On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern Argumentation Theory

On Some Aristotelian Sources of ModernArgumentation Theory

Christof Rapp • Tim Wagner

Published online: 27 September 2012

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Abstract Although he does not provide a general analysis of argumentation,

Aristotle is a highly influential source of modern argumentation theory. In his

treatises the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations and the Rhetoric, Aristotle presents

complementary aspects of a theory of sound arguments that are seen as the most

effective means of persuasion. Aristotle’s central notion of a deductive argument

(sullogismos) does not include references to an addressee, the situative context or

non-verbal aspects of communication, and thus differs from some modern views on

argumentation. A deductive argument in the Aristotelian sense is a sequence of

intellectual steps where the conclusion follows of necessity from the premises.

Aristotle does not relativize or relax this notion but takes other factors into account

by providing supplementary theoretical elements. For example, he reflects on

acceptable premises (endoxa), the adjustment of rhetorical arguments to the horizon

of the audience, methods of finding premises on the basis of argumentative schemes

(topoi), the use of non-argumentative means of persuasion, and a framework of

implicit discourse rules. Many of these themes are, albeit under a different name,

still discussed in modern argumentation theory.

Keywords Aristotle � Dialectic � Rhetoric � Deductive Argument � Topoi �Persuasion � Fallacy

Ch. Rapp

Lehrstuhl fur Philosophie III, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1,

80539 Munich, Germany

e-mail: [email protected]

T. Wagner (&)

Institut fur Philosophie, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6,

10099 Berlin, Germany

e-mail: [email protected]

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Argumentation (2013) 27:7–30

DOI 10.1007/s10503-012-9280-9

Aristotle’s writings provide a fundamental point of reference not only for historical

approaches to argumentation theory, but also for some important modern theories of

argumentation. This does not mean, of course, that all contemporary argumentation

theorists are necessarily Aristotelians in one way or another; it only implies that

down to the present day argument theorists have been profoundly inspired by

Aristotle’s theory of argumentation.

It is a remarkable coincidence that the founding fathers, as it were, of modern

argumentation theory (MAT), Chaım Perleman and Stephen Toulmin, define their

projects by almost identical references to Aristotle: Both of them stress that logic in

the sense that Aristotle calls ‘‘analytical’’ must be complemented by a project that

corresponds to what Aristotle has delineated as ‘‘dialectic’’.1 They also converge in

emphasizing that this dialectical dimension has been unduly neglected by the recent

development of philosophical logic. Against the alleged one-sidedness of formal

logic they both appeal to ancient dialectic in general and Aristotelian dialectic in

particular for the study of real argumentation between concrete interlocutors in

concrete situations. What they actually understand by Aristotelian ‘‘dialectic’’ can

best be seen when one examines their own theories—theories which set the agenda

for major parts of an emerging, modern argumentation theory; the program that is

carried out in The Use of Arguments2 and in The New Rhetoric elaborates on

something like a blend of Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric, where Toulmin’s

argumentation scheme seems to be closer to the Topics, while the systematics of

Chaım Perleman’s and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work is closer to the Rhetoric.

Some subsequent developments of MAT put more stress on the notion of fallacy,

thus also taking Aristotle’s treatise Sophistical refutations into account.3 In all these

cases the recourse to Aristotle is significantly more than a revival of a historical

position. The adaptation of selected Aristotelian theorems by MAT presupposes

specific theoretical interests in the theory of argumentation and requires a

theoretical framework like the one that has emerged from certain developments

in twentieth-century philosophy. If we therefore speak of ‘‘Aristotelian sources’’ of

MAT, we do not imply that these theorists have just picked up ready-made

Aristotelian theorems that were waiting in textbooks and manuals to be rediscov-

ered; we express, on the contrary, our awareness of the fact that these theories

together with their Aristotelian ingredients are the result of the ongoing debate on

how one can make the best sense of the rich, but sometimes ambiguous and

inconsistent, Aristotelian material that has come down to us and of how this material

fits best with the theoretical interests we happen to have.

In this contribution we comment on just this sort of discussion; we try to lay bare

some of the presuppositions made by some of the main representatives of MAT

about the directions of the Aristotelian texts, and we attempt to point out theoretical

options that, to our mind, are present in the Aristotelian texts. Thus, we will touch

not only on Aristotelian theorems that were actually taken up by modern

1 Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 5), and Toulmin (1986, 62).2 Toulmin (1958).3 Cf. e.g. Walton and Krabbe (1995), Woods and Walton (1989). On the state of the art in the study of

fallacies see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, chapter 7).

8 Ch. Rapp, T. Wagner

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argumentation theorists, but also on Aristotelian ideas that are congenial with

certain strands of MAT, but have not yet been explicitly used, finally on points

where the direction of the Aristotelian texts seems to diverge from the modern ideas

they inspired. Of course, we cannot do justice here to the complex state of

discussion in MAT, therefore, we let our agenda be informed by what strike us as

some of the core convictions of the aforementioned founding fathers of MAT, as

well as by a more or less random selection of recent developments in MAT that we

have lately encountered.

1 The Topics and the Rhetoric as Building Blocks of a Unified Theoryof Argumentation?

Let us start with an assumption that seems so obvious that it is seldom really

discussed, but almost always tacitly presupposed, namely the assumption that there

is something like a more or less coherent theory of argumentation in Aristotle. In

fact, there is no single work of Aristotle’s that systematically unfolds his

argumentation theory. The work that comes closest is Aristotle’s Topics—either

alone or together with its sister treatise the Sophistical Refutations. Still, if we look

into the Topics, we find instructions for a quite peculiar sort of discourse, namely the

dialectical examination of philosophical theses on the basis of accepted or

acceptable premises. The exercise that is pictured in the Topics is constrained by a

set of artificial rules that distinguishes the dialectical exercise sharply from more

natural, more conversational and more persuasion-oriented types of argumentation.4

If we look, however, into the Rhetoric—the other place in Aristotle that might be

associated with his argumentation theory—we do find ample material for an account

of persuasiveness; but, again, the types of arguments that are analysed or

recommended in the Rhetoric are inseparably connected with public speaking and

the narrowly defined occasions when these speeches have to be delivered: judicial

speeches in court, political speeches at people’s assemblies, and epideictic speeches

held at certain ceremonial events, most notably funerals.5

Given that neither the Topics nor the Rhetoric provide a general systematic

theory of argumentation, what do we mean, after all, by an ‘‘Aristotelian theory of

argumentation’’? Either we use this idea to refer selectively to particular

Aristotelian theorems or techniques (e.g. the use of topoi) or we use it assuming

that there is something like a more coherent underlying theory that can, in principle,

be pieced together from Aristotle’s works, even if this underlying theory is not

explicitly presented in any particular work. In following the second line of thought

we have to explore whether the scattered ingredients of an Aristotelian theory of

argumentation are interrelated in such a way that, taken together, they make up

something like a coherent whole. For such an enterprise it will probably help to

observe that the Topics and the Rhetoric can, up to a point, be seen as providing

complementary aspects of such a theory of argumentation. For this reason, the

4 Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.5 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.3.

On Some Aristotelian Sources 9

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question whether there is something like a coherent theory of argumentation in

Aristotle partly boils down to the issue of whether and how the two treatises or the

two projects that are carried out in the respective treatises are interrelated, and this

latter purpose, again, depends on some far from trivial assumptions concerning the

nature of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In what follows, we try to answer the questions of whether there is such a

common on-going project underlying both the Topics and the Rhetoric, and, if so,

how it might contribute to a unified or coherent theory of argumentation. To this

end, we would like to start off with a preliminary characterisation of both sub-

projects.

It is the declared purpose of the Topics to outline a method by which we can find

arguments for and against any given thesis, so that we will be able to attack or

defend it at will.6 Although this method might, in principle, have manifold

applications, the Topics applies it only to a specific kind of competition, in the

course of which one of two disputants has to defend one of a contradictory pair of

assertions, while his opponent tries to deduce the contradiction of the defendant’s

original claim from assertions to which the defendant has committed himself during

the debate. The aggressor, as it were, plays the role of the questioner, as he is the

one who asks the answerer to assent to certain statements that, once admitted, can be

used as premises for a final conclusion that contradicts the defendant’s original

claim.

