Financial Crisis and the Future of the P/C Insurance Industry
Challenges Amid theGlobal Economic Storm
Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., CPCU, PresidentInsurance Information Institute 110 William Street New York, NY 10038
Tel: (212) 346-5520 [email protected] www.iii.org
New York Society of Securities Analysts13th Annual Insurance Conference
New York, NY
February 9, 2009
Presentation Outline
• Financial Crisis & The Weakening Global Economy: Insurance Impacts
• Banks vs. Insurers• Economic Growth & Recession• Financial Strength & Ratings
• P/C Insurance Industry Overview & Outlook• Profitability• Premium Growth• Underwriting Performance• Financial Market Impacts
• Capital & Capacity• Regulatory Response to Crisis
• Emerging Blueprint of Regulatory Overhaul
• Important Threats Facing P/C Insurers in 2009
Q & A
THE ECONOMIC STORM
What a Weakening Economy and Financial Crisis Mean for the
Insurance Industry
Exposure & Claim Cost Effects
3.7
%
0.8
% 1.6
% 2.5
% 3.6
%
3.1
%
2.9
%
0.1
%
4.8
%
4.8
%
0.9
%
2.8
%
-0.5
%
-3.3
%
-0.8
%
1.2
% 2.2
%
2.6
%
3.0
%
3.3
%
3.2
%
-3.8%
-0.2%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
2
00
0
2
00
1
2
00
2
2
00
3
2
00
4
2
00
5
2
00
6
07
:1Q
07
:2Q
07
:3Q
07
:4Q
08
:1Q
08
:2Q
08
:3Q
08
:4Q
09
:1Q
09
:2Q
09
:3Q
09
:4Q
10
:1Q
10
:2Q
10
:3Q
10
:4Q
Real GDP Growth*
*Yellow bars are Estimates/Forecasts from Blue Chip Economic Indicators.Source: US Department of Commerce, Blue Economic Indicators 1/09; Insurance Information Institute.
Recession began in December 2007. Economic toll of credit crunch, housing
slump, labor market contraction is growing
The Q4:2008 decline was the steepest since the
Q1:1982 drop of 6.4%
Length of US Recessions,1929-Present*
43
13
811 10
810 11
16
6
16
8 8
14
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Aug.1929
May1937
Feb.1945
Nov.1948
July1953
Aug.1957
Apr.1960
Dec.1969
Nov.1973
Jan.1980
Jul.1981
Jul.1990
Mar.2001
Dec.2007
* As of February 2009
Sources: National Bureau of Economic Research; Insurance Information Institute.
Current recession began in Dec. 2007 and is already the
longest since 1981. If it extends beyond April, it will become the longest recession since the Great Depression.
Months in Duration
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
Jan
-00
Jan
-01
Jan
-02
Jan
-03
Jan
-04
Jan
-05
Jan
-06
Jan
-07
Jan
-08
January 2000 through December 2008
Unemployment will likely peak above 8% or 9% during this cycle, impacting payroll
sensitive p/c and non-life exposures
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Insurance Information Institute.
Dec. 2008 unemployment jumped to 7.2%, exceeding the 6.3% peak
during the previous cycle
Unemployment Rate:On the Rise
Average unemployment rate 2000-07 was 5.0%
Previous Peak: 6.3% in June 2003
Trough: 4.4% in March 2007
Dec
-08
U.S. Unemployment Rate,(2007:Q1 to 2010:Q4F)*
4.5%
4.5% 4.6% 4.
8% 4.9%
5.4%
6.1%
6.9%
7.4%
7.9%
8.3% 8.4%
8.4%
8.3%
8.2%
8.0%
4.0%
4.5%
5.0%
5.5%
6.0%
6.5%
7.0%
7.5%
8.0%
8.5%
9.0%
07:Q1 07:Q2 07:Q3 07:Q4 08:Q1 08:Q2 08:Q3 08:Q4 09:Q1 09:Q2 09:Q3 09:Q4 10:Q1 10:Q2 10:Q3 10:Q4
* Blue bars are actual; Yellow bars are forecastsSources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (1/09); Insurance Info. Inst.
Rising unemployment will erode payrolls
and workers comp’s exposure base.
