Persons and Family Relations Case Digest Atty. Bruce Rivera

Article 40

Morigo v. People

GR No. 145226 (2004) | Article 40

Facts:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates for four years then they lost contact with each other. After a few years, Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia from Singapore. He replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. Then after four years, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married at Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Then Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago. He filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with bigamy. The trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucio was null and void ab inito. The trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. (Domingo v. CA). Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

Held:

No. The Supreme court ruled that Morigo does not need to file a declaration for nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

Ratio:

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is voidab initio, in accordance with Articles 3and 4 of the Family Code.

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.

In the case at bar, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. They merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.

Wiegel vs Sempio-Diy

G.R. No. L-53703/ 143 SCRA 449 | Article 40

FACTS:

Karl Heinz Wiegel was married to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters former marriage. She contends that the first marriage is null and void having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. Lilia likewise alleged that Maxion was married to another woman before their marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Lilias marriage with Maxion is void

Whether or not Lilias marriage with Karl is void

HELD:

Lilias marriage with Maxion is NOT void, but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when Lilia married Karl she was still validly married to Maxion, consequently, her marriage to Karl is VOID.

RATIO:

The presence of force committed against both parties (Lilia and Maxion) only makes the marriage voidable, not void (Article 85, Civil Code). Thus, the marriage is valid until annulled. There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of Maxion at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Since there was no final judgment declaring Lilias first marriage void, then she was still validly marriage to Maxion. Thus, her marriage to Karl is void.

Terre vs Terre

211 SCRA 6 | Article 40

FACTS:

Dorothy Terre while married to Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin, was being courtedby Atty. Jordan Terre. After a while of persuasive courting, respondent successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage with her first cousin was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage without the need for any judicial decision for her previous marriage being void. They got married in 1977 where repondent wrote single under Dorothys status against her better judgement. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre disappeared but was still continuously supported by complainant after a few years respondent subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986 which Dorothy eventually found out. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

Respondents Contention:

Claims that he believed on good faith that his marriage to the complainant was void and that no judicial decision was needed since it was void ab initio

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void.

HELD:

Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The rule also applies on the side of Atty. Terre which will make his marriage to Dorothy be deemed valid since no judicial decision has been made on the contrary of such validity.

Valdez v RTC

260 SCRA 221 | Article 40

Facts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on Jan. 05, 1971 and had 5 children. Valdez sought for a declaration of nullity of marriage on June 22, 1992 pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code in the RTC of Quezon City. The trial court granted the petition on June 29, 1994 on the ground of their psychological incapacity to comply with their marital obligations. Stella and Joaquin were placed and the custody of their mother and Carlos, Antonio, and Angela will be free to choose which parent they want to stay with. They were directed to start the proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties based on Article 147 and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52, of the Family Code.

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification regarding the provisions of Article 50, 51, and 52 and asserted that the Family Code does not have any provisions about the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. The trial court ruled that the property regime of the parties shall be governed by the rules of ownership pursuant to Art. 147.

Issue:

Whether or not the property regime shall be governed by the rules of ownership.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court correctly applied the law and that the property relations between the two will be governed by the provisions of Article 147/

Ratio:

Co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union isprima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.

People vs Proceso Aragon

G.R. No. L-10016 (1957) | Article 40

Facts:

On September 28, 1925, Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While his marriage with Gorrea was subsisting, he contracted a subsequent marriage in Iloilo city with Maria Faicol under the name of Proceso Aragon. Upon the death of Maria Gorrea in Cebu city, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of Aragon and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. During her absence, Aragon contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu.

CFI of Cebu ruling:

Appelant was found guilty of bigamy. The CFI of Cebu held that, even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage.

ISSUE: Whether the accused committed bigamy when he married for the third time.

Held:

No. The marriage between Proceso Aragon and Jesusa Maglasang was valid. The Supreme Court held that a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. It is also to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage cannot prosper.

