Overview The Wassenaar Arrangement: Contributes to regional and international security and stability Promotes transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies Complements and reinforces the existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems Is not directed against any state or group of states. Uses export controls as a means to combat terrorism The Wassenaar Arrangement follows "Guidelines and Procedures, including the Initial Elements ". The "Initial Elements" were originally established in 1996 (and have been exceptionally amended in 2001), and set out the Purposes and Scope of the Arrangement. They also cover the Wassenaar Arrangement approach on: Control Lists Procedures for the General Information Exchange Procedures for the Exchange of Information on Dual-Use Goods and Technology Procedures for the Exchange of Information on Arms Meetings and Administration Participation Confidentiality Genesis of the Wassenaar Arrangement In light of the end of the Cold War, members of the former COCOM export control regime recognised that COCOM’s East-West focus was
Transcript
OverviewThe Wassenaar Arrangement:
Contributes to regional and international security and stability Promotes transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-
use goods and technologies Complements and reinforces the existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems Is not directed against any state or group of states. Uses export controls as a means to combat terrorism
The Wassenaar Arrangement follows "Guidelines and Procedures, including the Initial Elements". The "Initial Elements" were originally established in 1996 (and have been exceptionally amended in 2001), and set out the Purposes and Scope of the Arrangement. They also cover the Wassenaar Arrangement approach on:
Control Lists Procedures for the General Information Exchange Procedures for the Exchange of Information on Dual-Use Goods and Technology Procedures for the Exchange of Information on Arms Meetings and Administration Participation Confidentiality
Genesis of the Wassenaar ArrangementIn light of the end of the Cold War, members of the former COCOM export control regime recognised that COCOM’s East-West focus was no longer the appropriate basis for export controls. There was a need to establish a new arrangement to deal with risks to regional and international security and stability related to the spread of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Accordingly, on the 16 th of November 1993, in The Hague, at a High Level Meeting (HLM), representatives of the 17 COCOM member states agreed to terminate COCOM, and establish a new multilateral arrangement, temporarily known as the “New Forum”.
This decision was confirmed at a further HLM in Wassenaar, Netherlands on 29-30 March 1994. COCOM ceased to exist March 31, 1994. Participating States also agreed to continue the use of the COCOM control lists as a basis for global export controls on a national level until the new arrangement could be established. At this time the former COCOM cooperating countries, namely,
Austria, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland, were included as participating states in the "New Forum". With the objective of starting a new arrangement as soon as possible, three Working Groups were established. Working Group 1 was mandated to develop goals, rules and procedures for the new arrangement. Working Group 2 was tasked with developing the lists of goods and technologies that would be controlled, while the third Working Group was tasked to deal with administrative matters.
The Russian Federation, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic were welcomed as participating states at the High Level Meeting held on 11-12 September 1995 in Wassenaar. With this major milestone accomplished, the Working Groups were urged to expedite their work.
Agreement to establish the “Wassenaar Arrangement” was reached at the HLM held on 19 December 1995, again in Wassenaar and this was announced with a declaration issued at the Peace Palace in The Hague. At this time there was also agreement to locate the Secretariat in Vienna and establish a Preparatory Committee of the Whole to prepare for the first plenary meeting.
The inaugural Plenary Meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement was held 2-3 April 1996 in Vienna, Austria. Argentina, the Republic of Korea and Romania were welcomed as additional founding members. Consensus could not be reached on all issues, so the meeting was suspended to provide time to resolve the outstanding issues.
On 11-12 July 1996, the Plenary Meeting resumed, with Bulgaria and Ukraine participating, to make a total of 33 founding members. Final consensus on the “Initial Elements”, the basic document of the WA, was reached and it was established that the new Control Lists and Information Exchange would be implemented from 1 November 1996. The first Plenary Meeting of the now operational Wassenaar Arrangement was held on 12-13 December 1996 in Vienna.
ntroductionThe Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: ntroduction
The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities.
The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion. Therefore, for specifics on Export Controls in Participating States contact the National Authorities in that country.
