8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

1/10

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

2/10

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

3/10

242 Robert Dover

- December:negotiation s result in the Lisbon Treaty.2008 - March: deployment of 3,000 troop5 into Chad andCentral African Republic.

representatives from the governrnent holding theEU Presidency at the time, the ne.xt EU Presidency,the Secretariat of the Council, and the appropriaterepresentative from the Corrunission. The alin ofthis policy was to give a global voice and diplomaticleverage to the EU similar to that of an autonomousgovenunent. However, with member governmentsvigorously purswng independent foreign policiesand some actively seeking to dirninish the EU as a'foreign policy actor, these effons have been onlymoderately successful. International influence hasbeen achieved, however, through the appointmentof Special Representatives or Monitoring Missionsin regions where there are or have been particularlyacute crises. These have so far inel uded the GreatLakes (Africa), the Middle East, the Former Yugoslav

- August :Russia invades Georgia; French President Sarkozy(holding Presidencyofthe EU leads the fractured Europeanresponse.- October: EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMMGeorgia) begins.

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Ethiopia,Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, andGeorgia. These Special Representativeshave giventhe EU a direct role in solving the pro blems in theseareas and, in Bosnia, have proved a very high-profil eand critically acclaimed syrnbol of the EU's externalrelations policy (Toal2005).The overarching aims of this chapter are to pro vide a gwde to historica and institutional developments in EU foreign , security, and defence policyand to explain why these have occurred (see Box15.2). The chapter will also analyse some of themain contemporary debates in CFSP and EuropeanSecurity an d Defence Policy (ESDP), as well as thoseissues relevani to the medium- and long-term futureof the policies.

Some history: European PoliticalCooperationThe EU has a very well established reputation as a'civilian superpower', a reputation that is in partfounded on the size and strength of ts collective econornyand the number of citizens who are able to c:alIthemselves E u r o p e a n ~ The fust attempt at extendingthis economic responsibility to foreign affairs carnewith the establishment of the European PoJiticalCooperation (EPC) framework. This was a product ofthe Luxembourg Report of 1970,Iater to be incorporated into the European Communit y (EC) by the 1987Sing. e European Act (SEA). Even within the 1987regime, however, EPC was distinct from regularConununity procedures. Bringing EPC within the

TIeaty from 1987 indicated a willingness in the Uoionto draw external relatioDs away from the intergovernmental andAtlanticist stranglehold over the policy.EPC was principally a mean s of coordinatingmeetings between foreign ministers. Until1987 EPCdid n ot have its own inStitutiOllS and was mana gedby the troika, led by the country holding the EUPresidency. The problem with this set-up was thatthe Presidency (and troika) changed every sixmonths, and as such there was Iimited scope forcontinuity and long-term planning. This hinderedEU efforts to formulate common positions(Cameron 1999).

n

1If:1I1

l .;1

From CFSP to ESDP : the EU 's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 243......................... ................. . ...............The pre- and post -1987 EPC regimes wcre qw tesimilar in that the Commission and EuropeanParliament remained subservient to the memberstates. However, after 1987 the role of theCoIDlllssion became more extensive in economicnegotiations, such as those concern ing the GeneralAgreemellt on Tariffs and Trade GATT), as well asin areas where its competence over trade mattersimpinged on the external relations function ofEPe.EPC was often cri ticized for being weak and lacking in substance (Nuttall 1992; Allen 2002), but itdid generate joint positions during the 1980s that

gave some sense of a European view of the world.However, EPes light-touch approach and its loosefrarning made it ill eqwpped to project a commonEuropean vision at the end of the Cold War and ledto further accusatiODs that it was purely reactive.Arguably, the absence of a common Europeanresponse to the collapse of the Soviet Union was dueto a lack of common foreign policy identity, that is,a sense of the EU as a unified politica actor. It wasalso due to the governments' (and their intelligence

agencies') disarray over the collapse somethingthey had all failed to predict despite the mountingevidence. As an intergoverumental organization,the EEC and then the EU was as politically cohesiveas its members decided it should be, through theirday-to-day and Treaty-based negotiations. Thus it isoften prohlematic to identify an EU identity in thissphere, and somewhat simpler to highlight the preferences of individual member states.

