2016EmergencyPreparednessAddendumWorkingPaper:
ObservationsonDOE’s2016ClearPathIVExerciseandImplementationofthe2014NPCEmergencyPreparednessReportRecommendations
NationalPetroleumCouncil
PreparedinFollow-Uptothe2014NPCReport:EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters
July29,2016
OnDecember17,2014,theNationalPetroleumCouncil(NPC)approvedthereportEnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters.Asapartofapprovingthereport,theNPCagreedtoworkwiththeDepartmentofEnergyonimplementingthereportrecommendations.OnJuly29,2016,theNPCapprovedthetransmittalofthisworkingpaperandrelateddocumentstotheSecretaryandthepostingonwww.npc.org.TheNationalPetroleumCouncilhasnotendorsedorapprovedthisdocument,butapprovedthepublicationofthesematerials.TheNPCoffersthesesuggestionsinthespiritofcontinuingimprovementasindustryandgovernmentworkjointlytoimprovepreparednessandresponseprograms.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 2
INTRODUCTION ThisworkingpaperispreparedfortheuseoftheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)andothersimplementingtherecommendationsofthe2014NationalPetroleumCouncil(NPC)emergencypreparednessreportEnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters.Theintentistoprovideanindependentandconstructivereviewofongoingprogresswithimplementationofthoserecommendations,andthisreviewprovidesobservationsontheDepartment’s2016ClearPathIVexercise.TheNPCparticipantsacknowledgethatonlyanecdotalevidenceisavailableonseveraloftherecommendationsandthatobservationsofasingleexercisearelimitedinfullyevaluatingtheimplementationoftheotherrecommendations.
InaletterdatedOctober25,2013,SecretaryofEnergyErnestMonizrequestedtheNationalPetroleumCouncil’sadviceaboutnaturalgasandoilinfrastructureresilience(emer-gencypreparednessfornaturaldisasters).TheNPCassembledadiverseteamofindustryandgovernmentexpertsonemergencyresponsethatreviewedpastincidents,collectedanalyses,anddevelopedaconsensusonrecommendationsforindustryandgovernmenttoimproveresponsetosupplychaindisruptions.InDecember2014,theNPCapprovedandpresentedthereporttotheSecretary(www.npc.org,Reports:EmergencyPlanningandPreparedness:EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters). The2014reporthighlightedsevenkeyrecommendations.Theserecommendationsfallintotwobroadcategories:(1)leveragingoperationalframeworksthatareappropriatelystaffedand(2)maintainingreadinessthroughsustainingmechanismstoaddressinterdependencies,enhancecapabilities,andcontinuouslyimprove.2014ReportRecommendations:
OperationalFrameworkv HarmonizeDOE’senergyresponseteamstructurewiththeNationalIncident
ManagementSystem(NIMS)IncidentCommandSystem(ICS).v LeveragetheEnergyInformationAdministration’s(EIA)subjectmatterexpertisewithin
DOE’senergyresponseteamtoimprovesupplychainsituationassessments.v EstablishcompanyliaisonsanddirectcommunicationwithDOE’senergyresponseteam
toimprovesituationassessments.v Streamlineandenhanceprocessesforobtainingtemporaryregulatoryrelieftospeedup
recovery.
SustainingtheProcessv Statesshouldincreaseengagementwiththeoilandnaturalgasindustryintheirenergy
assuranceplans,andindustrymembersshouldassistthestatesinsuchefforts.v BothDOEandstatesshouldestablishroutineeducationandtrainingprogramsforkey
governmentemergencyresponsepositions.v BothDOEandstatesshouldimprovetheircomprehensivedrillandexerciseprograms
andincludeindustryparticipation.ReciprocalinvitationsextendedbycompaniestoDOEandstatesarerecommended.
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AttheDecember2014Councilmeeting,NPCChairCharlesD.Davidsonnotedthatthe
realchallengewasimplementingtherecommendations,notwritingthereport.TheNPCmembers,throughapprovingthereport,madeacommitmenttofollowthroughwithDOEandsupportimplementationofthekeyrecommendations.InaMarch23,2015lettertotheCouncil,SecretaryMonizthankedtheCouncilforthereportandnotedseveralareaswhereimplementationofthereport’srecommendationswasunderway.TheSecretaryalsorestatedtheDepartment’sinterestinworkingwithindustrypartnerstoenhanceenergysystemresilience.TheSecretary’sMarch2015letterisavailableforreferenceinAppendixA.
Oneofthesevenkeyrecommendationsaddressesaneffectivedrillandexercise
program.Inlate2015,DOEannouncedthatthefourthannual“ClearPath”energysectorpreparednessexercisewouldberevampedandmoveawayfromanacademicsessionformatofearlierClearPathexercisesandmoretowardafunctionalexerciseinsupportoftheQuadrennialEnergyReview(QER),theNPC’sreportrecommendations,andtheDeputySecretary’sdesireforcross-sectorcoordination.Consistentwiththecommitmentmadeinapprovingthereport,theNPCandindustryassistedDOEwiththeClearPathIVexercisethattookplaceinApril2016.ThiseffortbuiltuponpreviousworkcompletedbyDOEandindustryinworkingtowardimplementingthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.
TheAprilexercisescenariosimulateda9.0CascadiaSubductionZoneearthquakeand
tsunamiinthePacificNorthwest.TheNPCrolewastwo-fold:
1. SupportDOEbyprovidingalinktokeycompaniesintheexerciseregionandprovidingassistanceindesigningandplanningtheoilandgascomponentsoftheexercise
2. Provideindependentobservationsregardingthedemonstrationofreportrecommendationsduringtheexercise.
ManymembersoftheNPCteamparticipatedinthe2014EmergencyPreparedness
studyindividually,orcolleaguesfromtheircompaniesparticipated.Inaddition,somememberswereaddedtoensurethatkeyfacilitiesinthePacificNorthwestwererepresented.Afullrosterof2016EmergencyPreparednessAddendumparticipantscanbefoundinAppendixB.
ThisworkingpapercontainsasummaryofNPCsupportforDOE’sClearPathIVexercise
andobservationsofDOE’sexerciseandimplementationofthe2014NPCreportrecommenda-tions.InadditiontoDOE’simplementationofrecommendations,theNPCteamattemptedtoidentifyindustryandstateprogressinimplementingtherecommendations.AppendixCprovidesalistofreferencesusedinthisreview,AppendixDincludestheoutputfromtheStateFuelPlanningworkshop,andAppendixEprovidesadetailedsetofcommentsontheplanningandexecutionofthe2016ClearPathIVexercise.
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NPCSUPPORTFORCLEARPATHIV
TheNPCofferedtoassistinexercisedevelopmentwithafocusonincorporatingthe2014studyrecommendationsintoexerciseplay.DOEwelcomedthisassistanceandthreeNPCworkgroupswereestablishedtoleadtheseefforts.Workgroup1wasestablishedtoassistwithplanningDay1activitiesinPortland.Workgroup2wasestablishedtoassistwithplanningDay2activitiesandsupportingthefunctionalexercisesimulationcell.Workgroup3wasestablishedtoconductareviewoftheClearPathIVactivitiesanddocumentactionsthatdemonstratetheadoptionofthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.
ClearPathIVwasdevelopedtoprovideanopportunityforgovernmentandindustrytoexaminethechallengesofrespondingtoacatastrophicCascadiaSubductionZoneearthquakeandtsunamiandtoidentifygapswithinrespectiveresponseplansandpolicies.Day1activitiesconsistedofatabletopexerciseinthemorningfollowedbysector-specificworkshopsintheafternoon.Day2activitieswereplannedasafunctionalexercise,engagingmembersfromindustryandlocalmunicipalitiesinOregonandWashingtonstatesasControllersinaSimulationCelltotestmembersofDOE’sEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)andEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)inWashington,DC.
Forfurtherdetailsontheexercisescenarioandrelatedmaterialsonemergency
response,pleaserefertoAppendixCforalistofreferences.Workgroup1–Day1Exercise-TabletopandWorkshop Workgroup1focusedonsupportingthetabletopexerciseandfuelsworkshop.AWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup1effortsinassistingDOEwiththeDay1exerciseandthefacilitationoftheafternoonFuelsBreakoutSessionforoilandnaturalgassectorpartici-pants.TheWorkgroup1teamfocusedonthefollowingdeliverables:
• Contactingoilandnaturalgasoperatingcompanies(refineries,terminals,pipelines,etc.)inthePacificNorthwesttoparticipateintheexerciseandbreakoutsession.
• ProvidingsupportforDay1exerciseparticipationbydetailingresponseissuesthatoilandnaturalgascompanieswouldbedealingwithaftertheearthquake.
• FacilitatingtheFuelsBreakoutSessiontodiscussstatefuelplansandareasforimprovement.
Inaddition,theworkgroupprovidedexpertiseandeducationontheoilandnaturalgassupplychainsaspartoftheworkshopdiscussion.DetailedinformationandoutputfromtheworkshopregardingstatefuelplanscanbefoundinAppendixD.
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UseMSELandEEGduring
ExercisePlay.
IncorporateNPCInjectsintoMSEL
DevelopExerciseInjectsbasedon
EEG
DevelopExerciseEvaluation
CriteriaintheformofanEEG
ReviewNPCEPStudyRecommen-dations
IdentifyExercisePurposeandObjectives
DevelopWorkgroup2
Workgroup2–ExerciseDevelopment
AWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup2effortsinassistingDOEwithdevelopmentofthefunctionalexercise.Workgroup2waschargedwithtwokeyfocuspointsforassistinginthedevelopmentoftheexercise:1)establishingawaytotestDOEinitialactivationproceduresand2)demonstratingcoordinationbetweengovernment(federal,state,andlocal)andindustrypartners.WhileprovidingsignificantinputtoDOE’sexercisecontractor,DOEledtheoverallplanninganddevelopmenteffortfortheexercise.
UsingthekeyNPCEmergencyPreparednessstudyrecommendationsandfollowingHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance,Workgroup2developedanExerciseEvaluationGuide(EEG)focusingonkeyprioritiesandprovidingafoundationforexercisedevelopment.TheEEGoutlinedwhattheNPCobserversdesiredtoseedemonstratedduringtheexerciseplay.Workgroupparticipantsusedtheseexpectedplayeractionstodevelopexerciseinjectsthatwouldcreateanenvironmentforexpectedplayeractionstooccur.Theseinjectswereincorporatedintotheexercisescript,theMasterScenarioEventList(MSEL),developedbyDOEexerciseplanners.
