Neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile: common antecedents ... · PDF fileNeoliberalism in...

Neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile:

common antecedents, divergent paths

Tomás Undurraga

Abstract

This paper contrasts the experiences of neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile, exploring why two countries that implemented appar-

ently similar market reforms came to different stances on marketization: a post-neoliberal politics in Argentina, and a tempered

neoliberalism in Chile that has only recently come under scrutiny. The paper traces the common antecedents that inspired these re-

forms and the different outcomes and reactions that they produced. In contrast to recent literature, which emphasizes one or another

explanatory factor, this article offers a synthetic comparison of the historical, political, economic, and ideological factors in play, help-

ing to understand how capitalists achieved a hegemonic class position in Chile and not in Argentina.

KEYWORDS: Neoliberalism; Argentina; Chile; Post-neoliberalism; Capitalist class formation.

Recebido em 23 de Setembro de 2014. Aceito em 17 de Fevereiro de 2015.

I. Introduction1

The political and economic history of Argentina and Chile in the last fourdecades have many commonalities. Both countries were subject to earlyexperiments in free market reform under dictatorial regimes in the

1970s. While the ‘Chicago boys’ led radical transformations under the Pinochetregime (1973-1990) in Chile, Finance Minister Martínez de Hoz attempted toimplement an analogous programme under the Argentinean Junta (1976-1983).In Argentina, however, those reforms only fully took root a decade later withPresident Menem’s (1989-1998) implementation of the ‘convertibility plan’.During the 1990s, both nations were held up as ‘poster children’ of the Wash-ington Consensus. Following market reforms both countries have pursuedagro-export strategies, reinforcing the desindustrialisation of their modes ofproduction (Schneider 2009). Soybeans, beef and wheat lead Argentinean ex-ports while Chilean exports are dominated by copper, salmon and timber. Ac-cording to some economic benchmarks, both countries appear on equal footing,qualifying as upper-middle income economies2.

Despite some of these capitalist commonalities (Streeck 2010), the neo-liberal trajectories followed by these countries diverged. In Chile, the ‘socialmarket economy’ (Muñoz Goma 2007) was supported by the political-eco-nomic elites for two decades (1990-2010), preventing major challenges to the‘market model’. Despite the fact that free market ‘adjustments’ produced hugecosts in Chile (e.g. the 1982 banking collapse and the high unemployment thatfollowed) the constrictions of dictatorship provided the conditions for privateexpansion (Ffrench-Davis 2007). Post-dictatorship, four centre-left democraticgovernments led by the ‘Concertación’ coalition (1990-2010) maintained freemarket policies. Concertación did not break with neoliberalism, but only aimedto temper it by orchestrating greater social equality (E. Silva 2009). Despitestructural inequalities, the improved material conditions brought by capitalistmodernization – e.g. better quality of housing, roads and infrastructure, in-creased private consumption and access to education - helped create support for

DOI 10.1590/1678-987315235502

Artigo Rev. Sociol. Polit., v. 23, n. 55, p. 11-34, set. 2015

1 We thank the anonymousreviewers of the Revista deSociologia e Política for theircomments on this article.

2 Their per capita GDP basedon purchasing-power-parity(PPP) in 2010 wasUS$15,854.366 andUS$15,001.949 respectively(IMF 2011), while theirunemployment rates are alsosimilar: 7.8 percent inArgentina and 8.3 percent inChile (CEPAL 2011).

continuing the neoliberal model. The centre-right government of businessmenSebastián Piñera (2010-2014), then further reinforced the market model.

However, since the cycle of mobilizations that started with the ‘penguin’student movement in 2006 (Donoso 2013) and continued gathering momentumin 2011 with protests against for-profit education, neoliberalism in Chile hasbeen challenged in unprecedented ways (Mayol 2012). Growing discontentwith structural inequalities and a frustrated sense that the political class is out oftouch with popular needs and demands has produced social unrest unseen sincethe Pinochet years. Protests have focused on access to education as well as envi-ronmental concerns (Aysen), workers’ conditions (Codelco) and consumerrights (La Polar), among others. Scholars (and politicians) have argued thatChile is entering a new political cycle in which the subjugation of politics byeconomics is being questioned, with calls for building a more social democraticmodel (Atria 2013; Fuentes 2013; Atria et al., 2013). The promises of there-elected President Bachelet (2014-2018) – e.g. reforms in education, taxation,and a new constitution - indicate a new willingness to move away from someneoliberal conventions. The extents to which reform will be embraced by thecongress and made practical remain to be seen.

In Argentina, on the other hand, neoliberal policies came under severe scru-tiny much earlier, with the response to the country’s 2001 crisis proving pivotal.In effect, a social reaction against ‘market forces’ has mobilized the country forover a decade (Villalón 2007). The neoliberal model driven by Menem (1989-1999) was associated with middle class consumerism, but also with corruptionand unemployment (Novaro 2006). The poor performance of the WashingtonConsensus policies led to the collapse of the De la Rua government (1999-2001) and the convertibility plan. The governments of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-2011; 2011-2015) subse-quently capitalised on the backlash against the 1990s reforms. Their post-neoliberal politics reinforced the activation of popular actors, enhanced the le-gitimacy of the state’s right to intervene in structuring economic affairs, andstrengthened economic and social rights (Etchemendy 2011).

Despite the positive political and economic results of the Kirchner adminis-trations (at least until 2011), their post-neoliberal politics have engendered con-troversy – both domestically and abroad. There have been repeated clashesbetween the government and agro-industrialists over taxation and price controls(2008-2009), confrontations with the Clarín media group concerning televisioncontracts and the media law, disputes with private consultants about the infla-tion rates of INDEC (Institute of National Statistics), as well as disputes con-cerning the nationalization of pension funds (AFJP), Aerolíneas Argentinas andYPF (Oil company), among many others. Just recently (August 2014), the gov-ernment’s clash with foreign bondholders refusing to re-negotiation the coun-try’s 2005 debt, left Argentina in ‘technical default’. The rising inflation (over28% in 2013 according to private consultants – Revista América Economía, 14Jan. 2014) and the government’s unsuccessful attempts to reduce the dollari-zation of the economy have provoked national distress. Contesting neoli-beralism has not been easy for the Kirchners, and their politics have put theiropponents on the counter-offensive, with mixed results for Argentine society asa whole.

In the mainstream political and sociological literature, competing accountsexplain why neoliberalism penetrated further in Chile than in Argentina. Somescholars focus on the political conditions under which neoliberal experimentswere implemented during the military regimes (Huneeus 2001; L. Taylor 1998;Huneeus 2001; Pucciarelli 2004; 2011; Novaro 2006; Boisard & Heredia 2010).Sector analyses have tended to study the implementation of reforms in particu-

12 Tomás Undurraga

lar areas (e.g. employment, education, health coverage, pensions), looking atthe differing paths of adjustment through which these processes of ‘marke-tization’ became viable (Kurtz 2001; M. Taylor 2006; Ffrench-Davis 2010;Etchemendy 2011). Other studies have compared the position of actors withinnational economic systems, such as industrial relations (Atzeni, Durán-Palma& Ghigliani 2011), business politics (E. Silva 1996; Schneider 2004), tax sys-tems (Fairfield 2010), or models of citizenship (L. Taylor 1998). Another typeof research has focused on the ideas that have influenced the economic thinkingof policy makers, particularly ideas coming from the Economics Department atthe University of Chicago (Valdés 1995; Centeno & Silva 1998; Biglaiser 2002;Dezalay & Garth 2002; Heredia 2008; P. Silva 2008; Montecinos & Markoff2009; Gárate 2012). Finally, scholars have studied post-neoliberal reactions tomarket expansion in Latin America, often contrasting Argentina’s strong socialmovements with the more institutional response that has been characteristic ofChilean society (Villalón 2007; E. Silva 2009; Panizza 2009; Han 2012; Grugel& Riggirozzi 2012).

In light of the richness of the work that has been done on this issue so far, thispaper seeks to deliver a synthetic overview that allows us to see the varied fac-tors at play in producing these divergences. That is, instead of singling out anyone dominant set of factors, I seek to flesh out an explanatory picture that showshow many political, economic, institutional, and ideological variables contrib-uted to the divergent paths. A common hazard among scholars seeking to inter-pret market reforms and their impact lies in over-emphasizing particularexplanatory factors so to achieve theoretical tidiness or disciplinary distinct-ness. Equally, others tend to overstate the importance of national characteris-tics. This paper, by contrast, seeks to show that a comparative, multi-variableapproach may provide a clearer overview of these countries’ trajectories.

