Download - National Petroleum CouncilJuly 29, 2016 On December 17, 2014, the National Petroleum Council (NPC) approved the report Enhancing Emergency Preparedness for Natural Disasters. As a

2016EmergencyPreparednessAddendumWorkingPaper:

ObservationsonDOE’s2016ClearPathIVExerciseandImplementationofthe2014NPCEmergencyPreparednessReportRecommendations

NationalPetroleumCouncil

PreparedinFollow-Uptothe2014NPCReport:EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters

July29,2016

OnDecember17,2014,theNationalPetroleumCouncil(NPC)approvedthereportEnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters.Asapartofapprovingthereport,theNPCagreedtoworkwiththeDepartmentofEnergyonimplementingthereportrecommendations.OnJuly29,2016,theNPCapprovedthetransmittalofthisworkingpaperandrelateddocumentstotheSecretaryandthepostingonwww.npc.org.TheNationalPetroleumCouncilhasnotendorsedorapprovedthisdocument,butapprovedthepublicationofthesematerials.TheNPCoffersthesesuggestionsinthespiritofcontinuingimprovementasindustryandgovernmentworkjointlytoimprovepreparednessandresponseprograms.

NPCEmergencyPreparedness–2016ImplementationAddendum 2

INTRODUCTION ThisworkingpaperispreparedfortheuseoftheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)andothersimplementingtherecommendationsofthe2014NationalPetroleumCouncil(NPC)emergencypreparednessreportEnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters.Theintentistoprovideanindependentandconstructivereviewofongoingprogresswithimplementationofthoserecommendations,andthisreviewprovidesobservationsontheDepartment’s2016ClearPathIVexercise.TheNPCparticipantsacknowledgethatonlyanecdotalevidenceisavailableonseveraloftherecommendationsandthatobservationsofasingleexercisearelimitedinfullyevaluatingtheimplementationoftheotherrecommendations.

InaletterdatedOctober25,2013,SecretaryofEnergyErnestMonizrequestedtheNationalPetroleumCouncil’sadviceaboutnaturalgasandoilinfrastructureresilience(emer-gencypreparednessfornaturaldisasters).TheNPCassembledadiverseteamofindustryandgovernmentexpertsonemergencyresponsethatreviewedpastincidents,collectedanalyses,anddevelopedaconsensusonrecommendationsforindustryandgovernmenttoimproveresponsetosupplychaindisruptions.InDecember2014,theNPCapprovedandpresentedthereporttotheSecretary(www.npc.org,Reports:EmergencyPlanningandPreparedness:EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters). The2014reporthighlightedsevenkeyrecommendations.Theserecommendationsfallintotwobroadcategories:(1)leveragingoperationalframeworksthatareappropriatelystaffedand(2)maintainingreadinessthroughsustainingmechanismstoaddressinterdependencies,enhancecapabilities,andcontinuouslyimprove.2014ReportRecommendations:

OperationalFrameworkv HarmonizeDOE’senergyresponseteamstructurewiththeNationalIncident

ManagementSystem(NIMS)IncidentCommandSystem(ICS).v LeveragetheEnergyInformationAdministration’s(EIA)subjectmatterexpertisewithin

DOE’senergyresponseteamtoimprovesupplychainsituationassessments.v EstablishcompanyliaisonsanddirectcommunicationwithDOE’senergyresponseteam

toimprovesituationassessments.v Streamlineandenhanceprocessesforobtainingtemporaryregulatoryrelieftospeedup

recovery.

SustainingtheProcessv Statesshouldincreaseengagementwiththeoilandnaturalgasindustryintheirenergy

assuranceplans,andindustrymembersshouldassistthestatesinsuchefforts.v BothDOEandstatesshouldestablishroutineeducationandtrainingprogramsforkey

governmentemergencyresponsepositions.v BothDOEandstatesshouldimprovetheircomprehensivedrillandexerciseprograms

andincludeindustryparticipation.ReciprocalinvitationsextendedbycompaniestoDOEandstatesarerecommended.


AttheDecember2014Councilmeeting,NPCChairCharlesD.Davidsonnotedthatthe

realchallengewasimplementingtherecommendations,notwritingthereport.TheNPCmembers,throughapprovingthereport,madeacommitmenttofollowthroughwithDOEandsupportimplementationofthekeyrecommendations.InaMarch23,2015lettertotheCouncil,SecretaryMonizthankedtheCouncilforthereportandnotedseveralareaswhereimplementationofthereport’srecommendationswasunderway.TheSecretaryalsorestatedtheDepartment’sinterestinworkingwithindustrypartnerstoenhanceenergysystemresilience.TheSecretary’sMarch2015letterisavailableforreferenceinAppendixA.

Oneofthesevenkeyrecommendationsaddressesaneffectivedrillandexercise

program.Inlate2015,DOEannouncedthatthefourthannual“ClearPath”energysectorpreparednessexercisewouldberevampedandmoveawayfromanacademicsessionformatofearlierClearPathexercisesandmoretowardafunctionalexerciseinsupportoftheQuadrennialEnergyReview(QER),theNPC’sreportrecommendations,andtheDeputySecretary’sdesireforcross-sectorcoordination.Consistentwiththecommitmentmadeinapprovingthereport,theNPCandindustryassistedDOEwiththeClearPathIVexercisethattookplaceinApril2016.ThiseffortbuiltuponpreviousworkcompletedbyDOEandindustryinworkingtowardimplementingthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.

TheAprilexercisescenariosimulateda9.0CascadiaSubductionZoneearthquakeand

tsunamiinthePacificNorthwest.TheNPCrolewastwo-fold:

1. SupportDOEbyprovidingalinktokeycompaniesintheexerciseregionandprovidingassistanceindesigningandplanningtheoilandgascomponentsoftheexercise

2. Provideindependentobservationsregardingthedemonstrationofreportrecommendationsduringtheexercise.

ManymembersoftheNPCteamparticipatedinthe2014EmergencyPreparedness

studyindividually,orcolleaguesfromtheircompaniesparticipated.Inaddition,somememberswereaddedtoensurethatkeyfacilitiesinthePacificNorthwestwererepresented.Afullrosterof2016EmergencyPreparednessAddendumparticipantscanbefoundinAppendixB.

ThisworkingpapercontainsasummaryofNPCsupportforDOE’sClearPathIVexercise

andobservationsofDOE’sexerciseandimplementationofthe2014NPCreportrecommenda-tions.InadditiontoDOE’simplementationofrecommendations,theNPCteamattemptedtoidentifyindustryandstateprogressinimplementingtherecommendations.AppendixCprovidesalistofreferencesusedinthisreview,AppendixDincludestheoutputfromtheStateFuelPlanningworkshop,andAppendixEprovidesadetailedsetofcommentsontheplanningandexecutionofthe2016ClearPathIVexercise.


NPCSUPPORTFORCLEARPATHIV

TheNPCofferedtoassistinexercisedevelopmentwithafocusonincorporatingthe2014studyrecommendationsintoexerciseplay.DOEwelcomedthisassistanceandthreeNPCworkgroupswereestablishedtoleadtheseefforts.Workgroup1wasestablishedtoassistwithplanningDay1activitiesinPortland.Workgroup2wasestablishedtoassistwithplanningDay2activitiesandsupportingthefunctionalexercisesimulationcell.Workgroup3wasestablishedtoconductareviewoftheClearPathIVactivitiesanddocumentactionsthatdemonstratetheadoptionofthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.

ClearPathIVwasdevelopedtoprovideanopportunityforgovernmentandindustrytoexaminethechallengesofrespondingtoacatastrophicCascadiaSubductionZoneearthquakeandtsunamiandtoidentifygapswithinrespectiveresponseplansandpolicies.Day1activitiesconsistedofatabletopexerciseinthemorningfollowedbysector-specificworkshopsintheafternoon.Day2activitieswereplannedasafunctionalexercise,engagingmembersfromindustryandlocalmunicipalitiesinOregonandWashingtonstatesasControllersinaSimulationCelltotestmembersofDOE’sEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)andEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)inWashington,DC.

Forfurtherdetailsontheexercisescenarioandrelatedmaterialsonemergency

response,pleaserefertoAppendixCforalistofreferences.Workgroup1–Day1Exercise-TabletopandWorkshop Workgroup1focusedonsupportingthetabletopexerciseandfuelsworkshop.AWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup1effortsinassistingDOEwiththeDay1exerciseandthefacilitationoftheafternoonFuelsBreakoutSessionforoilandnaturalgassectorpartici-pants.TheWorkgroup1teamfocusedonthefollowingdeliverables:

• Contactingoilandnaturalgasoperatingcompanies(refineries,terminals,pipelines,etc.)inthePacificNorthwesttoparticipateintheexerciseandbreakoutsession.

• ProvidingsupportforDay1exerciseparticipationbydetailingresponseissuesthatoilandnaturalgascompanieswouldbedealingwithaftertheearthquake.

• FacilitatingtheFuelsBreakoutSessiontodiscussstatefuelplansandareasforimprovement.

Inaddition,theworkgroupprovidedexpertiseandeducationontheoilandnaturalgassupplychainsaspartoftheworkshopdiscussion.DetailedinformationandoutputfromtheworkshopregardingstatefuelplanscanbefoundinAppendixD.


UseMSELandEEGduring

ExercisePlay.

IncorporateNPCInjectsintoMSEL

DevelopExerciseInjectsbasedon

EEG

DevelopExerciseEvaluation

CriteriaintheformofanEEG

ReviewNPCEPStudyRecommen-dations

IdentifyExercisePurposeandObjectives

DevelopWorkgroup2

Workgroup2–ExerciseDevelopment

AWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup2effortsinassistingDOEwithdevelopmentofthefunctionalexercise.Workgroup2waschargedwithtwokeyfocuspointsforassistinginthedevelopmentoftheexercise:1)establishingawaytotestDOEinitialactivationproceduresand2)demonstratingcoordinationbetweengovernment(federal,state,andlocal)andindustrypartners.WhileprovidingsignificantinputtoDOE’sexercisecontractor,DOEledtheoverallplanninganddevelopmenteffortfortheexercise.

UsingthekeyNPCEmergencyPreparednessstudyrecommendationsandfollowingHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance,Workgroup2developedanExerciseEvaluationGuide(EEG)focusingonkeyprioritiesandprovidingafoundationforexercisedevelopment.TheEEGoutlinedwhattheNPCobserversdesiredtoseedemonstratedduringtheexerciseplay.Workgroupparticipantsusedtheseexpectedplayeractionstodevelopexerciseinjectsthatwouldcreateanenvironmentforexpectedplayeractionstooccur.Theseinjectswereincorporatedintotheexercisescript,theMasterScenarioEventList(MSEL),developedbyDOEexerciseplanners.

