This article was downloaded by: [Dr Kenneth Shapiro] On: 09 June 2015, At: 07:35 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/haaw20 Special Welfare Concerns in Countries Dependent on Live Animal Trade: The Real Foreign Animal Disease Emergency for Canada Terry L. Whiting a a Office of the Chief Veterinarian (Manitoba) , Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada Published online: 06 Jun 2008. To cite this article: Terry L. Whiting (2008) Special Welfare Concerns in Countries Dependent on Live Animal Trade: The Real Foreign Animal Disease Emergency for Canada, Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 11:2, 149-164, DOI: 10.1080/10888700801926008 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10888700801926008 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,
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This article was downloaded by: [Dr Kenneth Shapiro]On: 09 June 2015, At: 07:35Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK
Journal of Applied AnimalWelfare SciencePublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/haaw20
Special Welfare Concerns inCountries Dependent on LiveAnimal Trade: The Real ForeignAnimal Disease Emergency forCanadaTerry L. Whiting aa Office of the Chief Veterinarian (Manitoba) ,Winnipeg, Manitoba, CanadaPublished online: 06 Jun 2008.
To cite this article: Terry L. Whiting (2008) Special Welfare Concerns in CountriesDependent on Live Animal Trade: The Real Foreign Animal Disease Emergencyfor Canada, Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 11:2, 149-164, DOI:10.1080/10888700801926008
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10888700801926008
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,
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Special Welfare Concerns in CountriesDependent on Live Animal Trade:The Real Foreign Animal Disease
Emergency for Canada
Terry L. WhitingOffice of the Chief Veterinarian (Manitoba)
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Any outbreak of an Office International des Epizooties trade-disrupting (previouslyList-A) disease, such as classical swine fever or foot and mouth disease in a previ-ously disease-free region can have severe consequences for nonhuman animal wel-fare. In addition to animals destroyed for the purposes of disease eradication, certainpreexisting trade patterns may result in welfare slaughter programs affecting manymore animals than the disease eradication effort. Welfare slaughter is the destructionof healthy animals to prevent overcrowding on farms under movement restriction andas a consequence of loss of access to live animal export markets. Governments of Eu-ropean countries have anticipated welfare slaughter as part of their disease eradica-tion preparedness. The concept of welfare slaughter and the resource implicationsthereof have not been included in current, published, livestock disease emer-gency-planning documents in Canada or the United States. Animal welfare, specifi-cally the killing of healthy animals (not foreign animal disease eradication) has beenthe focus of public concern in recent disease-eradication efforts in Europe. NorthAmerican organizations responsible for livestock exotic disease emergency pre-paredness need to expand their plans to include welfare slaughter.
In foreign nonhuman animal-disease control, a stamping-out policy means carry-ing out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority, on confirmation of a dis-ease, the killing of the animals in the herd who are affected—and those sus-pected of being affected—and, where appropriate, those in other herds exposed
Correspondence should be sent to Terry L. Whiting, Office of the Chief Veterinarian (Manitoba),Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3T 5S6, Canada. Email: [email protected]
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to infection by direct animal-to-animal contact or by indirect contact of a kindlikely to cause the transmission of the causal pathogen. All susceptible animals,vaccinated or unvaccinated, on infected premises should be killed and their car-casses destroyed by burning, burial, or by any other method that will eliminatethe spread of infection through the carcasses or products of the animals killed.Inherent in stamping out are regional animal movement restrictions and develop-ment of quarantine zones; upon international declaration of disease, other coun-tries control the risk of disease introduction by preventing trade with the newlyinfected region or country (Anonymous, 2007a). Stamping out is the nationalpolicy of Canada and the United States for exotic, highly contagious, viral dis-eases such as classical swine fever and foot and mouth disease.
InWestern industrializedcountrieswherestampingoutof foreignanimaldisease(FAD) has been recently applied, there has been heightened public debate over theextreme costs required to achieve eradication and the ethical issues inherent in theprocess (Anonymous, 2001). The 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD) epizootic inthe United Kingdom gave rise to three major postapocalyptic forums for public dis-cussion (Anderson, 2002; Curry, 2002; Follett, 2002). These forums for public criti-cism extended from the disease eradication response in particular to currentagriculturalpractices related toproducinghumanfoodofanimalorigin ingeneral.