Given this general setting, dialecticians as pictured in the Topics, are primarily

interested in conclusive arguments, as it is the very goal of such conversations to

compel the opponent to arrive at and assent to the intended conclusion. If the

dialectical arguments were of a less binding type and were only meant to propose or

suggest the step from the acceptance of certain premises to the acceptance of the

insinuated conclusion, there would be no means by which to make the opponent

accept a certain conclusion or give up his original claim. Some, mostly

inexperienced, disputants may be vulnerable to accepting arguments that appear

to be conclusive without really being so. It may happen that a disputant succeeds in

driving his thesis home with the help of such fallacious arguments; but when the

quality of the disputants’ arguments is assessed—and Aristotle mentions criteria for

this kind of assessment in the eighth book of the Topics7—the disputant will be

criticized for using fallacious inferences.

Furthermore, the dialectician has to be interested in endoxa, in accepted,

acceptable or reputable assertions, as the answerer, in general, is committed to

accept assertions that are of the acceptable type, and as the answerer would be

foolish to accept assertions which are contrary to them (i.e. paradoxa in contrast to

endoxa).

The themes that are discussed in the dialectical disputations are taken from the

philosophical debates of Aristotle’s time. This is why the examples given for

dialectical theses are mostly general, not particular, in form; only the topoi from the

third book of the Topics are suitable for forming arguments about particular claims.

6 Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.1, 100a18–21.7 Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.11.


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But this is not a major surprise since this third book is most likely an appendix or

even a later addition to the agenda of the second book of the Topics.

Just as the Topics is, thus, interested in conclusiveness and validity, the Rhetoricdeals with persuasiveness. And just as the Topics distinguishes between the valid and

the only seemingly valid, the Rhetoric distinguishes between what is persuasive and

what is only seemingly persuasive.8 Finally, just as the Topics promises to develop a

method by which we can argue for and against any given thesis, the Rhetoric attempts

to determine what can be considered persuasive on any given topic.9 Hence, both

disciplines, dialectic and rhetoric, are, in principle, thematically unrestricted and

attempt to determine the conclusive and the persuasive, respectively—regardless of

whether the case in question is rather true than false or rather good than bad. Still,

although the Rhetoric provides considerations that might be significant for persuasion

in all possible fields of discourse, the three-book treatise that has come down to us

under the title of rhêtorikê technê, turns out to be interested—as already indicated—

only in persuasion in the realm of public speaking. Due to this limited field of

application, the Rhetoric is mostly concerned with particular, non-general topics, such

as whether, say, Alcibiades is guilty or not, but not with what it means to be guilty in

general, or whether, for example, it is useful for the Athenians to build a wall here and

now, but not with whether walls in general contribute to the flourishing of a city,

let alone the question of what the flourishing of a city consists in.

It seems, then, that for Aristotle dialectic and rhetoric are, at least in some

respects, complementary: Dialectic applies to dialogical, face-to-face disputations

about general topics, while rhetoric applies to speeches delivered to mass

audiences on non-general, particular topics. Such a division of labour between the

two projects might be taken as an indication that there is something like an on-

going project involving the two disciplines of dialectic and rhetoric and the

corresponding treatises the Topics and the Rhetoric. However, we must not forget

that even if we take both treatises together, thus obtaining complementary aspects

of a general theory of argumentation, the Topics and the Rhetoric as such do not

provide a general, let alone exhaustive, analysis of argumentation; what we get

are, for example, analyses of particular, contingent issues presented to a public

audience and analyses of general philosophical questions discussed in the

characteristic question–answer format that distinguishes Aristotelian dialectics;

what we do not get, however, is an analysis of, say, arguments about particular

and contingent issues presented in a dialogical face-to-face-situation. Nor do we

get, if our description of the two sub-projects is right, the complementary analysis

of the persuasiveness of arguments in the non-public sphere (given that it is not

the purpose of dialectic to actually persuade or convince an opponent, but to bring

him take positions from which his original position can be defeated). We can

state, then, as an interim result that MAT is perfectly justified in assuming that, to

a certain extent, Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric present something like an on-

going project that covers different aspects of a general theory of argumentation.

At the same time it is important to note that none of these writings aims at

8 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355b15 et seq.9 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1355b26 et seq.


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explicitly developing such a general theory, but that all pertinent writings, the

Topics, the Rhetoric and the Sophistical Refutations confine themselves to certain

narrow fields of argumentative discourse; taken together they fill some important

spots on the map of different fields and types of argumentation, but they are far

from providing a complete picture.

2 Delineating Dialectic and Rhetoric

In the previous section we discussed the relation between the Topics and the

Rhetoric and the corresponding fields of dialectic and rhetoric with a view to the

possibility of a coherent Aristotelian theory of argumentation based on a division

of labour. The relation between dialectic and rhetoric, however, is significant in

at least one further respect: different strands of MAT associate themselves with

either dialectic or rhetoric. Up to a point this might be a question of different

terminologies and different traditions, but sometimes the association with one or

the other of these fields indicates actual differences in the theoretical approaches.

Quite tentatively, some of the self-declared dialecticians are more interested in

the difference between sound and fallacious arguments, and some of the

rhetoricians are more interested in all perlocutionary aspects of our speech acts.

The former display an interest in refraining from ‘‘merely’’ psychological

questions, while the latter warn against a too narrow notion of argumentation.

Hence, the delineation between dialectic and rhetoric is definitely an issue in

MAT.10

Against that background, it is natural that authors attempt to position their own

approaches by way of reference to Aristotle, who gave the first elaborate account of

the interrelation of both fields. Unfortunately, the reference to Aristotle and his

model for correlating dialectic and rhetoric does not lead to an unambiguous result,

because his statements to the effect that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic or an

offshoot of it11 have been deemed highly obscure. Notwithstanding the notorious

difficulties in understanding these formulas, it is beyond all doubt that for Aristotle

dialectic and rhetoric are similar, since neither discipline is conceived as an

epistêmê of a well-defined subject matter; both are rather concerned with arguments

for and against any given position; just as dialecticians command a technê by which

they can attack and defend any given (philosophical) thesis, the rhetorician is

supposed to command a technê in virtue of which he will be able, for example, to

accuse or defend any given defendant in court. Furthermore, both of them deal with

arguments derived solely from accepted or acceptable opinions, and not from

scientific principles. It is possible to delineate the common ground between dialectic

and rhetoric by such similarities. The most basic philosophical rationale, however,

10 Cf. the papers that are collected in van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) as well as van Eemeren’s

contribution to this issue.11 Rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic: Rhetoric I.1, 1354a1; it is an offshoot of dialectic and the study of

character: I.2, 1356a25–27, it is a part of dialectic: I.2, 1356a30 et seq., it is similar to it: I.2, 1356a31.


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for Aristotle’s attempt to align rhetoric with dialectic becomes obvious from the

following train of thought:

The activity of persuasion is, as Aristotle points out at the beginning of the

Rhetoric, a kind of proof or proving.12 Why so? People are most convinced, or so

Aristotle says,13 when they take something to have been proven. It is therefore

legitimate to model the persuasive endeavour of the rhetorician as a kind of proof

(apodeixis). Given that all proofs are kinds of sullogismoi—which we take to be

deductive arguments—persuasion can essentially be described in terms of

sullogismoi, i.e. deductive arguments. What Aristotle seems to presuppose is that

persuasion essentially follows the structure of a deductive premise-conclusion

argument: In order to convince the audience of a suggested thesis or suggestion, the

orator has to infer this thesis from what the audience already believes. In a similar

vein, Aristotle claims in the De Anima that each doxa, each opinion in the proper

sense, derives from an inference (sullogismos)—and this is, in Aristotle’s view, the

reason why animals cannot have opinions in the proper sense.