Mercado vs. Tan-Mercado

337SCRA122 | Article 40 Absolute Nullity of Previous Marriage

FACTS:

Dr. Vincent G. Mercado (Petitioner) and Ma Thelma Olivia got married on April 10, 1976 which was solemnized by Judge Canares in Cebu City and latter blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10 of the same year in a religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. Their marriage brought them two children. For the second time around Dr. Vincent got married, this time with Consuelo Tan-Mercado (Respondent-Appellee) on June 27, 1991 before the MTCC-Bacolod City celebrated by Judge Gorgonio and followed by a Church ceremony after two days officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas. Their marriage bought them a child. After a year, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed against Dr. Vincent because his second marriage is been celebrated even without the Declaration of Nullity of his first marriage. After the bigamy case was filed he did then file an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his first wife in RTC Br. 1, Cebu City and latter got his first married null and void.

PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

That he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all and concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dr. Vincent Mercado committed bigamy even he filed for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and got it void only after the petition against him was filed.

HELD:

The court held that the Petitioner was guilty of the act of bigamy. The fact that he declared in the contract of his second marriage that he is single without even acquiring a declaration of nullity of marriage for his past marriage made the crime consummated. Thus, the final judgment declaring his first marriage null and void came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy was already tried in court. It means that at the time of the second marriage he is still validly married to his first wife. The court renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three years, four months and fifteen days of prison correctional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight years and twenty-one days of prison mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

RATIO:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.

In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:

Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court."

The petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC because all of these elements of bigamy were present: [1.] That the offender has been legally married; [2]. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; [3.] That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; [4.] That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

VITUG, J DISSENTING OPINION: Vitug expressed disagreement with the majority opinion of the court. According to Vitug, the subject of the instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case; and that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof. In fine, the Family Code did not have the effect of overturning the rule in criminal law and related jurisprudence.

Republic vs. Nolasco

G.R. No. 94053 |Article 41 Declaration of Presumptive Death

FACTS:

Respondent, Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

Respondent further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

Hence, On 5 August 1988, the respondent filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.

RTC Ruling: The trial court granted the respondents petition.

CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

Respondents Contention: That all of the requisites for a petition for presumptive death are present in this case, hence, his petition should be granted.

Petitioners Contention (Republic): That the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet Monica Parker, is already dead.

HELD:

No. The respondent failed to prove that there is a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet Monica Parker, is dead, which would bear the issuance of the declaration of presumptive death of his wife. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The marriage of the respondent and Janet Monica Parker is still valid.

RATIO:

There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: "1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee."

The Supreme Court contends that the third requisite is not present. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration or presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. The Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy,he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Lucban v. Republic

GR No. L-8492 (1956) | Article 41-42

FACTS:

Lourdes Lukban was married to Francisco Chuidian in 1933. On the same year, Francisco left Lourdes because of a violent quarrel. She tried looking for him, but to no avail. Lourdes intends to marry again, which is the reason why she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law. She seeks for the declaration that she is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.

Respondents Contention (NLRC & de Guzman):

The declaration Lourdes is seeking for is not authorized by law. A petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband ispresumed to be deadcannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband

Petitioners contention (Lourdes Lukban):

She contends that a special proceeding is "an application or proceeding to establishthe statusor right of a party, or a particular fact"; but, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of death. Furthermore, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an absent spouse may be declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can declare her status a widow, which declares that his husband has died, for her to remarry

HELD:

The court cannot grant her such relief

RATIO:

A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be aprima faciepresumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass

a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumptionjuris tantumonly, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final

Armas v. Calisterio

GR No. 136467 | Article 41-42

FACTS:

On April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married on May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead. Petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition claiming to beinter alia,the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled. Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. On 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Antonias son and Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico. On 1996, the lower court decided in favor of petitioner Antonia that she be declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico. Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to CA and one of the allegations is that the trial court erred in holding that the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse. CA reversed and set aside the lower courts decision and declared that Marietta and Teodoricos marriage is still valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is necessary in this case

HELD:

NO. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessaryas long as the prescribed period of absence is met.

RATIO:

Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur;viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40,of the Family Code. In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

Republic vs. Callejo (Allegro:respondent)

G.R. No. 159614. (2005) | Article 41-42

FACTS:

Alan Alegro (respondent) adduced evidence that he and Lea were married. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents' house. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.

Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house of Lea's parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He also went to the house of Lea's friend, Janeth Bautista, but he was informed by Janette's brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left for Manila. When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but that she left without notice. Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea's whereabouts but to no avail.

He decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea's friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea's whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan and again looked for his wife but failed.

Alan reported Lea's disappearance to the local police station. The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice. Alan also reported Lea's disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since. Lea's father, who was his compadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where Lea was.

The trial court rendered judgment granting the petition and declared Rosalia Julaton presumptively dead.

Contention of the Republic: The OSG (Republic, petitioner) filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA's decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead. It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Lea's father told him that Lea had been to their house but left without notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wife's disappearance to the local police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent did not really want to find and locate Lea.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Alan Alegro ha a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

HELD:

No. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief.

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that "men readily believe what they wish to be true."

In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to the house of his parents-in-law, his father-in-law told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.

It is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea's whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS.

The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.

Valdez vs. Republic

GR No. 180863, (2009) | Article 41-42

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez and Sofio got married on January 1971. Angelita gave birth to a baby daughter named Nancy. There were constant fights between the married couple because the husband was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the husband left the house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, and then they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to go their separate ways and executed a document to that effect. It was the final time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, Angelita and Virgilio Reyes wedded in June 1985. Virgilios application for naturalization in US got denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD:

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid. Petition was DENIED.

RATIO:

It can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law[19] and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. Also, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of well-founded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Article 45-46

Anaya vs. Palaroan

36 SCRA 97 | Article 45-46

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Anaya, on the other hand, also prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages. Fernando counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit.

Petitioners contention: Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code".

Defendants contention: Fernando denied the allegation of the complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative. That prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative)

RTC Ruling: dismissed both the complaint of Fernando and Anaya. The court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage

Anaya alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations in her reply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage

HELD:

NO. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment. The SC affirmed the decision of the RTC to dismiss the complaints.

RATIO:

This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:

ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article:

(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply is an entirely new and additional "cause of action." There is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Any secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.

Buccat v. Buccat

72 Phil 19 | Article 45-46

Facts:

The complainant and defendant knew each other in March 1938 and were committed after several interviews. On the same year, they got married. They live together for about eighty-nine days then the defendant gave birth to a child of nine months. Following this event, the petitioner left the defendant and did not do with her marital life.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage may be annulled in the ground of concealment of pregnancy by a man other than his husband?

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that marriage may not be annulled in the ground of concealment of pregnancy by a man other than his husband.

RATIO:

Indeed, it is unlikely the plaintiff and appellants allegation that had not evensuspected the serious condition of the defendant,with this, as is proved in pregnant condition advanced. Asthere is no need toestimate the fraud that speaks the appellant. He argued for this in the sense that countries not uncommon to find people from developed abdomen, it seems puerileto merit our consideration, inasmuch as theplaintiff was a freshman law. Marriage is a most sacred institution: it isthe foundation on which society rests.To cancel, clearevidence is necessary and reliable. In this case no such evidence.

Aquino vs Delizo

G.R. No. L-15853/ 109 Phil 21 | Article 45-46

FACTS:

Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of his marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man (her brother-in-law, Aquinos own brother). And sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represented the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Fernando Aquino testified. The only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Conchita Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the concealment of the wife that at the time of their marriage she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment.

HELD:

Yes, the concealment of the wife that at the time of their marriage she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it could hardly be expected to know merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant because she was naturally plump and she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.

RATIO:

Article 45(3) provides that a marriage may be annulled if at the time of the marriage that the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.

Article 46(2) provides that one of the circumstances that constitutes fraud referred to in Art. 45(3) is the concealment by wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.

Jimenez vs Canizares

L-12790, (1960) | Article 45-46

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez filed a petition for annulment for his marriage with Remedios Canizares. According to the petitioner, the orifice of his wifes vagina was too small for his male organ to penetrate her for the consummation of their marriage. The problem continued and it eventually led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage. The court summoned the wife and gave a copy to her but the she did not file any answer. The wife was also ordered to submit herself to physical examination to a competent lady-doctor and to file a medical certificate within 10 days. She was given an extra 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part, would continue the case without her and render judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with the sole testimony of the husband, that his wife was impotent without medical proof.