In considering lessons provided by other countries’ FAD eradication experi-ences (T. L. Whiting, 2003) and current livestock marketing patterns, the introduc-tion of an FAD into a Canadian livestock sector that is dependent on live exportsuch as the swine industry would result in three separate crises:
1. An immediate effort is directly related to the identification, quarantine, anddestruction of animals on infected and high-risk farms (stamping out/dis-ease eradication effort). The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) hasthe legislative mandate and fiscal resources to address. A recent example isthe 2004 avian influenza outbreak in British Columbia (Bowes et al., 2004).
2. The second concern is the animal welfare crisis that would develop onfarms that were not directly involved in the disease eradication effort butthat would be unable to transport animals because of live animal movementrestrictions put in place by both the control zones to facilitate the stamp-ing-out response and the U.S. border closure.
3. Last would be an industry-wide financial crisis related to the loss of exportmarket access that, in part, would be manifest as an acute fall in livestockvalue; as example, slaughter cows in Canada subsequent to bovinespongiform encephalopathy (E. Whiting, 2004).
The animal welfare crisis is closely interconnected with the disease eradicationeffort as both of the operational responses would occur concurrently and competefor the same human resources necessary for animal killing and carcass disposal re-sources. In Ontario and Manitoba, the most critical animal welfare problem would
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be an immediate (within 96 hr) inability to provide housing for thousands ofisowean piglets (Bargen & Whiting, 2002). This crisis could also result from othersituations, for example, in the United States, if a single state such as Iowa closed itsborders to live animal movement.
Unlike recent experience with avian influenza in British Columbia, with an in-troduction of classical swine fever (CSF) or FMD into Canada or a significant trad-ing region in the United States, the agri-emergency and media attention wouldcenter on the animal welfare emergency—not the disease eradication effort—ifCanadians were to respond as the British public did in the 2001 FMD outbreak oras the Dutch public did in 1998 (CSF).
STRUCTURE OF PIG FARMINGIN THE CANADA–UNITED STATES REGION
Swine production has undergone a worldwide revolution in recent years. A con-tributing factor has been the introduction of the practice of multiple sites for pigproduction (Harris, 2000). The “isowean” principle is the building block of vari-ous multisite pig production practices. Isowean, loosely defined as the removalof piglets from the environment of the dam prior to piglet colonization by com-mon pathogens, was developed specifically for elimination of infectious dis-eases. This method of production has been used to control or reduce severity ofthe nine major diseases:
Disease freedom in piglets is achieved by early removal from the sow herd. Fa-cilities designed for isolated weaning have no storage facilities on farm for weanedpiglets, and larger farms ship piglets off farm 2 or 3 days of the week (Bargen &Whiting, 2002).
Multisite production has been instrumental in the eradication of pseudorabies inthe United States (Taft, 1999). Aujeszky’s Disease (pseudorabies virus) was re-ported as a clinical disease of swine in the United States in the late 1960s andspread widely, becoming a serious limit on economic efficiency of the industry.During this time, Canada remained free of this disease. In 1989, the state and U.S.
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federal governments established a program for its eradication. In 1999, additionalfederal funds were made available to pay a per-animal bonus to producers who de-populated their herds in the Accelerated Pseudorabies Eradication Program (U.S.Department of Agriculture [USDA], 1999). Periodic herd depopulation is a com-monly used form of disease control in modern swine production. Herd depopula-tion, especially with concurrent government compensation, was an ideal time tomake structural changes in the buildings and the production system.
Iowa had 23% of the U.S. sow herd in 1978, which decreased to 17 % of theU.S. sow herd in 2002. There were 2.11 million breeding swine in Iowa in 1978; in2007, there were 1.08 million breeding swine (Honeyman & Duffey, 2006;Wisner, 2007). During this period, Iowa remained the nation’s leader in markethog and pork production. To maintain production, Iowa producers bring in feederpigs from many U.S. states in addition to the imports from Canada. For example, in2001, Iowa imported more than 13 million pigs from other U.S. sources (Shields &Mathews, 2003).