The paper uses the existing literature as well as interviews with intellectuals,politicians and business figures involved in recent changes in these countries3.The article is organised as follows. First, a brief discussion about the nature ofneoliberalism, and its key dimensions is developed. Section 3 displays the coreof the paper, comparing the neoliberal trajectories of Argentina and Chile alongnine distinct dimensions. Section 4 concludes by discussing the current state ofneoliberalism in these countries.

II. Neoliberalism: the disenchantment of politics by economics

Neoliberalism is a loose concept largely associated with critical perspectiveson the globalisation discourse. Rather than a succinct, clearly defined politicalphilosophy (Mirowski & Plehwe 2009), it is linked with various policy posi-tions, economic interests and cultural practices. Perhaps most commonly, theneoliberal project is identified with a set of policies that encapsulate the pre-scriptive development stance of ‘Washington Consensus’ institutions from the1980’s – i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and theInternational Development Bank (IDB). These policies sought a retrenchmentin the state’s role, privatization of public assets and cuts in public expenditure.They identified government as part of the problem of underdevelopment, citingcorruption, bad distribution of resources and inefficiency (Williamson 1990).

As a term, however, it gets used as both an oppositional slogan and as an an-alytical construction. Considered from the latter point of view, at least fourinterlinking dimensions may be identified as key features: neoliberalism as eco-nomic theory; as restructuring ethos; as a depoliticizing technique ofgovernmentality; and as a means of restoring class power. For the purposes ofthis paper, I use these four dimensions to shed light on the different fates of mar-ket policies in Argentina and Chile.

Neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile 13

3 This paper elaborates on 120interviews conducted in 2008and 2009 in Santiago (64) andBuenos Aires (56) with busi-ness scholars, policymakers,managers, journalists and in-tellectuals who have studied orparticipated in recent capitalisttransformations in these coun-tries. A full version of that re-search was published inUndurraga (2014).

First, as an economic theory, neoliberalism builds on the foundations ofnineteenth century economic liberalism, that is, economic laissez-faire. Its rootsare in the classical economic thinking of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and JohnStuart Mill and recent writings of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, amongothers. Neoliberalism claims that society as a whole is best served by maximummarket freedom and minimum intervention by the state, claiming that such a sit-uation will enable individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills to be maxi-mally developed. In this context, the government’s role is limited to providingsecurity, protecting private property, and creating and maintaining markets(Harvey 2005).

Second, as a restructuring ethos (Peck, Theodore & Brenner 2009), neo-liberalism attempts to replace political judgement and discourse with economicnorms and methods of evaluation (Davies 2014). Rather than a closed totality ofideas or a typological state form, neoliberal is here conceived as a private formof social rule marked by the dominance of giant corporations, the privatizationof public firms, and the colonization of state services by new public manage-ment (Crouch 2011). Understood in this way, neoliberalism is less typicallyconcerned with expanding markets per se, than in expanding the reach of mar-ket based principles and techniques of evaluation. As Davies (2014, p. 4)stresses, “the central defining characteristic of all neoliberal critique is its hostil-ity to the ambiguity of political discourse, and the commitment to the explicit-ness and transparency of quantitative, economic indicators, of which the marketprice system is the model. Neoliberalism is the pursuit of the disenchantment ofpolitics by economics”.

Neoliberalism may also be used as depoliticizing technique ofgovernmentality, one that effectively helps to de-collectivize society throughremoving the institutions that sanction public action. This aspect of neo-liberalism was famously brought forward in Foucault’s (2008) lectures onbiopolitics and Miller and Rose (2008) work on governmentality. According tothis logic, neoliberalism operates as a technique of ‘governmentality’ that aimsto shape citizens’ attitudes and behaviours by reinforcing the autonomy of indi-viduals as against the agency of politicized collectives. Based on the promisethat markets will provide steady and increasing access to consumption in the fu-ture, neoliberalism aims to discipline both citizens and political elites, postpon-ing the social demands of the former, and containing the internal conflicts of thelatter (Guell 2009).

A fourth feature of the neoliberal project consists in its ambition to restoreclass power (Dumenil & Levy 2004). Harvey (2005, p. 15) argues that neo-liberalism from the beginning was a project to achieve the restoration of classpower guided by business elites and international institutions. In 1971 the la-bour movement enjoyed its greatest global expansion, extending the collectiv-ization of popular demands (Therborn 2011). The global economic elitesgenerally regarded this largely anti-corporate, anti-imperialist movement ashaving gone too far, calling for renewing the conditions for capitalist’s expan-sion (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki 1975). Conservative think tanks like theHeritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute linked their defenceof ‘individual freedoms’ to the defence of free markets (Medved 2012). In thissense, neoliberalism would be a strategy for institutional transformation thatpromised to resolve the capitalist crisis of the 1970s providing new guaranteesfor the accumulation of wealth. The rising inequality across western countrieslinked to marketization and globalisation in the last four decades would come toconfirm this feature of the neoliberal project (Piketty 2014; Wilkinson 2005;Therborn 2013).

14 Tomás Undurraga

One way of conceiving neoliberalism that brings together certain aspects ofall four dimensions is due to Mirowski and Plehwe (2009). They argue thatneoliberalism is, effectively, a “thought collective”, where by this they mean amulti-centric movement anchored in a network of think tanks and pro-marketinstitutions that connect political, economic and scientific elites. Some of theepistemic commitments that mark this “thought collective” are: markets mustbe built, they do not emerge spontaneously; redefining rather than merely de-stroying or minimizing the state is in the best interest of the market and thosethat profit from it; the best solutions to problems caused by the market are them-selves market-based (e.g. carbon credits, the sale of human organs or vouchersfor education) (Mirowski 2013).

Considering these four dimensions, in what follows, I compare nine featuresof the neoliberal experiences in Argentina and Chile.

III. Neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile: common antecedents, divergent paths

III.1. Neoliberalism was attractive to the militaries of both countries in the 1970s as a depoliticizing mechanismfor re-establishing order

Neoliberal experiments in Argentina and Chile emerged in similar contexts.Both countries were facing political, economic and social unrest at the begin-ning of the 1970s. Social forces calling for the extension of the state – i.e.Peronism in Argentina and Allende’s Unidad Popular in Chile – disputed theposition and benefits of elites. The diagnoses of the militaries and of the tradi-tional elites that supported the coups were similar; years of collectivization, dis-tributive policies, and inflation had increased conflicts and weakened growth.Order needed to be re-established and societies had to be ‘normalised’ (Boisard& Heredia 2010). The regimes’ aims were broadly similar; they sought to endsocial unrest and economic stagnation by dismantling the remnants of importsubstitution policies and by imposing market relationships as the predominantform of social organisation (M. Taylor 2006). The deregulation and opening ofthe economies, the dissolution of parliament, and the banning of political par-ties, and in the Chilean case the adoption of a new constitution (1980), were allpart of a restructuring project to fashion a depoliticized and market-driven soci-ety (L. Taylor 1998).

Likewise, both regimes sought to carry out an ‘ideological cleansing’ of po-litical movements. US-supported military coups were fomented internally byruling elites, who saw in dictatorial regimes a way to assert class power and pro-tect their privilege from political threat (Harvey 2005). Both coups occurred incontexts of class conflict: desire for revenge against agitators, left-wing guerril-las, as well as unions provoked military interventions (L. Taylor 1998). In Ar-gentina, the so-called El Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (1976-1983)aimed to undermine the sources of Peronist power, notably the trade unionmovement and the industrial sector that had become accustomed to state protec-tion (Novaro 2006). Similarly, the coup in Chile was directed not only againstthe Unidad Popular supporters, but also against revolutionary discourse and ap-peals to class struggle (Camargo Brito 2008). As declared in the 1980s Consti-tution, the military aimed to “give Chile a new institutional basis cleansing ourdemocratic system of the vices that might lead to its destruction [and to] rebuildthe country morally, institutionally and materially” (Chile 1988, p.24).

The brutal military regimes in Chile (1973-1990) and Argentina (1976-1983) had the same peculiarity of combining widespread repression and radicalfree market reform. This combination is by no means obvious (Biglaiser 2002).The military depends on state resources, to which neoliberal policies restrict ac-cess. Historically, both militaries had regarded their nationalized industries as


key to defending sovereignty and national security in the context of a strongstate. The prospect of leaving national industries and the economy open to inter-national competition was difficult for many military officers in both countries toaccept (Canelo 2004; 2008; Valdivia 2003).

