Nuclear Weapon Tests:Prohibition or Limitation?

Edited byJozef Goldblat and David Cox

sipriStockholm International Peace Research Institute

CUPSCanadian Institute for International Peace and Security

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1988

Contents

Foreword xviii

Preface xix

Acronyms xxi

Parti . Summary and conclusions 3Jozef Goldblat and David Cox

I. Introduction 3II. How necessary was it for the nuclear weapon powers to

test a nuclear explosive before building a weaponstockpile? 4

III. Why were further test explosions needed after nuclearweapons had been developed, manufactured andstockpiled? 4New weapon designs—Reliability of the stockpiledweapons—Effects and physics tests—Security and safetytests—Need to retain the technology base

IV. Why did negotiations for a nuclear test ban begin, and whydid they fail? 8

V. What is the value of the test limitation treaties which havebeen signed? 10The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty—The 1974 ThresholdTest Ban Treaty—The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear ExplosionsTreaty

VI. How important is verification in achieving a test ban? 15VII. How are the existing test limitation treaties verified? 15

The PTBT—The TTBT—The PNETVIII. What are the present capabilities for detecting under-

ground nuclear explosions? 17IX. How could monitoring capabilities be improved to render

evasion difficult or impossible? 19International system—In-country stations—Non-seismicmeans of verification—On-site inspection—'Advantages'of cheating

X. What are the present attitudes of states towards nucleartesting? 22The United States—The Soviet Union—The United King-dom, France and China—Non-nuclear weapon countries

vi NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?

XI. What would be the impact of a comprehensive test ban onthe nuclear arms race? 25

XII. What other effects would result from a test ban? 26XIII. Conclusions 27

Part 2. Overview of nuclear explosions

Chapter I. The purpose of nuclear test explosionsPaper 1J. Carson Mark

I.II.

III.IV.V.

Paper 2

AbstractIntroductionUS testing experienceWeapon improvements—Adaptation to weapon car-riers—Effects tests—Safety tests—Peaceful nuclearexplosions—SummaryWeapon development without testingConfidence in stockpiled weaponsConclusionNotes and references

Donald M. Kerr

I.II.

III.IV.V.

AbstractIntroductionThe role of testing in weapon developmentWeapon reliabilityCan calculations replace testing?Consequences of testing restraints

Chapter II. The role of laboratory testsPaper 3Donald R. Westervelt

I.

II.

III.

AbstractThe importance of very-low-yield nuclear testsWhat is a nuclear test?—'Beginner' states—Nuclearweapon powers—ICF and similar tests—SummaryField test requirements for 'beginner' statesWhy a field test?—SummaryLaboratorv tests to replace underground explosions

3131

313132

37384142

43

434343444445

4747

4747

50

51Objectives of nuclear weapon programmes—Develop-ment of new weapon designs—Improvements in safetyand security—Assurance of force survivability—Avoidance of technological surprise—Discovery and cor-

CONTENTS vii

rection of stockpile problems—Design technologybase—SummaryNotes and references 58

Chapter III. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes 59Paper 4 59Iris Y. P. Borg

Abstract 59I. Introduction 59

II. Development of the US PNE programme, 1957-77 60Background—Research and phenomenology experi-ments—Excavation—Development of PNE explosives—Gas stimulation—Heavy element production—Under-ground storage

III. Feasibility studies on application of nuclear explosions 65IV. Termination of the Plowshare programme 66V. Soviet PNE programme to 1973 67

VI. Soviet PNE programme after 1973 68VII. Economic viability of PNEs 70

VIII. PNEs in emerging nuclear countries 71IX. Impact of the PTBT, NPT, TTBT and PNET 71

Notes and references 73Table 4.1. Plowshare experiments 62Table 4.2. Plowshare feasibility studies 65Table 4.3. Cost of conventional and nuclear development 70

Chapter IV. Environmental effects of underground nuclearexplosions 75

Paper 5 75A. C. McEwan

Abstract 75I. Phenomenological effects 75

Cavity, fracture and chimney formation—seismic andground shock effects—Fault displacements, aftershocksand earthquakes—Other shock-induced effects

II. Pathways for dispersal of radionudides in the environ-ment 81Production and initial distribution of radionudides—Venting—Leakage

III. Conclusions 89Notes and references 89Table 5.1. Examples of scaled depths of burial for five tests at

the Nevada Test Site 79

viii NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?

