Negotiation behaviour. Dichotomy or continuum?negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?...

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january · april 2008 · esic market

Negotiation behaviour. Dichotomy or continuum?

AbstractBearing in mind the importance of negotiation processes in today’s busi-ness world and how often they take place, this study focuses on the analy-sis of behaviour that can be adopted by negotiating parties, considered inthe literature to be a key factor in the success or failure of negotiations.The aim is to propose a typology of behaviour that can be applied to anysituation involving negotiation. From a purposely critical perspective, theexisting ambiguity surrounding the nature of negotiation behaviour incurrent literature is made clear. By putting forward four types of negotia-tion behaviour, the intention is to shed light on and unify the different the-ories presently circulating, whilst defending the exclusively tangible andvisible nature of negotiation behaviour and the possibility of adoptingintermediate types of behaviour, in contrast with the majority of previousstudies.

Keywords: Negotiation behaviour, collaboration, compromise, soft com-petition, competition.

JEL Code: M19, L29.

Saorín-Iborra, M. Carmen (2007). “Negotiation behaviour. Dichotomy or continuum?”.EsicMarket, 129, pp. 125-152.

M. Carmen Saorín-IborraDepartamento de Dirección de Empresas. Juan José Renau Piqueras. Universitat de València. Avda. Tarongers, s/n,46022 Valencia. Tel nº: +34 96 382 83 12. Fax: +34 96 382 83 33. E-mail: [email protected]


negotiation behaviour. dichotomy or continuum?

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1. IntroductionNegotiation behaviour is regarded as a key factor in the development andoutcome of negotiations that are so common in today’s business world(Rubin and Brown, 1975; Pruitt, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Weiss,1993, 1997; Sánchez, 2005). However, despite the clearly stated impor-tance of negotiation behaviour, there is a certain ambiguity in the relevantliterature with respect to this concept and its nature.

The established dichotomy between the two general types of behaviour,integrative and distributive or competitive, has been amply defended anddiscussed. In my view, such a differentiation is overly simplistic and farfrom represents the reality of the situation. Other types of behaviour existthat come between these two extremes, thus establishing a continuum.Negotiators present different types of behaviour during the negotiationprocess, whose impact produces differing outcomes (Roure, 1997; Sán-chez, 2005). I put forward a new typology of negotiation behaviour, pro-posing the existence of behaviour of an intermediate nature.

With this objective in mind, a definition is given of what should beunderstood by negotiation behaviour to then go on to distinguish betwe-en this and other concepts. In doing so, the exclusively tangible and visi-ble nature of negotiation behaviour is thereby justified. The second sectionwill focus on the various existing ideas on behaviour with this author’ssubsequent proposal on behaviour in business negotiations and their natu-re. In the following section, an empirical approximation is presented inorder to validate the behaviour typology proposal. The paper ends withconclusions and a description of the main contributions to this study bothat an academic and professional level.

2. Negotiation behaviour: delimiting the conceptThere are numerous existing definitions for negotiation behaviour, whichcan be grouped into two different types depending on the extent of theirvisibility. The first group of definitions, which are broad in nature, areconcerned with negotiation behaviour characterized both by tangible



aspects and by intangible ones. The following definitions are examples ofthis type: “primary parties’ behaviours […] it includes cognitive domainssuch as perception, information-processing and judgment” (Weiss, 1993;p. 279); or “these behaviours can be described in detail. They manifestthemselves in attitudes, actions and styles” (Dupont, 1996; p. 48).

The second type of definition is of a more restrictive nature, as it onlyincludes visible and tangible aspects. Here, negotiation behaviour is cha-racterized as the group of communicative tactics or actions that guides thenegotiator towards the other participants in the process (i.e. Adler et al.,1992; Serrano and Rodriguez, 1993; Tiessen, 1996; Rao and Schmidt,1998). Such communicative tactics can either be of the verbal kind or thenon-verbal kind (Graham, 1985; Adler et al., 1992).

According to Putnam (1990; p.15), negotiation behaviour is definedthus; “tactics are the communicative behaviours that operationalize stra-tegies”, while Rao and Schmidt (1998; p.666) state that “negotiatorbehaviour is tactical […] negotiators attempt to achieve their firms’goals by gaining their counterparts’ compliance through using influencetactics”.

A clear distinction is thus established between tangible or visibleaspects and those of an intangible nature. However, the close relation thatexists between these aspects is also underlined. They consider the commu-nicative tactics to be the fruit of intangible aspects (Rubin and Brown,1975; Thomas, 1992; George et al., 1998).

In relation to this last idea, Thomas (1992) establishes that the creationof expectations and the emotions experienced by parties involved in theprocess of managing conflict pave the way for the appearance of inten-tions1, which are defined as reactions or decisions on how to act when aconflict situation arises. These intentions will then lead to a decision onwhat kind of behaviour to adopt and this will, in turn, produce particularresults that will constitute the basis for the creation of new expectationsand emotions, thus reinitiating the aforementioned cycle. Therefore, allbehaviour is a function of an intention2.