On the whole, however, neoliberalism reform was attractive to both militar-ies because of the restructuring of social relations it promised and thedepoliticizing effects it seemed to entail. The regulatory role of the markets waspresented by monetarist economists as an effective mechanism for dismantlingenclaves of collective action, and diffusing group pressure on the state (L. Tay-lor 1998). ‘Natural competition’ between individuals was conceived as a neu-tralizing way of solving the distributive puzzle. Monetarism in this sensefunctioned not only as a ‘pure’ economic theory, but also as a technology ofgovernmentality (Foucault 2008). In other words, what neoliberalism offered tothe military regimes was an effective way of ‘governing at a distance’, enablingthem to disarm social forces and re-establish order, without appearing to com-promise individual autonomy (Fridman 2010).

III.2. Monetarism was controversial within both military regimes, but Pinochet had greater power forimplementing radical market reforms

The implementation of free market policies tends to be portrayed as a verti-cal imposition that rapidly gained followers in Chile (Harvey 2005; Klein2007), whereas the Argentinean process is presented as a less straightforwardexperience (Canelo 2004; Novaro 2006). Rather than being the result of a co-herent and premeditated programme, the execution of these policies in bothcountries was the product of trial and error, of experimentation (Kurtz 1999;Farías 2014). Political clashes and internal power struggles within the Juntaswere initially similar in both countries. The military regimes themselves, how-ever, were quite different. As Boisard and Heredia (2010, p. 5) point out, theChilean dictator won the nickname of ‘sultan’, in light of his capacity to concen-trate power and to ensure a pyramidal form of allegiance, while the Argentineandictatorship was described as ‘feudal’, because of the opposition between dif-ferent groups within the army. Just after the coup, the Chilean Junta decided todistribute government evenly between the military branches, resulting in a tri-partite, corporatist power-sharing arrangement (Cavallo, Salazar & Sepúlveda1988). A few months after the 1973 coup, however, Pinochet imposed his au-thority inside the Junta arguing that short-term political stability required a firmhand. After serious clashes between the military branches, Pinochet conqueredthe presidential office in December 1974 (Valdivia 2003). After that, the Juntawas limited to scrutinizing decisions made by the executive.

The more dispersed regime in Argentina, by contrast, never achieved theconcentration of power attained by Pinochet. Internal disputes on political andeconomic issues were evident from the earliest military pronouncements. Whilethe colorado faction sought to erase every vestige of Peronism from Argentin-ean politics, the azules advocated including Peronism (sans Perón) in the politi-cal system (Canelo 2004). The coup of 1976 was led by the most neoliberalcolorados while the azules were discredited by the failure of the governmentformed after the 1966 coup (Boisard & Heredia 2010). The colorados sought toeradicate Peronism from the political map, but, instead of proscribing it, as inprevious coups, they decided to attack the social structures that made such amovement possible, diminishing the powers of mass mobilization (Fridman2010, p.280).

The monetarist doctrine was not dominant in the early economic thinking ofeither military government. In Chile, the takeover of the ‘Chicago boys’, thegroup of technocrats that promoted market reforms, began in 1975. The Chi-

16 Tomás Undurraga

cago boys were convinced they needed to implement their policies by ‘shock’,since they assumed that gradual implementation would provoke greater resis-tance. The new policymakers believed that the only way to break the conditionsthat condemned Chile to ‘backwardness’ was to insulate themselves from thepressure of unions and business elites demanding state support (E. Silva 1996).As part of ‘opening the economy’, more than 200 state-owned industrial, finan-cial and commercial enterprises were sold in the ‘first wave’ of privatization(Gárate 2012). As Klein (2007) underlines, this economic ‘shock therapy’ wasimposed in a moment of low resistance, following two years of brutal social re-pression. Then, the visit of Chicago academics Milton Friedman and ArnoldHarberger in 1975 aimed to validate the liberalising policies.

With the Chilean experience in mind, the Argentinean Junta appointed themonetarist Martínez de Hoz as Minister of Finance in 1976. Despite an enthusi-astic response to his liberal plans from bankers, persistent differences across theprivate sector and fragmentation within the army constrained their full imple-mentation (Novaro 2006). Officers from each armed force were able to vetoministerial decisions, causing a radicalization of conflict between militarybranches and the liberal civilian team (Canelo 2004; Boisard & Heredia 2010).

Because the retrenchment of the state generated resistances, economicreforms were not easy to install. Reactions, however, were different in bothcountries. With the support of Pinochet, the Chicago boys applied a shockprogramme despite recession, unemployment, and complaints from businesses.The Chilean dictatorship was able to impose social discipline not just on theworking classes, but also on various industrial sectors. The situation was differ-ent in Argentina after the 1976 military coup. The stronger industrial sectorssuccessfully resisted reform, forcing compensation from the state and demand-ing especially tailored arrangements (Etchemendy 2011). Martínez de Hoz at-tempted to accommodate sector pressures in order to win support for theprocess of reform. He also scaled back his ambitions, concentrating on the areaswhere he could advance: trade policy, exchange rate policy, and the financialsystem (Novaro 2006, p.94), while letting go of structural changes that wouldhave been more extensive.

III.3. Chicago economists and their monetarist ideas penetrated far deeper in Chile than in Argentina

The remarkable turn towards neoliberalism in these countries is linked withthe U.S. interest in influencing Latin American elites, in an explicit attempt toseek allies in the fight against communism. Since the 1950s, well-coordinatedsocialization efforts by private foundations attempted to challenge CEPAL’ssupremacy in Latin America (Valdés 1995), seeking to establish links withbusinessmen, political parties, the armed forces and the media, with the inten-tion to influence public policy (Centeno & Silva 1998). The University of Chi-cago was particularly influential in this capacity, boosting monetarist viewsthrough a radical critique of Keynesian interventionism. Chicago signed ex-change agreements with several universities, where students received trainingin neoclassical economics. The School of Economics of Pontificia UniversidadCatólica (PUC) in Chile and the University of Cuyo in Mendoza and, later, theCentre for Macroeconomic Studies (CEMA) in Buenos Aires were the main in-stitutions that disseminated monetarist ideas in these countries.

The ‘Chicago boys’ in Chile had its origins in this economic-educative part-nership established in 1955 called Project Chile (Valdés 1995). Students fromPUC that received post-graduate training in Chicago then re-organized the fac-ulty of economics at PUC, and later played a key role in guiding the structuraltransformations of Pinochet’s regime (Gárate 2012). The alliance with JaimeGuzmán and the ‘gremialistas’ since the late 1960s afforded these technocrats


the possibility of connecting with the Pinochet regime4. Guzmán then becamethe main author of the 1980 Constitution, the institutional instrument that cameto seal the neoliberal transformation.

Driven by monetarist orthodoxy, and empowered by extraordinary politicalcontrol, Pinochet’s ministers were able to experiment in the creation of newmarkets (Farías 2014) – e.g. in education, housing, health, and pensions. Chi-cago economists not only guided the privatizations but also converted the eco-nomic profession to a monetarist approach, becoming the new referent of theemerging business class. They colonized the economics departments of majoruniversities, standardizing the discipline according to the theories of Friedmanand Harberger. PUC economists carried out a ‘cleansing operation’ of publicuniversities, replacing traditional economics scholars – mainly cepalinos – withmonetarists (Mönckeberg 2009, p. 154). As the economist Ricardo Ffrench-Da-vis explains: “the neoliberal ideology is much more intense in Chile than in Ar-gentina, Mexico or Brazil. Seventeen years of Pinochet, the takeover of theuniversities and the purge of economic faculties were crucial for the conversionof the business associations to neoliberalism” (Interview, November, 2008).The neoliberal ‘crusade’ was made even more effective because PUC econo-mists also formed and/or acquired several private universities from 1981 on-wards, when higher education itself was recast as a new private market(Mönckeberg 2005; 2007).

In contrast to the Chilean case, early U.S. efforts to transform the economicsprofession in Argentina failed. Cuyo and CEMA, the institutions that embracedChicago economics, had shorter intellectual and political relevance than PUC inChile. The largest and most important university in Argentina is the politicizedUniversidad de Buenos Aires (UBA), where monetarist ideas were contested onideological grounds, and failed to penetrate its school of economics (Fridman2010). Despite assistance from private U.S. foundations, the economics profes-sion in Argentina remained committed to structuralism in the 1970s and 1980s.Biglaiser (2009, p.91) argues that a lack of desirable full time academic posi-tions resulted in fewer U.S. educated Argentinean economists holding aca-demic jobs. Many such economists decided to work for international organisa-tions overseas. Without these U.S. trained academics returning to Argentina,students were more likely to enrol in courses taught by professors who opposedmonetarist ideas.