Representatives of Participating States meet regularly in Vienna where the Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat is located.
The WA Plenary is the decision-making and governing body of the Arrangement. It is composed of representatives of all Participating States who normally meet once a year, usually in December. The Plenary Chair is subject to annual rotation among Participating States.
The Plenary establishes subsidiary bodies for the preparation of recommendations for plenary decisions and calls ad hoc meetings for consultations on issues related to the functioning of the WA. At present, the WA main subsidiary bodies are: the General Working Group (GWG) dealing with policy-related matters and the Experts Group (EG) addressing issues related to the lists of controlled items. Once a year, a Licensing and Enforcement Officers Meeting (LEOM) is held under the auspices of the GWG.
Vienna Points of Contact (VPOC) are called for periodic meetings under the Plenary Chair to facilitate intersessional information flow and communications between/among Participating States and the Secretariat.
The Secretariat provides necessary support to WA operations from Vienna where it is located.
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities.
The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion. Therefore, for specifics on Export Controls in Participating States contact the National Authorities in that country.
Representatives of Participating States meet regularly in Vienna where the Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat is located.
The WA Plenary is the decision-making and governing body of the Arrangement. It is composed of representatives of all Participating States who normally meet once a year, usually in December. The Plenary Chair is subject to annual rotation among Participating States.
The Plenary establishes subsidiary bodies for the preparation of recommendations for plenary decisions and calls ad hoc meetings for consultations on issues related to the functioning of the WA. At present, the WA main subsidiary bodies are: the General Working Group (GWG) dealing with policy-related matters and the Experts Group (EG) addressing issues related to the lists of controlled items. Once a year, a Licensing and Enforcement Officers Meeting (LEOM) is held under the auspices of the GWG.
Vienna Points of Contact (VPOC) are called for periodic meetings under the Plenary Chair to facilitate intersessional information flow and communications between/among Participating States and the Secretariat.
The Secretariat provides necessary support to WA operations from Vienna where it is located.
The Australia Group : An IntroductionThe Australia Group is an informal arrangement which aims to allow exporting or transshipping countries to minimise the risk of assisting chemical and biological weapon (CBW) proliferation. The Group meets annually to discuss ways of increasing the effectiveness of participating countries’
national export licensing measures to prevent would-be proliferators from obtaining materials for CBW programs.
Participants in the Australia Group do not undertake any legally binding obligations: the effectiveness of their cooperation depends solely on a shared commitment to CBW non-proliferation goals and the strength of their respective national measures. Key considerations in the formulation of participants’ export licensing measures are:
they should be effective in impeding the production of chemical and biological weapons; they should be practical, and reasonably easy to implement, and they should not impede the normal trade of materials and equipment used for legitimate
purposes.
All states participating in the Australia Group are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and strongly support efforts under those Conventions to rid the world of CBW.
The Origins of the Australia GroupIn early 1984, a United Nations investigation team found that Iraq had used chemical weapons (CW) in the Iran-Iraq war in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and that at least some of the precursor chemicals and materials for its CW program had been sourced through legitimate trade channels. In response, several countries introduced export controls on certain chemicals that could be used to manufacture CW.
These controls suffered from a lack of uniformity, and it soon became apparent that attempts were being made to circumvent them. This led Australia to propose a meeting of the countries with export controls with the aim of harmonising their national licensing measures and enhancing cooperation. The first meeting of what subsequently became known as the Australia Group took place in Brussels in June 1985. At that meeting, the 15 participating countries and the European Commission agreed that there was value in exploring how existing export controls might be made more effective to prevent the spread of CW.
The Group has met regularly since then, and annual meetings are now held in Paris. The scope of the export controls discussed by the Group has evolved to address emerging threats and challenges. Evidence of the diversion of dual-use materials to biological weapons programs in the early 1990s led to participants’ adoption of export controls on specific biological agents. The control lists developed by the Group have also expanded to include technologies and equipment which can be used in the manufacturing or disposal of chemical and biological weapons.