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(1) Thomas (1992)makes the distinctionbetween five differenttypes of intention:competition, collaboration, compromising, accommodation andavoiding. (2) It has also been described using otherterms such as attitude(George et al., 1998; Altimira, 2000) and motivational orientation(Rubin and Brown,1975).



Although such a relation has been pointed out in a good number of stu-dies, are few empirically contrasted studies that show the relation betwe-en intention and negotiation behaviour, although the works of Rubin andBrown (1975) and Druckman (1994) are some exceptions.

Rubin and Brown (1975) show that motivational orientation on thepart of the negotiator, defined by them as a willingness to adopt one typeof attitude or another towards the opponent, influences both behaviourand consequently the outcome of the negotiation. These authors thusclaim that motivational orientation can take the form of individualism orgo right to the other end of the scale and be characterized by cooperati-vism3.

Druckman (1994), by means of meta-analysis, concludes that the nego-tiator’s stance in relation to the opponent has a considerable influence onthe adoption of a behaviour of compromise.

Therefore, a relation exists between the tactical aspects (behaviour) andthose of an intangible nature (attitude or intention) as shown in Figure 1.

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Expectations Intentions Behaviour Outcome

Figure 1. Cycle leading to negotiation behaviour

It is assumed in this study that, although there exists a relation betwe-en the two aspects (behaviour and intentions), what can be considerednegotiation behaviour should be clearly differentiated from what cannotbe thus described.

Lastly, it is also necessary to distinguish between negotiation behaviourand other concepts such as strategy, approach, orientation or style ofnegotiation.

(3) Individualism refersto the quest for the maximization of one’sown outcomes in the face of others’ interests,while collectivism is thedesire to obtain positive outcomes, not only forone’s own interests butalso for those of otherinterested parties.



As shown in Table 1, the concepts of strategy, approach and orienta-tion have been used as synonyms. However, the greatest amount of con-fusion revolves around the use of the term style, as it has occasionally beenused in a similar sense to the previous concepts. On other occasions, it hasbeen endowed with a much wider meaning, including traits of a structuralkind, such as the size of the negotiating team (Tung, 1982; Graham andHerberger, 1983; Paik and Tung, 1999).

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CONCEPTS PREVIOUS STUDIES (examples)

Strategy/ Approach Campbell et al. (1988)

Strategy/ Orientation Putnam (1990), Serrano and Rodríguez (1993), Graham et al. (1994), Roure (1997)

Strategy/ Approach / Orientation Lax and Sebenius (1986), Adler et al. (1992), Thomas (1992)

Strategy/ Style Thomas (1992), Dupont (1996), Paik and Tung (1999), Nau-ta and Saunders (2000)

Table 1. Concepts regarded as synonyms

However, the concepts of strategy, orientation and approach are clearlydifferentiated from that of negotiation behaviour (Putnam, 1990; Adler etal., 1992; Dupont, 1996; Yuan, 1998, Rao and Schmidt, 1998). For exam-ple, Putnam (1990; p. 15) states that behaviours “ […] reveal a bargainer’sintentions […]”. In the opinion of Yuan (1998; p. 73): “the negotiationstrategy […] refers to the overall game plan that negotiators employ toaccomplish their goals. Tactics are generally considered the components ofthe strategy. They are the communicative behaviours that operationalizestrategies in the bargaining process”.

Rao and Schmidt (1998; p. 666) point out that “[…] An array of beha-vioural tactics are used in negotiations regardless of the negotiators’ gene-ral strategy […]”.



Therefore, the concept of negotiation strategy can be compared to thatof intention proposed by Thomas (1992). In this sense, negotiation beha-viour corresponds to intentions, approaches, strategies or general negotia-tion orientation, but is also separate from them.

3. A proposal on negotiation behaviourDespite the difference that exists between the concepts of negotiation beha-viour and negotiation strategy, separating the two when analyzing the rele-vant literature is not always an easy task. In studies that focus on negotia-tion behaviour as a key factor in the interactive negotiation process, one seesthat this factor has been analyzed with reference to strategies or intentionsand not through the actions or communicative tactics that make it up.

Thus, two extreme types of orientation or general negotiation strate-gies can be established: integrative and distributive (Walton and Mckersie,1965; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Pruitt, 1981; Fisher et al., 1983)4.

Integrative strategy is that which searches for reconciliation betweenthe interested parties, attaining joint benefits or win/win objectives via thefree exchange of information and joint decision-making (Walton andMckersie, 1965). This means that it 1) focuses on the interests of bothsides 2) does not imply confrontation, 3) is aimed at qualitative objectivessuch as efficiency and fairness, 4) is based on sharing information in anhonest way and 5) its aim is to maximize benefits for all sides as an out-come of the negotiation (value creation) (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Tiessen,1996). So, integrative strategy of negotiation eases to build a trust rela-tionship and to achieve long term compromise (Rubin and Brown, 1975;Pruitt, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Saorín, 2006). Adopting this typeof negotiation style is key in negotiation such as relational sales (Román,2005) or strategic alliances (Menguzzato, 1992; Saorín, 2006). The reasonis that in these negotiation situations, to achieve a mutual satisfactory rela-tionship or agreement for long term is essential.