Thebasicprocesswasasfollows:

DetailedobservationsandsuggestionsforimprovingfutureDOEfunctionalexercisescanbefoundinAppendixE.Workgroup3–ObservationTeam Workgroup3wasformedtocoordinateateamofobserversforthefunctionalexerciseonDay2oftheDOEClearPathIVexercise.Thisteamwascomposedofemergencypreparednessandresponseprofessionalswithyearsofexperiencebothleadingexercisesandparticipatinginexercises,aswellassignificantexperienceleadingresponseteamsduringactualresponseevents.TheroleforWorkgroup3wastoobservetheDOEClearPathIVexerciseandofferinsightsonDOE’sprogressinimplementingthe2014NPCreportrecommendationsandthoughtsonareasforcontinuingimprovementinDOE’semergencyresponsesystem.Inadditiontoobservingtheexercise,Workgroup3hadtheopportunitytointerviewsomeDOEemployeesandindustryrepresentativesontheprogressoftheNPCstudyrecommendationsthatwerenotexercisedinthescenario.ThedetailsfromWorkgroup3’sobservationsformthebasisforthedetailedcommentsthatfollow.


OBSERVATIONSOFDOE’SEXERCISEANDIMPLEMENTATIONOF2014RECOMMENDATIONS

TheClearPathIVexerciseallowedtheNPCtoobserveprogresstowardthesevenrecommendationsinthe2014NPCreport,sincetheexercisetouchedonmanyoftheareasdiscussedintheNPCstudy.ThissectioncoverstheNPCobservationsrelativetoeachrecommendation.Thereviewwasnotintendedtobeacompleteassessmentoftheprogresstodate,sinceitwasbasedmainlyontheexerciseobservations.Theexercisehadseverallimitingfactorsforobservations,suchasexercisecontrols,technology,andphysicalconstraintswithinDOE,andsomerecommendationswerenotexercisedduringClearPathIV.

Themostchallengingbuildingblocksofasuccessfulresponseprogramareleadership

commitmentandaprogramownerwhoisgiventheresourcestosustaintheprogram.Thelong-termcommitmenttothesetwocomponentswillbefundamentaltoDOE’ssuccessfulemergencypreparednessandresponseeffort.Manyofthe2014NPCrecommendations,suchastheIncidentCommandSystem(ICS),areinstitutionalframeworkstomanageincidents,anditistheleadershipcommitmentandtheprogramownerthatensurestheireffectiveimplemen-tationanduse.DOEhasclearlybeguntheprocessofsettinganemergencypreparednessfoundation.

Aneffectivepreparednessandresponseprogramisalong-termendeavor.The

organizationswithmatureprogramshavebeenimplementingandcontinuouslyimprovingtheirprogramsformanyyears,evendecades.Inordertosustainandbuildonpastprogressovertime,theNPCcannotadequatelyemphasizetheimportanceofaformalmanagement-of-changeprocess.Amanagement-of-changeprocessisanessentialcomponentinanyprogram,buttheaddedcomplexityoftheelection-drivenchangeoftheAdministrationandthelargeturnoverofseniorstaffoveraveryshorttimeheightensthecriticalityofchangemanagement.TheNPCencouragesDOEtomakemanagementofchangeakeypriorityinplanningforanewAdministrationandanongoingpriorityoftheemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.

Followingisabriefoverviewofhigh-levelobservationsonpreparednessandresponseprogramprogressandareasforcontinuingimprovement.Thisoverviewisfollowedbymoredetailedobservations.TheNPCoffersthesesuggestionsinthespiritofcontinuingimprove-mentandlooksforwardtocontinuingtoworkwiththeDepartmentoverthenextyearsanddecadesasindustryandgovernmentworkjointlytoimprovepreparednessandresponseprograms.

Overview–OperationalFramework

TheexercisedemonstratedtheDOEleadership’scommitmenttoestablishingapreparednessandresponseprogram,whichisthefirststepinfurtherprogramdevelopment.OneoftheclearimprovementareaswastheinclusionofEIAintheEROresponseteam,anditappearedthatEIAparticipantsunderstoodtheirroles.TodevelopintoaseamlessteamintheSituationUnit,EIAwillrequiredocumentationofclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilitiesandadditionalpractice.EIA’sinclusionseemedtohelpothersoutsidetheindustrytounderstand


theantitrustissuesthatrequireEIA’sconfidentialinformationhandling.BasedoninteractionswithindustrythroughtheOilandNaturalGasSectorCoordinatingCouncil(ONGSCC),EIAhasalsocompiledafoundationallistofcompanyliaisoncontactstouseduringsuchincidents. Akeyeffortinimprovingandmaintainingapreparednessandresponseprogramistheprocessofcontinuousimprovement.DOEshouldcontinuetobuildtheircapabilityandunder-standingoftheICStoensureitsconsistentuseacrosstheentirepreparednessandresponseteam.TheobservationteamhasnotedthatareviewofDOEresponseplans,staffing,andfacilityspacemayofferareastoadvanceeffectiveness.Inthestaffcategory,theremaybeopportunitiestoincreasetheleverageofEIAstaffaspartoftheresponseteam.Inaddition,theONGSCCandtheEIAshouldworktogethertoensurethattheliaisoncontactlistmaintenanceprocessisinstitutionalizedandsustainable,andworkwithDOE’sEnergyResponseOrganizationtosynchronizeplanning.Overview–SustainingtheProcess TheClearPathIVexercisewasasignificantstepforwardinimprovingindustryandDOEenergyemergencypreparednesscooperation.ThroughtheONGSCCanditsmembertradeassociationsandcompanies,theindustryhasalsobeenreachingouttoDOEforgovernmentattendanceorparticipationinindividualcompanyexercises.AsDOEpersonnelcontinuetoparticipateinindustryexercises,movingfromobservationtoactualparticipantroleswilladvancethevalueofthatinput.ThefuelsworkshoponDay1oftheexercisewasanimportantopportunityforstatestoimproveunderstandingofindustrysupplychainsandusethatknowledgeinthedevelopmentoftheirstatefuelpreparednessplans.Italsowasanopportunityforindustryparticipantstoimproveunderstandingofstateandfederalrolesduringemergencies.Themovetoafunctionalexercisecreatedtheopportunityforindustryandgovernmenttoworktogethernotjustduringtheexercise,butduringtheplanningandreviewprocesses.Thiscreatedanongoingdialogueandfacilitatedthedevelopmentofworkingrelationshipsthatarelikelytocontinueforyears. ThisDOEandindustrycollaborationhighlightedopportunitiesforcontinuingimprove-ment.Thefuelsworkshopandthediscussionsonfundamentalsupplychainissuesemphasizetheneedforongoingtrainingandeducationbetweengovernmentandindustryatalllevelssothatthefuelproductionanddistributionnetworkismoreclearlyunderstoodinadvanceofanemergencybythosethatwillbeworkingtowardrestoration.Suchcollaborationwillalsohelptoinformmoreindustrypersonnelongovernmentroles,includingsituationassessmentsandareasinwhichgovernmentassistsinrestoration.FutureexercisescanbuilduponClearPathIVandprovideevengreatervalueinsupportingtheindustryandgovernmentemergencypreparednessandresponsesystems.

Followingisadetailedrevieworganizedaroundtheoriginal2014NPCemergencypreparednessrecommendationsthatincludesmanysuggestionsforimprovementdirectedatindustry,states,andtheDepartmentofEnergy.Afewkeyissueshavebeenidentifiedasthe


mostcriticaltoadvancetheDOEemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram,aswellasindustryandstateprograms.KeyActionItemsforDOE

• ConformtoICSorganizationalstructure,roles,nomenclature,andprocesses(avoidcustomization).TheICSapproachprovidesstandardizationthroughconsistentterminologyandestablishedorganizationalstructure.1

• Developacontinuityandmanagement-of-changestrategy.Thisshouldincludeastaffingplanforkeyemergencypreparednessandresponsepositions,whichaddressesemployeeturnoverandretainssubjectmatterexpertise,historicalknowledge,andanunderstandingofworkprocessestoensurealong-termorganizationalcoreteam.Inaddition,aprocessownerforemergencypreparednessandresponseleadership,whohasalong-termcommitmenttotheprogram,isakeycomponentofcontinuity.

• Engageexperienced,operationalrespondersandpractitionersascoachestoassistwithemergencypreparednessandresponsedesign,documentation,knowledge,tools,andtraining(e.g.,U.S.CoastGuard,subjectmatterexpertsfromindustryoperators,etc.).

• Expandtrainingandexercises.Continuecollaborationwithindustry,states,andothers.KeyActionItemsforIndustry

• CollaboratewithEIAonthedesignofasustainmentprocessforthecompanyliaisoncontactsystemwiththeONGSCC.

• FormalizeaprocesstoshareindustryexerciseschedulesandengagebothDOEandstategovernments’participationthroughtheEnergyGovernmentCoordinatingCouncil(GCC).

KeyActionItemsforStates

• Establishroutinereviewandupdateofstateenergyassuranceplans.

• Expandunderstandingofenergysysteminterdependencies.

• Improveunderstandingofoilandnaturalgassupplychains,includingregionalandnationalimplicationsofdisruptions.

DETAILEDREVIEWOF2014NPCREPORTRECOMMENDATIONSThefollowingsectionincorporatesobservationdetailstoreviewprogresstowardmeetingtheoriginal2014NPCrecommendations.Eachrecommendationbeginswiththe2014reportlanguageanddescriptivebulletsinbluetext.Thecommentsareorganizedintotwosubsectionsnotedas“ProgressObserved”and“OpportunitiesforImprovement.”

1NationalIncidentManagementSystem,HomelandSecurity,December2008.


Recommendation1HarmonizeDOE’senergyresponseteamstructurewiththeNationalIncidentManagementSystem(NIMS)IncidentCommandSystem(ICS).

v Adoptscalablemodelfromlocaltoregionaltonational–StaffordActenactedornot§ Usecommonnomenclature,structure,tools,training§ Ensureconnectivityatlocallevelandhigherlevels§ MaintainclearcontactpointsbetweengovernmentandindustryICSstructures

v DevelopDOEcultureandknowledgeofICS§ Ensurestaffingandtrainingtosustainbothcapabilitiesandcompetenciesbetween

incidents§ Identifymechanism(e.g.,U.S.CoastGuard)fortrainingDOEstaffonICS.

