Persons and Family Relations Cases V2

Relations Cases
B l o c k C F i r s t Y e a r s
S . Y . 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4
U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e C o r d i l l e r a s
C o l l e g e o f L a w
0

This compilation is a collaboration work of the first year law
students of the University of the Cordilleras.
Collaborators: Artates, Derick Jackson
Bautista, Eugenice Ivy Gwyn U. Bawagan, Ma. Danica Kaye
Bocyag, Cathy Budaden, June Mae R.
Caampued, John Matley M. Candelaria, Michelle Dulce M.
Castro April Jacob P. Ci-O, Purita A.
Cungihan, LV Katrina B. Dote, Jillian Jen
Esnara, Jonathan Estudillo, Alemar Roli E.
Gansoen, Gretchen B. Garcia, Janine R. Labiaga, Jalimgi
Lai, Lovely Angel Mendoza, Ma. Teresa A. Nepomuceno, Isaiah M. Puguon, Mark Reuel L.
Ramirez, Francisco Ignacio V. Reyes, Jona B.
Rodriguera, Eduard Angelo Q. Tiwaken, Romeo Jr. K
Treptor, Ronic Albert D. Ventura, Maria Teresita R.
Vitug, Jane Erika
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
CASE DIGEST 8
PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES 212 SCRA 299 9
CASE DIGEST 15
DE JESUS VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, 249 SCRA 152 16
CASE DIGEST 20
PVB EMPLOYEES U NION VS. VEGA, 360 SCRA 33 21
CASE DIGEST 24
DE R OY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 157 SCRA 575 25
CASE DIGEST 27
U NCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, I NC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 221 SCRA 285 28
CASE DIGEST 34
CASE DIGEST 39
CASE DIGEST 43
CASE DIGEST 48
CASE DIGEST 54
CASE DIGEST 58
CASE DIGEST 64
CASE DIGEST 72
CASE DIGEST 78
CASE DIGEST 88
CASE DIGEST 94
TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHONAN VS. BOHONAN, 106 PHIL 997 96
CASE DIGEST 99
CASE DIGEST 109
CASE DIGEST 114
BARONS MARKETING CORP. VS COURT OF APPEALS 286 SCRA 96 116
CASE DIGEST 122
GLOBE MACKAY VS COURT OF APPEALS 176 SCRA 778 124
CASE DIGEST 131
CASE DIGEST 135
CASE DIGEST 141
CASE DIGEST 146
CASE DIGEST 150
CASE DIGEST 155
CASE DIGEST 157
CASE DIGEST 161
CASE DIGEST 165
CASE DIGEST 175
CASE DIGEST 181
R UIZ VS UCOL 153 SCRA 16 184
CASE DIGEST 188
CASE DIGEST 197
CASE DIGEST 203
CASE DIGEST 210
CASE DIGEST 218
CASE DIGEST 224
CASE DIGEST 231
CASE DIGEST 236
CASE DIGEST 244
V. CIVIL PERSONALITY ........................................................................................................ 246
LIMJOCO VS I NTERSTATE ESTATE OF FRAGANTE 80 PHIL 776 247
ii
CASE DIGEST 257
CASE DIGEST 260
VI. MARRIAGE ........................................................................................................................ 268
CASE DIGEST 272
CASE DIGEST 275
CASE DIGEST 279
CASE DIGEST 293
CASE DIGEST 295
CASE DIGEST 304
CASE DIGEST 310
CASE DIGEST 313
CASE DIGEST 317
CASE DIGEST 322
CASE DIGEST 329
CASE DIGEST 344
R EPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS 236 SCRA 257 346
CASE DIGEST 350
CASE DIGEST 355
CASE DIGEST 362
CASE DIGEST 367
CASE DIGEST 383
CASE DIGEST 386
CASE DIGEST 392
CASE DIGEST 396
CASE DIGEST 402
CASE DIGEST 420
CHI MING TSOI VS COURT OF APPEALS 266 SCRA 324 421
CASE DIGEST 427
CASE DIGEST 448
CASE DIGEST 456
CASE DIGEST 464
CASE DIGEST 469
CASE DIGEST 473
CASE DIGEST 479
CASE DIGEST 485
CASE DIGEST 487
CASE DIGEST 491
CASE DIGEST 496
CASE DIGEST 502
CASE DIGEST 508
CASE DIGEST 513
CASE DIGEST 524
CASE DIGEST 528
CASE DIGEST 537
CASE DIGEST 545
CASE DIGEST 551
CASE DIGEST 560
CASE DIGEST 571
CASE DIGEST 575
CASE DIGEST 579
CASE DIGEST 584
CASE DIGEST 593
CASE DIGEST 607
CASE DIGEST 613
CASE DIGEST 633
CASE DIGEST 641
CASE DIGEST 646
CASE DIGEST 649
CASE DIGEST 652
CASE DIGEST 660
CASE DIGEST 669
CASE DIGEST 674
CASE DIGEST 679
CASE DIGEST 685
ESTATE OF R UIZ V COURT OF APPEALS 252 SCRA 541 686
VIII. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE .............................. 691