Within whose purview does the deductive argument fall? We would probably say

within the purview of the logician. Aristotle, by contrast, says that it falls within the

purview of the dialectician14—regardless of whether he simply had no word for

logic in our sense or whether he really meant that it is the dialectician, if anyone,

who is the real expert for all kinds or applications of the sullogismos.However this may be, if it is true that all sullogismoi fall within the purview of

the dialectician and if the syllogistic, i.e. deductive, premise-conclusion structure is

essential for all persuasive endeavours, then it follows that rhetoric, if it is

concerned with persuasion, essentially relies on the part of dialectic that is

responsible for the sullogismos. Indeed, Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that it is the

dialectician who is in fact responsible for all kinds of sullogismos and that the

dialectician will also become the master of the rhetorical argument if he only

acknowledges the differences between the dialectical and the rhetorical sullogismos.

On this account, there is no fundamental conflict between dialectic and rhetoric.

Furthermore, if sound arguments guarantee the reasonableness of argumentation and

if arguments are thought to be an efficient means of persuasion, neither is there a

fundamental conflict between reasonableness and effectiveness. This, we think, is

the essential rationale behind the dialectical turn of rhetoric initiated by Aristotle;

against rhetorical predecessors who, from Aristotle’s point of view, were too much

concerned with effectiveness, he aspires to show that arguments are central to

persuasion and not less effective than certain techniques by which the rhetorician is

instructed to speak outside the subject. Of course, no argument is thought to be

persuasive as it stands; it is one of the most crucial ingredients of Aristotle’s

rhetorical theory of argumentation that the general dialectical account of arguments

must be adjusted to the hearers and the subject matters of a public speech. And it is

of course true that Aristotle’s theory of persuasion includes moments beside mere

argumentation: Among the three technical means of persuasion (pisteis) there are

12 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a4 et sq.13 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a5 et sq.14 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a8–10.


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also the emotional state of the audience (pathos) and the character or credibility of

the speaker (êthos); to this list we might add the linguistic form (lexis) and the order

of the parts of speech (taxis). There have been many scholarly debates about how

these non-argumentative means of persuasion (or should they also be called

‘‘argumentative’’ in some way? See Sect. 6, below) are related to logos, argument15;

however, there are many indications that the introduction of these non-argumen-

tative means of persuasion are not meant to relativize the central role of

argumentation; after all, almost three-fourths of the text of Rhetoric I and II are

dedicated to argumentation in the narrow sense, and when Aristotle turns to the

discussion of lexis in Rhetoric III, he stresses that this is only a secondary concern.16

Also, when Aristotle says that it is necessary not only to look at the argument, but

also to present oneself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the emotional state

of the audience, as rhetoric always aims at the judgment of the audience,17 it seems

as if the non-argumentative means are required just to stabilize the audience’s

judgment formation and thus to enhance the effect of the given arguments.18

However one construes these aspects of the Aristotelian theory in detail, it seems

clear that the model he offers for reconciling dialectic and rhetoric is one in which

rhetoric is firmly based on dialectic, and rhetorical effectiveness is thought to flow

from reasonable arguments—assuming they are suitably chosen—and to not ask too

much of the audience of a public speech.19

3 Aristotelian Arguments and MAT Argumentation: A Mismatch?

Every argumentation theory should include an elucidation of what it is to be an

argument and what is meant by ‘‘argumentation’’. It is not entirely trivial, however,

to map Aristotle’s contributions to the definition of arguments onto the consensus of

MAT. As for MAT, there are, of course, many different approaches to defining

arguments and argumentation. There are, however, some recurring characterisations

that we would like to take as a starting point. Toulmin, to begin with, emphasizes

that while formal logic is concerned with propositions, argumentation theory deals

with concrete utterances.20 In a similar vein, Perelman loves to contrast

demonstration with argumentation: While demonstration proceeds in an impersonal

and abstract way, argumentation is always addressed at somebody; it ‘‘aims at

gaining the adherence of minds’’.21 Finally, in van Eemeren and Grootendorst

15 For a brief and useful overview see Kienpointner (2011, 10–12).16 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric III.1, 1403b18–20.17 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1, 1377b21–24.18 For an elaboration of this view, see Rapp (2012).19 Put in such general terms, this goal seems to be congenial with more recent developments in MAT:

‘‘The Aristotelian rhetorical norm of successful persuasion is not necessarily in contradiction with the

ideal of reasonableness that lies at the heart of the pragma-dialectical approach’’ (van Eemeren and

Houtlosser 1999, 165). We owe this reference to Kientpointner (2011).20 Cf. Toulmin (1996).21 Cf. e.g. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 14), Perelman (1994, 85).


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argumentation is defined as ‘‘a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at

convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward

a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the propositions expressed in

the standpoint.’’22 Let us leave it at that for the moment and go back to Aristotle.

First, it seems that there is no single word or terminus in Aristotle equivalent to

‘‘argument’’. In Topics I.12 he writes that there are two kinds of dialectical logos,and then he hastens to distinguish between sullogismos and epagogê—which is best

rendered as deductive and inductive argument. What most nearly approximates the

notion of an argument in this context is logos—but this word’s lack of specificity is

almost proverbial. The most neutral meaning in this context is that a logos is a

sequence of words, but this reading renders the division into exactly two kinds

inappropriate. Of course, logos can also be translated as ‘‘reason’’—the faculty of

reasoning as well as the reasons we can give. That arguments have to do with

reasoning is clear, as is the fact that providing reasons for what we maintain is close

to the notion of arguing. It seems, then, that due to these several ingredients,

Aristotle finds it natural to use the word logos as a generic term for what the two

irreducible forms of argument, sullogismos and epagogê, have in common. In the

same chapter of the Topics Aristotle also states that an epagogê is given when we

proceed from the particular to the general.23 This is why epagogê came to be

translated as ‘‘induction’’ or ‘‘inductive argument’’. In the Rhetoric Aristotle briefly

revisits the issue of induction and tells us that the rhetorical form of induction is an

example of an argument which proceeds not from the particular to the general, but

from one particular to another.24 The sad truth about the theory of induction in

Aristotle is that this is almost all he has to say about it. In both treatises, the Topicsand the Rhetoric, he hastens to get back to the sullogismos, and in both fields,

dialectic and rhetoric, he seems to be almost oblivious to the inductive form of

argumentation and models both dialectical disputation and rhetorical persuasion

almost entirely in terms of ‘‘syllogistic’’, i.e. sullogismos-based, reasoning. Possibly,

this privileging of the sullogimos can be partly relativized, as Eggs (1992, 918)

suggests, if we assume that in some passages the word sullogismos takes over the

role of the missing generic concept for both forms of arguments, but it remains true

and indisputable that major parts of Aristotle’s argumentation theory are centred

around the notion of sullogismos, while the corresponding inductive form of

argumentation is widely neglected.

What is meant in Aristotle by sullogismos? Aristotle defines the sullogismos as an

argument in which, certain things being supposed, something different from the

suppositions results of necessity from them.25 According to this definition, the

sullogismos is roughly what we would call a deductive argument; it is remarkable

that this definition does not refer to the syllogistic theory that is developed in the

Prior Analytics. This means that when Aristotle speaks of the sullogismos in the

Topics and the Rhetoric (which, by the way, uses the same definition of sullogismos)

22 Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, 1).23 Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.12, 105a13 et seq.24 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1357b25–36.25 Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.1, 100a25–27.


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we should not expect the formally restricted canonical sullogismos that we know

from the syllogistic theory, with exactly two premises and three terms, one of which

is the middle term, etc. The Topics seems to be entirely untouched by this theory

and hence it is no surprise that the arguments we do find in the Topics and in the

Rhetoric do not obey to any formal restriction of this kind. That they are formally

less rigid than the arguments from Aristotle’s syllogistic theory does not mean,

however, that they are meant to be logically more relaxed. On the contrary, the

definition quoted makes clear that the conclusion of a sullogismos is something that

follows of necessity from the premises.

