on this is presented in “P olitics
of Plunder: The P hilippines U nder Ma rcos”, Belinde
Aquino, Grea t B ooks Tra ding a nd U P College of
P ublic Administ ra tion, 1987.
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T h e i d e a o f c u l t u r a l a c c e p t a n c e o f
corr upt ion a lso needs t o be re-exa mined in
th e light of a st ring of public opinion polls
w here Filipinos decry it a s a ma jor problem.
The media , church pas tora l le t ters and
oth er cultu ra l ly valued sources l ikew ise
denounce th is. In deed, th e long list of la w s
enacted aga inst t hem mani fest t ha t gra f t
a nd corr uption a re not colonia l impositions
but a re desired by Filipinos th emselves.
B. Public Perception of Graft andCorruption
In a speech in 1988, J a ime Ca rdina l Sin,
A r c h b i s h o p o f M a n i l a , s t a t e d t h a t“cor rupt i on was the biggest problem of them
al l ” (Mu rph y, October 9, 1988). I n 1989,
a fter month s of declar ing th e rectit ude of
t h e g o v er n m e n t s h e h e a d s , P r e s id e n t
Cora zon C . Aquino despaired, “Corrupt ion
ha s r etu r ned, i f n ot on t he same scal e, at
l ea s t w i t h eq u a l sh a m el es s n es s
(Cagura ngan, 1989).” Apparent ly, m a ny
F i l ip i n os a g r e e w i t h h e r. I n a s u r v e y
conducted in J uly 1989 in Metr o Man ila
by the Social Weather Station (SWS), arespected public opinion polling firm , a s
much a s 58 percent of respondent s a greed
tha t g iven curren t co nd i t io ns , co r rupt
government off icials a re a grea ter t hrea t
to th e count ry th a n t he NPA (New P eople’s
A r m y , c o m m u n i s t g u e r r i l l a s w h o l o s t
ground a fter Aqu ino’s a ssum ption t o office).
T h o s e w h o w e r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e
performa nce of th e Aquino a dminist ra tion
in fighting gra ft a nd corruption decreased
f ro m 72 percen t in March 1987 to 26percent in J uly 1989 (G uidot e, 1989). In
her St a te of the Na t ion Address in J uly
1989, P resident Aquin o sha red th e people’s
exa spera t ion tha t she wo uld leave as a
problem th e very issue tha t she w a nted to
lea ve as a lega cy: a clean a nd a ccounta ble
government.
In deed, her successor, Fidel V. Ra mos,
ra nked gra ft a nd corruption a s third am ong
t h e m a jor p r o bl em s t h a t ob s t r u c t t h e
count ry’s a chievement s in his d evelopment
st ra tegy for the P hilippines 2000. The SWS
poll of September 1993 valida tes t his fea r:
89 percent o f the respondents fe l t tha t
corr uption w ould indeed be a big obsta cle
to at ta ining this vision.
Other SWS polls since have produced
consist ent r esults . An August 1990 sur vey
c o n d u c t e d i n M e t r o M a n i l a a s k e d
respondents to sta te their sat isfaction wit h
t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f s e v e r a l a g e n c i e s i n
r e d u ci n g g r a f t a n d cor r u p t i o n . Th e
proportion of dissatisfied respondents is
consistently h igher th a n t hose sa tisfied, foreach a gency. They s ta ted that gr a f t a nd
c o r r u p t i o n i s b i g i n t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l
Commission on G ood G overnment (PC G G ),
the B ureau of Interna l Revenue (B IR), the
Ca binet a s a w hole, the court s of justice,
the B ureau of Customs (B OC), an d in the
police force. They consid ered corr upt ion in
the cour t s a nd in the mi l it a ry a s smal l .
V e r y f e w t h o u g h t t h a t t h e r e w a s n o
corrupt ion in any o f these government
institutions.
In November 1991, 41 percent of th ose
p o l l e d a g r e e d t h a t m o s t h i g h - r a n k i n g
government employees are not suit ed to
their positions based on their knowledge
a nd capa bilities, a nd 62 percent n oted th a t
th e performa nce of governm ent employees
ha s not improved from 1986 (SWB, J uly
1993). In a Febru a ry 1992 na tionw ide poll
o n t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f h i g h o f f i c i a l s i n
governm ent, 40 percent of its respondent ssta ted tha t, ba sed on personal observat ion,
“most” of these high officia ls a re corru pt,
a nd a nother 27 percent sa id “some” of th em
w ere, a tota l of 67 percent w eighing in on
t he positive side (S WB , J uly 1993).
The public verdict on t he judicia ry is
mixed. In 1985, a B ishop-B usin essmen ’s
Conference poll revealed t ha t 30 percent
a greed a nd 29 percent disagr eed wit h the
statement that most judges could not be
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RE SOU RCE MATER IAL SE RIE S No. 56
bribed. In 1993, a similar split in ha lf can
be discerned. While 50 percent s a id none
or few judges could be bribed or bough t, 49
percent t hought ma ny or m ost could (SWB
J uly 1994). H o wever , o ne o u t of tw o
F i l i p i n o s c o n s i d e r e d t h e d e g r e e o f
corr uption in th e judicia ry serious (SWB
J uly 1993).
Over the year s, the performa nce of the
g ov e r n m e n t i n f i g h t i n g g r a f t a n d
corruption wa s evalua ted more poorly th a n
t h a t of t h e o ve r a l l p e r f or m a n c e. I t
i n d i ca t e d t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t
performance in f ight ing corrupt ion hasi n d e e d h a s b e e n d i s m a l . P h i l i p pi n e
Ombudsma n, Ania no Desierto, in a na tion-
w ide publ ic a f fa i rs TV progra m, Fir ing
Line, a ired on September 14, 1998, sta ted
t h a t t h e P h i l i p p i n e a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n
landscape “i s im proving as evidenced by t he
good m ar ks the coun t r y i s get t i ng f r om
i n ter na t i ona l groups l i ke Tran spar ency
In tern a t ional ( IT ) and the Pol i t i ca l and
Economi c Ri sk Consul tan cy (PERC), L td ”.
The H ong Kong ba sed P olitica l E conomicRisk Consulta ncy Ltd, likew ise graded 12
Asian countr ies a nd r a nked the P hilippines
the 4t h lea st corr upt count ry in it s survey.
As PERC (1998:1) hinted, most survey
gra des deteriora ted proba bly a s a reflection
of th e cha nge of sent iment in businessmen
from “ tu r n i ng a bl i nd eye to cor r up t i on
when econom ic ti mes ar e good. As econom ic
cond i t i o ns wo r sened , how ever , such
t o l e r a n c e d i s a p p ea r ed . . . E c on om i c cond i t i ons wer e becom i ng m or e di f f i cu l t
and i t w as easier for businessmen to see th e
l i n k b et w een t h a t d et er i o r a t i o n a n d
corrupt ion.” On the whole, th e results of
n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u r v e y s
co ns i s ten t l y dep ic t the Ph i l ipp ines as
r i d d l ed w i t h c or r u p t i on a n d u n a b l e t o
effectively fight corru ption.
C. The Magnitude of and Losses dueto Corruption
It is difficult t o estima te t he tota l losses
due to corr uption. The best mea sure is the
a mounts involved in ca ses f iled with th e
O m b u d s m a n . Th e O f f i c e o f t h e
Ombudsman (OMB ) reported th a t a bout P 9
b i ll i on w a s l os t t o g ov e r n m e n t d u e t o
m a l v e r s a t i o n , esta fa ( s w i n d l i n g ) a n d
violation of the provision of RA 3019 (the
Ant i-G ra ft a nd C orru pt P ra ctices Act) for
a period of eight a nd a ha lf years (1990 to
J u n e 1 99 8) (O M B 1 99 8) . I n t h e
O mbudsma n ’s repor t , 63 a genc ies a nd
depa r t ments con t r ibu ted t o the losses .However , the top ten o f these agencies
a lone a ccounted for a lmost P 8.5 billion.
La rge tho ugh th ese sums a re , b igger
a mounts a re involved in cases involving the
Ma rcoses. From th e Office of the Specia l
P ro secu to r under the O mbudsman , t he
mo ney va lue o f cases f i l ed aga ins t the
Marco ses invo lv ing the s ame o f fences
( m a l v e r s a t i o n , es t a f a a n d R A 3 0 1 9
violat ions) for th e sa me period w a s P 1,117billion. These cover ca ses of behest loan s,
b o t h f i l e d a n d u n d e r r e v i e w a n d
investiga tion, forfeitur e ca ses, P CG G cases
for recovery, crimin a l ca ses aga inst Ma rcos
cronies, and criminal cases a ga inst other
public officia ls. The Ombudsma n claimed
that , “the gover nm ent lost P1.4 tr il l i on and
cont i nu es to l ose P100M dai l y si nce th e
Off i ce began i nvest i gat i ng cor r upt i on i n
gover nm ent sin ce 1988.”4 This is s imila rly
pointed out by P resident J oseph Est ra dawh en he sa id , “at l east P24.13 B of what
th e Phi l i ppi ne gover nm ent spent l ast year
for var i ous projects was lost t o graf t an d
cor r up t i on , or bar el y 20% of a l l pr oject
fun ds are lost t o gr after s .” 5
4 Desierto, Ph ilippine Da ily Inq uirer, J uly 10, 1999.
5 Est ra da , Philippines Da ily Inquirer, Jun e 10, 1999.
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III. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIESAND PROGRAMS
P hilippine initia tives aga inst corrupt ion
ha ve taken the form of law a nd a nti-gra f tbodies creat ed by the Constitut ion, law a nd
executive orders. In a ddition to the sta te,
others inst itutions ha ve been a ctive in the
fight a gainst graf t a nd corruption.