On the other hand, a distributive strategy or orientation 1) focuses oncoming out on top in the negotiation, 2) implies confrontation, 3) inclu-

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(4) Integrative orientation has alsobeen called value creation (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Roure,1997), problem-solving(Campbell et al., 1998;Graham et al., 1994),cooperative (Graham etal., 1988; Dupont, 1996;Yuan, 1998; Tjosvold etal., 1999), win/winsituation (Zhao, 2000;Altimira, 2000), compromise (Druckman,1994) and negotiation of“satisfactory agreement”(Sánchez, 2005).Meanwhile, the distributive strategy orapproach has also beendescribed as competitive(Pruitt, 1981; Graham etal., 1988; Tiessen, 1996;Roure, 1997; Yuan,1998; Tjosvold et al.,1999), as reclaimingvalue (Lax and Sebe-nius, 1986; Roure,1997), win/lose situation (Zhao, 2000;Altimira, 2000), individualist (Graham etal., 1998; Graham et al.,1994), confrontation(Dupont, 1996) andnon-compromise(Dupont, 1994).



des concealing information, 4) is aimed at quantitative objectives and 5)attempts to maximize benefits or work in the interests of only one of thenegotiating parties (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Tiessen, 1996). Adopting thistype of negotiation strategy hinders to achieve agreements. But in case ofachieving an agreement, it will not be based on a long term compromise(Lax and Sebenius, 1986; O’Connor and Arnold, 2001; Munduate andMedina, 2005)

Although the majority of studies refer to these two extremes, there areothers that establish intermediate stances in an attempt to make a breakwith the integrative/distributive dichotomy. The dual model of Pruitt(1983) and that of Thomas (1992) particularly stand out in this sense, asthey have served as the basis for subsequent studies. While the formermodel focuses on the processes of negotiation, the latter deals with thewider field of the processes of conflict management.

Pruitt’s dual model (1983) lays down the distinction between four pos-sible negotiation strategies (as previously mentioned, this is a term he usesto describe the intentions that lead to possible negotiation behaviour) intwo dimensions; concern about the other side’s outcome and concernabout one’s own outcome. This means of classifying would give the resultsshown in Table 2.

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Negotiation strategy Concern about the other side’s outcome Concern about one’s own outcome

Problem Solving High High

Contending Low High

Yielding High Low

Inaction Low Low

Table 2. Pruitt’s dual model

Source: Based on Pruitt (1983).



“Problem solving involves an effort to find an alternative that is accep-table to both parties; contending involves an effort to force one’s will onthe other party; yielding involves a reduction in one’s basic aspirations;and inaction involves doing as little as possible in the negotiation” (Pruitt,1983; p. 167).

For his part, Thomas (1992) proposes a model of five intentions ororientations set in two dimensions: the assertiveness and cooperativism5

shown by each party involved in the process of conflict management6

(Figure 2).

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Ass

erti

vene

ss

Cooperativism

Competing Collaborating

Compromising

Avoiding Acommodating

Figure 2. Model of intentions

Competing “represents an attempt […] to satisfy one’s own concerns atthe other’s expense”, while collaborating “represents an attempt to fullysatisfy the concerns of both parties to achieve an integrative settlement”.Accommodating “involves an attempt to satisfy the other’s concerns at theneglect of one’s own”, avoiding “reflects a desire to ignore or neglect the con-cerns of both self and other”, and compromising is understood as “midwaybetween competing and accommodating” (Thomas, 1992; p. 668, 669).

Source: Based on Thomas (1992).

(5) Assertiveness is defined as “the extent towhich the party attemptsto satisfy his or her ownconcerns and cooperativism as theextent to which the partyattempts to satisfy theother’s concerns” (Thomas, 1992; p. 668).(6) Negotiation is ameans of resolving conflict; therefore Thomas’ model is applicable to the analysisof the processes of negotiation.



Both classifications of intentions cited here are very similar. Theirequivalents would be: competing/contending, accommodating/ yielding,avoiding/inaction and collaborating/ problem solving. The only inten-tion without equivalent is that of compromising that appears in Thomas’model (1992) but is not expressed in Pruitt’s dual model (1983). Howe-ver, the intentions of avoiding and accommodating cannot lead to nego-tiation behaviour as they include the non-fulfilment of some of the defi-ning traits of the whole process of negotiation7. In the case ofaccommodating, the characteristic of the tension caused by creating-reclaiming value is not fulfilled, whilst in the case of avoiding, the traitsof the will to arrive at an agreement and the reclaiming-creating valuetension are not present. It can therefore be suggested that the models ofPruitt and Thomas should be reduced to two or three negotiation inten-tions or strategies, respectively, with a view to applying them to theanalysis of negotiation.

Although negotiation intention or strategy can help us to understandthe type of behaviour adopted we propose that it is exclusively characte-rized by tangible aspects. Therefore, it is the visible aspects that should beanalyzed. It is worth pointing out at this stage, that studies that analyzethe tangible nature of negotiation behaviour are few and far between. Theworks of Graham (1985), Adler et al., (1992) and Rao and Schmidt(1998) are notable exceptions and studies by Lewicki and Robinson(1998), Volkema (1999) Volkema and Leme Fleury (2002) and Elahee etal. (2002) might also be included in this rather short list.