Thebasicprocesswasasfollows:
DetailedobservationsandsuggestionsforimprovingfutureDOEfunctionalexercisescanbefoundinAppendixE.Workgroup3–ObservationTeam Workgroup3wasformedtocoordinateateamofobserversforthefunctionalexerciseonDay2oftheDOEClearPathIVexercise.Thisteamwascomposedofemergencypreparednessandresponseprofessionalswithyearsofexperiencebothleadingexercisesandparticipatinginexercises,aswellassignificantexperienceleadingresponseteamsduringactualresponseevents.TheroleforWorkgroup3wastoobservetheDOEClearPathIVexerciseandofferinsightsonDOE’sprogressinimplementingthe2014NPCreportrecommendationsandthoughtsonareasforcontinuingimprovementinDOE’semergencyresponsesystem.Inadditiontoobservingtheexercise,Workgroup3hadtheopportunitytointerviewsomeDOEemployeesandindustryrepresentativesontheprogressoftheNPCstudyrecommendationsthatwerenotexercisedinthescenario.ThedetailsfromWorkgroup3’sobservationsformthebasisforthedetailedcommentsthatfollow.
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OBSERVATIONSOFDOE’SEXERCISEANDIMPLEMENTATIONOF2014RECOMMENDATIONS
TheClearPathIVexerciseallowedtheNPCtoobserveprogresstowardthesevenrecommendationsinthe2014NPCreport,sincetheexercisetouchedonmanyoftheareasdiscussedintheNPCstudy.ThissectioncoverstheNPCobservationsrelativetoeachrecommendation.Thereviewwasnotintendedtobeacompleteassessmentoftheprogresstodate,sinceitwasbasedmainlyontheexerciseobservations.Theexercisehadseverallimitingfactorsforobservations,suchasexercisecontrols,technology,andphysicalconstraintswithinDOE,andsomerecommendationswerenotexercisedduringClearPathIV.
Themostchallengingbuildingblocksofasuccessfulresponseprogramareleadership
commitmentandaprogramownerwhoisgiventheresourcestosustaintheprogram.Thelong-termcommitmenttothesetwocomponentswillbefundamentaltoDOE’ssuccessfulemergencypreparednessandresponseeffort.Manyofthe2014NPCrecommendations,suchastheIncidentCommandSystem(ICS),areinstitutionalframeworkstomanageincidents,anditistheleadershipcommitmentandtheprogramownerthatensurestheireffectiveimplemen-tationanduse.DOEhasclearlybeguntheprocessofsettinganemergencypreparednessfoundation.
Aneffectivepreparednessandresponseprogramisalong-termendeavor.The
organizationswithmatureprogramshavebeenimplementingandcontinuouslyimprovingtheirprogramsformanyyears,evendecades.Inordertosustainandbuildonpastprogressovertime,theNPCcannotadequatelyemphasizetheimportanceofaformalmanagement-of-changeprocess.Amanagement-of-changeprocessisanessentialcomponentinanyprogram,buttheaddedcomplexityoftheelection-drivenchangeoftheAdministrationandthelargeturnoverofseniorstaffoveraveryshorttimeheightensthecriticalityofchangemanagement.TheNPCencouragesDOEtomakemanagementofchangeakeypriorityinplanningforanewAdministrationandanongoingpriorityoftheemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.
Followingisabriefoverviewofhigh-levelobservationsonpreparednessandresponseprogramprogressandareasforcontinuingimprovement.Thisoverviewisfollowedbymoredetailedobservations.TheNPCoffersthesesuggestionsinthespiritofcontinuingimprove-mentandlooksforwardtocontinuingtoworkwiththeDepartmentoverthenextyearsanddecadesasindustryandgovernmentworkjointlytoimprovepreparednessandresponseprograms.
Overview–OperationalFramework
TheexercisedemonstratedtheDOEleadership’scommitmenttoestablishingapreparednessandresponseprogram,whichisthefirststepinfurtherprogramdevelopment.OneoftheclearimprovementareaswastheinclusionofEIAintheEROresponseteam,anditappearedthatEIAparticipantsunderstoodtheirroles.TodevelopintoaseamlessteamintheSituationUnit,EIAwillrequiredocumentationofclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilitiesandadditionalpractice.EIA’sinclusionseemedtohelpothersoutsidetheindustrytounderstand
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 7
theantitrustissuesthatrequireEIA’sconfidentialinformationhandling.BasedoninteractionswithindustrythroughtheOilandNaturalGasSectorCoordinatingCouncil(ONGSCC),EIAhasalsocompiledafoundationallistofcompanyliaisoncontactstouseduringsuchincidents. Akeyeffortinimprovingandmaintainingapreparednessandresponseprogramistheprocessofcontinuousimprovement.DOEshouldcontinuetobuildtheircapabilityandunder-standingoftheICStoensureitsconsistentuseacrosstheentirepreparednessandresponseteam.TheobservationteamhasnotedthatareviewofDOEresponseplans,staffing,andfacilityspacemayofferareastoadvanceeffectiveness.Inthestaffcategory,theremaybeopportunitiestoincreasetheleverageofEIAstaffaspartoftheresponseteam.Inaddition,theONGSCCandtheEIAshouldworktogethertoensurethattheliaisoncontactlistmaintenanceprocessisinstitutionalizedandsustainable,andworkwithDOE’sEnergyResponseOrganizationtosynchronizeplanning.Overview–SustainingtheProcess TheClearPathIVexercisewasasignificantstepforwardinimprovingindustryandDOEenergyemergencypreparednesscooperation.ThroughtheONGSCCanditsmembertradeassociationsandcompanies,theindustryhasalsobeenreachingouttoDOEforgovernmentattendanceorparticipationinindividualcompanyexercises.AsDOEpersonnelcontinuetoparticipateinindustryexercises,movingfromobservationtoactualparticipantroleswilladvancethevalueofthatinput.ThefuelsworkshoponDay1oftheexercisewasanimportantopportunityforstatestoimproveunderstandingofindustrysupplychainsandusethatknowledgeinthedevelopmentoftheirstatefuelpreparednessplans.Italsowasanopportunityforindustryparticipantstoimproveunderstandingofstateandfederalrolesduringemergencies.Themovetoafunctionalexercisecreatedtheopportunityforindustryandgovernmenttoworktogethernotjustduringtheexercise,butduringtheplanningandreviewprocesses.Thiscreatedanongoingdialogueandfacilitatedthedevelopmentofworkingrelationshipsthatarelikelytocontinueforyears. ThisDOEandindustrycollaborationhighlightedopportunitiesforcontinuingimprove-ment.Thefuelsworkshopandthediscussionsonfundamentalsupplychainissuesemphasizetheneedforongoingtrainingandeducationbetweengovernmentandindustryatalllevelssothatthefuelproductionanddistributionnetworkismoreclearlyunderstoodinadvanceofanemergencybythosethatwillbeworkingtowardrestoration.Suchcollaborationwillalsohelptoinformmoreindustrypersonnelongovernmentroles,includingsituationassessmentsandareasinwhichgovernmentassistsinrestoration.FutureexercisescanbuilduponClearPathIVandprovideevengreatervalueinsupportingtheindustryandgovernmentemergencypreparednessandresponsesystems.
Followingisadetailedrevieworganizedaroundtheoriginal2014NPCemergencypreparednessrecommendationsthatincludesmanysuggestionsforimprovementdirectedatindustry,states,andtheDepartmentofEnergy.Afewkeyissueshavebeenidentifiedasthe
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 8
mostcriticaltoadvancetheDOEemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram,aswellasindustryandstateprograms.KeyActionItemsforDOE
• ConformtoICSorganizationalstructure,roles,nomenclature,andprocesses(avoidcustomization).TheICSapproachprovidesstandardizationthroughconsistentterminologyandestablishedorganizationalstructure.1
• Developacontinuityandmanagement-of-changestrategy.Thisshouldincludeastaffingplanforkeyemergencypreparednessandresponsepositions,whichaddressesemployeeturnoverandretainssubjectmatterexpertise,historicalknowledge,andanunderstandingofworkprocessestoensurealong-termorganizationalcoreteam.Inaddition,aprocessownerforemergencypreparednessandresponseleadership,whohasalong-termcommitmenttotheprogram,isakeycomponentofcontinuity.
• Engageexperienced,operationalrespondersandpractitionersascoachestoassistwithemergencypreparednessandresponsedesign,documentation,knowledge,tools,andtraining(e.g.,U.S.CoastGuard,subjectmatterexpertsfromindustryoperators,etc.).
• Expandtrainingandexercises.Continuecollaborationwithindustry,states,andothers.KeyActionItemsforIndustry
• CollaboratewithEIAonthedesignofasustainmentprocessforthecompanyliaisoncontactsystemwiththeONGSCC.
• FormalizeaprocesstoshareindustryexerciseschedulesandengagebothDOEandstategovernments’participationthroughtheEnergyGovernmentCoordinatingCouncil(GCC).
KeyActionItemsforStates
• Establishroutinereviewandupdateofstateenergyassuranceplans.
• Expandunderstandingofenergysysteminterdependencies.
• Improveunderstandingofoilandnaturalgassupplychains,includingregionalandnationalimplicationsofdisruptions.
DETAILEDREVIEWOF2014NPCREPORTRECOMMENDATIONSThefollowingsectionincorporatesobservationdetailstoreviewprogresstowardmeetingtheoriginal2014NPCrecommendations.Eachrecommendationbeginswiththe2014reportlanguageanddescriptivebulletsinbluetext.Thecommentsareorganizedintotwosubsectionsnotedas“ProgressObserved”and“OpportunitiesforImprovement.”
1NationalIncidentManagementSystem,HomelandSecurity,December2008.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 9
Recommendation1HarmonizeDOE’senergyresponseteamstructurewiththeNationalIncidentManagementSystem(NIMS)IncidentCommandSystem(ICS).
v Adoptscalablemodelfromlocaltoregionaltonational–StaffordActenactedornot§ Usecommonnomenclature,structure,tools,training§ Ensureconnectivityatlocallevelandhigherlevels§ MaintainclearcontactpointsbetweengovernmentandindustryICSstructures
v DevelopDOEcultureandknowledgeofICS§ Ensurestaffingandtrainingtosustainbothcapabilitiesandcompetenciesbetween
incidents§ Identifymechanism(e.g.,U.S.CoastGuard)fortrainingDOEstaffonICS.