A. Anti-corruption LawsThe a ccount a bility of public officials is
enshrined in t he Const itut ion of 1987, as
it ha s been in t he Ma lolos Constitu tion of
1898, th e Commonwea lth Constit ut ion of
1935 a nd t hen t he Const itut ion of 1973, theMa rt ial La w period. Art icle XI of the 1987
Consti t ution, enti t led “Account a bil ity of
P ubl ic Off icers” , s ta tes th e fundamenta l
principle of public office, a s public tr ust .
It r equires full a ccount a bility a nd integrity
a mong public officers an d employees. The
P resident, Vice-P resident, m embers of the
S u p r e m e C o u r t , m e m b e r s o f t h e
C o n s t i t u t i on a l C o m m i s si on s a n d t h e
O m b u d s m a n m a y b e i m p e a c h e d f o r
v io la t ions o f the Const i tut ion , t reason,
bribery, gra f t a nd corrupt ion, other high
crimes , an d for betra ya l of public t r us t .
Oth er public officia ls committ ing such a cts
can be investiga ted a nd prosecuted through
th e regula r judicial process provided by
law.
The P hilippine government is directed
to mainta in honesty and in tegr i ty in the
public service, and t o ta ke action aga instgra ft a nd corruption (Section 27, Art . II ).
I t i s a l s o d i r e c t e d t o g i v e f u l l p u b l i c
disclosure of all tr a nsa ctions involving t he
public int erest (Section 28, Art . II). This
provision is complement ed by t he B ill of
Rights w ithin th e Constitut ion, w hich gives
people th e right t o informa tion on ma tt ers
of public concern , includin g officia l records,
document s an d papers pert a ining to officia l
a ct s , t r a n s a ct i on s o r d e ci s ion s , a n d t o
government resea rch dat a used a s the basisfor policy development (S ection 7, Art . I II ).
The Anti-G ra f t a nd C orrupt P ra ct ices
Act (RA 3019) w a s pas sed in 1960. I t
e n u m er a t e s w h a t m a y b e con s i d er e d
corr upt pra ct ices by a ny publ ic of f icer,
declares t hem unlaw ful and provides th e
corresponding pena lties of imprisonment
(1 mont h, 6 years a nd 15 yea rs), perpetua l
d isqua l i f ica t ion f rom publ ic of f ice , a nd
confiscation or forfeiture of unexplained
wea lth in the favour of the government. It
a lso provides for the submiss ion by a l l
government personnel of a s tatement of
a s s e t s a n d l i a b i li t i es e v er y t w o y e a r s .
Co ns idered l andm a rk leg i s la t ion a t the
t ime , i t a l so e l ic ited t he fol low ing w rycomment:
“Th e ant i -gr af t l aw was passed not
because th er e was a need f or i t bu t
onl y to appease publ i c opini on. Th er e
wa s no ur gent need for an t i -g ra f t
l egislat i on because th e Revi sed Pena l
Code and other l aw s were suffi cient
t o b r i n g t h e g u i l t y t o cou r t ”
(Congressma n Ma nuel Zosa , quoted
in G.U. Iglesias, 1993:35).
B. Laws During the Martial LawPeriod (1972-1986)
P res ident ia l Decree no.6, w hich took
ef fec t s ix days a f te r the impo s i t io n o f
Mar tia l Law, wa s the “ legal” basis for the
p u r g e o f a l m o s t 8 , 0 0 0 o f f i c i a l s a n d
e m p l o y e e s i n t h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e
dicta torship. The provision for summa ry
proceedings wa s reiterat ed in P residential
Decree No. 807, the Civil S ervice Act of theperiod and was repealed by the Corazon
Aquino a dminist ra tion. All other a nt i-gra ft
president ia l decrees rema in in effect. This
includes:
(i ) P res ident ia l Decree No. 46 (1972),
ma king i t unlaw ful for government
personnel to receive, an d for priva te
persons to give, gifts on a ny occa sion
including Chris t ma s , regar dless o f
w hether th e gift is for past or futur e
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fa vors. It also prohibits entert a ining
public officia ls an d th eir relat ives.
(i i) P residentia l Decree No. 677 (1975)
requires the sta tement of a ssets a nd
liabilities to be submitt ed every y ear.
(iii) P resident ia l D ecree No. 749 (1975),
gra nt ing immunit y from prosecut ion
to givers of bribes or other gifts a nd
t o t h e i r a c c o m p l i c e s i n b r i b e r y
charges if they tes t i fy a ga ins t the
publ ic of f icia ls or pr iva te persons
guilty of t hese offences.
C. Laws of the RedemocratizationPeriod (1986 to the present)
Immedia tely a fter Aquino’s a ssumption
to office, she promulgated the “Freedom
C o n s t i t u t i o n ” w h i c h , a m o n g o t h e r
p r o v i s i o n s , d e c l a r e d a l l g o v e r n m e n t
p o s i t i o n s v a c a n t u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e
ident ified (Section 3, Ma rch 28, 1986). This
Freedom C onstitut ion w a s th e basic la w of
a r e vol u t i on a r y g o ve r n m en t a n d w a s
superseded by the Const itu tion of 1987. Sixnew a nti-corruption law s emerged under
its operation.
Th e Ad m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e o f 1 98 7
(Executive Order No. 292)6 incorpora t es in
a unif ied document t he ma jor st ructura l ,
functional and procedural principles and
rules of governa nce. I t rei tera tes public
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y a s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
pr in ciple o f governa nce. In 1989, t he
Republic Act N o. 6713, t he C ode of Conducta nd Et hica l St a nda rds for P ublic Officials
a nd Employees wa s pa ssed. It promotes a
high s ta nda rd of eth ics a nd requires a l l
government personnel to make a n a ccurat e
sta tement of assets a nd liabilities, disclose
net worth a nd fina ncia l connections. It a lso
requires new officials t o divest own ership
in an y privat e enterprise with in 30 da ys
from a ssum ption of office, t o avoid conflict
of int erest . The Ombuds ma n Act of 1989
(RA 6770) provides t he fun ct iona l a nd
str uctura l orga niza tion of the Office of the
Ombudsma n. The Act further defining the
J ur i sd ict ion of the Sa nd iganba ya n (RA
8249) p la ce s t h e S a n d i g a n b a y a n a s a
spec i a l co ur t o n par wi th the Co ur t o f
Appeals.
D. Constitutional Anti-corruptionBodies
T h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d
specia l independent bodies to support th eprinciples of honesty, int egrit y a nd public
a ccounta bility. These a re:
(i ) the Of fice of the Ombudsman as the
people’s protector a nd w a tchdog;
(i i) the Civil Service Commission a s the
centr a l personnel a gency;
(iii) t h e C o m m i s s i on o n Au d i t a s t h e
s u p r e m e b o d y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
a u d i t i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s
expenditures a nd performa nce; a nd(iv) The Sa ndiganba yan a s a special court
t h a t h e a r s c a s e s o f g r a f t a n d
corruption.
To ensure tha t t hese orga niza tions and
th eir commissioners ca n fulfill their d uties
w ithout fear of reprisal from other a gencies
of the government, th e Constit ution gran ts
them fisca l aut onomy7 (Section 2, Art icle
VIII). Their a ctions a re a ppea la ble only t o
the Supreme Court .
T h e O f f i c e o f t h e O m b u d s m a n w a s
creat ed to investiga te a nd a ct promptly on
compla ints filed aga inst public officia ls an d
6 Executive orders promulgat ed by P resident Aquino
during th e revolutionary period when she wa s sole
legisla tor (1986-87) ha ve th e force of th e la w.
7 Fisca l a u t onomy in tha t t he i r a pproved annua l
appropriat ion sha ll be automatically a nd regularly
released, so tha t t here can be no undue delay in
t h e e x ec u t i o n o f t h e i r d u t i e s . Th e i r a n n u a l
a ppropriat ion cann ot be reduced from tha t of the
previous year s.
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employees, and to serve as the people’s
w a t c h d og of t h e g ov e r n m e n t . I t i s a n
institut ion w ith t he biggest r esponsibility
to prevent gra ft an d corru ption. It provides
for a Deputy Ombudsma n for t he milita ry,
a n d a t l e a s t o n e e a c h D e p u t y f o r t h e
geographical divisions of Luzon, Visayas
an d Mindana o.