According to Aristotle’s definition, it is certainly true of the sullogismos that it

includes a constellation of propositions put forward in order to justify the

proposition that is expressed as the conclusion. On the basis of the same definition it

seems, however, that the justification is only seen as successful if the conclusion

follows of necessity from the premises. In comparison to modern accounts, which

only expect that in argumentation we try to make our standpoint more acceptable or

reasonable or that we justify it one way or another, this would be a much more

severe constraint. It is also clear that the notion of the sullogismos is neutral with

respect to the difference between demonstration and (dialectical) argumentation.

The definition of the sullogismos that is used either with scientific principles in order

to provide a scientific demonstration or with (only) accepted opinions in order to

serve as a dialectical argument is the same in both cases. This corresponds to the

fact that, as opposed to the MAT definitions we mentioned, the audience and the

expected effect on the audience is not mentioned in Aristotle’s definition of the

sullogismos.

On the basis of this brief and preliminary comparison we can state the following

possibly substantial discrepancies (disregarding the fact that, as we said, the notion

of sullogismos covers only one of the two species that fall under the generic notion

of argument): (1) In comparison to a rich notion of argumentation that includes a

reference to the addressee the notion of the sullogismos seems to be rather

underdetermined. Looking from this perspective, it seems promising not to take the

‘‘bare’’, as it were, notion of sullogismos as possibly equivalent to the MAT notion

of argumentation, but to look at the class of arguments with ‘‘endoxic’’ premises, i.e.

premises that are accepted by certain addressees.26 (2) According to some—not

all—MAT-accounts of argumentation, the addressee’s readiness to find a standpoint

acceptable can be increased by many means, both verbal and non-verbal, and not

only by putting forward premise-like constellations of propositions. From this point

of view, the Aristotelian premise-conclusion model of argumentation may seem too

narrow. One possible response would be to include means of persuasion that do not

belong to logos, as Aristotle puts it, in the notion of argumentation (see Sect. 6,

below); there is the risk, however, that we might broaden the notion of

argumentation to the point where everything that is possibly persuasive is rated

as argument, which is most probably not Aristotle’s intention. Another, more

conservative response would be to look for places where Aristotle himself

cautiously broadens the concept of argument. One such passage, e.g., would be the

26 See Sect. 4, below; there will be, however, different uses of the accepted premises.


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discussion of maxims in Rhetoric II.21, where Aristotle acknowledges that

arguments can be given without the explicit use of the premise-conclusion scheme:

In the maxims ‘‘Being a mortal, do not cherish immortal anger’’ or ‘‘A mortal

should think mortal, not immortal, thoughts’’ the reason is, as Aristotle says,

implicitly given by the mention of ‘‘mortal’’.27 (3) The conviction that deductive

arguments are nearly omnipresent (Aristotle defines the sullogismos as deductive

argument and finds sullogismoi in everything from logic and dialectic to scientific

demonstration and rhetoric) seems to be absent from most MAT schools. Even those

who are concerned about the reasonableness of argumentation need not require all

acceptable arguments to be deductive; quite often it seems to be sufficient that the

transition from a premise to a conclusion seems to be reasonable—but not

necessary—under the given circumstances. This would be a substantial discrepancy.

For this reason it seems that Aristotle’s notion of an argument can be adapted to

MAT and fully modernized only if we can find hints of more ‘‘relaxed’’ notions of

argument in Aristotle. It is widely held that one can find such a notion in Aristotle’s

Rhetoric. Let us briefly examine this possibility:

Taking up a terminus from traditional rhetoric, Aristotle calls the rhetorical form

of proof an ‘‘enthymeme’’. Again and again he stresses that the enthymeme28 is a

kind of sullogismos or that it is the rhetorical form of the sullogismos, i.e. of the

deductive argument, while the example is the rhetorical version of the inductive

argument. As we have already said, Aristotle even invokes the dialectician’s

expertise in all kinds of sullogismos for the construction of enthymemes. Even the

advocates of ‘‘relaxed’’ arguments must admit that so far this entire setting does not

indicate any relaxation for rhetorical arguments. They therefore take recourse to the

definition of the enthymeme in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where they try to detect

indications of a more relaxed way of arguing. In fact, the definition of the

enthymeme slightly modifies the standard definition of the sullogismos that we

discussed above; in rhetoric we speak of an enthymeme, Aristotle says, when,

‘‘certain things being the case, something different beside them results because of

their being either universally or for the most part the case.’’29 The most

controversial modification of the standard definition obviously lies in the

qualification ‘‘for the most part’’. On the one hand, if this qualification was meant

to qualify the inference itself—indicating that the conclusion does not follow of

necessity, but only for the most part—then, indeed, the idea of a deductive argument

would have to be abandoned. On the other hand, it is also possible to understand this

definition as saying that the premises maintain something to be the case either

universally or (only) for the most part. This latter reading would qualify the status of

the premise(s), not the inference itself. One could argue now, from a modern point

of view, that a premise that holds only for the most part or is only probable does not

allow for any necessary, but only for probable inferences. Again, this would result in

a remarkable deviation from, and a relaxation of, the deductive model. However, it

27 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II.21, 1394b20–25.28 There is a long-standing tradition that takes the enthymeme to be an incomplete syllogism. This is not

Aristotle’s view: see below, Sect. 4.29 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric. I.2 1356b15–17. For a different interpretation cf. Burnyeat (1994).


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seems that this is not Aristotle’s view, for he seems to be happy with saying that

what follows from a for-the-most-part premise is a for-the-most-part conclusion, but

that this modally qualified conclusion still follows of logical necessity (‘‘If such-

and-such is for the most part true, then it follows of necessity that something else is

for the most part true’’). On this account, Aristotle is being generous in granting that

due to the contingent subject matter of a public speech the premises and the

conclusions of rhetorical arguments very rarely express necessities, but he is still

insistent on his view that the deductive scheme can be used for relating for-the-

most-part premises to for-the-most-part conclusions.30

In recent scholarship the deductivist reading of Aristotle’s enthymemes has come

under scrutiny by interpreters who are obviously interested in bringing Aristotle

closer to the insights of MAT. Here, it seems quite clear that it is not Aristotle who

inspired MAT, but MAT that encouraged certain readings of Aristotle. Whichever

reading will prevail in the long run, it seems fair to say that Aristotle heavily relied

on his deductive scheme, that he stressed the less stringent character of rhetorical

premises rather than the possibility of less rigid inferences and that, if he was really

willing to deviate from the deductive scheme, he was not quite explicit in doing so.

4 Paying Attention to the Addressee’s Convictions and Capacities

As we said at the outset of this paper, MAT sets itself off from the analytic part of

logic or from the fixation on formal aspects of arguments by emphasizing that all

arguments are directed to concrete addressees with individual convictions. If

argumentation in general, as for example Perelman stresses,31 aims at increasing the

addressee’s readiness to approve a suggested point of view, a substantial account of

argumentation has to take into account what different groups of hearers are

convinced of and how arguments can be adjusted to the convictions of the people

they address.

If we look for an equivalent interest in Aristotle, we will first be faced with his

highly developed account of the role of endoxa—accepted, acceptable or reputable

opinions that play a major role in both his Topics and his Rhetoric. The dialectical

argument is defined by Aristotle as an argument, sullogismos, from accepted or

acceptable (endoxa) premises. This is what distinguishes dialectical from scientific

arguments,32 as the latter have to apply premises that are true (i.e. established as

true) and, as Aristotle puts it, ‘‘first’’. For the dialectical disputation, it does not

matter whether the deployed premises are true or not; it suffices that they are

acceptable and that they have actually been accepted or granted by the dialectical

interlocutor. Neither does it matter whether the defendant who grants a certain

premise is personally convinced of the truth of this premise or not. Due to the rules

30 At this point the supporter of relaxed rhetorical arguments could refer to one type of the sign-

enthymeme, which, as Aristotle says, does not yield a sullogismos, but is nevertheless rated as

‘‘enthymeme’’. The status of such arguments, however, is precarious, since in some passages Aristotle

treats them straightforwardly as fallacies (see below, Sect. 7).31 Cf. Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, § 3 et seqq).32 Cf. Aristotle, Topics I.1, 100a29–100b23.