ProgressObservedObservershadasenseofDOEleadershipcommitment,whichiscriticaltodevelopingandmaintainingapreparednessandresponseprogramforDOEtouseinperformingitsroleunderESF-12.DOEleadershiphasexpressedonvariousoccasionstheirdesiretoimplementtheNPCstudyrecommendations,includingadoptionofICSastheresponseorganizationandcommunicationtool.
• TheDeputySecretary’sparticipationintheexercisedebriefandintheEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)meetingsindicatedherinterestandcommitmenttoimprovingtheDOEpreparednessprogram.Shewasfocusedonlessonslearnedfromtheexerciseandunderstoodtheimportanceofparticipatinginexerciseswiththeindustry.
• TheDeputyAssistantSecretary’sleadershipwasresponsibleforsupportingandprovidingresourcesfortheexercise,includingparticipatingintheNPCactivityassociatedwiththiseventandallowingNPCobserverstoattend.
TheDOEOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityhasprogressedinharmonizingitsresponsestructureunderNIMSICS.
• Sincethe2014NPCstudy,DOEhasdevelopedanEnergyResponsePlandocument,whichcontainsthebasicconceptsoftheICS.
• Thefunctions(legal,safety,publicaffairs)wereorganizedunderwhatappearstobetheCommandStaff.
• TheEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)wasorganizedunderthebasicstructureofICSandcontainedthefollowingsections:Operations,Planning,Finance,andLogistics.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 10
OpportunitiesforImprovementDOE’sresponseorganizationdesignneedstobefullyconsistentwithNIMSICSandavoidterminologythatcreatesconfusion,particularlywithstaffgroupdesignations.StrictconformitytoICSstructure,nomenclature,anddocumentationofDOEEnergyResponsePlanorganizationstructurewillimprovetheeffectivenessofDOEresponseandinteractionwithotherpublicandprivateresponsestakeholders.
• ImplementationoftheICS,underNIMS,isnotconsistentacrossorganizationsandfirstrespondersatalllevelsofgovernment.Althoughmanyagenciesatlocal,state,andfederallevelsuseICS,thevariabilityinapplicationunderminestheefficienciessoughtthroughstandardization.Aconsistent,disciplinedprocessforcommunicationbetweenfederalagenciesandwithindustrycanleadtomoretimelyandqualityinformationtosupportsituationalawarenessanddecision-makingduringnaturaldisasters.
• Theuseofstaffingpositionterminologyandsomedocumentsprovidedduringtheexercisecreatedconfusionastowhowasperformingcertainroles.ItwasparticularlyuncleartotheobserverswhowasperformingtheroleofIncidentCommanderduringtheClearPathIVexercise.DOEneedstoclearlydefinetheterminologyforpositionsandtheassociatedroleswiththem.
– AtvarioustimetheERODirectorseemedtobeperformingthefunctionofIncidentCommanderandatothertimesitappearedthatthisfunctionwashousedintheSeniorEnergyResponseOfficial(SERO)position.
– VariousversionsoftheorganizationchartsindicatedthreedifferentreportingstructuresfortheSERO,CommandStaff,andERODirector.
o TheEnergyResponsePlanindicatesthatthePublicAffairsOfficerwouldreporttotheSEROandtheLegalOfficerwouldreporttotheERODirector.InaNIMScompliantICS,theCommandStaffwouldreporttotheIncidentCommander.
o Duringtheexercise,theCommandStaff(legalandpublicaffairs)reportedtotheSERO.InNIMSICSthatwouldindicatethattheSEROwastheIncidentCommander.
o TheExercisePlayerLayoutdocument,providedtotheobservers,usedthetermChiefofStaffinplaceoftheERODirectoranddidnotindicateanypositiontermedtheSERO.
o AnotherdocumentprovidedtotheobserversindicatedthatboththeCom-mandStafffunctions(legalandpublicaffairs)reportedtotheERODirector.
– Alltheorganizationalchartsprovidedtotheobservers,andintheEnergyResponsePlan,indicatedFinance,Logistics,andAdministrativefunctionsarebeingsuppliedbythesameperson.InaNIMSICScompliantstructure,ratherthancombiningfunctionsunderoneSection,ifanyfunctionsidentifiedinICSasbeneaththelevelofIncidentCommanderarenotbeingperformedbythatICSSection,theyaretheresponsibilityoftheIncidentCommander.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 11
• EIMCisnotastandardICSelement,rolesandresponsibilitiesarenotclear,andchainofcommandwasnotconsistentnorclearrelativetotheICSstructure.TheERO(onDay2)waitedfortheEIMCtoestablishpriorities,whichwerecommunicatedtotheUnifiedCommandGroup(UCG)andthentheERO.WithinatypicalICS,theEROwouldberecommendingobjectivestotheUCGasinputtoEIMC.
Rolesandresponsibilitiesofresponseteampositionsneedtobeclearlyunderstoodbyall;documentationofrolesandresponsibilitiesmustbedescribedsufficientlyintheEnergyResponsePlan.(Note:TheEnergyResponsePlanreferencesothersupportingdocumentation–e.g.,The“EnergyResponseOrganizationTacticalProceduresManual”andthe“ESF#12ProgramPlan”–thatmayhavemoredetailanddescription,butwerenotavailabletotheassessmentteamforreview.)
• TherewasconfusionbetweenUCGrolesofcommandandcoordination.Thereisasig-nificantdifferencebetween“command”and“coordination”andthecorrectterminologyshouldbedecideduponbasedontheroleofthatgroup.Typically,aUCGiscreatedwhenleadershipisjointwithmembersfromdifferentorganizations.TheexerciseUCGwasmadeupofplayersfromtheDOE(i.e.,anOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityandNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration[NNSA]LeadershipTeam).ThesignificantlydifferentmissionsbetweentheseDOEresponseteamsshouldbeconsideredintheuseofany“unifiedcommand/coordination”group.Itmaybeappropriateforsomeresponses,butthatshouldbeclearlyarticulatedinDOE’senergyresponseplanandterminologychangedtoavoidconfusionwithICSdefinitions.
• TheEnergyResponsePlanhadveryshortroleandresponsibilitydescriptionsforeachposition,whichlackedsufficientclarity.Clarityofroleforeachresponsesectionmustbeclearlyunderstoodbyallresponseteammemberstoensureacohesiveresponseteamandavoidduplicationofeffort.
• ThefunctionsoftheEIMC,UCG,andEROdidnotappeartobecompletelyunderstoodbyallthemembersofeachgroup.Thisaddedconfusionbetweenrolesforeachgroupandinturncleardirectionongoals,objectives,andsituationalstatuswerenotfollowedwiththerigorthatwewouldnormallyexpectunderanICSorganizationalstructure.
StandardICSworkprocessesandtoolsshouldbefullyusedtoimprovetheeffectivenessofDOE’sresponseteam;adherencetotheseprocessesandtools,throughouttheevent,willenableDOEtoquicklyalignwithandworkeffectivelyinarealresponsewithotherpublicandprivateorganizations.
• TherewasnoevidenceofthedevelopmentofaDOEIncidentActionPlan(IAP)fortheresponse.WithouttheinitialdevelopmentofanIAPandarepeatableprocesstoupdatetheIAPwiththechangingscenario,thereisnowayfortheresponseteamtokeepupwithallthechangingsituation.DOEusedwhattheyreferredtoas“BattleRhythm”astheirplanningtool.BattleRhythmisnotatermroutinelyusedorunderstoodbyotherorganizationsandagenciesoperatingunderICS.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 12
– TheBattleRhythmwasobservedtobealistofpre-definedmeetingsorconferencecallsandtimes.TheuseofthisBattleRhythmalonecouldnotproduceanICSqualityIAP.TheIAPisadocumentthatcontainstheresponseobjectives,com-municationoftheobjectives,strategicdirection,tacticalplanstoaccomplishtheobjectives,identificationandallocationofresources,thedevelopmentofasituationalstatusboard(display),andtheoperationalperiodforactivity.TheIAPisreviewedandsignedoffonbytheIncidentCommander.Itisusedtoensurecohesionofmissionbytheresponseteamandistheplanforaccomplishingtheobjectives.
• TheICSstandardPlanning“P”processwasnotleveragedtodeveloptheIAP.
– TheuseoftheICSstandardPlanning“P”processwasabsentfromtheresponseplanningprocess.DOEindicatedinlaterinterviewsthattheBattleRhythmwasintendedtobetheprocesstodeveloptheirprimaryproduct–theSituationReport.TheBattleRhythm,asobserved,couldnotreplacethePlanning“P”processandlackstheabilitytoadequatelydeveloptheIAP.WithouttheuseofanIAP,developedbytheuseofthePlanning“P”,acoordinatedandefficientresponseeffortwillbeextremelydifficulttomaintain.Trainedresponders,operatingunderICSandthePlanning“P”processcanprogressivelyhandleandaccomplishcomplexscenarios.OurobservationisthattheBattleRhythm,ascurrentlyused,cannotbereliedupontheuseinalong-termorcomplexscenario.
• TherewasnosituationalstatusboardavailableintheDOEEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)toinformtheentireresponseteamofthestatusoftheresponse.Thiswouldincluderesourcesidentifiedandallocated;responseobjectives;asituationaldisplay(map)oftheoperationsarea;responseorganizationchartwithspecificnamesassignedtoeachsection;etc.ItwastheobserversopinionthatWebEOCwasintendedtobeused,butitdidnotworkandtherewasnoattempttodisplaywallcharts.
DOE’sEnergyResponsePlanshouldincludesufficientlytrainedstafftocoverIncidentCommandrolesandEOCoperationsforascenariothatextends24/7operationsoveranextendedperiod(weeksormonths).TheEOCstaffingduringtheexerciseappearedtobeinadequatetohandlethisspecificexercisescenario.
• Theobserverssaworheardnorecognitionconcerningthisissue.
• DOEindicatedthatitisinvestigatingtrainingotherDOEemployeesoutsideoftheInfrastructureSecurityandEnergyRestorationDivisiontofillthoseroles.
• DOEindicatedthatitsrationalefor“doublingup”ontheICSSectionChiefpositionswastoprovideanopportunityforcross-training.