Unemployment is expected to peak above 8% in the
second half of 2009.
Monthly Change Employment*(Thousands)
-76 -83 -88 -67 -47-100
-67-127
-403 -423
-584-524
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08
Job losses in 2008 totaled 2.589 million, the highest since 1945 at WW II’s end; 11.1 million people are now defined as unemployed.
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm; Insurance Info. Institute
The Nov./Dec. 2008 losses were the largest since May 1980 loss of 431,000,
but less than the Dec. 1974 loss of 602,000
New Private Housing Starts,1990-2010F (Millions of Units)
2.07
1.80
1.36
0.93
0.72
0.95
1.48
1.35
1.46
1.29
1.20
1.01
1.19
1.47
1.62 1.64
1.57 1.60
1.71
1.85
1.96
0.70.80.91.01.11.21.31.41.51.61.71.81.92.02.1
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08E 09F 10F
Exposure growth forecast for HO insurers is dim for 2009 with some
improvement in 2010.
Impacts also for comml. insurers with construction risk exposure
New home starts plunged
34% from 2005-2007;
Drop through 2009 trough is 65% (est.)—a
net annual decline of 1.35 million
units
I.I.I. estimates that each incremental 100,000 decline in housing starts costs
home insurers $87.5 million in new exposure (gross premium). The net
exposure loss in 2009 vs. 2005 is estimated at about $1.2 billion.
Source: US Department of Commerce; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (1/09); Insurance Information Inst.
16.916.916.6
17.117.5
17.817.4
16.516.1
13.2
11.2
13.1
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07F 08E 09F 10F
Weakening economy, credit crunch are hurting auto sales; Gas prices less of a factor now.
New auto/light truck sales are expected to experience a net
drop of 5.7 million units annually by 2009 compared
with 2005, a decline of 20.7%
Impacts of falling auto sales will have a less pronounced effect on auto insurance exposure growth
than problems in the housing market will on home insurers
Auto/Light Truck Sales,1999-2010F (Millions of Units)
Source: US Department of Commerce; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (1/09); Insurance Information Inst.
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08*
$0
$5
$10
$15
$20
$25
$30
$35
$40
$45Wage & SalaryDisbursementsWC NPW
*9-month data for 2008Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WASCUR; I.I.I. Fact Books
Wage & Salary Disbursements (Payroll Base) vs. Workers Comp
Net Written Premiums
7/90-3/91
Shaded areas indicate recessions
3/01-11/01
Wage & Salary Disbursement (Private Employment) vs. WC NWP$ Billions $ Billions
12/07-?
Weakening wage and salary growth is
expected to cause a deceleration in workers comp
exposure growth
Total Industrial Production,(2007:Q1 to 2010:Q4F)
1.5%
3.2% 3.6%
0.3% 0.4%
-3.4%
-8.9%-8.6%
-6.1%
-2.6%
2.9%3.3%3.8%3.7%
0.5%
2.0%
-10.0%
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
07:Q
1
07:Q
2
07:Q
3
07:Q
4
08:Q
1
08:Q
2
08:Q
3
08:Q
4
09:Q
1
09:Q
2
09:Q
3
09:Q
4
10:Q
1
10:Q
2
10:Q
3
10:Q
4
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics; Blue Chip Economic Indicators (1/09); Insurance Info. Inst.
Industrial production began
to contract sharply during H2 2008 and
is expected to shrink through the
first half of 2009
Obama stimulus program is expected benefit impact industrial production and therefore
insurance exposure both directly and indirectly
Figures for H2:09 and 2010 revised
sharply upwards to reflect expected
impact of Obama stimulus program
$214.5
$124.0
$77.7 $68.4$49.4
$26.8 $19.2
$0
$100
$200
$300
Public sectorjobs and vital
services
Help workershurt by theeconomy
Transportation,Infrastructure
Education Energy Lowerhealthcare
costs
Science,technology
U.S. $825B Economic Stimulus Package, By Category
Sources: House Appropriations Committee; Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2009
$ BillionsCommercial insurance lines
that will benefit from the Obama stimulus plan
include workers comp, commercial property,
commercial auto, surety, inland marine and others
5.2%
-0.9
%-7
.4%
-6.5
%-1
.5%
1.8%
4.3%
18.6
%20
.3%
5.8%
0.3%
-1.6
%-1
.0%
-1.8
%-1
.0%
3.1%
1.1%
0.8%
0.4%
0.6%
-0.4
%-0
.3%
1.6%
5.6%
13.7
%7.