When analyzing intracultural negotiations,8 Graham (1985) studiesverbal and non-verbal behaviour shown by negotiators. Verbal communi-cation is measured using twelve different categories9, the number of timesthe word “NO” is used and the degree of concession, measured by com-paring the first offer and the initial concession. With regard to non-verbaltactics, coordination in communication is analyzed through the studies ofperiods of silence and the overlapping of conversations, glances at theopponent (length) and moments of physical contact.

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(7) It is said that negotiation has sevendefining characteristics:relation of interdependence, interests of a mixed nature, the will on bothsides to reach an agreement, expectations,communicative interaction, participationof at least two parties and the tension of reclaiming-creating value(combination of movements aimed atachieving one‘s own interests and movementsaimed at arriving at anagreement which wouldmutually benefit allsides).(8) These were carriedout through simulationsof intracultural, commercial negotiations(buyer/seller) betweenbusinesspeople fromthree different countries(U.S., Japan and Brazil).(9) Definitions of theproposed categories(Graham, 1985, p. 88)are:Promise: A statementin which the source indicated his intention toprovide the target with areinforcing consequencewhich source anticipatestarget will evaluate aspleasant, positive, orrewarding.Threat: Same as promise,except that the reinforcing consequencesare thought to be



In order to analyze negotiation behaviour Adler et al. (1992) used thefindings from the previous study but added an extra category, which is thenumber of times the word “YOU” is employed. In addition, they analyzenegotiation strategy, thereby demonstrating the distinction between theconcepts of strategy and behaviour.

Both studies cited above, extreme integrative behaviour (problem solving)is characterized by the existence of a high frequency of questions and perso-nal revelations, and by a low frequency of threats, promises, commitments,punishments, demands and rewards. These last categories are more typical ofthe opposite type of behaviour. In relation to non-verbal tactics, integrativebehaviour is characterized, above all, by the low frequency of the use of thewords “NO” and “YOU”, by the high level of coordination in the conver-sation (existence of periods of silence and reduced overlapping), by the highdegree of glances at the opponent and by the low degree of physical contact.

Rao and Schmidt (1998) also study negotiation behaviour from its tan-gible conceptualization. However, their analysis is carried out in a diffe-rent way from previous studies. In this case, the authors base their ideason the classification of communicative tactics proposed by Kipnis and Sch-midt (1985)10.

As previously mentioned, from amongst the studies that analyze nego-tiation behaviour via the tactics employed, studies by Lewicki and Robin-son (1998), Volkema (1999), Volkema and Leme Fleury (2002) and Ela-hee et al. (2002) are also worthy of note. The last three are based on theproposal put forward by Lewicki and Robinson (1998), in which groupnegotiation behaviour (tactics) under general headings: bluffing, misrepre-sentation of the firm’s position to an opponent, traditional competitivebargaining, attacking the opponent’s network and inappropriate informa-tion gathering. It is fair to suggest that previous proposals from Graham(1985) and Adler et al. (1992) are reflected within these groupings.

In this research, adopting and defending the existence of intermediatestances in negotiation behaviour11 and its tangible nature, four types ofbehaviour are proposed that negotiators could predominantly adopt in

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noxious, unpleasant, orpunishing.Recommendation: A statement in which thesource predicts that apleasant environmentalconsequence will occurto the target. Its occurrence is not underthe source’s control.Warning: Same asrecommendation, exceptthat the consequencesare thought to be unpleasant.Reward: A statement bythe source that is thoughtto create pleasant consequences for the target.Punishment: Same asreward, except that theconsequences arethought to be unpleasant.Positive normativeappeal: A statement inwhich the source indicates that the target’spast, present, or futurebehaviour was or will bein conformity with socialnorms.Negative normative appeal: Same as positivenormative appeal, exceptthat the target’s behaviouris in violation of socialnorms.Commitment: A statement by the sourceto the effect that its futurebids will not go below orabove a certain level.Self-Disclosure: A statement in which thesource reveals



their interaction12: collaboration, compromise, soft competition and com-petition (Figure 3). The names chosen for each type of negotiation beha-viour reflect the importance endowed in this study to the contributions ofthe models of Pruitt (1983) and Thomas (1992) to the literature on nego-tiation and, in particular, to the typology proposed herein. Thus, collabo-ration is associated with an extreme integrative strategy. Competition isthe type of behaviour based on a highly distributive orientation or highlycompetitive intention. With respect to intermediate behaviour, while com-promise implies the adoption of an integrative approach, though not tosuch an extent as in collaboration, soft competition involves less competi-tive orientation than competition. This is how the proposal of a conti-nuum of behaviour can be presented in contrast to the widely supporteddichotomy that appears in previous studies.