In addition, the economic establishment in Argentina did not create a cohe-sive technocratic team before the coup (Heredia 2004; Canelo 2004). The econ-omists that led El Proceso (1976-1983) were recruited from the liberal thinktanks CEMA, FIEL, and Mediterranea (Heredia 2004). The recruitment, how-ever, brought in a diverse and heterogeneous staff. Internal disputes betweentraditional and technocratic liberals were difficult to reconcile within the team,which consequently lacked the internal coherence needed to influence the mili-tary regime. The different branches of the Junta, in addition, also had differentpriorities for governing (Canelo 2008). Despite the conditions of impunity un-der the dictatorial regime, there was no dominant actor able to propel marke-tization in any broadly significant way.

Further, there was no explicit practical reform programme to lend coherenceto market reforms in Argentina, whereas Chile had what was called ‘the brick’.This master document helped to diffuse a coherent ideological agenda, effec-tively levelling divergent liberal opinion (Valdés 1995; Boisard & Heredia2010). The brick was based on two main ideas. First, it advocated ‘rebuildingthe country’, which involved the retrenchment of social expenditure and open-ing the economy (i.e. liberalization of banks and commerce). Second, it aimedat ‘modernization’, which focused on seven central areas: labour markets, so-

18 Tomás Undurraga

4 The gremialistas are aconservative right wingmovement that arose fromPUC School of Law in 1967with the intention todepoliticize the university.Gremialistas and monetaristeconomists then shook theirties for a common goal ofdepoliticize not only thepolity, but also the economy(see Gárate 2012, chapter 3).

cial security, education, health, regionalization, agriculture, and justice. In all ofthese domains, modernization was based on a series of common principles: de-centralization, privatization, free-choice, and competition (Foxley 1987). Thebusiness media in Chile strongly supported the diffusion of the ‘brick’ and lib-eral ideas in general. El Mercurio, in particular, promoted Chicago measures,emphasizing the reduction of inflation as a remarkable achievement at the endof the 1970s (Montecinos 2009). Over time, the brick became the most prodi-gious justificatory device of Chilean capitalism, strongly influencing themindset and identity of the local business class (Tironi 2013). In Argentina, bycontrast, there was no such enthusiastic press response to neoliberal ideas, nor asingular programmatic expression of them (Novaro 2006). Despite the exis-tence of traditional newspapers such as La Nación, it was only with the creationof the newspaper Ámbito Financiero in 1977 that pro-market ideas becamemore widely available to the public in Argentina (Ruiz 2005). The capacity ofÁmbito to change popular economic thinking, however, was limited.

III.4. Monetarist policies were eventually rejected in both countries for causing economic collapse, but whereasPinochet’s regime resisted the social pressure, the Malvinas defeat buried both the military and neoliberalism inArgentina

The massive bank run and financial collapse in Argentina in 1980 and inChile in 1982 were both considered crises of neoliberalism, stemming from alack of financial regulation and inappropriate macroeconomic policies. Levelsof GDP dropped, unemployment and poverty increased, and income distribu-tion worsened (CEPAL 2010). As a reaction to economic collapse, monetaristpolicies were rejected in both countries, and both their finance ministers –Martínez de Hoz and De Castro – were replaced. But while the Pinochet regime,fortified by the recently approved 1980 Constitution, resisted the protests andsocial upheavals of 1983-1986, the economic collapse in Argentina coupledwith the Malvinas military defeat destroyed not only the reputation of the mili-tary but also that of liberal market reform. Market policies in Chile started togain acceptance among businesses and the political class only after 1985, withthe economic recovery.

Pinochet’s regime was neither a monolithic unit nor a coherent programmefrom beginning to end. Historical accounts of the regime tend to consider threeinternal stages (Ffrench-Davis 2007). First, the establishment of military order(1973-1974); second, neoliberal reforms in their purest ideological stage – untilthe bank collapse (1975-1982); and then the pragmatic period that marked thesecond wave of privatizations (1983-1989). The 1982 banking collapse in Chileproduced huge social costs (GDP declined by 13.6% and unemployment rose to25%). Cacerolazos and popular protests, however, were resisted by the regimeand dissent was repressed. A series of state interventions that deviated fromChicago policies were promoted by the regime after the 1982-1983 crisis, in-cluding tariff increases and selective export incentives, regulation of financialmarkets, and the take-over of collapsed private banks, which were later privat-ized again (Kurtz 2001; Ffrench-Davis 2010). Policy-makers from the regimethus seemed to have experienced an institutional learning during the period,loosening ideological commitments to neoliberalism in favour of pragmatic ap-proaches (Montero 1993).

The first attempted neoliberal experiment in Argentina (1976-1983) wasmore contentious. In addition to the ideological differences inside the Junta,market reforms met strong resistance from Argentina’s large industrial sectorwhich historically had depended heavily on the state (Castellani 2009). As men-tioned earlier, Martínez de Hoz concentrated on reforming trade policy, ex-change rate policy, and the financial system. His deregulation programme


involved a plan of monthly decreasing devaluations – la tablita – aimed at con-trolling the exchange rate and reducing inflation. Although this programmegenerated access to ‘easy money’, monetarist policies collapsed with the ruin-ous run on banks and the substantial devaluation of the peso in 1981. The socialreaction to the economic crisis and to Argentina’s demoralizing 1982 defeat inthe Malvinas war was massive, leading to the discrediting of monetarist policiesamong many other outcomes.

Following the dictatorship and the Malvinas war, the country emerged bat-tered by high levels of public debt and rampant inflation. The democraticallyelected government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) prosecuted the Junta mem-bers in an effort to restore justice (Pucciarelli 2006). Alfonsín promoted a returnto heterodox economic policies, and sought to re-launch the ‘productivista’model. In short order, however, his policies led to economic disaster, with infla-tion rising over 600 percent and external debts climbing to near US$ 50 billionat the end of his tenure (World Bank 2002). Argentina became an icon of the“lost decade” of the 1980s in the region. Successive strikes, economic stagna-tion and the 1989 hyperinflation crisis destabilized Alfonsín’s government, pre-venting him from completing his term.

In short, while the Chilean military experiment in the end (after 1985) waseconomically successful, helping to restore class power and forcing the opposi-tion to negotiate with it to ensure transition to democracy, the military govern-ment in Argentina could not re-equilibrate the economy in crisis and lost adisastrous war, debilitating their credibility and that of market policies. Due to alegacy of deep economic crises, human rights violations, and the weakness ofstate institutions, the Argentinean transition to democracy was threatened by se-rious problems of governance.

III.5. Neoliberal restructuring proceeded further under Pinochet and was then tempered under Concertación,whereas Washington Consensus policies were fully implemented by Menem though they never met withwidespread support

In the mid 1990s Argentina and Chile seemed to be on equal footing. In vir-tue of stabilizing inflationary threats and positive economic results followingthe reforms, both countries were considered ‘poster children’ of WashingtonConsensus policies. Despite the shared optimistic narrative that held sway atthis juncture, neoliberalism had very different roots in these countries, as theabove discussion indicates. By the 1990s, market reforms in Chile had alreadyexperienced almost a decade of adaptation, during which time the social costs ofthe reforms had been effectively supressed. Marketization in Argentina, by con-trast, was being freshly negotiated between Menem’s Peronist government, un-convinced industrialists, and a strong union movement. The proposed‘adjustments’ met with group resistances.

The Pinochet dictatorship undertook far-reaching reforms in conditions ofpolitical impunity, imposing social discipline not only on the working classes,but also on the business sector. The Chilean dictatorship was neither compelledto negotiate compensatory measures with manufacturing firms nor with unions.In fact, it harshly repressed the latter (Winn 2004). Sectoral readjustments wereleft to the market, and neoliberal restructuring proceeded further, weakeningcollective forces (M. Taylor 2006). By contrast, the paths of adjustment in1990s Argentina were guided by a corporatist arrangement covering many in-dustrialists and unions. Menem’s government built specific coalitions for eachpolicy and pushed reform to distinct degrees in different industries, dependingon the strength of the resistance – e.g. the automobile, steel, and petroleum sec-tors (Etchemendy 2011). The state compensated protected actors in labour andbusiness through market share compensation, or via direct rent allocations

20 Tomás Undurraga

(Azpiazu & Basualdo 2004). Those chiefly affected by marketization in Argen-tina had both the resources and institutional means to pressure political authori-ties into negotiating their reforms.

To be sure, the continuity of market-friendly policies following the Pinochetregime was an important factor in the consolidation of neoliberalism in Chile.When democracy was restored, the Concertación coalition (1990–2010) optedfor maintaining the free market model, aiming to counter-balance the ‘socialdebt’ accumulated during the dictatorship (Han 2012) by introducing social pol-icies such as labour and tax reforms (Ffrench-Davis 2010). These policies as-pired to achieve ‘growth with equity’. Although the achievement of their statedaim may be called into question, in practice neoliberalism was tempered,though at the expense of its progressive promises (Garretón 2012). Concer-tación helped to build a ‘social’ market economy geared to protecting vulnera-ble groups while investing in institutions that would help compensate formarket deficiencies (E. Silva 2009).