7%1.
2%-2
.9% -0
.5%
-3.4
%-4
.9%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08F
Rea
l N
WP
Gro
wth
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
Rea
l G
DP
Gro
wth
Real NWP Growth Real GDP
Real GDP Growth vs. Real P/C Premium Growth: Modest Association
P/C insurance industry’s growth is influenced modestly by growth
in the overall economy
Sources: A.M. Best, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Blue Chip Economic Indicators, 8/08; Insurance Information Inst.
FINANCIAL STRENGTH &
RATINGS Industry Has Weathered
the Storms Well
P/C Insurer Impairment Frequency vs. Combined Ratio, 1969-2007
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Co
mb
ined
Ratio
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Imp
air
men
t R
ate
Combined Ratio after DivP/C Impairment Frequency
Impairment rates are highly correlated
underwriting performance and could reached a
record low in 2007
Source: A.M. Best; Insurance Information Institute
2007 impairment rate was a record low 0.12%, one-seventh the 0.8% average since 1969;
Previous record was 0.24% in 1972
Summary of A.M. Best’s P/C Insurer Ratings Actions in 2008*
Under Review, 63 , 4.3%
Upgraded, 59 , 4.0%
Initial, 41 , 2.8%
Other, 59 , 4.0%
Affirm, 1,183 , 81.0%
Downgraded, 55 , 3.8%
*Through December 19.Source: A.M. Best.
21
Despite financial market turmoil, high cat losses and a soft market in 2008, 81% of ratings actions by A.M. Best
were affirmations; just 3.8% were downgrades
and 4.0% upgrades
P/C insurance is by design a resilient in business. The dual threat of financial
disasters and catastrophic losses are
anticipated in the industry’s risk
management strategy.
Reasons for US P/C Insurer Impairments, 1969-2005
*Includes overstatement of assets.
Source: A.M. Best: P/C Impairments Hit Near-Term Lows Despite Surging Hurricane Activity, Special Report, Nov. 2005;
Catastrophe Losses8.6%
Alleged Fraud11.4%
Deficient Loss
Reserves/In-adequate Pricing62.8%
Affiliate Problems
8.6%
Rapid Growth
8.6%
2003-2005 1969-2005
Deficient reserves,
CAT losses are more important factors in
recent years
Reinsurance Failure3.5%
Rapid Growth16.5%
Misc.9.2%
Affiliate Problems
5.6%
Sig. Change in Business
4.6%
Deficient Loss
Reserves/In-adequate Pricing38.2%
Investment Problems*
7.3%
Alleged Fraud8.6%
Catastrophe Losses6.5%
Critical Differences Between P/C
Insurers and BanksSuperior Risk Management Model
& Low Leverage Makea Big Difference
How Insurance Industry Stability Has Benefitted Consumers
BOTTOM LINE:• Insurance Markets—Unlike Banking—Are Operating
Normally• The Basic Function of Insurance—the Orderly Transfer
of Risk from Client to Insurer—Continues Uninterrupted• This Means that Insurers Continue to:
Pay claims (whereas 27 banks have gone under) The Promise is Being Fulfilled
Renew existing policies (banks are reducing and eliminating lines of credit)
Write new policies (banks are turning away people who want or need to borrow)
Develop new products (banks are scaling back the products they offer)
Source: Insurance Information Institute25
• Emphasis on Underwriting Matching of risk to price (via experience and modeling) Limiting of potential loss exposure Some banks sought to maximize volume and fees and disregarded risk
• Strong Relationship Between Underwriting and Risk Bearing Insurers always maintain a stake in the business they underwrite, keeping “skin in the game”
at all times Banks and investment banks package up and securitize, severing the link between risk
underwriting and risk bearing, with (predictably) disastrous consequences—straightforward moral hazard problem from Econ 101
• Low Leverage Insurers do not rely on borrowed money to underwrite insurance or pay claimsThere is no
credit or liquidity crisis in the insurance industry• Conservative Investment Philosophy
High quality portfolio that is relatively less volatile and more liquid• Comprehensive Regulation of Insurance Operations
The business of insurance remained comprehensively regulated whereas a separate banking system had evolved largely outside the auspices and understanding of regulators (e.g., hedge funds, private equity, complex securitized instruments, credit derivatives—CDS’s)
• Greater Transparency Insurance companies are an open book to regulators and the public
Source: Insurance Information Institute26
Reasons Why P/C Insurers Have Fewer Problems Than Banks:
A Superior Risk Management Model
The Financial Crisis in PerspectiveBank vs. Insurer Impacts
$600
$106
$780
$205
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
$700
$800
Banks Insurers
Losses as of Sept 2008
Total expected losses
Financial Institutions Globally FacingHuge Losses from the Credit Crunch*
*Global losses since the beginning of 2007.Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008, IIF, Bloomberg, cited in a presentation by Thomas Hess (Chief Economist, Swiss Re) October 23, 2008, accessed via Geneva Association web site.