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of a dialectical disputation, he has no choice but to accept it if it is accepted by all,

by most or by the experts—provided he cannot come up with a counterexample. For

the rhetorician, on the contrary, everything depends on whether he is able to provide

premises that coincide with the convictions of the audience. It is the fundamental

idea of Aristotle’s technique of persuasion that it is possible to bring an audience to

an intended conclusion by appealing to the audience’s extant convictions and by

inferentially connecting these pre-existing convictions with the insinuated conclu-

sion. For this reason, the endoxa, the acceptable assertions that are used by the

rhetorician, are only a subset of the assertions that can be considered by the

dialectician; in a word, the rhetorician is not interested in the variety of accepted

opinions, but only in what a given audience might possibly be convinced of. In

dialectic, it is not the aim of the dialectical competitor to change the opponent’s

conviction or attitude; he can be content if he succeeds in compelling the competitor

to accept the insinuated conclusion; in rhetoric, by contrast, the rhetorician is

expected to steer the audience’s judgment formation up to the point that people give

their vote or cast their ballot in accordance with what the rhetorician suggests. To

achieve this, the rhetorician cannot rely on the audience’s willingness to obey

certain procedural rules (as the dialectical competitors are bound to do). Either the

rhetorician succeeds in tracing the intended conclusion back to the audience’s pre-

existing convictions or he has no influence whatsoever on what they decide.

We can then say that although both dialectic and rhetoric make use of accepted

opinions, endoxa, they do not use the same set of endoxa, they do not use them for the

same purpose and they do not use them in the same way. Although all dealings with

endoxa fall within the purview of the dialectician, it is the field of rhetoric that

applies the use of endoxa in a way that comes close to the interests of MAT to

systematically include the addressee’s individual conviction or mental horizon in the

study of arguments. In a similar vein, Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that whatever is

persuasive is persuasive to somebody.33 However, he admits that not even the

rhetorician can pick out individual convictions, but must confine himself to what is

persuasive to people of a certain general type.34 In practice, when the orator is

confronted with a mass audience he often has to start from quite general or

widespread convictions (koina),35 without being able to do justice to individual

preference or to preferences of certain groups (e.g. the young, the elderly, the rich,

the poor, etc.36)—however that might be, this is one example where we could say that

although the scope of Aristotle’s is quite limited (here: limited to the expectations of

a mass audience of a public speech), the theoretical instrument for generally

incorporating the convictions and expectations of the addressees is actually present.

Beside the system of the endoxa, there is another important aspect of how

Aristotelian rhetoric tries to adjust arguments to the addressee’s intellectual horizon:

when Aristotle describes the peculiarities of rhetorical arguments, to which he

33 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1356b26 et seq.34 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1356b28–34.35 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.1, 1355a27.36 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.12–17. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 20), refer to these chapters as

contributions to the rhetorician’s knowledge of the audience.


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assigns the traditional rhetorical term ‘‘enthymeme’’, he stresses that the rhetorical

proofs must not be taken from ‘‘too far away’’, because the typical hearer of a public

speech is supposed to be a simple person who is not able to follow long chains of

argument.37 Due to a long-standing interpretative tradition which understands

Aristotelian enthymemes to be abbreviated arguments in which one of the required

premises is suppressed, commentators have often taken this remark as a comment

on the suppression of premises. In fact, what Aristotle says is that enthymemes must

not be as precise as a scientific demonstration and that they should be shorter than

ordinary dialectical arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is

defined by incompleteness and brevity. The orator can avoid lengthy chains of

arguments by selecting the right premises, i.e. premises that are not too far from the

intended conclusions. On this reading, it seems that it is essential for the rhetorical

argument that it be adjusted to the capacity, expectation and intellectual horizon of

the given audience. The drawback, however, is that Aristotle’s effort to adjust

arguments to public audiences remains rather one-dimensional, as all these

arrangements are made with a view to the intellectual insufficiency of a public

mass audience.

5 The Uses of Topoi

We have already said that in the Rhetoric the sullogismos falls within the purview of

the dialectician. Part of this purview certainly consists in a sullogismos in the way

we discussed above in Sect. 3. It is likely, however, that the dialectician’s

competence also includes the ability to discern valid and invalid arguments or to

overlook, in general, the manifold ways in which such sullogismoi can be construed.

In the Topics the long catalogues of topoi seem to present different ways of

construing such deductive arguments. If we regard the topoi as something like

argumentative schemes, acquainting ourselves with these schemes will help us to

identify valid arguments, just as acquainting ourselves with a list of possible

fallacies will help us to detect deceptive arguments. At the same time, the catalogue

of topoi can be seen as a manual for the construction of arguments. How exactly the

topoi guide us in finding and constructing arguments is a controversial issue.38 The

minimal scholarly consensus is that the topoi are meant to be useful for the

construction of premises for a given conclusion. This means that we already have to

know the conclusion we intend to draw (within the dialectical game this is the

contradiction of what the opponent says), and that the topos helps us to construe a

premise from which we can deduce the intended conclusion—provided the

opponent assents to this premise. In the literature this is often called the ‘‘inventive’’

function of a topos. According to this inventive function the topos contributes to the

task of premise selection (although it is not the topos itself that determines whether

the required premise is an endoxon or not). We, at least, think that the topos has not

37 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.2, 1357a17–22.38 Cf. De Pater (1965) and the introduction to Brunschwig (1967); for a brief summary of the scholarly

discussion see also Wagner and Rapp (2004, 29–35).


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only this inventive but also a probative function in that it also guarantees the

transition from the premises to the conclusion (if the topos, e.g., says that whatever

holds of the genus, must also hold of each species, then the same topos is a warrant,

as it were, for the transition from a premise concerning a particular genus to a

conclusion about its species).

What we should add about the use of topoi is this: the use of topoi is essential for

both projects, the Topics and the Rhetoric. In the Topics the topoi deployed are not

dependent on specific subjects or themes. Therefore, the topoi here are mostly taken

from semantic, logical or otherwise general rules. In the Rhetoric Aristotle

distinguishes between general and specific topoi, where the general correspond to

the topoi of the Topics39 and the specific are such in the sense that they can only be

used to construe arguments with a specific predicate, for example arguments about

what is good, just or noble. If Aristotle says that the latter type of topoi, the specific,

are more appropriate for rhetorical use, this certainly reflects the difference we

already alluded to, i.e. that dialectic is mostly about general topics, while rhetoric

aims at judgments about particular states of affairs.

The Aristotelian technique of topoi has generally met with sympathy and

approval by the proponents of MAT. Quite generally, the Aristotelian topoi are

often invoked as ‘‘role models’’ when the notion of an argumentation scheme is

introduced. In particular, Toulmin’s general analysis of the structure of argumen-

tation introduces the important notion of an ‘‘inference warrant’’,40 and it has often

been observed that the role of these warrants resembles that of the topoi in

Aristotle41—at least in its probative function. In legal theory Viehweg appealed to

Gian Battista Vico’s contraposition of the old rhetorical/topical and the new critical/

geometrical method42; Viehweg attempts to show that within the realm of

jurisprudence, the topical method (for which he explicitly refers to Aristotle and

Cicero) is far superior to the axiomatic-systematic approach. Perelman, too, often

highlights that in jurisdiction there are remnants of the old rhetorical art of

argumentation. He regards Aristotelian topoi as the most general premises, but

wishes to distinguish his own use of loci from the Aristotelian one; first, he attempts

to get rid of what he takes to be a metaphysical contamination of Aristotelian

39 Even if most of the general topoi in the Rhetoric are not really general in the same sense as the topoi of

the Topics are; most are general only in the sense that they can be used in all three genres of speech, while

the specific ones are always peculiar to one such genre or to one of the key notions of a genre, ‘‘just’’ in

the judicial speech, ‘‘good’’ in the forensic speech, and ‘‘noble’’ in the epideictic speech. Still, the notion

of a general topos in the Rhetoric clearly refers back to the project of the Topics, though only five out of

28 general topoi in Rhetoric II.23 clearly resemble the topoi of the Topics (1397a7–19, 1397a20–23,

1397b12–174, 1397b174–27, 1399a6–9). Insofar as the topoi in the Topics rest on, as we have said,

semantic, logical or otherwise general rules it makes little sense to stress, as Warnick (2000, 111 et seq.)

does, the cultural dependency of these topoi. As an example Warnick introduces the topos from the

opposites—that if a and b are opposites and a has the quality q, the opposite of quality q can be predicated

of b. To our mind, this is just one application of Aristotle’s complex logical system of opposites and does

not indicate specific cultural preferences. Revealingly, Warnick uses the example that Aristotle gives

afterwards to make her point, not the general scheme.40 Cf. Toulmin (1958, Chapter 3).41 Cf. Bird (1961).42 Cf. Viehweg (1963, §§ 1–2).