The C iv i l Serv ice Commiss ion is th e
c e n t r a l p e r s o n n e l t a s k e d t o p r o m o t e
ef f ic ient and responsive publ ic serv ice
de l ivery, t o es t a b l i sh a ca reer serv ice ,
s t rengthen the meri t sys tem and huma n
resource development , promote publ icaccountabi l i ty and enforce the Code o f
Conduct a nd Et hica l Sta ndar ds for P ublic
Off icials a nd E mployees (RA 6713). I t
undertakes anti-corruption functions, such
a s v a l u e s o r i e n t a t i o n w o r k s h o p s a n d
employee voluntarism.
Th e C o m m i s s i o n o n Au d i t , w h i l e
prima ri ly regarded a s an eva luat or of the
government ’s performance in handl ing
funds, a lso ha s a s a fun ction on the inputside, a s i t conducts a udits on t he income
a nd revenues of government . Aside from
e n s u r i n g f i n a n c i a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , t h e
Co mmiss ion ma y a l so inqu i re as t o the
effectiveness a nd impa ct of progra ms, a nd
not a lone into th e economy, efficiency or th e
l e g a l i t y a n d r e g u l a r i t y o f g o v e r n m e n t
operations.
The Sandiganbayan , litera lly “the pillar
of t h e n a t i o n ” , is a s p ec ia l cou r t w i t hjurisdiction over civil a nd crimina l ca ses
involving gra ft a nd corrupt practices.
E. Presidential Anti-corruptionBodies
E a ch president ha s appoint ed his or her
a nti-gra ft or investiga ting a gencies “as an
exer cise of th e pr esid en t ’s power to pr obe
in to the anomal ous member s of h i s/ her
adm in istrat i ve organi zat ion (Alfiler, 1979:
329)”. P resident Aquin o broke tr a dition by
orga nizing a commit tee of ca binet officia ls
r a t h e r t h a n a n a g en cy w i t h f u ll -t i m e
personnel, the President’s Committee on
P ublic Et hics a nd Account a bility (P CP E A).
Its fra mework advan ced the insepa ra bility
o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f r o m o t h e r a c t s o f
governa nce, the idea t ha t corruption ca n
be t ack led by mana gement ac t ions tha t
increa se its risks an d decrea se its benefits,
a nd decentra lized gra ft-busting.
P res ident Fidel V. Ra mos creat ed the
P residential Commission a gainst G ra ft a nd
Co rrupt io n (PCA GC) under Execut ive
Order No. 151 da ted J a nua ry 11, 1994. Itw a s t a s k ed t o in v e s t i ga t e p r e si d en t i a l
a p p o i n t e e s c h a r g e d w i t h g r a f t a n d
corru pt ion . Likewise , i t funct ions as a
c o o r d i n a t i n g b o d y i n t h e e f f o r t s o f
i n h i b i t i n g t h e p r a c t i c e o f g r a f t a n d
corr uption, t o expeditiously prosecut e such
prac t i ces by o f f i c i a l s in the execut ive
d e p a r t m e n t , a n d t o m o n i t o r t h e
implementa t ion o f the Moral Recovery
Program.
U n l i k e ot h e r p r e si d en t s , P r e s i d en t
E s t r a d a h a s n ot c r ea t e d h i s ow n a n t i -
c o r r u p t i o n b o d y a n d h a s a l l o w e d t h e
Ramo s ’ c rea ted PCA GC to co n t inue in
off ice. He seemed to be incl ined to use
i n s t e a d t h e I n t e r -Ag e n c y An t i -g r a f t
Coordina t in g C ouncil , composed o f th e
C o m m i s s i o n o n A u d i t , C i v i l S e r v i c e
C o m m i s s i o n , t h e O m b u d s m a n , t h e
D e p a r t m e n t of J u s t i ce , t h e N a t i on a l
B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i on a n d t h eP residential Commission a gainst G ra ft a nd
Corruption.
F. The Rank and File as GraftBusters (Cariño, 1992)
B e c a u s e o f t h e i r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e
w or k i n g s of b ot h f or m a l a n d i n f or m a l
processes, employees a re na tu ra l sources
o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t d e v i a t i o n s f r o m
a ccounta bility. It wa s in the Aquino regime
in 1986, th a t th e potent ial of employees as
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gra ft-busters w a s ta pped. Several unions
h a d t a n g l e d w i t h t h e ir r e s p ec t i ve
m a n a g e m e n t o n t h e i s s u e o f t h e i r
a ccount a bility a nd performa nce. The union
i n t h e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i f i c a t i o n
Administrat ion ha s uneart hed anomalies
a nd delays in th e implementa tion of some
projects such a s t he U SD $ 192 million r ura l
e lectr i f ica t ion revi ta l iza t ion progra m, a
joint project of the World Bank and the
Office of Economic Cooperation Fund of
J a pan (Man ila Ch ronicle, November 13,
1995:4). The m ost s uccessful effort is st ill
that as described by Gaffud (1994), which
wa s a ble to remove the top a dministra torsof a n a gency in 1990. The union quest ioned
tr a nsa ctions w ort h P 176 million, including
overpricing, purchases ma de w ithout being
utilized, purchases made for non-existent
projects , etc. After being ignored by th e
D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e a n d t h e h i g h e r
off icials of the depart ment to wh ich i t is
a t t a c h e d , t h e u n i o n f i n a l l y f o u n d a
listening ea r in a n NG O (non-governm ent
o r g a n i z a t i o n ) , t h e G i s i n g B a y a n
Foundat ion, w hich t hen f i led complaint sw ith the Ombudsma n. After investiga tion,
P resident Aquino dismissed thr ee assista nt
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , b u t n o t t h e h ea d
administrator.
Sin ce 1986, th e lea dership of at least
s e ve n ot h e r u n i on s f a c ed h a r a s s m e n t ,
intimidat ion, a nd sometimes, removal from
of f i ce fo r t he i r a n t i -corru pt io n s t a nce .
Never the less , they have succeeded in
bringing cases o f corrupt ion , a buse a ndnepotism pra cticed by th eir superiors to the
a t t en t ion o f con t ro l bod ies such a s t he
Commiss ion on Audi t , t he Ombudsma n
and leg i s l a t i ve co mmi t tees fo r fur ther
investigation.
G. Participation of the Non-governmental Sector
P eople pow er energized in th e ED SA
inflamed non-government organizations
(NGOs) to get concerned about issues of
in tegr i ty a nd corrupt io n . Thei r in i t i a l
a p p r o a c h c e n t e r e d n o t o n p u n i s h i n g
corr upt ion, but in being involved in keeping
government opera tions clean a nd effective.
Th e C o m m u n i t y E m p l oy m e n t a n d
Development P rogram (CED P ) of the lat e
1980s beca me t he la bora tory for t his new
par tnersh ip o f go vernment and cause-
oriented groups. For insta nce, th e Na tiona l
Movement for F ree E lections (NAMFR E L)8
b r a n c h e d f r o m e l e c t i o n c a s e s t o t h e
moni tor ing of CE DP implementa t ion in
various loca l areas . B a sed on this virtua l
experiment, the government promulga ted
guidelines on the use of such volunteergroups for exception monitoring.
Some a ssocia tions focused dir ectly on
p r e v en t i n g c or r u p t i o n . Ope rasyong
Walan g L agay (OWL), its n a me connoting
a movement to prevent bribery, a ssisted
some depa rt ments a nd local governments
in str eam lining procedures a nd improving
bidding commit tees. How ever, it folded in
1989 becau se the volunt eers could not cope
w ith t he increasing dema nds on th eir time,a very rea l problem for volunt eerism in a
growth field such as corruption.
The Na tiona l C oa lition of Tra nspa rency
w a s laun ched in 1989 to show th a t public
s u p p o r t f or m e a s u r e s t o e n h a n c e
a ccount a b i li t y cou ld s t i l l be mus tered .
Composed of over t hirt y NG Os, including
Bishop-Businessmen’s Conference (BBC),
NAMFRE L, a nd other groups tha t w ere in
th e forefront of the a nt i-Ma rcos str uggle,it put forwa rd a comprehensive a pproa ch
to the problem a s it recognized the priva te
sector’s incrimina tion in t he cont inua tion
of governm enta l corru ption. La cking self-
righteousness, its f irs t ca mpaign w a s for
i ts membership to pay the proper taxes,
a nd t hus be mora lly ca pable of censuring
t h e d i s s i p a t i on of p u b l i c r e v en u e s b y
8 NAMFRE L is now a ctive in sponsoring semina r-
workshops on J apa n’s koban system of policing.
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government. It w a s in meeting with them
tha t the P resident admitt ed the return of
sha meless corruption in her a dministra tion
(Cagurangan, 1989).