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information about itself.Question: A statement inwhich the source asksthe target to reveal information about itself.Command: A statementin which the source suggests that the targetperform certain behaviour.(10) They distinguishbetween three mega-categories of tactics ofinfluence: “hard”, “soft”and “rational”. Hard tactics of influence include threats, demandsand sanctions. Those of asoft nature are those thatemphasize friendship (forexample explanations or questions) and those of arational kind aim to gainthe acceptance of thecounterpart and suppose a mixture of theprevious two. (11) Other authors whosupport the idea of intermediate positionsare Fisher et al. (1983),Lax and Sebenius (1986),Putnam (1990), Serranoand Rodríguez (1993),Roure (1997), Rao andSchmidt (1998).(12) In all negotiation,each side adopts differenttypes of behaviour, although there is alwaysone which predominatesduring the process (creating-reclaimingvalue tension) (Lax andSebenius, 1986; Putnam, 1990; Roure,1997; Sánchez, 2005).

Pure IntegrativeBehaviour

Pure CompetitiveBehaviour

Competition SoftCompetition

Compromise Collaboration

CompetitiveOrientation

IntegrativeOrientation

Figure 3. Proposal on negotiation behaviour

As previously pointed out, although intention can help us to anticipa-te and understand the type of behaviour adopted by negotiators, it is not,in itself, a sufficient indicator. In reality, it is tactics that delimit differentkinds of behaviour. Therefore, using the studies by Graham (1985) andAdler et al. (1992) as a starting point, my proposal on negotiation beha-viour is characterized as shown in Table 3.



Collaboration implies sharing information in an open, clear, honest,complete manner. It is a type of behaviour that implies establishing effec-tive communication between all sides (obtaining and transmitting infor-mation)13.

Competition implies that a negotiator can hide the maximum amountof information, and in particular basic information. In this situation, thecommunication established is ineffectual.

In between these two types of behaviour, are those of Compromise andSoft Competition. Compromise is similar to the behaviour associated withcollaboration, but the communicative effectiveness and mutual knowled-ge reached between sides is less than in the case of collaboration. Infor-mation is shared in an open, fairly clear, honest way.

On the other hand, Soft Competition, from its conceptualization as dis-tributive or intermediate competitive behaviour, implies establishing rea-

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FrequencyCollaboration Compromise

SoftCompetitionTactics Competition

Questions High Medium Low Low

Explanations High Medium Low Low

Personal disclosures High Medium Low Low

Treatment of key issues High Medium Low Low

Threats Low Low Medium High

Refusals Low Low Medium High

Conversational Overlaps Low Low Medium High

Demands Low Low Medium High

Unforeseen interruptions Low Low Medium High

Table 3. Nature of proposed negotiation behaviour

(13) Effective communication involvesa higher frequency ofquestions, explanationsand personal disclosures, as, throughthese tactics, information is betterobtained and transmitted.



sonably ineffective communication. It involves the biased hiding of infor-mation on basic aspects.

4. Empirical approximation

4.1. Methodology justificationAlthough this research has been proposed more as a theoretical contribu-tion, a first empirical approximation was carried out in order to validatethe behaviour typology. A series of case studies were analyzed in relationto three negotiation processes of external growth strategy. It should benoted that this choice is based fundamentally on two aspects. The first isdue to the requirements of a qualitative study. The objective is the analy-sis of behaviour and, more precisely, negotiation behaviour. Therefore, inorder to attain this objective, emphasis is placed on answering questionssuch as how? and why? As stated by Eisenhart (1989), Yin (1994, 1999)and Hurley (1999) among others, the use of case studies is the most sui-table qualitative methodology, in particular because it allows the resear-cher to study a phenomenon as a dynamic process within its own context.The second aspect stems from an attempt to avoid the limitations presen-ted by other methodologies used in the analysis of negotiation behaviour,such as laboratory experiments. Although it is clear that extremely valua-ble conclusions can be drawn from this type of analysis, they also repre-sent controlled situations that may not entirely reflect real life. The aim ofthis study is therefore to carry out an empirical analysis that is appropria-te, not only according to the phenomenon itself, but also from the pers-pective of real situations and contexts. It should be pointed out, however,that this makes the study of non-verbal characteristics impossible as therehas been no direct observation of the negotiation processes.

From amongst the possible business negotiation situations that mighthave been used for this analysis, acquisition negotiations were chosen, asthese have been seldom analyzed due to the lack of information providedby top management of firms involved in negotiation processes, a challen-ge addressed in this empirical approximation.

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The information obtained through interviews with high-ranking mana-gers, key participants in negotiation processes. The chosen number is based onprevious studies such as those by Weiss (1987, 1990) or Yan and Gray (1994).

Characteristics of the firms involved, along with the particularities ofthe information gathering process are shown in Table 4. For reasons ofconfidentiality, real names of firms and individuals do not appear.

4.2. Procedures for gathering, assessing and validating informationA story telling (Douglas, 1985) approach was used for the interviews, inwhich interviewees were asked to recount how the negotiation developed,which tactics were mainly adopted and which aspects or key factors affec-ted the final outcome. However, this does not imply that the interviewertook on the role of a passive listener. Indeed, in the terms used by Douglas(1985) a creative strategy was employed for these sessions. He stated that“creative interviewing […] involves the use of many strategies and tacticsof interaction, largely based on an understanding of friendly feelings orintimacy, to optimize cooperative, mutual disclosure and a creative searchfor mutual understanding” (Douglas, 1985; p. 25).