HELD:

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did defend herself and as such, claim of the husband cannot be convincingly concluded. The court deemed that it is a well-known fact that women in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent authority. Such physical examination in this case should not be considered self-incriminating. She is not charged with contempt or any other offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed and as impotence not being assumed it does not fit any of the causes for annulment with accordance to Article 45. The case was remanded to trial court.

Article 48-49

Sin v Sin

G.R. No. 137590 | Article 48-49

Facts:

Florence and Philipp Sin, a Portugese citizen, were married on January 4, 1987 at Manila after a two-year engagement. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the RTC of Pasig City a complaint for declaration of nullity for marriage against Philip. On June 16, 1995 the RTC dismissed Florences petition. Florence filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals on December 19, 1995 and was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 30, 1998. Florence filed again a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals and was later denied.

Contention (Court): The state did not participate in any of the proceedings throughout the trial. Fiscal Jose Jabson only filed a manifestation stating that he found no collusion between the parties and but did not actively participate. Other than appearing at certain hearings nothing was heard from him and neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.

Issue:

Whether the declaration of nullity for marriage may be declared even without the participation of the State in the proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court reverses and sets aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court and remanded the case to the trial court for proper trial.

Ratio:

Even if the trial court was able to prevent the dissolution of marriage, it cannot be argued that there was a lack of participation on the part of the State. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not merepro-formacompliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. The Supreme Court states that:

*The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasonsfor hisagreement or opposition as the casemay be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of thedefensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. Hence, the evidence shows that the State did not participate in the case not only in the RT but also in the Court of Appeals.

De Ocampo vs Florenciano

G.R. No. L-13553 (1960) | Article 48-49

Facts:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938 in nueva ecija. They begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other men other than Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952, defendant had finished studying her course and left the plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff caught his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. Thereafter, he signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed a petition for legal separation on July 5, 1955.

CFI ruling:

The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed the action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina on the ground of adultery.

CA ruling:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CFI, holding that when she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation and admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame there was a confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery therefore the appellate court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.

Issue:

WON a decree of legal separation between the spouses may be issued

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the decree of legal separation between the spouses and ruled that Art. 101 does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that even if the statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. In this case, the offense of adultery had really taken place, according to the evidence. The Court mentioned that even if the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. Lastly, plaintiff's failure to actively search for defendant and take her home after the latter had left him in 1952 does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame since it was her who left him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men.

Ratio:

Collusion in divorce or legal separation

Agreement between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce

it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it

In this case, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.

Article 55-56

LAPUZ-SY vs. EUFEMIO

43 SCRA 177 | Legal Separation

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy (Petitioner-Appellant) on August 18, 1953 filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio (Respondent-Appellee). Carmen and Eufemio were civilly married on September 21, 1934 and canonically on September 30 of that same year. They lived their married life without children and throughout they acquired properties together. In 1943 Eufemio abandoned Carmen. Sometime in March 1949 when Carmen found out that her husband is cohabitating Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok, a Chinese woman. She (Carmen) then filed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which would order the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counter-clained for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen Lapuz-Sy, on the ground of is prior and subsisting marriage (with Ngo Hiok), celebrated according to Chinese law and customs. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.But before the trial could be completed wherein the Respondent Eufemio was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on June 9, 1969, Petitioner Carmen died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Carmens counsel duly notified the court of her death. On the scheduled date of surrebuttal, Respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.The father of Carmen, Macario Lapuz, substituted her in the trial as her counsels move.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of Carmen before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action.

HELD:

The death of Petitioner-Appellant (Carmen) abated the decree of legal separation at bar because it occurs unexpectedly while the trial case was still ongoing, making all its anticipated rights and claim to never take effect.

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona, even if property rights are involved.

The petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

RATIO:

The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

Gandionco vs. Penaranda

G.R. No. 79284 | Legal Separation

FACTS:

On 29 May 1986, private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of supportpendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, Hon. Senen C. Penaranda, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered the payment of supportpendente lite.