The number of countries participating in the Australia Group has grown from 15 in 1985 to 40 plus the European Commission.
Objectives of the GroupChemical and biological weapons (CBW) are indiscriminate in their application and their deadly effects have been known since ancient times. They were first used on a large scale in the First World War, with soldiers being exposed to poisonous gases, including phosgene and sulphur mustard (a blistering agent). The result was over one million casualties and approximately 100,000 fatalities. Since that time, CBW technology has become more advanced, and hence even more lethal. The use by Iraq of CW in the form of nerve agents and sulphur mustard in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, and the 1995 poison gas (sarin) attack on the Tokyo underground, provide chilling examples of the indiscriminate and inhumane effects of these weapons.
The principal objective of Australia Group participants’ is to use licensing measures to ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing
facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the spread of CBW. The Group achieves this by harmonising participating countries’ national export licensing measures. The Group’s activities are especially important given that the international chemical and biotechnology industries are a target for proliferators as a source of materials for CBW programs.
Participants have recognised from the outset that export licensing measures are not a substitute for the strict and universal observance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). All participants in the Australia Group are States Parties to both the BWC and the CWC. Support for these regimes and their aims remains the overriding objective of Australia Group participants. Export licensing measures instituted by individual members assist in implementing key obligations under the CWC (Article I, 1 (a) and (d)) and the BWC (Articles I and III).
Export licensing measures also demonstrate participants determination of members to avoid not only direct but also inadvertent involvement in the spread of CBW, and to express their opposition to the use of these weapons. It is also in the interestS of commercial firms and research institutes and of their governments to ensure that they do not inadvertently supply chemicals, chemical equipment, biological agents or biological equipment for use in the manufacture of CBW. Global chemical and biological industries have firmly supported this principle.
Relationship with the Chemical Weapons ConventionAustralia Group participants strongly supported the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva leading to the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). They became original signatories to the Convention when it opened for signature in Paris in January 1993 and are States Parties to that Convention. Australia Group participants are now playing an active and constructive role in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague.
The CWC contains a number of provisions relating to the transfer of chemicals which may be diverted to CW programs. Article I of the CWC prohibits States Parties from assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage in activity prohibited by the Convention, or from developing, producing, acquiring, or stockpiling chemical weapons. Article VI requires States Parties to ensure that the development, production, acquisition, retention, transfer or use of toxic chemicals and their precursors does not take place for purposes prohibited by the Convention. In addition, Parts VI, VII and VIII of the Annex on Implementation and Verification impose specific restrictions on the trade in chemicals listed in the Schedules to the Convention.
Participants in the Australia Group reflect support for the CWC as the principal instrument for addressing the threat posed by chemical weapons. Australia Group participants believe their involvement in the Group is fully consistent with the CWC and indeed is an effective means of implementing those key obligations in the CWC listed above. The establishment of efficient national export licensing mechanisms serves to strengthen the non-proliferation goals of the CWC, whilst at the same time encouraging trade in chemical materials for legitimate, peaceful purposes.
Relationship with the Biological Weapons ConventionAll of the participants in the Australia Group are States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which has been in force since 1975. They have also been active in efforts to strengthen the Treaty, including through active participation in the confidence building measures agreed by successive BWC review conferences, and in annual meetings since the Fifth Review Conference in 2001.
Article I of the BWC prohibits States Parties from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining biological agents and toxins, or related biological weapons or equipment.
Article III of the BWC obliges States Parties to prevent the transfer of materials which might assist the manufacture, or any means of acquiring, biological weapons. The Australia Group's activities serve to support the objectives of the BWC by enhancing the effectiveness of national export licensing measures.
The Missile Technology Control Regime
The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR was originally established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since that time, the number of MTCR partners has increased to a total of thirty-four countries, all of which have equal standing within the Regime.
The MTCR was initiated partly in response to the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The risk of proliferation of WMD is well recognized as a threat to international peace and security, including by the UN Security Council in its Summit Meeting Declaration of January 31, 1992. While concern has traditionally focussed on state proliferators, after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, it became evident that more also has to be done to decrease the risk of WMD delivery systems falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals. One way to counter this threat is to maintain vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMD.