Nevertheless, it is intriguing to ask why a political coalition associated withworkers’ unions that had democratically defeated the dictatorship by promisingsocial change then became resistant to structural transformation once it was inpower. Key ministers of President Aylwin (1990-1994), such as Enrique Cor-rea, argued that Concertación maintained market policies mainly for pragmaticreasons: “rather than being convinced of private solutions at the time, the inher-ited system was stable. Any structural change that would have risked the emer-gent economic growth might have threatened our ability to maintain politicalpower” (Interview, January, 2009). In the first fragile years of democracy, Pres-ident Aylwin offered to seek fairness and justice but only ‘as far as possible’.Abandoning hopes for political revenge and preserving the status quo were theconditions for building governance. Minister Boeninger (1990-1994) in partic-ular promoted a demobilization doctrine that stigmatized protest and social con-flict. Channelling social demands through private services became an effectiveway of producing social order, of imposing ‘governmentality at a distance’(Foucault 2008). Moreover, the investment of pension funds in market shareslent further relevance to the performance of local firms and stability of financialmarkets.

Neoliberal policies in Argentina had their own particularities. The drasticreforms that Menem and Cavallo launched with the convertibility plan in 1991were proposed in the aftermath of the hyperinflation crisis. That crisis repre-sented a serious trauma for Argentines, a deep break with normal life. The senseof economic disaster, the physical insecurity that resulted from widespread loot-ing, and the power vacuum created by Alfonsin’s early resignation combined toopen a kind of social abyss. According to Novaro (2009, p. 323), the threat ofungovernability that resulted gave rise to a desperate need to adopt any action orplan that would end the crisis. President Menem, in particular, was not particu-larly convinced of market reforms, but implemented them in an attempt to con-trol hyperinflation as well as to gain access to international capital in the hope ofreversing the recession (Pucciarelli 2011). Rather than reflecting any particu-larly strong ideological conviction, the acceptance of Menem’s restructuringplan by the main political actors reflected a desperate wish to stabilize the econ-omy.

The convertibility plan was a ‘fixed peg’ that included a requirement thatevery peso issued by the Central Bank must be matched by a U.S. dollar in itsaccounts. In addition, structural reforms included liberalized trade, labour mar-ket deregulation, opening the financial sector to international capital flows, andthe privatization of state enterprises (ILO 2008). Between 1991 and 1993, Ar-gentina privatized all of its major public utility services – e.g. the national air-


line and cargo-shipping companies, state-owned manufacturing firms, as wellas the operation of railways, waterways, ports, airports, and the national postservice, amongst others (Azpiazu & Basualdo 2004). The speed with whichthey were privatized, however, meant that deficiencies in design and regulationwere rife.

The peculiar shapes that neoliberalism took in these countries is crucial forunderstanding the divergence in outcomes. Whereas Argentina implemented allthe mandates of the Washington Consensus, Chile implemented more selec-tively. For instance, in 1991 Aylwin government implemented ‘encaje’ – a sys-tem of capital controls that restrict short-term capital inflows. This reduced thevulnerability of the Chilean economy to international economic shocks, such asthat represented by the 1997 Asian crisis. Argentina, by contrast, opened its fi-nancial markets to short-term investments, in keeping with Washington Con-sensus orthodoxy. This let Argentina vulnerable to the volatility of internationalfinancial markets. In addition, Chile kept its main national industry – the coppermining company Codelco – in state hands, whereas Argentina privatized all itskey natural resource industries. While Codelco’s revenues continue to financeover 40% of government social programmes in Chile, social policies in Argen-tina are mainly financed by state taxation of business revenues. Furthermore,scholars have called into question the idea that Chile’s post-1985 export boomwas the result of free market policies, arguing that key exporting sectors such asfisheries, forestry, and fruit were consolidated through state support (Kurtz2001).

III.6. Political technocracy helped build a neoliberal consensus in Chile, while the attempt to disenchant politicsby economics was unable to disarm the collective tissue of Peronist’s networks in Argentina

Another striking difference between market reforms in Argentina and Chilewas the support given (or withheld) by key political actors. Whilst in Chile atechnocratic arrangement among political elites in the 1990s helped sustainmarket-friendly policies, in Argentina no shared conviction supported thepro-business model. Despite policy-makers’ agreement on the need to modern-ize the state, clientelistic practices and competing strategic policies were alwayspresent, a diversity of policy perspectives that remains today.

The renovation of centre-left thought was fundamental for the continuity ofmarket-friendly policies in Chile. During years spent in exile or in resisting thedictatorship, many intellectuals renewed their thinking about markets, whetherstudying abroad or in independent centres in Chile (Puryear 1994). The role ofcentres such as Cieplan, FLACSO, Ilades, CED and SUR was crucial in shapingthe technocratic thinking of Concertación. The group of technocrats that cameto power with the Aylwin government, the ‘Cieplan Monks’, in many respectsresembled their neoliberal predecessors, the Chicago boys (P. Silva 1991). The‘technopols’, a new type of politician with a technocratic orientation towardeconomics (P. Silva 2008; Joignant 2011), spread among the political class. Asright wing leader Joaquín Lavín points out: “technocracy in Chile is very strongacross the whole political spectrum. It was one of the self-imposed missions [ofthe Pinochet regime]: to create a critical mass of economists that would moder-ate things” (Interview, December, 2008).

In addition, the political constraints operative during the ‘transition to de-mocracy’ in the 1990’s along with fear of Pinochet himself (who remained incontrol of the army until 1998), limited public criticism of the economic model.Remaining ‘authoritarian enclaves’ and ‘extra-institutional circuits of power’ -i.e. the links between the military, business sectors and right wing parties - fur-ther inhibited the expression of conflict (Cortés Terzi 1997)5. While an empow-ered business class sought to defend the economic model and the legacy of

22 Tomás Undurraga

5 The major constraints in thisrespect were represented by

Pinochet’s regime, critical voices within Concertación, which agitated for re-form, were dismissed by establishment members of their own government. Ac-cording to Garretón (2013), Concertación did not have the knowledge, will orpower to change the market model. Thus, the transition to democracy was char-acterized by a pragmatic ethic, gradualist change, and the large-scale accep-tance of the country’s extant political norms. The political practices that facili-tated the transition to democracy were based on tacit agreements amongpolitical and economic elites, marginalizing those who sought to question theneoliberal order (Fuentes 2013). During the Concertación and Piñera govern-ments (1990-2014), demands for increasing social expenditure were effectivelycontained by the priority of fiscal discipline. The powerful Ministers of Financeof these administrations – i.e. Foxley, Aninat, Eyzaguirre, Velasco, and Larraín– kept economic order as their main priority.

In Argentina, the changing nature of Peronism was crucial to both enableand limit neoliberal restructuring. On the one hand, the transformations of theJusticialist Party (PJ) during the 1980s and the 1990s were instrumental in en-abling the deployment of market reforms. According to Levitsky (2003,pp.107-143), during the 1980s PJ ceased to be a party dominated by traditionallabour unions, and instead shifted toward patronage networks, especially inpoor neighbourhoods. The dismantling of the traditional mechanisms of labourparticipation, and the consequent erosion of syndicalist influence, eliminatedkey sources of domestic opposition to Menem’s reforms. On the other, compen-sation and clientelistic networks administered by Peronist political brokers(punteros) in popular neighbourhoods remained vital to maintaining politicalmobilization (Auyero 2007). The Peronist philosophy of popular participationcontinued during the 1990s and reproduced practices that were in many waysincompatible with the attempt of neoliberalism to disenchant politics by eco-nomics.

The implementation of market reforms in 1991 also coincided with a pre-ponderance of economists in public affairs and public decision-making (Here-dia 2008). Those economists, however, had to deal with a diverse political classthat included union members, regional leaders, and traditional politicians.Technocracy in Argentina never had the hegemonic position that enjoyed inChile. Voices of dissent continued to be heard in the mainstream press, and atthe end of the decade, Argentineans had a polarized view of the 1990s model.Whilst government advocates stressed that Argentina had ‘entered the firstworld’, critics denounced the ‘latin-americanization’ of the social structure(idem, p.205). During the recession years of 1998-2002 the model’s promisewaned further, eroding the hopes of the neoliberal project.

III. 7. Neoliberalism produced different outcomes and knock-on effects: whereas material progress spread anotion of success in Chile, the 2001 implosion extended disenchantment in Argentina, triggering a backlashagainst marketization

The distinctive experiences of neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile lentcapitalism itself different popular legitimacies in each country. While capitalistmodernization in Chile, with its emphasis on private property and individualrights, brought material progress in a context of inequality, the few modernisedaspects of 1990s Argentina were crushed by the social, political and economicimplosion of 2001, burying any positive popular feeling about market reforms.