PELAYO VS IAURON 12 PHIL 453 692
CASE DIGEST 694
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO VS COURT OF APPEALS 272 SCRA 752 696
CASE DIGEST 699
CASE DIGEST 709
CASE DIGEST 718
JOCSON VS COURT OF APPEALS 170 SCRA 333 720
CASE DIGEST 725
CASE DIGERST 731
STASA, I NC. VS COURT OF APPEALS 182 SCRA 879 733
VILLANUEVA VS IAC 192 SCRA 21 738
CASE DIGEST 742
v
Table of Contents
CASE DIGEST 747
AYALA DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS COURT OF APPEALS 286 SCRA 272 748
CASE DIGEST 756
CASE DIGEST 764
ACRE VS YUTTIKKI 534 SCRA 224 766
CASE DIGEST 768
E NRICO VS HEIRS OF SPOUSES MEDINACELI 534 SCRA 418 769
CASE DIGEST: 774
CASE DIGEST: 779
CASE DIGEST: 785
CASE DIGEST: 795
CASE DIGEST: 803
CASE DIGEST: 817
HEIRS OF MARCELINO VS HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO 541 SCRA 479 819
CASE DIGEST 829
SANDEJAS VS IGNACIO JR . 541 SCRA 61 832
CASE DIGEST 843
CASE DIGEST 848
CASE DIGEST 853
XII. PATERNITY AND FILIATION ........................................................................................ 858
JAO VS. CA 859
MARQUINO VS I NTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 233 SCRA 130 911
CASE DIGEST: 915
R ODRIGUEZ VS COURT OF APPEALS 245 SCRA 150 916
CASE DIGEST: 921
CASE DIGEST: 950
PE LIM VS COURT OF APPEALS 270 SCRA 1 951
CASE DIGEST: 955
CASE DIGEST: 958
CASE DIGEST: 962
CASE DIGEST: 983
ESTATE OF R OGELIO G. O NG VS DIAZ 540 SCRA 480 984
CASE DIGEST: 993
XIII. ADOPTION ...................................................................................................................... 995
CASE DIGEST: 1004
CASE DIGEST: 1007
CASE DIGEST 1010
CASE DIGEST: 1016
CASE DIGEST: 1024
CASE DIGEST: 1028
CASE DIGEST: 1032
XIV. SUPPORT ....................................................................................................................... 1033
CASE DIGEST 1037
ESTATE OF R UIZ VS COURT OF APPEALS 252 SCRA 541 1038
CASE DIGEST 1043
GAMBOA HIRSCH VS COURT OF APPEALS 527 SCRA 380 1046
CASE DIGEST 1048
CASE DIGEST 1057
CASE DIGEST 1062
CASE DIGEST 1078
CASE DIGEST 1090
CASE DIGEST 1100
XVI. SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW ........................... 1113
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS COURT OF APPEALS AND MAXIMO WONG 1114
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ 1122
R EPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS 1134
CASE DIGEST 1138
XVII. LATEST JURISPRUDENCE ........................................................................................ 1144
CASE DIGEST 1153
CASE DIGEST 1164
CASE DIGEST 1176
THE PHILIPPINES, 1177
CASE DIGEST 1189
CASE DIGEST 1204
DANILO A. AURELIO VS. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO 1205
CASE DIGEST 1210
JUANITA TRINIDAD R AMOS,ET AL. VS. DANILOPANGILINAN ET AL. 1212
CASE DIGEST 1215
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO V. ARCHBENCEL A NN LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY HERMOTHER ARACELI LOPEZ 1217
CASE DIGEST 1222
MA. VIRGINIA V. R EMO VS. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1224
CASE DIGEST 1229
I NSURANCE OF THEPHILIPPINE ISLANDS CORP VS SPOUSES GREGORIO 1231
viii
A. Constitutional Provisions
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development .
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
2
B. Preliminary Title Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Full Case
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017- 1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226- 228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180- 1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606- 1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737- 1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567- 568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712- 786, 788-852, 854-857.
