Laura Rockwood
Section Head, Non-Proliferation and Policy Making
Office of Legal Affairs
NON-PROLIFERATION & IAEA SAFEGUARDS
- THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK -
The World Nuclear University Summer Institute
Oxford University
30 July 2012
The Dawn
1938: Discovery of
uranium fission in
Europe
July 1945: Trinity
Test
The Threat
6 Aug. 1945: “Little Boy”
9 Aug. 1945: “Fat Man”
The Aftermath
The First Twenty-Five Years: Creation of IAEA and its Safeguards System
1945
US – 1st
and only
use of
nuclear
weapons
1946
Baruch Plan
USSR
NW test
1949
UK NW
test
1952
1953
“Atoms for
Peace”
Proposal IAEA
established
1957
France
NW test
China
NW test
1964 1960
1st IAEA SG
system
(INFCIRC/26)
1961
Expansion of SG
system –
(INFCIRC/66, Rev.1
& Rev.2)
1968
NPT
opened
for
signature
Latin
American
NWFZ
Treaty
opened
for
signature
1967
1965-68
Early Non-Proliferation Efforts
• 1945: UN established – Charter signed June 1945
• Jan 1946: United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission (UNAEC) created
• Members of UNAEC represented on UNSC
• June 1946: Baruch Plan - US proposal for
International Atomic Development Authority (IADA)
• IADA - monopoly on nuclear material & facilities
• US to destroy all NW; give all info to IADA
• Safeguards in all countries
• Died with USSR’s first nuclear weapon test in 1949
Challenges of the 1950’s - 60’s
Exercise unilateral restraint in sharing technology
AND
Create independent international verification body
AND
Develop system for verifying use of supplied material
and items
Perceived Risk?
Proliferation of nuclear weapons through misuse of
supplied material and items
“Atoms for Peace” – December 1953
“It is not enough to take
this weapon out of the
hands of the soldiers.
“It must be put into the
hands of those who will
know how to strip its
military casing and
adapt it to the arts of
peace.”
THE IAEA
• Created by the Statute of the IAEA in 1957
• Independent inter-governmental organization
• Unique relationship with UN Security Council
• Not a UN organization
• 154 Member States
• Authority to implement
safeguards
IAEA Safeguards
• Article III.A.5 • Agency assistance
• To bilateral or multilateral arrangements • e.g. NPT; Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties
• To any nuclear activities of a State, at its request
• Article XII • Safeguards measures
• On site inspection
• Any time, any place access
• Reports and record keeping
• Non-compliance
IAEA Safeguards
• Membership in IAEA does not require acceptance of safeguards
• IAEA safeguards possible in non-Members (and in non-States)
• DPRK
• Taiwan, China
• Requires consent of State
• Voluntary undertaking
• Security Council Chapter VII
• Safeguards Agreement
Types of Safeguards Agreements
• Item Specific (INFCIRC/66-type)
• India, Israel and Pakistan
• Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOAs)
• The 5 NPT NWSs: China, France, Russia, UK, US
• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs)
(INFCIRC/153-type)
• In force for 167 of the 185 NNWSs
Critical Path to Weapons-Usable Material
WEAPONIZATION
Nuclear-related
infrastructure: research
centers and laboratories
without nuclear material
HEU
PU
Spent Fuel Storage
Fuel
Fab. Reactors
and CAs Reprocessing
Heavy Water Production
Mining Ore
Concen-
tration
Con-
version
Enrichment
Safeguards Coverage under Item Specific
Agreements
Reactors
and CAs
PU
Reprocessing
Heavy Water Production
Fuel
Fab. Con-
version
Nuclear-related
infrastructure: research
centers and laboratories
without nuclear material
HEU
Spent Fuel Storage
Mining Ore
Concen-
tration
Enrichment
WEAPONIZATION
NWFZ: Latin America & Caribbean
Tlatelolco
• Non-proliferation and
peaceful use undertakings
• IAEA SG on all nuclear
activities
• Ban on NW testing
• OPANAL & special
inspections
• Protocols:
• States with territories in the
zone
• NWSs – negative security
assurances
The NPT
• Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament
Committee, Geneva
1965-1968
• Opened for
signature 1968
• Entered into force
5 March 1970
The Following Two Decades: The Comprehensive Safeguards System
Israel
bombs Iraqi
reactor at
Tuwaitha
1971
INFCIRC/153:
Model for NPT
SG Agreements
approved
1972
1st NPT
SG Agreement
enters into force
1974
India tests
“peaceful
nuclear device”
1981
1985
DPRK
becomes
party to
NPT
1990
1990
Iraq
invades
Kuwait
4th NPT
Review
Conference
1990
IAEA starts
“strengthening
SG”
NPT
enters
into
force
1970
1971
NPT Zangger
Committee
(Trigger List
published in
1974
INFCIRC/209)
1974
Nuclear
Suppliers Group
(Guidelines
published in
1978
INFCIRC/254)
1986
South
Pacific
NWFZ
Treaty
EIF
Chernobyl
1986
Challenges of the 1970’s-80’s
Perceived Risk?
