Peace Process Sabet

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The Peace Process and the Politics of Conflict Resolution

Author(s): Amr G. E. SabetSource: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Summer, 1998), pp. 5-19Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538127 .

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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THEPOLITICS OF CONFLICTRESOLUTIONAMRG. E. SABET

This nalysis f heMiddle astpeaceprocess rgues hat he pplica-tionofconventionalWesternonflictesolutionmechanisms as at-temptedo removehe ustice rinciplerom heArab-Israelionflict.The uthor ontends hat he hiftfrom"closedgenda"determinedby orevalues oan "open genda"where verythingsopen orbar-gainingandfrom justice-drivenentitlement-benefits"atrix o autility-drivencost-benefits"ne, anonlyeadto ssue ransformationand the rogressivecalingbackofgoals.Acceptance fthe dver-sary'sframeworkas reducedArabnegotiatorsosupplicantsatherthancounterparts hose erceptionsan be managedbytheoppo-nent.After xaminingArab options, he authorconcludesthatwhateverettlementmergesrom he urrentrocesss bound o ailbecause t annotfulfillasicdemandforustice, esultingn a redefi-nition fthe onflictn itsbroader eligiousnd strategicorizons.

THE FANFARE SURROUNDING THE MIDDLE EAST "PEACE PROCESS" has obscured howlittle thas been subjectedto systematicnd objective nalysis.Norhave itsnegotiation rinciples een sufficientlycrutinized obring ut theunderly-ingnature nd structuref theprocess or ts bility odeliver n itspromises.Ifa yet moreviolentand bitter uture f theArab-Israeli ollision s to beavoided, distinctionmustbe made betweenconflict esolution s "the rans-formation f relationships n a particular ase by the solution of theproblemswhich led to theconflictual ehavior n the first lace" and "thesuppressionor settlement f conflict y coercivemeans,or by bargainingandnegotiationnwhichrelative owerdetermineshe outcome."1 he dis-tinctionmustbe made,then,betweenresolution nd settlement. orunlesstheformer btains and incorporates heprinciple f ustice (particularlynthe conflict'sore Palestinianssue),the"peace process"cannotbutcollapseinto a reducedand unstable ettlementrrangement.PEACE TRANSFORMATION AND THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE

The currentpeace process"has attemptedocircumvent,ransform,ndconceptuallyobliterate he justiceprincipleof theArab-Israeli onflict y

AMR G. E. SABET is visiting ssociate professorof political science at Tampere University,Finland.Journal of Palestine Studies XXVII,no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 5-19.


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6 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESresorting o conventionalWesternconflict esolutionmechanisms.Thesemechanismshave fundamentallyltered he political genda of theconflictthrough ubterfugend issue transformation.his developmentwas facili-tatedby systemicnd regionalchangesarising rom he collapse oftheSo-viet Union,the second GulfWarand the destructionf raq,andAmerican-Israelimilitarynd scientific ooperation.The application f Western conflictesolution"mechanisms equired heintroduction f superordinate xes to change the region's regime of alli-ances. "Moderate"Araband Jewishforcessupporting peace" were to bealigned against radicals" r "extremists"pposing it nboth societies.Arableaders were to make common cause with srael n fightingotextremismper se, but Islamicresistance o the concessional schemes being workedout-in otherwords, theywere to fight heirown so as to claim sharedgroundwith srael.Parallel othesechanges nthepolitical onstellation asa shift rom "closed agenda" determined y immutable ore values to an"open agenda"whereeverythings open forbargaining. hus, nsteadof aclosed agenda settingslamists nd existing egimes s natural lliesagainsta commonIsraelienemy,the new open agenda evolved into one of con-frontinghe effectsfinjustice ather han tscauses.

The negotiating trategydopted by the Arabsafterhe GulfWar was ar-ticulated y PresidentHusni Mubarakof Egypt,who inJanuary 989 pro-claimed thathe and otherArab eaders were supported n their earch forpeace by "thepeace lovingforces n Israel tself." e indicated hat fter llthesacrificesn previouswars with srael,he "was notreadyto takemorerisks."2 hisstatement asically cknowledgesthe conflict o be one of costsrather hanofentitlements,fpragmatism ather hanrights,nd conveysawillingness o play bytherulesoftheopponent.Expressing isratherim-itedunderstandingfthe Vietnamese ase as an exampleofa war that wassettled nlythrough egotiations,"Mubarakfailedto relatetheoutcome toconditions n theground.The Vietnamesewere successfuln mposing heirwillon a farmorepowerful dversary recisely ecause theyhad been will-ingtotakerisks,while theArabparty'starting ointfornegotiations as toconcede entitlementlaims.Since the Arabswere willing orelinquishwhattheyhad consideredsacred since 1948,furtherressure ould be expectedto lead them to concede otherrights nd Jerusalem s well-afterall, theprecedenthad been set. This ntroducedtructuralransformnationsapableofchanging hepsychological istributionfpower heavilyn favor f sraeland alteringheArabpositionfrom ne of defiance o one of virtual ubmis-sion. As a settlementmechanism, he "peace process"has recast the sub-stance of the conflict y steadilycreating he appropriate nvironmentalmeans-endsframeworkor uch "concessions" o be made.Negotiation onstituteshe "artof the dialecticsof wills thatuse force(and/orpeaceful measures)to resolve their onflict."3trategiesnd tactics,in additionto optionsand the available resources, onstitute hepillarsofnegotiating ynamics. heiroverriding rinciple s to takeadvantageto the