Chilean society changed significantly under market reforms. Between 1990and 2010, its GDP tripled, and the proportion of its population living below thepoverty line fell from 40% to 15% (Chile 2011). In the last three decades Chil-ean quality of life improved along a number of axes: quality of housing, homeequipment, access to education, and basic services (Atria et al., 2013, p.259).


the existence of designatedsenators, the state securitycouncil, the binominal votingsystem and the inability of thePresident to designate the headof the army. President Lagosreformed most of the‘authoritarian enclaves’ in2005, except for the binominalpolitical election system, acentrepiece of Pinochet’s 1980Constitution.

The expansion of markets and of popular credit effectively ‘democratized’ con-sumption across new sectors, creating new citizen-consumers (UNDP 1998).Access to tertiary education as well as private debt grew exponentially duringthis time, as the number of private universities multiplied. While optimisticreadings celebrate the expansion of the Chilean educational system, in which 70per cent of university students are first generation, critics emphasize the perver-sion of a profit-oriented system that in many respects still reproduces social in-equalities (Mayol 2012).

Economic expansion also gave the private sector and the business class a he-gemonic position, which has been further bolstered by a triumphalist narrativeabout the country’s progress (Larraín 2001). Occupying a leading position ineconomic regional rankings, and being included in the OECD has reinforcedthis celebratory vision. President Piñera’s government (2010-2014) sought tocapitalize on this spirit, extending private sector norms and practices to publicinstitutions and boasting of a style of governance modelled on corporate man-agement.

Despite the clear economic advances it has wrought, neoliberalism has beensubject to intense scrutiny in Chile, especially after the 2011 revolts and the riseof the ensuing social movements. In the late 1990s, the market model receivedboth “complacent” and “self-flagellating” readings from inside Concertación.While the former emphasized the country’s prosperity and the stability of theeconomic model (Tironi 1999; Larraín & Vergara 2000), the latter accentuateddistributive inequalities, and the inability of Concertación to achieve “growthwith equity” (Moulian 1998; Garretón 2012). These discrepant readings againresurfaced in the aftermath of Concertación, when party members sought tocome to grips with its legacy. For some, Concertación was able to achieve socialdemocracy as far as was effectively possible, for the latter, Concertación man-aged, at best, to give neoliberalism a human face (Atria 2013). The eruption ofsocial movements has stimulated discussion of the country’s economic model,with scholars calling for the launch of a new social democratic model (Atria etal., 2013).

Market reforms in Argentina produced an even more controversial result.On the one hand, the convertibility plan successfully stabilized the economy,achieving a rapid reduction of inflation and interest rates. Output soared be-tween 1991 and 1997. The business sector grew quickly and multinational cor-porations took hold in several new industries. On the other hand, many nationalindustries, accustomed to tariff barriers and protections, could not cope with in-ternational competition, and closed. Significant job losses resulted and unem-ployment grew to 19% in 1995 (Novaro 2006). Privatized enterprises, mainlyadministrated by foreign corporations, boasted profit margins much higher thanthose obtained by nationally owned businesses, generating charges of globalexploitation and injustice (Azpiazu & Basualdo 2004). After the consumeristboom of the first few years, a rise in poverty and social inequality also becameevident. The ‘new poor’ (Minujin & Kessler 1997) became increasingly visiblein public spaces. The neoliberal program produced a reconfiguration of thepower structure, strengthening the economic elite at the expense of worker’ssafety. As Canelo et al. (2011, p.16) suggest, the 1990s in Argentina “synthe-sized, in its way, a sudden integration into economic globalization and techno-logical leap of the late twentieth century, with a falling to unprecedented levelsof deprivation in the country and widespread practices of wage exploitation andpolitical domination no less regressive”. Menem finished his second term(1994-1998) with his reputation in tatters. The piquetero movement – led by un-employed former state enterprise functionaries, such as YPF, among others –became the new symbol of social malaise.

24 Tomás Undurraga

At the turn of the new century, social pressure looked set to implodeneoliberalism in Argentina. Social movements calling for protection againstmarket expansion (Polanyi 2001) grew sharply; pickets, roadblocks, and pro-tests multiplied among those who felt they had been damaged by neoliberalmodernization (E. Silva 2009; Villalón 2007). The crisis exploded in December2001, when order broke down in the provinces as people began to loot stores inRosario, Mendoza, Entre Ríos, and Buenos Aires. Simultaneously, the imposi-tion of ‘corralito’ provoked discontent among the middle classes. Widespreadprotests arose against De la Rua’s government. Buenos Aires, famously, be-came the scene of street battles. ‘Que se vayan todos!’ (Let’s get rid of them all!)was the cry on the streets, calling for the ouster of the ruling political classes.Between 20th December 2001 and 2nd January 2002, Argentina had five presi-dents. It seemed all but impossible to contain the turmoil, until Peronist EduardoDuhalde restored political power, managing to bring the situation under control.

Argentina stopped making payments on its foreign debt, officially default-ing on US$132 billion. In January 2002, the convertibility plan came to an end.After 11 years, the peso-dollar peg was scrapped. The peso was left to float andsuffered a sharp devaluation, losing about 70% of its value in four months (Levi& Valenzuela 2007). As a consequence of four years of recession (1998-2002)and the implosion of 2001, poverty became severe. In October 2002, INDEC re-vealed that 57.5% of Argentineans were living below the poverty line and27.5% were in extreme poverty. The Argentinean population was not only im-poverished but also lost faith in its institutions and authorities. The credibility ofthe political and business classes was completely shattered.

The question of what went wrong became pressing in the wake of the 2001crisis. For some commentators the crisis was due to a lack of neoliberalism. Ac-cording to this view, the government was unable to ‘discipline’ federal adminis-trations and union demands, thereby increasing the fiscal deficit. For others, thecrisis was due to an excess of neoliberalism. In this view, the devastating socialconsequences of high unemployment and polarizing inequality were an unstop-pable time bomb. Democratic Argentinean society was not ready to pay thetransitional social costs that Chile eventually did under conditions of dictator-ship. Further, the taint of corruption that hung about the privatization processalso undermined its legitimacy. The modernizing improvements the processpartly delivered were lost under the massive social costs it imposed. Even forthe ideologists of the convertibility plan, such as Juan Llach, the results were ap-palling. In his own words, “[Neoliberalism in Argentina] is in a double crisis.First, it is the real crisis. It produced a profound social crisis and a recessionthat lasted four years. Then, there is the ideological crisis: neoliberalism lost itsanchor and social validity” (La Nación, September 13, 2003).

III.8. Neoliberalism as a de-collectivising project advanced further in Chile – particularly in the workplace,whereas in Argentina’s post-convertibility landscape the Kirchners reinvigorated faith in politics and collectiveorganization

A critical factor shaping the divergent fates of neoliberalism in these coun-tries is the degree to which their societies were de-collectivized through marketreforms. Whereas the mix of privatization and regulatory constraints on collec-tive action effectively restrained Chilean society during Concertación years(1990-2010), similar attempts at popular deactivation did not succeed in Argen-tina. By contrast, the post-2001 reaction and the counteroffensive lead by theKirchner’s governments (2003-2015) revitalized collective forces and thespread of social movements. Contrasting current labour rights and conditions aswell as the status of unions reveals the extent to which the situation diverges inthe two countries.


Organized labour in Argentina has a robust history. The collective rightsachieved during the Perón years (1946-1955) resulted in the labour movementgaining significant industrial and political power. The Argentine labour move-ment was incorporated into the party political system by becoming the struc-tural, ideological, and financial base of Peronism (Atzeni, Durán-Palma &Ghigliani 2011). As mentioned earlier, the reforms lead by Menem’s govern-ments (1989-1999) had a profound impact on the labour market (unemploy-ment reached 19% in 1995). Labour unions were weakened as centralisedcollective bargaining was limited to firm level in a bid to facilitate flexibilityand economic adjustment, especially in the newly privatised utilities and enter-prises. In exchange for introducing reforms – and a way of co-opting the CGT(Confederación General del Trabajo) –, the Menem governments allowed un-ions to invest in the new business opportunities brought about by the priva-tisation of pensions, labour accidents insurance and health care (idem, p.142).For a country accustomed to high labour participation, unemployment was ex-perienced as a qualitative loss of citizenship.