Ant i-corru ption orga niza tions a ssocia ted
w ith religious groups include the BB C, th e
G i s i n g B a y a n F o u n d a t i o n 9 a n d t h e
religious right , calling itself Citizens B a tt le
A g a i n s t C o r r u p t i o n ( C I B A C )10 . The
Nat iona l is ta P ar ty, a pol it ica l par ty , a lso
f or m e d a n a n t i -g r a f t p a n e l , c om p os e d
la rgely of form er off icials of the Ma rcos
regime (Ma nila B ulletin, J une 4, 1989),
making i t suspect as a po l i t ica l neutra lbody.
Meanw hi le, the Anti-P ol ice Scala w a g
G r o u p ( A P S G ) i s f o c u s e d o n p o l i c e
c or r u p t i o n . I t r e c en t l y c a l l e d on t h e
Philippine National Police (PNP) to curb
rampant “ tong ” and payola collection fr om
operators of i l legal gambling, ironical ly
perpetra ted by members of the P NP ’s own
i l lega l ga mbl ing ta sk forces . An AP SG
s p ok e s p er s o n d i s c los e d t h a t i n M e t r oMa nila a lone, there w ere about 30 to 45
ga mbling “ma inta iners” of vice dens such
as v ideo ka re ra , sak l a , h i - l o , 11 lo t tery ,
bookies, and pr osti tut ion dens w ho give
goodw ill money r a nging from P 500, 000 to
P 1 million, a side from t he monthly “payola ”
for prot ection of P 100, 000 t o P 500, 000
(P h i l ipp ine Da i l y I nqu i rer, Augus t 10,
1998:22).
IV. THE OMBUDSMAN'S STRATEGY AGAINST GRAFT AND
CORRUPTION
In t his port ion, I w ill present some dat af r o m t h e O m b u d s m a n a n d t h e
Sandiganbayan tha t can provide us w ith
insight on the results of the P hilippine ant i-
corr upt ion effort. These effort s a re focused
on t he intr iguing cau ses of corr uption:
(i) I n d i v i d u a l c a u s e s w h i c h a r e
a t t r ibuted to wea k mora l fiber a nd
distorted va lues a mong bureaucra ts,
such as ma teria lism, lack of integrity
a nd nat ionalism;(ii) O r g a n i z a t i on a l ca u s es r e f er t o
d e f i c i e n c i e s , i n t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c
a ppa ra tus such a s low sa la ry, poor
r e c r u i t m e n t a n d s e l e c t i o n
p r o ce d u r e s , a n d r e d t a p e in
government; an d
(iii) S o ci e t a l ca u s e s w h e r e c or r u p t
beha vior is itself th e norm of society.
A. Programs of the Office of theOmbudsman
T h e O M B i s m a n d a t e d u n d e r t h e
Consti tution to protect the people from
a buse or m isuse of pow er by government,
its a gencies or functiona ries. It must fight
for justice for all citizens, prevent loss of
government funds a nd bring t he culprit to
jus t ice. I t f a ces a g igan t ic chal lenge in
c a r r y i n g o u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s
determina tion to rid itself of undesira bles
in th e public serv ice. The conferm ent oft h i s e x t e n s i v e a u t h o r i t y b y t h e
Co ns t i tu t ion insu la ted t he O f f ice fro m
political in fluence or int erference by:
(i) S t a t i ng t h a t t h e Om bu ds ma n i s
r e m o v a b l e f r o m o f f i c e o n l y b y
impeachment;
(ii) P rescribing a fixed term of office for
seven years w ithout reappointment ;
(iii) D u r i n g t h e t e r m , h i s /h e r s a l a r y
cannot be diminished;(iv) Leveling the Ombuman’s rank w ith
9 “Gising Bayan ” means “Wake U p Nat ion.” I t wa s
originally the t it le of a r adio program under Radio
Veritas, the Catholic station.
10 CIB AC is coined from the Taga log w ord “sibak ”
which means t o cut down.
11 These are local gambling pract ices considered
illegal.
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th a t of a S upreme Court justice.
B. Five (5) Major Functions12
The Ombudsm a n performs f ive ma jor
func t io ns , such as inves t iga t io n , g ra f t
prevention, public assistance, prosecution,
a n d a d m i n is t r a t i v e a d ju d i ca t i on . I t i s
invested w ith corresponding a uthori ty t o
be a ble to ca rry out t hese functions. The
investiga tive fun ction of th e Office involves
determ ina tion of viola tions of the a nt i-gra ft
law s by public functionaries th rough fact-
f i n d i n g o r e v i d e n c e g a t h e r i n g . I t a l s o
inc ludes t he f ind ing o f pro ba b le ca use
through formal preliminary investigationfor th e purpose of prosecution.
In gr a f t prevention, the Off ice ha s the
a ut hori ty t o prevent t he commiss ion of
g r a f t b y o r d e r i n g o r s t o p p i n g t h e
implementa tion of government contr a cts
tha t ar e found to be disadvant ageous to the
governm ent. In t he exercise of its public
assistance, the Office of the Ombudsman
extends assistance to ci t izens in gett ing
ba sic public services from th e governm ent .In prosecution, t he Office ma y file cha rges
or prosecute ca ses in court a ga inst erring
public officials a nd privat e citizens found
t o ha ve conn ived wit h th em. The Office of
th e Special P rosecutor ma y prosecute the
case in the Sandiganbayan . In the regula r
court s, regula r prosecut ors a re deputized
by th e Office of the Ombudsma n to ha ndle
prosecution.
Un der i ts a dministra t ive adjudica t ionfunct ion , th e Of fice ha s th e aut hori ty to
conduct a dministra tive penalties wh ere the
err ing public official or employee, includin g
Ca binet Secreta ries, may be suspended or
dismissed from public service. I t h olds
disciplina ry a uth ority over all government
funct iona r ies , except th e president a nd
members of congress a nd t he judiciar y a nd
oth er impeacha ble off icials . In a l l oth er
crimina l ca ses, however, all public officia ls
a nd employees, w ithout a ny exception, a re
u n d e r t h e O m b u d s m a n ’s i n v e s t i g a t i v e
jurisdiction.
In consonance with all these functions
perform ed by the Ombud sma n, s/he sha ll
a ct on a ll complaint s, but not limited to a cts
or omissions w hich:
(i ) a re con t ra ry to law or regu la t ions ;
(ii) a re unrea sona ble, unfa ir, oppressive
or discrimina tory
(i ii ) a re incons i s ten t w i th t he genera l
course of a n a gency’s function, t houghin a ccorda nce with law ;
(iv) proceed from a mista ke of law or a n
a rbitrary a scertainment of facts ;
(v) a re in the exercise of d iscret iona ry
pow ers but for a n improper purpose;
or
(vi) a re otherw ise irregula r, immora l or
devoid of justification.
In it s effort to solve the tw in evils of gra ft
a n d c o r r u p t i o n , t h e O f f i ce o f t h eO m b u d s m a n e m p l o y s a t w o - p r o n g e d
stra tegy: confronta tiona l and psychologica l
approaches.
The confronta tiona l a pproa ch involves
t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d c r i m i n a l
inves t iga t ion a nd prosecut ion o f err ing
m e m b e r s of t h e b u r e a u c r a c y. I n t h i s
regard, a number of criminal cases were
filed in t he Sandiganbayan involving high -
ra nking o f f ic ia ls a nd a bout 2 ,500 ca sesreferred t o the ordina ry court s involving
low -ra nking m embers of t he burea ucracy.
To complement th is capa bility, t he I nt er-
Agency Consultative Committee with the
Comm ission on Audit (COA), C ivil S ervice
Commission (CS C), P hilippine C ommission
Aga ins t G ra f t a nd Corrupt ion (P CAG C),
a nd the Na tiona l Burea u of Investiga tion
(NB I) have been formed a nd orga nized for
effective coordination.12 The Ombudsma n P rimer, p.2.
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As par t of the st ra tegy, the t ripod system
w a s a d o p t e d t o e n f o r c e h o n e s t y a n d
e f f i c i e n c y . T h i s s y s t e m i n c l u d e s t h e
establishment of Corruption Prevention
U n i t s (C P U s ), J u n ior G r a f t w a t ch U n i t s
(J G U s) a nd insta llation of the Offices of the
Resident Ombudsman. The CPU’s were
o r g a n i z e d t o b r oa d e n c om m u n i t y
p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d s e r v e a s t h e
O m b u d s m a n ’ s e y e s a n d a r m s , c l o s e l y
m o n i t o r i n g c r i t i c a l a n d s u b s t a n t i a l l y
f u n d e d g o v e r n m e n t p r o je c t s a n d /o r
tra nsa ct ions in t heir respect ive ar eas o f
concern. They a lso serve as a fr ont desk to
r e c e i v e a n d f a c i l i t a t e r e q u e s t s f o ra ssista nce, complaint s , or report s of a ny
a n o m a l o u s or c or r u p t p r a c t i c e s. I n
addi t ion , the CPU’s work hand-in-hand
w i t h t h e O f f i c e o f t h e O m b u d s m a n i n
pro mo t ing the o b jec t ives o f the l a t te r
thr ough t he conduct of va rious a ctivit ies
involving communit y par ticipat ion, such a s
c on s u l t a t i v e w or k s h o ps , s y m p os i a ,
seminars and co n ferences , deve lo p ing
m o r a l v a l u e s o f h o n e s t y , a s w e l l a s
e d u c a t i n g t h e p u b l i c o n p r e v e n t i v e
m e a s u r es i n it s f i gh t a g a i n s t g r a f t a n d
corr uption. At present , about 200 CP U ’s
ha ve been a lrea dy organized from a mong
c i v i c -m i n d e d n o n -g o v e r n m e n t a l
organizations.