Previous to the interviews, as much information as possible was gat-hered on the cases by looking at the firms’ web pages and studyingnewspaper reports as a way of better understanding the context of thenegotiation process.

The interviews, which were recorded in their entirety and later trans-cribed verbatim, focused on a series of topics including; attitudes of thenegotiators, the type of communication established (exchange of informa-tion), the relationship created between the parties involved in the negotia-tion, and the evolution both of attitudes and of the nature of the infor-mation being exchanged. However, for the purposes of this study, the dataobtained was placed into three main categories: 1) negotiation strategy, 2)negotiation tactics and 3) negotiation behaviour and its evolution.

It should be noted that the information obtained from the interviewswas verified on three fronts. On the one hand, external documentation

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was revised and analyzed. It was then verified by checking internal docu-mentation, with the exception of one case, and then contrasted with theopinions of interviewees from the firms involved.

Assessment was carried out on all categories upon which informationwas based. In this sense, interviewees were asked their opinion regardinga series of topics related to all the previously indicated categories (table 5).

All the information was analyzed using the methodology proposed byMiles and Huberman (1984). Mainly seven-point semantic scales14 wereused. An expert on the topic was given transcripts of the interviews andsubsequently validated the assessments. The validation procedure usedwas the same as that proposed by Larsson and Finkelstein (1999).

4.3. Assessment outcomesAlthough this study is based on the analysis of negotiation behaviour viathe tactics that constitute it, with a view to seeing the extent of the pre-sence of the relation with strategies, analysis begins by assessing exactlywhat these intentions were. Using the information from the interviews, thetactics used in each case are subsequently identified. Due to limitations ofspace, we will now present the most relevant information used for ourassessment.

Acquisition 1Two stages can clearly be distinguished in which negotiation behaviourpresents marked differences. During the first stage, the climate surroun-ding the negotiation was extremely tense and conflictive. Despite thewillingness on both parts to reach an understanding, there was obviouspressure to achieve their own interests. Indeed, it was stated that one ofthe sides adopted particularly belligerent behaviour during the first stageof the negotiation process.

The exchange of information was not the cause of the climate created.In this case, all the necessary information was at the disposal of both nego-tiating parties. Moreover, no additional information was required. On

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(14) They were usedwith a view to reflectingthe perceptions or opinions of intervieweesmore exactly. Eachsemantic point on thescale corresponded tothe following assessment: very low,low, medium-low,medium, medium-high,high and very high.



another note, consultants were used to see through the operative side andproduce an agreement. In other words, they were given the responsibilityof establishing the equation of the deal, subsequently presenting the agre-ement so that all stakeholders could approve it. The tense situation at thebeginning was due to existing differences on the desirability of carryingthrough the acquisition at all, so that only one firm would be bidding forthe contract offered by firm A’s main client. The two sides held differentviewpoints on the situation of the water market.

Therefore, in this negotiation process, there were many ups and downsand a good deal of tension although, in the last year (the negotiation pro-cess lasted a total of two and a half years), after a change of managementin firm A, development of the process was far more amicable, reaching anagreement after six months following the shake-up. Managers who tookpart in the interviews expressed the view that trust between the two sidesincreased during this last period.

Topics discussed during negotiation were the key ones, according tothe interviewees15. Participation percentages and the code of conduct formembers of the Board of Directors became two sources of grave disagre-ement. In relation to the tactics employed, they were regarded as fairlynegative, as indicated at the start. This could even have resulted in bothcompanies presenting a bid for the contract, endangering firm A’s chancesof renewing their major contract, with serious repercussions for the survi-val of the firm. At the same time, little was given away due to the attitu-de of either side as to their position. However, the changes in managementbrought about more of a consensual perspective and the more negativetactics (demands, threats) gave way to a healthier exchange of informa-tion, personal disclosures and explanations.

Acquisition 2According to the interviewees, the climate created was cordial along theprocess (six months). In this sense, it was stressed that the culture of theAmericans was a key factor as it is characterized by a tendency towards

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(15) An agreement wasreached regarding theorganizational chart(managerial structure),the equation of the dealand the degree of participation of theacquired firm. At thesame time, a consensuswas reached on establishing a series oflimitations as to themaximum percentage ofshares that could beowned by each holder(33%), along with theestablishment of sanctions that could beenforced for infringingthis agreement.



formality and good manners in this context. It was also underlined that,previous to starting negotiations, the Managing Director of the area ofexpansion of firm C had already made contact with the other party, and aclimate of understanding or mutual interest could be perceived, in whichpositions could be seen as relatively in line with one another. Firm C pro-duced an initial project with clear objectives and action plans to be imple-mented, supposing an agreement was reached. Moreover, in the opinion ofthe interviewees, only certain differences arose among managers that wereretained from the acquired firm several months after the agreement wasreached with regard to the departure of the Commercial Director who hadheld the post of treasurer prior to the acquisition.16.