In the aftermath of the 2001, both Kirchner governments promoted a back-lash against free market economics. Stimulated by the boom of commodities,Argentina embarked on a period of economic recovery and debt renegotiation.The post-neoliberal Kirchner governments launched a litigant style of politicsthat promised social justice through robust government intervention in theeconomy and society (and the National Institute of Census and StatisticsINDEC). They not only strengthened state institutions, but also empowered col-lective organisations, i.e. unions, human rights associations and the Justicialistparty. A resurgent formal union movement grew, led first by informal workersand more recently by union representatives from relatively privileged formalsectors, e.g. subway, auto, oil, and tyre workers (Etchemendy 2010). Central-ised wage bargaining in industrial and service sectors, and agreements on sec-tor-wide wage increases as well as the minimum wage represent a backlashagainst the labour flexibility of the 1990s. The number of collective agreementsincreased from 348 in 2004 to 1,231 in 2008. Despite unions’ proportionally di-minished number of members, union density among unionised workers remainsat 40% (Atzeni, Durán-Palma & Ghigliani 2011). Likewise, union bargainingamong formal employees in Argentina was over 70% in 2007 (ILO 2008),which is a considerable number in the Latin American context.

The optimism generated over the course of the Kirchner administrations,and the death of Néstor Kirchner in October 2010, help to explain the 53 percentpopularity with which Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner was re-elected in 2011.The revival of militant street protest among young people is another sign of therevitalization of politics in Argentina (e.g. La Campora led by MáximoKirchner; Jóvenes K; JP Evita; los Guardianes de la Democracia; 25 de Mayo;Perukas; Oktubres) (Pavón 2012, p.553). According to the Barometer of theAmericas 2010 (Lodola 2011), Argentina stands out for being one of the mostconfrontational countries in the region, where social protest is seen as an effi-cient means of achieving political aims. The proportion of Argentines that dem-onstrated in the streets in 2010 was vastly greater than the proportion of thosewho participated in institutionalised conflict resolution channels, such as peti-tioning legislators, mayors or councillors – this reflects, among other things, theconsiderable public legitimacy street demonstrations have in Argentina.

Argentina’s still robust trade union culture, contrasts strongly with the situa-tion in Chile. The atomised labour movement there has its own history. During17 years of dictatorship (1973-1990) unions were politically repressed and theirleaders ‘disappeared’ (Cavallo, Salazar & Sepúlveda 1988). The collectiverights achieved through Peronism in Argentina were exactly what José Piñera,Pinochet’s Minister of Work, sought to avoid through the 1979 Labour Code in

26 Tomás Undurraga

Chile (Piñera 1990, p.58). Prohibiting the unionisation of temporary workersand public servants, limiting strike days, and giving free rein to firms to dismissworkers for ‘business reasons’, all undermined collective action, seriouslytransforming the power balance between capital and labour. Collective bargain-ing was allowed only at individual firm level, reducing any form of sectoral ornational negotiation. Employer’s capacity to depress wages while increasingboth workloads and the length of the working day helped Chilean capitalism toboom in the 1980s. According to Winn (2004), the working class and its organi-sations were the main victims of the ‘Chilean miracle’.

Although the 1983-1986 cycle of mobilizations activated Chilean society,the labour movement was so structurally debilitated by the dictatorship that itwas unable to organise resistance against neoliberal reforms. Concertación(1990-2010) then also helped to demobilise labour in the interest of promotinggovernability. Although Concertación promised to re-balance power betweenworkers and firms (“there is no democracy without labour reform”), thechanges in the labour code (1990, 1993, 2001 and 2006) were unable to reducesocial disparities, which remained virtually unchanged between 1990 and 2010(Gini 0.56 to Gini 0.53). Despite consecutive labour reforms, the balance ofpower remains clearly angled in favour of firms. Almost two thirds of the Chil-ean labour force is working on short-term contracts or under other conditions ofprecariousness (Sehnbruch 2009, p.8). The number of contracts of indefiniteduration has had a steady decline (49.5% of the workforce in 1998 to 41.5 in2012) (Fundación Sol 2013). Vulnerable employment has proliferated in suc-cessful sectors such as mining, fishing, retail, and agricultural exports throughsubcontracting, which allows companies to outsource their work responsibili-ties (Echeverría 2010; Stecher 2013). Union density and the incidence of collec-tive bargaining have also shrunk considerably. While the unionization ratenationwide was 21.1% in 1991, in 2010 it was only 15.8% (Chile 2011a), withthe highest figures in the mining sector. Similarly, the percentage of workers in-volved in collective bargaining fell from 10.3% in 1991 to 6.8% in 2009 (Chile2011b). The participation of workers in strikes is also minimal. While in 1991,1.5% of employees that can potentially bargain collectively participated in astrike; in 2012 the figure reached only 0.65% (Durán 2013, p.90).

Chile’s profound structural inequalities, however, have meant that differentvulnerable groups have become more likely to agitate. Growing strikes and pro-tests by contract workers in the mining, forestry, and retail sectors (2006, 2007and 2011) reflect permanent tensions between workers, contractors and largefirms (Durán-Palma & Lopez 2009; Echeverría 2010). The 2011 protests, inparticular, mark a breaking point in this regard. Both the students on the streets,and the public in surveys, voiced opposition to private, for profit education, andthe high levels of individual debt that go with it. This widespread expression ofdiscontent has constituted a significant challenge to the neoliberal model. Thebelief that collective organization and protesting in the streets may affect poli-tics has risen firmly in recent years, evincing new hopes for social change.

III.9. Whereas business elites have constantly defended the capitalist modernization in Chile, renewing itsjustifications, the counter-offensive lead by the Kirchners and allies had further weakened neoliberalism inArgentina

A further factor differentiating neoliberalism’s fate in Argentina and Chileis the role of the capitalist class. Neoliberalism partly succeeded in Chile be-cause the bourgeoisie, the strata destined to defend capitalism (Schumpeter1976), was empowered by the market reforms, and, consequently, was betterable to protect and justify the new market model. This did not come to pass inArgentina, where the dispersed business class never rose to such power, and


were perceived as accomplices in the 2001 crisis. While divisiveness and inter-nal competition have undermined the capacity of the Argentine business sectorto build a common agenda, the politically connected capitalist class in Chile hasbeen largely effective in defending a pro-business environment, at least until re-cently.

Business associations in Chile, gathered under the umbrella of the Confed-eration for Production and Commerce (CPC), are powerful actors with signifi-cant capacity to coordinate divergent sectors (e.g. agro-business, banks,mining, or industry). Further, informal networks based on family relations, reli-gious groups, college mates, chains of capital, and shared business interestsconnect economic elites (Tironi 1999; Thumala 2007). Partisan linkages withUnión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN), thetwo powerful right wing parties, have facilitated the defence of business inter-ests in Parliament, such as maintenance of low taxation and a flexible labourmarket (Undurraga 2012). Due to the strong structural power of the private sec-tor, Concertación governments (1990-2010) felt the need to consult with busi-ness associations on the details of their reforms. For instance, both Leyes deMercado de Capitales I y II during the Lagos and Bachelet administrations werebased on proposals written by the industrial association SOFOFA.Unsurprisingly, none of the key reforms of the Concertación governments - tax(Aylwin), state modernisation (Frei), health (Lagos) and pensions (Bachelet)were as progressive as they were originally believed to be, achieving only a par-tial correction of neoliberalism’s inequities (Garretón 2012). The power ofbusinesses and the right wing sector - overrepresented in parliament due to thebinominal system – constrained further, more progressive policy changes.

Since the mid 1980s, the market model become more explicitly and aggres-sively defended by the private sector itself. Corporations invested in businessassociations and institutions that celebrated the economic success of the ‘ex-porter model’ and promoted free market values. These institutions formed whatThrift (2005) calls ‘cultural circuits of capitalism’, based on strong networks ofenterprises, pro-business organisations, think tanks, private universities, andthe economic media (Undurraga 2013). These business circuits have renewedthe justifications of Chilean capitalism, integrating and effectively transformingthe criticism it has received – e.g. corporate social responsibility discourse inmining industry (Tironi & Zenteno 2013). Different business centres such asICARE and CEP, plus strong business associations play a key role in promotinga business agenda, offering technical support for regulatory lobbying in the Par-liament. The election of businessman Piñera as Chilean president (2010-2014)was the crowning triumph of the new managerial elite, which was not only en-riched by capitalist modernization but acquired the political authority to go withit.

It is interesting to note, however, that the increasing awareness of Chile’sstructural inequalities has started to erode the unchallenged position of busi-ness. Different groups have become more likely to agitate for the improvementof their social conditions (Undurraga 2014). The Piñera administration’s linkswith the business class aroused suspicion that the government was far too be-holden to business interests. Complaints against a profit-driven university sys-tem, corporate scandals involving price-fixing pharmaceutical retailers andunilateral renegotiation of unpaid debtors banks (e.g. La Polar, Cencosud) allincreased this sense of discontent. According to a UDP 2011 National survey,between 2010 and 2011, confidence in large companies declined from 27.9% to16.5%.