The breeding and farrowing of sows and managing of young pigs is the most la-bor-intensive and usually viewed as the more management-intensive phase of pigproduction. Many of the disease-free isowean piglets produced in Canada wereavailable to fill previous sow barns that had been converted into feeder barns in thecentral midwestern states (Figure 1). In 2004, Iowa and Pennsylvania became thelast two states to achieve freedom from pseudorabies (USDA, 2006).
Manitoba pig herd started to increase in the early 1980s. A portion of this indus-try expansion can be attributed to both the anticipation and the elimination of the98-year-old Western Grain Transportation Act, transportation subsidy (CrowRate) in 1995. Grain prices in Western Canada had been decreasing since 1985.Cheap local feed grain was then available for pork production, and local invest-ment capital was available from the $300 million Crow rate adjustment fund(Dyck, 1996). The average annual rate of growth in Manitoba provincial swineproduction from 1985 to 1995 was 4.6% and from1995 to 2004, 12.6%. Annualproduction growth fell from the high of 12.8% in 2003 to less than 2% in 2006. Pigproduction in the province in 2006 of 9.1 million pigs was 10 times the level of 30years earlier. More than 2.4 million pigs—less than 3 weeks old and weighing lessthan 7 kg—were exported to the United States. In addition, 1.65 million head werefeeder pigs less than 50 kg. There were 370,500 sows on Manitoba farms on July 1,2007.
In describing the consequences of FAD epizootics, financial impacts are oftenclassified as direct costs or indirect costs. Direct costs are those that the Veteri-
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nary Authority must pay out in order to achieve the disease control goal such asthe verification and enforcement of mandatory cease-movement, compensationfor animals ordered destroyed, and costs of carcass disposal. Indirect costs arelosses incurred by individuals and sectors of the industry consequential to thedisease occurrence such as down time on empty farms and loss of export marketfor meat products and live animals. A major part of contingency planning is,therefore, anticipating the type and magnitude of direct costs and identifying thecorresponding resources required for effective response and impact mitigation.
Animal movement restrictions severely disrupt the production systems affected.Animals located in quarantine zones most often cannot be salvaged as food and arestrategically killed to relieve overcrowding or otherwise deteriorating animal hus-bandry conditions that occur on farms placed under movement restriction (CouncilDirective, 1980, 1985; Seracon Management Consulting, 2002). “Welfare slaugh-ter” is a term used in FAD eradication efforts to describe noninfected animals killed
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FIGURE 1 This figure shows the annual export of Canadian live pigs (nonbreeding) to theUnited States from January 1988 to December 2006. In Statistics Canada data reports, the cate-gory of pigs greater than 50 kg includes purpose grown market pigs and cull sows and boars.The category of pigs less than 50 kg includes primarily newly weaned pigs (5 kg) and feederpigs (25 kg). The pseudorabies eradication program started in the United States in 1989 but didnot gain significant ground in the most concentrated states such as Iowa until 1998 with the in-troduction of the Accelerated Pseudorabies Eradication Program. Isowean (baby)/feeder pigexports have increased significantly over the years from 138,485 head in 1990 to 4.1 millionhead in 2006. Pseudorabies was eradicated from commercial swine in the United States in 2004.
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during the operational response. Analysis of previous events indicate the magnitudeof welfare slaughter subsequent to an FAD incursion is magnified under certain con-ditions: (a) if the preincursion animal production industry is focused on export, (b) ifthe incursion is prolonged, (c) if livestock movement restrictions are placed upon awide geographic area, or (d) if the incursion involves intensified livestock produc-tion (Anonymous, 2002a; Saatkamp, Berentsen, & Horst, 2000). The need for wel-fare slaughter will also be magnified where a time-sensitive livestock commoditysuch as isowean piglets is affected (Bargen & Whiting, 2002). Welfare slaughter is adirect cost of FAD eradication (Bourn, 2002; Dijkhuizen, 1999; Meuwissen, Horst,Huirne, & Dijkhuizen, 1999; Saatkamp et al., 2000; Seracon, 2002; Sugiura et al.,2001; Wrathall & Mitchell, 2001).
