De Roy and Ramos vs. CA [G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988]Post
undercase digests,Legal EthicsatMonday, March 26, 2012Posted
bySchizophrenic MindFacts:The firewall of a burned-out building
owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but
the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts,
the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty ofgrossnegligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by theCourt of Appealsin a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the
fifteen-day period tofilean appeal, petitioners filed a motion
forextension of timetofilea motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by theappellatecourt in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the
Resolution because the same was not filed within thegrace periodas
enscribed in the present jurisprudence .
Issue: Whether or not theCourt of Appealscommitted grave abuse
of discretion in denying the denied the motion and let the
petitioner be bound by the negligence of their counsel
Held:The Court finds that theCourt of Appealsdid not commit a
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion
forextension of timetofilea motion for reconsideration. In the
instant case, petitioners' motion forextension of timewas more than
a year after the expiration of thegrace period. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of thegrace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of thegrace periodto the
promulgation of the decision of theCourt of Appealson August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure tofilea motion for
reconsideration within the reglamentary period. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of SupremeCourt decisions(G. R. s) and in such publications
as the SupremeCourt ReportsAnnotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Tanada vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27)
TITLE: Tanada v TuveraCITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136
SCRA 27
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent
public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be
granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of that which he
holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court
to make the said petition for the reason that the right sought to
be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by
no less than the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUE:Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still
required considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise
provided.
HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not with the publication requirement which cannot
be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become
effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official
Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985.
This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens.
Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
Manzano vs SanchezManzano vs. SanchezAM No. MTJ-001329, March 8,
2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22,
1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that
both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge
ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims
that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew
that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven
years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left
their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their
spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE:Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two
contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract
marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article
34 of Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no
legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties
has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract
that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly,
respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law
when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Lupo Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes243 SCRA 32
Facts:Atienza, visiting his house in Makati wherein he has two
children with De Castro, saw the respondent Judge Brillantes
sleeping in his bed. The houseboy claimed that the judge had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza files charges on the judge on
the ground that the respondent is already married and has five
children. Judge denies the claim of being married stating that the
alleged union wasnt valid because it lacked a marriage license.
Although upon the request of the womans parents they held another
marriage ceremony later that year, they still didnt apply for a
marriage license. The woman abandoned the Judge nineteen years ago
leaving their children to his care. He claims that Article 40 of
the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was thus governed by the Civil Code
of the Philippines; while the second marriage on 1991, governed by
the Family Code.
Issue:WON the judge can contract a second marriage without a
judicial declaration of nullity.
Held/Ratio:No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered
into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
FC, said Article is given retroactive effect since it does not
prejudice or impair any vested right. His failure to secure a
marriage license on two possible occasions betrays his sinister
motives and bad faith as a lawyer and judge.Dismissed from
service.Guy v. Court of AppealsFacts:Karen Oanes Wei, a minor by
and through her mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for
lettersof administration before the RTC of Makati. Respondents
alleged that they are duly acknowledgedillegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati on October 29, 1992, leaving
an estate ofP10, 000,000.00 consisting of real and personal
properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouseShirley Guy and
children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed
Guy. Respondentsare a asking for an appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis estate.They
also want to appoint Michael C. Guy as Special Administrator of the
Estate. Petitioner is praying forthe dismissal of the petition for
the reason that his deceased father left no debts and that his
estate can besettled without securing letters of administration. He
argued that private respondents should haveestablished their status
as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima
Wei.Issue:1.Whether private respondents petition should be
dismissed for failure to comply with ruleson non-forum
shopping?2.Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming theirSuccessional
Rights?3.Whether private respondents are barred by prescription
from proving filiation?Holding:1.Yes, the petition lacks merit. The
law provides that certification of non-forum should beexecuted by
the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply means cause
for a dismissalof the case. Merits of the case and the absence of
an intention to violate rule with impunityshould be considered to
temper the strict application of the rules.2.Private respondents
cannot be bar from claiming successional rights. To be valid
andeffective, waiver must be couched clearly and in unequivocal
terms to leave no doubt withregards to the intention of a party in
giving up a right or benefit legally pertains to. Waivercannot be
attributed to a person if it not explicitly and clearly evinces
intent to abandon aright. This case has no waiver of hereditary
rights.3.Private respondents must not be barred from proving
filiation because the law provides thatfiliation of an illegitimate
child is established by a record of birth appearing in the
civilregister or a final judgment, or an admission by means of a
public document or a privatehandwritten instrument. Action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his/herlifetime.
However, action must be based upon open and continuous possession
of the statusof an illegitimate child.
AZNAR VS GARCIAMARCH 28, 2013~VBDIAZAZNAR vs. GARCIAG.R. No.
L-16749January 31, 1963FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The
estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will,
which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her
legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY
Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.Opposition to the approval
of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it
deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she
having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward in an earlier case.As to his citizenship, we find
that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided
in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as
a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears
never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled
in the Philippines.ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the
Philippine law or the California law?HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.The law that governs the
validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:ART. 16.