The J un ior G ra f twa tch Uni t s (J G U’s )
ha ve been orga nized to mobilize the youth
(both a t h igh school and co l lege level ,
including th e out-of-school yout h) in t he
f ig h t a g a i n s t g r a f t a n d c or r u p t i on , b y
encoura ging th em to become th e primar y
coordina ting a rm of the Ombudsma n w ithrespect t o the educa tiona l an d motivat iona l
projects involving youth, a nd a s a n effective
a lly of the Office of the Ombudsma n. All
over the count ry, th ere ar e alrea dy seven
hund red a nd sevent y-four (774) J unior
G r a f t w a t c h U n i t s a ccr e di t ed b y t h e
O m b u d s m a n . T h e s e a r e o r g a n i z e d t o
develop and strengthen their instinct of
goodness a nd idea lism wh ich is a nchored
Figure I. THE POLICY OF GRAFT PREVENTIONStages of Graft Prevention
UNCOVERING P LANS FOR
CORRU PTION
STOPP ING ON-GOING ACTS
OF CORRUP TION
DE TERRI NG
CORRU PTION
CONDITIONING THE MIND
AGAINST CORRU PTION
PROACTIVE
GRAFT
PREVENTION
RESIDE NT OMBUDS MEN J UNIOR GR AFTWATCH UNIT CORRU PTION PRE VENTION UNITS
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in the principle tha t a child who grows up
i n a n e n v i r o n m e n t o f h o n e s t y w i l l b e
d i f f ic u l t t o co r r u p t w h e n s /h e a t t a i n s
maturi ty .
The Office of t he Ombu dsm a n believes
tha t in empowering t he citizenry to pra ctice
t h e i r i n n a t e v i r t u e s o f h o n e s t y a n d
uprightness, and getting t hem involved in
the O mbudsma n ’s s t r uggle for the r ight
va lues, w e ca n expect a citizenry w ith even
stronger moral f iber in th e futur e . The
Office’s gra ft prevention effort s ar e directed
a t sust a ining th e support of all sectors of
Filipino society, w hich is a h ealt hy sign of
e m p o w e r i n g t h e c i t i z e n r y i n n a t i o n
building. It ha s likewise insta lled Resident
O m b u d s m e n ( R O s ) i n 2 2 i m p o r t a n t
depart ments of the government t o serve as
wa tchdogs and gua rdians of integri ty a nd
e f f i c iency. They c lose ly moni t or t he
performa nce of governm ent functiona ries,
th ereby producing s trong deterr ence to
bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency.
S e e F i g u r e I f o r t h e s t a g e s o f g r a f t
p r e v e n t i o n a s c o n c e i v e d b y t h e
Ombudsman.
The psychologica l approa ch ad opted ha s
been des igned to creat e and nur tur e an
environment of integrity in the P hilippine
society. This proceeds from t he principle
tha t corruption ca nnot t hrive in a mil ieu
of honesty . This approa ch, w hich ha s a
long-ra nge objective, is expect ed to ha ve a
last ing effect beca use it a ims t o develop a
str ong mora l fiber for th e citizenry.
For th is purpose, the Office ha s w orkedw i t h t h e E d u c a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t o n
introducing gra ft prevention modules tha t
w ill tea ch stud ents old Filipino va lues of
hones ty and in tegr ity. I t ha s forged a n
a greement w ith t he Movie an d Television
Review a nd Cla ssificat ion B oard (MTRCB )
to ascerta in tha t corrupt pra ctices pictured
in movie f i lms an d t e levis ion progra ms
ha ve redemptive va lues or punishment of
Figure II. THE OMBUDSMAN’S TOTAL STRATEGY AGAINSTGRAFT AND CORRUPTION
CONFRONTATIONAL
APPROACH
Administrative
AdjudicationInvestigat ion P rotection
G RAFT-FR E E
B U RE AU CRACY/SOC IE TY
Community
Mobilization
Va lues Forma tion
& Reorientation Strengthening of the Citizens ’ Mora l
Fiber; G ra ft D eterrence
Public
Assistance
Graft Prevention
Education
Resident
OmbusmenPSYCHOLOGICAL
APPROACH
En forcement of La ws on P ublic Accounta bility
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th e corru pt. Orienta tion semina rs for new
government ent ra nt s are a lso conducted to
provide a deeper underst a nding of public
service va lues a nd of the a ccount a bi li ty
a t t a c h e d t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n t h e
governm ent. It ha s cont inuously conducted
va lues orient a tion semina rs/w orkshops to
enhance organizational effectiveness and
str ength en the mora l fiber of the personnel.
The tota lity of the Ombudsma n ’s s t ra t egy
aga ins t gra f t a nd corrupt ion is show n in
Figure II.
C. Focus on New Initiatives: Dealing
with “Graft-prone Agencies”G i v e n t h e f a c t t h a t s t o l e n m o n e y i su s u a l l y n e v e r r e c o v e r e d , e v e n i f a
convict ion is obta ined , the Ombudsma n
d e c i d e d t h a t t h e p r o b l e m m u s t b e
c on f r o n t e d b e f or e it i s c om m i t t e d . A
psychological a pproach w a s developed to
address the soc i a l env i ronment wi th in
w hich gra f t an d corru pt ion occur. The
a p p r o a c h a s p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d
a tt empts to strengt hen the citizen ’s mora l
fiber a nd deter the opportun ities for gr a ft.
In det ermining th e gra ft-prone a gencies
of the government , the Ombudsma n a dopts
thr ee criteria :
(i) the size of the budget of the agency,
(i i) the number of i ts personnel; and
(i ii) th e number o f cases f i l ed in t he
Office of the Ombudsm a n.
As ma y be noted, the f irst tw o cri teriarela t e to the presence of opport unit ies for
corruption, wh ile th e third relat es to a ctual
c a s e s u n c o v e r e d b y c o m p l a i n t s a n d
investiga tion. The agencies meeting t hese
criteria a re th e follow ing:
(i) D e pa r t m e nt of E d u ca t i on , C u lt u r e
a nd Sports (DE CS)
(ii) D e pa r t m e n t of P u b l ic Wor k s a n d
Highwa ys (DP WH)
(iii) D e p a r t m e n t o f E n v i r on m e n t a n d
Na tur a l Resources (DE NR)
(iv) Department of Agriculture (DA)
(v ) D epa r t m en t of H ea l t h (D OH )
(v i) Depar tment of Tra nspor ta t ion and
Commu nicat ion (DOTC)
(v ii) Depar tm ent o f In t er ior a nd Loca l
G overnment (DILG )
(v i i i )Depar tment o f Na t iona l De fence
(DND)
(ix) Depart ment of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
(x) N a t i on a l I r r i ga t ion Ad m in is t r a t i on
(NIA)
(xi) Nat ional P ower Corporat ion (NPC )
(xii) B u r e a u o f I m m i g r a t i o n a n d
Deportation (BID)(xiii)Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA)
(xiv) P hilippine P orts Authority/B urea u of
Cu st oms (P PA/B OC)
(xv) B ureau of Internal Revenue (B IR)
(xvi) B oard of Investm ent (B OI)
F o r t h e s e a g e n c ie s , t h e R e s i d e n t
Ombudsmen r eview s processes t o cut red
ta pe, an d inspects bidding requirements
a nd contr a cts for evidence of gra ft.
This progra m a ppears t o be a w orth w hile
i n i t i a t i v e t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e
O m b u d s m a n a s s i s t s a n a g e n cy i n
improving policies a nd progra ms t o prevent
corru ption. In th a t sense, it is proactive,
a n d v i e w s c or r u p t i o n f r o m a s y s t e m i c
perspective. However, the work tha t th e
Resident Ombudsma n is given should not
duplica te or ta ke aw a y t he responsibili ty
of the mana gement , th rough a w orkinginternal control unit , in supervising the
performa nce of t he functions a ssigned to
th a t a gency. To tra nsfer t his responsibility
t o a n o u t s i d e a g e n c y m a y e n m e s h t h e
Ombudsma n in implementa tion problems,
as well as corruption opportunit ies , and
decrea se its capa city for enforcement a nd
provision of sa nctions. This seems to us
simila r t o the pre-a udit functions th a t u sed
to be performed by the Commiss ion on
Audit, until it r ecognized t ha t ma na gement
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should w ield th i s impor t a n t pow er, f or
w hich it is responsible.
Anoth er problem ma y be in the la belling
of agencies as graft-prone. Bigness alone
is not necessarily a prelude to corruption.