Guidelinesshouldbedevelopedformanagingresponsetosimultaneousevents.EstablishingaUnifiedCommandapproachacrosstheeventswouldbevaluablewhentheeventsimpactthesameregionand/orsectorandresponserequirescoordinationandallocationofsimilarresources.Whentherearefewornointerdependenciesbetweenresponseresources,it
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 13
maybemoreeffectivetomanageeacheventunderadiscreetresponsestructure(ERO)withcommunicationsintegratedattheEIMClevel.Thecomplexities,diversities,anddynamicsofmanagingaresponsetosimultaneousevents,acrosssectors,regions,andagenciesisdifficult.ThedecisionforanintegratedresponseteamunderUnifiedCommandissituationandeventdependent.However,oncedecided,fullyutilizingtheICSprocessandtoolstoclearlycommunicateresponsescope,responsibilities,andactionplansisacriticalenablertoensureresponseteamsarealignedandeffective.
• Respondingasa“unifiedresponseorganization”betweentheCascadiascenarioandthenuclearthreatscenariowasconfusing.Eventhoughthesescenarioswereintroducedashavingoneresponseteam,thepartiesaddressingthesescenariosroutinelyworkedinseparatespaces.
• Itappearedthattheintegratedfunctionshadlimitedbenefitandaddedtotheroleconfusion.
• Integrationatthehigherlevels,perhapstheEIMC,ismoreappropriate.
EmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)logisticsshouldaccommodateawidevarietyofinternalandexternalparticipantssupportingunifiedcommand,includingreliablecommunications,sufficientspace,redundantsystems,andotherEOCdesignbestpractices.TheEOCusedforthisexerciseappearedhavesignificantlimitationsandperhapshinderedamorecohesiveresponse.
• Usingrestricted(classified)spacefornon-classifiedemergencyresponseoperationsaddsunnecessaryconstraintstocommunicationsandinteractions.Fortheexercise,DOEprovidedescortswhowerehelpful,informative,andprofessional;theyaccom-modatedrequestsquicklyandpleasantly,butinarealevent,ifthereareun-clearedparticipants,theselimitationsmaybedifficulttocoordinateeffectively.
• TheDOEEmergencyOperationsCenterhadlimitedspacetohandlealargeexercise;theUnifiedCommandGroupwasisolatedfromtherestoftheteam.
• CommunicationsystemissuesrequiredtheEIAsituationunitrepresentativeintheEOCtoleavetheexerciseroomforextendedperiodsduringtheafternoontocommunicatewiththeEIAteam.
Summary–Recommendation1InputThedisciplineofICS,usingthesystematic,standardizedapproach,providesaneffectivemechanismforDOEtoactasthecoordinating,primaryagencyforenergyinfrastructureassessment,repair,andrestorationwithinthefederalgovernmentaspartoftheNationalResponseFrameworkandtheNationalIncidentManagementSystem.ThebenefitsofimplementingICSasdesignedincludes:standardizedorganizationstructurewithclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilities,integratedcommunicationsthatfacilitateescalationofissues,situationassessment,commonoperatingpicture,andcoordinationofresponseacrossagendasandsectors.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 14
Recommendation2LeveragetheEnergyInformationAdministration’s(EIA)subjectmatterexpertisewithinDOE’senergyresponseteamtoimprovesupplychainsituationassessments.
v StaffsituationunitleaderandsupportpersonnelfromEIA(mostknowledgeableonindustrysupplies)
v Developsituationassessmentviatwocommunicationpaths§ BottomupthroughgovernmentICSstructure(ESF-12contact,PSAs,JFO,etc.)§ Directone-on-onecommunicationsandcoordinationwithIndustrySupplyChain
Liaisonsv Summarizeoverallfuelsupplysituationandcascadingeventsandtimelinesv Aggregateindustrysupportrequirementsv SupportDOEcontinuingtoassessandimplementsocialmediainformationgathering.
ProgressObservedEIAparticipatedinthePlanningSectionoftheEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO),withastaffpersonintheEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC).EIAstaffsupportingtheEROwerelocatedoutsideoftheEOCinanEIAdata-secureareainordertocollectandprocessindividualcompanydatafortheSituationReport.EIAhaspreparedalistofquestionstopre-identifythetypesofinformationthatwillberequiredduringarealdisruptionevent.EIAusedsimulatedcontactsforindustryrepresentativestogetaninitialassessmentofthesupplychainproceduresforpurposesoftheexercise.ASituationReportwasproducedthatcoveredmajorenergyfacilitiesstatusandinformationonrecovery.TheEnergyResponsePlanindicatesthattheSituationReportistheprimaryproductoftheEROduringamajorevent.WhiletheexercisebeganDay2withapreparedSituationReport,thePlanninggroupproducedasecondreporttowardtheendoftheday,usinginputfromEIA.OpportunitiesforImprovement
UseofEIA’ssubjectmatterexpertisewithinDOE’senergyresponseteamdidnotappeartobefullyexercised.IncorporatingthisroleasalearningobjectiveintofutureexercisedesignmayassistinincreasingEIA’seffectivenesstotheprocess.ThisisanotherexampleofwheretheEnergyResponsePlanneedstobeupdatedtoclarifyandcodifyEIA’srolesandresponsibilities.EIA’sroleintheEROasobservedduringtheexerciseshouldenhanceitsabilitytointeractmoreeffectivelywithsituationassessment.EIA’ssupporttotheSituationUnit,undertheICSstructure,shouldbeformalized,andtrainingonemergencyresponseprotocolsandtoolsshouldbeprovidedtoEIApersonnel.EIAhasmanystatisticalanalyticalskillsandabilitiesthatcanaidDOE’sassessmentofimpactstotheenergysectorduringasupplydisruption.EIAindividualsassignedtotheEROSituationUnitrolesshouldhaveabroadknowledgeoftheoil
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 15
andgassupplychains,sensitivitytobusinessproprietaryandcompanyconfidentialdata,andunderstandingofthesupplymarkets.MorefullyleveragingEIA’ssubjectmatterexpertiseontheEROteamwillimprovethequalityofanalyticalandsituationassessmentsproducedbyDOEandusedfordecision-makingmorebroadly.Recommendation3EstablishcompanyliaisonsanddirectcommunicationwithDOE’senergyresponseteamtoimprovesituationassessments.
v DOEICSLiaisontogatherone-on-oneinformationpriortoorduringsupplychaindisruptions§ Developbestandfastestsourceforinformationandclarityonsupply,delivery
issues,andsupportneeds§ AdviseDOEonsituationassessment(status,potentialcascadingevents,response
activity)§ Highlightantitrustandconfidentialitylimitationsthatprecludejointindustry/trade
associationsupportv OilandNaturalGasSectorCoordinatingCouncil(ONGSCC)tosupportDOEin
maintainingtwo-waycontactroster(regional/national)v DOEandindustrytoestablishcontactsinadvanceofemergencyevent.
ProgressObservedIn2015,theNPC,ONGSCC,andEIAcompiledcompanyliaisoncontactinformation.Asrecommended,theinformationrepresentsthesinglepointofcontactforDOEtocontactcompaniesinsupportofsituationassessment,andanavenuetocontactseniorcompanyofficials,asintendedintheNPCstudyrecommendations.
• AnNPCrequestforcontactinformationwasdistributedtoallNPCmembercompaniesandtradeassociations.Theletter,supportedwithFAQ,outlinedthekeyinformationrequestedandprotocoltobefollowedbyEIAtomaintainconfidentialityoftheinformation.
• TheONGSCCsupportedthecompilationofthecurrentcompanycatalogue.Sincecompanyparticipationisvoluntary,theONGSCCandtradegroupsworkedonaprioritizedlistofcompaniestoensureeffectiveindustrycoverageindifferentsegmentsoftheindustry.Thelistincludes:− Refiningcompanies–approx.96%ofalltherefiningcompaniesthatoperatean
individualrefinerycapacityof>150,000bpd;thisrepresentsapprox.86%ofallU.S.-basedrefiningcapacity
− Midstreamcompanies(liquidpipelines&terminals)–approx.65%ofallmidstreamcompaniesthatwerelistedinthetoptierbycapacityorthroughput.Thisincludesforliquidpipelines–top25bybbl.deliveredormilesofpipe;forterminals–top10
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 16
bybbl.ofcapacityornumberofterminals;andforFERC-regulatedcompanies–28companies.
− Naturalgasandoilproductioncompanies–14companies.EIAhasstateditsintentiontovalidateandupdatethelistannuallythroughanexercisecall-outprocedure,butthiswasnotpracticedduringtheexercise.TheONGSCChasupdatedthesectorplanappendixonemergencymanagementduringsupplychaindisruptions.Thisincludes:ONGSCCRolesandLimitations,keyreferencematerial(APIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook,2014NPCreport),descriptionofhowtheoilandnaturalgassectorcompaniesprepareandrespondtoincidents,andcompanyorganizationalstructureandoperationsundertheNationalResponseFramework.TheappendixwasapprovedandtheAPIhandbookadoptedbytheONGSCC.EIAvalidatedkeyoilandgascompaniesinPADD5inpreparationfortheClearPathIVexercise.OpportunitiesforImprovementEIAmayneedtoassessthecompletenessofthecontactlistforallPADDsandcoordinatewiththeONGSCCtofillanyidentifiedgaps.EIAhasnottestedtheLiaisonContactSystem.DuringClearPathIV,asimulationcontactlistwasused,sotheactualliaisoncall-outprotocolwasnotused.TheONGSCCandEIAneedtoworktogethertoinstitutionalizeasustainmentprocessfortheliaisoncontactlist.WithinDOE,aformalprotocolbetweentheEnergyInformationAdministrationandtheOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityshouldbeestablishedtoclarifytheinformationsharingandstaffroles.Recommendation4Streamlineandenhanceprocessesforobtainingtemporaryregulatoryrelieftospeeduprecovery.
v Developbestpracticelanguageandstandardizedtemplatesforkeytemporaryregulatoryrelief
v Keyimprovements:§ ImproveexistingEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)processforfederalfuel
waiverstoreducedelaysanddecreaseuncertainty§ IdentifyCleanAirActprovisions/restrictionsonEPAwaiverauthoritythatmay
createuncertaintiesthathinderresponseactivities§ Improvestatefuelwaiverprocesses§ ImproveJonesActwaiverprocess.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 17
ProgressObservedTheDOEEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)processedarequestforregulatoryreliefaspartoftheClearPathIVexercise.OpportunitiesforImprovementTheexerciseresponsetoaninjectforaJonesActwaiverrequestindicatesadditionalworkmaybeneededinthisarea.