Table 5.2. Inventory of some fission product and actinide radio-nudides arising from underground tests at different times afterdetonation 82

Figure 5.1. The fracture zone and chimney formed after col-lapse of the cavity in a deep underground nuclear detonation 77

Figure 5.2. US Air Force helicopters fly DOE radiation-monitoring personnel and photographers over Yucca Flatduring tests 78

Figure 5.3. Strontium-90 annual deposition in New Zealand andat Milford Haven, UK 84

Part 3. The historical recordChapter V. Survey of past nuclear test ban negotiations 95Paper 6 95

959596

measures: the

105109113114

Chapter VI. The nuclear explosion limitation treaties 119

Paper 7 119Jozef Goldblat

Abstract 119I. Introduction. 119

II. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty 120Scope of the obligations—Verification—Entry into forceand amendments—Implementation—Assessment of thePTBT

III. The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty 127Scope of the obligations—Verification—Implementation—Assessment of the TTBT

IV. The 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 133Scope of Ihe obligations—Verification—Implementation—Assessment of the PNET

V. Conclusions 139Notes and references 140

G. Allen

I.II.

III.IV.V.

GrebAbstractIntroductionThe early years: hope and frustrationThe PTBT—The NPT—More partialTTBT and the PNETRenewed CTB negotiations, 1977-80New leaders and the test ban, 1981-86ConclusionNotes and references

CONTENTS ix

Part 4. The question of verificationChapter VII. Present capabilities for the detection and identi-fication of seismic events 145

Paper 8 145Lynn R. Sykes

Abstract . 145I. Introduction 145

II. Recent scientific advances in the verification of nucleartesting 146More accurate estimates of yields of Soviet explosions—Recent advances in identifying very small undergroundnuclear tests

III. Capabilities for monitoring a comprehensive test bantreaty 150

IV. Soviet compliance with the TTBT 151V. Disadvantages to US security interests if the TTBT and

SALT II do not continue in force 154Table 8.1. Thresholds for reliable identification of underground

nuclear explosions using seismic networks external and inter-nal to the USSR 150

Figure 8.1. Example of recordings made by the NorwegianSeismic Array of a large earthquake followed by a very smallunderground nuclear explosion at the eastern Kazakhstan testsite, USSR 148

Figure 8.2. Histogram of the number of underground explo-sions at the Arctic test site, USSR, in Novaya Zemlya from1964 to 1975 as a function of size 154

Appendix 8A. Letter to Hugh E. DeWitt, Lawrence LivermoreNational Laboratory 156Appendix 8B. Weapons of various sizes that had been tested bySpring 1985 158

Paper 9 159Dennis C. Fakley

Abstract 159I. Introduction 159

II. Seismic detection 159III. Seismic identification 161

Location—Depth of focus—P-wave first motion—Com-plexity and spectral discriminants—The mb:Ms

criterion—Identification at regional distancesIV. Yield/magnitude relationships and evasion scenarios 165V. An overall assessment of current seismic verification

technology 167

x NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?

VI. The potential for seismic verification improvements 167VII. Differences in CTB verification assessments 168

Chapter VIII. International seismological verification 169

Paper 10 169Peter W. Basham and Ola Dahlman

Abstract 169I. Introduction 169

II. Historical background 170Geneva experts, 1958-59—Development of national pro-grammes—International efforts

III. The 1978 CCD global system . 174CCD Group of Scientific Experts—Seismographstations—Parameter data derived at stations—Waveformdata—Parameter data communications—Internationaldata centres—An opening to the future system

. I V . An international seismological verification system 179Political requirements—A three-tiered verificationsystem

V. Implementation of the global system 186VI. Conclusions 187

Notes and references 188Figure 10.1. Schematic diagram of the international seismic

data exchange system described by the GSE in its first report,1978 175

Figure 10.2. A global seismograph network described by theGSE in its first report in 1978, as an example of stations thatmight be selected for the global system 176

Figure 10.3. Proportional land areas of the earth occupied bynuclear weapon states, by potential participants in the globalseismic verification system, and by potential non-participantsin the global system 188

Chapter IX. In-country seismic stations for monitoringnuclear test bans 191Paper 11 191Willard J. Hannon, Jr

Abstract 191I. Introduction 191

II. The verification process 192The technology of in-country seismic systems—Functionsof an in-country monitoring system—Monitoring advanta-ges of in-country stations

III. CTB evasion techniques 195IV. LYTTB evasion techniques 201

CONTENTS xi

V. What is acceptable verification? 203VI. Conclusions 205

Notes and references 206Table 11.1. Functions necessary to deploy and operate an in-

country seismic monitoring system 192Table 11.2. Approximate number of unidentified events per

year from high-performance seismic systems monitoring theSoviet Union 201

Figure 11.1. Regional seismic waves; a regional seismic recordfrom a well-coupled nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Sitemeasured at EIko, Nevada; a teleseismic record for the sameevent from a high-quality array station located in Norway 196