The situation is starkly contrasting in Argentina. Business associations donot have the capacity to influence governance at industry level to anywhere near

28 Tomás Undurraga

a comparable degree. Different factions defend their own business strategies,strengthening their particular political ties and promoting their own, often com-peting, economic interests (Lewis 2009). Despite the existence of several busi-ness associations, such as SRA (Sociedad Rural Argentina), UAI (UnionIndustrial Argentina), and ADEBA (Asociación de Bancos Argentinos), there isno single encompassing business association like the Chilean CPC. This situa-tion is not new. Agriculture and industry in Argentina developed strong associa-tions before Perón, but rivalry and the politicisation of business representationby Peronism increased fragmentation among the business sector (Acuña 1998).Despite several attempts to build an economy-wide peak association, the inabil-ity to reconcile sectorial interests, and weak institutional capacity underminedthese efforts (Schneider 2004).

Under the Kirchner governments (2003-2015), pressure on the private sec-tor grew steadily, with only businessmen close to the government exempt frominterference (for a full picture of the business groups favored and disfavoredduring the Kirchner years, see Gaggero, Schorr & Wainer 2014). Internationalcorporations, firms linked to the government opposition, and the agro-industrialsector, in particular, criticize the ‘hostile’ business environment installed by theKirchners. During their governments, public service contracts with privatizedutilities were renegotiated, AFJP – the private pension system – AerolíneasArgentinas and YPF (Petroleum) were re-nationalized, and television cablecontracts were negotiated anew. The Kirchners also increased taxes on com-modity exports, such as soybeans, meat, and wheat. For example, the 2008 con-flict between the government and the farm industry over hikes in export taxes(retentions) crisped the political environment. Conflicts with the adversaries totheir post-neoliberal politics increased, reinvigorating political life.

The credibility of the business class – alongside politicians and unions – iswidely doubted in Argentina. Their capacity to defend a business agenda and tojustify their way of doing business is also limited. Corruption, low patriotism,and tax evasion are accusations commonly levelled at economic elites. Success-ful entrepreneurs in Argentina tend to keep a relatively low profile. With the ex-ception of the business media, they do not frequently appear in the public presscommenting on current affairs. Businessmen interviewed for this study com-mented that it is not convenient for them to show off their success or to be tooloud in defending their interests in the public domain. Alfredo Coto, for in-stance, owner of a supermarket chain and president of the business associationIDEA, gave an interview on November 18, 2005, before IDEA’s annual meet-ing, criticising the government and projecting 13% inflation for 2006. TheKirchners reacted ferociously, applying significant political pressure to Mr.Coto who ended up renouncing the presidency of IDEA. He was subsequentlythe first employer to sign a price agreement with the government. José MiguelAranguren, the president of Shell, endured a similar experience in 2005 afterchallenging Kirchner’s call to boycott Shell because of their refusal to acceptgovernment imposed price limits. Consequently, many businesses have beensubjugated by the political power of the Kirchners, with the exception of somebusiness friends of the government who have maintained privileges – to an ex-tent.

IV. Conclusions: post-neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile?

Some scholars argue that Argentina entered a phase of post-neoliberal poli-tics in the last decade (Riggirozzi 2010; Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012). The coun-ter-reaction against market policies canalised by the Kirchner governmentsechoes the double movement of social protection Polanyi describes (1944). TheKirchners reinforced the activation of popular actors and enhanced the legiti-


macy of the state’s right to intervene in structuring economic affairs. Further,they installed a narrative of a “before and after”, where before was neo-liberalism and the 2001 crisis, and after were economic recovery and the resto-ration of memory and national pride. These changes have certainly generatedtheir share of conflicts; disputes about the proper relationship between the stateand the private sector remain lively (Undurraga 2014).

Despite the emphasis on a post-neoliberal narrative, it is important to stressthat the Kirchner governments have maintained some continuities with theneoliberal slogans of the 1990s, for instance they have largely preserves the fis-cal equilibrium. While their macroeconomics took a Keynesian turn, stimulat-ing internal consumption, at the microeconomic level the restructuring ethos ofneoliberalism (Peck, Theodore & Brenner 2009) remains alive at least in someareas. Many Argentineans prefer private services over state provided ones whenit comes to education, health, and security, even in the lower-middle classes. Onthe other hand, although the Kirchners succeeded in restoring broad confidencein state institutions, a number of outstanding problems continue to plague Ar-gentinean society, such as insecurity and fear of crime, inflationary pressures,and deteriorating public services in health, education, and transport (Kessler etal., 2010). In between these breaks and continuities, conflicts between support-ers and opponents of the Kirchner project have gained new impetus. While thegovernment spreads its incendiary rhetoric against global financial institutions,‘vulture’ funds and anybody else that threatens the social achievements of thenational-popular model, the opposition criticizes the rising inflation, state inter-vention in manipulating national statistics (INDEC) and the absence of interna-tional financial credit, calling for an end to the “capitalism of friends”.

In Chile, the rise of the 2011 mobilizations seems to mark the beginning of anew political cycle. Some argue that a post-neoliberal order may be emerging,an order that calls into question the core of the neoliberal model, i.e. the disen-chantment of politics by economics. The three promises of President Bachelet’sprogramme (2014-2018) – free education for all, tax reform and a new demo-cratic constitution – aimed to respond to this new political cycle, moving awayfrom orthodox neoliberalism towards a more social democratic model. Despitethe commitment of Bachelet’s coalition (Nueva Mayoría) to carrying out struc-tural reforms, and despite the support Bachelet herself received at the ballot box(62%), passing these reforms in the congress have not – thus far – been easy.

Six months into Bachelet’s administration, differences have emerged thatdistinguish the current government from what came before, though the shift hasnot been as marked as some expected. A tax reform was effectively approved inJuly 2014, raising corporate income tax from 20 to 25%, though the package ap-proved was substantially less progressive than the original. Rather than includ-ing any social movement representatives at the negotiation table, the finalagreement was hammered out between the government and the opposition at thehouse of a business representative (Peña 2014). Thus, the same elite style ofpolitics characteristic of the old Concertación was manifest, evincing that al-though the power of the business classes might have been challenged, in manyrespects it has not yet been diminished. The education reform is undergoing ne-gotiations with all kinds of ‘stakeholders’, but the government political capitalis shorter than it was in March 2014. Interestingly, the same scholar that inter-preted the 2011 student revolts as the ‘demise of the model’ (Mayol 2012) hasrecently announced a new book entitled “the demise of the demise” (Mayol2014). Although it is unclear the extent to which the new political cycle will dif-fer from that of the Concertación years, the effervescence of Chilean societyand the belief that collective pressure in the streets can effectively change poli-tics is challenging the technocratic hegemony of recent decades.

30 Tomás Undurraga

Having said that, it would be hasty and unwarranted to consider the risingmobilizations in Chile as akin to the post-neoliberal reaction that characterisedthe 2001 aftermath in Argentina. Chile has not had any political or economiccrisis on that kind of scale, nor has it experienced a political movement such asKirchnerism, which has led a counter-offensive against the neoliberal model.Further, after 30 years of adjusting regulations the market model is deeply em-bedded in Chilean society; the ambivalent decade of Menem’s neo-liberal ex-periment in Argentina produced no such result. As those who likened Chile andArgentina to each other as ‘poster children’ of the Washington Consensus wereproven wrong by history, so too it would be a mistake to draw hasty compari-sons between the post-neoliberal impulses at work in these countries today.

Tomás Undurraga ([email protected]) holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Cambridge (United Kingdom) andis presently a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Science and Technology Studies of the University College London.Institutional Affiliation: University College London, London, United Kingdom.

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Resumo

O artigo contrasta as experiências do neoliberalismo na Argentina e no Chile e explora por que dois países que implementaram

reformas para o mercado aparentemente semelhantes atingiram posições distintas quanto à mercantilização: uma política pós-

neoliberal na Argentina e um neoliberalismo temperado no Chile que só recentemente vem sendo questionado. O artigo traça os

antecedentes comuns que inspiraram essas reformas e os diferentes resultados e reações que eles produziram. Em contraste com a

literatura recente que enfatiza um ou outro fator explicativo,o artigo oferece uma comparação sintética dos fatores históricos,

políticos, econômicos e ideológicos em jogo, ajudando a entender como os capitalistas conseguiram uma posição de classe

hegemônica no Chile mas não na Argentina.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: neoliberalismo; Argentina; Chile; pós-neoliberalismo; formação da classe capitalista.

License information: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY-NC 4.0),which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

34 Tomás Undurraga

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