• TheUnifiedCommandGroup(UCG)spenttimeworkingaJonesActwaiver(transportationofgoodsandfuelonnon-U.S.flaggedvesselsbetweenU.S.ports),whichshouldbeaclearlydefinedanddocumentedprocess.Regulatoryreliefinvolvingotheragencieswasnotpartoftheexercise.
• AnyregulatoryreliefcommunicationwiththesimulatedfederalinteragencyNationalResponseCoordinationCenterwasnotobserved.
Inordertorespondeffectivelytothemanydifferentwaiversandassociatedauthorities,DOEmaywanttodocumentthespecificrolesofDOEandspecificallytheOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityinthevariouswaiverprocesses.ThisdocumentationcouldbeincludedintheenergyresponseplantoidentifytheappropriateDOEdepartmentandICSpeopletooverseewaiverprocessrequestsandtoprovideinteragencysupport.TheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookprovidesanoverviewofthemanypossiblewaiversthathaveoccurredduringemergencyevents.Recommendation5Statesshouldincreaseengagementwiththeoilandnaturalgasindustryintheirenergyassuranceplans,andindustrymembersshouldassistthestatesinsuchefforts.v DOEandstatestoassesscomprehensivenessofstateenergyassuranceplans
§ Statestoincreaseindustryinvolvementwithplandevelopment(roleforONGSCC,trades)
§ Includeassessmentofvulnerabilitiesandriskassessmentsofsupplychains§ Ensureresiliencyconsideredinpermittingprocess(i.e.,gasvs.electricfornaturalgas
compression)§ Addressinterdependencies(cross-regionalandcross-industry)§ Verifyplansforensuredfuelsupplyanddistributionpointsforfirstresponders
v IndustrytoensurethatinterdependenciesareaddressedinBusinessContinuityPlans.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 18
ProgressObservedClearPathIVDay1agendaprovidedanopportunityforstatestoengagewiththeoilandgasindustrytoshareunderstandingandenhancestate(Washington,Oregon)energyassuranceplans.OregonidentifiedadditionalareasforimprovingitsplanandWashingtonusedtheexercisetoinformthedraftingofaplanunderdevelopment.
• State-industrydiscussiontopicsincludedindustryassessmentprocesses;overflightsordamageassessment;andalternativesourcesofproducts,supplies,andpersonnel.
• Authoritytoallocatefuelwasdiscussed,recognizingthecomplexityofdifferentauthoritiesandhowthisissueisaregionalissuethatwouldneeddetailedanalysisineachstateplan.
TheONGSCCandNationalAssociationofStateEnergyOfficials(NASEO)hostedajointmeetingofstateenergyofficialsandindustryinOctober2015todiscussfurtherimplementationoftheNPCrecommendations.DOEandNASEOareworkingtogetheronaprocesswiththestatestoimproveandupdatestateenergyassuranceplans,training,andexercises,pendingavailableresources.
• Thisisafollow-uptoamajorjointprogramthatconcludedin2014andwasfundedbyDOEtoestablishenergyassuranceplansinthestates.
• InFebruary2016,theSecretaryofEnergyenteredintoaMemorandumofUnderstandingtostrengthenandexpandcommunicationsandinformationsharingthroughtheEnergyEmergencyAssuranceCoordinatorprogramwithNASEO,theNationalAssociationofRegulatoryUtilityCommissioners,theNationalGovernorsAssociation,andtheNationalEmergencyManagementAssociation.
DOE’sOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityhassupportedaStateEnergyRiskAssessmentInitiativetohelpstateenergyagenciesbetterunderstandriskstotheirenergyinfrastructuresotheycanbebetterpreparedtomakeinformeddecisionsabouttheirinvestments,resilience,response,andhardeningstrategies.2,3ClearPathIVdemonstratedaneffectivewayforstatesnotonlytotesttheirplans,butexploremoreopportunitiesforindustryinvolvement.
2U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability.“StateEnergyRiskAssessmentInitiative.”http://energy.gov/oe/mission/energy-infrastructure-modeling-analysis/state-and-regional-energy-risk-assessment-initiative.3U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability,EnergyModelingandAnalysisDivision.“EnergyRiskResourceLibrary.”December31,2015.http://energyoe.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=ece7b1c390b24177b4361784104cab7d.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 19
OpportunitiesforImprovementAllstakeholdersneedtomakeagreaterefforttocommunicateduringsteadystateoperations,andnotjustimmediatelybeforeorduringanevent.ThepathwaysforcommunicationbetweenstatesandindustryareidentifiedintheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookandthe2014NPCreport.DiscussionsduringClearPathIVDay1oftheexercisehighlightedthatfederal,state,local,andindustrystakeholdershavenotsufficientlydiscussedthecauseandeffectofinterdependentenergysystemsastheyrelatetoplanning,allocationofresources,andpotentialsupplyanddemandconcernsduringanenergydisruptionevent.Federal,state,local,andindustrypreparednessplansshouldbeenhancedtoaddressallocationofresourcesandcascadingsupplyanddemandimplicationsduringadisruptionevent.Stateenergyplansrequireroutinereviewandupdating.Recommendation6BothDOEandstatesshouldestablishroutineeducationandtrainingprogramsforkeygovernmentemergencyresponsepositions.
v UseandmaintaintheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookasakeyreference§ Overviews:supplychains,pre-eventpreparations,operationalmodels,regulatory
reliefinventory§ EnhanceAPIhandbookandappendices
v DOEandstatestoholdregulareducationsessions§ Conductannualrefreshereducationonsupplychainsinadvanceofhurricaneseason§ Leverageexistingfederal,state,local,andindustryforumsforeducation§ Engagethecorrectlevelofdecision-makersandstakeholders(e.g.,localdecision-
makers)v DOEandstatestoestablishmanagement-of-changeprocessesforkeypositions.
ProgressObserved
TheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryHandbookhasbeenupdated(consistentwiththeNPCstudyrecommendations).Theupdatedversion,publishedApril2016,isavailableontheAPIwebsite;hardcopiescanbeobtainedbycontactingtheAPIoffice.APIhasofferedoutreacheducationtovariousgovernmentagencies;therehasbeenselectinterestandinquiriesbutno
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 20
sessionshavebeenscheduled.TheAPIhandbookhasbeenadoptedbytheONGSCCasakeyreference.4EnergyInformationAdministration(EIA)petroleumsupplyreportsareavailableforPADD5(ClearPathIVregion),aswellasPADDs1and3.5,6ThesereportsenhanceDOEEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)andstategovernmentsupplychainawarenessforregionsmostlikelyimpactedbynaturaldisasters.Accesstothesereportsenablesmoreeffectiveanalysisandimprovedsituationassessment.ONGSCCmembershavecontinuedtoreachoutthroughtheNPCreportprocess,theEnergyGovernmentCoordinatingCouncil(EnergyGCC),andparticipationineventssuchasClearPathIVtoprovideindustryexpertiseandexperience.OpportunitiesforImprovementGovernmentpersonnelturnoverandmanagement-of-changeprocessremainacontinuingconcern.Lossofpersonnelmeanslossofknowledge.Amanagement-of-changeprocessisanessentialcomponentofanyemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.TheNPCencouragesDOEtomakemanagementofchangeakeypriorityinplanningforanewAdministrationandanongoingpriorityoftheemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.DiscussionsonDay1oftheexerciseindicatedthat,asDOEmoreclearlyadherestoitsroleandresponsestructureunderESF-12,itshouldworkwithstatestoeducatethemonDOE’sroleandhowtheyinteractwiththestates.Thisisespeciallyimportantforthesituationassessmentactivity.Theexercisedidnothaveavisiblepathforstatesituationassessmentneedstoflowtothefederallevelandforafeedbackloopoffederalsituationreportsbacktothestates.UndertheNationalResponseFramework,thiswouldbethroughtheinteragencyjointfieldoffice(JFO).ContinuingeducationandtrainingofDOEandstatestaffshouldbeanongoingpriorityinthefaceofexpectedstaffturnover.Theeducationalprogramobjectivesneedtoincludebothemergencyresponsecapabilities,suchasICS,andenergy-specificexpertise,suchasoilandnaturalgassupplychainbasics.
4AmericanPetroleumInstitute,OilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook,April2016.http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/hurricane-information/oil-and-natural-gas-industry-preparednes.5U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.“PADD5TransportationFuelsMarkets.”September30,2015.http://www.eia.gov/analysis/transportationfuels/padd5/.6U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.“PADD1andPADD3TransportationFuelsMarkets.”February3,2016.https://www.eia.gov/analysis/transportationfuels/padd1n3/.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 21
Recommendation7BothDOEandstatesshouldimprovetheircomprehensivedrillandexerciseprogramsandincludeindustryparticipation.ReciprocalinvitationsextendedbycompaniestoDOEandstatesarerecommended.
