Verification» Testing for CP8L for Usei in Shearon Harris-Nuclear. Power'Plant~" in compliance~ w/Rev 1 to Reg, Guide.1 '5 3, Section Si 1, li2'. of IEEE« Std 384 1974
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NGY 3 11985 SERIAL: NLS-85-001
Mr. Harold R. Denton, DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationUnited States Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANTUNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-000TEST REPORT ON ELECTRICAL SEPARATION VERIFICATIONTESTING
Dear Mr. Denton:
Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) hereby submits additional informationconcerning Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Shearon Harris NuclearPower Plant (SHNPP). This information is submitted to support the SHNPP compliancewith Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 1, "Physical Independence of Electrical Systems,"and with Section 5.1.1.2 of IEEE Standard 380-1970, "IEEE Trial-Use Criteria forSeparation of Class lE Equipment and Circuits," which allows the use of testing andanalyses to justify separation of less than the spatial requirements of Sections 5.1.3 and5.1.0 of IEEE Standard 380-1970. Attached is a copy of the Wyle Laboratories Report,"Test Report on Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Carolina Power &Light Company Use in the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Test ReportNumber 07879-02," which contains the analyses and test descriptions to support theSHNPP criteria for electrical separation.
The test methodology, conditions, and results contained in the attached Wyle Test Reportare summarized below:
TEST METHODOLOGY/SEQUENCE
l. Carolina Power & Light Company evaluation of SHNPP electrical auxiliary systemdesign and breaker schemes, cable tray fill,etc., as input to development of the testconditions.
2. Carolina Power & Light Company/Wyle evaluation of field as-built installations anddevelopment of test configurations.
3. Carolina Power dc Light Company/Wyle development of Test ProcedureNo, 07879-01, Revision A.
damage potential.
5. Confi uration Tests - Verify acceptability of tested configurations and separationdistances without interposing barriers. Configuration tests were only necessary forthat voltage class where the capability of ignition was demonstrated (i.e., powerclass).
85ii260452 851121P,DR ADOCK', 05000400A
411 Fayettevtlte Street ~ P. O. Box 1551 o Raleigh, N. C. 27602
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Mr. Harold R. DentonPage 2
TEST CONDITIONS
The following conditions/assumptions are bases of the test program:
l. A cable in the SHNPP raceway systeqexperiences a fault current in excess of thecables allowable energy let-through (I t) due to failure of the circuits primaryovercurrent protective device.
2. The test current is that current just below the long-time trip setting of the circuitssecondary overcurrent protective device, and is maintained at a constant value untilconductor open-circuit or steady-state is reached.
3. No credit has been taken for operator initiated action to clear the fault.
0. The current was conservatively maintained at a constant level as the circuitimpedance increases due to conductor heating.
. TEST RESULTS
The test results are detailed in Wyle Test Report No. 07879-02. The minimum separationdistances based on the test results are detailed on Table 1 (attached). Also contained inTable 1 are the minimum SHNPP acceptable separation distances which are based on theWyle Test results with additional conservatisms added to some of the testedconf igurations.
In general, the SHNPP design philosophy for separation of electrical cables and racewaysis to provide spatial separation as required by Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.0 of IEEEStandard 380-1970 wherever possible. Where spatial separation is not possible, theminimum separation distances willbe justified by analysis supported by test or suitableban iers willbe provided. Attached are marked-up pages for FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.30 toreflect this revised position. These changes willbe included in a future FSARamendment.
3HE/ccc (30053DK)
Attachments
Yours very truly,
S. R. Zi mermanManager
Nuclear Licensing Section
CC: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)Mr. O. Chopra (NRC-PSB)Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP)Wake County Public Library
Mr. H. A. ColeMr. Wells EddlemanMr. 3ohn D. RunkleDr. Richard D. WilsonMr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)Dr. 3. H. Carpenter (ASLB)Mr. 3. L. Kelley (ASLB)
TABLE 1
MINIMUMSEPARATION DISTANCES
SeparationConfiguration(From/To)i~ote 1
1) Low level or controlF/A cable or tray toClass IE raceway orcable
Minimum SHNPPAcceptable
Separation Distances
1" horizontal,3" vertical
Acceptable WyleTest/Analysis
Separation Distances
1" vertical
2) LV power tray toClass lE F/A cable,tray or flex conduit
3) LV power tray (H) toClass IE conduit
12" horizontal,36" vertical
0" horizontal,12" vertical
12" horizontal,36" vertical
1" horizontal,12" vertical
0) LV power F/A cable toClass lE F/A cable,tray or flex conduit
5) LV power F/A cable ortray (R) to Class 1Econduit
12" horizontal,36" vertical
12" horizontal,12" vertical
6" horizontal,36" vertical
6" horizontal,12" vertical
6) Conduit to Class IEtray or F/A cable
F/AHRLV
Note 1
Free AirHorizontal TrayRiser Tray-Low Voltage
Separation distances shown only apply when considering the "from" as thedamage source and the "to" as the protected raceway.