Billions
The IMF estimates total “credit- turmoil-related” losses will
eventually amount to $1.4 trillion
$205B or 20.8% of estimated total (bank+insurer) losses will be
sustained by insurers worldwide
28
US Bank Failures:* 1995-2009**
86
13
8 7
4
11
3 4
0 0
3
25
2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09**
Through January 23, 2009
Remarkably, as recently as 2005 and 2006, no
banks failed—the first time this had happened in
FDIC history (dating back to 1934)
*Includes all commercial banking and savings institutions. **Through Jan. 23. Source: FDIC: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/index.html; Insurance Info. Institute
Bank failures are up sharply. 27 banks (but no p/c or life
insurers) failed in 2008/09 due to the financial crisis, including the largest in history—Washington Mutual with $307B in assets.
30
Top 10 P/C Insolvencies, Based Upon Guaranty Fund Payments*
$2,265.8
$1,272.7
$1,049.7$843.4
$699.4$566.5 $555.8 $543.1 $531.6 $516.8
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
* Disclaimer: This is not a complete picture. If anything the numbers are understated as some states have not reported in certain years.
Source: National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds, as of September 17, 2008.
$ MillionsThe 2001 bankruptcy of Reliance Insurance was the largest ever among p/c insurers
32
P/C INSURANCE FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE
A Resilient Industry in Challenging Times
Profitability
Historically Volatile
P/C Net Income After Taxes1991-2009F ($ Millions)*
$14,
178
$5,8
40
$19,
316
$10,
870
$20,
598
$24,
404 $3
6,81
9
$30,
773
$21,
865
$3,0
46
$30,
029
$61,
940
$5,4
21
-$6,970
$65,
777
$44,
155
$20,
559
$38,
501
-$10,000
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$70,000
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
08F
*ROE figures are GAAP; 1Return on avg. surplus. 2008 numbers are annualized based on 9-mos. Actual of $4.066 billion.Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Inst.
2001 ROE = -1.2%2002 ROE = 2.2%2003 ROE = 8.9%2004 ROE = 9.4%2005 ROE= 9.4%2006 ROE = 12.2%2007 ROAS1 = 12.3%2008 ROAS = 1.1%*
Insurer profits peaked in 2006.
35
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 06 08
1975: 2.4%
1977:19.0% 1987:17.3% 1997:11.6% 2006:12.2%
1984: 1.8% 1992: 4.5% 2001: -1.2%
10 Years
10 Years
9 Years
Note: 2009 figure is actual 9-month result.Sources: ISO; Insurance Information Institute.
2008E: 1.1%
P/C Insurance Industry ROEs,1975 – 2008E*
36
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08*
ROE Cost of Capital
ROE vs. Equity Cost of Capital:US P/C Insurance:1991-2008:Q3
*Excludes mortgage and financial guarantee insurers.Source: The Geneva Association, Ins. Information Inst.
The p/c insurance industry fell well short of is cost of capital in 2008
-13.
2 p
ts
US P/C insurers missed their cost of capital by an average 6.7 points from 1991 to 2002, but on
target or better 2003-07
-1.7
pts
+2.