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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 7extent ossibleofthe adversary's eaknessesand oversights. he configura-tive outcome determines he agreements eached and how they re imple-mented. In this ense,negotiation s a double-edgedsword: tcan resolveconflicts r exacerbatethem.While t s impossible o predictwithcertaintythe result f a negotiating rocess, a numberofpremisesmayindicate tsdirection. hus,thefinal utcome ofnegotiations suallyreflectshe relativepower configurationf the parties oncerned; whereone endsup dependsonwhere one starts";4nd negotiating utcomesemanatenot onlyfrom b-jectivematerial onditions ut, s importantly,romubjective sychologicalfortitude.he weaker side inparticularmust husexhibit onsiderablefirm-ness to establish credibilityhreshold ufficiento make demandsor up-hold positions.Otherwise, n cases of asymmetricalower, diminishedwillinevitably ranslatesnto a one-sided open agenda in which-as far s theprivileged arty s concerned-agreementmay not necessarily e preferredto nonagreement. ailureof will also allows forthe unilateral lteration fthe rulesof thegameand for edefininghenorms hat ll actorsmust ollowintheirmutual elations.5 nce this tagehas been reached,negotiationub-stantively eases, since, as Henry Kissinger noted, "the weak do notnegotiate."6

Both the Americans nd the Israelis believed that step-by-stepatherthan comprehensive egotiating pproachwould contributeo undermin-ing theArabconsensusof"notalks, o recognition, o peace" that mergedattheKhartoum ummitnAugust 967. The purposewas to dividetheArabworld,winde facto ecognitionf srael, ndput srael n a stronger ositionwhen t came tonegotiate irectly ith hefront-linetates nd the Palestini-ans.7 srael'stacticwas tobring he Arabs nto"stepby step,practical ettle-ments and interim agreements as a gradual incrementalprocess of'interlocking'he rivals nto positive rrangements hichmaymakeit moredifficultor hem o revertoopen conflict nd war."8 uch tacticswere con-sistentwith heoverall trategyfdetaching gypt rom heArab-Israelion-flict, solating Syria, nd, on the Palestinianfront, ursuinga policy ofcantonizationn Gaza and the West Bank. Above all, the approach suc-ceeded inbreaking henecessary inkbetween statecraftnd war. Once allthishad been achieved, srael reversed tsposition,withthe current rimeminister, enjaminNetanyahu, allingfor a package approach"that ircum-vents heagreements ignedearlier.9PEACE-JUSTICE DIALECTICS

Power relationsbased on considerations f mightfrequentlyffend"sense of ustice" nd fuel the emotionsof resentment nd angerthatulti-mately ead to violence. Notionsof injustice as a reaction o a perceiveddiscrepancy etweenentitlementsnd benefits"lwaysremain n inherentrisk actor.10Peace"as theoppositeofviolence ratherhan s a reflectionfjustice s unlikely o overcome such concerns.Bereavements nflictedythe


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8 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESWeston theArabs ngeneral, ndon thePalestiniansn particular, ave fromtheoutset haracterized heconflictnArabeyes as one ofentitlement-bene-fits as opposed to themorepragmatic argaining pproach of cost-bene-fits),meaning hat t s the notionof rights hat s the determiningactor ndthatwhateverbenefits erive from he conflict's esolution re secondary.The Arab sense of injusticehas triggeredntenseemotionalresponses thatcannot be quantifiedolely n tangible erms rreduced simply o an aver-sion to loss. Phenomenologically,hesense of ustice "engage(s) powerfulpassionsthathave theeffectf ncreasinghestridencyfdemands, mplify-ing intransigence, educing sensitivityo threats nd value trade-offs,n-creasing hewillingness orunrisks, nd increasing he ikelihoodof violentbehavior."" Thishelps explainthe violence associated withmilitant uslimorganizations uch as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad.Their acts arelargely he observablesymptoms f theunobservable need to respondtogroup insultwithrage.12Referring o the Islamist organizations s terroristtructures pposingpeace is partof an alternative iscursivemechanism hat eeks to eliminatethe entitlement-benefitsiscrepancy ontext nfavorof one based on cost-benefits, he formerbeing

depictedas irrationalnd the latter s rational.Buthistorical xperienceshows thatwhen basic entitle-ments are at stakeagainst overrwhelmingdds, lessrationalityctually aresbetter han more rationality.For instance, he Czechs' behavior with respect toNazi Germany's demands fortheir and was "toorational" n the face of a militaryhreat heybelievedthey ould not win against n the ong run.13n contrast,heFinnsand theNorthVietnamesewere less rational nd moreemotional,more determinedtofight gainst he overwhelming owerof theSovietUnionand theUnitedStates, espectively. inland,while osingtwice, arnedrespect nd perhapsmade itself ess attractives a potential atellite. he NorthVietnamese, fcourse,ultimately revailed,14 inning war nwhichtheyhad lostvirtuallyall the battles.thardly ears mentioning hat,within he context f the U.S.-constructed peace" discourse, t is fareasier to manipulatepartieswhosecalculatingmatrix rifts owardcost-benefituantificationsthe Czech op-tion) than parties who are not prey to such calculations the Finn orVietnamese ption).The justice motive differs rom version to loss both prescriptivelyndextensively. rescriptively,he desire to see justicedone "though he earthmay perish" s a drive mbedded in basic humanvalues and is indifferentomaterial aluationsbased on economyor self-interest.xtensively,he us-tice motivediffersrom ain-loss onsiderationsn that t nvolvesnotwhatpeople would like to have but whattheyconsider theirdue, their ntitle-ments.People within he entitlement-benefitsalue matrix sually arewill-ing to incur a heavy price for potentiallyess useful things hey consider

Historical experience showsthat when basicentitlements re at stakeagainst overwhelmingodds, less rationalityactually fares betterthanmore rationality.


