CALUB V. CA, GR No. 115634, April 27, 2000

Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law. A replevin case against the State, without its consent, cannot prosper.

FACTS:

Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber and thereafter confiscated them. The owners of the vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover the vehicles. They won in the trial court on the ground that petitioner did not act in accordance with the law. So petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and is therefore valid.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of property under custodia legis.

2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State.

RULING:

1) No, replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law.

2) Yes, this suit is not valid because the State may not be sued without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his duties. It has been established that the DENR acted within its authority. Hence, its action is the action of the State.

G.R. NO. 108619 JULY 31, 1997EPIFANIO LALICAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 52, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

The petitioners were apprehended on the Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan Puerto Princesa for violating Section 68 of PD No. 705 or known as The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines. There were 1, 800 board feet of lumber loaded in two (2) passenger jeeps in different sizes and dimension that were confiscated. On August 9, 1991, all the accused were pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Petioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information filed against them contenting that, Section 68 of PD 705 does not include lumber because the wording of the law categorically specify timber to be collected as to constitute the violation on the said law. He further contends that, the law is vague because it does specify the authority or legal documents required by existing forest law and regulation. The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not the courts to determine the wisdom of the law or to set the policy as rest by the legislature. He further asserts that the word timber should include lumber which is a product or derivative of a timber. The position of the prosecution could result to the circumventionof the law, for one could stealthily cut a timber and process it to become a lumber. On September 24, 1991, the lower court construed the interpretation of the law against the State thus the motion was granted.

The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on the order underscoring the fact that the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another. The motion was approved thus this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the term lumber is included in the concept of timber in order to constitute an offense as stated in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines).

RULING:

No, the Court ruled that, the word lumber includes timber. The primary reason why the law was enacted is to secure and maximize the use of the natural resources; the non-inclusion of lumber on the law may give rise for the circumvention of law.

Section 68 of the said law punishes these acts namely (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277. To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumbers which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology.

G.R. NO. 131270 MARCH 17, 2000PERFECTO PALLADA, PETITIONER, VS . PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Sometime in the latter part of 1992, DENR received a reports that illegally cut lumber were delivered in the warehouse of Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia Bukidnon. DENR officers in collaboration of PNP raided the company’s warehouse and found a large stockpile of lumber in varying sizes cut by a chainsaw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipt considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator.

On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended. During the trial, the accused presented documents that the lumber are legally obtained. This may include the certificate of origin. However, the court found out that Pallada was guilty of the violation of PD 705 and the rest of the accused were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The case was appealed to the CA and rendered a decision affirming the decision of the lower court, thus this case was elevated.

ISSUE:

Whether a separate certificates of origin is used for lumber and timber.

RULING:

Yes, there should be a separate Certificate of origin. The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin. For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-83 states in pertinent parts: In order to provide an effective mechanism to pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof, the attached Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . which form[s] part of this circular [is] hereby adopted as accountable forms for official use by authorized BFD officers . . . .5. Lumber . . . transported/shipped without the necessary Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) . . . as herein required shall be considered as

proceeding from illegal sources and as such, shall be subject to confiscation and disposition in accordance with LOI 1020 and BFD implementing guidelines.

The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.

G.R. NO. 136142 OCTOBER 24, 2000PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFONSO

DATOR ET.AL ,ACCUSED- APPELANT

FACTS:

Pastor Telen and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. The accused while transporting pieces of lumber bound to Maasin, Southern Leyte, they were apprehended by the police officer and seized pieces of lumber. As a result SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The accused Telen alleged that the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same municipality. He further contends that he secured verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of the DENR.

The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD 705sentencing the accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.

ISSUE:

Whether the penalty imposed to Telen the accused is correct in violation of PD 705.

RULING:

No, in the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No. 705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the

basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article 309 paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods for simple theft. Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

G.R. NO. 161798 OCTOBER 20, 2004PICOP RESOURCES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. AUGUSTUS L.

CALO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RESPONDENT

FACTS:

Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35 which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 designating the petitioner as DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation." The MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda, petitioner’s security personnel were deputized as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders. In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOP’s impounding area. A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary mandatory Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null and void and sought to restrain the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing the said memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R. Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated February 16, 2001 and to refrain and desist from implementation. Petitioner was also ordered to release the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and criminal proceedings were ongoing.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the virtue of MOA regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation.

RULING:

Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances. Petitioner’s compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue of the Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the confiscated forest products may have come from its concession area, petitioner admitted that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government Prosecution- Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioner’s interest in the confiscated forest products was merely contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner contends that private respondents’ intrusion was in violation of petitioner’s PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these license agreements. It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. Petitioner also cannot claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of theDENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner ,

vs . THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE

BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT

AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents .

FACTS:

On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya fromOctober 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990. However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena. Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter; Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by petitioner’s TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's

request was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

RULING:

No. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy

the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed

OPOSA,minors, and represented by their parents petitioners,

vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as

theSecretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,

and THEHONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,

Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

FACTS:

This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law— and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of

contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE,

accused appellant

FACTS:

Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the PTF went on patrolseveral times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged that, on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chain saw lumber (Species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from theproper authorities Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP’s of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant’s activities consist an offense

RULING:

Yes, possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a violation of the RFC. When the police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to prove that he has the permit to possess and transport the lumber. All he had was the permit for the coconut slabs. He even concealed the lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon first inspection of the load. Under the circumstances, there is no doubt that the accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber, but could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it could not be seen by merely looking at the cargo. There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code:

a. by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without licence and

b. by possessing timber or other forest products without required legal documents. In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of said acts. However, in the second offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the crime.

GR NO. 152989. SEPTEMBER 4, 2002ROLDAN, JR. PETITIONER V. HON, MADRONA ET.AL.

RESPONDENTS

FACTS:

On August 9, 2001, petitioner applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the various government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, petitioner was allegedly informed by some employees from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting approval. Consequently, petitioner proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway. He used the cut logs as materials to build his chicken cages. About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner’s place, allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted there were 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.

ISSUE:

a. Whether a person who cuts trees for his own use within his property without the necessary permit from the DENR and without transporting the same outside said property, be criminally charged for violating PD 705?

b. Whether the owner of a private property is administratively liable under Section 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and used them for his own agricultural purposes.

RULING:

a. Yes, Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. As to the assertion that his penalty for cutting trees in his own land should not be equated with that for qualified theft, suffice it to say that the judiciary is never concerned with the wisdom of the law. Whether or not the legislature was correct in imposing on violators of PD 705 a penalty equal to that imposable on those guilty of qualified theft is a question beyond the power of the Court to resolve. It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be affected, even if the law is harsh -dura lex sed lex Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the “Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit,” provides:

SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-woodproducts covered by these regulations which are transported without the prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.

b. No, The rule is clear. The aforementioned administrative order considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES VS MAYOR JOSE YAP

These are two consolidated cases.

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land they’ve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG appealed.

G.R. No. 173775

During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed with the Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They

alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.

The OSG again opposed Sacay’s petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

ISSUES: 

Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.

RULING: 

Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.

Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926  ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.

926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:

(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

CHU VS. JUDGE TAMINA.M. NO. RTJ-03-1786. AUGUST 28, 2003

FACTS:

Chu filed administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law, serious misconduct, and grave abuse of discretion against Judge Camilo E. Tamin of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. Judge Tamin issued search warrant against Chu for possession of “forest products of dubious origin” in violation of PD 705 as applied for by Communty Environment and Natural Resources Officer Michael dela Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz). On the strength of the warrant, 576 pieces of pagtapat lumber (mangrove specie) was seized from Chu. Chu assailed the validity of the warrant for violating Sec. 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure because the certified copies he obtained from the court did not contain any transcript of the judge’s examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his witness Cuaresma. Judge Tamin’s contention is that the certified copies of the records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of his examination because the clerical staff in his office who prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)’s findings: Judge Tamin is liable for gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge apparently believes that searching questions need not be in writing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Tamin properly issued the search warrant against Chu.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that Judge Tamin is grossly ignorant of the law and ordered to pay P5,000.00 fine.

Art. III, Sec. 2 of Constitution and Rule 126, Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals, reiterated the requirements of Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants, which judges must strictly observe, as follows:

Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.

VIRGILIO BON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

G.R. NO. 152160 JAN 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1) amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00. Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, petitioner Virgilio Bon, Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of ‘Not Guilty’ to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution presented Nestor Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, Barangay Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones [and] Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon.

The evidence for the prosecution was synthesized by the trial court, as follows: Prosecution’s evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayane and Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza which shows that Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7, 1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one of the barangay tanods, Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza’s complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza. During their investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees:four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters o[r] 4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00.

In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court, as follows: All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge. He said that he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land.

Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and was instituted as such] by Teresita’s father. He developed the land, planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza refused to receive the landowner’s share of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza. He denied cutting and gathering the trees in the land and pointed to Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his complaint.

Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar Narvaez indicted him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he

happened to box Oscar Narvaez, after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge.

On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, petitioner,Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed an appeal to the CA.

In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses’ credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or media representatives is admissible in evidence against the author.

RULING:

The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanour as they testified. Equally established is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm those of the trial court, as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CA’s findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the lower courts’ assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.

Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,[30] provides:

SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.” Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents. Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees.

It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements concur: 1. There is more than one circumstance. 2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. 3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.