3 p
ts
-9.0
pts
The cost of capital is the rate of return
insurers need to attract and retain
capital to the business
-9.7
pts
37
Presidential Politics & P/C Insurance
How is Profitability Affected by the President’s Political Party?
15.10%10.13%
8.93%8.65%
8.35%7.98%
7.68%6.98%6.97%
5.43%5.03%
4.83%4.43%
3.55%
16.43%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
Carter
Reagan II
G.W. Bush II
Nixon
Clinton I
G.H.W. Bush
Clinton II
Reagan I
Nixon/Ford
Truman
Eisenhower I
Eisenhower II
G.W. Bush I
Johnson
Kennedy/Johnson
*ROE for 2008 based on H1 data. Truman administration ROE of 6.97% based on 3 years only, 1950-52.Source: Insurance Information Institute
OVERALL RECORD: 1950-2008*
Democrats 8.05%
Republicans 8.02%
Party of President has marginal bearing on profitability of P/C insurance industry
P/C Insurance Industry ROE byPresidential Administration,1950-2008*
Investment Performance
Investments are the Principle Source of Declining
Profitability
Property/Casualty Insurance Industry Investment Gain:1994- 2008:Q3 1
$ Billions
$35.4
$42.8$47.2
$52.3
$44.4
$36.0
$45.3$48.9
$59.4$55.7
$63.6
$28.3
$56.9$51.9
$57.9
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
1Investment gains consist primarily of interest, stock dividends and realized capital gains and losses. 2006 figure consists of $52.3B net investment income and $3.4B realized investment gain. *2005 figure includes special one-time dividend of $3.2B.Sources: ISO; Insurance Information Institute.
Investment gains are off sharply in 2008 due to lower yields and poor equity market conditions.
43
P/C Insurer Net Realized Capital Gains, 1990-2008:Q3
$2.88$4.81
$9.89
$1.66
$6.00
$9.24$10.81
$13.02
$16.21
$6.63
-$1.21
$6.61
$8.97
-$9.71
$18.02
$3.52
$9.70$9.13$9.82
-$10-$8-$6-$4-$2$0$2$4
$6$8
$10$12$14$16$18$20
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
08:Q
3
Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute.
Realized capital gains exceeded $9 billion in 2004/5 but fell sharply in
2006 despite a strong stock market. Nearly $9 billion again in 2007, but
$-9.7 billion in 2008 through Q3.
$ Billions
44
Underwriting Trends
Financial Crisis Does Not Directly Impact Underwriting
Performance: Cycle, Catastrophes Were 2008’s Drivers
115.8
107.5
100.198.4
100.8
92.6
101
103.3101.2
95.7
90
100
110
120
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008* 2009F
P/C Insurance Industry Combined Ratio, 2001-2009E
*Includes Mortgage & Financial Guarantee insurers. Sources: A.M. Best.
Best combined ratio since 1949
(87.6)
As recently as 2001, insurers paid out nearly $1.16 for every
$1 in earned premiums
Relatively low CAT
losses, reserve releases
Including Mortgage
& Fin. Guarantee insurers
Cyclical Deterioration
51
2005 ratio benefited from heavy use of reinsurance which lowered net losses
-55-50-45-40-35-30-25-20-15-10-505
101520253035
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
Source: A.M. Best, ISO; Insurance Information Institute * Includes mortgage & finl. guarantee insurers
$ B
illi
ons
Insurers earned a record underwriting profit of $31.7 billion in 2006, the largest ever but only the
second since 1978. Cumulative underwriting deficit from 1975 through 2007 is $422 billion.
Underwriting Gain (Loss)1975-2008:Q3*
$19.877 Bill underwriting loss in 08:9M incl. mort. & FG insurers
52
Number of Years With Underwriting Profits by Decade, 1920s –2000s
67
10
8
45
0 0
3
0
2
4
6
8
10
1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s*
Note: Data for 1920 – 1934 based on stock companies only.Sources: Insurance Information Institute research from A.M. Best Data. *2000 through 2008.
Number of Years with Underwriting ProfitsUnderwriting profits were common before the 1980s (40 of the 60 years
before 1980 had combined ratios below 100)—but then they vanished. Not a single underwriting profit was recorded in the 25 years from 1979
through 2003.