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.However, intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.The
application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term national law is used
therein.The next question is: What is the law in California
governing the disposition of personal property?The decision of CFI
Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under
the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property
by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the
provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is
as follows:If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of
its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.It is argued
on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen
of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that
given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such
law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen
was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article
946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following
the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the
law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.We note
that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal
law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to
such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in
other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of
the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner.Appellees argue that what
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws
for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions.It is argued on appellees (Aznar
and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law to the contrary
in the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is
the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.As
explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of
the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;
such action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict
of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine
law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..NOTES:
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The national law indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.VAN
DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTONG.R. No. L-68470October 8,
1985FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of
the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two
children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice
has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay,
stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property
of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property.Alice moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community
property as of June 11, 1982.The Court below (presiding judge:
Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that
the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now
the subject of this certiorari proceeding.ISSUE: What is the effect
of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines?HELD: Petition is granted, and
respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the ComplaintFor the
resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether
the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.The
Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the
Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations.As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney
he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to
represent him in the divorce proceedings:xxx xxx xxxYou are hereby
authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent
me, without further contesting, subject to the following:1. That my
spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.2. That
there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.3.
That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the
court.xxx xxx xxxThere can be no question as to the validity of
that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.Thus, pursuant to
his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERAMARCH 28,
2013~VBDIAZPILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et
alG.R. No. 80116June 30, 1989FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half
years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling
initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.More
than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil
had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal,
after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of
the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution
directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the
petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia
was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge
Ibay-Somera.A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was
denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash.As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for
adultery.ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the
filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done
after obtaining a divorce decree?HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned
order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued
in this case is hereby made permanent.NOUnder Article 344 of the
RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since
been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement.Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of
said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case.Stated differently, the
inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time
of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and
rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.Garcia-Recio vs. RecioTITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v
Rederick A. RecioCITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA
437
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived
as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family
court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the
marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it
was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan
City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact,
while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned
only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE:Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio
is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry
petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the
divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines
since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The
said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as
evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either:(1) an official publication or(2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:(a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and(b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that
will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.TENCHAVEZ V.
ESCANO (1965)Short summary:Former Filipina obtained divorce while
still a Filipina then obtained Nevadan citizenship, remarried. Now
being sued for legal separation and damages, which are both
granted
Facts:-Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tenchavez were both married w/o
parental knowledge-marriage registered w/ local civil
register-marriage lacked authority from Archbishop or parish priest
but no remarriage because father f Escano did not consent to
remarriage-Tenchavez returned to Manila. Escano lived with parents,
left for US in 1950 and sued for divorce because of "extreme mental
cruelty" which was granted by Nevadan court, ruled final and
absolute in 1950-1951: Escano's parents sought annulment of
marriage w/ Archbishop of Cebu-1954: Escano sought Papal
dispensation of her marriage-1954: Escano married an American in
Nevada-1955: Tenchavez filed complaint for legal separation and
damages vs. EscanoAnswer: Nevada Court decree of divorce was valid,
so is her 2nd marriage-1958: Escano obtained American
citizenship
LC: no legal separation, but Tenchavez do not need to support
Escano
WON Tenchavez and Escano were already divorced by virtue of the
Nevada Court decree? NO-at the time the divorce was issued, Escano
was still a Filipino citizen, then subject of RP Law which does not
admit absolute divorce (only legal separation)-Divorce is against
public policy so by virtue of Art17, NCC: the foreign decree of
absolute divorce cannot render ineffective prohibitive RP laws
WON Tenchavez entitled to Damages? YES-Refusal to perform wifely
duties, denial of consortium, desertion of husband constitutes
wrong + adultery
Summary:1. Foreign divorce between Filipino citizens not
recognized2. Remarriage of divorced wife and cohabitation with
person other than lawful husband is ground for legal separation3.
Desertion and securing of individual divorce decree entitles one to
damages4. An action for alienation of affections against parents
does not lie if NO Malice/ unworthy motives
~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
VAN DORN V. ROMILLOShort Summary: Filipino wife and foreigner
husband had properties in RP but got divorced, acknowledging that
they had no community property. Foreigner husband now sues wife for
accounting of their conjugal property in RP. SC held that since
they are already divorced, no community property. Unfair if
Filipina is still bound to someone who does not consider her his
wife. :p
Facts:ALICE (RP Citizen) and RICHARD (US Citizen):-married in
HK-resided in RP as husband and wife for 10 years-divorced in
US-afterwards, Alice married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada
RICHARD sued Alice for accounting of conjugal property and to
manage conjugal property (the Galleon Shop in Ermita)-MTD by Alice:
there was a previous judgment of divorce by the Nevada court ruling
that they had no community property--DENIED: (1) property invoked
is located in RP; (2) Divorce decree has no bearing in this
case
WON DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED AS VALID IN RP? It dependsBut here it
was recognized.-though it is true that DIVORCE is against public
policy in RP, but absolute divorce is just not applicable to
Filipino nationals but NOT on aliens who may obtain divorce abroad
validly under their national law. If such was the case, divorce
would be recognized in RP.-In NEVADA LAW: Divorce dissolves the
marriage. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. -Thus, pursuant to RICHARD's national law,
HE IS NO LONGER THE HUSBAND OF ALICE. He would have no standing to
sue in the case as Alice's husband entitled to exercise control
over the conjugal estate.-To maintain that under RP laws, American
Richard should still be considered married to Alice cannot be
considered just. Alice should not be discriminated against in her
won country if the ends of justice are to be served.
