Original Paper UDC 165.62/E. Husserl Received December 15th, 2007 Tomislav Zelić Columbia University, Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures, 319 Hamilton Hall, MC 2812,1130 Amsterdam Ave. USA- New York, NY 10027 [email protected]On the Phenomenology of the Life-World Abstract This essay attempts to clarify the ambiguities attached to the term ‘the life-world’ and ‘a priori of the life-world’ in the phenomenological sense. It sketches the phenomenology of the life-world with respect to everyday pre-scientific life and perception, the mathematical and geometrical sciences of the natural world, and the eidetic and phenomenological re- ductions of pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Key words Edmund Husserl, phenomenology, life-world Introduction Edmund Husserl (1858–1938) used the term “life-world” (Lebenswelt) for the first time in his manuscripts as early as in 1917, 1 but he did not present an extensive treatment of its phenomenological meaning until the publication of The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänome- nologie) in 1936. As it stands in his last major work, the term is extremely am- biguous. In order to give a general idea of the complications, let us consider some of Husserl’s definitions, before presenting an interpretative analysis and comprehensive explication of the phenomenological term “the a priori of the life-world” (das Apriori der Lebenswelt). 2 Husserl uses it to designate “the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception” (die einzig wirkliche, die wirklich wahrnehmungsmäßig gegebene, die je erfahrene und erfahrbare Welt) and “the original ground of all theoretical and practical life” (der Urboden alles theoretischen wie prak- tischen Lebens) on the same page. 3 At the same time, it is the “forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science” (das vergessene Sinnesfundament der 1 According to David Carr, “Husserl’s Prob- lematic Concept of the Life-World”, in F.A. Elliston and P. McCormick (eds.), Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), S. 202–212, 203 and fn. 3 in reference to the Husserl archives at Leuven. 2 Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, in: Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana, Band VI, hrsg. v. Walter Biemel (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1954). Edmund Hus- serl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northern University Press, 1970), p. 139ff. 3 Krisis, S. 49; Crisis, p. 49.
AbstractThis essay attempts to clarify the ambiguities attached to the term ‘the life-world’ and ‘a priori of the life-world’ in the phenomenological sense. It sketches the phenomenology of the life-world with respect to everyday pre-scientific life and perception, the mathematical and geometrical sciences of the natural world, and the eidetic and phenomenological re-ductions of pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy.
Key wordsEdmundHusserl,phenomenology,life-world
Introduction
EdmundHusserl (1858–1938) used the term “life-world” (Lebenswelt) forthefirsttimeinhismanuscriptsasearlyasin1917,1buthedidnotpresentanextensivetreatmentofitsphenomenologicalmeaninguntilthepublicationofThe Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology(Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänome-nologie)in1936.Asitstandsinhislastmajorwork,thetermisextremelyam-biguous.Inordertogiveageneralideaofthecomplications,letusconsidersomeofHusserl’sdefinitions,beforepresentinganinterpretativeanalysisandcomprehensiveexplicationofthephenomenologicalterm“thea prioriofthelife-world”(das Apriori der Lebenswelt).2Husserlusesittodesignate“theonlyrealworld,theonethatisactuallygiventhroughperception”(die einzig wirkliche, die wirklich wahrnehmungsmäßig gegebene, die je erfahrene und erfahrbare Welt)and“theoriginalgroundofalltheoreticalandpracticallife”(der Urboden alles theoretischen wie prak-tischen Lebens) on the same page.3At the same time, it is the “forgottenmeaning-fundamentofnaturalscience”(dasvergessene Sinnesfundament der
1
According to David Carr, “Husserl’s Prob-lematicConceptof theLife-World”, inF.A.Elliston and P. McCormick (eds.),Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals (Notre Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), S.202–212, 203 and fn. 3 in reference to theHusserlarchivesatLeuven.
2
EdmundHusserl,Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie, in: Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana, Band VI, hrsg.v.WalterBiemel(Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1954). Edmund Hus-serl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,trans.DavidCarr (Evanston: Northern University Press,1970),p.139ff.
3
Krisis, S.49;Crisis,p.49.
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T. Zelić, On the Phenomenology of theLife-World414
Naturwissenschaft),4 “the constant ground of validity”5 (der ständige Gel-tungsboden),“asourceofself-evidence”and“asourceofverification”(eine ständig bereite Quelle von Selbstverständlichkeiten).6Althoughitisboththe“totality”(Totalität)andthe“horizon”(Horizont)7ofallrecognizedandun-recognizedreality,8itdoesnotcontaininitselftheidealobjectsofexactmath-ematicsandgeometry.9Ontheonehand,ithasa“bodily”(körperlich)chara-cterandweleada“living”(leiblich)10existenceinit,but,ontheotherhand,itisoneofour“culturalaccomplishments”(Kulturleistungen),“auniversalmentalacquisition”(eine universale geistige Leistung),and“theconstructofauniversal,ultimatelyfunctioningsubjectivity”(Gebilde einer universalen letztfungierenden Subjektivität).11Although“eachofushashislife-world,”itis“meantastheworldforall”(jeder von uns hat seine Lebenswelt, gemeint als die Welt für Alle).12Ontheonehand,itis“subject-relative”(subject-rela-tiv),13but,ontheotherhand,itis“givenpriortoallends”(vorgegeben allen Zwecken).14Nevertheless,ithasa“generalstructure”(allgemeine Struktur).15Itissimplywhatitisandremainsunchangednomatterhowitiscognizedinitsconcreteness,16althoughitincorporatestheprogressiveaccomplishmentsoftheobjectivesciences.17
Atfirstglance, thesevaryingandseeminglycontradictorydescriptionsanddefinitions already hint at the problems inherent to the phenomenologicalconceptofthelife-world.Thetaskinthisessayistoexplicatethemeaningofthephrase“thea prioriofthelife-world”(das Apriori der Lebenswelt).18Thefirstpartofthephrase,a priori,isnolessproblematicthanthesecondpart,life-world.InIdeas I(Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänome-nologischen Philosophie,ErstesBuch,AllgemeineEinführung indie reinePhänomenologie),Husserlhadatfirstassigneda prioristatustoessencesandlatertothestructuresoftranscendentalsubjectivity,19beforefinallyassigningittothelife-worldintheCrisis.Hence,letusfollowandexplainthetrajectoryofthesepuzzlingchangesinHusserl’stwomajorworksbeforesketchingoutthephenomenologyofthelife-world.