ProgressObservedObservershadasenseofDOEleadershipcommitment,whichiscriticaltodevelopingandmaintainingapreparednessandresponseprogramforDOEtouseinperformingitsroleunderESF-12.DOEleadershiphasexpressedonvariousoccasionstheirdesiretoimplementtheNPCstudyrecommendations,includingadoptionofICSastheresponseorganizationandcommunicationtool.

• TheDeputySecretary’sparticipationintheexercisedebriefandintheEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)meetingsindicatedherinterestandcommitmenttoimprovingtheDOEpreparednessprogram.Shewasfocusedonlessonslearnedfromtheexerciseandunderstoodtheimportanceofparticipatinginexerciseswiththeindustry.

• TheDeputyAssistantSecretary’sleadershipwasresponsibleforsupportingandprovidingresourcesfortheexercise,includingparticipatingintheNPCactivityassociatedwiththiseventandallowingNPCobserverstoattend.

TheDOEOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityhasprogressedinharmonizingitsresponsestructureunderNIMSICS.

• Sincethe2014NPCstudy,DOEhasdevelopedanEnergyResponsePlandocument,whichcontainsthebasicconceptsoftheICS.

• Thefunctions(legal,safety,publicaffairs)wereorganizedunderwhatappearstobetheCommandStaff.

• TheEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)wasorganizedunderthebasicstructureofICSandcontainedthefollowingsections:Operations,Planning,Finance,andLogistics.


OpportunitiesforImprovementDOE’sresponseorganizationdesignneedstobefullyconsistentwithNIMSICSandavoidterminologythatcreatesconfusion,particularlywithstaffgroupdesignations.StrictconformitytoICSstructure,nomenclature,anddocumentationofDOEEnergyResponsePlanorganizationstructurewillimprovetheeffectivenessofDOEresponseandinteractionwithotherpublicandprivateresponsestakeholders.

• ImplementationoftheICS,underNIMS,isnotconsistentacrossorganizationsandfirstrespondersatalllevelsofgovernment.Althoughmanyagenciesatlocal,state,andfederallevelsuseICS,thevariabilityinapplicationunderminestheefficienciessoughtthroughstandardization.Aconsistent,disciplinedprocessforcommunicationbetweenfederalagenciesandwithindustrycanleadtomoretimelyandqualityinformationtosupportsituationalawarenessanddecision-makingduringnaturaldisasters.

• Theuseofstaffingpositionterminologyandsomedocumentsprovidedduringtheexercisecreatedconfusionastowhowasperformingcertainroles.ItwasparticularlyuncleartotheobserverswhowasperformingtheroleofIncidentCommanderduringtheClearPathIVexercise.DOEneedstoclearlydefinetheterminologyforpositionsandtheassociatedroleswiththem.

– AtvarioustimetheERODirectorseemedtobeperformingthefunctionofIncidentCommanderandatothertimesitappearedthatthisfunctionwashousedintheSeniorEnergyResponseOfficial(SERO)position.

– VariousversionsoftheorganizationchartsindicatedthreedifferentreportingstructuresfortheSERO,CommandStaff,andERODirector.

o TheEnergyResponsePlanindicatesthatthePublicAffairsOfficerwouldreporttotheSEROandtheLegalOfficerwouldreporttotheERODirector.InaNIMScompliantICS,theCommandStaffwouldreporttotheIncidentCommander.

o Duringtheexercise,theCommandStaff(legalandpublicaffairs)reportedtotheSERO.InNIMSICSthatwouldindicatethattheSEROwastheIncidentCommander.

o TheExercisePlayerLayoutdocument,providedtotheobservers,usedthetermChiefofStaffinplaceoftheERODirectoranddidnotindicateanypositiontermedtheSERO.

o AnotherdocumentprovidedtotheobserversindicatedthatboththeCom-mandStafffunctions(legalandpublicaffairs)reportedtotheERODirector.

– Alltheorganizationalchartsprovidedtotheobservers,andintheEnergyResponsePlan,indicatedFinance,Logistics,andAdministrativefunctionsarebeingsuppliedbythesameperson.InaNIMSICScompliantstructure,ratherthancombiningfunctionsunderoneSection,ifanyfunctionsidentifiedinICSasbeneaththelevelofIncidentCommanderarenotbeingperformedbythatICSSection,theyaretheresponsibilityoftheIncidentCommander.


• EIMCisnotastandardICSelement,rolesandresponsibilitiesarenotclear,andchainofcommandwasnotconsistentnorclearrelativetotheICSstructure.TheERO(onDay2)waitedfortheEIMCtoestablishpriorities,whichwerecommunicatedtotheUnifiedCommandGroup(UCG)andthentheERO.WithinatypicalICS,theEROwouldberecommendingobjectivestotheUCGasinputtoEIMC.

Rolesandresponsibilitiesofresponseteampositionsneedtobeclearlyunderstoodbyall;documentationofrolesandresponsibilitiesmustbedescribedsufficientlyintheEnergyResponsePlan.(Note:TheEnergyResponsePlanreferencesothersupportingdocumentation–e.g.,The“EnergyResponseOrganizationTacticalProceduresManual”andthe“ESF#12ProgramPlan”–thatmayhavemoredetailanddescription,butwerenotavailabletotheassessmentteamforreview.)

• TherewasconfusionbetweenUCGrolesofcommandandcoordination.Thereisasig-nificantdifferencebetween“command”and“coordination”andthecorrectterminologyshouldbedecideduponbasedontheroleofthatgroup.Typically,aUCGiscreatedwhenleadershipisjointwithmembersfromdifferentorganizations.TheexerciseUCGwasmadeupofplayersfromtheDOE(i.e.,anOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityandNationalNuclearSecurityAdministration[NNSA]LeadershipTeam).ThesignificantlydifferentmissionsbetweentheseDOEresponseteamsshouldbeconsideredintheuseofany“unifiedcommand/coordination”group.Itmaybeappropriateforsomeresponses,butthatshouldbeclearlyarticulatedinDOE’senergyresponseplanandterminologychangedtoavoidconfusionwithICSdefinitions.

• TheEnergyResponsePlanhadveryshortroleandresponsibilitydescriptionsforeachposition,whichlackedsufficientclarity.Clarityofroleforeachresponsesectionmustbeclearlyunderstoodbyallresponseteammemberstoensureacohesiveresponseteamandavoidduplicationofeffort.

• ThefunctionsoftheEIMC,UCG,andEROdidnotappeartobecompletelyunderstoodbyallthemembersofeachgroup.Thisaddedconfusionbetweenrolesforeachgroupandinturncleardirectionongoals,objectives,andsituationalstatuswerenotfollowedwiththerigorthatwewouldnormallyexpectunderanICSorganizationalstructure.

StandardICSworkprocessesandtoolsshouldbefullyusedtoimprovetheeffectivenessofDOE’sresponseteam;adherencetotheseprocessesandtools,throughouttheevent,willenableDOEtoquicklyalignwithandworkeffectivelyinarealresponsewithotherpublicandprivateorganizations.

• TherewasnoevidenceofthedevelopmentofaDOEIncidentActionPlan(IAP)fortheresponse.WithouttheinitialdevelopmentofanIAPandarepeatableprocesstoupdatetheIAPwiththechangingscenario,thereisnowayfortheresponseteamtokeepupwithallthechangingsituation.DOEusedwhattheyreferredtoas“BattleRhythm”astheirplanningtool.BattleRhythmisnotatermroutinelyusedorunderstoodbyotherorganizationsandagenciesoperatingunderICS.


– TheBattleRhythmwasobservedtobealistofpre-definedmeetingsorconferencecallsandtimes.TheuseofthisBattleRhythmalonecouldnotproduceanICSqualityIAP.TheIAPisadocumentthatcontainstheresponseobjectives,com-municationoftheobjectives,strategicdirection,tacticalplanstoaccomplishtheobjectives,identificationandallocationofresources,thedevelopmentofasituationalstatusboard(display),andtheoperationalperiodforactivity.TheIAPisreviewedandsignedoffonbytheIncidentCommander.Itisusedtoensurecohesionofmissionbytheresponseteamandistheplanforaccomplishingtheobjectives.

• TheICSstandardPlanning“P”processwasnotleveragedtodeveloptheIAP.

– TheuseoftheICSstandardPlanning“P”processwasabsentfromtheresponseplanningprocess.DOEindicatedinlaterinterviewsthattheBattleRhythmwasintendedtobetheprocesstodeveloptheirprimaryproduct–theSituationReport.TheBattleRhythm,asobserved,couldnotreplacethePlanning“P”processandlackstheabilitytoadequatelydeveloptheIAP.WithouttheuseofanIAP,developedbytheuseofthePlanning“P”,acoordinatedandefficientresponseeffortwillbeextremelydifficulttomaintain.Trainedresponders,operatingunderICSandthePlanning“P”processcanprogressivelyhandleandaccomplishcomplexscenarios.OurobservationisthattheBattleRhythm,ascurrentlyused,cannotbereliedupontheuseinalong-termorcomplexscenario.

• TherewasnosituationalstatusboardavailableintheDOEEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)toinformtheentireresponseteamofthestatusoftheresponse.Thiswouldincluderesourcesidentifiedandallocated;responseobjectives;asituationaldisplay(map)oftheoperationsarea;responseorganizationchartwithspecificnamesassignedtoeachsection;etc.ItwastheobserversopinionthatWebEOCwasintendedtobeused,butitdidnotworkandtherewasnoattempttodisplaywallcharts.

DOE’sEnergyResponsePlanshouldincludesufficientlytrainedstafftocoverIncidentCommandrolesandEOCoperationsforascenariothatextends24/7operationsoveranextendedperiod(weeksormonths).TheEOCstaffingduringtheexerciseappearedtobeinadequatetohandlethisspecificexercisescenario.

• Theobserverssaworheardnorecognitionconcerningthisissue.

• DOEindicatedthatitisinvestigatingtrainingotherDOEemployeesoutsideoftheInfrastructureSecurityandEnergyRestorationDivisiontofillthoseroles.

• DOEindicatedthatitsrationalefor“doublingup”ontheICSSectionChiefpositionswastoprovideanopportunityforcross-training.