B esides, the third cri teria of the num ber
o f c a s e s m a y b e m i s l e a d i n g i f t h e y
p r i m a r i l y c o n s i s t o f c a s e s s t i l l u n d e r
inves t iga t ion , r a th er tha n resolved . A
l i t i g a t i o n - p r o n e a g e n c y m a y n o t b e
equiva lent t o a corrupt ion-prone one. We
ma y poin t out t ha t t h i s is sue shows t he
u r g e n t n e e d f o r t h e O m b u d s m a n t o
expeditiously dispose of cases br ought toits jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION ANDRECOMMENDATIONS
The P hi l ippines ha s unleashed ma ny
weapons against irresponsible behavior in
the government. I t ha s a comprehensive
set of law s tha t ma y ha ve ascer ta ined a l l
t h e p o s s i b l e i n s t a n c e s o f g r a f t a n d
corrupt ion tha t can be devised. The ant i-
corru ption ag encies ha ve been given ample
pow ers to identi fy a nd punish offenders.
They recognize the bur den of pow er, wit h
specia l ag encies to give priority t o cat ching
the “big fish” a nd gr a ve offences, over t he
a cts of low er ra nking personnel . They
s ta r ted on the i r own t o coord ina t e wi th
each oth er for gr eat er over-a ll effectiveness.
T h e y a p p r o a c h c o r r u p t i o n i n b o t h a
p r e v en t i v e a n d pu n i t i v e w a y. Th e y
recognize tha t t he ta sk is not only with t hegovernment , an d ha ve enlist ed civil society
in th e s tru ggle. For their par t , c it izens
ha ve also volunt eered, in coopera tion w ith
sta te a gencies or by t hemselves, in fighting
corru ption. On the whole, th e P hilippine
a p pr o a c h h a s u s e d d e m oc r a t i c m e a n s ,
r e l y i n g o n d u e p r o c e s s , t r a n s p a r e n t
procedures, a nd volition in effecting ma ny
of its a spira tions. Yet corru ption continues.
Wha t else needs t o be done?
A. Re-examination of Existing LawsThe P hilippines does not need a ny m ore
law s a gainst corruption. If a nything, wha t
i t n e e d s i s a r e - e x a m i n a t i o n o f a n t i -
c o r r u p t i o n l a w s n o t o n l y t o r e m o v e
duplica tion, but a lso to ensure tha t those
existing a re a ccepted by the populace an d
e n f o r c e a b l e b y t h e a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n
a gencies. We ca n only cite a few a rea s for
furt her study. There a re at present some
provis ions t ha t , in t heir s t r ic tness , ma y
encoura ge their brea ch:
(i) The Anti-gift Decree has never been
implemented, but it ca n conceivablyb e u s e d a g a i n s t a c o m p l e t e l y
i n n o c e n t , g e n e r o u s p e r s o n , w h o
(being a devout Chris t ian) cannot
help but give gifts on C hristma s da y,
a n a ct s a n ct i on e d by P D 4 6 a n d
i g n o r e d b y a l m o s t e v e r y b o d y
immersed in Philippine culture.
(ii) Th e s t a t e m e n t o f a s s e t s a n d
liabil i t ies , a s imple but potential ly
s t r o n g m e c h a n i s m t o f i n dunexpla ined wea l th , i s submi t ted
yea rly by a ll public officia ls, but no
one ever studies them. In any ca se,
any wel l-paid accountant can hide
unexplained w ealth , an d so th e only
people potent ia l ly a t r i sk a re c iv i l
servant s tha t cannot a f ford to have
others wr ite their s ta tements .
(i ii) Other provisions ma y work aga inst
gett ing good people in governm ent,for exa mple, by the requir ement for
d i v e s t m e n t . Th i s a p p r oa c h t o
possible conflicts of interest w ill be
met by w ell-qua lified people ent ering
into the highest reaches of the sta te
apparatus. The current divestment
procedure ma y be too ha rsh , since it
could ef fect ively mea n t ha t no top
i n d u s t r i a l i s t f o r i n s t a n c e ca n b e
Secreta ry of Tra de an d In dustry, a nd
no top banker ma y be Centra l Ba nk
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G overnor. Tha t w ould be denying the
g o v e r n m e n t v a l u a b l e h u m a n
resources.
A possible a ltern a tive is to put more
trus t in t ra nsparency a nd the press
(w hich requ i res a n a mendment o f
ex i s t ing l a w ). When a pres iden t
c h oo s es a p e r s o n w h o s h o w s
relucta nce because of the d ivestm ent
r e q u i r e m e n t , e x e m pt i o n m u s t b e
ma de for t ha t person, provided t ha t
h e o r s h e d i s cl os e s i n d e t a i l a n d
publicly al l personal interests that
ha ve public implicat ions. This couldmean that the ci t izenry could keep
t r a c k o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e
relevan t businesses a nd industr ies ,
w hile a va lued member is in public
off ice. Conver sely, the problem of
confl ict of interest m ust be ta ckled
hea d on by removing persons w hose
personal in teres t prospered whi le
th ey were in office. This is a mply
provided for in RA 3019 a nd RA 6713,
e v en w i t h o u t t h e d i v es t m e n trequirement.
(iv) The schedule of pena lt ies ma y a lso
be looked in to . In some ca ses the
p e n a l t y m a y b e t o o l o w , e . g , t h e
m a x i m u m i m p r i s on m e n t f o r
corr upt ion under RA 3019 is 15 yea rs.
In others, it ma y be too high, e.g, th e
sole pena lty for gr a ve misconduct on
f i rs t of fence is d ismissa l f rom the
service. E xtr eme pena lt ies do notencoura ge prosecution of of fences,
even when t hey are blata nt , because
of the cultura l tra it of “sayang ” (wa ste
of time) for t hose who w ill merit only
low pena l t i es and “awa ” (pity) for
t h o s e w h o w i l l b e h i t b y h a r s h
punishment.
B. EnforcementT h e P h i l i p p i n e s h a s a n i m p r e s s i v e
number of laws to tackle pract ica l ly a l l
ca ses requ i r ing f as t a c t ions . However,
enforcement of th ese la w s leaves much to
be desired. The ret ention of officia ls w hom
the Pres iden t ’s an t i -gra f t agency i t se l f
recomm ended to be removed suggests a
lack of poli t ical wil l , and the priori ty of
par tisa nship over the public interest. This
w o u l d h a v e p r o v i d e d a n o c c a s i o n f o r
a r t icula t ing t he Adminis tra t ion ’s ethical
v is ion , ca tching a b ig f i sh , an d wa rning
e v e r y o n e t h a t t h e l e a d e r s h i p m e a n s
business.
T h e p e o p l e e x p e c t n o t o n l y e q u a l
enforcement of the law, but even morest rictness on persons perceived to be in t he
P r e s i d e n t ’s inn er c i rc le. D ecis iveness
would also be perceived i f the public is
informed of a clear connection betw een t he
official’s misdeed an d his/her removal. P a rt
o f the popular d i s sa t i s f ac t ion wi th the
conduct of accountabi l i ty i s the lack of
c l os u r e o f c a s e s . Th e n u m b e r of
investigations that were not f inished, or
h a v e “ sof ter ” f ind ings a nd conc lus ions
w hen no longer la boring un der th e publiceye, does not in crea se public confidence in
the a nti-corruption progra ms.
C. Leadership in the Anti-corruption Drive
L e a d e r s h i p o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s
prima rily focused on f ight ing corruption
requires h igher q ual i f ica t ions t ha n w ha t
i s n o r m a l l y d e m a n d e d . Th i s a p p l ie s
part icularly to the Ombudsma n a nd to the
hea ds of other a gencies specifica lly crea tedfor this purpose. The very concept of a n
O mbudsma n requ i res a person of h igh
integri ty whose very presence provokes
respect a nd rectitude. The P hilippines ha s
not been blessed w ith t he appoint ment of
such persons to th is office. In stea d, they
ha ve been contr overs ia l , such t ha t t hey
ra ised q uestions a bout th e Office, itself not
only about its head . The Pres ident w ho
a p p o i n t s t h e O m b u d s m a n s h o u l d b e
cognizan t of the high expecta tions of the
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people to bring t o th e Ombudsma n ’s office
p e r s o n s k n o w n f o r t h e i r e t h i c a l r o l e
model ing , non-par t i s ansh ip , and good
judgement.
D. More Resources for EnhancingAccountability
Resources for enhancing accountability
a nd a tt a cking corruption must be provided.