Proliferation through misuse of indigenous nuclear
fuel cycle
Develop safeguards system for verifying supplied and
produced nuclear material in a State
AND
Require export controls for nuclear material and
specialized single use equipment and material
The NPT
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs)
•Not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Art. II)
•Accept safeguards on all nuclear material (Art. III.1, 4)
All States Parties
•Export controls: nuclear material; single use items (Art. III.2)
•Facilitate exchange of technology (Art. IV.2)
•Pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Art. VI)
Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs)
•Not to provide nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices to NNWSs (Art. I)
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
The Structure and Content of Agreements
between the Agency and States required in
connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)
CSAs: State’s Undertaking
INFCIRC/153, para. 1
… to accept safeguards, in accordance with
the terms of the Agreement, on all source
or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of the State, under its jurisdiction
or carried out under its control anywhere ...
CSA – Basic Obligations of the State
• Establish a State system of accounting for
and control of nuclear material (SSAC) (paras 7, 31, 32)
• Provide information to the Agency
• Facilitate access by Agency
• Cooperate with the Agency (para. 3)
*Paragraph references are to INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)
Responses?
•If Board decides an action by the State is
“essential and urgent” to ensure verification of
non-diversion, State is obliged to take that action
(INFCIRC/153, para. 18)
• If Agency is unable to verify that there has been
no diversion of nuclear material, may report to
Security Council and/or take other action
(INFCIRC/153, para. 19)
Safeguards Coverage under CSAs
WEAPONIZATION
Mining Ore
Concen-
tration
Heavy Water Production
Nuclear-related
infrastructure: research
centers and laboratories
without nuclear material
Con-
version
Fuel
Fab. Reactors
and CAs
Spent Fuel Storage
Reprocessing
PU
HEU
Enrichment
Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) - 1974
• State eligibility for SQP (GOV/INF/276, Annex B): • Little or no nuclear material and
• No nuclear material in a nuclear facility
• Holds in abeyance much of State’s reporting and access requirements
• Does not hold in abeyance: • Obligation not to divert nuclear material to
proscribed uses
• Requirement to establish SSAC
• Report annually imports and exports of nuclear material
Limitations of Traditional Safeguards
• Limited routine access – frequency and
locations
• Little attention to small quantities of material
• Focus on declared materials (correctness)
• No assurances of absence of undeclared
nuclear material and facilities (completeness)
Export Controls: NPT and Non-NPT
Zangger Committee (1971) – NPT suppliers
•Trigger List (1974) – Nuclear material and single use
items triggering safeguards
(INFCIRC/209)
Nuclear Suppliers Group (1975) – All major suppliers
• List of single use items and related technology (1978)
(INFCIRC/254)
Limitations of Export Controls
Limited scope and conditions:
• No requirement for full-scope SG
• No controls on dual-use items items relevant
to nuclear weapons development
Limited information exchange:
• No procedures for exchanging information on
export denials
• No provision of information to the IAEA
NWFZ: South Pacific
Rarotonga
• Non-proliferation and peaceful
use undertakings
• Comprehensive safeguards:
support for IAEA SG system
• Consultative Committee &
complaints procedures
• Ban on dumping radioactive
waste
• Protocols for:
• States with territories in the zone
• NWSs – negative security
assurances
• NWSs – no testing
The Next Decade: Strengthening Safeguards
IAEA
discovery
of Iraq’s
nuclear
weapons
programme
1991
Iraq:
UNSC
res.