There had been a markedly rich exchange of information. Right fromthe beginning, there was a fair amount of access to relevant informationon firm D, such as monthly reports and all kinds of documentation relati-ve to topics that most concerned the acquirer firm or which they wishedto analyze.

In addition, information provided by firm C also played an importantrole right from the start of the negotiation. Information was provided ona wide range of topics related to all the functional areas and on the pre-established objectives and action plans that had been laid down for imple-mentation once the agreement was signed and the firm had been acqui-red17.

With regard to the topics discussed during the negotiation, it was sta-ted that all key areas of the operation were discussed, establishing reviewclauses that depended on the existence of due diligence that the terms ofthe agreement would be honoured18. Although the choice of a ManagingDirector and “controller” occurred after the signing of the agreement,firm C had already expressed its interest in the human capital possessedby firm D during the negotiation stage. Therefore, discarding personnelfrom the acquired firm was not among the objectives of firm C. On thecontrary, they were counting on the continuation of all of firm D’s humanresources after the acquisition19.

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(16) This last piece ofinformation was essential for the assessment of negotiation strategy.(17) For example thenumber of new antennaethat would have to beerected as established,along with the maximumpercentage of missedcalls, the new design formobile phones, new calltariffs, market objectives, advertisingcampaigns etc.(18) Thus an agreementwas reached in terms ofthe price of the acquisition and the formof payment (in cash), thestate of the firm’s facilities and a range ofcontingencies that mightarise later on werereflected in clauses established in a pre-contract.(19) The only changesthat were made were thatthe highest rankingrepresentative of firm Dwas named as Presidentand the Financial Director was made Headof the Department forNew Development. Thenew Managing Directorwas named from theacquirer firm and theControl DepartmentManager or (”controller”) also camefrom among the managers at firm C.



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142 08

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The negotiating sides were constant in the behaviour shown. Just as theinterviews indicated, this was in accordance with the tactics that predo-minated throughout the negotiations which included questions, personaldisclosures, responses and explanations of everything that both sides desi-red or needed to know. Negative responses occasionally cropped up atparticular moments of the negotiation but these were minimal.

Acquisition 3A reasonably relaxed climate was indicated particularly during the firststage of approximation in which information was willingly provided.

The interviewees expressed the opinion that this process was characte-rized by a clear desire for understanding on both sides, which allowed theoccasional discrepancy to be overcome without excessive problems. Attimes where there was tension, explicit mechanisms were used to solve anyrifts. They opted to delay a decision on those occasions and a proposalwas made on the terms under which an agreement could later be reached.A cordial, good-natured relationship was never jeopardized, despite thefact that the sides did not coincide on some points. Negotiations wereaimed at creating a relationship of trust. A key factor here was the exis-tence of previous personal and professional relationships that already exis-ted between the interviewees.

Another important trait that was stressed during the interviews was thefree exchange of information that increased at later stages in the negotia-tion. The process was carried out with complete transparency on bothsides, with a view to creating a balance between the two parties.

This assessment was ratified when it was indicated that all the keytopics related to the operation were treated in as much depth and detail aspossible, as both sides considered that a correct analysis of each others’concerns was fundamental to the success of the relationship20.

Finally, with regard to tactics, all those interviewed did not hesitate inreplying that throughout the process (which lasted two and a halfmonths), a great deal of questions, personal disclosures, responses and

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(20) Interviewees statedthat discussion took place on topics such asfinancing, production,organization, power, strategy, salaries, management, humanresources, decision-making, etc.



explanations were discussed and no threats, refusals or demands were pre-sent at any moment, as they both regarded this as an erroneous way toconduct a negotiation aimed at mutual understanding and long-term com-mitment. Having an extremely clear professional career plan for the acqui-red firm’s human resources was essential to this process, particularly dueto their key role. It was of utmost importance for personnel not to decideto leave the company after the acquisition as theirs was a source of know-ledge that was basic to creating the value involved in this acquisition ope-ration.

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CASES ANALYZED

ACQUISITION 1 ACQUISITION 2 ACQUISITION 3

NEGOTIATION STRATEGY

Perception of the degree of effectivecommunication Medium Very high Very high

Discussion of key issues Yes Yes Yes

Willingness on both sides to search for mutual understanding Medium-low Very high Very high

Orientation towards the creation of a relationship of trust Medium-low Very high Very high

Evolution of negotiation behaviour Yes No No

Reciprocal behaviour Yes Yes Yes

NEGOTIATION TACTICS

Integrative (questions, explanations, From little to a good Fairly frequent use Common usepersonal disclosures) deal of use

Competitive (threats, refusals, From marked to Low level of use Absence of usedemands) scarce use

NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOUR Soft competition tocompromise Compromise Collaboration

Table 5. Assesment of categories



4.4. Pattern fitAs can be drawn from the assessments of the varying cases analyzedherein, it can be observed that they all fit the expected patterns describedby the typology and accompanying characterization proposed in thisstudy. However, the results should be regarded with caution for two mainreasons. This is partly due to the number of negotiation processes studiedand also to the impossibility of analyzing behaviour through direct obser-vation which would allow for the analysis of non-verbal tactics. However,it can be suggested that these limitations do not affect the validity of theresults obtained.