Guidelinesshouldbedevelopedformanagingresponsetosimultaneousevents.EstablishingaUnifiedCommandapproachacrosstheeventswouldbevaluablewhentheeventsimpactthesameregionand/orsectorandresponserequirescoordinationandallocationofsimilarresources.Whentherearefewornointerdependenciesbetweenresponseresources,it


maybemoreeffectivetomanageeacheventunderadiscreetresponsestructure(ERO)withcommunicationsintegratedattheEIMClevel.Thecomplexities,diversities,anddynamicsofmanagingaresponsetosimultaneousevents,acrosssectors,regions,andagenciesisdifficult.ThedecisionforanintegratedresponseteamunderUnifiedCommandissituationandeventdependent.However,oncedecided,fullyutilizingtheICSprocessandtoolstoclearlycommunicateresponsescope,responsibilities,andactionplansisacriticalenablertoensureresponseteamsarealignedandeffective.

• Respondingasa“unifiedresponseorganization”betweentheCascadiascenarioandthenuclearthreatscenariowasconfusing.Eventhoughthesescenarioswereintroducedashavingoneresponseteam,thepartiesaddressingthesescenariosroutinelyworkedinseparatespaces.

• Itappearedthattheintegratedfunctionshadlimitedbenefitandaddedtotheroleconfusion.

• Integrationatthehigherlevels,perhapstheEIMC,ismoreappropriate.

EmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)logisticsshouldaccommodateawidevarietyofinternalandexternalparticipantssupportingunifiedcommand,includingreliablecommunications,sufficientspace,redundantsystems,andotherEOCdesignbestpractices.TheEOCusedforthisexerciseappearedhavesignificantlimitationsandperhapshinderedamorecohesiveresponse.

• Usingrestricted(classified)spacefornon-classifiedemergencyresponseoperationsaddsunnecessaryconstraintstocommunicationsandinteractions.Fortheexercise,DOEprovidedescortswhowerehelpful,informative,andprofessional;theyaccom-modatedrequestsquicklyandpleasantly,butinarealevent,ifthereareun-clearedparticipants,theselimitationsmaybedifficulttocoordinateeffectively.

• TheDOEEmergencyOperationsCenterhadlimitedspacetohandlealargeexercise;theUnifiedCommandGroupwasisolatedfromtherestoftheteam.

• CommunicationsystemissuesrequiredtheEIAsituationunitrepresentativeintheEOCtoleavetheexerciseroomforextendedperiodsduringtheafternoontocommunicatewiththeEIAteam.

Summary–Recommendation1InputThedisciplineofICS,usingthesystematic,standardizedapproach,providesaneffectivemechanismforDOEtoactasthecoordinating,primaryagencyforenergyinfrastructureassessment,repair,andrestorationwithinthefederalgovernmentaspartoftheNationalResponseFrameworkandtheNationalIncidentManagementSystem.ThebenefitsofimplementingICSasdesignedincludes:standardizedorganizationstructurewithclearlydefinedrolesandresponsibilities,integratedcommunicationsthatfacilitateescalationofissues,situationassessment,commonoperatingpicture,andcoordinationofresponseacrossagendasandsectors.


Recommendation2LeveragetheEnergyInformationAdministration’s(EIA)subjectmatterexpertisewithinDOE’senergyresponseteamtoimprovesupplychainsituationassessments.

v StaffsituationunitleaderandsupportpersonnelfromEIA(mostknowledgeableonindustrysupplies)

v Developsituationassessmentviatwocommunicationpaths§ BottomupthroughgovernmentICSstructure(ESF-12contact,PSAs,JFO,etc.)§ Directone-on-onecommunicationsandcoordinationwithIndustrySupplyChain

Liaisonsv Summarizeoverallfuelsupplysituationandcascadingeventsandtimelinesv Aggregateindustrysupportrequirementsv SupportDOEcontinuingtoassessandimplementsocialmediainformationgathering.

ProgressObservedEIAparticipatedinthePlanningSectionoftheEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO),withastaffpersonintheEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC).EIAstaffsupportingtheEROwerelocatedoutsideoftheEOCinanEIAdata-secureareainordertocollectandprocessindividualcompanydatafortheSituationReport.EIAhaspreparedalistofquestionstopre-identifythetypesofinformationthatwillberequiredduringarealdisruptionevent.EIAusedsimulatedcontactsforindustryrepresentativestogetaninitialassessmentofthesupplychainproceduresforpurposesoftheexercise.ASituationReportwasproducedthatcoveredmajorenergyfacilitiesstatusandinformationonrecovery.TheEnergyResponsePlanindicatesthattheSituationReportistheprimaryproductoftheEROduringamajorevent.WhiletheexercisebeganDay2withapreparedSituationReport,thePlanninggroupproducedasecondreporttowardtheendoftheday,usinginputfromEIA.OpportunitiesforImprovement

UseofEIA’ssubjectmatterexpertisewithinDOE’senergyresponseteamdidnotappeartobefullyexercised.IncorporatingthisroleasalearningobjectiveintofutureexercisedesignmayassistinincreasingEIA’seffectivenesstotheprocess.ThisisanotherexampleofwheretheEnergyResponsePlanneedstobeupdatedtoclarifyandcodifyEIA’srolesandresponsibilities.EIA’sroleintheEROasobservedduringtheexerciseshouldenhanceitsabilitytointeractmoreeffectivelywithsituationassessment.EIA’ssupporttotheSituationUnit,undertheICSstructure,shouldbeformalized,andtrainingonemergencyresponseprotocolsandtoolsshouldbeprovidedtoEIApersonnel.EIAhasmanystatisticalanalyticalskillsandabilitiesthatcanaidDOE’sassessmentofimpactstotheenergysectorduringasupplydisruption.EIAindividualsassignedtotheEROSituationUnitrolesshouldhaveabroadknowledgeoftheoil


andgassupplychains,sensitivitytobusinessproprietaryandcompanyconfidentialdata,andunderstandingofthesupplymarkets.MorefullyleveragingEIA’ssubjectmatterexpertiseontheEROteamwillimprovethequalityofanalyticalandsituationassessmentsproducedbyDOEandusedfordecision-makingmorebroadly.Recommendation3EstablishcompanyliaisonsanddirectcommunicationwithDOE’senergyresponseteamtoimprovesituationassessments.

v DOEICSLiaisontogatherone-on-oneinformationpriortoorduringsupplychaindisruptions§ Developbestandfastestsourceforinformationandclarityonsupply,delivery

issues,andsupportneeds§ AdviseDOEonsituationassessment(status,potentialcascadingevents,response

activity)§ Highlightantitrustandconfidentialitylimitationsthatprecludejointindustry/trade

associationsupportv OilandNaturalGasSectorCoordinatingCouncil(ONGSCC)tosupportDOEin

maintainingtwo-waycontactroster(regional/national)v DOEandindustrytoestablishcontactsinadvanceofemergencyevent.

ProgressObservedIn2015,theNPC,ONGSCC,andEIAcompiledcompanyliaisoncontactinformation.Asrecommended,theinformationrepresentsthesinglepointofcontactforDOEtocontactcompaniesinsupportofsituationassessment,andanavenuetocontactseniorcompanyofficials,asintendedintheNPCstudyrecommendations.

• AnNPCrequestforcontactinformationwasdistributedtoallNPCmembercompaniesandtradeassociations.Theletter,supportedwithFAQ,outlinedthekeyinformationrequestedandprotocoltobefollowedbyEIAtomaintainconfidentialityoftheinformation.

• TheONGSCCsupportedthecompilationofthecurrentcompanycatalogue.Sincecompanyparticipationisvoluntary,theONGSCCandtradegroupsworkedonaprioritizedlistofcompaniestoensureeffectiveindustrycoverageindifferentsegmentsoftheindustry.Thelistincludes:− Refiningcompanies–approx.96%ofalltherefiningcompaniesthatoperatean

individualrefinerycapacityof>150,000bpd;thisrepresentsapprox.86%ofallU.S.-basedrefiningcapacity

− Midstreamcompanies(liquidpipelines&terminals)–approx.65%ofallmidstreamcompaniesthatwerelistedinthetoptierbycapacityorthroughput.Thisincludesforliquidpipelines–top25bybbl.deliveredormilesofpipe;forterminals–top10


bybbl.ofcapacityornumberofterminals;andforFERC-regulatedcompanies–28companies.

− Naturalgasandoilproductioncompanies–14companies.EIAhasstateditsintentiontovalidateandupdatethelistannuallythroughanexercisecall-outprocedure,butthiswasnotpracticedduringtheexercise.TheONGSCChasupdatedthesectorplanappendixonemergencymanagementduringsupplychaindisruptions.Thisincludes:ONGSCCRolesandLimitations,keyreferencematerial(APIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook,2014NPCreport),descriptionofhowtheoilandnaturalgassectorcompaniesprepareandrespondtoincidents,andcompanyorganizationalstructureandoperationsundertheNationalResponseFramework.TheappendixwasapprovedandtheAPIhandbookadoptedbytheONGSCC.EIAvalidatedkeyoilandgascompaniesinPADD5inpreparationfortheClearPathIVexercise.OpportunitiesforImprovementEIAmayneedtoassessthecompletenessofthecontactlistforallPADDsandcoordinatewiththeONGSCCtofillanyidentifiedgaps.EIAhasnottestedtheLiaisonContactSystem.DuringClearPathIV,asimulationcontactlistwasused,sotheactualliaisoncall-outprotocolwasnotused.TheONGSCCandEIAneedtoworktogethertoinstitutionalizeasustainmentprocessfortheliaisoncontactlist.WithinDOE,aformalprotocolbetweentheEnergyInformationAdministrationandtheOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityshouldbeestablishedtoclarifytheinformationsharingandstaffroles.Recommendation4Streamlineandenhanceprocessesforobtainingtemporaryregulatoryrelieftospeeduprecovery.

v Developbestpracticelanguageandstandardizedtemplatesforkeytemporaryregulatoryrelief

v Keyimprovements:§ ImproveexistingEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)processforfederalfuel

waiverstoreducedelaysanddecreaseuncertainty§ IdentifyCleanAirActprovisions/restrictionsonEPAwaiverauthoritythatmay

createuncertaintiesthathinderresponseactivities§ Improvestatefuelwaiverprocesses§ ImproveJonesActwaiverprocess.


ProgressObservedTheDOEEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)processedarequestforregulatoryreliefaspartoftheClearPathIVexercise.OpportunitiesforImprovementTheexerciseresponsetoaninjectforaJonesActwaiverrequestindicatesadditionalworkmaybeneededinthisarea.