This is an investment tha t w ill pay off in
the long run. G ua rdians must be supported
in th eir progra ms a nd given incentives not
to stra y from account a bil ity . The funds,
personnel, technology, a nd oth er resources
o f t h e O m b u d s m a n a n d t h eSandiganbayan must a l low them t o keep
in step w ith t he corrupt they a re trying to
cat ch. The persona l income of such officials
should be compet i t i ve wi th the pr iva te
s e c t o r , s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n s c i e n t i o u s
p e r f or m a n c e o f t h e i r d u t i e s . Th e i r
orga nizat ions should be provided w ith t he
necessa ry equipment high-tech devices like
hidden ca meras, etc a nd munda ne mat ters
such as paper c l ips , enve lopes , f i l ing
c a b i n e t s a s i s n e e d e d i n t h e i r w o r k .Incumbents should be imbued w ith a sense
o f m i s s i o n e a r l y , v i a a w e l l - p l a n n e d
orient a tion progra m, a nd keep them going
w ith peer group an d leadership support ,
a n d a h o t l i n e f o r c o u n s e l i n g o n t h e
problems they meet.
Civil serva nt s w ho perform exceptiona lly
w el l should be recogn iz ed . The C iv i l
Service Commission progra m t o this effect
is a step in the right direction, but it honorst oo few people. The increa se of sa la ries
a c r o s s t h e b o a r d t h r o u g h t h e S a l a r y
Sta ndardiza t ion Law is a wa y to keep up
w ith inflat ion, but it ha s ha d the pernicious
effect of eating up a ny resources tha t m a y
be given competit ively. Merit increases a nd
p r om ot i on c a n s i gn a l t h a t a n a g e n cy
recognizes th a t one officia l is doing bett er
work tha n the others are.
E. Better Public AdministrationT h e m a n a g e m e n t a p p r o a c h s t a r t e d
under t he Aquino a dministra tion should be
c on t i n u e d a n d i m p r o v e d . P e r s o n s i n
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e
t r a i n e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d t o t h i n k
s t ra teg ica l l y. The cha l lenge i s to use
wha tever capacity t here is towa rds work
th a t i s focused on enha ncing the publ ic
i n t e r e s t . Th e r e i s a l s o a n e e d t o
ins t i tut iona l ize some of the ef for t s th a t
h a v e b e e n p u t i n t o e n h a n c i n g
a ccount a bility since 1986. This mea ns the
support of agency reform measur es, as w ell
a s the esta blishment of new procedures, topave the w ay for clean er administra t ion.
F. Encouraging Public SectorUnions
D e m o c r a c y i s d e v e l o p e d i n t h e
bureaucracy as t he ra nk a nd file are given
the cha nce to air t heir grievances, press for
bet ter working condi t ions , and demand
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d r e c t i t u d e f r o m t h e
m a n a g e m en t . E v e n w i t h C i v il S e r v i ce
Commission encouragement, unions stillface an uphill batt le in being hea rd by t heir
bosses. An ar ra ngement wh ere th e union
keeps i ts independence w hile rema ining
open to a par tnersh ip for serv ice wi th
m a n a g e m en t w ou l d p r ov i d e t h e b es t
a v e n u e n o t o n l y f o r p o l i c i n g h o w
a ccounta ble ma na gement is , but a lso for
improving th e performa nce of everyone a t
a ll levels of the orga nizat ion.
G. Reform of Politicians andBusiness People
Cha nges should a lso focus on t he ma in
corrupters, t he politicians a nd t he private
s e ct o r . Th e N G O s t h a t r e q u i r e t h e i r
members to pay the right ta xes a nd conduct
a ctivit ies tow a rds corru ption prevention
w ithin t heir ra nks should be encoura ged.
P olitical pa rt ies should reform th emselves,
primarily th rough the continuous tra ining
of th eir members on pa rt y principles and
p o l i c i e s , a n d t h e i r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e
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principle of politica l neutr a lity a mong civil
serva nts. P ending that , the pa ssage of the
law required by the Consti tution against
politica l dyna sties, an d increased recourse
to a nd encoura gement of the a ctivit ies of
the E th ics Commi t t ees o f bo th H ouses
w ould be more immediat e steps. Ca use-
orient ed groups a nd public sector u nions
ma y a ssist politician s, especially t hose who
regard themselves as non-tradit ional , in
developing support groups to re-enforce
th eir desire for t rue public service, not m ere
patronage.
H. Transparency and AccountabilityMa ke tra nsparency real , al low ing civils e r v a n t s a n d t h e p u b l i c t o a c c e s s
informa tion in government . A qu estion
hour in C ongress, or a ra dio-TV progra m
w i t h q u e s t i o n s a n d c o m m e n t s t o b e
a nsw ered by execut ive officia ls ma y help
inquir ies into a ny a spect of th eir policies
a nd performa nce. Report s of investiga tions
should be ma de ava ilable to the public. The
s u p p o r t o f t h e m a s s m e d i a i n t h e s e
e n d e a v o r s , a c co m pa n i e d b y t h e i r ow nefforts a t r eforming t heir ra nks, would be
crucia l to t he success of these effort s.
A c c o u n t a b l e p e r f o r m a n c e w o u l d b e
support ed if the public is informed a bout
w h a t t h e a g e n cy d oe s a n d w h y. I t i s a
m e a n s o f e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e p e r s o n n e l
th emselves know its mission. At th e sa me
time, both t hey a nd t he public w ould a lso
t h e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e a s o n in g b e h in d
w h a t s e e m t o a p pe a r o n l y a s r e d t a p e.Informat ion sha ring - part icularly of steps
i n s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y - a l s o m a k e s i t
unnecessary for the cl ient to seek out a
‘fixer ’. Open tra nsa ctions ca n build a sense
of par tnership betw een t he government
a nd t he people th e agencies serve.
I. Moral ReformH a ving role models, a code of eth ics a nd
va lue forma tion exercises speak of a desire
for mora l reform w ithin t he government.
W h i l e c u l t u r e s c a n n o t b e c h a n g e d
overnight , support for va lue cha nges must
be developed through a system of rewa rds
a nd punishments th a t becomes regula rized
in sta nda rd opera ting procedures. Also, th e
meting out of positive an d nega tive str okes
must be sw if t but fa ir, an d even-ha nded.
Va lue development semina rs s hould be
case-orient ed, th ought provoking, a nd a ble
to encourage innovative behavior, while
ra ising ala rm a bout continued violat ions.
J . Role of the PeopleThere is a need for popula r involvement
in e th ics and accounta bi li ty. P a y ing theproper t a xes, obeying regula tions, being
w ell informed a bout governm ent services -
these a re only t he first steps in moving t o
a disciplined but democra tic society . In
a d d i t i o n , s u p po r t f o r p o li t i c ia n s w h o
p r o m o t e c a u s e s r a t h e r t h a n j u s t t h e i r
cha rm a nd personality w ould also ma ke the
l i n e o f a c co u n t a b i l i t y c l ea r e r . Th e
d e v el op m e n t o f pa r t i e s w i t h c o h er e n t
plat forms should t hen be a focus of people’s
par t icipa t ion , to t ie up wi th the r eformssuggested above. These a re all in a ddition
to the encoura gement o f NG O s tha t a re
non-par tisa n in exposing corruption a nd
bringing violat ors to justice. The sta rt of
ma ny of these measures ha s alrea dy been
ma de. They a re in tun e w ith democrat ic
principles , a s wel l a s th e cul ture . One
hopes that ma ny more f ina ncia l , huma n
a nd mora l resources w ill be placed a t t he
service of accounta bility in t he count ry.