A priority
InthetrajectoryofHusserl’stranscendentalphenomenologyfromtheIdeas I(1913)totheCrisis(1936),wecandistinguishroughlythreethematicphases.Inthefirstphase,phenomenologyevolvesasadescriptivescienceofa prioriessencesconstitutedasmattersoffactsinthenaturalattitude.Accordingly,phenomenology,asthedescriptiveeideticscience ofessences,stilloperatesin the natural attitude as the empirical natural sciences, although, strictlyspeaking, theformerpresupposes the latter.Byperforming theepoché, thesuspensionofjudgment,i.e.,by“puttingoutofaction”thenaturalattitudeinwhichfactsandessencesareconstituted,thephenomenologistmustbracketofftheempiricalsciencesoffactsaswellasthedescriptiveeideticscienceofessencesandreducebothspherestotheuniversalstructuresoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Atthispoint,thequestionmayariseastowhetherthelife-worldmightnotbethea priorihorizonofessences,i.e.,themeaning-fundamentfromwhichallessencesariseintheprocessofeideticreduction.Ifyes,thenthea prioristatusofessencesbecomesquestionableorit isevenlostaltogether.InthesecondphaseofHusserl’sprocedure,thephenomenologicalreductionuncov-ers the sphere of transcendental subjectivity,which constitutes all facts andessencesaswellasthetworespectivesciencesthereof.Inthefirstphase,phe-nomenologyelaboratestheeideticscienceandessencesasthepresupposed
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T. Zelić, On the Phenomenology of theLife-World415
substratumofallempiricalnaturalsciencesoffacts.Inthesecondphase,bothfactsandessencesfallundertheepoché,sincetheyturnouttobemundaneandconstitutedbytranscendentalsubjectivity.Asaresult,essencesloosetheirformera prioristatus.Theeideticvariation,thephenomenologicalmethodofaccessingessences,stilloperatesinthenaturalattitude.Thephenomenologi-calepochéthematizestheaccessibilityofa prioriessencesasfundamentaltotheintentionalstructuresoftranscendentalsubjectivity.At thispoint, thequestionmayariseas towhether the structuresof trans-cendentalsubjectivitythatHusserllaidoutintheIdeas Icapturethemean-ing of the phenomenological term ‘thea priori of the life-world.’Husserlhyperbolicallyallegedthattheabsolutebeingoftranscendentalsubjectivitywouldsurviveeventheannihilationof theworld.20AccordingtoHusserl’searlyphenomenologicalinquiry,wemustreducetheworldtothecorrelativetranscendentobjectivity,whichwepositasactuallygiveninthenaturalat-titude,althoughtranscendentalsubjectivityconstitutesit.LaterintheCrisis,Husserlputsintoperspectivehisearlyconviction(whichsharestheobjectiv-ismofthenaturalsciencesundercriticalexaminationintheCrisis)andclari-fies the correlation between the life-world and transcendental subjectivity.On theotherhand, theCrisis leavesuswithanotherparadox,namely, thattranscendentalsubjectivityisatthesametimetheconstitutingsubjectofthelife-worldandtheconstitutedobjectin thelife-world.Thisparadox,however,isfarlessproblematicthanitmayseematfirstglance.Itmerelyunderscores“humanity’sresponsibilityforitself”(Verantwortung der Menschheit für sich selbst).21
In view of the equivocations resulting fromHusserl’s use of the terms ‘a priori’and‘life-world,’weshouldexaminetheterminologywithintheentirework, ifweare toarriveatacoherent interpretationofphenomenology in
4
Krisis, S.48und123–6;Crisis,p.48–53,and121–3.
5
Krisis, S.124;Crisis,p.122.
6
Krisis, S.124;Crisis,p.126.
7
Krisis, S.432;Crisis,p.379ff.
8
Krisis, S.49;Crisis,p.50.
9
Krisis, S.137;Crisis,p.139.
10
Krisis, S. 50 und 109f.; Crisis, p. 50 and107f.
11
Krisis, S.115;Crisis,p.113.
12
Krisis, S.258;Crisis,p.254.
13
Krisis, S.127f.;Crisis,p.125f.
14
Krisis, S.141;Crisis,fn.p.138.
15
Krisis, S.142f.;Crisis,p.142f.
16
Krisis, S.59;Crisis,p.59.
17
Krisis, S.131;Crisis,p.129.
18
Krisis, S.140ff.;Crisis,p.139ff.
19
EdmundHusserl,Ideen zu einer reinen Phä-nomenologie und phänomenologischen Philo-sophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, in:Gesammel-te Werke, Husserliana, Band III, 1, hrsg. v.Karl Schumann (DenHaag: Nijhoff, 1976).EdmundHusserl,Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F.Kersten (Dordrecht:Kluwer,1998).
20
Ideen I,§49,S.103ff.,Ideas I,#49,p.101.
21
Krisis, S.348;Crisis,p.400.