• TheUnifiedCommandGroup(UCG)spenttimeworkingaJonesActwaiver(transportationofgoodsandfuelonnon-U.S.flaggedvesselsbetweenU.S.ports),whichshouldbeaclearlydefinedanddocumentedprocess.Regulatoryreliefinvolvingotheragencieswasnotpartoftheexercise.

• AnyregulatoryreliefcommunicationwiththesimulatedfederalinteragencyNationalResponseCoordinationCenterwasnotobserved.

Inordertorespondeffectivelytothemanydifferentwaiversandassociatedauthorities,DOEmaywanttodocumentthespecificrolesofDOEandspecificallytheOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityinthevariouswaiverprocesses.ThisdocumentationcouldbeincludedintheenergyresponseplantoidentifytheappropriateDOEdepartmentandICSpeopletooverseewaiverprocessrequestsandtoprovideinteragencysupport.TheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookprovidesanoverviewofthemanypossiblewaiversthathaveoccurredduringemergencyevents.Recommendation5Statesshouldincreaseengagementwiththeoilandnaturalgasindustryintheirenergyassuranceplans,andindustrymembersshouldassistthestatesinsuchefforts.v DOEandstatestoassesscomprehensivenessofstateenergyassuranceplans

§ Statestoincreaseindustryinvolvementwithplandevelopment(roleforONGSCC,trades)

§ Includeassessmentofvulnerabilitiesandriskassessmentsofsupplychains§ Ensureresiliencyconsideredinpermittingprocess(i.e.,gasvs.electricfornaturalgas

compression)§ Addressinterdependencies(cross-regionalandcross-industry)§ Verifyplansforensuredfuelsupplyanddistributionpointsforfirstresponders

v IndustrytoensurethatinterdependenciesareaddressedinBusinessContinuityPlans.


ProgressObservedClearPathIVDay1agendaprovidedanopportunityforstatestoengagewiththeoilandgasindustrytoshareunderstandingandenhancestate(Washington,Oregon)energyassuranceplans.OregonidentifiedadditionalareasforimprovingitsplanandWashingtonusedtheexercisetoinformthedraftingofaplanunderdevelopment.

• State-industrydiscussiontopicsincludedindustryassessmentprocesses;overflightsordamageassessment;andalternativesourcesofproducts,supplies,andpersonnel.

• Authoritytoallocatefuelwasdiscussed,recognizingthecomplexityofdifferentauthoritiesandhowthisissueisaregionalissuethatwouldneeddetailedanalysisineachstateplan.

TheONGSCCandNationalAssociationofStateEnergyOfficials(NASEO)hostedajointmeetingofstateenergyofficialsandindustryinOctober2015todiscussfurtherimplementationoftheNPCrecommendations.DOEandNASEOareworkingtogetheronaprocesswiththestatestoimproveandupdatestateenergyassuranceplans,training,andexercises,pendingavailableresources.

• Thisisafollow-uptoamajorjointprogramthatconcludedin2014andwasfundedbyDOEtoestablishenergyassuranceplansinthestates.

• InFebruary2016,theSecretaryofEnergyenteredintoaMemorandumofUnderstandingtostrengthenandexpandcommunicationsandinformationsharingthroughtheEnergyEmergencyAssuranceCoordinatorprogramwithNASEO,theNationalAssociationofRegulatoryUtilityCommissioners,theNationalGovernorsAssociation,andtheNationalEmergencyManagementAssociation.

DOE’sOfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliabilityhassupportedaStateEnergyRiskAssessmentInitiativetohelpstateenergyagenciesbetterunderstandriskstotheirenergyinfrastructuresotheycanbebetterpreparedtomakeinformeddecisionsabouttheirinvestments,resilience,response,andhardeningstrategies.2,3ClearPathIVdemonstratedaneffectivewayforstatesnotonlytotesttheirplans,butexploremoreopportunitiesforindustryinvolvement.

2U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability.“StateEnergyRiskAssessmentInitiative.”http://energy.gov/oe/mission/energy-infrastructure-modeling-analysis/state-and-regional-energy-risk-assessment-initiative.3U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,OfficeofElectricityDeliveryandEnergyReliability,EnergyModelingandAnalysisDivision.“EnergyRiskResourceLibrary.”December31,2015.http://energyoe.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=ece7b1c390b24177b4361784104cab7d.


OpportunitiesforImprovementAllstakeholdersneedtomakeagreaterefforttocommunicateduringsteadystateoperations,andnotjustimmediatelybeforeorduringanevent.ThepathwaysforcommunicationbetweenstatesandindustryareidentifiedintheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookandthe2014NPCreport.DiscussionsduringClearPathIVDay1oftheexercisehighlightedthatfederal,state,local,andindustrystakeholdershavenotsufficientlydiscussedthecauseandeffectofinterdependentenergysystemsastheyrelatetoplanning,allocationofresources,andpotentialsupplyanddemandconcernsduringanenergydisruptionevent.Federal,state,local,andindustrypreparednessplansshouldbeenhancedtoaddressallocationofresourcesandcascadingsupplyanddemandimplicationsduringadisruptionevent.Stateenergyplansrequireroutinereviewandupdating.Recommendation6BothDOEandstatesshouldestablishroutineeducationandtrainingprogramsforkeygovernmentemergencyresponsepositions.

v UseandmaintaintheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbookasakeyreference§ Overviews:supplychains,pre-eventpreparations,operationalmodels,regulatory

reliefinventory§ EnhanceAPIhandbookandappendices

v DOEandstatestoholdregulareducationsessions§ Conductannualrefreshereducationonsupplychainsinadvanceofhurricaneseason§ Leverageexistingfederal,state,local,andindustryforumsforeducation§ Engagethecorrectlevelofdecision-makersandstakeholders(e.g.,localdecision-

makers)v DOEandstatestoestablishmanagement-of-changeprocessesforkeypositions.

ProgressObserved

TheAPIOilandNaturalGasIndustryHandbookhasbeenupdated(consistentwiththeNPCstudyrecommendations).Theupdatedversion,publishedApril2016,isavailableontheAPIwebsite;hardcopiescanbeobtainedbycontactingtheAPIoffice.APIhasofferedoutreacheducationtovariousgovernmentagencies;therehasbeenselectinterestandinquiriesbutno


sessionshavebeenscheduled.TheAPIhandbookhasbeenadoptedbytheONGSCCasakeyreference.4EnergyInformationAdministration(EIA)petroleumsupplyreportsareavailableforPADD5(ClearPathIVregion),aswellasPADDs1and3.5,6ThesereportsenhanceDOEEnergyResponseOrganization(ERO)andstategovernmentsupplychainawarenessforregionsmostlikelyimpactedbynaturaldisasters.Accesstothesereportsenablesmoreeffectiveanalysisandimprovedsituationassessment.ONGSCCmembershavecontinuedtoreachoutthroughtheNPCreportprocess,theEnergyGovernmentCoordinatingCouncil(EnergyGCC),andparticipationineventssuchasClearPathIVtoprovideindustryexpertiseandexperience.OpportunitiesforImprovementGovernmentpersonnelturnoverandmanagement-of-changeprocessremainacontinuingconcern.Lossofpersonnelmeanslossofknowledge.Amanagement-of-changeprocessisanessentialcomponentofanyemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.TheNPCencouragesDOEtomakemanagementofchangeakeypriorityinplanningforanewAdministrationandanongoingpriorityoftheemergencypreparednessandresponseprogram.DiscussionsonDay1oftheexerciseindicatedthat,asDOEmoreclearlyadherestoitsroleandresponsestructureunderESF-12,itshouldworkwithstatestoeducatethemonDOE’sroleandhowtheyinteractwiththestates.Thisisespeciallyimportantforthesituationassessmentactivity.Theexercisedidnothaveavisiblepathforstatesituationassessmentneedstoflowtothefederallevelandforafeedbackloopoffederalsituationreportsbacktothestates.UndertheNationalResponseFramework,thiswouldbethroughtheinteragencyjointfieldoffice(JFO).ContinuingeducationandtrainingofDOEandstatestaffshouldbeanongoingpriorityinthefaceofexpectedstaffturnover.Theeducationalprogramobjectivesneedtoincludebothemergencyresponsecapabilities,suchasICS,andenergy-specificexpertise,suchasoilandnaturalgassupplychainbasics.

4AmericanPetroleumInstitute,OilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook,April2016.http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/hurricane-information/oil-and-natural-gas-industry-preparednes.5U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.“PADD5TransportationFuelsMarkets.”September30,2015.http://www.eia.gov/analysis/transportationfuels/padd5/.6U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.“PADD1andPADD3TransportationFuelsMarkets.”February3,2016.https://www.eia.gov/analysis/transportationfuels/padd1n3/.


Recommendation7BothDOEandstatesshouldimprovetheircomprehensivedrillandexerciseprogramsandincludeindustryparticipation.ReciprocalinvitationsextendedbycompaniestoDOEandstatesarerecommended.

v DOEemergencypreparednessprogramneedsanassignedprocessownerv DOEwithstatestoestablishfrequencyandscope(local,state,andfederal)v DOEtodevelopandimplementacomprehensivedrillandexerciseprogramthatfully

teststheirresponseplantosupplychaindisruptions§ Engagewithotherfederalagenciesandinterdependentprivatesectors§ Ensurerightlevelparticipation(seniordecision-makers,firstresponders,etc.)§ Testunderstandingofroles,communications,priorities,interdependent

infrastructurev IndustrytoinviteDOEparticipationintheirdrillsandexercisesv DOEandstatestoadjustplansbasedonlessonslearnedfrompastdrills/exercisesand

incidents.ProgressObservedDOEadvanceditsexerciseprogrambyimplementingafunctionalexercise(ClearPathIV)withboththeoil&naturalgasandtheelectricindustries.DOEhasanassignedprocessownerintheDeputyAssistantSecretary.Thiswasnotedasacriticalelementinthebeginningofthereviewsectionofthispaper.Continuingtoproperlyresourcethepreparednessandresponseeffortisequallyimportant.AteachEnergyGCCmeeting,bothDOEandtheindustryshareavailableinformationonupcomingexercisesordrillsforawarenessandtoencourageparticipationbetweenindustryandgovernment.DOEhasattendedexercisesordrillshostedbyseveraloilandnaturalgascompanies,includingExxonMobil,MarathonPetroleumCo.,andShell.ManycompaniesparticipatedinthedesignandroleplayatClearPathIVin2016.ForalistofNPCparticipants,pleaserefertoAppendixB.DOEadvancedtheirexerciseprogrambyimplementingafunctionalexercise(ClearPathIV)withboththeoil&naturalgasandtheelectricindustriesparticipating.TheClearPathIVexerciseservedasanimportantopportunityforgovernment(federalandstate)andindustrytoworktogetherandadvanceemergencypreparednesscapability.


OpportunitiesforImprovementUsingHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance,DOEshouldincludeindustrypartnersinthemulti-yeartrainingandexerciseplanningprocess.ContinuedcollaborationbetweenDOEandindustrywillenableevengreaterbenefitforfutureexercises.Improvedexercisepreparationandaddedtrainingofexercisecontrollersforthefunctionalexercisecomponentwillenhancetheexercisebenefits.DOEshouldconsiderusingICScoaches(suchasCoastGuardstriketeamsorindustrysubjectmatterexperts)withtheresponseteamduringexercisesinordertoprovidemoredirectionintheirrolesandresponsibilities.Moreadvancedtechniqueswillaligntrainingandexerciseprogramswiththecapabilitiesandplanningasthematurityoftheincidentmanagementorganizationgrows.ONGSCC(industry)shouldformalizeaprocesswithintheONGSCCandtheEnergyGCCforgatheringandsharinginformationonupcomingindustryexercisestofacilitateDOEandothergovernmentagencyparticipation.Governmentrepresentativesshouldexpandparticipationandconsiderservingasparticipantsinindustryexercises,ratherthanobservers,togainthemostbenefitfromtheexperience.


Appendices


AppendixA–SecretaryMonizLettertotheCouncil,March23,2015


AppendixB–NPCEmergencyPreparednessAddendumParticipants

EmergencyPreparednessAddendumWorkgroup

Lead

PhilipB.Smith Manager,EmergencyManagement ShellEnergyandRegulatoryPolicy&Advocacy ResourcesCompany

SecretaryJamesA.Slutz SeniorStudyCoordinator NationalPetroleumCouncil

Members

DavidK.Barrett SeniorCorporateStrategicAdvisor ExxonMobilCorporationCorporateStrategicPlanning

MatthewD.Duncan ProgramManagerforState,Local, U.S.DepartmentofEnergyTribal,TerritorialEnergyAssuranceInfrastructureSecurity&EnergyRestorationOfficeofElectricityDelivery&EnergyReliability

SeanM.Griffin ProgramManagerforExercises U.S.DepartmentofEnergyInfrastructureSecurity&EnergyRestorationOfficeofElectricityDelivery&EnergyReliability

JeffreyT.Gunnulfsen Director AmericanFuel&SecurityandRiskManagement PetrochemicalManufacturers

EricA.Haugstad Director,ContingencyPlanning TesoroCompanies,Inc.&EmergencyResponse Environmental,Health,Safety&Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning

NancyL.Johnson SeniorAdvisor,Environmental U.S.DepartmentofEnergyScience&PolicyAnalysisOfficeofOilandNaturalGasOfficeofFossilEnergy

SuzanneM.Lemieux Manager,Midstream& AmericanPetroleumInstituteIndustryOperationsMarineandSecurity

JayS.Montgomery VicePresidentand KinderMorganEnergyChiefSecurityOfficer Partners,L.P.

FabioA.Naranjo OperationalExcellence/Health, ChevronEnvironment&SafetyProcess/ TechnicalTeamLead


JillianRobles EmergencyManagementSupervisor DevonEnergyCorporation

KeithC.Robson Manager MarathonPetroleumCorporateSafety,Security CompanyLPandEmergencyPreparedness

RobinR.Rorick Director AmericanPetroleumInstituteMarineandSecurityIssues

JoanneM.Shore ChiefIndustryAnalyst AmericanFuelandGovernmentRelations/Outreach PetrochemicalManufacturers

GerardTaylor EmergencyManagementSpecialist Chevron

Workgroup1–TabletopandWorkshop(Day1)

Lead

BillyJ.Powell Manager,AmericasEmergency ShellExploration&Response ProductionCompany

Members

PaulD.Andersen OperationsManager WilliamsNorthwestPipeline

MarkL.Anderson SeniorEnergyPolicySpecialist WashingtonStateStateEnergyOffice DepartmentofCommerce

StephanieArnold Safety&SecurityManager U.S.Oil&RefiningCo

HannahP.Breul TeamLead,PetroleumMarketAnalysis U.S.DepartmentofEnergyEnergyInformationAdministration

TracyL.Cowan Manager,BusinessContinuity TesoroCompanies,Inc.RickDuncan Director,BordersWestRegion TransCanadaPipelinesLimited

ToddFelix EmergencyManager NWNaturalJeffreyT.Gunnulfsen Director AmericanFuel&

SecurityandRiskManagement PetrochemicalManufacturers

KelliGustaf Crisis&Continuity BPUSPipelines&LogisticsManagementAdvisor

EricA.Haugstad Director,ContingencyPlanning TesoroCompanies,Inc.&EmergencyResponseEnvironmental,Health,Safety&Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning

TerryW.Hardman Manager,PipelineControl WilliamsNorthwestPipeline

JimHart SeniorManager–GasOperations NWNaturalDeannaHenry EmergencyPreparednessManager OregonDepartmentofEnergy

NuclearSafety&Energy EmergencyPreparednessDivision

AndrewHolbrook Manager–Operations, KinderMorganInc.PacificNorthwest



ScottL.McCreery Crisis&ContinuityManager BPFuelsNorthAmericaDeanA.Meier HeadTerminalOperator/ ChevronWillbridge

OperationsPlanner LightProducts

XavierMiller SupplyLogisticsCoordinator– ExxonMobilRockies/PacificNorthwest

LauraK.Ritter LeadAnalyst–Security ExelonGovernanceandRiskCorporateInformationSecurityServices

JillianRobles EmergencyManagementSupervisor DevonEnergyCorporation

LoriRussell VicePresident–UtilityServices NWNaturalYvonneSisler ContractortoOfficeofEnergy/ U.S.DepartmentofEnergy

InfrastructureSecurityand EnergyRestoration

RickSlaugh Director–Environmental,Health KinderMorganEnergy&Safety Partners,L.P.

JamesA.Slutz SeniorStudyCoordinator NationalPetroleumCouncil

PhilipB.Smith Manager,EmergencyManagement ShellEnergyResourcesandRegulatoryPolicy&Advocacy Company

GerardTaylor EmergencyManagementSpecialist ChevronLarryWest CoordinatorofMaintenance Williams

Workgroup2–ExerciseDevelopment(Day2)

LeadJillianRobles EmergencyManagementSupervisor DevonEnergyCorporation

Members

RobertJ.Fick GlobalEmergencyPreparednessand ExxonMobilCorporationResponseAdvisor

SeanM.Griffin ProgramManagerforExercises U.S.DepartmentofEnergy InfrastructureSecurity&Energy Restoration OfficeofElectricityDelivery& EnergyReliability

EricA.Haugstad Director,ContingencyPlanning TesoroCompanies,Inc.&EmergencyResponseEnvironmental,Health,Safety&Sustainability–ContingencyPlanning



KevinP.O’Prey SeniorVicePresident/ Obsidian,ACadmusCompany/ContractortoInfrastructure U.S.DepartmentofEnergySecurityandEnergyRestoration

BarbaraT.Parker OilSpillResponseand ShellExploration&AdvocacyManager ProductionCompany

BillyJ.Powell Manager,AmericasEmergency ShellExploration&Response ProductionCompany

RickSlaugh Director–Environmental, KinderMorganEnergyHealth&Safety Partners,L.P.

GerardTaylor EmergencyManagementSpecialist ChevronWorkgroup3–ObservationTeam

LeadJayS.Montgomery VicePresidentand KinderMorganEnergy

ChiefSecurityOfficer Partners,L.P.

Members

DavidK.Barrett SeniorCorporateStrategicAdvisor ExxonMobilCorporationCorporateStrategicPlanning

RobertJ.Fick GlobalEmergencyPreparednessand ExxonMobilCorporationResponseAdvisor

MarshallW.Nichols ExecutiveDirector NationalPetroleumCouncil

BarbaraT.Parker OilSpillResponseand ShellExploration&AdvocacyManager ProductionCompany

KeithC.Robson Manager MarathonPetroleumCorporateSafety,Securityand CompanyLPEmergencyPreparedness

RobinR.Rorick Director AmericanPetroleumInstituteMarineandSecurityIssues

JoanneM.Shore ChiefIndustryAnalyst AmericanFuelandGovernmentRelations/Outreach PetrochemicalManufacturers

MichaelSmith SeniorAdvisor U.S.DepartmentofEnergyOfficeofElectricityDelivery&EnergyReliability


AppendixC–ReferencesAmericanPetroleumInstitute.OilandNaturalGasIndustryPreparednessHandbook.April2016.http://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/hurricane-information/oil-and-natural-gas-industry-preparednes.CascadiaRegionEarthquakeWorkgroup(CREW).CascadiaSubductionZoneEarthquakes:AMagnitude9.0EarthquakeScenario.2013.http://crew.org/sites/default/files/cascadia_subduction_scenario_2013.pdf.FederalPowerAct,16U.S.C.§824a(c).http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Federal%20Power%20Act.pdf.NationalPetroleumCouncil.EnhancingEmergencyPreparednessforNaturalDisasters:GovernmentandOil&NaturalGasIndustryActionstoPrepare,Respond,andRecover.2014.http://www.npc.org/reports/2014-Emergency_Preparedness-lr.pdf.RobertT.StaffordDisasterReliefandEmergencyAssistanceAct,Pub.L.93-288.§42-5121(2013).https://www.fema.gov/robert-t-stafford-disaster-relief-and-emergency-assistance-act-public-law-93-288-amended.U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.EmergencySupportFunction#12–EnergyAnnex.January2008.http://energy.gov/oe/downloads/emergency-support-function-12-energy-annex.U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.NationalResponseFramework,SecondEdition.May2013.https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32230.WhiteHouse.PresidentialPolicyDirective8:NationalPreparedness.March30,2011.http://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.