The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines) applied to an integral common list of controlled items (the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex). All MTCR decisions are taken by consensus, and MTCR partners regularly exchange information about relevant national export licensing issues.
National export licensing measures on these technologies make the task of countries seeking to achieve capability to acquire and produce unmanned means of WMD delivery much more difficult. As a result, many countries, including all MTCR partners, have chosen voluntarily to introduce export licensing measures on rocket and other unmanned air vehicle delivery systems or related equipment, material and technology.
The current Chairman of the Regime is Minister Santiago Irazabal Mourão of Brazil.
Portugal (1992)Republic of Korea (2001)Russian Federation (1995)South Africa (1995)Spain (1990)Sweden (1991)Switzerland (1992)Turkey (1997)Ukraine (1998)United Kingdom (1987)United States of America (1987)
Membership
As with all MTCR decisions, the decision to admit a new partner is taken by consensus. In making membership decisions, partners tend to consider whether a prospective new member would strengthen international non proliferation efforts, demonstrates a sustained and sustainable
commitment to non proliferation, has a legally based effective export control system that puts into effect the MTCR Guidelines and procedures, and administers and enforces such controls effectively. The Regime's dialogue with prospective partners is conducted through the MTCR Chair, visits to capitals by teams comprised of representatives of four MTCR partners and bilateral exchanges. The group does not have an observer category.
MTCR Plenary Meetings
MTCR partners hold an annual Plenary Meeting chaired on a rotational basis (see below for a list of MTCR Plenaries). The Plenary host becomes the Chair of the MTCR for the period extending to the next Plenary. Technical Experts Meetings, Information Exchanges and Enforcement Expert Meetings are held on an ad hoc basis. The MTCR has no secretariat. Distribution of the Regime’s working papers is carried out through a Point of Contact (POC), the functions of which are performed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France. Intersessional consultations also take place monthly through POC meetings in Paris, occasionally reinforced with capitals-based officials.
Italy United KingdomCanada Japan USA Norway AustraliaSwitzerlandSwedenGermanyUKJapanHungaryNetherlandsFinlandCanadaPoland ArgentinaRepublic of KoreaSpainDenmarkGreeceAustraliaBrazil
Objectives of the MTCR
The aim of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation of missiles, complete rocket systems, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometres, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The Regime’s controls are applicable to certain complete rocket systems (to include ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles (SLVs), and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems (to include cruise missiles, drones, UAVs, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs)). Partners also recognize the importance of controlling the transfer of missile-related technology without disrupting legitimate trade and acknowledge the need to strengthen the objectives of the Regime through cooperation with countries outside the Regime.
How the MTCR Achieves its Objectives:
Export Controls: The Regime rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines applied to an integral common list of controlled items listed in the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex. The MTCR does not take export licensing decisions as a group. Rather, individual partners are responsible for implementing the Guidelines and Annex on the basis of sovereign national discretion and in accordance with national legislation and practice.
MTCR partner countries are keen to encourage all countries to observe the MTCR Guidelines on transfers of missiles and related technology as a contribution to common security. A country can choose to adhere to the Guidelines without being obligated to join the group, and a number have done so. MTCR Partners welcome opportunities to conduct broader dialogue on proliferation issues with such countries.
Meetings: MTCR partners regularly exchange information about relevant national missile non-proliferation export licensing issues in the context of the Regime's overall aims. A Plenary Meeting is held annually and chaired on a rotational basis. Recent Plenaries have been held in Ottawa, Canada (2001), Warsaw, Poland (2002), Buenos Aires, Argentina (2003) and Seoul, South Korea (2004), Madrid, Spain (2005), Copenhagen, Denmark (2006), Athens, Greece (2007) and Canberra, Australia (2008). In addition, inter-sessional consultations take place monthly through Point of Contact (POC) meetings in Paris, while Technical Experts Meetings are held on an ad hoc basis. The MTCR has no secretariat; distribution of the Regime's working papers is carried out through a "point of contact" the functions of which are performed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France.