Canadian experts predicted that an FMD incursion into Canada, under the bestpossible scenario, would result in a prolonged U.S. border closure (Seracon,2002). For example, CSF, a disease with trade impacts similar to FMD but limitedto swine and pork products, was identified on August 8, 2000, in East Anglia,United Kingdom, and resulted in the infection of 16 farms with the last restrictedarea lifted in December 2000 (Sharpe, Gibbens, Morris, & Drew, 2001; Wrathall& Mitchell, 2001). The final rule for the United States to recognize Britain free ofCSF was on October 16, 2003 (USDA, 2003). Trade in live pigs and pork fromBritain to the United States resumed 3 full years after the disease was eradicated.
Canada, as compared with other pork and beef producing countries, is heavilydependent on export of live animals as well as processed pork and beef products.FMD is a virus affecting both species and the trade of products from both species.For the year 2001, the Canadian ratio of meat produced compared with meat con-sumed domestically was 1.29 for beef and 1.59 for pork (Seracon, 2002). Similar2001 ratios for the United States were 0.97 for beef and 1.03 for pork; for Austra-lia, 3.18 for beef and 1.05 for pork (Seracon).
Statistics Canada changed its swine export reporting structure for 2004 to sepa-rate feeder pigs previously reported as swine, nonbreeding, less than 50 kg, intothree weight cohorts. In previous years, all nonbreeding live swine exported lessthan 50 kg were lumped together in official reports. This weight range of pigs con-tains both isowean (4–5 kg) at around 19 days of age and feeder pigs (24–25 kg) ataround 60 days of age (Harris, 2000). These two types of pigs represent differentstages in the production system. Manitoba exports primarily early weaned piglets(Figure 2), and Manitoba is also by far the primary Canadian origin of feeder pigsfor the U.S. market (Figure 3).
WELFARE ASSURANCE: SCOPE
The proportional cost of animal welfare assurance in comparison to the dis-ease-control efforts has been accounted for in financial analysis of previous
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155
FIGURE 2 This figure concerns live piglet and feeder pigs exported from Manitoba to the UnitedStates by the state of destination in 2006. In 2004, Statistics Canada started reporting export live
FIGURE 3 This figure shows the annual total of live swine (nonbreeding) less than 50 kg(feeder pigs) exported to the United States from Canada by province. There has been recentslowing in export of feeders from Canada largely by reduced growth in Ontario feeder-exportmarket starting in 2004. Manitoba (68%) and Ontario combined account for about 90% of thetotal feeder pig exports to the United States in 2006.
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FAD incursions. However, complete accurate documentation of the financialimpacts of FAD incursions is difficult to establish even in retrospect (Saatkampet al., 2000). In recent incursions of FAD into Office of International des Epizo-oties (OIE) member countries with stamping out as the national policy, the scaleof welfare slaughter was one half to 10 times the cost of eradicating the diseaseon infected farms (Bourn, 2002; Dijkhuizen, 1999; Saatkamp et al., 2000;Sugiura et al., 2001; Wrathall & Mitchell, 2001).
Even in the case of a very moderate-size FAD incursion, welfare slaughter op-erations will exceed the cost for disease control. In Europe, for incursions of CSF,if eight or more herds are infected on the day of identifying the first case, the costsof welfare slaughter are expected to exceed the cost of stamping out (Saatkamp etal., 2000). Modeling a Canadian outbreak of FMD, using the 2001 trading patternsin live animals and animal products, it was estimated that in a small FMD outbreakwith 50 infected herds, in the eradication effort 4,200,000 animals would be killedunder welfare slaughter programs, whereas only 10,000 infected animals would bekilled as a result of the disease incursion and successful eradication. The financialexpenditure to control disease would be less than 1% of the overall cost/loss of theincursion (Seracon, 2002).
THE FAERS SYSTEM
The Canadian Food and Agriculture Emergency Response System (FAERS) wasdeveloped largely in response to the January 1998 Ontario-Québec ice storm.The FAERS is intended to provide a basis for developing contingency plans topotential agriculture disasters while assuring such plans are coherent with theEmergency Preparedness Act (1985, c. 6), Emergencies Act (1985, c. 22), Na-tional Support Plan, and the Federal Policy for Emergencies. Provincial depart-ments of agriculture and other agri-food sector stakeholders, Agriculture andAgri-Food Canada (AAFC), and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)have jointly established the FAERS to facilitate federal-provincial-industry col-laboration (CFIA, 1999).