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SHNPP FSAR
I'h"For a further description of isolation devices, refer toSec t ion 8. 3. 1. 2. 14.
(b) Non-Class IE equipment is physically separated from Class I'::equipment by the above mentioned methods ( i.e., separated safetyclass structures, distance, suitable barriers, or" any cuinbinationthereof).
Specific Separation Criteria
1) Separation Criteria for Cables and Raceways
(a) General Plant Areas: General plant areas are considered tobe those areas in which the Class IF. raceways are not subject topipe whip or other hazards as described in Paragraph (b) below,and with the exception of the cable spreading rooms. The minimumseparation distances utilized in general plant areas are 3 f t ~ (ortrays separated horizontally and 5 f t. for trays separatedvertically. This separation distance I.s based on the following:
(1) Cable splices in cable trays are prohibited.
(2) Cable and raceways are flame retardant.
0< (3) b e ay are ot f led ove e iie l~(4) Hazards are limited to failures or faults internal tnthe electric-equi pment or„cables.
If, in addition, high energy electric'equipment such as f~.9 kVswitckgear, transformers over 480V or large rotating equipmt at Isexcluded from the area, and power cables are installed in enclosedraceways or there are no power cables, the minimum separationdistance is 1 ft- horizontally and three ft. vertlcaLLy.
Horizontal separation is measured from the side rail oF on< trayto the side rail of the adjacent tray. Vertical separation isineasured from the bottom of the top trav to the top of the siderail of the bottom tray. C casu ~ I
F Co+IN scpgr g+adh is Mctsurgg A Hne.
/ere t e a ove separation diptance cou' not be nai af,ned
suigable fire barriers and/~ appr»ved protective oat ing. haveb 6n utiIized .or cab'.es hale been instat'Ied In i i .losed in~~wayshich re s 'ftablp for p»tect ~g the cable..r m;i . Ir. In
ad j ent ceways. In enera plas areas t't ee-hou f I.re~~
~~ba riers >ave been in. al leg betw n red da cable trav whe et e ab e separation Lstaqces c ld no be nai,nta ed. Inddit on maximum u e has Seen ade o inh rent b .rie.s su i asS
floors and walls i the design of th ra way sy tens.r'.3. 1-37
Sa!NPP FSARMLS b05
go $F'
21
T mi 'mu separa- n di ce twe enclos r ew s
et en arrier and prot ted racewa i
on-Glass IE circuits are generally p'eparated from Clas 'Ecircuits by the same minimum spatiaL requirements as r dundant:Class IE circu ts are s j>arated f om each o er. Ho ever, w rethe cynvergi circuit are cont ined in ass IE ay and on-
Clasg IE co duit, on) the non lass IE aceway c'rcuits rey
enclosed (p .e., in conduit). Analysis f this nfigur ion s
demonstrated that/here uou be no a/verse ef ecrs of he n n-Class IP circuit pon the glass IE or recite. Non-Class IE,
. ~ circuMs need no't be ro ted from Class IE circui
(b)'able and Raceway Hazard Areas — Analyses of the effects ofpipe whip, jet impingement, missiles, fire, and floodingdemonstrate that safety related electrical circuits, raceways, and
equipment are not degraded beyond an acceptable level.
The analyses are referenced as follows'.
High Pressure Piping
Missiles
Flammable Material
Flooding
(Seciion 3.6)
(Section 3.5)
(Section 9.5.1)
(Section 2.4)
In fire hazard areas outside the cable spreading rooms, whereredundant safety related trays or safety relapsed and non-safetyrelated trays are exposed to the same fire hazard, protection has.
been provided by spatial separation, Eire suppression systems,fire retardant coatings, fire barriers, or combination thereoE.
(c) Cable Spreading Area and Control Room
The cable spreading area is the space below the Control Room wherethe instrumentation and control cables converge prior to enteringthe control, termination, or instrumentation panels. Refer toSection 8.3.1.2.14 for further discussion of the circuits in theseareas. s
W~se'-r f1 bar ers+Hand/o encl sed cew s, av eeit a m 1mum mepar ion stan o 1 i . b we
r ewaye or twee barr's a t pr ec edbpfere phe con/ergi rac ay are pec1fi lly
tray and non-Glass I<F<cond t, denly he non-Class E
t1 zee clo drac ay(Class
In the cable spreading rooms; cabling for redundant safetydivisions A and B are separated by three hour fire barriers.Automatic sprinklers are also provided in the cable spreadingrooms. Non-safety related cables are run in separate racewaysfrom safety related cables uith a~separation distance of IEt. Eor trays separated horizontally and 3 Et. for trays separatedvertically. e the~inimum separat1o ~rrme
1nt ln
8. 3. 1-38 Amendment No. 21
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raceway ci uits are en sed (i.e., ig onduit). An@lysis of~
~ ~~
~~
+his co figuration has demonstrated Mat there would be no adverseeffec of the nonMlass IE circu~s upon the Cl~s IE circuits. '] '=
Son lass IE circuits need not~'e protected f Class IE~ ~rcuxts.
e ov5 'separation met o s are based on t e ollowing:
(I) Cable splices in cable trays are prohibited.