687
1991
1991
South
Africa
concludes
NPT SGA
1992
DPRK: NPT
SGA enters
into force
1993
1993
1993
1993
1998
1995
IAEA’s
Programme
93+2
initiated
DPRK:
IAEA
detects
incon-
sistencies
DPRK: non-
compliance;
report to
UNSC
NPT
extended
indefinitely
Iraq: IAEA
inspectors
withdrawn
1997
South
Africa:
declares
dismantled
6 weapons
Model
Additional
Protocol
approved
(INFCIRC/
540)
1994
US/DPRK
Agreed
Framework
1998
India,
Pakistan
NW tests
1995
“93+2”
to
Board
South-East Asian
NWFZ Treaty
1996-7
5th NPT
Review
Conf.
2000
CTBT
10 34
24
19
21
33
23 20
35
22
32
7 8
26
25
29
36
31 30
27
28 11
1
2
3
6
9
5
39
40
68
72
69
70 71
73C
73B
73A
74
66
38 37
12
41
65
64
13
14
67
76
75 77
63
79 78
80
54
49
46
48
4
17
16
47
44
42 43
45
51
86
57
53 15 50
59
61
56
58
52
55 87
83
82
62
81
84
60
85
89
88
18
90
IT
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory
IQC
Tammuz 2 Reactor
IQB
IRT 5000
Reactor IQA
TUWAITHA
Activities Declared Prior to 1991
10 34
24
19
21
33
23 20
35
22
32
7 8
26
25
29
36
31 30
27
28 11
1
2
3
6
9
5
39
40
68
72
69
70 71
73C
73B
73A
74
66
38 37
12
41
65
64
13
14
67
76
75 77
63
79 78
80
54
49
46
48
4
17
16
47
44
42 43
45
51
86
57
53 15 50
59
61
56
58
52
55 87
83
82
62
81
84
60
85
89
88
18
90
IT
Temporary weaponization
Explosives, Neutron initiatior
Planned
production of U metal
Clandestine Isotope irradiation
and location of computers
Reprocessing
Tritium activities and
HEU recovery (crash program)
Laser enrichment research and support Theoretical
weaponization
activities
U metal
production
UCl4
production
lab
EMIS
development
Weaponization theoretical
computations
R&D
UF4 and UF6
preparation
R&D chemical
enrichment
EMIS related activities
TUWAITHA
Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Activities
Challenges of the 1990’s
Ensure verification of all nuclear material and activities:
declared and the absence of undeclared
AND
Expand export controls to cover dual use items
Perceived Risk?
Proliferation through undeclared nuclear material
and activities
CSAs – Shifting Perceptions
INFCIRC/153, para. 2
… the Agency’s right and obligation to
ensure that safeguards will be applied … on
ALL source or special fissionable material in
all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or
carried out under its control anywhere ...
Redefined Objective
Assurances of Correctness and
Completeness of a State’s
Declarations
Model Additional Protocol
Model Protocol Additional
to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards
INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)
What’s New?
Additional Information • Sites of nuclear facilities/LOFs
• R&D without nuclear material
• Nuclear material not otherwise reported under the CSA
• Manufacturing & export of components/equipment
Complementary Access • To places beyond nuclear material and facilities
• Short notice (2/24 hours) – not unannounced
• Managed access to protect sensitive information
Administrative Measures • Simplified inspector designation
• Reduced visa requirements
What’s NOT new?