Dialogue and Outreach: The MTCR Chair and MTCR partners undertake outreach activities to non-partners, in order to keep non-partners informed about the group's activities and to provide practical assistance regarding efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery systems. On behalf of the MTCR, the chair pursues a range of contacts with non-partners, including MTCR-sponsored workshops and seminars and intensified dialogue concerning the MTCR goals and activities, with the focus on such topics as export controls, related legislation, transshipment and enforcement.
Selected outreach activities include:
In September 2000, an MTCR roundtable meeting was convened in Paris to inform prospective new members on the MTCR. Officials from 11 countries interested in the MTCR attended the roundtable, which was an opportunity to outline the MTCR agenda and enable participants to describe their export controls and present their views on missile non-proliferation.
In May 2001, a round table meeting was convened in Warsaw with the purpose of engaging representatives from 53 countries in a dialogue on a draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (now known as the Hague Code of Conduct). In November 2002, the Hague Code of Conduct was launched. As of March 2004, over 110 countries have agreed to abide by the terms of the Code.
In April 2002, a seminar was hosted by the government of Hungary in Budapest, Hungary. The seminar, which was attended by participants from 14 countries in Central and Eastern Europe, was an opportunity to discuss non-proliferation issues such as proliferation threats, trends in missile proliferation, licensing, export controls, catch-all and transshipment.
In February 2003, the MTCR chair attended the Asian Export Control Seminar hosted by Japan and the Berlin Export control Seminar hosted by Germany, both of which were attended by participants from non-MTCR member states, and emphasized the
importance of missile non-proliferation and export control.
In April 2002, the Hungarian government hosted in Budapest a regional technical seminar for non-partners on MTCR-related issues. The aim of the seminar was to provide info to export controls experts from Central and Eastern Europe on the activities of the MTCR.
In February 2003, the MTCR chair attended the Asian Export Control Seminar hosted by Japan and the Berlin Export control Seminar hosted by Germany, both of which were attended by participants from non-MTCR member states, and emphasized the importance of missile non-proliferation and export control.
In April 2004, Argentina hosted in Buenos Aires a Regional Seminar on Proliferation, Brokering and Transhipment. The primary aim of the seminar was to promote, at a regional level, the awareness of the danger posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to global security.
In April 2004, Germany hosted the Berlin Export Control Seminar. It aimed to discuss the difficulties and gaps regarding the control of sensitive software and technologies.
In order to foster awareness and common understanding over the importance of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery and to share expertise on export controls, Japan hosted in October 2004 the 12th Asian Export Control Seminar and the 2nd Asian Export Control Policy Dialogue.
In addition, the MTCR website (www.mtcr.info) contains basic documents on the regime. This information is intended to provide non-member countries and the general public with information about the MTCR's goals and activities.
The MTCR and the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the Hague Code of Conduct): The MTCR has made concerted efforts to reduce global missile proliferation, recognizing the growing international consensus that could be directed into practical action to reduce this threat. Against this backdrop, MTCR partners initiated the process that resulted in The Hague Code of Conduct.
In 1999, MTCR partners began consultation to this end, initially internally and then with non-MTCR states. They agreed in Ottawa in 2001 to universalize the draft text through a transparent and inclusive negotiating process open to all states, severing in the process the Regime's connection with the Code. France hosted the first negotiation session, which was attended by participants from more than 70 countries. Spain hosted the second session, by which time the participants had grown to more than 90 countries. The Code was launched in The Hague in November 2002 and now has 130 subscribing states.