Figure 11.2. Differences in frequency content, used to detectexplosions in the coda of an earthquake 198

Figure 11.3. Magnitude-yield relationships from Nevada TestSite explosions and estimated detection thresholds for in-country networks deployed in the Soviet Union 199

Figure 11.4. The estimated detection capability of an in-countrynetwork, which varies as a function of the number and type ofstations deployed 200

Figure 11.5. The value of different networks, depending on theevasion threat 204

Chapter X. Techniques to evade detection of nuclear tests 209Paper 12 209Jeremy K. Leggett

Abstract 209I. Introduction 209

II. Evasion by cavity decoupling 210Theory and practice—Feasibility

III. Other strategies for evasion 228Evasion by dry-alluvium muffling—Evasion by earth-quake masking—Evasion in space

IV. Conclusions 230Notes and references 232

Chapter XI. Means of nuclear test ban verification other thanseismological . 237Paper 13 237Allan M. Din

Abstract 237I. Introduction 237

II. Monitoring by satellite-based sensors 238III. Radar monitoring of the ionosphere 240IV. Detection of airborne radioactivity 241V. On-site monitoring 243

xii NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?

VI. Conclusions 244Notes and references 246

Chapter XII. On-site inspection to check compliance 247

Paper 14 247Warren Heckrotte

Abstract 247I. History of on-site inspections 247

Conference of Experts, 1958—Early CTB negotiations—Tripartite negotiations, 1977-80

II. Voluntary OSIs: initiation and potential problems 252III: Seismic monitoring: requirement for OSIs 253IV. Location of an OSI: a critical element 255V. Techniques and procedures for an OSI 255

Aerial survey—Visual and geological survey—Seismicsurvey—Survey for artifacts—Radiation survey—General considerations

VI. Conclusion 259Notes and references

261

261261261262263

Chapter XIII. Degree of verification needed 265Paper 16 265Ray E. Kidder

Abstract 265I. Introduction 265

II. Distribution of US nuclear explosive yields, 1980-84 266III. Military significance of tests of various yields 267IV. Experiments with potential military significance: nuclear

weapon research 269V. Conclusions 270

Notes and references 272Table 16.1. Percentage of tests conducted with yield less than Y

kilotons 268Figure 16.1. The distribution of yields of nuclear explosions

conducted at the Nevada Test Site, 1980-84 267

Paper 15A. A. Vasiliev and I. F. Bocharov

I.II.

III.IV.V.

AbstractIntroductionThe US and Soviet positionsThe need for verificationOn-site inspectionConclusion

CONTENTS xiii

Chapter XIV. Verification of a very-low-yield nuclear testban 273Paper 17 273Charles B. Archambeau

Abstract 273I. Introduction 273

II. Provisions of a limited test ban and verificationrequirements 274

III. Seismic verification: general considerations 276IV. The impact of new seismic verification methods 278V. Implications for long-term test ban verification 278

VI. Relationship to the NRDC-Soviet Academy monitoringproject 279

VII. Monitoring test sites using in-country seismic stations 280VIII. Identification of seismic events 285

IX. Yield estimation 289X. Summary 293

Notes and references 295Figure 17.1. Soviet salt deposits and sites of underground

nuclear explosions, 1962-85 280Figure 17.2. US salt deposits and sites of underground nuclear

explosions, 1961-85 281Figure 17.3. Soviet earthquakes, 1960-74 • 283Figure 17.4(a). Earthquakes and nuclear explosions occurring

in the vicinity of the Soviet Kazakh and Azgir test sites 287Figure 17.4(b). Discrimination results, for identification of

events in figure 17.4(a) 287Figure 17.5. The relationship between magnitude and yield of

high coupling mb and/or Ms explosions at NTS sites, selectednon-NTS US sites and French sites 290

Figure 17.6. The relationship between magnitude and yield forthe- largest nuclear tests at eastern Kazakh 292

Part 5. Consequences of the cessation orfurther limitation of nuclear testsChapter XV. Attitudes of the nuclear weapon powers 299Paper 18 299Carl G. Jacobsen

Abstract ' 299I. Introduction

II. The Soviet position 300III. The US position , 302IV. The British position 304

xiv NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?