v DOEemergencypreparednessprogramneedsanassignedprocessownerv DOEwithstatestoestablishfrequencyandscope(local,state,andfederal)v DOEtodevelopandimplementacomprehensivedrillandexerciseprogramthatfully
teststheirresponseplantosupplychaindisruptions§ Engagewithotherfederalagenciesandinterdependentprivatesectors§ Ensurerightlevelparticipation(seniordecision-makers,firstresponders,etc.)§ Testunderstandingofroles,communications,priorities,interdependent
infrastructurev IndustrytoinviteDOEparticipationintheirdrillsandexercisesv DOEandstatestoadjustplansbasedonlessonslearnedfrompastdrills/exercisesand
incidents.ProgressObservedDOEadvanceditsexerciseprogrambyimplementingafunctionalexercise(ClearPathIV)withboththeoil&naturalgasandtheelectricindustries.DOEhasanassignedprocessownerintheDeputyAssistantSecretary.Thiswasnotedasacriticalelementinthebeginningofthereviewsectionofthispaper.Continuingtoproperlyresourcethepreparednessandresponseeffortisequallyimportant.AteachEnergyGCCmeeting,bothDOEandtheindustryshareavailableinformationonupcomingexercisesordrillsforawarenessandtoencourageparticipationbetweenindustryandgovernment.DOEhasattendedexercisesordrillshostedbyseveraloilandnaturalgascompanies,includingExxonMobil,MarathonPetroleumCo.,andShell.ManycompaniesparticipatedinthedesignandroleplayatClearPathIVin2016.ForalistofNPCparticipants,pleaserefertoAppendixB.DOEadvancedtheirexerciseprogrambyimplementingafunctionalexercise(ClearPathIV)withboththeoil&naturalgasandtheelectricindustriesparticipating.TheClearPathIVexerciseservedasanimportantopportunityforgovernment(federalandstate)andindustrytoworktogetherandadvanceemergencypreparednesscapability.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 22
OpportunitiesforImprovementUsingHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance,DOEshouldincludeindustrypartnersinthemulti-yeartrainingandexerciseplanningprocess.ContinuedcollaborationbetweenDOEandindustrywillenableevengreaterbenefitforfutureexercises.Improvedexercisepreparationandaddedtrainingofexercisecontrollersforthefunctionalexercisecomponentwillenhancetheexercisebenefits.DOEshouldconsiderusingICScoaches(suchasCoastGuardstriketeamsorindustrysubjectmatterexperts)withtheresponseteamduringexercisesinordertoprovidemoredirectionintheirrolesandresponsibilities.Moreadvancedtechniqueswillaligntrainingandexerciseprogramswiththecapabilitiesandplanningasthematurityoftheincidentmanagementorganizationgrows.ONGSCC(industry)shouldformalizeaprocesswithintheONGSCCandtheEnergyGCCforgatheringandsharinginformationonupcomingindustryexercisestofacilitateDOEandothergovernmentagencyparticipation.Governmentrepresentativesshouldexpandparticipationandconsiderservingasparticipantsinindustryexercises,ratherthanobservers,togainthemostbenefitfromtheexperience.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 23
Appendices
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 24
AppendixA–SecretaryMonizLettertotheCouncil,March23,2015
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 25
AppendixB–NPCEmergencyPreparednessAddendumParticipants
EmergencyPreparednessAddendumWorkgroup
Lead
PhilipB.Smith Manager,EmergencyManagement ShellEnergyandRegulatoryPolicy&Advocacy ResourcesCompany
SecretaryJamesA.Slutz SeniorStudyCoordinator NationalPetroleumCouncil
Members
DavidK.Barrett SeniorCorporateStrategicAdvisor ExxonMobilCorporationCorporateStrategicPlanning
MatthewD.Duncan ProgramManagerforState,Local, U.S.DepartmentofEnergyTribal,TerritorialEnergyAssuranceInfrastructureSecurity&EnergyRestorationOfficeofElectricityDelivery&EnergyReliability
SeanM.Griffin ProgramManagerforExercises U.S.DepartmentofEnergyInfrastructureSecurity&EnergyRestorationOfficeofElectricityDelivery&EnergyReliability
JeffreyT.Gunnulfsen Director AmericanFuel&SecurityandRiskManagement PetrochemicalManufacturers
EricA.Haugstad Director,ContingencyPlanning TesoroCompanies,Inc.&EmergencyResponse Environmental,Health,Safety&Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning
NancyL.Johnson SeniorAdvisor,Environmental U.S.DepartmentofEnergyScience&PolicyAnalysisOfficeofOilandNaturalGasOfficeofFossilEnergy
SuzanneM.Lemieux Manager,Midstream& AmericanPetroleumInstituteIndustryOperationsMarineandSecurity
JayS.Montgomery VicePresidentand KinderMorganEnergyChiefSecurityOfficer Partners,L.P.
FabioA.Naranjo OperationalExcellence/Health, ChevronEnvironment&SafetyProcess/ TechnicalTeamLead
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 26
JillianRobles EmergencyManagementSupervisor DevonEnergyCorporation
KeithC.Robson Manager MarathonPetroleumCorporateSafety,Security CompanyLPandEmergencyPreparedness
RobinR.Rorick Director AmericanPetroleumInstituteMarineandSecurityIssues
JoanneM.Shore ChiefIndustryAnalyst AmericanFuelandGovernmentRelations/Outreach PetrochemicalManufacturers
GerardTaylor EmergencyManagementSpecialist Chevron
Workgroup1–TabletopandWorkshop(Day1)
Lead
BillyJ.Powell Manager,AmericasEmergency ShellExploration&Response ProductionCompany
Members
PaulD.Andersen OperationsManager WilliamsNorthwestPipeline
MarkL.Anderson SeniorEnergyPolicySpecialist WashingtonStateStateEnergyOffice DepartmentofCommerce
StephanieArnold Safety&SecurityManager U.S.Oil&RefiningCo
HannahP.Breul TeamLead,PetroleumMarketAnalysis U.S.DepartmentofEnergyEnergyInformationAdministration
TracyL.Cowan Manager,BusinessContinuity TesoroCompanies,Inc.RickDuncan Director,BordersWestRegion TransCanadaPipelinesLimited
ToddFelix EmergencyManager NWNaturalJeffreyT.Gunnulfsen Director AmericanFuel&
SecurityandRiskManagement PetrochemicalManufacturers
KelliGustaf Crisis&Continuity BPUSPipelines&LogisticsManagementAdvisor
EricA.Haugstad Director,ContingencyPlanning TesoroCompanies,Inc.&EmergencyResponseEnvironmental,Health,Safety&Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning
TerryW.Hardman Manager,PipelineControl WilliamsNorthwestPipeline
JimHart SeniorManager–GasOperations NWNaturalDeannaHenry EmergencyPreparednessManager OregonDepartmentofEnergy
NuclearSafety&Energy EmergencyPreparednessDivision
AndrewHolbrook Manager–Operations, KinderMorganInc.PacificNorthwest
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 27
SuzanneM.Lemieux Manager,Midstream& AmericanPetroleumInstituteIndustryOperationsMarineandSecurity
ScottL.McCreery Crisis&ContinuityManager BPFuelsNorthAmericaDeanA.Meier HeadTerminalOperator/ ChevronWillbridge
OperationsPlanner LightProducts
XavierMiller SupplyLogisticsCoordinator– ExxonMobilRockies/PacificNorthwest
LauraK.Ritter LeadAnalyst–Security ExelonGovernanceandRiskCorporateInformationSecurityServices
JillianRobles EmergencyManagementSupervisor DevonEnergyCorporation
LoriRussell VicePresident–UtilityServices NWNaturalYvonneSisler ContractortoOfficeofEnergy/ U.S.DepartmentofEnergy
InfrastructureSecurityand EnergyRestoration
RickSlaugh Director–Environmental,Health KinderMorganEnergy&Safety Partners,L.P.
JamesA.Slutz SeniorStudyCoordinator NationalPetroleumCouncil
PhilipB.Smith Manager,EmergencyManagement ShellEnergyResourcesandRegulatoryPolicy&Advocacy Company
GerardTaylor EmergencyManagementSpecialist ChevronLarryWest CoordinatorofMaintenance Williams
Workgroup2–ExerciseDevelopment(Day2)
LeadJillianRobles EmergencyManagementSupervisor DevonEnergyCorporation
Members
RobertJ.Fick GlobalEmergencyPreparednessand ExxonMobilCorporationResponseAdvisor
SeanM.Griffin ProgramManagerforExercises U.S.DepartmentofEnergy InfrastructureSecurity&Energy Restoration OfficeofElectricityDelivery& EnergyReliability
EricA.Haugstad Director,ContingencyPlanning TesoroCompanies,Inc.&EmergencyResponseEnvironmental,Health,Safety&Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 28
SuzanneM.Lemieux Manager,Midstream& AmericanPetroleumInstituteIndustryOperationsMarineandSecurity
KevinP.O’Prey SeniorVicePresident/ Obsidian,ACadmusCompany/ContractortoInfrastructure U.S.DepartmentofEnergySecurityandEnergyRestoration
BarbaraT.Parker OilSpillResponseand ShellExploration&AdvocacyManager ProductionCompany
BillyJ.Powell Manager,AmericasEmergency ShellExploration&Response ProductionCompany
RickSlaugh Director–Environmental, KinderMorganEnergyHealth&Safety Partners,L.P.
GerardTaylor EmergencyManagementSpecialist ChevronWorkgroup3–ObservationTeam
LeadJayS.Montgomery VicePresidentand KinderMorganEnergy
ChiefSecurityOfficer Partners,L.P.
Members
DavidK.Barrett SeniorCorporateStrategicAdvisor ExxonMobilCorporationCorporateStrategicPlanning
RobertJ.Fick GlobalEmergencyPreparednessand ExxonMobilCorporationResponseAdvisor
MarshallW.Nichols ExecutiveDirector NationalPetroleumCouncil
BarbaraT.Parker OilSpillResponseand ShellExploration&AdvocacyManager ProductionCompany
KeithC.Robson Manager MarathonPetroleumCorporateSafety,Securityand CompanyLPEmergencyPreparedness
RobinR.Rorick Director AmericanPetroleumInstituteMarineandSecurityIssues
JoanneM.Shore ChiefIndustryAnalyst AmericanFuelandGovernmentRelations/Outreach PetrochemicalManufacturers
MichaelSmith SeniorAdvisor U.S.DepartmentofEnergyOfficeofElectricityDelivery&EnergyReliability
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 29
AppendixC–ReferencesAmericanPetroleumInstitute.OilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook.April2016.http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/hurricane-information/oil-and-natural-gas-industry-preparednes.CascadiaRegionEarthquakeWorkgroup(CREW).CascadiaSubductionZoneEarthquakes:AMagnitude9.0EarthquakeScenario.2013.http://crew.org/sites/default/files/cascadia_subduction_scenario_2013.pdf.FederalPowerAct,16U.S.C.§824a(c).http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Federal%20Power%20Act.pdf.NationalPetroleumCouncil.EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters:GovernmentandOil&NaturalGasIndustryActionstoPrepare,Respond,andRecover.2014.http://www.npc.org/reports/2014-Emergency_Preparedness-lr.pdf.RobertT.StaffordDisasterReliefandEmergencyAssistanceAct,Pub.L.93-288.§42-5121(2013).https://www.fema.gov/robert-t-stafford-disaster-relief-and-emergency-assistance-act-public-law-93-288-amended.U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.EmergencySupportFunction#12–EnergyAnnex.January2008.http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/emergency-support-function-12-energy-annex.U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.NationalResponseFramework,SecondEdition.May2013.https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32230.WhiteHouse.PresidentialPolicyDirective8:NationalPreparedness.March30,2011.http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 30
AppendixD–ClearPathIVExerciseWorkshop(Day1)–StateFuelPlansTheFuelsBreakoutSessionreviewedtheplenaryanddiscussedhowincidentmanagementappliestotheoilandnaturalgassector:responseintheinitialphaseofadisasterandthenfollowedbyashiftinapproachduringthelong-termresponsethatrequiresactivitiesbeyondemergencyresponse.Thesessionclarifiedthefollowing:
• ThestatesofWashingtonandOregonbothhavefuelplanswithsomeareasstillindevelopment.Oregon’splanwasfairlywelldefined(stagingareas,storagerequirements,somepredesignated,etc.)