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general and the phenomenology of the life-world in particular.We shouldseparatethephenomenologyof thelife-worldfromtheearlierphenomeno-logicalenterprise,especiallythedescriptionofessences,whichHusserllaterdevelopedintoalogicalandlinguistictheoryofmeaning.Inhisfinalwork,Husserlthematizesthelife-worlditselfatlength.Inthiscontext,theterm“thea prioriofthelife-world”becomesproblematicbecauseofitsequivocations.TheCrisismainlydealswiththerelationshipbetweenthea prioriconstitutedobjectsofthemathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnatureandthea pri-ori constituting structures of transcendental subjectivity.On the one hand,Husserlmaintainsthattheobjectivesciencesofnaturepresupposeyetcannotinquirethepre-logicalandsubject-relativea prioriofthelife-world.22Ontheotherhand,hestates:
“[…] the life-world does have, in all its relative features, ageneral structure.This generalstructure,towhicheverythingthatexistsrelativelyisbound,isnotitselfrelative.Wecanattendtoitinitsgeneralityand,withsufficientcare,fixitonceandforallinawayequallyaccessibletoall.”“[…]dieseLebenswelt[hat]inallenihrenRelativitätenihreallgemeine Struktur.Dieseallge-meineStruktur,andieallesrelativeSeiendegebundenist,istnichtselbstrelativ.Wirkönnensie in ihrerAllgemeinheit beachtenundmit entsprechenderVorsicht ein für allemalund fürjedermanngleichzugänglichfeststellen.“23
Ofcourse,phenomenologyaloneisabletodisclosethelife-world.Althoughthemotivationforthephenomenologicalreductiontothea prioriofthelife-worldiscomprehensible–itis,namely,thereductiontoapre-logicalandsub-ject-relativeexperienceofthelife-world–thegoalofthereductionremainsdubious,aslongasthelife-worldremainsheterogeneousanditsconceptionambiguous.Inordertounfoldtheheterogeneityevenfurtherandresolvetheambiguities in theend,weshouldprovidean interpretativeanalysisof themeaningfacetsoftheterm‘thea prioriofthelife-world.’Inotherwords,weshouldmakeaholisticdistinctionbetweenatleastfourmeaningsoftheterm‘world,’eachofwhichcapturesaonlyalimitedaspectofthephenomenologi-calmeaningoftheterm‘life-world’asitisusedthroughouttheCrisis.Thefourworldsare,first,theworldofscientificobjectivity,secondly,theworldofperceptualmeaning,thirdly,theworldofspecializedpre-scientificinterests,fourthlyandlastly,thelife-worldinthestrictphenomenologicalsenseoftheterm‘thea prioriofthelife-world.’
T. Zelić, On the Phenomenology of theLife-World417
isthemeaning-fundamentthatscientificthinkingpresupposesandthehori-zoninwhichscientificthinkingtakesplace.IntheCrisis,heinquiresintotherelationshipofscientificthinkingandlife-worldexperience,andtherelation-shipbetweentheworldofscientificobjectivityandthatwhichtheextendedphenomenologicalreductiondisclosesasthelife-worldinthestrictsense.Thetranscendentalhistorical-criticalphenomenologicalreflectionrevealsthatmathematicsandgeometryhavehadapracticalpurposeinGreekantiquity,asforinstancerequiredbypreciselandsurveying,inwhichthetheoreticalsci-encehadabeneficialconnectionwiththelife-worldandthepracticalneedsthatarisefromit.24HusserlsuggeststhatPythagoreanmathematicianswerenotonlyawareoftheontologicaldifferencebetweentheidealobjectsandthesensibleworldbutalsoabouttheirmethodofapplyingtheidealobjectstothesensibleworld tounderstand it.He juxtaposes therelationshipbetween themathematicalandgeometricalsciencesandthelife-worldagainstthemathe-matizationofnatureinmodernity.Hehighlightstwohighpointsinthisproc-ess.ThefirstaccomplishmentwasGalileo’sgeometrizationofnature,andthesecondwasDescartes’andLeibniz’arithmetizationofgeometry.Morespecif-ically,theabstractionofanidealfromasensibleobjectproduces,asHusserlputsit,ageometrical“limit-shapes”(Limesgestalten)with“sensibleplenum”(sinnliche Fülle).25We can geometrically abstract these ideal objects fromsensible shapes,without interpreting themany further.Wemay then applythearithmeticallyinterpretedplenatoelucidatethesensibleworld.However,ideallythinkableandexperientiallysensibleobjectsremainunequal.Never-theless,natureitself“becomesamathematicalmanifoldandthemathematicaltechniquesprovidethekeytoitsinnerworkings.”26Galileo’smathematicalscience holds nature to be ontologicallymathematizable, and theworld tobeontologicallyreducibletologicallyormathematicallyidealizedstructures.“Knowingtheworldinaseriouslyscientificway,‘philosophically,’canhavemeaning andbepossible only if amethod canbedevisedofconstructing,systematicallyandinasenseinadvance,theworld[…].”(Die Welt ‘philo-sophisch’, ernstlich wissenschaftlich erkennen, das kann nur Sinn und Mög-lichkeit haben, wenn eine Methode zu erfinden ist, die Unendlichkeit ihrer Kausalitäten, von dem geringeren Bestand der jeweils in direkter Erfahrung und nur relative festzustellenden aus systematisch, gewissermaßen im voraus, zu konstruieren.)27DavidCarrhassummarizedthistwofoldstepasfollows:
“Toovercomethevaguenessandrelativityofordinaryexperience,scienceperformsasetofabstractionsandinterpretationsupontheworldasitoriginallypresentsitself.Firstitfocusesupon the shape-aspect of theworld […], then it interprets these shapes as pure geometricalshapesinordertodealwiththemingeometricalterms.Butitforgetsthatthisfirstmoveisanabstractionfrom somethinganditssecondaninterpretationof something[…].Havingforgottentheabstractiveandidealizingroleofscientificthought,thephilosophicalinterpretationcomesupwithanontologicalclaim:to be is to be measurable […]”.28
22
Krisis, S.140;Crisis,p.140.