For the purpose of FAERS, “an emergency” (agri-food emergency) is definedas “an abnormal situation requiring prompt action beyond normal procedures inorder to prevent injury or damage to people, plants, livestock, property, or the en-vironment” (CFIA, 1999). The FAERS is, or purports to be, an all-hazards crisismanagement system designed to link the federal, provincial, and private sectors tobetter manage and coordinate response to agriculture and food emergencies.
There are five types of agri-food crisis situations described in the FAERS man-ual based on who the lead agency would be. A FAD incursion is a “mandatedemergency” under the FAERS system where the jurisdictional responsibility isclearly with the CFIA as the lead agency. The CFIA component of FAD eradica-
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tion as described by disease eradication plans (CFIA, 1997, 2001), however, doesnot follow the FAERS management principals of a comprehensive bottom-up con-tingency planning and response system. The CFIA disease eradication strategydocuments describe in detail how infected animals and premises will be dealt with.These strategy documents do not consider the consequential impacts of diseasepresence on the agricultural trade of a region and therefore are not comprehensivecrisis management approaches (CFIA, 1997, 2001).
In Canada, animal welfare concerns related to a FAD response currently repre-sent a nonmandated disaster (no federal agency has the lead), as the CFIA does nothave the legislative responsibility or contingency plans in areas other than infectedherd eradication. Under the FAERS model, in nonmandated agriculture emergen-cies, AAFC and the CFIA will jointly determine which of the two organizationswill take the lead and which will provide a support function. In general, AAFC isexpected to take the lead when the emergency support primarily relates to provid-ing financial compensation to farmers—a major function of welfare slaugh-ter/market support programs (CFIA, 1999).
The FAERS program was last identified in the CFIA 2002–2003 report to Par-liament, Part 3.5.4 (Anonymous, 2003). The current status of this initiative is notknown by the author.
THE FADES PLAN
Many provincial governments have recently completed a review of Foreign Ani-mal Disease Eradication Support Plans (FADES; Anonymous, 2002b, 2004).These federal-provincial agreements are essentially designed to recruit provin-cial resources to assist the CFIA in the stamping out of infected herds. Theseplans have worked well in poultry, a supply managed commodity (Anonymous,1996, Bowes et al., 2004) where regulatory control of the industries has resultedin limited export in live animals or product. In swine production regions that areexport dependent, the nature and predominant activity of the FAD emergencyresponse will need to focus not only on disease eradication but also on how todeal with critical overcrowding on uninfected farms. These aspects are not cur-rently under discussion.
An additional problem is that the current FADES plans may appear to the pro-ducers to be comprehensive emergency response plans and give producers a falsesense of security, when in fact they are provincial agreements to support the fed-eral disease eradication effort (Anonymous, 2004). There is no provision withinthe FADES initiative that addresses animal welfare slaughter or other consequen-tial effects of dealing with a regional animal health crisis (Geale, 2002). During theactivation of a FADES plan, there will be concurrent demands on provincial andindustry resources related to administration of disease control efforts and main-
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taining animal welfare. Therefore, if a Canadian emergency response to CSF orFMD were to develop as currently proscribed, only a miniscule part of the man-agement would be planned for, funded, and have line responsibilities clearly de-fined under FADES; that is, the CFIA has committed to deal with the infected andhigh-risk animals. The welfare slaughter and consequential market effects of theincursion would be, in theory, managed according to the FAERS principal, that is,local authority; municipality/province has first-responder obligations, althoughthose obligations have not been communicated to them by the federal lead agen-cies on livestock disaster-management.
Pork production in the United States has also developed based on a massive in-terstate trade in live animals (Shields & Mathews, 2003). That trade would ceaseimmediately upon the identification of a FAD (OIE Animal Health Code, 2006).The stoppage of interstate trade would trigger a massive need for welfare slaugh-ter, which is not alluded to in readily available American response plans (U.S. De-partment of Homeland Security, 2004; National Association of State Departmentsof Agriculture, 2001; USDA, 2005).
INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN FAD RESPONSE
In livestock production, FAD risks are one of the many risks faced by farmers.Agricultural risks are classified as systemic (all farmers are affected, such as lowcommodity prices) or nonsystemic (drought, hail). If one farmer receives hailand crop losses occur, all farmers are not affected. Hail is a nonsystemic predict-able agricultural risk that occurs at a dependable low frequency, and insurance isavailable for hail and similar risks from the private sector.
FAD is a catastrophic-systemic risk (Skees & Barnett, 1999). If one farm be-comes affected, all farms within the country producing the same product suffer aloss. Insurance companies are unable to provide a product to cover low frequencycatastrophic and systemic risks (Skees & Barnett). In countries that have recentlydealt with an FAD, some governments dramatically changed the risk managementpolicy for agriculture to one that shares some of the costs for future FAD eradica-tion with farmers but have met with significant political resistance (Meuwissen,van Asseldonk, & Huirne, 2003). Governments in North America and Europe havehistorically responded to “disasters” in agriculture with free ad hoc disaster relief.Livestock commodity groups have become proficient political lobbyists. The U.S.Farm Bill and the Canadian Agricultural Policy Framework are multiyear commit-ments to funding agricultural programs.
History has demonstrated in Western democracies that political pressure bylivestock-producer stakeholders can encourage and trigger government financialassistance via free disaster relief programs (van Asseldonk, Meuwissen, & Huirne,2002). A belief by farmers that governments would be unable to resist the political
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pressure for free disaster relief under FAD eradication has impeded the sale of in-surance coverage for this risk in Europe, where some insurance products are avail-able (van Asseldonk et al.). Where insurance products are available, there has beensignificant government participation either in premium subsidy or in underwritingrisks. No insurance products have emerged in Canada for systemic risks in live-stock agriculture.
With both national and subnational governments remaining silent on compre-hensive policy related to catastrophic and systemic risks in the United States andCanada, the silence of the livestock industry on this issue can be viewed as confor-mity, not an outlier.
A Canadian example of a national response to a systemic-catastrophic disasteris The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy (TAGS), which was a 5-year, $1.9 billioninitiative starting in 1994. TAGS provided income support and labor market-adjustment programs to fishers, plant workers, and trawlerpersons affected by theeast coast groundfish population collapse (Anonymous, 1997). The eventual col-lapse of the east coast cod-stock was predicted by government and industry scien-tists (Alverson, 2002).
PREDICTING THE FUTURE
The 1997–1998 CSF epizootic in the Netherlands was largely responsible fortriggering a restructuring (compulsory reduction) of the pork production sectorin that country (van Heugten, 1999). The Pig Production Restructuring Act(Netherlands) came into force on September 1, 1998, with the intention of re-ducing pig herds by up to 25%. This restructuring reflects a significant change inpublic attitude toward the livestock sector in general and pig production in par-ticular. Livestock farming has fundamentally changed in the Netherlands from a“right” to a licensed activity (Brinkhorst, 2000).
At present, it is unclear how government support of the operational demands ofCSF-FMD response and recovery assistance to farmers subsequent to an FADwould be valued by the public and delivered in Canada. For the export-dependentbeef and pork sectors, the lesson provided by Taiwan in failing to eradicate the1997 FMD incursion is that overall FAD contingency planning should include theworst-case scenario of not eradicating the disease and collapse of the industry(Yang, Chu, Chung, & Sung, 1999).
Under a real FAD crisis, it will be impossible to immediately eradicate FADfrom a region and concurrently demonstrate the region is disease free. A signifi-cant time period of border closure is inevitable. If costs are federally and provin-cially shared in response and recovery, some regions will be severely affected on aper capita basis. Regions of Canada vary greatly in their dependence on exportmarkets for live pigs and pork products (Figure 4). The province of Québec has in-
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ternalized the majority of risk associated with international livestock movementrestrictions. The funding of a comprehensive, national, systemic, risk-management policy would have to recognize the value of steps taken at thesubnational level.