~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERAShort summary: After
obtaining a divorce decree in Germany, German ex-husband of
Filipina wife sued the latter for adultery. The court held that
since they were already divorced, there's no marital relationship
to protect and the ex-husband has no COA.
Facts:-IMELDA MANALAYSAY-PILAPIL (fil) and ERICH GEILING
(german) were married in Germany, stayed in RP-marital discord
>>> separation de facto-GEILING initiated divorce
proceedings in GERMANY. Pending decision of German courts, Imelda
filed action for legal separation, support and separation of
property.-GERMAN COURT granted DIVORCE.-Afterwards, GEILING sued
IMELDA for ADULTERYImelda had affairs w/ 2 other men during their
marriage>>>initially dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence>>>Reconsidered, refiled-IMELDA filed MOTION TO
QUASH: no jurisdiction, as the complainant is not the "OFFENDED
SPOUSE" there being a final decree of divorce
already>>denied. This case is the special civil action for
the annulment of the order denying the motion to quash.
WON COURT HAS JURIDICTION OF THE ADULTERY CASE, IT BEING THAT
FOREIGNER EX-HUSBAND ALREADY OBTAINED A FINAL DECREE IN HIS COUNTRY
GRANTING THEIR DIVORCE? NO-in adultery charge, status of the
complainant as the "OFFENDED SPOUSE" important-offended spouse:
still married to accused at the time of filing of complaint-since
here, already divorced, then not the offended spouse which the law
requires-ON ALLEGATION THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE AFFAIRS WHEN
THEY WERE STILL MARRIED SO HE COULD NOT HAVE FILED IT THEN: no
matter.>No longer a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of marriage is decreed.>No danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family (rationale for adultery law)-ON
ARGUMENT THAT RPC INTENDED TO PUNISH ADULTERY ALTHOUGH THE MARRIAGE
IS AFTERWARDS DECLARED VOID: can't file adultery charge after
divorce, which declares the marriage void ab initio. The case used
to support such argument contemplated a situation when the adultery
charge was filed before a judicial declaration for nullity ab
inition of the marriage was rendered (or in this case, if it was
filed before the judicial decree of divorce was final).
~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALSShort summary:A Filipina wife divorced
her Filipino husband then remarried twice. When her former husband
(who also remarried and had kids) died, she now claims a share from
his estate, claiming that the divorce decree she obtained is not
valid as she is a Filipino national. Court held that the 2nd wife
of the decedent was not the surviving spouse because they were
married even before the divorce decree was obtained by the 1st
wife. The court remanded the case just to determine WON the 1st
wife was already an US citizen when divorce decree granted.
Facts:-Fe Quita married Arturo Padlan (both Filipinos) were
married May 1941.-Arturo Padlan married Blandina Dandad April
1947.-Fe Quita obtained a divorce decree in California in July
1954. She remarried 2x-1972: Arturo died intestate, leaving his 2nd
family and Fe
WHO WAS THE SURVIVING SPOUSE? FE OR BLANDINA? Secret!-Blandina's
side implied that Fe was no longer a Filipino citizen when she
acquired a divorce decree. However, not threshed out during the
trial so remand the case (the TC merely said that since divorce is
not valid in RP, divorce decree was also not valid)-However, as the
marriage between Blandina and Arturo was contracted when the 1st
marriage between Arturo and Fe was still subsisting, it is
considered bigamous and thus void. Blandina is clearly not the
surviving spouse.-but as the children of Blandina were all
recognized by Arturo as his children, these children are assured of
shares in the intestate estate~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
1. VALIDITY OF FOREIGN DIVORCE BETWEEN FOREIGNERSHAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE AND LEGAL SEPARATION: when
foreign divorce is recognized by a contracting state:a.
Respondent/petitioner had habitual residence in that stateb. Both
spouses were nationals of that statec. Petitioner national +
habitual resident
In US: full faith and credit clause of consti:>if BOTH Souses
domiciled in 1 state, can recognize divorce decree by a sister
state>if only 1 spouse: additional conditions>if divorce
decree by a foreign country: Not covered but would recognize
divorce provided that the parties are domiciled in that State
IN RP: no law recognizing foreign divorce but under
international comity, it is recognized as long as not violate
strongly held policy of RP
A. ANNULMENT AND DECLARATION OF NULLITY-affect STATUS &
DOMESTIC RELATIONS of partiesDIVORCEANNULMENT/NULLITY
Ground Occurs after marriage celebrationDefects are present at
the time of celebration
Lex foriOn validity of marriage
CHOICE OF LAW APPROACH: grounds for annulment and
nullityTRADITIONALPOLICY-CENTERED
Lex loci celebrationisLaw of the state of marital domicile -
considered to have the most significant interest in the status of
the parties
WHO MAY CLAIM JURISDICTION*place of celebration of
marriage*place of marital domicile