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T
able1
OFFICEOFTHEOMBUDSMAN
STATISTICALREPORTONCR
IMINAL/ADMINISTRATIVECASES
From
1988to1998
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
19931
994
1995
1996
1997
1998
OM
BCasesReceivedduringthe
year
57
3,722
3,997
5,142
5,303
8,172
9,454
6,122
8,117
8,15
0
8,551
Ca
sesreceivedbacktopendin
g
19
92
2
8
18
OldTanodbayanCases
1,811
2,814
998
145
314
105
154
46
552
Ca
rry-overfrom
thepreviousyea
er
6
3,536
6,403
8,805
9,9281
2,789
14,652
12,975
12,47
3
9,159
To
talWorkloadofCriminal/
Ad
ministrativeCases/Complaints
1,868
6,592
8,51111,69014,42218,20522,39720,83921,73620,65
117,728
Disposedof
1,862
3,056
2,108
2,885
4,494
5,416
7,772
7,864
9,26311,49
210,816
Dismissed/Closedandtermi
nated
1,862
2,996
1,908
2,278
3,839
3,605
4,851
4,262
5,109
8,98
6
8,397
PenaltyImposed
73
93
95
179
29
6
253
Prosecution
60
200
607
655
1,738
2,828
3,507
3, 975
2,21
0
2,166
RegularCourts
405
393
1,378
2,198
2,988
3,734
1,72
2
1,700
Pe
nding
6
3,536
603
8,805
9,92812,78914,62512,97512,473
9,15
9
6,912
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Table 2WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
(as of December 31, 1997)
Central
Office
Cases received during the year 1,246 1,494 2,075 1,150 2,185 8,150
Referred by the ot her OMB office 8 13 0 49 0 445
Disposed ca ses revert ed ba ck t o pen din g 0 0 0 28 0 28
Ca rry-over from 1996 3,980 2,460 1,932 3,244 857 12,473
Total workload of criminal
and administrativecases 5,234 3,967 4,007 4,471 3,417 21,473
Less ca ses recalled to cent ra l
office /t ra nsferred to OMB office 186 68 177 9 5 445
Net workload of cases 5,048 3,899 3,830 4,462 3,412 20,651Disposed 3,249 1,772 2,094 2,034 2,343 11,492
Dismissed /exonera ted 2,812 1,337 1,527 1,520 989 8,185
P rosecut ion 254 383 357 451 765 2,210
P ena lt y imposed 148 15 86 47 0 296
Closed a nd t ermina t ed 35 37 124 16 589 801
P ending 1,799 2,127 1,736 2,428 1,069 9,159
Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars
Table 3WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES
(as of December 31, 1997)
Central
Office
Ca ses received during t he yea r 880 1,125 1,242 847 1,370 5,454
Referred by the oth er OMB offices 7 13 0 46 255 321
Disposed ca ses revert ed t o pending 0 0 0 25 0 25
Ca rry-over from 1996 2,989 1,997 1,281 2,765 756 9,788
Total workload of criminal cases 3,876 3,125 2,523 3,683 2,381 15,855Less ca ses recalled to cent ra l
office /t ra nsferred t o OMB offices 179 2 132 6 3 321
Net workload of criminal cases 3,697 3,123 2,391 3,678 2,378 15,267
DISPOSED 2,749 1,480 1,440 1,746 1,643 9,058
Dismissed 2,460 1,097 1,070 1,295 878 6,800
Closed a nd Termina t ed 35 0 13 0 0 48
P rosecut ion 254 383 357 451 765 2,210
w ith regula r court s 176 244 291 309 752 1,772
w ith S a ndiga nba ya n 78 139 66 142 13 438
P ending 948 1,643 951 932 735 6,209
Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars
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Table 4WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
(as of December 31, 1997)
Central
Office
Ca ses received during the yea r 366 379 833 303 815 2,696
Referred by t he ot her OMB offices 1 0 0 3 120 124
Disposed ca ses reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 0 3 0 3
Ca rry-over from 1996 991 463 651 479 101 2,865
Total workload of
administrative cases 1,358 842 1,484 788 1,036 5,508
Less cases reca lled t o centra l
office /t ra nsferred t o other OMB offices 7 66 45 4 2 124
Net workload of administrative cases 1,351 776 1,439 784 1,034 5,384DISPOSED 500 292 654 288 700 11,492
Dismissed /exonera ted 352 240 457 225 111 1,385
P ena lt y imposed 148 15 86 47 0 296
Closed a nd t ermina ted 0 37 111 16 589 753
Act ive /a w a it ing fina l disposit ion 851 484 785 496 334 2,950
Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars
Table 5
TOTAL WORKLOAD OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES(as of December 31, 1996)
Central
Office
Ca ses received 1,342 1,525 2,026 1,140 2,084 8,117
Referred by ot her OMB offices 19 13 1 16 243 292
Disposed ca ses revert ed ba ck t o pending 0 0 5 87 0 92
OS P /TB P t ra nsferred ca ses 6 1 1 544 0 552
Ca rry-over from 1995 4,718 2,063 2,062 3,079 654 12,576
Total cases received 6,085 3,602 4,095 4,866 2,981 21,629Less cases reca lled t o centra l
office /t ra nsferred t o other offices 65 7 210 6 4 292
Net workload of cases 6,020 3,595 3885 4,860 2,977 21,337
Disposed 2,974 1,135 1,765 1,219 2,121 9,214
Dismissed 2,063 879 1,472 909 741 6,604
P rosecut ion 350 185 201 221 549 1,506
P ena lt y imposed 21 65 46 39 8 179
Closed a nd t ermina ted 0 6 46 50 823 925
P ending 3,046 2,460 2,120 3,641 856 12,123
Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars
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Table 7
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS(as of December 31, 1996)
Central
Office
Cases received 314 312 602 272 856 2,356
Referred by th e Cent ra l Office 1 0 0 6 65 72
Disposed ca ses /reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 1 11 0 12
Ca rry-over 1995 1,316 406 720 474 79 2,965
Total administrative cases received 1,631 718 1,323 763 970 5,405
Less ca ses recalled to cent ra l
office /t ra nsferred t o other offices 5 0 66 1 0 72
Net workload of administrative cases 1,626 718 1,257 762 970 5,333
Disposed 635 255 606 283 869 2,648
Dismissed /exonera ted 614 184 531 208 38 1,575
P ena lt y imposed 21 65 46 39 8 179
Closed a nd t ermina t ed 0 6 29 36 823 894
Act ive /a w a it ing fina l disposit ion 993 463 651 479 101 2,685
Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars
Table 6WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES
(as of December 31, 1996)
Central
Office
Cases received 1,028 1,213 1,424 828 1,228 5,761
Referred by ot her OMB offices 18 13 1 10 178 220
Disposed ca ses revert ed t o pending 0 0 4 76 0 80
OS P /TB P t ra nsferred ca ses 6 1 1 544 0 552
Ca rry-over 1995 3,402 1,657 1,342 2,605 605 9,611
Total criminal cases received 4,454 2,884 2,772 4,103 2,011 16,224
Less ca ses recalled to cent ra l
office /t ra nsferred t o ot her offices 60 7 144 5 4 220
Net workload of criminal cases 4,394 2,877 2,628 4,098 2,007 16,004DISPOSED 2,339 880 1,159 936 1,252 6,566
Dismissed 1,989 695 941 701 703 5,029
Closed a nd t ermina ted 0 0 17 14 0 31
P rosecut ion 350 185 201 221 549 1,506
w ith Regula r Court s 195 181 153 194 542 1,265
w ith S a ndiga nba ya n 155 4 48 27 7 241
P ending 2,055 1,997 1,469 3,162 755 9,438
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Table 8TOTAL WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL ANDADMINISTRATIVE CASES (as of December 31, 1995)
Central
Office
Cases received 1,203 0 1,159 1,354 617 4,333
Referred by t he Cent ra l Office 0 1,142 109 137 248 1,636
Disposed ca ses /reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 0 19 0 19
Referred by th e ot her OMB offices 27 18 6 19 285 355
OS P /TB P t ra nsferred ca ses 9 0 0 1 36 46
Ca rry-over 1994 5,855 1,692 2,257 3,459 602 13,865
Total criminal / administrative
cases received 7,094 2,852 3,531 4,989 1,788 20,254
Less cases reca lled t o centra loffice /t ra nsferred t o other offices 30 2 85 231 7 355
Net workload of criminal /
administrative cases 7,064 2,850 3,446 4,758 1,781 19,899
Disposed 1,984 1,416 1,475 1,834 1,155 7,864
Dismissed 1,637 1,140 1,143 1,311 473 5,704
P rosecut ion 307 252 246 379 336 1,520
P ena lt y imposed 1 24 15 55 0 95
Closed a nd t ermina ted 39 0 71 89 346 545
P ending 5,080 1,434 1,971 2,924 626 12,035
Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars
Table 9CRIMINAL CASES
(as of December 31, 1995)
Central
Office
Cases received 955 0 710 1,135 295 3,095
Referred by t he Cent ra l Office 0 852 85 100 217 1,254
Disposed ca ses reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 0 11 0 11
Referred by t he ot her OMB office 21 15 4 10 250 300
OS P /TB P t ra nsferred ca ses 9 0 0 1 36 46Ca rry-over 1994 4,372 1,272 1,446 2,796 559 10,445
Total criminal cases received 5,357 2,139 2,245 4,053 1,357 15,151
Less cases reca lled t o centra l
office /t ra nsferred t o ot her office 26 2 64 206 2 300
Net workload of criminal cases 5,331 2,137 2,181 3,847 1,355 14,851
Disposed 1,576 1,105 929 1,397 775 5,782
Dismissed 1,266 853 648 987 439 4,193
Closed a nd termina t ed 3 0 35 31 0 69
P rosecut ion 307 252 246 379 336 1,520
P ending 3,755 1,032 1,252 2,450 580 9,069
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PARTICIPANTS ’ PAP ERS
Table 10ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS
(as of December 31, 1995)
Central
Office
Cases received during the year 248 0 449 219 322 1,238
Referred by the Cent ra l Office (CO) 0 290 24 37 31 382
Disposed ca ses /reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 0 8 0 8
Referred by th e ot her OMB office 6 3 2 9 35 55
Ca rry-over from 1994 1,483 420 811 663 43 3,420
Total administrative cases received 1,737 713 1,286 936 431 5,103
Less cases r eca lled to CO /tr a nsferr ed
t o ot her office 4 0 21 25 5 55
Net workload of administrative cases 1,733 713 1,265 911 426 5,048Disposed 408 311 546 437 380 2,082
Dismissed 371 287 495 324 34 1,511
P rosecut ion 1 24 15 55 0 95
Closed a nd t ermina ted 36 0 36 58 346 476
Act ive /a w a it ing fina l disposit ion 1,325 402 719 474 46 2,966
Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars