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Session Objectives
1 Discuss alternative models to NIMS ICS
2 Cite potential positive and negative
attributes of the ICS
3 Discuss some of the limitations of the ICS
and obstacles to effective implementation
4 Understand how to utilize information about
limitations and obstacles
Importance
• Become a better participant within ICS structures
• Understand the context in which the ICS operates
• Understand the challenges faced by the system in implementation
Alternative models and the NIMS ICS
• NIMS ICS designed to be universal
• Alternatives to NIMS ICS not supposed to be used
• Many different models were used for decades within the fire discipline
• Most models based on either the FIRESCOPE ICS or the Fireground Command System
FIRESCOPE ICS
• 1960s response to a series of wildfires
• Interagency group convened to solve problems in 1972
• Outcome was Wildfire Incident Command System
• Grew in popularity
• Adopted and adapted by fire departments and other disciplines
FIRESCOPE ICS and NIMS ICS
• FIRESCOPE ICS most similar to NIMS ICS
• Intelligence function different– NIMS ICS allows addition of 6th functional area
for intelligence
– FIRESCOPE located information and intelligence functions within Planning Section
Fireground Command System
• Chief Brunacini at Pheonix Fire Departments– Recognized similar problems to those in wildland
firefighting
– Believed a system that could be used day-to-day more useful
– Adapted FIRESCOPE model for structural fires
Differences Between the Systems
• Suitability to incidents of different scale, scope and duration
• Utilization of hierarchical levels and organizational structures
• Terminology
Examples of Adaptations
• National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS)
• NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire Department Incident Management System
• Model Procedures Guide for Structural Firefighting
Shared Concepts and Principles
• Each version shares basic concepts and principles
• Examples include– Hierarchical modular organization– Span of control– Establishment and transfer of command– Chain of command and unity of command– Accountability– Information management
Critical Issue
• Not the number of variations that exist
• But that jurisdictions and disciplines have felt it necessary to adapt and modify the ICS
• In fact, variations to this day– Nonuse
– Partial use
–Modifications
– Adaptations
Variations
• Implications for response efforts?
• What may contribute to the tendency of jurisdictions to change the system?
• These questions will be discussed throughout this session.
Exercise
• Form groups of 2-4 people
• Brainstorm a list of potential positive and negative attributes of the ICS
• You will have 10 minutes
• When finished write your group’s list on the blackboard/whiteboard
Potentially Positive Attributes
• Flexible• Widely applicable• Designed to standardize• Can be used day-to-day• All levels of government
and all disciplines• Based on proven
management characteristics
• Enjoys wide support
• Use is required• Use can decrease
– Perception of chaos and confusion
– Communication problems– Leadership issues– Duplication of effort– Unnecessary response-
related expenditures
• Use can increase safety of responders
Potentially Negative Attributes
• Based on assumptions
• Characteristics of emergencies and disasters
• Everyone has to use the system
• Everyone has to be trained
• Positions are specialized
• Everyone has to practice
• Everyone has recognize incident commander as legitimate
• On-scene management
• Volunteers and groups will emerge
• Temporary Use
• ICS is mandates
• Buy-in and commitment are necessary
Exercise
• Perceptions vary– Levels of government– Person-to-person– Organization-to-organization
• Questions to consider:–Why did you choose to list attributes as positive or
negative?– Are there any attributes that do not belong? If so,
why?
+ Flexibility and Scalability +
• Certain functions must be addressed in every incident
• System can be adapted based on nature of incident, stage of incident, and available resources
• Quickly scaled up or down
• Facilitated by as little as one or many
+ Applicability +
• Characteristics of incident should not affect the use of the ICS
• Has been used successfully to manage diverse incidents
+ Standardization +
• Should be used in the same way
• Allows predictable and patterned coordination and communication
+ Used Day-to-Day +
• Plan events
• Structure administrative activities
• Response to routine emergencies
• Coordinate response to disasters
• Day-to-day use encourages smooth transition into and scaling up of the ICS
+ All Levels of Government and Disciplines +
• Designed to let all entities merge into common structure
• Work together efficiently• Despite, different–Missions– Priorities– Responsibilities– Terminology– Cultures
+ Proven Management Characteristics +
• Practitioner developed
• Based on “best practices” and “lessons learned”
• Continues to evolve
+ Wide Support +
• Fire discipline has used for decades
• Other organizations adopted prior to the mandate of the ICS through NIMS
• Examples include– United States Coast Guard
– Occupational Health and Safety Administration
– Environmental Protection Agency
–Military and some businesses
+ Perception of Chaos and Confusion +
• Common issue—perceptions of chaos – Link with lack of organization
• The ICS can reduce when effectively implemented
+ Communication Problems +
• Utilize common terminology, incident action planning, ICS forms, and other tools
• Tools designed to – Facilitate flow of information and
–Minimize communication problems
+ Leadership Issues +
• Common issue—perceived lack of command and control
• The ICS provides processes for– Designation of incident commander
– Transferring command
– Use of unified command
+ Duplication of Effort +
• Common issue—more than one organization attempts to meet the same need
• Leads to unnecessary response-related expenditures
• Use of the ICS should eliminate
+ Increase Safety +
• Priority placed on safety in many ways
• Examples include– Designation of safety officer
– Incident action planning process
– Resource management
– Span of control
- Assumptions -
• Chaotic situations that must be managed through command and control
• System works
• It works for everyone
• Everyone will want to use it
• Response will be efficient if used
• Little research
• Implications if any assumptions are not true?
- Incident Characteristics -
• Prior research on disasters
• Qualitative and quantitative differences
• How might qualitative and quantitative differences impact the ability to implement the ICS?
- Everyone Has to Use -
• Relies on consistent use–Within organizations
– Across organizations
• Creates opportunities for the system not to perform
- Training -
• Depends on knowledge
• Knowledge depends on training– Accessible and available
• Additional position-specific training– More than one person in preparation for large-scale incidents
• Ongoing training due to turnover
• Jurisdictions– Commit personnel and funding
– Easier for some than others
• What might happen if jurisdictions do not get enough training?
- Practice -
• Depends on practice (i.e. experience) using system
• Get practice– Exercises
– Actual incident management
– Use on a daily basis
• What happens if organizations do not have enough practice?
- Incident Commander -
• Incident commander – Must be perceived to be legitimate
– All must work under the incident commander
• Clear criteria, but– May not follow the criteria
– And/or may not agree on how command and control should be handled
• What happens if they do not work within the structure?
- On-scene Management -
• ICS used for field operations
• MACs can use what they feel best-suited
• Implications for response if similar systems are not used in each?
- Volunteers and Emergent Groups -
• Volunteers and emergent groups– Research has shown common, necessary, and
helpful
• Not always positively perceived
• Implications of volunteers and emergent groups for the ICS?
- Temporary Use -
• Many organizations do not use the ICS on a daily basis
• Reasons why they do not include– Organization’s mission, priorities, leadership, and
culture
– Complexity may be off-putting
• Potential issues for traditional first responders too
• Implications if not used on a daily basis?
- ICS Mandate -
• Both positive and negative attribute
• Have to be compliant for certain funding– No obligation if they do not seek funding
• Implications if jurisdictions opt out?
- Buy-in -
• Resentment of federal mandates
• Training and practice not enough
• Implications if jurisdictions do not buy-in to the system?
Exercise
• Continue to work in same groups.
• Review and analyze one of four Moynihan (2006) case studies
• Identify the factors that encouraged or limited the implementation of the ICS in the case study.
• You have 20 minutes to conduct your analysis and prepare a list.
1993 Laguna and 2003 Cedar Fires
Encouraged
• Relationships and trust in place prior to incident
Limited• There were not enough
resources
• Incident’s scope rapidly expanded
• There were jurisdictional disagreements
• Individuals worked outside the ICS/chain of command
• Responders did not have sufficient training and experience
1995 Oklahoma City Bombing
Encouraged• Limited in scope
• Limited number of tasks
• Victims had limited variety of needs
• Agreement about who should be in charge
• There were enough resources
• Well-practiced and trained
• Preexisting relationships
Limited
• Resources converged
• Volunteers emerged
2001 Attack on the Pentagon
Only Encouraging Factors
• Limited geographic scope
• Small number of victims
• Incident site easily accessible
• There were enough resources
• The types of tasks generated by incident were familiar
• Incident command established without debate
• System was used flexibly
• Responders had training and experience
• Preexisting relationships and trust
Hurricane Katrina
Only Limiting Factors
• Geographic scope widespread
• Large number of tasks
• Lack of resources
• Communications systems and facilities unusable
• Many individuals and organizations involved and worked outside the ICs
• Neither incident command or unified command were established
• Responding organizations were themselves overwhelmed
• Lack of knowledge and training
• Lack of accountability
• Lack of preexisting relationships
Patterns?
Conditions Encouraging Use
• Limited number of tasks
• Geographically limited incidents
• Limited time pressure
• A manageable number of organizations involved in the response
• Responders have experience with the ICS model
• High capacity and adequate resources
• Preexisting relationships
Moynihan’s Conclusion
• Responders cannot control nature of crisis faced
• Implications:– Issues the system itself
cannot correct
– Nature of the incident
– Potentially allows explanation and prediction
Moynihan (2008)
• The success of the ICS is contingent
• Limited:– Nature of crisis
– Lack of experience
• Encouraged:– Use of SOPs
– Interagency trust
– Incidents long duration and limited scope
Buck et al. (2006)
• Preconditions:– Familiar tasks
– Preexisting relationships and trust
– Incident characteristics
• Conclude– System not flawed, rather faulty implementation
– Doubtful will be used “by all actors and in all disaster contexts”
– Not a universal system
Perry (2006)
• Preconditions:– Familiar tasks
– Training
– Enough resources
– Effective resource management
Wenger et al. (1990)
• Problem with system itself
• Findings:– The ICS modified and adapted
– Does not deal well with small scale disasters
– Issues with command
– Too “fire-centric”
– Did not integrate organizations into system well
– Depends on significant practice
– Complex nature of disasters not conducive to standardization
EFO Papers
• Supportive of the ICS and its use as a standard
• But many similar issues to those in academic work– Working with other jurisdictions and/or
agencies/organizations
– Resource issues
– How departments (or other organizations) used the system
– Appropriateness for volunteer and small fire departments
– Command and the ICS
– Command post and emergency operation center interface
EFO Papers Cont.
• Conditions:– Buy-in
– Training
– Regional perspective
– Funding and resources
– Critical role of practice
– Daily use
Implications from Literature
Factors within control
• Training
• Education
• Practice
• Resource management
• Generating buy-in and commitment
Factors beyond control
• Availability of resources (e.g. funding)
• Incident characteristics
• Victims’ needs
• Number and kind of tasks
• Whether or not other organizations involved have trained, practiced, and are committed
Implications Cont.
• Successful implementation may be dependent on preconditions
• ICS not a “cure-all”
• But knowledge of limitations and obstacles can help
Exercise
• Take 5 minutes to individually consider how the information and discussion from this session might impact you in your– First job where ICS training and implementation is
required
– As a professional in the field of emergency management
– As an emergency management student
First Job
• Manage expectations
• Manage personal performance
• Recognize where obstacles may exist and work with other stakeholders to overcome those obstacles
• Understand there may be factors beyond control
Professional
• Better understanding of what may have impacted the performance of the system in particular incidents
• Understand that some issues can be controlled and others cannot
• System will be refined over time
• When change required ensure preconditions met and/or advocate for the resources necessary to ensure they are met