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topoi,43 and second, he tries to preserve the term for premises about what is valuable

and preferable.44 Others have tried to show that the argument schemes that

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca unfold in The New Rhetoric45 broadly correspond to

the common topoi in Aristotle’s Rhetoric II.23. Indeed, several accounts of

argumentation schemes have been development in MAT quite independently from

Aristotle, but with an awareness of the historical origins of such schemes, e.g.

Kientpointner and Walton, to mention only two, have worked extensively on such

an argumentation theory.46 Kienpointner and Rigotti have also stressed the

inventive/generative aspect of Aristotelian topoi; Rigotti has even labeled them as

‘‘argument generators’’.47 Tetens observes that formal logic is of limited use for

argumentation training. He refers to the ancient tradition in general and the

Aristotelian tradition in particular, which abstracted paradigmatic arguments to

more general argumentation schemes which are limited to certain fields and themes,

and are not universally applicable. The formulation of such argumentation patterns

and the use of such patterns in making students sensible of differences between

good and bad argumentation belong, as Tetens puts it, to the realm of topics, as

originally formulated by Aristotle.48

In the light of these few examples it seems that the success of Aristotle’s

technique of topoi in MAT is undisputed. We would nevertheless like to point out

some differences between Aristotle’s use of topoi and the various uses that MAT

has made of them:

43 What Perelman means by ‘‘metaphysical’’ is Aristotle’s system of the four predicables (definition,

accidental predicate, genus, proprium), by which the topoi of the Topics are structured and from which

many of the general rules that make up the topoi are taken. It is certainly true that, e.g., the difference

between essential and accidental predicates rest on a certain metaphysics; it is still disputable whether this

topical system is therefore ‘‘metaphysically loaded’’. After all, the way in which the predicables are

introduced in the Topics gives clear criteria for the distinction of four sorts of predicates and does not

appeal to specific theorems of Aristotle’s metaphysics.44 This is obviously the reason for Perelman’s somewhat surprising interest in the topoi of Aristotle,

Topics III (Cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, § 21, and Perelman 1994, Chapter II.4). This narrow

focus is surprising, since, as we already said, the topoi of book III of the Topics are in several respects

exceptional within the Topics, most notably because they (also) apply to practical-particular and to

philosophical-general questions.45 Cf. Warnick (2000, 109): I. The quasi logical ones: contradiction, incompatibility (1), identity,

definition, analyticity, tautology (2), reciprocity, rule of justice (3), transitivity, inclusion, division (4),

weights, measures, probabilities (5), II. The ones based on the structure of reality: (liaisons of succession

(6), liaisons of coexistence (7), symbolic liaisons, double hierarchies, differences of degree and order (8),

III. The ones establishing the structure of reality: example (9), illustration (10), model and anti-model

(11), analogy and metaphor (12), IV. Dissociation.—To be honest, we find not only Warnick’s general

account of the general topoi questionable (see footnote 39 above), but also regard many of the similarities

between Aristotle and The New Rhetoric she wishes to discover quite superficial. The problem is that

many of the common or general topoi of the Rhetoric are—due to Aristotle’s use of historical speeches—

too narrowly formulated and not really abstracted from the examples used.46 Cf. Kienpointner (1997). Among the many titles by Walton we just want to mention one of his most

recent works on argumentation schemes: Walton et al. (2008). This latter book generously includes a

historical survey of argumentation schemes (chapter 8). Unfortunately, the section on Aristotelian topoiturns out to be quite distorting, so that no informative conclusion about Walton’s view of Aristotle can be

drawn. For Kienpointner on Aristotle see Kienpointner (2005, 2011).47 Cf. Rigotti (2007).48 Cf. Tetens (2011), in particular, 491 et seqq., see also Tetens (2004, 54).


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Quite often when Aristotle’s technique of topoi is invoked by MAT-authors the

topical approach is used to construe a contrast between the topical method and all

sorts of deductive reasoning. The assumption of such a contrast is certainly correct

in one important way, but it is also misleading in several other ways. It is right, to

begin with, also from an Aristotelian point of view to say that the topical method is

different from an axiomatic-deductive method; when using Aristotelian topoi for

construing arguments we choose a particular topos out of a plurality of topoi and we

take the reliability of the topos for granted, without investigating its credentials. We

are not interested, unlike those taking an axiomatic-deductivist approach, in

reducing the multitude of topoi to a few axioms or in deriving the topoi or the

conclusions we drew with their help from first, improvable axioms. This is, we

think, the basic sense, in which the topical and the axiomatic methods are opposed.

This does not exclude, however, the possibility of inquiring into some more general

rules or principles that govern several sets of topoi. For example, in the Topics many

topoi are derived from the rules inherent in the four kinds of predication (the

predicables), while others derive from the rules implied by the several forms of

oppositions, from the genius-species-relation, etc. Even in ancient times, commen-

tators were therefore seeking to identify such general ‘‘maxims’’.49

It would also be misleading to separate the use of topoi from deductions by making

topoi a mere matter of invention (of premises), while the construction of the

corresponding arguments is left to the logician. Such a characterization of Aristotelian

topoi derives from a traditional picture of the division of labour between Aristotle’s

Topics and his Analytica. According to this tradition, the Topics is exclusively

concerned with the finding of premises, while the business of logic is left to another

discipline. This tradition obviously derives from an over-systematization of the

Aristotelian Organon. It is more plausible to assume, as we have already said, that for

Aristotle the topoi also represented different modes of how a sullogismos can be

conclusive, and thus he meant to ascribe an additional probative function to the topoi.Most notably, it is misleading to use Aristotle’s topical approach to construe a contrast

between topical and deductively valid arguments. A widespread assumption is that as

soon as topoi enter the stage, people are no longer really interested in deductive

arguments, but in mere plausibility, in inferences that seem likely, understandable and

in accordance with common opinion, but that do not necessarily form a valid deductive

argument. It is quite obvious where this picture comes from, if we take into account

that topoi regularly occur together with endoxa, accepted premises, in Aristotle’s

dialectics. However, within an Aristotelian frame this picture appears misleading on

closer examination, as in Aristotle’s dialectic topoi are supposed to construe

sullogismoi (deductive arguments) that are formally equivalent to scientific demon-

strations. Dialectical arguments differ from demonstrations not in their form or logical

rigour, but only in the quality of the premises.50 For Aristotle, then, there is no tension

between the use of topoi and the adherence to deductive arguments.

49 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Arist. Top. II, 135, 2 et seq. (Wallies); for the idea of grouping

several topoi under more general headings, see also Rapp (2000).50 The same is also true of rhetorical arguments or enthymemes, which are defined as sorts of sullogismoi(see above, Sect. 3).