There could be a very substantial livestock crisis/disaster in Canada withoutever having FAD identified here. Animal disease or other crisis in the UnitedStates could trigger international border closure in a time-sensitive production sys-tem. This situation would not constitute a mandated emergency under the currentFAERS agreement and no immediate mandated federal response (CFIA, 1999).CFIA participation in an animal emergency is triggered only by identification ofthe disease in Canada. An FAD limited to a single U.S. state such as Iowa and asingle species such as swine would have significant repercussions in live animalmarkets and animal on the farm welfare in Canada. Similar to Canada, the UnitedStates has not included the ramifications of livestock movement restrictions intheir animal-disease emergency plans (USDA, 2001).
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FIGURE 4 This figure shows Canadian regional volumes of export in pork and live pigs for2006. Open bar is pork export in million kg (right axis). Solid bars are live pigs exported in mil-lion animals (left axis). Québec (PQ) has a long history of provincial government involvementin livestock production. Québec had a mature pork production chain with predominantly fin-ished product exported where Manitoba (MB) and Ontario (ON) are large exporters of porkproducts and live pigs. British Columbia (BC) and the Atlantic Region provinces (East) haverelatively small export volumes (StatsCan, 2006). Regions would differ significantly on a percapita basis in the financial impact of a foreign animal disease incursion into Canada or theUnited States. Manitoba contains about 3% of the Canadian population. Pork may be diverted toother international markets as opportunity may arise; however, live swine production is contin-gent on dedicated facilities in the United States.
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DISCUSSION
Animal welfare assurance is part of the FAD emergency response and manifestsas a direct cost. The CFIA has the limited responsibility to deal with infectedfarms. The federal agricultural minister through AAFC and provincial partneringhas traditionally delivered income support to farmers in times of unforeseen fi-nancial disaster and would be the apparent lead agency on rural economic stabi-lization and recovery. Currently, there is insufficient Canadian operational infra-structure to rapidly respond to animal welfare concerns inherent in an FADincursion into North America. There is currently no obvious leadership, legisla-tive framework, or preauthorized funding to meet direct costs that governmentand industry would incur to assure an effective animal welfare component ofFAD response. There is little evidence that the official veterinary infrastructuresin Canada and the United States have recognized a responsibility or are preparedto assure animal welfare in FAD disasters.
Lack of preparedness to concurrently assure animal welfare and eradicate in-fected livestock may result in failure to eradicate the FAD. As current nationalFAD disease eradication strategies only deal with infected farms, it is a gross errorto misconstrue these disease eradication plans as effective and comprehensiveagri-emergency management programs for CSF and FMD.
An important lesson provided from the British and Dutch experiences is that noindustry, including livestock production, is exempt from public review. Publicgoodwill is predicated on the belief held by the public that farmers are responsiblestewards and the national veterinary infrastructure is competent and prepared fordisease-related emergencies. The response to the reality of the animal welfare costof eradication in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands has been for the publicto withdraw its support for livestock production. If Canada were to experience anFMD or a CSF incursion, there would be massive animal welfare issues generated.In the media coverage of the event and the industry call for free disaster relief, theaverage citizen would be able to understand the structural issues that should havebeen identified and avoided as part of responsible emergency preparedness. Thepublic may recognize a lack of responsible stewardship by governments and theindustry and, like the Europeans, withdraw their support for livestock production.
CONCLUSION
Based on lessons provided by other countries’ FAD eradication experiences, in-troduction of FMD or CSF into Canada would result in a small crisis related tostamping out disease on infected farms in relation to the animal welfare impactsof disruption to export market access. The livestock industry in Canada has at-tempted to get this issue on the national agriculture agenda with very limited
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success. At the time of writing this document, Animal Welfare was a minorpoint in the Next Generation Agricultural Policy Framework (Anonymous,2007b) and systemic risk management was not on the agenda.
FAD control is an international problem as trade in livestock is international,especially between Canada and the United States. The official veterinary structurehas been tasked by society and governments to prepare for all aspects of the disas-ter related to exotic disease control. Solutions to this risk must start with interna-tional cooperation and recognition of the actual nature of the emergency. Theofficial veterinary infrastructure must recognize that disease eradication is no lon-ger the primary concern of society, and the duty of good government and livestockindustry is both animal health and welfare.
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