In this recourse, petitioner contends in his special civil action for certiorari that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, the application for supportpendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by the private respondent. The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Legal Separation on the grounds of concubinage of requires the petitioner of finding guilty ofconcubinage of the same?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court held that civil action for legal separation may proceed simultaneously with the criminal action for concubinage. The Court dismissed the petition of the petitioner.

RATIO:

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action isnotone "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.

Bugayong v. Ginez

GR No. L-10033 (1956) | Article 55-56

FACTS:

Benjamin Bugayong, a US Navy serviceman, was married to Leonila Ginez. When Benjamin reported back to duty, they agreed that Leonila is to stay with Benjamins sister. However, when Benjamin was back in service Leonila left the house of Benjamins sister and stayed with her parents in Pangasinan. Through correspondence, Benjamin learned from his sister-in-law and other anonymous people of the infidelity of the acts of Leonila. Benjamin went home to Pangasinan and got his wife, they lived at the house of Benjamins cousin as husband and wife (IYKWIM ) for 2 nights and a day. After that, they went to the house of Benjamin and stayed there for the night as husband and wife. Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. Benjamin filed for legal separation against Leonila. This was dismissed in the trial court on the ground of condonation by the husband (Benjamin) of the acts of his wife. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred erroneously in granting the dismissal on the ground of condonation.

Respondents Contention (Leonila Geniz):

The acts of infidelity had been condoned by the husband, therefore bars the action for legal separation and adultery.

Petitioners contention (Benjamin Bugayong):

There was no condonation on the part of the husband.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actions of Benjamin constitutes an act of condoning the actions of his wife

HELD:

Yes. The court held that the actions of Benjamin constitutes condonation of the acts of infidelity by his wife. The court agrees with the trial court that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code

RATIO:

Condonation

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation

conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offensewhich the latter has committed

American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation

Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation

Article 58

Pacete v. Cariaga

231 SCRA 321 | Article 58

FACTS:

Petitioners, Pacete and Clarita, filed for certiorari for the CFI of Cotabatos alleged grave abuse of its discretion indenyingpetitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer inits decision on Legal separation between Pacete and Alanis and the marriage if the former to Clarita as null and void. On October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion. On 18 December 1979, the defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be counted from. Defendants were still aware of the order so they then again filed another motion for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following day the court denied this last motion on the ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . . as first extension had expired."

ISSUE:

Whether or not CFI of Cotabato gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation.

HELD:

YES. A petition for certiorariis allowed when the default order isimproperlydeclared, or even when it isproperlydeclared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.In these exceptional instances, the special civil action of certiorarito declare the nullity of a judgment by default is available.In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally sanctioned.

RATIO:

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

Article 63

Macadangdang vs. CA

G.R. No. L-38287. (1981) | Article 63

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang contracted marriage in 1946 after having lived together for two years. From a humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation in Davao City, the spouses moved to Mawab, Davao del Norte where, through hard work and good fortune, their small business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate and others. They were blessed with six children. With their established businesses and accumulated wealth, their once simple life became complicated and their relationship started to suffer setbacks. While the economic or material aspect of their marriage was stabilized, the physical and spiritual aspects became shaky. Both accused each other of indulging in extramarital relations. Married life for them became so intolerable that they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned to Davao, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. Then and there, she decided to take the initial action.

Private respondent a complaint for legal separation in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim. Private respondent filed a petition for appointment of administrator, to administer the estate of the conjugal partnership pending the termination of the case. Petitioner opposed the aforesaid petition.

Trial court handed down its decision and, ordered the legal separation of plaintiff and the defendant, or what under the old law was separation from bed and board with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal community of property.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer that he be allowed to continue administering the conjugal properties in accordance with law. Petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration praying therein that the orders be reconsidered by not proceeding with the appointment of an administrator of the conjugal properties of the parties. Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid second motion for reconsideration

Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Said petition sought to review, set aside, and declare null and void the orders of respondent Judge; to prohibit respondent Judge from carrying out and executing the aforecited orders; and to prohibit him from treating, regarding and construing his decision as being "final and executory" as well as from enforcing the same in any manner whatsoever.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the questioned decision of the lower court had become final and, consequently, the appointment of an administrator was valid and that the petition was not sufficient in substance, since the applicable law and jurisprudence afford the petitioner no valid cause to impugn the three questioned orders. The appellate court accordingly dismissed the petition.