53
Personal Lines
Auto (~75% of Market)Home (~25%)
103.
9
104.
5
103.
5
104.
9
99.8 10
2.7
104.
5
109.
9
110.
9
105.
3
98.4
94.3 96
.4
93.9
97.6
103.
3
97.6
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08E 09FSource: A.M. Best (historical and forecast).
Improvement in 2009 assumes reasonable degree of underwriting
discipline and average CAT activity ($10 B -$12B)
Personal LinesCombined Ratio, 1993-2009F
2008 deterioration due to price
competition and higher CAT
losses. Trends reverse in 2009.
Commercial Lines
110.
3
110.
2
107.
6
103.
9
109.
7
112.
3
111.
1
122.
3
110.
2
102.
5
105.
4
91.1
95.1
106.
5
105.
1
102.
0
112.
5
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08E 09F
2006/07 benefited from favorable loss cost trends, improved tort environment, low CAT
losses, WC reforms and reserve releases. Most of these trends reversed in 2008 and
mortgage and financial guarantee segments have big influence. 2009 is transition year.
Commercial coverages have exhibited significant
variability over time.
Commercial Lines Combined Ratio, 1993-2009F
Mortgage and financial guarantee may account for up to 4 points on the commercial
combined ratio in 2008
Sources: A.M. Best (historical and forecasts)
Catastrophe Losses
Impacting Underwriting Results and the Bottom Line
U.S. Insured Catastrophe Losses*$7
.5
$2.7
$4.7
$22.
9
$5.5 $1
6.9
$8.3
$7.4
$2.6 $1
0.1
$8.3
$4.6
$26.
5
$5.9 $1
2.9 $2
7.5
$6.7
$25.
2$1
00.0
$61.
9
$9.2
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
08**
20??
*Excludes $4B-$6b offshore energy losses from Hurricanes Katrina & Rita.**Based on PCS data through Dec. 31. PCS $2.1B loss of for Gustav. $10.655B for Ike of 12/05/08.Note: 2001 figure includes $20.3B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims. Non-prop/BI losses = $12.2B.Source: Property Claims Service/ISO; Insurance Information Institute
$ Billions2008 CAT losses exceeded
2006/07 combined. 2005 was by far the worst year ever for
insured catastrophe losses in the US, but the worst has yet to come.
$100 Billion CAT year is coming soon
65
Capital/Policyholder
Surplus
Shrinkage, but Capital is Within Historic Norms
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
$400
$450
$500
$550
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
U.S. Policyholder Surplus: 1975-2008*
Source: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute. *Towers Perrin estimate as of 12/31/08
$ B
illi
ons
“Surplus” is a measure of underwriting capacity. It is analogous to “Owners Equity” or “Net Worth” in non-insurance organizations
Actual capacity as of 9/30/08 was $478.5, down 7.6% from 12/31/07 at $517.9B, but 68% above its 2002
trough. Recent peak was $521.8 as of 9/30/07. Estimate as of 12/31/08 is $438B is 16% below 2007
peak.
The premium-to-surplus ratio stood at $0.94:$1 at year end 2008, up from
near record low of $0.85:$1 at year-end 2007
72
Policyholder Surplus, 2006:Q4 – 2008:Q4(Est.)
$ Billions
$487.1$496.6
$512.8$521.8
$478.5
$438.0
$505.0$515.6
$517.9
$380
$400
$420
$440
$460
$480
$500
$520
$540
06:Q4 07:Q1 07:Q2 07:Q3 07:Q4 08:Q1 08:Q2 08:Q3 08:Q4
Source: ISO (historical); Towers Perrin (Oct. 21) estimates for Q4 2008. Q4 assumes no major Investment market recovery before year-end 2008.
Declines Since 2007:Q3 Peak
Q2: -$16.6B (-3.2%) Q3E: -$43.3B (-8.3%)
Q4E: -$84B (-16.1%)
Capacity peaked at $521.8 as of 9/30/07
73
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 0708:Q3
U.S. P/C Industry Premiums-to-Surplus Ratio: 1985-2008:Q3
Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute.