The Hague Code of Conduct is open to voluntary subscription by all countries. It provides subscribing states with a forum for promoting ballistic missile non-proliferation. As the first multilateral arrangement on missiles, it complements the important, ongoing work of the MTCR and the many other tools countries use to promote missile non-proliferation. Further information on the Hague Code of Conduct is available on the site hosted by the Austrian Ministry of European and International Affairs:
MTCR and Trade
Export Licenses: Export licenses are not bans, but efforts to prevent transfers contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. MTCR controls are not intended to impede peaceful aerospace programmes or international cooperation in such programmes, as long as these programmes could not be used to develop delivery systems for WMD. MTCR controls are also not
designed to restrict access to technologies necessary for peaceful economic development. The MTCR Guidelines help to build confidence among suppliers that they can provide access to technology without such technology being diverted to WMD delivery system programmes.
End-user Undertakings: MTCR partners have agreed that, in a manner consistent with their national laws and practices and when relevant under the MTCR Guidelines and other existing undertakings, partner countries should obtain the following undertakings before the transfer of a controlled item:
a statement from the end user specifying the use and end use location of the proposed transfer, if necessary accompanied by documents explaining its business activities and organization;
an assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfers will not be used for any activities related to the development or production of delivery systems for WMD; and
where possible and if deemed necessary, an assurance that a post shipment inspection may be made by the exporter or the exporting government.
Partners have also agreed that partner countries should obtain assurances that their consent will be secured, in a manner consistent with their national law and practices, prior to any retransfer to a third country of the equipment, material or related technology or any replica thereof.
Inter-partner Trade: MTCR partners have explicitly affirmed the principle that membership in the MTCR does not involve an entitlement to obtain technology from another partner and no obligation to supply it. Partners are expected, just as in such trade between partners and non partners, to exercise appropriate accountability and restraint in inter partner trade.
Adherence to MTCR Guidelines & Annex by Non-Members: MTCR partner countries are keen to encourage all countries to observe the MTCR Guidelines on transfers of missiles and related technology as a contribution to common security.
A country can choose to adhere to the Guidelines without being obliged to join the group and a number have done so. MTCR and its members welcome opportunities to conduct technical exchanges and broader dialogues on proliferation issues with such countries.
Our Mission
The Zangger Committee, also known as the "NPT Exporters Committee", essentially contributes to the interpretation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thereby offers guidance to all parties to the Treaty.
Article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT performs a vital function in helping to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear material and equipment. Specifically, it provides:
"Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article."
The main significance of this paragraph is that parties to the Treaty should not export, directly or indirectly, nuclear material and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States unless the export is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. By interpreting and implementing article III, paragraph 2, the Zangger Committee helps to prevent the diversion of exported nuclear items from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and thereby furthers the objectives of the Treaty and enhances the security of all States.
As circumstances are changing with respect to the use of nuclear technology, it is the Zangger Committee's mission within the framework of the NPT to take account of changing security aspects and to adapt export control conditions and criteria from time to time according to the needs.
History
Between 1971 and 1974, a group of 15 States - some already parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT), others prospective parties - held a series of informal meetings in Vienna chaired by Professor Claude Zangger of Switzerland. As suppliers or potential suppliers of nuclear material and equipment, their objective was to reach a common understanding on:
(a) the definition of what constituted "equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" (as it was not defined anywhere in the Treaty);
(b) the conditions and procedures that would govern exports of such equipment or material in order to meet the obligations of article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT, on a basis of fair commercial competition.
The group, which came to be known as the Zangger Committee, decided that its status was informal and that its decisions would in themselves not be legally binding upon its members. Decisions of the Committee are taken by consensus.
In 1972, the Committee reached consensus on basic "understandings" contained in two separate memoranda. These memoranda form the guidelines of the Zangger Committee today. Each memorandum defines and provides for procedures for the export of materials and equipment described in article III, paragraph 2; the first memorandum on source and special fissionable material (article III, para. 2 (a)), the second on equipment and material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material (article III, para. 2 (b)).
The Zangger Committee Understandings reflect the requirements laid down in article III, paragraph 2. There are three conditions of supply:
(a) For exports to non-nuclear-weapon States, source or special fissionable material either directly transferred, or produced, processed, or used in the facility for which the transferred item is intended, shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) For exports to non-nuclear-weapon States, such source or special fissionable material, as well as transferred equipment and non-nuclear material, shall be subject to safeguards under an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
(c) Source or special fissionable material, and equipment and non-nuclear material shall not be re-exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State unless the recipient State accepts safeguards on the re-exported item.