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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 9theirs s a matterfright nd are willing o tradeoff r foreswear oods thattheywould liketohave but towhichtheydo not feel entitled. The mode ofreasoning nvolved n the defense of one's entitlements,"herefore,differsfundamentallyrom he mode ofreasoning nvolved n the pursuit fothergoods: ittendsto be categorical nd deontologicalrather hanutilitarian."15

In substance, srael, ided by Americanndifferencefnotcomplicity,t-tempted o reconcile the entitlement-benefitsiscrepancynot by meetinglegitimate alestinian emands but by transforminghe rules n such a waythat he PalestinianAuthorityPA), led by Yasir Arafat, ould increasinglyact-if notactually elieve-as if thad misconceived hescope and contentofPalestinian ntitlements.16s YehoshafatHarkabi,formerhiefofIsraelimilitaryntelligence, ointed out: "Making he opponent uneasy and apolo-getic about his objective, s a firstmall step in the process of its erosion,inducinghim to start iscarding t."17 hus, recentyears ppear to have wit-nessed a progressive caling back of Palestinian xpectations. ndeed, withtheexceptionofthehighlykillednegotiator afiz l-AsadofSyria, look atthenegotiating atterns fArabdecisionmakersrevealsa significant ro-pensity o modify he values at stake n a fashion hatultimatelyhallengestheir wn entitlements.srael,on theotherhand, continues o maintain tsown constants nd payoffsnterms fa unified erusalem nder tscontrol,possession of most of theWest Bank (despite redeploymentmaneuvers),monopolizedaccess tonuclearweapons, priorityf sraeli ecurity oncernsover all other onsiderations, nd eventual ccess to the waterresourcesoftheNile and theEuphrates.18Israel'sdelinking f security rom hanges on theground n Jerusalemand the WestBank,and thereforerom hepoliticalheart f the"peace pro-cess,"reflects furtherttempto divest hepurported alestinian/Arabe-gotiatingormula f ts substance.DuringhisAugust1997visit o theregionin the wake of Hamas bombings in Jerusalem,U.S. envoy Dennis Rosssoughtfurthero entrench he Palestiniannegotiatorwithin hisdelinkingstructure.e calledupon Israelis nd Palestinians o workas partners gainstthe"common hreat" rommilitants,mphasizing hat securitys somethingthat erves sraeli nterests nd Palestiniannterests."19sraelisecuritywasthusto become the PA's objective,whether rnotPalestinian emandsforstatehood ould or would be met. n return orArafat'sesumptionfsecur-ity cooperationwithIsrael,Ross gave a vague promise of an upcomingbroad U.S.peace initiativehat upposedlywould addressPalestinians' om-plaints gainst srael, ncluding some kind"offreezeon settlementxpan-sion.20ButwhenSecretaryfStateMadeleineAlbrightisited heregion hefollowingmonth,he respondedto complaints hat sraelwas strengtheningitsgriponJerusalem, xpanding colonies,and leveling he homes ofPales-tinians y declaring hat there s no moralequivalentbetweenkilling eo-ple and buildinghouses.... The PalestinianAuthority usttake unilateralstepsand actionsto root out the terroristnfrastructure."'21


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10 JOURNALF PALESTINE STUDIESThe problemwithunilateral estures, s Kissinger oted, s that hey re-move a key negotiatingsset. n general,diplomatsrarely ay for ervices

alreadyrendered."Moreover,he continued, hey temptthe adversary todragout thenegotiationsnorder odeterminewhether ther nilateral es-turesmay be forthcoming."22otonlydidAlbright emand such unilateralgestures fthePalestinians,he refused o acknowledge any connectionbe-tween the militant cts of some Palestiniangroups and the Israeli govern-ment'sbreaking fagreements nd settlementxpansion.Ross'spromises oArafatan be likened o Britain'sWorldWar commitmentso support nde-pendence forArabs fthey oined the war effortgainstOttomanTurkey.Arafat's elationship ith slamist roups,however, s too complex to en-able him to accede to U.S.-Israeli emandsfor crackdownon their nfra-structure,t east nottothe extent esired.For muchas Arafat ould like toclamp down on the Islamists, e knows thatdestroying hem could meanpoliticalsuicide.EradicatingHamas and Islamic Jihadwould diminishhisusefulness s a negotiator:he slamists re his asttrump ard.This swherethe inherent ontradictions f a common security ramework an be feltmoststrongly.While the sraeliswould like to see Islamicoppositionelimi-natedtotally, rafat annotwithout eopardizinghis own survival o morethan ontain ndweaken them. hus, hePAand Israelcannotpursuea com-mon security olicy,but onlya parallel one. Arafat's ilemma s that hissituation rojectshimsimultaneouslys a collaboratorto theIslamists, swell as to some secularnationalists)nd as an ineffectivenduncooperativeleader to theAmericansnd Israelis).The results a concessionary utcomethat an lead onlyto the erosionofthePA's legitimacy, orcingtto controlits own people by increasingly oercive measures.23However much Israelismay loatheArafat, e represents or them thelesser of evils and a kindof safety alve. His rumblingsbout not beingdictated oby sraelcannotconceal thathis real concern sfear fgeneratingsympathyor slamicmilitantsy acquiescing n Israelidemands.Moreover,the concentration f power in Arafat's ands,his personalcontrolof thefundsprovided by internationalonors,his virtual ack of accountability,andhiseffortsoweakenall other orces nd social institutions-inhort,hefact hathe has become the PAin all butname24 significantlyonsolidatesIsrael'sposition.Thus,and notwithstandingheIslamistmilitants,sraelbycontrollinghe "chief' an control he "tribe."n thisrespect, hePA, thoughshort fbeinga state, s not an aberration uta typical egionalplayer.PEACE CONCESSIONS AND THE STRATEGY OF DEFEAT