23
Krisis, S. 142;Crisis, p. 139, italics in theoriginal.
24
D. Carr, “Husserl’s Problematic Concept oftheLife-World”,p.204.
25
Krisis, S.27;Crisis,p.30.
26
D. Carr, “Husserl’s Problematic Concept oftheLife-World”,p.205.
27
Krisis, S. 29/30;Crisis, p. 32, italics in theoriginal.
28
D. Carr, “Husserl’s Problematic Concept oftheLife-World”,p.204.
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The logical andmathematical truth about theworldpresents all objects inexactyetidealizedmeasurementsandrelationships,whiletherealobjectsintheworldneverrepresentmore thanjustapproximations to these idealizedobjects.Thus,itmayoccurthat“throughagarbofideas[…]wetakefortrue beingwhatisactuallyamethod”(Das Idealkleid macht es, daß wir für wahresSeinnehmen, was eine Methodeist […]).29
Inreferencetothemathematicalandgeometricalscienceofnature,pheno-menologyisnotthediscoveryordescriptionofidealobjects,buttheattempttoclarifythemeaningofidealobjects.Therefore,Husserldoesnotdismissscientificidealizationprocessesbutratherpraisesitsaccomplishments.How-ever, thecriticalreflectionontheseaccomplishmentsdemonstratesthatthemodernmathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnaturedonotinquirebackinto theoriginalconstitutionof idealobjects.Husserl also retainsboth theeideticreductiontoessences, i.e.,of thelife-worldandtranscendentalsub-jectivity,andthetranscendentalreductiontothea prioristructuresoftrans-cendental subjectivity, which are presupposed by all accomplishments ofobjectiveconstitution.Themathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnaturehaveneither themeansnor themethods togiveaplausibleaccountof theidealizationprocessinwhichtheyengage.Thus,theycannothelpbutengageinabstractionsandinterpretationsofidealobjectswithoutrealizingthatthoseideal objects,which they apply in their understanding of nature, are trulyintentionalaccomplishmentsoftranscendentalsubjectivity.ThepointofHus-serl’sdiscussionofthemodernscientificmathematizationofnatureistoshowthattheoreticalscientificthinkingconcealsandattimesmayevendismissthelife-world,which, sinceprimitive times, always is and remains the forgot-tenmeaning-fundamentofthepursuitofscience.Theworld,asunderstoodby themathematical and geometrical sciences of nature, is equitablewiththeidealizedmodelsandconstructions,whicharetheresultsofthemathe-matizationofnature.However, therebythe life-worlddisappearsascertainandpre-given.Whereasoriginallythemotivationforthemathematizationofnaturewastheexactmeasurementofnature,itlaterbecametheilluminationoftheworlddefinedasthetotalityofidealobjects.Afteraprocessofdetach-ment,wherebytheabstractionsbecameinterpretationsontheirownaccord,themathematicalandgeometricalworldofobjectivityhasgraduallycometosubstitutethelife-world.Husserlwrites:
Ironically, themodern sciences fall into a crisisdespiteor ratherpreciselybecause of their purported success. Husserl arrives at the conclusion that“Galileo, the discoverer […] of physics is at once a discovering and con-cealinggenius”(Galileo, der Entdecker […]der Physik ist zugleich ein ent-deckender und verdeckender Genius.)31TakingintoconsiderationHusserl’shistoricallycriticalreflectiononthemathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnature,itmayseempuzzlingthatthemethodofmathematicallyandgeo-metricallyidealizingnature,thoughunclarified,couldproduceagreatvarietyofmeaningfulformulaeandbeneficenttechniques.ThispuzzleispreciselywhatHusserldescribesasthecrisisofEuropeansciences.Succinctly,thecri-sisisthatthemodernsciencesgraduallydetachfromandbecomeforgetful
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The secondworld, i.e., theworldofperceptualobjectivity, consistsofob-jectsthatweperceivewithdeterminateshapes,sizes,andqualities.Intheirdeterminacy, perceptual objects obtain an aspect of invariance, because ofwhichtheybecomeobjectivelymeasurable.Althoughperceptualobjectsareobservablebyallofusatleastpotentially,therearenocriteriaofexactnessinscientificterms.Asaresult,theintersubjectivecommonalityofperceptualobjectsholdsonlyinaninexactsense.Wemustdistinguishthisworldfromtheworldthatthephenomenologicalanalysisoftheoriginallife-worldexpe-riencesdiscloses,namely,theperceptualworldofobjects,whichweperceiveindeterminatelyandsubjectively.Inthiscase,thelife-worldisthepre-objec-tiveworldofperceptionwhereweperceivevaguetypesinanindeterminatemodeofgivenness.33
Husserlhadalready introducedhis conceptionof the life-worldas the im-mediately intuitablehorizon in the Ideas I.However, hedidnotdealwiththemeaningofthelife-worldastheperceptualhorizonthere.Describingthe“thefieldofperception”fromtheperspectiveofthenaturalattitude,hemedi-tates:
“Iamconsciousof theworldendlesslyspreadout in space,endlesslybecomingandhavingendlesslybecomeintime.Iamconsciousofit:thatsignifies,aboveall,thatintuitivelyIfinditimmediately,thatIexperienceit….Alongwiththeonesnowperceived,otheractualobjectsarethereformeasdeterminate,asmoreorlessknown,withoutbeingthemselvesperceivedor,indeed,presentinanyothermodeofintuition.Icanletmyattentionwanderawayfromthewri-tingtablewhichwasjustnowseenandnoticed,outthroughtheunseenpartsoftheroomwhicharebehindmyback,totheverandah,intothegarden,tothechildreninthearbor,etc….Butnotevenwiththedomainofthisintuitionallyclearorobscure,distinctorindistinct,co-present–whichmakesupaconstanthaloaroundthefieldofactualperception–istheworldexhaustedwhichis‘onhand’formeinthemannerpeculiartoconsciousnessateverywakingmoment.Onthecontrary,inthefixedorderofitsbeing,itreachesintotheunlimited.Whatisnowperceivedandwhatismoreorlessclearlyco-presentanddeterminate(oratleastsomewhatdeterminate),arepenetratedandsurroundedbyanobscurely intended to horizon of indeterminate actuality.”