V. The French positionVI. The Chinese position

VII. ConclusionNotes and references

Chapter XVI. Attitudes of the nuclear threshold countriesPaper 19Peter Lomas

AbstractI. Introduction

II. IndiaIII. PakistanIV; ArgentinaV. Brazil

VI. South AfricaVII. Israel

VIII. ConclusionNotes and references

Chapter XVII. A nuclear test ban and prevention of nuclearweapon proliferationPaper 20Paul C. Warnke

AbstractI. Introduction

II. The debate on horizontal proliferation

305306307308

311311

311311312313314315315316317318

321321

321321322

Tripartite CTB negotiations, 1977-80—The exemplary *value of a tripartite agreement—Impact of a CTB on alliednations-'-Impact of a CTB in areas of regional conflict

III. The debate on the question of vertical proliferation 325Rationales for continued nuclear testing—Arguments foran end to nuclear testing

IV. The low-threshold alternative 328Notes and references 329Appendix 20A. Letter to the Chairman of the House of Represen- 330tatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

Paper 21 332Vitalii I. Goldanskii

Abstract 332I. Introduction 332

II. Horizontal proliferation 333III. Vertical proliferation 333

CONTENTS xv

IV. Threshold agreements: the arms control value 334Notes and references 334Table 21.1. Nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon testing 332Table 21.2. US nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site, 334

1980-84

Chapter XVIII. Political, strategic and psychological effectsof a nuclear test ban 335Paper 22 335Eugene J. Carroll, Jr

Abstract 335I. Introduction 335

II. 'Talk-test-build' arms control 337III. Possible psychological consequences of a test ban 338IV. Possible political consequences of a test ban 339V. The consequences of nuclear arms control 341

VI. Conclusions 344Notes and references 345

AnnexesAnnexe 1. Existing legal limitations on nuclear explosions 349Prepared by Ragnhild Ferm

I. Major treaties 349II. Other treaties 363

Annexe 2. Major proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty 367

L, UK-USA-USSR: Tripartite Report to the Committee onDisarmament, 30 July 1980 367

II. Sweden: Draft treaty banning any nuclear weapon testexplosion in any environment, 14 June 1983 370

III. Group of Socialist Countries: Basic provisions of a treatyon the complete and general prohibition of nuclearweapon tests, 8 June 1987 375

Annexe 3. Seismological means of nuclear test ban verification:techniques and equipment 379Eva Johannisson

I. Introduction 379II. Earthquakes 379

III. Explosions 381IV. Seismic waves 382V. Magnitudes and yields 385

VI. Seismographs 387

xvi NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION?

VII. Detection and location of seismic events 389Array stations—Station networks

VIII. Identification 392Depth estimation—Discrimination techniques

IX. Conclusions 398Figure 1. World seismicity for a six-year period (1969-74) with

bodywave magnitudes larger than 4.0 and focal depthsbetween 0 and 100 km 380

Figure 2. The main test sites where nuclear explosions arecurrently conducted: the Nevada Test Site in the USA,Novaya Zemlya and Semipalatinsk in the USSR, Lop Nor inChina and the French test site at Mururoa 381

Figure 3. Seismogram showing P-, S-, Rayleigh and Love wavesrecorded from an earthquake 383

Figure 4. Seismic waves drawn as examples of some of thephases that can be found in a recording of a seismic event 384

Figure 5. Arrival time, amplitude and period of one cycle, asmeasured from the seismogram in order to locate an event anddetermine its strength 385

Figure 6. Seismic magnitudes as a function of explosion yield fordifferent geological environments 387

Figure 7. Outline of a typical modern digital seismographinstallation 388

Figure 8. Examples of short-period records of a shallow and adeep earthquake and of a nuclear explosion 393

Figure 9. Short- and long-period signals recorded at the HagforsObservatory from an underground explosion and anearthquake 394

Figure 10. mb and M, values for a number of undergroundnuclear explosions and shallow and deep earthquakes locatedin the USSR, plotted in a mb:Ms diagram 395

Figure 11. Short-period signals observed at the HagforsObservatory from a shallow earthquake and an undergroundexplosion 396

Annexe 4. Nuclear explosions, 16 July 1945-1 July 1987 399Robert S. Norris and Ragnhild Ferm

I. Sources 399II. Interpretation 401

Notes and references 401Table 1. Estimated number of nuclear explosions 16 July 1945-

5 August 1963 (the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty) 402' Table 2. Estimated number of nuclear explosions 6 August

1963-30 March 1976 403Table 3. Estimated number of nuclear explosions 31 March 1976

(date of the envisaged application of the 150-kt explosive yieldlimitation under the TTBT and the PNET)-1 July 1987 404

CONTENTS xvii

Table 4. Dates and locations of individual nuclear explosions31 March 1976 (date of the envisaged application of the 150-ktexplosive yield limitation under the TTBT and the PNET)-1 July 1987 405

Table 5. Estimated aggregate number of nuclear explosions16 July 1945-1 July 1987 411

Select bibliography 413

Index 417