Firstly, with regard to the proposed relationship between the type ofintention or strategy and behaviour (tactics), it has been observed that tho-se of an integrative nature are linked with integrative tactics and aredirectly proportional. In other words, in cases where a highly integrativestrategy has been adopted, it has been associated with collaboration beha-viour (acquisition 3). In the case of a less marked integrative strategy, theadopted behaviour was that of compromise (acquisition 2). Meanwhile, acompetitive strategy is associated with soft competition behaviour. Fromall of this, it can be concluded that there is a direct relation between thetype of strategy adopted and negotiation behaviour.

Secondly, the validity of the proposal on characterization has beenanalyzed in this study. As can be seen, the fit is equally present for thenegotiation processes studied herein. The use of integrative verbal tactics(questions, explanations, personal revelations) is greater in cases of colla-borative behaviour and this is less true for cases assessed as employingbehaviour based on compromise. On the other hand, verbal tactics of acompetitive nature (threats, refusals, demands) are not normally used,though they may arise at certain points in the development of integrativenegotiations. It has been observed that in competitive negotiations, tacticsof this kind predominate and the use of integrative tactics is scarce. Aninversely proportional relation can also be observed between the use ofintegrative and competitive tactics. The greater the use of integrative tac-

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tics, the lesser the use of competitive strategies and vice versa. Thus, thetwo types of pattern fit are confirmed in this empirical approximation.The first is concerned with the relation between negotiation strategy orintention and behaviour. The second confirmed pattern is linked to thecharacterization proposal regarding the typology of negotiation behaviourput forward in this study.

5. ConclusionsAlthough the importance of negotiation behaviour has been underlineddue to the influence it has over the success or failure of negotiations, a cer-tain amount of imprecision is still to be found the literature, as pointed outin the review section. This critical study focuses on the different existingconceptions and characterizations of negotiation behaviour. It is my viewthat behaviour is exclusively defined by tangible and visible aspects (com-municative tactics or actions of a verbal and non-verbal nature), therebymarking out a clear differentiation and delimitation with regard to theconcepts of strategy, approach, orientation and style of negotiation. The-se last concepts represent the intangible aspects that form the basis ofnegotiation behaviour.

Whilst making a break with the widely supported integrative/distribu-tive dichotomy appearing in previous studies, four types of negotiationbehaviour have been proposed that support the idea of the existence ofintermediate positioning. This proposal thus presents a continuum ofnegotiation behaviour, from what is considered clearly delimited, purelycompetitive behaviour to one which is entirely integrative. It contains atypology that can be applied to any negotiation situation from a tangible,visible perspective, which may help us to better understand negotiationbehaviour in determining the success or failure of a negotiation.

Although this study is intended to be, above all, a theoretical proposal,its validity for negotiation behaviour and characterization has been tested.Evidence suggests relation between negotiation strategy and the tacticsemployed (behaviour).

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It is necessary for future research, not only to empirically contrast thisproposal on negotiation behaviour, but also to analyze to what extent theproposed continuum of behaviour corresponds to a continuum of diffe-rent negotiation outcomes.

Another contribution is to be found in the methodology employed andthe type of negotiation process analyzed. Negotiation behaviour has beenmainly studied in the past via laboratory experiments under totally con-trolled conditions. Case studies, on the other hand, allow us to studynegotiation behaviour in a real context from a dynamic perspective. Inaddition to this, the choice of the object of analysis should be underlinedin the context of acquisition negotiations; a situation that has received lit-tle attention on the part of researchers due to the difficulties involved inaccessing information from top level managers, who are key players insuch negotiations.

It is clear that the empirical analysis of the proposal contained in thisstudy is merely a first approximation. Broader analysis should be under-taken in future research, not only of a larger number of case studies acrossdifferent negotiation contexts, but even a subsequent empirical contrast ofa quantitative nature might be considered of the typology and characteri-zation proposed here. Another project for the future might be to analyzeto what extent the continuum of the types of behaviour proposed corres-pond to a continuum of different situation outcomes. The relation betwe-en the type of negotiation behaviour and the final outcome is a line of rese-arch that goes further than the objectives laid down for this study thoughit is considered to be of enormous interest and should be one of the ques-tions that researchers should address in the future.

The contributions at a professional level are also important. In parti-cular, it is worthwhile pointing out the usefulness of this proposal for busi-ness professionals when participating in a negotiation process. A success-ful outcome is the primary objective of all negotiators and therefore,understanding the different types of behaviour they might adopt to thisend and which other negotiators may use, constitutes a fundamental pre-

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mise. In this way, professionals can approach the problems that characte-rize these processes by anticipating conflicts that may arise and, conse-quently, adopt the type of behaviour suitable for each situation with aview to putting the negotiation back on the right track towards a success-ful conclusion. This work might also lead us to reflect on the importanceof the choice of the negotiating team, as it should be made up of peoplewith the ability to be flexible with regard to the choice of the type of beha-viour to adopt in a given process.

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