29
Krisis, S.52;Crisis,p.51,italicsintheorigi-nal.
30
Krisis, S.48/9;Crisis,p.48/9.
31
Krisis, S.48/9;Crisis,p.52.
32
It is noteworthy thatHusserl’s critical argu-ment against the modern mathematical sci-
ences of nature is similar to that of Nietz-sche against Kant’s critical idealism inBeyond Good and Evil.SeeTomislavZelić,“Nietzsche’s Theory of MultiperspectivismRevisited,”Synthesis philosophica 22 (2007),no.1:231–44.
33
Krisis, S.340;Crisis,p.344.
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“IchbinmireinerWeltbewußt,endlosausgebreitetimRaum,endloswerdendundgewordeninderZeit.Ichbinmirihrerbewußt,dassagtvorallem:Ichfindesieunmittelbaranschaulichvor,icherfahresie.[…]FürmichdasindwirklicheObjekte,alsbestimmte,mehroderminderbekannte, in einsmit den aktuellwahrgenommenen, ohnedaß sie selbstwahrgenommen, jaselbstanschaulichgegenwärtigsind.IchkannmeineAufmerksamkeitwandernlassenvondemebengesehenenundbeachtetenSchreibtisch ausdurchdieungesehenenTeiledesZimmers,hintermeinemRückenzurVeranda,indenGarten,zudenKinderninderLaubeusw.[…]AberauchnichtmitdemBereichediesesanschaulichklaroderdunkel,deutlichoderundeutlich,Mit-gegenwärtigen, daseinenbeständigenUmringdesaktuellenWahrnehmungsfeldesausmacht,erschöpftsichdieWelt,diefürmichinjedemwachenMomentbewußtseinsmäßig‘vorhanden’ist.SiereichtvielmehrineinerfestenSinnesordnunginsUnbegrenzte.DasaktuelleWahrge-nommene,dasmehroderminderklarMitgegenwärtigeundBestimmte(odermindestenseini-germaßenBestimmte)istteilsdurchsetzt,teilsumgebenvoneinemdunkel bewußten Horizont unbestimmter Wirklichkeit.”34
At thispoint,wemustnote thatwecannot simply reduce the life-world asHusserlconceivesofitintheCrisistotheunthematichorizonof perceptualob-jectivity.Suchaconceptionofthephenomenologicalreductionwouldbemis-leadingforatleastthefollowingtworeasons.First,theIdeas Iwouldremainwithintheconfinesofexplicatingthenaturalattitude.Thephenomenologicalreductionwouldnotreachfarenough;itwouldfailtodisclosetranscendentalsubjectivity.Secondly,andmoreimportantly,wewouldcontractthemeaningof“thea prioriofthelife-world”totheunperceivablehorizonofperception,whichcertainlycontainsthevestigesofanadequatephenomenologicalanaly-sisofperception,butdoesnotexhaustthefullphenomenologicalmeaningof“thea prioriofthelife-world.”Moreover,wecouldthinkofthesecondworld,i.e.,theworldofperceptualobjectivity,asconstitutedoutofthefirstworld,i.e.,theworldofscientificobjectivity.However,inthatcase,wewouldcontractthelife-worldtoanidealizedobjectivityinthemannerasthemathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnaturedo.Asaresult,wewouldthusdiscoverandatthesametimeconcealtheworldofperceptualobjectivity,asGalileovis-à-visthelogicallyandmathematicallyidealizedworldofphysics.