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Finally, it is misleading if the Aristotelian use of topoi is captured by the contrast

of formal and material reasoning or argumentation.51 As we have said, many of the

general topoi of the Topics are taken from rules that derive from the several types of

predication. If, e.g., a thesis expresses a definitional predication, then it is clear that

whatever holds for the subject must also hold for the (defining) predicate and vice

versa. If a topos is derived from such rules, it is the form of predication and not the

content that matters and, hence, such a topos is far from being ‘‘material’’. This is

also the reason why the restricted applicability of topoi is sometimes overempha-

sized.52 In the Topics the system of topoi is supposed to provide arguments for and

against any thesis, regardless of content, and for that purpose a ‘‘material’’ character

and the resulting limited applicability are not useful. What these MAT authors seem

to have in mind are rather specific topoi, as we find them in the first book of the

Rhetoric. These topoi, however, are often understood as merely providing

acceptable opinions on different subjects, while a topos in the proper sense is

expected to do more, i.e. to ‘‘find’’ or to ‘‘construe’’ a premise or to formulate a

complete argument. Whether and how the specific topoi match up to this

expectation has seldom been examined.53 At any rate, it would be mistaken to

take the less interesting lists of specific topoi as paradigmatic for all Aristotelian

topoi.

6 Character and Emotions: Towards a Broader Notion of Argumentation?

Aristotle’s theory of argumentation as it is laid out in the Topics does not seem to be

interested in factors related to interpersonal communication situations. Arguments

are primarily seen as sequences of intellectual steps. Their linguistic realization, the

form in which they are presented and their effect on the hearers are only touched

upon at random. Aristotle’s treatise on the art of rhetoric, by contrast, even though it

rather focuses on monologic speeches and not on dialogical situations, is less

restricted; the person of the speaker, the disposition and horizon of the hearer, the

general situation and context are all taken into consideration. This leads to the

question whether the rather narrow notion of argumentation that can be found in the

Topics (and likewise in the Analytics) is altered to fit into the framework of the

Rhetoric. If so, Aristotle could be seen as an early source of broader, more

pluralistic notions of argumentation, as they are discussed in MAT.

From a technical point of view the addressee can be persuaded through proof and

argument (logos), by displaying the speaker’s character (êthos) and by arousing the

emotions of the audience (pathos). These so-called ‘‘technical’’ means of persuasion

51 This contrast is emphasized by Toulmin (1986), passim. According to an often quoted example from

Toulmin (1958) the premise that a Swede can generally be taken not to be a Roman Catholic can be used

as warrant for the inference that, if Peter is a Swede, he is almost certainly not a Roman Catholic. If such

empirical facts belong to what Toulmin takes to be ‘‘material’’ in contrast to ‘‘formal’’, then none of

Aristotle’s general or common topoi and only a few of his specific topoi would qualify as material.52 Cf. Toulmin (1996, 303) and Tetens (2011, 491).53 Some attempts at construing specific topoi not as ready-premises, but as tools that are supposed to

generate arguments, are made in Rapp (2002, vol. II, 290–298).


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can be coordinated to the three vertices of the triangle of speaker, hearer and subject

matter. The theory of persuasion as it is laid out in the Rhetoric thus broadens the

scope of the analysis. Whereas the theory of the Topics neglected or idealized the

vertices of speaker and hearer (by imposing artificial procedural rules on them), the

Rhetoric seems to raise them to the same level as the subject matter and the

corresponding means of persuasion, i.e. proof or argument.

The aspects of persuasion which we may call ‘‘non-argumentative’’—just for the

purpose of contrasting them with proofs or arguments in the narrow sense—may

interfere with or impede the intended persuasion process. If the audience does not think

that the speaker is trustworthy, the best argument will fail to achieve the desired effect.

And if the hearers happen to be in an emotional state that prevents their minds from

forming clear thoughts, they will presumably not even be able to follow the speaker’s

train of thought. Conversely, the rhetorician may use the strong personal impact he

makes or the emotional disposition he arouses for emphasizing or highlighting those

aspects of the subject matter that are capable of influencing the audience’s judgment.

Aristotle does not give a very detailed account of the non-argumentative means

of persuasion. And the little he actually says about them is stated rather negatively,

in that it tells us what should be avoided, rather than positively instructing us on

how to support the argumentative strategy; persuasion may be accomplished by

showing character virtues the lack of which would prevent the audience from

believing that the speaker is trustworthy. If the speaker does not display practical

intelligence, the audience will not be inclined to believe that he has anything true to

say about the case at hand. But it may also be the case that a person is competent

and intelligent but seems to lack moral integrity. If the hearers have doubts about the

virtuous character of the speaker, they may concede that he is clever but refrain

from accepting what he says because he may pursue aims which are not acceptable

to them. And if the speaker is perceived as competent and virtuous, the possibility

still remains that he has, for whatever reason, an aversion to the audience. If the

speaker appears to lack goodwill for the audience and seems to display subtle

hostility or arrogance, the readiness to adopt his views will completely disappear.

If the rhetorician succeeds in presenting himself as a trustworthy person, the

audience forms a second-order judgment that what is put forward by a credible

person should be accepted. This second-order judgment has nothing to do with the

subject matter of the speech. And even though Aristotle does not give detailed

instructions on exactly how character should be displayed, he clearly seems to

prefer using rather indirect forms to express personal virtues. A speaker who opens

his speech by explicitly praising his intelligence, his virtuous character or his

benevolence before the audience, will come across as a suspect individual who

aspires to distract from some other hidden motif.

Some short remarks in the Poetics show how practical instructions on how to

display a person’s character might look. In a tragedy the character of a person can be

seen when it comes to a choice (prohairesis) between different possible actions—

‘‘hence there is no room for character in a speech in which the speaker does not

show what he chooses or avoids’’.54 Conversely, character can be displayed in a

54 Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 6, 1450b8 et seq.


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speech in which the speaker shows how he would choose. If the speaker uses this

means of persuasion there are two possibilities: either an element of the speech can

be stated only to serve the goal of producing a certain appearance without its being

related to the subject matter of the speech, or a statement about the subject matter of

the speech serves at the same time as a means to show the speaker’s character. But

even if the latter is the case it should not be confused with an argument that is

merely about the case at hand. The moment the hearer accepts what the speaker says

not only because of the content but also because of the speaker’s credibility, the

argument is no longer independent of the person who presented it.

The means of persuasion that is related more directly to the hearer, the arousal of

emotions (pathos), allows for a greater range of variation. Aristotle introduces this

subject as the analysis of emotions.55 The rhetorician has to know the complete

definition of an emotion in order to be able to arouse it. Aristotle therefore offers

accounts of different emotions in some detail. If the rhetorician knows, e.g., that

anger is ‘‘a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a

conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no right to slight oneself or one’s

friends’’,56 he will be able to arouse anger by presenting a case that instantiates this

definition. Definitional knowledge allows one to model a given case correctly. For

example, anger cannot be directed against universal entities like man in general, but

must be directed against individuals, because only individuals can commit slights.

That anger is a kind of desire implies that it is followed by a certain pleasure which

arises from the expectation of revenge. It is pleasant to think that one will attain

what one aims at. Therefore, the rhetorician should rather highlight the possibility of

taking revenge than neglecting it. The rhetorician who wants to arouse a certain

emotion can do so by emphasizing aspects of the subject matter of his speech in

such a way that the persons involved and the courses of action seem to be in

accordance with the definition of the emotion. Thus, the rhetorician can steer the

hearers’ emotional state by making them believe that, for example, a slight has been

committed by someone who was not entitled to do so; and the emotional state

resulting from such a belief is likely to have an impact on the judgment the hearers

finally make.

As we have seen, both the display of the speaker’s character (êthos) and the

arousal of the hearer’s emotions (pathos) work on the basis of inferences or

judgments made by the hearer, even though they cannot be reduced to these

inferential aspects. How can the dividing line between proper argumentation and

non-argumentative means of persuasion be drawn? Obviously, it is not sufficient to

check whether or not inferences and judgments come into play. What matters is the

relationship between the premises and the target conclusion. If the speaker wants to

make the addressee accept a certain claim (for example the claim that a city wall

should be built), an argument in the proper sense should be directly relevant to this

claim. The second-order judgment that the speaker is a trustworthy person has no

direct bearing on such a claim. The emotional state of fear or anger that influences

the hearer’s judgment formation does not necessarily depend on pertinent premises.