• Therearetwotypesoffuelissues(refertoNationalResponseFrameworkflowchartattheendofthisappendix):
o IncidentManagement(EmergencyResponsePhase–LifeSafety)
§ StateandcountyEmergencyOperationsCenters(EOCs)
§ FuelneededtosupportESF-10andearlyESF-12activities
§ EOCshavedirectcommunicationstoterminalsandrefineriesforESF-10fuelneeds
• Strictlyneedsforemergencyresponse–notforecastingsupplyforrecoveryorconditionoffacility
§ Communicationsareconductedprivatelywithterminal/facilityandnotprovidedingroupsettingwithotherindustrymembers.Discussionsmustbeconfidentialtoensurecompliancewithantitrustregulations.ThisshouldbeacknowledgedinStateFuelPlans.
§ Lackofelectricpowermayrequiremanagement-of-changereviewsforothermethodsoffuelingsuchasgravity-fedoptions.
§ Immediateneedwillbeforgeneratorsforemergencyresponsefuelonly,notrecovery
o IssueManagement(RecoveryPhase–Long-TermFuelSupply)
§ DOEEmergencyResponseTeamESF-12
§ Antitrustpreventsdiscussionoffuelprovidersinagroupsetting,asnotedabove;thisissueshouldbeclearlyacknowledgedinstateplans(earlyidentificationofprocessforlong-termfueldiscussions)
• IndustrytohavedirectcontactwithEnergyInformationAdministration(EIA)–Individualcompaniesdiscusssupplyandrecoveryneedsbasedonassessment,timing,etc.(EIAprovidesthepointofcontactforDOE.)
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 31
• EIAtoaggregateinformationandcoordinatewithDOEemergencyresponseteam(incidentcommander)tosharetotalswithstatesimpacted,etc.
• Includeconditionoffacilityandneedsforrecoveringfacility
• Electricneeds–generators,heavylifthelicopters,etc.
§ Otherfuelsupplytopics
• Howtomanageregionalsupply?
• Howtoconsultwithoilcompaniesforadditionalsupplyfromoutofregiontomeetrecoveryneeds?
• Prioritizingrecoveryofassetsinregionbasedonimpact
• Whocanrecoverthequickest–whichrefinery,terminal,etc.?
§ NationalResponseFrameworkflowchart(seegraphic)needstobeincludedinstateplans
• Communicationprocessto/fromstateandfederal
§ Needforearlyidentificationofwaiversinstateplans
• FuelWaivers
• JonesActWaivers
• U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersWaivers
• EPAAirQualityWaivers
• StateEnvironmentalWaivers
• FederalEnvironmentalWaivers(OilPollutionActof1990andtheCleanWaterAct)–EstimatedDailyRecoveryCapacity
• U.S.NavySingle-PointMooringSystems
• StateplansneedtoaddressengagementandcoordinationwithEIAinregardtoinformationaboutfuelsuppliesinaregion.
• Discussionsfocusedonresponsecoordination14daysaftertheincident.Whilesomepowerwillberestoredinlessimpactedareas,itwillbeamajorefforttorestoreareasinthePacificNorthwestthatreceivedsevereinfrastructuredamage.
• Foramajorearthquake,theregion’sfuelsupplywouldbedifficulttoaccessanddistributeduetodamagedpipelines,roads,andports.Stateplansshouldaddressthefollowing:
o Fuelsupplieswouldhavetocomefromoutsidetheregioneitherbytruck,rail,orship.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 32
o Withthehighway,bridges,rail,andwaterwayinfrastructuredestroyed,therewouldbearelianceontruckingfuelintoaffectedareas.Truckingfuelwouldhavelimiteddistributiontoaffectedareasinwhichtherearenoaccessibleroadsorbridgesduetodamagefromtsunamiwatersandearthquake.
o Deliveringfuelbyshipwouldrequiremooringareasidentifiedfortankshipsthatcouldtransferproducttobarges,etc.Inaddition,atemporarydockandstoragefacilitywouldneedtobeconstructedforreceivingthefuel.
• TherewasdiscussionofaddinginformationtotheStateFuelPlanstoaddressstreamliningtheprocessandearlyrequestofobtainingkeywaivers(JonesAct,Single-PointMooringSystems,etc.)foraffectedareas.EachplanwouldneedtohaveaclauseorstatementaboutantitrustrulesastheyrelatetoEIAinformation.Byaddressingtheseandotherkeyissueswillassistinresponseintheregion.
• Forindustryandfederalgovernment,earlyresponseeffortswillbefocusedonsearchandrescue(safetyandhumanlife)followingbyenvironmentalemergencyresponseefforts.
Insummary,bothWashingtonandOregonhavefuelplansbutadditionaldetailisrequiredtoaddresstheissuesidentifiedabove.Theworkshopparticipantssuggestedthatanexpandedworkshopwithallstakeholdersandindustrywouldbeausefulprocesstoensuretheplanscoverkeyissuesandlinesofcommunications.Thelevelsofengagementandcoordinationneedtobeclearlydefinedatlocal,state,andfederallevels.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 33
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 34
AppendixE–ClearPathIVExerciseCritiqueDetailsTheNPCofferedtoassistinexercisedevelopmenttosupportDOEintheincorporationofthe2014NPCstudyrecommendationsintoexerciseplay.DOEwelcomedthisassistance,andNPCworkgroupswereestablishedtoleadtheseefforts.Workgroup1wasestablishedtoassistwithDay1activitiesinPortland.Workgroup2wasestablishedtoassistwithDay2activities.AndWorkgroup3wasestablishedtoobservetheClearPathIVactivitiesandserveinthe“exerciseevaluators”roleintermsoftheHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance.ClearPathIVwasdevelopedtoprovideanopportunityforgovernmentandindustrytoexaminethechallengesofrespondingtoacatastrophicCascadiaSubductionZone(CSZ)earthquakeandtsunamiandtoidentifygapswithinrespectiveresponseplansandpolicies.ObjectivesfortheClearPathIVeventweredevelopedtocoverbothDay1andDay2activities:
1. ExamineenergysectorrolesandresponsibilitieswithinresponseplansutilizedforaCSZ9.0earthquakeandtsunami,suchastheDOEEnergyResponsePlan,FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)RegionalPlans,StateEmergencyManagementPlans,StateEnergyAssurancePlans,andindustryresponseplans.
2. Highlightstrategiestoaddressfueldisruptionsandshortagesduringamulti-stateregionaldisasterwithimpactstooilandnaturalgassupplychainsandmethodsoftransportation.
3. Identifyessentialelementsofinformationanddeterminemethodsandprocessesofinformationsharingbetweenstate,federal,andindustrypartnerstobestprovidesituationalawarenessandtodevelopacommonoperatingpicturetosupportexecutiveandoperationaldecision-makingandresourcerequirements,adjudication,allocation,anddisposition.
4. Determineeffectiveidentificationofcriticalresourcesandcapabilities,eliminateduplicationofrequestsordelivery,anddeterminelogisticalrequirementswithcommercialandgovernmentalmethodswithinmultiplemutualassistancenetworksandsystems.
5. Prioritizetherestorationofenergysystemswithstate,federal,andindustrypartnerswithconsiderationtocascadingimpactstointerdependentsectors.
6. EvaluatetheDOEUnifiedCommandStructureConceptofOperationswithfederal,state,andindustrypartnersinrespondingtotheCSZdisaster.
Day1activitiesconsistedofatabletopexerciseinthemorningfollowedbysector-specificworkshopsintheafternoon.Day2activitieswereplannedasafunctionalexerciseengagingmembersfromindustryandlocalmunicipalitiesinOregonandWashingtonstatesascontrollersinaSimulationCelltotest
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 35
UseMSELandEEGduringExercisePlay.