Counsel for petitioner, through a notice of death and motion to dismiss, informed the Court that petitioner Antonio Macadangdang died and as a consequence thereof, this case have become moot and academic.

Private respondent, when required to comment on the aforesaid motion, moved for a resolution of this case although she believes that petitioner's death has posed new intervening circumstances that would affect the entire purpose in filing the same. In effect, private respondent agrees with petitioner's counsel that her husband's death has rendered the instant petition moot and academic.

Petitioners Contention: Petitioner had averred that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that respondent Judge's incomplete decision had become final and executory and that the same Court committed an error in holding that the appointment of an administrator in the case below was proper.

Respondents Contetnion: Private respondent, upon the other hand, has always maintained among others that the decision had become final and executory when the petitioner failed to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period of 30 days from receipt thereof, despite the non-issuance of a supplemental decision regarding the division of the conjugal properties

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of the trial court finding petitioner guilty of concubinage and decreeing legal separation between him and his wife Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had already become final and executory long before the herein petition was filed.

HELD:

Yes. Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies; the same problems may come up again in another case of similar magnitude. Considering also the far-reaching significance and implications of a pronouncement on the very important issues involved, this Court feels bound to meet said issues frontally and come out with a decisive resolution of the same.

The Court do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains of the absolute community of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. Article 106 of the Civil Code thus reads:

"Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects.

"1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;

"2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 176;

The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

Generally speaking, the purpose as to the disposition of property is concerned is to fix and make certain the property rights and interests of the parties and it has been held also that the provisions of the decree should definitely and finally determine the property rights and interests of the parties; and that any attempted reservation of such questions for future determination is improper and error.

The clear mandate of Article 106 of the Civil Code, the decision of the trial court decreeing the legal separation between then spouses Antonio Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had long become final and executory and the division of the conjugal property in a "supplemental decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal separation.

The death of herein petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new problem which can be resolved simply by the application of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of the deceased petitioner.

Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective when the decree of legal separation became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details which properly pertain to the lower court.

The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession.

Article 68

Potenciano vs. CA

GR No. 139789, 139808, (2001) | Article 68

FACTS:

In March 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was lovingly inseparable (as in Like, super in love sila) from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the CA for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium which got dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is Erlindas motion to reconsider the decision made. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano and his kids, Lin and Sylvia appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. A conference was set on September 2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted. Erlindas motion to have Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in March 2001.

Erlindas contention: She did not compel Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano' s mental state was not an issue, but..like, the root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody daw!! Clearly, she cannot deny that she wanted Potenciano to live with her. One reason why Erlinda sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda' s property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.

ISSUE:

Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.

HELD:

Erlindas motion for reconsideration was DENIED. What the law provides is that husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.

Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda

G.R. No. 11263 | Article 68

FACTS:

Jose Campos Rueda, the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the Eloisa Goitia, the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; Just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induced him to maltreat her by word and deed. Since the plaintiff cannot stop defendant from inflicting physical injuries upon her and desist from his repugnant desires, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendants demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wife can claim support outside of the conjugal domicile.

HELD:

YES. Under the facts alleged in the complaint, the wife is legally still within the conjugal domicile. The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when he has no other remedy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the same.

RATIO:

Articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:

"ART. 143.The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article.

xxx xxx xxx

"1.The consorts.

"ART. (149) 49.The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same."

Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.

The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. When a marriage is once formed, a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by agreement, and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement but upon the law. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, support, and live with each other.

The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.

Ty v. CA

GR No. 127406 | Article 68

Facts:

Private respondent, Edgardo M. Reyes, married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony. Then they had a church wedding. However, after few years, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license, same with the church wedding for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. They also had a church wedding. Private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. .He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married.He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria.He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue.She submitted their Marriage License. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. The trial court sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null andvoid ab initio and ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals.The appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision.It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.