• Agency’s right to carry out unannounced inspections
(INFCIRC/153, para. 84)
• Agency’s right to request access to undeclared locations
(INFCIRC/153, para. 73, 77)
• Agency’s right to verify correctness and completeness
(INFCIRC/153, para. 2)
Safeguards Coverage: CSAs with APs
WEAPONIZATION
Reprocessing Mining Ore
Concen-
tration
Con-
version
Enrichment
Fuel
Fab. Reactors
and CAs
Spent Fuel Storage
PU
Heavy Water Production
HEU
Nuclear-related
infrastructure: research
centers and laboratories
without nuclear material
INFCIRC/254:
• Part 1 (1978): “EDP” items, and technology transfer
• Part 2 (1992): Dual-use equipment, material and technology
• Conditions:
“Full scope” SG as condition for future supplies (1992)
Exchange within NSG of notifications of denials
INFCIRC/539 (Rev.4): Outreach activities
1997: “The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities” - revisions issued in 2000, 2003, 2005 & 2009
Export Control Developments
NWFZ: Africa & Southeast Asia
Bangkok • Non-proliferation and peaceful
use undertakings
• Comprehensive safeguards: support for NPT & IAEA SG system
• Export controls
• Fact-finding missions by Executive Committee
• Ban on dumping radioactive waste
• Protocol: • NWSs– negative security
assurances
The Last Decade
Iraq: IAEA
resumes SC
inspections
2002 2003
DPRK
rejects Agreed
Framework;
expels IAEA
inspectors
2002
Iran: non-
compliance
reported to SC
2002
2003
DPRK
announces
withdrawal
from NPT
2003
Iraq: IAEA
inspectors
withdrawn
2003
Iran:
discovery of
undeclared
enrichment
programme
7th NPT
Rev. Con.
DPRK:
enrichment
programme
for weapons
2001
2004
Libya: NW
programme
ROK/Egypt:
undeclared nuclear
activities
2005
UNSC
resolution
1540:
non-State
actors 9/11
2003
2006
DPRK
announces
NW test
2007
DPRK:
IAEA
returns
Syria:
bombing of
Dair Alzour
2009
DPRK
expels
IAEA
US/India Deal
PSI
N. Terrorism
Convention
EIF of
Pelindaba
& CANWFZ
Treaties
UNSC
resolution
1887
Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) - 2005
• State eligibility for SQP (GOV/INF/276, Annex B): • Little or no nuclear material and
• No existing or planned nuclear facility
• Still holds in abeyance much of State’s reporting and access requirements
• BUT reinstates State’s obligation to: • Provide an initial report on nuclear material
• Permit Agency access to verify the initial report
• Provide early information on any decision to construct a nuclear facility
The Nobel Peace Prize – December 2005
Challenges of New Millennium?
Perceived Risks:
Nuclear black markets – non-State actors
Weaponization – undetected activities
Breakout – withdrawal from the NPT
Disarmament slowdown – failure to fulfil
obligations under Article VI of the NPT
UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004)
• WMD and role of non-State actors
• Need for domestic:
• Border controls
• Accounting & security controls
• Physical protection
• Effective national legislation
Possible Responses?
Possible Responses?
UNSC Resolution 1887
• Arms reduction & disarmament
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
• Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty
• Security assurances by the NWSs
• Security Council resolutions
• Export controls & illicit trafficking
• Best practices in safety & security
• Effective IAEA safeguards
Today’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
Security Council
IAEA Safeguards
Security Disarmament
Export controls
Security Assurances
Safety Counter Proliferation
NPT & NWFZ Treaties
Assurances of Supply
The Present and Beyond …
2010
2010
Nuclear Security
Summit
8th
NPT
Rev.
Con.
2010
Iran
UNSC
Res. 1984
Fukushima
Accident
2011
Syria
Reported
to UNSC
2011
Tomorrow's Regime …
Security Council
IAEA Safeguards
Security Disarmament
Export controls
Security Assurances
Safety Counter Proliferation
NPT & NWFZ Treaties
Assurances of Supply