IncorporateNPCInjectsintoMSEL
DevelopExerciseInjectsbasedonEEG
DevelopExercise
EvaluationCriteriaintheformofanEEG
ReviewNPCEPStudyRecommen-dations
IdentifyExercise
PurposeandObjectives
DevelopWorkgroup2
membersofDOE’sEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)andEnergyResponseOrganization.Thepurposeofthisappendixistoprovidefeedbackaboutthefunctionalexercisedesign,development,andexecutionratherthanobservationsonresponseeffectiveness.Workgroup2ExerciseDevelopmentAWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup2effortsinassistingDOEwithdevelopmentofthefunctionalexercise.Workgroup2waschargedwithtwokeyfocuspointsforassistinginthedevelopmentoftheexercise:1)establishingawaytotestDOEinitialactivationproceduresand2)demonstratingcoordinationwithfederal,state,andindustrypartners.UtilizingthekeyNPCEmergencyPreparednessreportrecommendationsandfollowingHSEEPguidance,Workgroup2developedanExerciseEvaluationGuide(EEG)toaddressthefocuspointsandprovideafoundationforexercisedevelopment.TheEEGoutlinedtheanticipatedplayeractionsbasedonthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.Workgroupparticipantsusedtheseexpectedplayeractionstodevelopexerciseinjectsthatwouldcreateanenvironmentforexpectedplayeractionstooccur.Theseinjectswereincorporatedintotheexercisescript,theMasterScenarioEventList(MSEL),developedbyDOE’sexerciseleaders.NPCexerciseevaluatorsusedtheEEGtodeterminewhetherornotplayeractionsduringtheexerciseoccurredcorrectlyasaresultofissuedinjects.Workgroup2metnumeroustimesviaconferencecallandtheninpersonwithDOE’sexerciseleaderstodevelopMSELinjects.TheMSELwasusedduringtheClearPathIVexerciseasthemainscripttoguideexerciseplayandensurethatexerciseactivitiestestedNPCstudyrecommendationsappropriatelyandinawaythatwouldallowforevaluatorobservation,asindicatedintheEEG.Thebasicprocesswasasfollows:
InjectdevelopmentbyNPCWorkgroup2wassuccessfulandwellreceivedbyexerciseleadersresponsibleforMSELdevelopment.AllelementsintheNPC-developedEEGwereaddressedandmadeobservablethroughexerciseinjects.ItisimportanttonotethatinjectsdevelopedbyWorkgroup2werespecifictoNPCstudyrecommendationsandoilandnaturalgasactivitiesonly.TheseinjectswereincorporatedintothelargerMSELusedforexerciseplay.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 36
Asmentioned,afunctionalexercisewasdevelopedtotestobjectivesonDay2.AccordingtotheHSEEP,afunctionalexerciseisbestusedfortestinganoperationscenterenvironment.AMSELisinitiatedbycontrollersinaSimulationCell(SimCell)andguidestheplayeractionsandbehaviors.Injectsareredirectedtoplayersuntiltheobjectiveismetandvalidatedsuccessfully.AtypicalfunctionalexercisehasoneSimCellandisfocusedtowardaparticularplayergroup.InthecaseofClearPathIV,themake-upofthecontrollerversusplayergroupswasnotwelldefinedandledtoconfusionleadinguptotheexercise,aswellasonthedayoftheexercise.Onetrueplayergroupwasidentified–theDOEgroupinWashington,DC.However,multipleSimCellsalsoservingasExercisePlayerswerecreated.ThisresultedinplayerstestingplayersandSimCellcontrollerstestingSimCellcontrollersratherthantheSimCellcontrollerstestingtheplayers.Successofafunctionalexercisereliesonawell-scriptedMSELandawell-organizedSimCell.Initially,itwasunderstoodbytheNPCworkgroupsthattheSimCellinPortlandwouldbemadeupofindustrypartnersfrombothenergysectorsaswellaskeymunicipalpartnersandthattheplayerswouldbethegroupsrepresentingorworkingwithDOEinWashington,DC.ItwasnotuntilgroupsarrivedinPortlandthatworkgroupmembersbecameawarethatcontrollersinPortlandwouldalsobeexpectedtoserveasplayersandthattheMSELwasnotfullyscriptedbutwouldbedevelopedadhocduringexerciseplay.Inaddition,duringexerciseplay,facilitatorswereinjectedintosector-specificroomstobeginleadingsector-specificdiscussionsrelatedtothescenarioandsectorpriorities.Thisalsocausedconfusionbecauseitwasnotdirectlytiedtoexerciseplay.Thefacilitatorplacedintheoilandnaturalgasroomwasfromtheelectricsectoranddidnotunderstandtheuniquedynamicsoftheoilandnaturalgassector.Thediscussionfocusedmoreonindustryeducatingthefacili-tatoraboutthesector,ratherthanonanexchangeamongsectorparticipants.ExerciseCritiqueThefollowingexercisecritiqueisbasedontheHSEEPguidanceforexercisedesignandexecutionandtheprofessionaljudgementsofindustrysubjectmatterexpertswithdecadesofexperienceleading,designing,andevaluatingemergencypreparednessexercises.Theseindividualsarealsothekeyplayersincorporateemergencyresponseprograms,withyearsofpracticalexperienceinmanagingincidentresponseoperations.ThepurposeofthiscritiqueistoprovideinputtofutureDOEexerciseleadersandplannersforimprovingtheeffectivenessoffutureexercises.Exercisesaremeanttobelearningopportunitiesforparticipants.Exerciseobjectivesandcorrespondingscenariosaredevelopedtoallowparticipantsasafeenvironmenttotesttheirknowledgeandskillswhileguidingkeylearningprinciples.Exercisesmaybeorganizedinawaythatallowsparticipantstolearnandsuccessfullyworkthroughproblems.Basedonearly
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 37
discussionwithexerciseleaders,thereappearedtobeconfusiononwhethertheexercisegoalwasalearningenvironmentorwhethertheaggressivedesignwasintendedtohighlightdeficiencies.Thisexerciseforcedplayerstoengagewithlittleguidanceanddidnotappeartoembedappropriateoperationalexerciseplanningprocessintotheexercisedesign.Aneffectivelydesignedexercisecanprovidebothalearningenvironmentandidentifyareasforimprovement.Functionalexercisesmustbewellplanned,organized,andexecuted.ThesetypesofexercisesarethemostdifficulttoorganizeandmustbecontrolledbyaLeadwithexperienceindeveloping,executing,andparticipatinginsuchevents.TheMSELmustbevery“tight”andheavilycontrolled.“FreePlay”mustbekepttoaminimumandcommunicationsmustbeatightlyclosedloopwithawell-developedcommunicationsdirectory.Theexercisedidengageagreatnumberofplayersfromvariousindustries,disciplines,andlevelsofgovernment.Itisalwaysbeneficialhavingpartnersfromvariousjurisdictionsandcompaniescometogetherinacommonenvironmentandtalkthroughacommonscenario.Thiswasapositiveelementoftheexercise.AnotherpositiveelementwastheopportunityforDOEtointeractwiththevariouspartnerswhileworkingthroughtheirvariousplans.ThisprovidedanopportunityforpartnerstointeractwithDOEandforDOEtointeractwithpartnerspre-emergencyinasafeenvironment.ThenetworkinginthePortlandvenuewasalsoapositiveelementoftheexercise.Partnersrepresentingmanydifferententitieswereabletodiscussresponseactivitiesandsharebestpractices.TheexercisedesignprocessforClearPathIVlooselyfollowedHSEEPguidance.SomeHSEEPterminology,documentation,andplanningconferenceswereheld;however,theexerciseexecutionlackedcommandandcontrol.Coreelementsthatcouldhaveledtoamoresuccessfulexerciseweremissing.
• ExerciseobjectiveswerewrittentocoverbothDay1andDay2activities.ThiscreatedconfusionaboutwhatthefocuswouldbeforDay1versusDay2.TheassumptionwasthattheDay2activitieswereprimarilymeanttoengageDOEHQoperationcenters.
• AmorecohesivefunctionalexercisewouldhaveallowedforenhancedtestingoftheDOEHQoperationcenters.However,SimCelloperationswerenotwellplanned,requiredcontrollerstoalsoparticipateasplayers,andinsomecases,testedtheplayersasmuchormorethanDOE.
• Rolesforexerciseparticipantswereassignedlastminuteandnotexplained.Playerswereleftconfusedabouttheirroleandunsureofwhattheirexpectationswereforparticipation.Exerciseparticipantswerenotwellbriefedfromearlyintheplanningprocessontheirrolesduringtheexercise.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 38
• TheMSELwaswrittenasalistofeventswithoutconnectinglogicallywithinputfrom
variouspartners.Thisdidnotleadtoacohesivescriptforexerciseplay.Awell-developedMSELwillcreateaconversationbetweencontrollersandplayers.UponreadingthroughaMSEL,someoneunfamiliarwiththeexercisewillbeabletounderstandtheexercisescenarioandseewhatisbeingaskedoftheplayers.ThiswasnotthecasewiththeClearPathIVMSEL.
• Inaddition,theprocessforexecutingtheSimCellandinjectswasnotclearlycommunicatedorcontrolled.PlayersshowedupattheexercisewiththeirownMSELanduponStartExbeganimplementingexerciseinjectspertheirownindividualMSEL.ThesehadnotbeencoordinatedinadvancewiththeLeadController,werenotincorporatedintotheexerciseMSEL,andthisactivitywasnotrecognizeduntiladesignatedcontrollerwasapproachedwithaquestionaboutwhotosendinjectsto.
• Inaddition,aMSELtypicallysimulatespartnersthatarenotactuallyrepresentedasplayersanddesignatesanappropriatecontrollerforsuch.Thisalsowasnotorganizedwellandledtoconfusionduringexerciseplay.
• TheMSELandexercisedocumentationtobeutilizedbycontrollersduringthefunctionalexercisewereprovidedtocontrollersanhourpriortoStartEx,notallowingforadequatereviewandpreparationtime.Ideally,thiswouldbeprovidedatthecontrollersandevaluatorsbriefing.
• Aninvitationtothecontrollersandevaluatorsbriefingwassentthedaypriortothemeetingbeingheld.Thisshouldbeplannedaspartoftheinitialexerciseschedule.
• Theplayerlistwasfinalizedthemorningoftheexerciseandwasalsopiecedtogether.Controllersshouldhavebeenidentifiedinadvancetoallowforsuccessfulexerciseplay.AnyadditionalparticipantsshouldhavebeenassignedasObservers.
TheexercisecouldhavebeenevenmoresuccessfulwithbetterplanningandpreparationforDay2events.Keyitemsthatshouldreceiveadditionalattentioninthefuture:
• DesignatealeadexercisecontrollerwithextensiveknowledgeoffunctionalexerciseandMSELdesigntoleadthefunctionalexerciseefforts.
• Identifytruedesiredoutcomesforthefunctionalexerciseandchooseplayersand
controllersfortheSimCellthatwillallowthatobjectivestobeaccomplished.
• CreateasingleSimCellthatisonlyservingascontroller.The“hybrid”modelwasnotsuccessfulandisnotconsideredabestpracticeforexercisedesign.
NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 39
• Ensurethatexerciseparticipantsareidentifiedearlyintheplanningprocessandclearlyunderstandtheirroles.
• PublishtheMSELandotherpertinentcontrollerdocumentsinadvanceoftheexerciseandensureallcontrollersandevaluatorsunderstandthescriptanditemstobeaccomplished.
• AllEEGsshouldbetiedtoMSELinjects.ConclusionTheClearPathIVexercisewasvaluableandadvancedgovernmentandindustryengagementonemergencypreparednessandresponse.TheexerciseprovidedanexcellentopportunityforstateandindustrypartnersfromthePacificNorthwesttointeract.TheworkplanningtheexerciseandthenworkingtogetherduringtheexercisecreatedavenueforDOEtointeractwithindustryatlocal,regional,andnationallevels.Disorganization,confusion,andlackoftruefunctionalexerciseplayinhibitedsomeofthebenefitsthatmayhavebeenachieved.Betterpreparationforexerciseexecutionanddevelopmentofexercisecontrollersandclarifyingrolesandresponsibilitiesduringexerciseplaywillheightenthebenefitoffuturefunctionalexercises.Forfutureexercises,DOEmaywanttoexpanditsengagementofindustrysubjectmatterexpertsorotherswithexperienceworkingwithindustryonfunctionalexercisessignificantlyinadvanceofanexercisetoimprovetheexerciseoutcome.Planningformajorindustryexercisesmaybeayearorlongerfrominitialschedulingthroughexecutingtheexercise.ADOEexercisesuchasClearPathIVhasthissamelevelofcomplexityandrequiresthesameplanningtimeframe.