19980.85:1–the lowest
(strongest) P:S ratio in recent history.
Premiums measure risk accepted; surplus is funds beyond reserves to pay unexpected losses. The larger
surplus is in relation to premiums—the lower the ratio of premiums to surplus—the greater the
industry’s capacity to handle the risk it has accepted.
0.92:1 as of
9/30/08
P/C insurers remain well capitalized despite recent
erosion of capital
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
*
NWP % changeSurplus % change
*Actual 9-month 2008 result.Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute
Historically, Hard Markets Follow When Surplus “Growth” is Negative
Sharp decline in capacity is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a true hard market
P/C Premium Growth
Primarily Driven by the Industry’s Underwriting Cycle, Not the Economy
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute
Strength of Recent Hard Marketsby NWP Growth
1975-78 1984-87 2000-03Shaded areas denote “hard
market” periods
Net written premiums fell 1.0%
in 2007 (first decline since 1943)
and by 0.4% in 2008, the first back-
to-back decline since 1930-33
77
Year-to-Year Change in Net Written Premium, 2000-2008E*
*2008 figure is 9-month actual result from ISO.Source: A.M. Best (historical)
5.0%
8.4%
15.3%
10.0%
3.9%
0.5%
4.2%
-1.0% -0.4%2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008F
P/C insurers are experiencing their
slowest growth rates since 1930-33
Slow growth means retention is critical
Protracted period of
negative or slow growth is possible due to soft
markets and slow
economy
78
AFTERSHOCK: Regulatory Response
Could Be Harsh
All Financial Segments Including InsurersWill Be Impacted
Emerging Blueprint for Financial Services Regulatory Overhaul
*http://financialservices.house.gov/press110/press0320082.shtml
Source: Wall Street Journal, “Frank Backs Regulator for Systemic Risk,” 2/4/09, p. C3; I.I.I. research.
Phase I: Systemic Risk Regulation/Regulator Identification of systemic risk points in the financial system Design of appropriate regulation to prevent future collapses Will require international consultation (US can’t manage systemic risk
alone) • Oversight Responsibility: Likely With Federal Reserve
Fed would have capacity and power to assess risk across financial markets regardless of corporate form and to intervene when appropriate *
Fed could oversee (according to House FS Committee Chairman Barney Frank: Hedge funds (need to ensure “complete transparency”) Credit ratings agencies Executive compensation (to curb “perverse risk incentives”)
TIMELINE: Frank wants “general outline” by April 2 meeting of G20 industrialized and developing nations
Emerging Blueprint for Financial Services Regulatory Overhaul (cont’d)
Phase I: Systemic Risk Regulation/Regulator: OTHER (cont’d)
• Unification of federal bank regulatory agencies• Creation of a Financial Products Safety Commission to vet products
before sold to investors• Creation of federal insurance program for muni bonds paid via premiums• Support for status quo on mark-to-market
Phase II: Sectoral Reform/Overhaul• Each segment of the financial services industry will be examined and
subject to regulation specific to its function, risks and other factors• TIMELINE: August 2009 or later
Source: Wall Street Journal, “Frank Backs Regulator for Systemic Risk,” 2/4/09, p. C3; I.I.I. research.
Possible Regulatory Scenarios for P/C Insurers as of Year-End 2009
Source: Insurance Information Inst.
• Status Quo: P/C Insurers Remain Entirely Under Regulatory Supervision of the States Unlikely, but some segments of the industry might welcome this
outcome above all others• Federal Regulation: Everything is Regulated by Feds
Unlikely that states will be left totally in the cold• Optional Federal Charter (OFC): Insurers Could Choose
Between Federal and State Regulation Unlikely to be implemented as envisioned for past several years by
OFC supporters• Dual Regulation: Federal Regulation Layer Above State
Feds assume solvency regulation, states retain rate/form regulation• Hybrid Regulation: Feds Assume Regulation of Large
Insurers at the Holding Company Level• Systemic Risk Regulator: Feds Focus on Regulation of
Systemic Risk Points in Financial Services Sector What are these points for insurers? P/C vs. Life?
Insurance Information Institute On-Line
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND
YOUR ATTENTION!
87