The World of Pre-Scientific Interests
Thethirdworldconsistsofthepluralizedworldofspecializedpre-scientificinterestsandmotivationsarisingfromoursubjectiveprojectsandvocations.Weconstitutethisworldoutofoverlappingandintersectingworldsintersub-jectively,insofarasindividualslivingintheworldliveandperceivethesameobjectsinacommonworld.Forinstance,allparticipatingperceiversperceivethesamehouse.Althoughtheinterestinthesameobjectvariesdependingonwhethertheperceiveristhedwellerofthehouse,anarchitect,arealestateagent,oracontractoraccordingtotheirvocationalorientation,thehouseisan intersubjectivelycommunalobjectofperception.Thevariousworldsofspecializedinterestsincorporatethesamehouseunderdifferentaspects.Asaresult,theobjectisaconstructconstitutedoutofthedifferentsensesdefinedintermsofthedifferentspecializedworlds.Tothatend,theconstitutionoftheworldofperceptualobjectivityisreducibletotheintersubjectivelyconstitutedworldofspecializedinterests.Wehavealreadyseenabovethattheworldofscientificobjectivityisreducibletotheworldofperceptualobjectivity.Nowthatwehaveassertedthereducibilityoftheworldsofspecializedintereststotheworldofperceptualobjectivity,theformerattainsthestatusofaninterimandhybridsphereofthescientificandpre-scientificworlds.Sincewehavealreadyelaborated theconcealmentof the life-worldby theidealizationsofthemathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnature,wecan
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nowtoruleoutthemeaningfacetoftheterm‘thea prioriofthelife-world’accordingtowhichthelife-worldisthetotalityoftheworldsofspecializedinterests.Ontheonehand,Husserldemonstrateshowthemathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnatureconcealthelife-worldasthemeaning-funda-mentthattheypresupposeintheirveryefforts.Healsocallsforthedeside-ratumofaspecificphilosophicalscienceofthelife-world,thatis,thephe-nomenologyofthelife-world.Ontheotherhand,itisevidentthatnoneoftheworldsofspecializedinterestmotivatesaninterestinthetotalityofallpos-sibleworldsofspecializedinterests.Theideaofatotalinterestisabsurdonitsownterms.Therefore,thephenomenologistcannotperformthephenome-nological thematizationof the life-worldbyconceptualizing the life-worldas the totalityofallspecializedpre-scientific interests,andneithercan thephenomenologicalphilosopher-scientistdevolvetheinvestigationofthelife-worlduponanyofthespecializedsciences.Hence,thelife-worldisalsonotthetotalityofthesystemsandmodelsofthemathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnature[Naturwissenschaften]andthehumanities[Geisteswissen-schaften].Onthecontrary,thephenomenologicalepochémustbeextendedtobeunderstoodnotonlyasbracketingthegeneralthesisoftheactualworldandtheputtingoutofactionofthenaturalattitude,butalsoastheexclusionof themode of inquiry into objective sciences andpre-scientific interests.Phenomenologyprevailsoverallscientificandpre-scientifictheoriesoftheworldandaccomplishesthehistoricalreductionofthenaturalworldconceptstothephenomenologicalconceptofthelife-worldasthehorizonoftranscen-dentalsubjectivity.Thehistorical-criticalreflectionexplicatesyetanotheraspectoftheinterrela-tionoftheworldsofscientificandpre-scientificinterests.Insofaraswemayunderstand theworld ofpre-scientific interest as aworld of culture in thewidestsense,thesciencesofnatureandthescientiststhemselvesbelongtothelife-worldasculturalphenomena.Thusinallthenaturalworldconcep-tionsof thenatural sciencesandpre-scientific interests, the“everydaysur-roundingworldoflifeispresupposedasexisting”(die alltägliche Lebenswelt als seiende vorausgesetzt), and yet here are also “the sciences, as culturalfactsinthisworld,withtheirscientistsandtheories”(die Wissenschaften, als Kulturtatsachen in dieser Welt mit ihren Wissenschaftlern und Theorien).35Althoughthenaturalsciencesenrichthelife-worldculturally,thelife-worldremainsinvariantduringallofthetheoreticalchangesinthescientificviewoftheworld.Inotherwords,wemaysubsumethenaturalsciencesunder“cul-turalaccomplishments”(Kulturleistungen).However,Husserlpointsoutthattheypresupposethea prioriofthelife-world“astheconstructofauniversal,ultimatelyfunctioningsubjectivity”(als Gebilde einer universalen letztfun-gierenden Subjektivität).36Heexplainsfurther:
“Beforeallsuchaccomplishments,therehasalwaysalreadybeenauniversalaccomplishment,presupposedbyallhumanpraxisandallpre-scientificandscientific life.Thelatterhavethespiritualacquisitionsoftheuniversalaccomplishmentastheirconstantsubstratum,andalltheiracquisitionsaredestinedtoflowintoit.““AllensolchenLeistungenistimmerschonvorhergegangeneineuniversaleLeistung,diejedemenschliche Praxis und jedes vorwissenschaftliche undwissenschaftlicheLeben schon vor-
34
Ideen I, §27,S.56f.;Ideas I,#27,p.51f.
35
Krisis, S.106;Crisis,p.104.
36
Krisis, S.115;Crisis,p.113.
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Therefore,thetheoreticalresultsofthemathematicalandgeometricalscien-ces of nature attain “the character of validities for the life-world, addingthemselvesassuchtoitsowncomposition”(den Charakter von Geltungen für die Lebenswelt […],alssolche ihremeigenenBestandesich immerfortzuschlagend).38Thenaturalsciencesassuchareconstructsoftranscendentalsubjectivityand itsparticularpraxis,namely, the theoretical-logical,whichitselfbelongstothelife-world.Asaresult,theworldofthetheoretical-scien-tificinvestigationoflogicalobjectivityfallsbackintotheculturallife-worldasoneamongthepre-scientificinterests.39
Eidetic Reduction and Mathematical and Geometrical Idealization