Issue:

Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

Held:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that damages should not be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

Ratio:

Although the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted duplicitously and craftily in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.

Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife.In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.To do so, would make the application of the law absurd.Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.

Ilusorio vs Bildner

G.R. No. 139789 | Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lwayer, is about 86 years of age who possessed extensive property valued millions of pesos. He is married to Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio. They have lived together for a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, they had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he is in Manila, and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he is in Baguio City, while Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.

On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo City for about five months. During that period, his health deteriorated. The children, Sylvia Ilusorio and Ma. Erlinda Bildner, alleged that this was because of an overdose of medicine that was given to him by Erlinda. On May 31, 1998, from Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City. Instead he lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati City. Consequently, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. After due hearing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, but Erlinda was given visitation rights. Both parties elevated the case to this Court. Erlinda sought the reversal of the dismissal of her petition, while Potenciano wanted to annul the visitation rights of Erlinda.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her

HELD:

No, Erlinda Ilusorio may not secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty. Also, with his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy and this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

RATIO:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. In the case at bar, there was no illegal confinement or detention.

Although Article 68 of the Family Code provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support, no court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

Article 69

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

248 SCRA 300 | Article 69

FACTS:

Imelda, around 8 years old, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied elementary school and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She pursued a degree in education in St. Pauls College in Tacloban. She also taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to Manila during 1952 for work and was employed wby her cousin, the now deceased, Daniel Romualdez, which was the speaker of the House of Representatives. In 1954, she wed President Ferdinand Marcos who was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte. When Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won the presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She also served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978. Then she lived in exile in Hawaii with her husband. Being in exile it was understood that Hawaii has been deemed their domicile.

When Imelda Romualdez-Marcos returned to the Philippines after her husbands death, after a while she decided to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte during the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the current Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition to disqualify Imeldawith the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and she claimed that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile even though it has been changed due to her marriage with the late president. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Imeldas domicile is still Tacloban despite the her marriage, her exile to Hawaii and her government positions in Metro Manila

HELD:

The Court decided that Imelda Marcos has proved that she has attained the necessary residential qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in Leyte being that her domicile was in fact still Tacloban, since she did decide to return to Leyte after her husbands death. Also, ones domicile is changed after marriage but is given a right to choose a new one after the death of her husband. Article 69 proves that she has given valid and compelling evidence that her choosing of Tacloban as her domicile is applicable as it does not go against the solidarity of the family. In terms of election requirements, residence and domicile shall be taken as one and the same.

Article 73

Ayala Investments v CA

G.R.No. 118305 | Article 73

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan from Ayala Investments & Development Corp. As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM executed security agreements which makes him answerable regarding the debt of PBM to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan thus AIDC filed a case against PBM and Alfredo Ching with the Court of First Instance in Pasig. The court ruled that PBM and Ching should pay the principal amount and interests. Pending appeal of the judgement, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal upon motion of AIDC. The writ of execution was issued and Abelardo Magsajo caused the issuance of a notice of sheriff sale regarding three of their conjugal properties.

Alfredo CHing and his wife filed a case for injunction against AIDC and the Court of First Instance alleging that they cannot enforce a judgment against their conjugal properties because the loan did not redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership. After the application, the court issued a temporary restraining order to Magsajo to proceed with the sale. AIDC questioned the decision of the lower court regarding the sale. The auction took place and AIDC, being the only bidder, was awarded the Certificate of Sale by Magsajo. AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction filed by Alfredo Ching and his wife. The motion was dismissed and during the trial, Ching presented several witnesses while AIDC did not present any evidence.

Contention (AIDC): The consummation of the sale makes the petition for injunction filed by Alfredo Ching moot and academic.

Contention (Ching): There was a third party who claims ownership of property attached upon in this case, two of the properties are in the name of Encarnacion Ching, the wife of Alfredo and a third party which constitute a different legal situation.

Issue:

Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.

Held:

The trial court promulgated in its decision declaring the sale null and void. The loan procured from respondent-appe