3
First Year C S.Y. 2013 - 2014
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question
said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3.Petition for Mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought
to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because,
4
if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided,…
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all-important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published…
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
5
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa — and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records — no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: "Bajo la denominaciongenerica de leyes, se comprendentambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con lasmismaspor el Gobierno en uso de supotestad.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ...." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain
their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
6
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1.& L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS:
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 Decided on: April 24, 1985 Ponente: ESCOLIN, J.
FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Tanada and others, seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the
Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER : Said laws needs publication requirement.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: They argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when decrees themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. (Effective immediately upon approval)
ISSUE: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?
RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
8
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres 212 SCRA 299 G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
Full Case
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.
In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.
For compliance.(Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong.
Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment
9
agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy.
I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)
An ad hoc, one-stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:
The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned:
1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies
2. Manpower Pooling
4. Processing and Deployment
5. Welfare Programs
II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or Principals
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.
xxx xxx xxx
X. Interim Arrangement
All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of
employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
10
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:
1. That the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule- making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. That the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. That the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power . — The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate
private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and
overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:
11
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" ( Ibid .).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of
Filipino workers either for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment
business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspended effective July 1, 1991."
12
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing . — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it . Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
13
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES G.R. No. 101279 Decided on: August 6, 1992 Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS: Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. Pursuant to the circular, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, providing guidelines on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. As a result, DOLE, through the POEA, took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. Petitioner Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI), filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. Hence, said order in invalid.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The circulars are valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
ISSUES: Whether or not the requirements of publication was complied with.
RULING: No. The orders and circulars issued are invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Once, more we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
15
De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit, 249 SCRA 152 G.R. No. 109023. August 12, 1998
Full Case
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DE PARUNGAO, VENUS M. POZON AND other similarly situated personnel of the LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION
(LWUA), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND LEONARDO L. JAMORALIN in his capacity as COA- LWUA Corporate Auditor respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
The pivotal issue raised in this petition is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the
payment of honoraria which they were receiving prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act 6758.
Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and
the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled An Act Prescribing A
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and
additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation.
Section 12, Rep. Act 6758, reads -
Sec. 12. - Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation.- Allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign services personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of
basic salary.
Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides:
Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation
granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, xxx shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.
16
Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM- CCC No. 10. More specifically, petitioners contend that DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette; petitioners stressed.
In its decision dated January 29, 1993, the COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10 and sanctioned the disallowance of petitioners‘ honoraria.
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this court via the present petition, posing the questions:
(1) Whether or not par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 can supplant or negate the express provisions of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement; and
(2) Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication
in the Official Gazette. Petitioners are of the view that par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 prohibiting fringe benefits and allowances effective November 1, 1989, is violative of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which authorizes payment of additional compensation not integrated into the standardized salary which incumbents were enjoying prior to
July 1, 1989.
To buttress petitioners‘ stance, the Solicitor General presented a Manifestation and Motion in
Lieu of Comment, opining that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to implement. The Solicitor General theorized, that:
xxx following the settled principle that implementing rules must necessarily adhere to
and not depart from the provisions of the statute it seeks to implement, it is crystal clear that Section 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a patent nullity. An implementing rule can only be declared valid if it is in harmony with the provisions of the legislative act and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. When an implementing rule is inconsistent or repugnant to the provisions of the statute it seeks to interpret, the mandate of the statute must prevail and must be followed.
Respondent COA, on the other hand, pointed out that to allow honoraria without statutory, presidential or DBM authority, as in this case, would run counter to Sec. 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which proscribes payment of additional or double compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. Therefore, the grant of honoraria or like allowances requires a
specific legal or statutory authority. And DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is
merely an interpretative regulation of a law already published; COA concluded.
In his Motion for Leave to intervene, the DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758.
Before resolving the other issue - whether or not Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 can
supplant or negate the pertinent provisions of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement, we have to tackle first the other question whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force and effect notwithstanding the absence of publication thereof in the Official Gazette. This should
17
take precedence because should we rule that publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is sine qua non to the effectiveness or enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10, resolution of the first issue posited by petitioner would not be necessary.
The applicable provision of law requiring publication in the Official Gazette is found in Article 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453, 454, this Court succinctly construed the aforecited provision of law in point, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to fill in the details‘ of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
The same ruling was reiterated in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 299 [1992].
On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following
the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government
officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul
18
together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.