Wemustexamineyetanotheraspectofthephenomenologyofthelife-world;namely,themethodologicalconsiderationoftherelationbetweentheprocessof the scientific idealizations of the life-world and the phenomenologicalmethodofeideticreductiontoessences.Byvirtueofthisconsideration,wemustsharplyemphasizethedifferencebetweenbothmethodsandunderscorethatthemethodofidealizationcannotexplicatetheterm‘thea prioriofthelife-world.’Aswehavenotedatthebeginning,theobjectivelogicala prioriofthemathematicalandgeometricalsciencesofnatureresultfromtheproc-essofidealizingthelife-world.Ontheotherhand,phenomenologyholdsthatthe life-worldhas its owngeneral structures. If themethodof idealizationwereindistinguishablefromtheeideticreduction,thenthelife-worldwouldbe reducible to logicala priori ideal objects resulting from theprocess ofscientificidealization.Thatis,thelife-worldwouldbealogicalobjectivea priori.However, thelife-worldin thephenomenologicalsense, thestratumwithintheuniversala prioristructuresoftranscendentalsubjectivity,isnei-therthematicinanyparticularscientificresearchprojectofthemathematical-logicaltypenoristhelife-worldsolelyaperceptualobject,nottomentionapre-scientificobjectofinterest.Intheidealizationprocess,westartwithagivensensibleshape,e.g.acircularshape,andimagineotherpossibleshapesbelongingtothesametype,whichwearrangeinaseriesofmoreorlesscircularshapes.Thenwebecomeawarethattheseriespointstoalimit-shape,inourexample,theperfectgeometricalshapecalled‘circle.’Wecannottraversetheentireseries,sinceitisinfinite;however,weproceedasifwehaddoneso.Atthispoint,thequestionarisesas towhether the ideal limit-shape is presupposeda priori orwhetherweintuitivelyapprehend theaffinityof theseries to some ideal form.Husserlaccountsforthelife-worldexperienceintermsofourencounterwithsensi-bleshapesorvaguetypes,whicharenotidealobjects.Thevaguetypesarefullyempirical,sincetheybelongtothephenomenologicallyreducedworldinwhichweperceiveindeterminatesensibleshapes.Ultimately,weconstitutea priorigivenessencesthrougheideticreductionandthemethodofideali-zation.Althoughessencescorrelatetoa priorigivenstructuresofempiricalvague types, they are not identicalwith them.Therefore, the structures ofthelife-worldareanalogousorcorrelativetoidealobjectsthatweconstitutethrougheithereideticreductionoridealization.Theproblemofthelife-worldconsistsinthequestionastohowtheoriginallife-worldexperienceofpre-ob-
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jective,non-ideal,andvaguetypescouldcorrelatetotheidealobjectsthatareaccessibleinintuitiveapprehensionalone,iftheformerremainphenomenalapproximationstothelatter.Whilethemethodofidealizationisnon-arbitraryand restrainedby the relation to the type inquestion, theeidetic reductionis freeandarbitrary.According to thisdifferentiation, thedisclosureof thelife-worldasastratumofthea prioristructureofthelife-worldanditsownessential structures can succeed exclusively through thephenomenologicalmethodofeideticreduction.Atthispoint,wetouchupontheproblemsofhistoryandtheidealityofmean-ing,whichisrelatedtotheproblemofthelife-worldandthustherequirementsofgeneticphenomenology.Wecanonlybrushuponthistheme.Theaccom-plishmentofidealobjectsbymeansoftheintuitiveapprehensiondemandsaphenomenologicalaccountforthegenesisofidealobjects.However,thisac-countcanneverdispensewiththerequirementthatthegenesisofidealobjectsmustbecompatiblewiththemeaningofidealobjects.Sincethisthesisseemstoincurthechargeofpsychologism,Husserlcanonlycircumventitbyassert-ingthatmeaningsarenon-temporalandahistoricalidealobjects.Hence,idealobjectsaresaidtobetherebeforetheyarediscoveredbyscientificinquiry,beitbymeansofidealizationoreideticreduction,anditissaidthatidealobjectsneverbeartemporalpredication.Weconstitutetheunityofmeaningreferringtoidealobjectsinthetranscendentalhistoryofmeaning,whichisnotahistoryofevents,butthenon-temporalandahistoricalgenesisofmeaning.
The A priori of the Life-World
The phenomenological conception of the life-world supersedes the abovetreatednatural conceptionsof theworld.According to the full-blownphe-nomenologicalconception,thelife-worldisthehorizonwithinwhichalloftheotherworlds,theworldsofscientificobjectivity,ofperceptualobjectivity,andofpre-scientific interests,areconstitutedandgiven.However, thelife-worldisnotoneworldbesidealloftheothers.Rather,thelife-worldis,toputitinaformulaoftranscendentalphilosophy,theconditionofthepossibilityofallworldsquaworldsofnaturalconception.IntheCrisis,thephenomeno-logicalreductionofthenaturalconceptionoftheworldtothetranscendental-phenomenologicalconceptionofthelife-worldmotivatestheconsiderationsonthelife-worldasthea priorihorizonoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Thephenomenologicalreductionsrequireanextensionthatwillaccomplishtheseconsiderations.AnothergoaloftheCrisisistoclarifytheworldofscientificobjectivity.Thisclarificationentailsthereferencetoawidespectrumofnatu-ralworld conceptions, namely, theworldof perceptual objectivity and theworldofpre-scientificinterest,aswellasthephenomenologicalconceptionsoftheoriginallife-worldexperienceofvaguetypesandthelife-worldasthea priorihorizonoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Husserlsubsumesallofthesemeaning facets of the life-world under one title, although only the formersatisfiesthemeaningoftheterm“thea prioriofthelife-world”inthestrictesphenomenologicalsense.
37
Krisis, S.115;Crisis,p.113.
38
Krisis, S.134;Crisis,p.131.
39
Krisis, S.132;Crisis,p.129.Seethechapterentitled “Ambiguities in theConcept of theLife-World” inDavid Carr,Phenomenology and the Problem of History(Evanston:North-westernUniversityPress,1974),190–211.