Empirical tudiesregardingwinners nd losers in negotiationsndicatethat hepartieswithhigher spirationevels actuallygetmore.Opponentswithhigh aspirations,rrespectiveftheir killor power,ended up as win-ners nevery ase wherethey pposed low aspirants. urthermore,egotia-tors who made the first ompromiseended up the losers in the final


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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 11

outcome.25 n the ight f such findings,t follows hat he strategic onces-sions initiated y the late PresidentAnwar Sadat through he Camp Davidregime, nd in whose footsteps number of otherArab leaders have fol-lowed, can only ead to disastrous onsequences for the Arab world. Thepattern f concessionsthat nevitably esultswhen one party irtually e-clares itself esperateto opt out of confrontation hile the otherremainsdetermined an never be just,for everalreasons.First, oncessions are fair nly as long as the negotiators ave no need torevise theiroriginalexpectations bout the overall shape of the ultimateagreement r about their trategic oals ofentitlement.26eavingaside thedowngrading fPalestinian xpectations hatpreceded Oslo, theOslo ac-cords allowed the Palestinian egotiatoro anticipate Palestiniantate ov-eringmostof the West Bank and Gaza at theend ofthe process.Sincethen,thePA appears to have been reduced by the negotiating atternthas fol-lowed to nothingmore than an auxiliarysraeli security tructure.ndeed,the entireArabworld has undergone n extraordinarycalingback of goals.As Mubarak'schiefpolitical dviser Osama Baz remarked, he conflict e-tween the Arabs and Israel is now over boundariesand no longerover27Israel's existence. (In contrast, ormersraeli chiefof staff aphael Eitandeclared the conflict o be "civilizational.")Second, negotiation equires hatpartiesbe governedbythesame rules,withneither ide having he rightoalter hemunilaterally. iventhatnego-tiations a matter ffinding he properformula s a referent rinciple ndthen mplementingetail,28fone party an change the negotiating ormulaat will and theother s constrained yit-that s, f heparties ease tohaveequal stalemating ower-then no mechanism f ointdecisionmaking x-istsand thetalksno longerconstitute egotiations. t is thusthat srael hasunilaterallylteredthe formula rom and forpeace, as was agreed at theOctober1991Madridconference, o peace forpeace or security orpeace.Thischange,whichfundamentallyeorders heprocess n Israel's mage,be-ganundertheLaborgovernment,lbeit ess overtly;29o personalizethe s-sue by presentingtas a Netanyahu nitiative,s manyArabs tendto do,rather han as a matter f Israelistrategys to blur the deeper factors, l-lowing heoptionlessArab eadersto buy timeby deluding hemselves hatreturnfLaborwill setthings ight.Finally,while any concessions made by the Israeli side can onlycomefrom ains acquired attheexpense of the Arabside, reciprocal oncessionsbythe Arabsmust nevitablyome outof their wn capital.A frameworkfmutual oncessions,while in appearanceprocedurally air, ides a substan-tive njusticenflictedn one negotiating arty.Whateverustificationsrecitedfor this state of affairs-thebalance of power, the situation n theground, he fact hat srael won the and militarily-the egotiatingxerciseisessentiallyeduced tothevictor'smposing tswillon thevanquished.Thissituationnvites erms f surrender ather hanthe conciliation hat omesfrom onflict esolution.


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12 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIESThe Palestinian eader thus ommitted serious trategicmistake y sign-ing nterim greements hat eferred o a later tage such fundamentalssues

as Jerusalem, efugees, nd Jewish colonies-in other words, by signingagreements mphasizing heprocessof nteractionather han hecontent fthe negotiating ositions.30 uch a blunderwas a reflection f the Arab/Pal-estinian egotiators'nabilityo rankpriorities fnational nterestsnd goals,as well as their onfusionofmeans and ends. Within he frameworkf aconfidence-buildingrocess as opposed to one based on content), rioritygoes to current nd ad hoc problemsofwhatevermagnitude tthe expenseof long-term trategic onsiderations,n essence resultingn a policy thatgives equal weight o all issues. Indeed,thisprocess-orientatedrameworkactually eads to a confusion fpriorities,nd ifprioritiesre confused,nolong-term ational interest trategy an be focused upon, nor decisionsabout the channeling fresourcesmade. Process becomes an end in itselfrather hanthe means it s supposed to be.This oss of strategic alance is whatmade itpossible for sraelto "screw"thePalestinians t Oslo II, touse Labor eader ShimonPeres's frank xpres-sion.31 ndeed, whateverWesternconflictmanagementframeworks uti-lized, the Arabs will lose every imethey gree to be placed in an externalrulestructure. s Carl Schmitt bserved, f people permits nother arty odetermine n itsbehalfthe distinctionffriend nd enemy, then t is nolonger a politicallyfree people and is absorbed into another politicalsystem."32In ending he ntifada nd signing he Oslo accords,Arafat ave up twoofhis most mportantrump ards without eceiving nything f substance nreturn. is error urtherbsolvedtheArab ndother tates fanyembarrass-ment hatmight ave prevented hemfrom ormalizingelationswith srael,effectivelyolsteringtsregional nd internationaltatus nd ending ts so-lation. n so doing, he PLO squandered thevery imited everage t had andplaced itselfn its enemy's grip,or at best in thatof itsAmerican lly inmuch the same fashion, houghunder farworse conditions, s Egypthaddone earlier).NothingnthePA's negotiating atternwould seem to allowfor he realization f itsrightsnd demandsfor tatehood, ven as parallelexpectations n thebroaderArabfrontontinue o decrease in light ftheadversary'snitiativeynamics.