(2)
~3)Cable and raceways are flame retardant.
J'athe trays are not. fill above t e ~de caila.
(4) Hazards are limited to internal faults or faultsinternal to the electric equipment or cables.
(d) Identification - For ident:ification of cable and raceways,refer to Section 8.3.1.3.
2) Separation Criteria for the Emergency AC Zwwer Supply
(a) Emergency Diesel Generators'. Redundant Class lE emergencydiesel generators are located in separate safety class structuresand have independent air supplies. The wall separating dieselgenerator sets is floodtight and fire resistant, and protects theredundant sets against internally generated missiles. Missileprotection is described in Section 3.5.
3) Separation Criteria for the DC Power-Supplies
(a) Batteries'Redundant. Class-1E batteries are installed inseparate rooms in the Reactor Auxiliary Building.
(b) Battery Chargers: Battery chargers for redundant Class 1Ebatteries are physically separated by the methods described inSection 8.3.1.2.30(a).
(c) Distribution Panels: Redundant Class lE DC distributionpanels are physically separated by the methods described inSection 8.3.1.2.30(a).
4) Separation Criteria for the Distribution System
(a) Redundant Class 1E 6.9 kV switchgear and 480V power centersare located in separate electrical equipment rooms.
(b) Redundant Class 1E 480V motor control centers, 208/120Vdistribution panels and 120V uninterruptible power supplies areseparated by the methods described in Section 8.3.1.2.30(a).
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INSERT A
Where the above separation distance could not be maintained, thelesser separation distances have been established and )ustified by(1) test, (2) analysis or (3) the installation of suitable firebarriers/or approved protective coatings.
(1) Test — CP&L has contracted Wyle Laboratories to perform testingin accordance with Section 5.1.1.2 of IEEE-384-1974 to )ustifylesser separation distances. The test methodology, conditionsand results are documented in Wyle Test Report No. 47879-02 andare briefly described in the sections below.
a. Test Methodolo /Se uence
CP&L evaluation of SH? ?P electrical auxi.liarysystem design and breaker schemes, cable trayfill, etc. as input to development of the testconditions.
2. CP&L/Wyle evaluation of field as-builtinstallations and development of testconfigurations.
3. CP&L/Wyle development of test procedure No.47879-01 Rev. A.
4. Screenin Tests — to determine the cable(s) withignition. potential and the- worst damagepotential—. ~
5. Confi uration Tests —verify acceptability oftested configurations and separation distanceswithout interposing barriers. Configurationtests were only necessary for that voltage classwhere the capability of ignition wasdemonstrated (i.e. power class).
b. Test Conditions
The following conditions/assumptions are bases of thetest program:
1. A cable in the SHNPP raceway system experiencesa fault current in excess of the cablesallowable energy let-through (I~t) due tofailure of the circuits primary overcurrentprotective device.
2. The test current is that current )ust below thelong-time trip setting of the circuits secondaryovercurrent protective device, and is maintainedat a constant value untill conductoropen-circuit or steady-state is reached.
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b. Test Conditions (continued)
3. No credit has been taken for operator initiated~ action to clear the fault.
4. The current was conservatively maintained at aconstant level as the circuit impedanceincreases due to conductor heating.
C ~ Test Results
The test results are detailed in Wyle Test Report No.47879-02. The minimum separation distances based on thetest results are detailed in Table 8.3.1.10.
(2) ~Anal eie — Vhete the damage potential ie contained within aconduit, and the class 1E cable(s) are in tray or are free airdrop out cable, an analysis has been performed in accordancewith the recommendations of Section 5. 1.1.2 of IEEE-384-1974 tojustify a minimum separation distance of one inch. The resultsof the analysis indicate that provided one inch separation ismaintained, any damage potential associated with the conduit-will have no adverse affects on the Class 1E circuits.
(3) Installation of Barriers - Where the separation distances couldnot be justified by test or analysis suitable barriers/orapproved protective coatings have been utilized, or cables havebeen installed in enclosed- raceways which are suitable forprotecLing the ~bles. The minimum separation distance betweenenclosed -raceways or between nd the raceway/cable(s) is1 in.
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