AppendixD–ClearPathIVExerciseWorkshop(Day1)–StateFuelPlansTheFuelsBreakoutSessionreviewedtheplenaryanddiscussedhowincidentmanagementappliestotheoilandnaturalgassector:responseintheinitialphaseofadisasterandthenfollowedbyashiftinapproachduringthelong-termresponsethatrequiresactivitiesbeyondemergencyresponse.Thesessionclarifiedthefollowing:

• ThestatesofWashingtonandOregonbothhavefuelplanswithsomeareasstillindevelopment.Oregon’splanwasfairlywelldefined(stagingareas,storagerequirements,somepredesignated,etc.)

• Therearetwotypesoffuelissues(refertoNationalResponseFrameworkflowchartattheendofthisappendix):

o IncidentManagement(EmergencyResponsePhase–LifeSafety)

§ StateandcountyEmergencyOperationsCenters(EOCs)

§ FuelneededtosupportESF-10andearlyESF-12activities

§ EOCshavedirectcommunicationstoterminalsandrefineriesforESF-10fuelneeds

• Strictlyneedsforemergencyresponse–notforecastingsupplyforrecoveryorconditionoffacility

§ Communicationsareconductedprivatelywithterminal/facilityandnotprovidedingroupsettingwithotherindustrymembers.Discussionsmustbeconfidentialtoensurecompliancewithantitrustregulations.ThisshouldbeacknowledgedinStateFuelPlans.

§ Lackofelectricpowermayrequiremanagement-of-changereviewsforothermethodsoffuelingsuchasgravity-fedoptions.

§ Immediateneedwillbeforgeneratorsforemergencyresponsefuelonly,notrecovery

o IssueManagement(RecoveryPhase–Long-TermFuelSupply)

§ DOEEmergencyResponseTeamESF-12

§ Antitrustpreventsdiscussionoffuelprovidersinagroupsetting,asnotedabove;thisissueshouldbeclearlyacknowledgedinstateplans(earlyidentificationofprocessforlong-termfueldiscussions)

• IndustrytohavedirectcontactwithEnergyInformationAdministration(EIA)–Individualcompaniesdiscusssupplyandrecoveryneedsbasedonassessment,timing,etc.(EIAprovidesthepointofcontactforDOE.)


• EIAtoaggregateinformationandcoordinatewithDOEemergencyresponseteam(incidentcommander)tosharetotalswithstatesimpacted,etc.

• Includeconditionoffacilityandneedsforrecoveringfacility

• Electricneeds–generators,heavylifthelicopters,etc.

§ Otherfuelsupplytopics

• Howtomanageregionalsupply?

• Howtoconsultwithoilcompaniesforadditionalsupplyfromoutofregiontomeetrecoveryneeds?

• Prioritizingrecoveryofassetsinregionbasedonimpact

• Whocanrecoverthequickest–whichrefinery,terminal,etc.?

§ NationalResponseFrameworkflowchart(seegraphic)needstobeincludedinstateplans

• Communicationprocessto/fromstateandfederal

§ Needforearlyidentificationofwaiversinstateplans

• FuelWaivers

• JonesActWaivers

• U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineersWaivers

• EPAAirQualityWaivers

• StateEnvironmentalWaivers

• FederalEnvironmentalWaivers(OilPollutionActof1990andtheCleanWaterAct)–EstimatedDailyRecoveryCapacity

• U.S.NavySingle-PointMooringSystems

• StateplansneedtoaddressengagementandcoordinationwithEIAinregardtoinformationaboutfuelsuppliesinaregion.

• Discussionsfocusedonresponsecoordination14daysaftertheincident.Whilesomepowerwillberestoredinlessimpactedareas,itwillbeamajorefforttorestoreareasinthePacificNorthwestthatreceivedsevereinfrastructuredamage.

• Foramajorearthquake,theregion’sfuelsupplywouldbedifficulttoaccessanddistributeduetodamagedpipelines,roads,andports.Stateplansshouldaddressthefollowing:

o Fuelsupplieswouldhavetocomefromoutsidetheregioneitherbytruck,rail,orship.


o Withthehighway,bridges,rail,andwaterwayinfrastructuredestroyed,therewouldbearelianceontruckingfuelintoaffectedareas.Truckingfuelwouldhavelimiteddistributiontoaffectedareasinwhichtherearenoaccessibleroadsorbridgesduetodamagefromtsunamiwatersandearthquake.

o Deliveringfuelbyshipwouldrequiremooringareasidentifiedfortankshipsthatcouldtransferproducttobarges,etc.Inaddition,atemporarydockandstoragefacilitywouldneedtobeconstructedforreceivingthefuel.

• TherewasdiscussionofaddinginformationtotheStateFuelPlanstoaddressstreamliningtheprocessandearlyrequestofobtainingkeywaivers(JonesAct,Single-PointMooringSystems,etc.)foraffectedareas.EachplanwouldneedtohaveaclauseorstatementaboutantitrustrulesastheyrelatetoEIAinformation.Byaddressingtheseandotherkeyissueswillassistinresponseintheregion.

• Forindustryandfederalgovernment,earlyresponseeffortswillbefocusedonsearchandrescue(safetyandhumanlife)followingbyenvironmentalemergencyresponseefforts.

Insummary,bothWashingtonandOregonhavefuelplansbutadditionaldetailisrequiredtoaddresstheissuesidentifiedabove.Theworkshopparticipantssuggestedthatanexpandedworkshopwithallstakeholdersandindustrywouldbeausefulprocesstoensuretheplanscoverkeyissuesandlinesofcommunications.Thelevelsofengagementandcoordinationneedtobeclearlydefinedatlocal,state,andfederallevels.



AppendixE–ClearPathIVExerciseCritiqueDetailsTheNPCofferedtoassistinexercisedevelopmenttosupportDOEintheincorporationofthe2014NPCstudyrecommendationsintoexerciseplay.DOEwelcomedthisassistance,andNPCworkgroupswereestablishedtoleadtheseefforts.Workgroup1wasestablishedtoassistwithDay1activitiesinPortland.Workgroup2wasestablishedtoassistwithDay2activities.AndWorkgroup3wasestablishedtoobservetheClearPathIVactivitiesandserveinthe“exerciseevaluators”roleintermsoftheHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP)guidance.ClearPathIVwasdevelopedtoprovideanopportunityforgovernmentandindustrytoexaminethechallengesofrespondingtoacatastrophicCascadiaSubductionZone(CSZ)earthquakeandtsunamiandtoidentifygapswithinrespectiveresponseplansandpolicies.ObjectivesfortheClearPathIVeventweredevelopedtocoverbothDay1andDay2activities:

1. ExamineenergysectorrolesandresponsibilitieswithinresponseplansutilizedforaCSZ9.0earthquakeandtsunami,suchastheDOEEnergyResponsePlan,FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)RegionalPlans,StateEmergencyManagementPlans,StateEnergyAssurancePlans,andindustryresponseplans.

2. Highlightstrategiestoaddressfueldisruptionsandshortagesduringamulti-stateregionaldisasterwithimpactstooilandnaturalgassupplychainsandmethodsoftransportation.

3. Identifyessentialelementsofinformationanddeterminemethodsandprocessesofinformationsharingbetweenstate,federal,andindustrypartnerstobestprovidesituationalawarenessandtodevelopacommonoperatingpicturetosupportexecutiveandoperationaldecision-makingandresourcerequirements,adjudication,allocation,anddisposition.

4. Determineeffectiveidentificationofcriticalresourcesandcapabilities,eliminateduplicationofrequestsordelivery,anddeterminelogisticalrequirementswithcommercialandgovernmentalmethodswithinmultiplemutualassistancenetworksandsystems.

5. Prioritizetherestorationofenergysystemswithstate,federal,andindustrypartnerswithconsiderationtocascadingimpactstointerdependentsectors.

6. EvaluatetheDOEUnifiedCommandStructureConceptofOperationswithfederal,state,andindustrypartnersinrespondingtotheCSZdisaster.

Day1activitiesconsistedofatabletopexerciseinthemorningfollowedbysector-specificworkshopsintheafternoon.Day2activitieswereplannedasafunctionalexerciseengagingmembersfromindustryandlocalmunicipalitiesinOregonandWashingtonstatesascontrollersinaSimulationCelltotest


UseMSELandEEGduringExercisePlay.

IncorporateNPCInjectsintoMSEL

DevelopExerciseInjectsbasedonEEG

DevelopExercise

EvaluationCriteriaintheformofanEEG

ReviewNPCEPStudyRecommen-dations

IdentifyExercise

PurposeandObjectives

DevelopWorkgroup2

membersofDOE’sEmergency&IncidentManagementCouncil(EIMC)andEnergyResponseOrganization.Thepurposeofthisappendixistoprovidefeedbackaboutthefunctionalexercisedesign,development,andexecutionratherthanobservationsonresponseeffectiveness.Workgroup2ExerciseDevelopmentAWorkPlanwasdevelopedtoguideWorkgroup2effortsinassistingDOEwithdevelopmentofthefunctionalexercise.Workgroup2waschargedwithtwokeyfocuspointsforassistinginthedevelopmentoftheexercise:1)establishingawaytotestDOEinitialactivationproceduresand2)demonstratingcoordinationwithfederal,state,andindustrypartners.UtilizingthekeyNPCEmergencyPreparednessreportrecommendationsandfollowingHSEEPguidance,Workgroup2developedanExerciseEvaluationGuide(EEG)toaddressthefocuspointsandprovideafoundationforexercisedevelopment.TheEEGoutlinedtheanticipatedplayeractionsbasedonthe2014NPCreportrecommendations.Workgroupparticipantsusedtheseexpectedplayeractionstodevelopexerciseinjectsthatwouldcreateanenvironmentforexpectedplayeractionstooccur.Theseinjectswereincorporatedintotheexercisescript,theMasterScenarioEventList(MSEL),developedbyDOE’sexerciseleaders.NPCexerciseevaluatorsusedtheEEGtodeterminewhetherornotplayeractionsduringtheexerciseoccurredcorrectlyasaresultofissuedinjects.Workgroup2metnumeroustimesviaconferencecallandtheninpersonwithDOE’sexerciseleaderstodevelopMSELinjects.TheMSELwasusedduringtheClearPathIVexerciseasthemainscripttoguideexerciseplayandensurethatexerciseactivitiestestedNPCstudyrecommendationsappropriatelyandinawaythatwouldallowforevaluatorobservation,asindicatedintheEEG.Thebasicprocesswasasfollows:

InjectdevelopmentbyNPCWorkgroup2wassuccessfulandwellreceivedbyexerciseleadersresponsibleforMSELdevelopment.AllelementsintheNPC-developedEEGwereaddressedandmadeobservablethroughexerciseinjects.ItisimportanttonotethatinjectsdevelopedbyWorkgroup2werespecifictoNPCstudyrecommendationsandoilandnaturalgasactivitiesonly.TheseinjectswereincorporatedintothelargerMSELusedforexerciseplay.