ARAB OPTIONSThe perennial egitimacyrisis ndpersonalizedruleofthe Arabregimesinevitably ffect heirnegotiating erformance nd conflictmanagementcompetence.BoutrosBoutros-Ghali, keyfigurenthenegotiationshat edto theCampDavid accords,wrote n hismemoirs hat heEgyptian elega-tionnotonlydidnot know how topreparefor hecomingnegotiations,utdid not even know thegeneral strategy pon whichto base its moves. "Itdallied my hopes that nspirationwould come to us when we arrived t


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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 13Camp David,"he wrote na perhapsunwitting ut devastatingndictmentfthe Egyptian egotiating attern.33 iventhat adat was at a loss as to whatstep to take afterhis visit to Jerusalem, e "put himself ompletely ntoAmerican ands,"willing to take Carter'sword that given tep was neces-sary"and unable, unlike the U.S. president, to separate business fromfriendship."34he resultwas a diplomatic rameworkhat ncludednot onlytraditional egotiation,mediation, onciliation,nd arbitration,ut also thepresumablymore advanced methodsofconflict esolution hat mphasizednot the content f the negotiating ositionsbut the process of nteraction-confidence uilding, ducationformutualunderstanding,nd the pursuit fsuperordinateoals, including conomic incentives.35 he twooverlappingapproachescompromised ore issues, eadingSadat to sacrificeArabstrate-gic entitlementsnfavor fshort-termgyptian erritorialnd financial ains.The tragedy s that hePAseems to be following he same pattern fcon-cessions, but withoutthe assets and leverage that Egypt possessed. ForEgypt, s themost powerfulArabcountry, ould offer he Israeliside thestrategic oncession ofdroppingout ofthe conflict quation and in returncould be rewardedwith erritorialains even if t the cost of a loss ofsover-eignty nd self-respectnd diminished egional tatus). he Camp David ac-cords, n otherwords, constituted he highpointofthe peace strategyhatcould onlybe followedbythereversal fopposites:themorepeace is pur-sued, thefewerthereturns,ntil point s reached where thereare onlynegative esults, hich swhatwe arewitnessing oday.Thisessentiallyon-stitutes hedynamics fthepeace dialectics.Giventhecurrentituation,heArabnegotiators avethreemainoptions.First, heycan accept whatever s being "offered" r imposed,seekingthebest conditionsunder the circumstances. econd, theycan stallfortime,hopingfor change in circumstance hatwillpermit eversion o the and-for-peace ormula. inally, hey an transformhenegotiatingulesbyintro-ducingtheir wn formula nd redefininghe conflictnterms f tsbroaderreligious ndstrategic orizons,whileworking ctively oward he construc-tion of new regional nd systemic lliances.In the shortrun, t is the first ptionthat ppears the most ikely o beadopted. Mubarak'sremark o Netanyahu hatwar is "an old (fashioned)matter.. and will not solve any cause"36boils down to a peace-for-peaceformula. venwhen the ArabLeague raised the threat f economicboycottfollowingsrael's decision to build a new colony on JabalAbu Ghunaym(Har Homa) inoccupiedEastJerusalem,twas as a "recommendation"atherthan commitment.BothEgypt ndJordan eclined associated callsfor heArabs to freeze theirnormalization frelationswith sraelon thegroundsthat heywere tied topeace agreementshat revented hemfrom oingso.Whatever heir ctualpolicies,theArab tates ontinue o callfor returnto land forpeace. This formula nvolvesconditionality,or mplicitn theland-for-peaceonfigurations a presumedveto: fno landis returned,herewillbe no peace. But towhat extent an theArabscredibly all forobser-


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14 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIESvanceoftheformula? he June1996 Arab ummitn Cairoannounced peaceas a "strategichoice." Such a declarationde factorenders and a residualcomponent. fneitherwarnor economic and diplomatic anctions re op-tions, hentheMadridformula with ts nherent eto orconditionality)s inessence dissolved.The summithus ffectivelyeducedthe formula o peaceforpeace, in linewithMubarak's emark. ut nations hat ttemptopresentthemselves s unfailinglyeacefulcan hope to obtain ittle y way of sua-sion from ny forces theymay have.37Nor can theveto capability omefromslamist ombings: poradicviolence s not the same thing s war capa-bilitynd can be dealt with t the ocal securityevel rather hanwithin hebroader context f the "peace process."

In sum, ackingcontrol ver their oncessionalbehavior, he Arab deci-sion makershave contributedo theelimination f thesecond option alto-gether venwhile continuingo demand ts mplementation.hisbeingthecase, theycan onlyact within he confines f an American-Israeliecurityframework,ilting he balances heavily n favorof the first ption. Netan-yahu's ntransigencend disregard or hesigned agreements o not merelyreflect iscommitmento his electoral romises, is commonsense negotia-tioncalculations, nd hisfirm raspof theevolving ituation; hey re alsoconsistentwith sraeli trategynd beliefs, lbeitwithout abor'sfinesse ndfig-leaf ffers. nd iftheArab negotiatorshemselves re willing o under-minetheir ntitlements,hen t shardlyurprisinghat heir pponentonhisown does not revert o the ess favorable inkageoflandforpeace.THE THIRD OPTION