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The Phenomenology of the Life-World
However,theextendedphenomenologicalepochédoesnotpenetratethelife-world,nordoesthelife-worldfallundertheepoché.Rather,theepochémakesexplicitwhatisunacknowledgedinthenaturalconceptionsoftheworldbydisclosingthelife-worldasastratumofthea prioristructuresoftranscenden-talsubjectivity–bythematizingtheunthematichorizonofallconstitutions.We bring to light the constitution of the life-world through transcendentalsubjectivity,whichinvolvesthemultifacetedintentionalmeaningsthatcon-stitute the equivocation of the phenomenological term ‘thea priori of thelife-world’.Afterall,tothinkthatthelife-worldisnotcognitivelyaccessiblewouldbeamistake.Thephilosophicalandscientificinvestigationintothelife-worlden-countersdiversifiedphenomenaofsocialpracticeandpraxissuchasacting,communicating,andevaluating,andsoonaswellascultural,aesthetic,andreligiousachievements inthebroadestsenseandsortsofutilityandvalue,beautyandugliness,sacrednessandprofanity.Basedonourphenomenologi-caldescriptionoftheworldaspluralizedworldsofperceptualobjectivityandpre-scientificinterests,wecanconcludethattheyconstituteasphereofsocialandculturalpractice:perceptualmeaningisderivablefrompracticalinterestsandactivities.Thecoreofperceptualcognitioninthelife-worldisdeeplyrootedinaction,communication,andevaluation.Itwouldthereforebefacetioustoargue that thecognitionofpersons,events,andactionsdoesnot representitsobjectsadequatelyandexhaustively.Uniqueindividualsalwaysvaguelyexemplifyidealizedtypes.Insocialandculturalpractice,thelife-worldisthepre-givenhorizonofallintentionalactivityanditiscognizableonlyinpurelytheoreticalinvestigationsoftranscendentalphenomenology.Wemayputintoquestion,sotospeak,socialactions,personalities,andeventsspatiotempo-rally. It iscommonknowledge thatMauriceMerleau-Ponty(1908–61)hasdrawnonHusserl’sideaofthenon-Cartesian“livingbody”(Leib)incontrastto theCartesian“body”(Körper)40 inorder todemonstrate thatperceptualmeaningisderivablefromitslocomotion.Thelivingbodybecomesaculturalobjectexercisingthepowerofexpressivecommunication.41Inconclusion,wecanassert,quitegenerally,thatmeaningisderivablefromthesocial,cultural,andhistoricalcoverageofthelife-world.However,duetothecomplexityofthelife-world,wecannotplausiblyregardthecognitionofsuchlife-worldphenomenaashighlyidealizedformsofscience.Factualconstraints necessarily keep the level of idealization and exactness of thephenomenologically motivated sciences of the life-world lower than thatofthemathematical-logicalsciencesofnature.Transcendentalphenomeno-logyaccomplishes,first,thephenomenologicalclarificationofidealobjects’meaning, which describes that the mathematical-logical idealizations oflife-worldpresupposemanifoldaccomplishmentsofthefullintentionallifeof transcendental subjectivity. Secondly,with the genetic phenomenologyofmeaning, it gives a transcendental-historical account of the intentionallifeoftranscendentalsubjectivity,theprerequisitethatensurestheintersub-jectivityofthestudyofthelife-worldandrenouncesbothobjectivismandnaturalism.Thus,phenomenology,correctlyunderstoodasthetranscenden-tal-philosophic clarificationofmeaning,makespossible thephilosophicalandscientificinvestigationofthediversifiedandcomplexphenomenaofthelife-world.
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EdmundHusserl,Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, trans.F.Kersten(TheHague:MartinusNjihoff,1983).
EdmundHusserl,The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,trans.DavidCarr(Evanston:NorthernUniversityPress,1970).
DavidCarr,“Husserl’sProblematicConceptof theLife-World”, inF.A.EllistonandP.McCormick(eds.),Husserl, Expositions and Appraisals (NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977),202–212.
DavidCarr,“AmbiguitiesintheConceptoftheLife-World”,in:DavidCarr,Phenome-nology and the Problem of History (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974),190–211.
MauriceMerleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception,trans.P.Kegan(NewYork:Rout-ledge,2002).TranslationoftheFrenchoriginalPhénoménologie de la Perception(Paris:Gallimard,1945).
Tomislav Zelić
O fenomenologiji životnog svijeta
SažetakOvaj članak pokušava ne samo pojasniti višeznačnosti vezane uz fenomenološke pojmove ‘život-ni svijet’ (Lebenswelt) i ‘a priori svijeta života’ (das Apriori der Lebenswelt), nego isto ocrtati fenomenologiju svijeta života u odnosu prema predznanstvenom životu i svakdanje percepcije, matematičkim i geometrijskim prirodoslovnim znanostima te eidetičkoj i fenomenološkoj reduk-ciji čiste fenomenologije i fenomenološke filozofije.
ZusammenfassungDieser Essay versucht nicht nur die Vieldeutigkeiten zu entwirren, die sich um die phänome-nologischen Begriffe ,Lebenswelt’ und ,Apriori der Lebenswelt’ ranken, sondern auch eine Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt in Beziehung zu vorwissenschaftlichem Alltagsleben und sinn-licher Wahrnehmung, den mathematischen und geometrischen Naturwissenschaften sowie der eidetischen und phänomenologischen Reduktion der reinen Phänomenologie und phänomeno-logischen Philosophie zu umreißen.
MauriceMerleau-Ponty,Phénoménologie de la Perception (Paris:Gallimard,1945).Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Percep-tion, trans.P.Kegan(NewYork:Routledge,2002), 202ff.
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Tomislav Zelić
Sur la phénoménologie de la Lebenswelt (« monde de la vie »)
RésuméCet article tente non seulement de clarifier la polysémie des concepts phénoménologiques « le monde de la vie » (Lebenswelt) et « l’apriori du monde de la vie », mais aussi de définir la phénoménologie du monde de la vie par rapport à la vie préscientifique, à la perception quo-tidienne, aux sciences naturelles, mathématiques et géométriques, ainsi que par rapport à la réduction eidétique et phénoménologique de la phénoménologie pure et de la philosophie phénoménologique.