Asmentioned,afunctionalexercisewasdevelopedtotestobjectivesonDay2.AccordingtotheHSEEP,afunctionalexerciseisbestusedfortestinganoperationscenterenvironment.AMSELisinitiatedbycontrollersinaSimulationCell(SimCell)andguidestheplayeractionsandbehaviors.Injectsareredirectedtoplayersuntiltheobjectiveismetandvalidatedsuccessfully.AtypicalfunctionalexercisehasoneSimCellandisfocusedtowardaparticularplayergroup.InthecaseofClearPathIV,themake-upofthecontrollerversusplayergroupswasnotwelldefinedandledtoconfusionleadinguptotheexercise,aswellasonthedayoftheexercise.Onetrueplayergroupwasidentified–theDOEgroupinWashington,DC.However,multipleSimCellsalsoservingasExercisePlayerswerecreated.ThisresultedinplayerstestingplayersandSimCellcontrollerstestingSimCellcontrollersratherthantheSimCellcontrollerstestingtheplayers.Successofafunctionalexercisereliesonawell-scriptedMSELandawell-organizedSimCell.Initially,itwasunderstoodbytheNPCworkgroupsthattheSimCellinPortlandwouldbemadeupofindustrypartnersfrombothenergysectorsaswellaskeymunicipalpartnersandthattheplayerswouldbethegroupsrepresentingorworkingwithDOEinWashington,DC.ItwasnotuntilgroupsarrivedinPortlandthatworkgroupmembersbecameawarethatcontrollersinPortlandwouldalsobeexpectedtoserveasplayersandthattheMSELwasnotfullyscriptedbutwouldbedevelopedadhocduringexerciseplay.Inaddition,duringexerciseplay,facilitatorswereinjectedintosector-specificroomstobeginleadingsector-specificdiscussionsrelatedtothescenarioandsectorpriorities.Thisalsocausedconfusionbecauseitwasnotdirectlytiedtoexerciseplay.Thefacilitatorplacedintheoilandnaturalgasroomwasfromtheelectricsectoranddidnotunderstandtheuniquedynamicsoftheoilandnaturalgassector.Thediscussionfocusedmoreonindustryeducatingthefacili-tatoraboutthesector,ratherthanonanexchangeamongsectorparticipants.ExerciseCritiqueThefollowingexercisecritiqueisbasedontheHSEEPguidanceforexercisedesignandexecutionandtheprofessionaljudgementsofindustrysubjectmatterexpertswithdecadesofexperienceleading,designing,andevaluatingemergencypreparednessexercises.Theseindividualsarealsothekeyplayersincorporateemergencyresponseprograms,withyearsofpracticalexperienceinmanagingincidentresponseoperations.ThepurposeofthiscritiqueistoprovideinputtofutureDOEexerciseleadersandplannersforimprovingtheeffectivenessoffutureexercises.Exercisesaremeanttobelearningopportunitiesforparticipants.Exerciseobjectivesandcorrespondingscenariosaredevelopedtoallowparticipantsasafeenvironmenttotesttheirknowledgeandskillswhileguidingkeylearningprinciples.Exercisesmaybeorganizedinawaythatallowsparticipantstolearnandsuccessfullyworkthroughproblems.Basedonearly


discussionwithexerciseleaders,thereappearedtobeconfusiononwhethertheexercisegoalwasalearningenvironmentorwhethertheaggressivedesignwasintendedtohighlightdeficiencies.Thisexerciseforcedplayerstoengagewithlittleguidanceanddidnotappeartoembedappropriateoperationalexerciseplanningprocessintotheexercisedesign.Aneffectivelydesignedexercisecanprovidebothalearningenvironmentandidentifyareasforimprovement.Functionalexercisesmustbewellplanned,organized,andexecuted.ThesetypesofexercisesarethemostdifficulttoorganizeandmustbecontrolledbyaLeadwithexperienceindeveloping,executing,andparticipatinginsuchevents.TheMSELmustbevery“tight”andheavilycontrolled.“FreePlay”mustbekepttoaminimumandcommunicationsmustbeatightlyclosedloopwithawell-developedcommunicationsdirectory.Theexercisedidengageagreatnumberofplayersfromvariousindustries,disciplines,andlevelsofgovernment.Itisalwaysbeneficialhavingpartnersfromvariousjurisdictionsandcompaniescometogetherinacommonenvironmentandtalkthroughacommonscenario.Thiswasapositiveelementoftheexercise.AnotherpositiveelementwastheopportunityforDOEtointeractwiththevariouspartnerswhileworkingthroughtheirvariousplans.ThisprovidedanopportunityforpartnerstointeractwithDOEandforDOEtointeractwithpartnerspre-emergencyinasafeenvironment.ThenetworkinginthePortlandvenuewasalsoapositiveelementoftheexercise.Partnersrepresentingmanydifferententitieswereabletodiscussresponseactivitiesandsharebestpractices.TheexercisedesignprocessforClearPathIVlooselyfollowedHSEEPguidance.SomeHSEEPterminology,documentation,andplanningconferenceswereheld;however,theexerciseexecutionlackedcommandandcontrol.Coreelementsthatcouldhaveledtoamoresuccessfulexerciseweremissing.

• ExerciseobjectiveswerewrittentocoverbothDay1andDay2activities.ThiscreatedconfusionaboutwhatthefocuswouldbeforDay1versusDay2.TheassumptionwasthattheDay2activitieswereprimarilymeanttoengageDOEHQoperationcenters.

• AmorecohesivefunctionalexercisewouldhaveallowedforenhancedtestingoftheDOEHQoperationcenters.However,SimCelloperationswerenotwellplanned,requiredcontrollerstoalsoparticipateasplayers,andinsomecases,testedtheplayersasmuchormorethanDOE.

• Rolesforexerciseparticipantswereassignedlastminuteandnotexplained.Playerswereleftconfusedabouttheirroleandunsureofwhattheirexpectationswereforparticipation.Exerciseparticipantswerenotwellbriefedfromearlyintheplanningprocessontheirrolesduringtheexercise.


• TheMSELwaswrittenasalistofeventswithoutconnectinglogicallywithinputfrom

variouspartners.Thisdidnotleadtoacohesivescriptforexerciseplay.Awell-developedMSELwillcreateaconversationbetweencontrollersandplayers.UponreadingthroughaMSEL,someoneunfamiliarwiththeexercisewillbeabletounderstandtheexercisescenarioandseewhatisbeingaskedoftheplayers.ThiswasnotthecasewiththeClearPathIVMSEL.

• Inaddition,theprocessforexecutingtheSimCellandinjectswasnotclearlycommunicatedorcontrolled.PlayersshowedupattheexercisewiththeirownMSELanduponStartExbeganimplementingexerciseinjectspertheirownindividualMSEL.ThesehadnotbeencoordinatedinadvancewiththeLeadController,werenotincorporatedintotheexerciseMSEL,andthisactivitywasnotrecognizeduntiladesignatedcontrollerwasapproachedwithaquestionaboutwhotosendinjectsto.

• Inaddition,aMSELtypicallysimulatespartnersthatarenotactuallyrepresentedasplayersanddesignatesanappropriatecontrollerforsuch.Thisalsowasnotorganizedwellandledtoconfusionduringexerciseplay.

• TheMSELandexercisedocumentationtobeutilizedbycontrollersduringthefunctionalexercisewereprovidedtocontrollersanhourpriortoStartEx,notallowingforadequatereviewandpreparationtime.Ideally,thiswouldbeprovidedatthecontrollersandevaluatorsbriefing.

• Aninvitationtothecontrollersandevaluatorsbriefingwassentthedaypriortothemeetingbeingheld.Thisshouldbeplannedaspartoftheinitialexerciseschedule.

• Theplayerlistwasfinalizedthemorningoftheexerciseandwasalsopiecedtogether.Controllersshouldhavebeenidentifiedinadvancetoallowforsuccessfulexerciseplay.AnyadditionalparticipantsshouldhavebeenassignedasObservers.

TheexercisecouldhavebeenevenmoresuccessfulwithbetterplanningandpreparationforDay2events.Keyitemsthatshouldreceiveadditionalattentioninthefuture:

• DesignatealeadexercisecontrollerwithextensiveknowledgeoffunctionalexerciseandMSELdesigntoleadthefunctionalexerciseefforts.

• Identifytruedesiredoutcomesforthefunctionalexerciseandchooseplayersand

controllersfortheSimCellthatwillallowthatobjectivestobeaccomplished.

• CreateasingleSimCellthatisonlyservingascontroller.The“hybrid”modelwasnotsuccessfulandisnotconsideredabestpracticeforexercisedesign.


• Ensurethatexerciseparticipantsareidentifiedearlyintheplanningprocessandclearlyunderstandtheirroles.

• PublishtheMSELandotherpertinentcontrollerdocumentsinadvanceoftheexerciseandensureallcontrollersandevaluatorsunderstandthescriptanditemstobeaccomplished.

• AllEEGsshouldbetiedtoMSELinjects.ConclusionTheClearPathIVexercisewasvaluableandadvancedgovernmentandindustryengagementonemergencypreparednessandresponse.TheexerciseprovidedanexcellentopportunityforstateandindustrypartnersfromthePacificNorthwesttointeract.TheworkplanningtheexerciseandthenworkingtogetherduringtheexercisecreatedavenueforDOEtointeractwithindustryatlocal,regional,andnationallevels.Disorganization,confusion,andlackoftruefunctionalexerciseplayinhibitedsomeofthebenefitsthatmayhavebeenachieved.Betterpreparationforexerciseexecutionanddevelopmentofexercisecontrollersandclarifyingrolesandresponsibilitiesduringexerciseplaywillheightenthebenefitoffuturefunctionalexercises.Forfutureexercises,DOEmaywanttoexpanditsengagementofindustrysubjectmatterexpertsorotherswithexperienceworkingwithindustryonfunctionalexercisessignificantlyinadvanceofanexercisetoimprovetheexerciseoutcome.Planningformajorindustryexercisesmaybeayearorlongerfrominitialschedulingthroughexecutingtheexercise.ADOEexercisesuchasClearPathIVhasthissamelevelofcomplexityandrequiresthesameplanningtimeframe.