In what amounts o a viciouscircle, apitulationismnlyfuelsbitterness,resentment,nd, ultimately,he mobilization f the forces of indigenousresistance. hiscan be expected,even if n the ong run, o bringforth p-tionthree.The Palestinian ore of theArab-Israelionflict bscuredthe underlyingreligious nd strategic oundations fconflicting ills.As long as thefocuswas on thepresumedconfrontationetweentwonationalisms, ewish ndPalestinian,ver the same piece of and,these more nherent ontradictionsremained n the background.But withthegradual collapse ofnationalisticjustificationsnd withthe issue ofJerusalem omingto thefore, he Arab-Israeli conflict s being reduced to its religiostrategicnderpinnings-alinkage emergingfromthe fact that"a nation's interest erives from tsidentity.38SinceJerusalems a religious ause, the clash over itcannotbe secular-ized-that is, tcannotbecome a solely political ssue.To theextent hat eli-gionis entitlementategorical,hecity annotbe theobjectofcompromise.Thisbeingthecase, "peace" outcomesand legalitieswill remainmarginal,applicable in the domainofpolitics s long as the coerciveframeworkhatproducedthemcontinues nplace. In therealmofreligion, owever, uch


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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 15constraintsmay notfunction s a long-termiable deterrentnd indeed aremore ikely o promote onflictnsofar s they rustratehepursuit fentitle-ments, dentity,nd basic values.39In theArab/Islamic orld, slamist roups are drivenmainly ythe usticemotive,which svalue-orientedentitlement-benefits),hileactors ommit-ted to the"peace process"tendto be more utility-ori-ented (cost-benefits). his poses an acute problemfor the applicationof Westernconflictresolutionmechanisms in an Islamic context. First,militantIslamist roupsand Muslims ngeneralcontinue, s amatter ffaith nd values, to rejectthe enemy rre-spectiveofwhattakesplace atthepolitical evel. Sec-ond, thecontending arties o the conflict o not seeanythingn common with one another,nor is theredesire to coexist.40 hird,while the Palestinian ssue is being transformedthrough he peace strategy,t s also beingcountertransformednto a corereligious rinciple-a substantive hange that ould foreshadow futures-lamic-Jewishonflict.Whatever he outcome of the "peace process" in thepoliticaldomain, t is unlikely o resolve the broaderconfrontationhat snow slowly butominously aking hape.Externalmechanisms eeking rtificiallyo construct ommongoals orin-terests etween theadversariesdo not apply in the case ofJerusalem ndwould be seen as yetanother ttempto impose alienstructures.his is es-peciallytruewhen conventionalWestern onflict esolution rinciplesholdthat peacemaking"s notpossibleuntil onflicts ave "ripened,"hat s,untilcostshave escalatedto thepointwhere parties re prepared o settle.41Warmay be condemned,but "sanctions, unitive xpeditions, acifications, ro-tectionof treaties, nternationalolice, and measuresto assure peace re-main."42The harvest n the Arab/Islamicworld is there to see: Egyptprostrate nd ineffectual;yria solated and pressured; ordan, n American-Israelivassal; Palestinians antonized; raq destroyed; ibya and Sudan em-bargoed; the Arabianpeninsula virtually ccupied; Algeria n thegripof abloodbath; ran and militantslamist roups to be containedor crushed.Ontheother ide is a robustJewish tatewith nuclearcapabilityndmilitarilyfarmorepowerful han all itspotential dversaries ombined.It has been saidthat he second GulfWarwas an issue-transformingventthat aused theArabsto recognize"notonlythat hey ould notfightsraelbut thatmanyof themhad no interestndoingso."43While themajorityftheArabpeople-as distinct rom heirargely elegitimized ulers-maynotshare this onclusion, t s one thatperception-alteringechanisms eek toinduce.44Within uch a reconstructionf the regionalorder, amuel Hunt-ington's clash ofcivilizations" rgument an be perceivednotsimply s anintellectual xercise to be supported rrefuted t theanalytical evel,but asthetheoretical overfora policyin the actual process of implementation.Thispolicy attempts o createtheripe environmentalonditions or he es-

Islamist groups are drivenmainly by the usticemotive,which is value-oriented,while actorscommitted to the 'peaceprocess" tend to be moreutility-oriented.


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16 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIEStablishmentf "peace" while reconstructinghe Muslimworld and crushinggrass-roots slamistgroups.However, to the extent hat slam is an activevalue thatdetermineshe subjective and where possible the objective) na-tureof theconflict,tconstitutes n organizational ountermechanismhatwill continueto block the alteration f the conflict tructure.n ArabandMuslimeyes, and despiteAmerican-Israeliffortso convince them other-wise,thisconflicts a zero-sumgame,for fAmerican-Israelipeace" is toconstituteheregion'snew interest, hiswill requirethe transformationftheregion's dentity.The fact hat slam ontologically s entitlement-drivenfocusingon con-tent)while the"peace process"epistemologicallys cost-articulatedfocus-ing on process) sets them on incommensurableplanes of interaction.Harmonizing hought ystems, owever, requires thatthey be positionedwithin he same logical framework.45o harmonize he "thoughtogic" ofthe Arab/Muslimworld with thatof the "peace" strategy equires thatcounterthoughtse peripheralizednd ifnecessary rushed.What s atstakeconsequently s no longerthe politico-national roblemof usurpationofland but ratherhevery xtractionf a nation'sreligio-nationalnd historicalheritage.An Arab negotiatorwhose thought s reconstructedwithintheframeworkf his adversary's s essentially educed to a supplicantratherthana counterpart. is will and perceptions freality ontinue o be man-aged and alteredby the opponent,withanysettlementikely o hingeoncontingentowerrelations. erein ies the essence ofthe so-called "civiliza-tionalclash" and its camouflaged inkto the"peace process."In focusingon the new Islamic enemy,the UnitedStates has targetedwhat itcalls "terrorist"roups,aiming,withthe collaboration f clientre-gimesand with varying egrees of success, to neutralize nd marginalizethem.Any slamist ppositionalgroup is thusdepictedas a "disturberfpeace . . . [and]designated o be an outlawofhumanity."46 hile tmaybefeasible o crush uch groups throughheoverwhelming owerof the stateand/or xternal ssistance, hisdoes not solve theproblemas long as theenvironmentalonditions eadingto their mergenceremain n place andregenerate.Nor does their uppressionnecessarily ead to the containmentof slamicdynamism,incethe vitalityf slam s not constrained y,orde-pendentupon, their xistence.Finally, ven thoughmanyof thosegroupscould be (or have been) marginalized,heynevertheless ave succeeded inscoring major strategic ictoiybymainstreamingslamin public lifeandsociety t large. slamicsymbolspenetrate hesociety nd thepoliticaldis-courseofthe Muslimworld more than ver, nd, na dialectical ashion, heretreat fpolitical slam has been accomplishedbythe advancement f Is-lam as a social condition.47Neutralizinghese subtleundercurrentsouldrequirenotonly crushing hemilitants,ut in effect nuffingutthe valuesystem n whichtheirmotivations re based. In otherwords,the systemwould have to be attacked n its basic values and notmerely tspoliticalagenda.