The understandings were formally accepted by individual States members of the Committee in an exchange of notes among themselves. These amounted to unilateral declarations that the Understandings would be given effect through respective domestic export control legislation. In parallel with this procedure, most member States wrote identical letters to the Director General of the IAEA informing him of their decision to act in conformity with the conditions set out in the Understandings and asking him to communicate their decision to all States members of the IAEA. He did so in INFCIRC/209, dated 3 September 1974.
The two memoranda became known as the "trigger list", since the export of listed items "triggers" IAEA safeguards.
Attached to the trigger list is an annex "clarifying", or defining, the equipment and material of memorandum B in some detail. The passage of time and successive developments in technology have meant that the Committee is periodically engaged in considering possible revisions to the trigger list, and the original annex has thus become increasingly detailed. To date, eight clarification exercises have taken place. Clarifications are conducted on the basis of consensus, using the same procedure followed in the adoption of the original understandings.
Members
The - currently 38 - Member States of the Zangger Committee are:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus (joined 9 November 2010), Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America.
The European Commission is permanent observer.
Zangger Committee and NPT
At the first Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975, a brief paragraph in the final document referenced the work of the Zangger Committee without naming it.
This paragraph stated:
"With regard to the implementation of article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connection with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty (IAEA document INFCIRC/209/Rev.2). The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition established by those States, of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements".
In 1980, the Review Conference produced no consensus final document. However, in 1985, the Final Document contained a short reference to the Committee's activities, again without naming it. This time the Conference in effect endorsed the main activity of the Zangger Committee by indicating that further improvement of the trigger list should take account of advances in technology.
In 1990, the Zangger Committee was mentioned by name and the conference provided a brief description of its aims and practices. While the Conference did not adopt a final document, Main Committee II agreed on language pertaining to a number of ideas and proposals concerning the implementation of the Treaty in the areas of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguards. Main Committee II observed that Zangger Committee members had met regularly to coordinate the implementation of article III, paragraph 2, and had adopted nuclear supply requirements and a trigger list. It recommended that this list be reviewed periodically to take into account advances in technology and changes in procurement practices, a recommendation that the
Zangger Committee has continued to pursue. Main Committee II also urged all States to adopt the Zangger Committee's requirements for any nuclear cooperation with a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the Treaty.
At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the work of the Zangger Committee was also referenced in Main Committee II and, more specifically, in the working group established by Main Committee II to consider export control issues. While the Conference did not adopt a final declaration similar to those of previous conferences, a consensus text on the Zangger Committee was attained. (The unofficial text emerging from this exercise was subsequently published in the IAEA document INFCIRC/482 for information purposes.) The working group noted that a number of States suppliers had formed an informal group known as the Zangger Committee and had adopted certain understandings. It invited States to consider applying these understandings and recommended that the list of items and the procedures for implementation be reviewed from time to time. The working group further noted that the application by all States of the understandings of the Zangger Committee would contribute to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it called for international consultations among all interested States.
The Conference approved, inter alia, decision 2, which contains a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and decision 1, which provides the basis for the adopted "Strengthening of the Review Process for the Treaty" of the implementation of the Treaty.
Decision 2 contains several principles of particular relevance to the work of the Zangger Committee, in the fields of safeguards and export controls. In particular, principle 17 calls upon all States to promote transparency in nuclear-related export controls through cooperation and dialogue. Members of the Committee have worked to promote transparency through international seminars and other forms of dialogue.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, language on the Zangger Committee was negotiated in a working group on export controls, established by Main Committee II, as part of a wider package, which contained thoughts for the improvement of dialogue and cooperation, comprising also elements of coordination in the framework and with the participation of the IAEA. This reference to the Zangger Committee became linked to other issues not related to export controls. The Conference ended before agreement could be reached on these issues.