55 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1, 1378a20 et sqq.56 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.2, 1378a31 et sqq.


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Whereas within the realm of rational argumentation a premise that turns out to be

false can no longer be used in building a sound argument, emotional states may

maintain their efficacy independently of the truth value of the premises they are

based on.

The fact that inferences and judgments are involved when the speaker presents

himself as trustworthy or arouses the emotions of the audience should not blind us to

the differences between non-argumentative means of persuasion and pertinent

argumentation. It is no coincidence that Aristotle distinguishes êthos and pathosfrom logos and seems not to see these means as instances of a wider notion of

argumentation. His definition of a deductive argument (sullogismos) stresses the

‘‘causal’’ role of the premises for the conclusion. The conclusion comes about

‘‘through’’ the premises or ‘‘because of’’ them. If the addressee accepts a claim

because of the presumed character of the speaker or under the influence of an

emotional state, these factors may not be pertinent in the same sense as the premises

of a proper argument. Aristotle takes the non-argumentative factors into account,

gives a neutral explanation and sketches methods for exploiting their potential; he

does not incorporate them into his notion of an argument. The concept of pertinence

or relevance that is central here, nevertheless, still awaits detailed reconstruction.57

7 Fallacies and Other Violations of Discourse Rules

The study of fallacies is one of the central topics of MAT. It is generally accepted

that Aristotle is among the founding fathers of this discipline. Especially the treatise

on Sophistical Refutations is regarded as an important contribution to the systematic

analysis of arguments that are incorrect or deceptive. As often happens in the history

of philosophy, Aristotle’s doctrine has not only served as a point of reference for

affirmative reconstruction but also as a model that has been extended, modified,

criticized and contrasted with different approaches. In recent decades, the ‘‘Standard

Treatment’’—as Hamblin (1970) called the Aristotelian heritage in the study of

fallacies—has been criticized as incomplete, insufficient, or unclear because on the

one hand it seems to be restricted to the dialectical context it stems from and on the

other hand it uses unclear, ‘‘metaphysical’’ notions and distinctions such as essential

versus accidental properties.58 Indeed, Aristotle’s system of fallacies is quite

inflexible. For him, a fallacy is an inference that seems to be a sullogismos, without

actually being conclusive. Each type of fallacy is connected with a specific reason

why people are deluded into thinking that the conclusion follows from the premises.

Appealing to these various sources of delusion, Aristotle even attempts to prove that

the list of fallacies he gives is systematically complete.59 Within Aristotle’s

conceptual frame it seems that all inferences that are non-conclusive (apart from

57 Although, of course, MAT has already incorporated the concept of relevance into its agenda; cf. e.g.

van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, chapter 4).58 This second criticism resembles a motif that we already encountered in Perelman: cf. footnote 43.59 Cf. the contribution by Pieter Sjoerd Hasper to this issue.


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inductions, of course) are fallacious. At least there is no single concept by which to

classify such inferences.60

The Amsterdam School has taken an entirely different approach. The concept of

pragma-dialectical fallacies which was introduced in the 1990s exemplifies a

position which seems to have little in common with Aristotle’s views about

fallacies. According to this approach fallacies are violations of discussion rules

intended to ensure that differences of opinion can be resolved. The pragma-

dialectical rules are recapitulated in ten principles—the ‘Ten Commandments’ of

critical discussion. Among these principles there are rules about logical validity61 or

the avoidance of unclear formulations62 which are not too far from Aristotle’s

account. Other rules concern the general setting of the discourse, e.g. the freedom to

advance or cast doubt on a standpoint or to define which moves are allowed and

which are not.63 If, for example, a premise represents an accepted starting point, the

other party is not allowed to deny it; otherwise this will be counted as a fallacy.

The pragma-dialectical concept of fallacies is not restricted to logical incorrect-

ness or misleading use of linguistic expressions. It also covers moves which within

the framework of Aristotelian dialectics are sometimes necessary and seem to be

part of the game. If, for example, a premise within a dialectical disputation might be

used to deduce the target conclusion of the opponent, the defendant is advised by

Aristotle not to grant it.64 Thus, we seem to be confronted with a straightforward

opposition between Aristotle’s views and MAT approaches.

On closer examination, however, the supposed opposition turns out to be less

pronounced. Aristotle does not speak about the rules of discourse in terms of fallacies

or fallacious moves. Nevertheless, the Topics rests on the ideal of an ‘‘impeccable’’

dialectical argument, which comes close to some modern normative rules of discourse.

In Topics VIII.11, Aristotle enumerates six criteria for retrospective evaluation of an

argument. Implicitly, the possible points of criticism form a set of rules which define

ideal dialectical arguments. In an ideal dialectical dispute the desired conclusion

which is opposed to the answerer’s original thesis is established only through premises

which are necessary, relevant and more acceptable than the conclusion.65 This ideal

result is only accessible for interlocutors who aim at jointly achieving deeper

knowledge about the subject-matter.

The preconditions that have to be fulfilled to realize this co-operative form of

dialectical argumentation are demanding: the dialecticians have to know which

60 Some commentators think that in Rhetoric I.2 Aristotle regards sign-enthymemes as acceptable

arguments, even if they are non-conclusive. However, he does not express his appreciation for sign-

enthymemes in so many words. In Rhetoric II.24 he straightforwardly classifies sign-enthymemes as

fallacies. The example given in this latter chapter clearly involves a dilution; possibly, Aristotle thinks

that people could accept the sign-examples in Rhetoric I.2—without being deluded. For the ancient and,

in particular, Aristotelian treatment of fallacies see also Pieter Sjoerd Hasper and Christof Rapp (eds.),

Ancient Fallacies. In Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 15, forthcoming.61 Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1996, 284: Rule (8) with fn. 23).62 Cf. loc. cit.: Rule (10).63 Cf. loc. cit.: Rules (1) and (6).64 Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.6, 160a3–6.65 Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII.11, 161b19–33.


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views are generally accepted and what the experts think; they have to be capable of

foreseeing the consequences of a statement; they should neither block the partner’s

strategy nor go down without a fight; and they should be able to establish valid

deductions. If they fail to do the latter, they commit what Aristotle would call a

fallacy. If a dialectician fails to comply with one of the other implicit rules, this is

noted in subsequent evaluations of his argumentative capacities, but is not called a

‘‘fallacy’’. All in all, the set of possible violations of discursive rules Aristotle’s

dialectic is aware of clearly extends beyond his own notion of fallacies; the spirit of

some of these rules is not too far from certain pragmatic fallacies in MAT.

8 Conclusions

Modern argumentation theorists frequently focus on oppositions such as dialectic

versus rhetoric, analytical versus topical, reasonable versus effective, formal versus

informal, or normative versus descriptive. Many of these pairs are related to the

ancient tradition of public speech and argumentative discourse, in particular to

Aristotle’s treatises the Topics and the Rhetoric. The conceptual field that they

survey and map with the help of these distinctions is broad and not always clearly

delimited. Even though Aristotle did not treat the multifaceted aspects of

argumentation under one common heading, one may see the different theoretical

elements that center around his notion of a sound argument as parts of a coherent

project. This project might anachronistically be called Aristotle’s argumentation

theory. Aristotle himself did not see argumentation as a single field of research. He

studied logical and semantical relations that could be used to find or establish

premises, he analysed the relations between the terms of standardized deductive

arguments, he systematized and evaluated accepted opinions, and he accounted for

the factors of persuasion processes. In doing so, he raised many of the questions that

are still discussed in contemporary argumentation theory. His answers to these

questions are sometimes formulated in a language that sounds unfamiliar and seems

to be far away from the modern world. But under the surface of texts that may be

difficult or sketchy, we find a coherent and self-contained approach that combines a

realistic view of what people actually do when the dispute, argue, or try to persuade

others with the normative emphasis of how people should construct and present

sound arguments. This approach has set the agenda ever since and has provoked

criticism ever since. In one way or another the elements of Aristotle’s theory still

remain important sources for modern argumentation theory.

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On Some Aristotelian Sources of Modern Argumentation Theory

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