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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POUTICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 17CONCLUSION

Defining slam as thenew enemy fter he collapse of communism onsti-tutes a strategic ecision foreshadowing he American-Israeli roject ofredrawing hepoliticalmapoftheArabworld.The expectation mongmanyMuslims hat hisprojectwill target ot only marginalizedslamist roupsorMuslim egimes ut,more broadly,mainstreamslam has slowly ntroduceda subtlemessianic treak ntotheir onflict erceptions nd contributedoraising orebodings fupcoming apocalyptic vents.As these nterest-identitydverse inkagesbecome increasingly ranspar-ent, nd as contiguousArabcountries, speciallyEgypt, radually ecognizeonce more that srael s not a threat nlyto thePalestinians,he conflict illcontinue o change inproportion o the ntensityf thosefeelings. hat s-lamis being politicized s not, herefore,imply matter f a religiousdoc-trine hat oes notallowfor heseparation freligion nd politics, ut morefundamentally matter f ustice nd strategic onsiderations s well. In itscalltoarms, slam snotabout violence and extremism; ather,t s aboutthelegitimatend unequivocal right o self-defense. hreats o security,dentity,and religious alues cannotbe containedby suppressionorbymere settle-ment arrangements. y the same token, the "peace" being offered s notaboutnegotiationsnd cooperationbutabout the destruction f values.The"peace process" s saying hatmotives t the very ore ofhuman needs willhave to be neutralized.Western onflict esolutionmechanismsdo not seem well-equippedtocope with heseunique characteristicsfpresent nd future rab-Israeli n-tagonisms.Available theoretical onstructs ave externalized eligiousbe-liefs as determining omponents, reducingthem to culturally lterablevariables.Religious convictions, owever,and especiallyMuslimviews oftheJewish/Zionistdversary, emainfixed onflict arameters. onflict he-ory'sreactionhas been to reject uch factors s a sourceofcognitive isso-nance andtodismiss eligion s a matterfunwelcome complexity hat allslargely utside ts ken. Meanwhile, hese conflict heorieshave failed o ad-dress crucialquestionsas to whether the weak have the right o make adifferentet ofrulesfor hemselves."48 ore mportantly,heyhave failed ocope with the Israeli-Palestinianhowdown as one facetof a multidimen-sional conflictnwhichreligion s a parameter, ota variable.The fear hattheArab/Muslimorldwillgo ''Islamist" eflectshefear hatWestern ettle-mentmechanismsdo not and cannotmeet the basic humanneeds of theregion'speople.NOTES

1. JohnBurton,Con,flict: esolutionand Prevention (London: MacmillanPressLimited, 990), p. 3.2. "PresidentHosni Mubarak: The In-evitabilityf Peace (21 January 989)," inWalter Laqueur and BarryRubin, eds.,

The Israeli-Arab Reader, 5thed. (NewYork: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 546-47.3. Edward N. Luttwak, trategy Cam-bridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-sityPress, 1987), p. 241.


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18 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES4. Howard Raiffa, he Artand Scienceof Negotiation (Cambridge: HarvardUni-versity ress, 1982), p. 215.5. RaimoVayrynen, d., New Direc-tions in ConflictTheory London: SagePublications, 1991), pp. 4-5.6. Norman G. Finkelstein, mage andReality of the sraeli-Palestinian Conflict(New York: Verso, 1995), p. 237.7. Michael Field, nside the ArabWorld Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-sityPress, 1994), p. 384.8. YehoshafatHarkabi,Arab Strategiesand Israel's Response (New York: The

Free Press, 1977), p. 103.9. Interview,Newsweek, 23 June 1997,p. 39.10. MelvinJ. Lerner, The JusticeMo-tive n Human Relations," n MelvinJ.Ler-ner and Sally C. Lerner, ds., The JusticeMotive in Social Behavior: Adapting toTimes of Scarcity and Change (NewYork: Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 12-13.11. David A. Welch,Justice and theGenesis of War (Cambridge, England:Cambridge University ress, 1993), p. 20.12. JohnW. Burton,Global Conflict(London: WheatsheafBooks Ltd.,1984), p.13. 13. Michael Handel, Weak States inthe nternational System London: FrankCass, 1981), p. 93.14. Ibid.15. Welch,Justiceand theGenesis ofWar, pp. 20-21.16. Ibid., p. 20.17. Harkabi,Arab Strategies,p. 88.18. In Report ofa StudyGroup Con-vened by theAmerican Academy ofArtsand Sciences, itwas proposed that "re-gional waterplans would be an importantcomponent of the bilateral nd multilat-eral accords. The opportunity o increaseaccess to water would serve as one of theinducements for srael to negotiatesecur-ity ccords with ts neighbors.Projectstobe given high priority ould include theUnityDam on theYarmouk River nvolv-ing Jordan, yria nd Israel, pipelines forwater from he LitaniRiver n Lebanonand fromTurkeyor Egypt, nd a jointJordan-Israel esalinizationplant in Eilat/Aqaba." The report s in Ann M. Lesch,Transition to Palestinian Self-Govern-ment (Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 1992), p. 158. Note the paftern fconcessions requiredof theArabs in or-der for srael to accept negotiating ecur-