In light of the foregoing disquisition on the ineffectiveness of DBM-CCC No. 10 due to its non- publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, as required by law, resolution of the other issue at bar is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on Audit is SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to pass on audit the honoraria of petitioners. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 109023 Decided on: August 12, 1998 Ponente: PURISIMA, J.,
FACTS: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. Republic Act No. 6758 entitled An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, took effect. Section
12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the
herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10 but were denied. Hence the instant petition.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER : DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the
provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is merely an interpretative regulation of a law already published.
ISSUE: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
RULING: No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC
No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM- CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
20
PVB Employees Union vs. Vega, 360 SCRA 33
G.R. No. 105364. June 28, 2001
Full Case
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO vs.
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LIQUIDATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents
KAPUNAN, J.:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?
This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with
Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court in SP-32311.
After lengthy proceedings, partial payments of the sums due to the employees were made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid.
On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the above case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of the Philippine Veterans Bank.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen.[6]
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that
respondents were set to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of another lawyer, while petitioners‘ claims have been frozen to their prejudice.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case.
21
On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards filed a Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch 39 of the RTC of Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that said court order PVB to pay their backwages and salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders No. NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in an Order dated June 5, 1992, approved therein movants‘ case and directed the bank liquidator or
PVB itself to pay the back wages and differentials in accordance with the computation
incorporated in the order. Said interveners likewise manifested that there was an error in the computation of the monetary benefits due them.
On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated July 6, 1992,
filed their Comment opposing the Motion for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion from the operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds that the movants have no legal interest in the subject matter of the pending action; that allowing intervention would only cause delay in the proceedings; and that the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis and would render moot the relief sought in the petition.
On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with the
issuance by respondent judge of several orders involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169. PVB further alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in excess of or without jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.
We find for the petitioners.
Republic Act No. 7169 entitled An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created
Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes,
which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years from the date of the reopening of the head office. The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same.
Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed
Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of R.A. No. 7169.
On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitation Committee.
Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge.
As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining order in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation of PVB.
22
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started regular banking operations.
Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped of the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.
Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. It is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency.
It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.
Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of interveners VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is
conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view that both contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause unless
otherwise provided.
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Vega G.R. No. 105364 Decided on: June 28, 2001 Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). Thereafter, the PVB employees union, herein petitioner, filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for
rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER : With the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio, and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
RULING: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days
following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs
Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
24
De Roy vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 575
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
Full Case
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners‘ motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners‘ motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
25
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161], stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court‘s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners‘ motion for extension of time was filed on September 9,
1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to
the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners‘ view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court‘s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the proprietor of a building or structur e is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of last clear
chance, which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
Case Digest
PUBLICATION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
De Roy vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 80718 Decided on: January 29, 1988 Ponente: CORTES, J.: FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in
HabulayasvsJapzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER : The rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: There is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.
RULING: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.
27
Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285
G.R. No. 100335. April 7, 1993
Full Case
UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. (now UNCIANO COLLEGES & GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC.); MIRANDO C. UNCIANO, SR., DOMINADOR SANTOS AND EDITHA
MORA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Honorable LOURDES K. TAYAO-JAGUROS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Manila; ELENA VILLEGAS thru VICTORIA VILLEGAS; and TED MAGALLANES thru JACINTA MAGALLANES, respondents.
NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision 1 of public respondent
Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and its resolution dated June 3, 1991.
The antecedent facts are, as follows:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction and
damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. (now Unciano Colleges and General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and LaureanaVitug, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-52745. Among other things, they alleged
therein that:
"6.01. Around the latter part of July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition proposing to the school authorities the organization of a student council in the school.
They solicited support of their petition from the studentry by asking the students to endorse the same with their signatures. They were able to get at least 180 signatures.
"6.02. On August 18, 1989, Elena Villegas and a certain student named Solomon Barroa were summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow and had never allowed such an organization.
"6.03. On September 12, 1989, when news leaked out that the above-named students would be barred from enrolment, they sought confirmation with respondent Dr. Moral, Dean of Discipline, who told them 'it's not true unless you violate the rules and regulations of the school and if you still insist with your student council.'
"6.04. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing, the above-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they would be barred from enrolment for the second semester because they supposedly harassed a female student, invited an outsider to the school to speak before the students, and also because the school has an arrangement with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports not to allow their students to put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable Dismissal, and warned them that if she herself
were to give it, it would be marked `expelled.'
28
"6.05. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that they were no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Studen

Date post:	07-Aug-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	lantisdomingo
View:	220 times
Download:	0 times

Persons and Family Relations Cases V2

Documents