ity ccords with them, sraeli securitybeing paramount. Even before the adventof Netanyahu, security orpeace" ratherthan "land for peace" was essentiallywhat was being demanded.19. Howard Goller, Washington Post,12 August 1997.20. Samar Assad, Los Angeles Times,12 August 1997.21. BarrySchweid, Washington Post,10 September 1997.22. Henry Kissinger,Diplomacy (NewYork: Simon and Schuster,1994), pp. 467and 488.

23. See further lenn E. Robinson,"The Growing Authoritarianismf theArafatRegime," Survival 39, no. 2 (Sum-mer 1997), 54.24. Ibid., 45.25. Chester L. Karrass, The NegotiatingGame (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,1970), pp. 17-19.26. Otomar J. Bartos, "Simple Modelof Negotiation" n I. WilliamZartman, d.,The Negotiation Process (London: SagePublications, 1978), p. 22.27. Kayhan al-Arabi, 17 March 1998,p. 11.28. I. William Zartman, Negotiation sa JointDecision-Making Process," inZartman, d., The Negotiation Process,pp.76-77.29. According to Benjamin Netanyahu,Yitzhak Rabin,the assassinated Laborparty eader and former rime minister,"was vely clear thattherewere no limita-tionswhatsoeveron Israeli constructioninJerusalem.Rabin was the one who au-thorizedthe buildingof Har Homa (JabalGhoneim settlement)," nterview,News-week, 23 June 1997, p. 39.30. Commentingon the result, ndperhaps justifying etanyahu's positionand his own call forredesigningthe Osloagreements,Kissinger tatedthat nyanalogy to the early stages of thepeaceprocess was illusory.As he put it "intheearliernegotiation, tep-by-step rogressrelieved tensions and built confidence.On theWest Bank, the opposite was thecase. Both sides had jumped into the'peace process' withouthaving clarifiedworkable objectives and expected towrest thatclarity rom he process itself.Instead, ithas compounded theirperplex-ities.This was no accident. Clearly,Arafatwas led to believe by Israeli,Americanand European interlocutorshatthe final


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THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE POLITICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 19destinationwas at least the 67 bordersand recognitionof a Palestinian tate-hood. But that gnored the vast differencein the negotiationsbetween Israel and thePLO compared with those between Israeland theneighboringArab states." HentyKissinger, The Oslo Piecemeal Process,"WashingtonPost, 24 August 1997.31. As quoted by Noam Chomsky,"EasternExposure: Misrepresenting hePeace Process," Village Voice, 6 February1996, p. 6.32. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of thePolitical, trans. George Schwab (NewBrunswick:RutgersUniversity ress, 1976),p. 49.33. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,Tariq Misrila al-Quds [Egypt'sroad to Jerusalem],(Cairo: Al-Ahram enterforTranslationand Publication, 1997), p. 137. Author'stranslation.34. Raymond Cohen, NegotiatingAcross Cultures Washington,D.C.: UnitedStates nstitute f Peace Press, 1995), pp.55-56. On the Egyptian-U.S. elationship,Cohen writes p. 56) thatrarely can a pa-tron-client elationshiphave achievedsuch pronounced expression."35. Luc Reychler, The Artof ConflictPrevention:Theory and Practice," n Wer-nerBauwens and Luc Reychler, d., TheArt ofConfflictrevention (London:Brassey's, 1994), pp. 5-7. See also RogerFisherand WilliamUry,Getting o Yes(New York: Penguin Books, 1983), as arepresentative f the HarvardNegotia-tionsProject.

36. Interviewwith Husni Mubarak. Al-Hawadeth, 21-27 February 1997, p. 21.

37. Luttwak, trategy, . 194.38. Samuel P. Huntington, The Ero-sion of American National Interests," or-eign Affairs5,no. 75 (Sept.-Oct. 1997), p.1. 39. Burton,Global Conflict, p.137-38.40. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, ConflictResolution n an Islamic Context,"Peaceand Change 21, no. 1 (January 996), pp.33-34.41. Burton,Conflict.Resolution andPrevention, p. 88.42. Schmitt, he Concept of the Polit-ical, p. 79.43. Field, nside the Arab World, p.385. Emphasis added.44. Commentingon several polls inthe Arab world related to this matter, d-ward Said observed: "In evety instancepublic opinion has in fact expressed noenthusiasmfornormalizationwith srael.On mass level this suggests thatthe senseof defeat s not quite as widespread andprostrate s official olicy and the logicof capitulationistntellectualswould haveus believe." See his Peace and its Discon-tents New York:Vintage Books, 1995), p.134.45. Burton,Conflict.Resolution andPrevention, p. 89.46. Schmitt, he Concept of the Polit-ical, p. 79.47. OlivierRoy,TheFailure ofPolit-ical Islam, trans.Carol Volk (Cambridge:Harvard University ress, 1994), p. 78.

48. George Orwell,A CollectionofEs-says (New York: Harcourt,1981), p. 40.

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