KEY POINTS EPC was set up in the 19705. It was reformed withinthe Single European Act in 1987. Although EPC was able to secure opportunities for dia.logue amongst the Ees members , it was frequentlycriticized for being purely reactive. EPC was unable to forge a common response to theend of communism and the collapse of the SovietUnion in the late 19805 and early 19905, though it canbe argued that the expectations placed upon it weretoo greal.

The changi ng context o Europeanforeign pol icyDespite the absence of an agreed European view aboutthe end of the Cold War, the EU was well placed to playa leading role in the new economic world order.Organizations like NATO had, however, lost their raiSOD d'etre with the fall of commuoism. What NATOdid bring was the potential engagement of the UoitedStates in Europe, someLhing that the Ge nnan and UKgovernments saw as being particularlyimportant, andwhich the new Central and Eastem European members who had enjoyed the politica and economic support of the USA have also seen as vital.The colJapse of the Soviet Uoion removed some significant barriers to the EU 's eastern enlargemeDL It alsoallowed members of the European Free Trade Area

(EFTA) (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Norway) to submitapplications to join the EU , since the need, from aEuropean perspective, for a buffer rone' between Russiaand the Wesi was greatly reduced with cessation ofColdWar hostilities. The debate between respective EU gov-ernrnents about wbether fo enlarge the CommunityimmediateJy or whether to add fust to the Community'scompetences was resolved with thevery European compromise of extending competences (for example, devel-oping Economicand Monetary Uoion (EMU), reform ing tlle central administrative institutions ofth e EU, andcod.ifying a foreign and security palicy , whilst at thesame rime preparing for enlargement and thechaUengesof a post-Cold War Europe.

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

4/10

244- Robert Dover

A more e v e l o p ~ W foreign ,>olicy cooperation was made possible by the end of the ColdWar as the events of this time created a necessarypolicy space, whilst avoidng American and Britishaccusations that the Community was trying 10undennine NATO and US involvement in Europe.Moreover, the new policy arrived at an opportune

time for EU-VS relanans; the US and particularlyPresident Bill Clinton, who took oftice in 1993, sawan opportunity to reap a peace dividend by limiting US involvement in mainland Europe. Thiswould only be possible, however, if EU membergovernments were able to shoulder more of thesecurity burden in Europe.

ommon Foreign and Security PolicyThe sections that follow consider the evolution of anew Common Foreign and Security Policythroughits various treaty incarnations at Maastricht andAmsterdam.

The Maastricht TreatyThe European Council at Maastricht saw agreementon a Common Forcign and Security Policy (CFSP),which was to form the second piJIar (pillar 2) of thenew European Un on. Pillar 2 was to be intergovernmental, involving very little input from theEillopean Commission and European parliament.Moreover, the CFSP s decision-making frameworkrests on member state unanimity in the Council,giving each government the ability to veto anypolicy initiative or operation. As a consequence, EUforeign and security policy was to be a lowest common denominator process, with policy outputs thatwere extremely conservative.

CFSP sought to assist EU governments in formulating common foreign policy positions. However,as the CFSP was positioned outside the Communitydecision-making structures, this was problematic.This is because there are many economic issues within pillar 1 the supranational EuropeanCommunity pillar-that have an impact on theEU s external relations (see Chapter 14). Similarly,pillar 3 (Justice and HomeAffairs), which deals with

issues such as irnmigration, asylum, terrorism, andtrafficking, uses decision-making procedmes thatvary from those in CFSP and also has obvious external dimensions that make coordination difficult(see Chapter 19). The coordlnation of Europeanexternal policy across the three pillars was to beachieved by giving the Commission and theParliament some formal roles, wrnch were laterexpanded upon. The Treaty states that the Commission should be associated with aU aspects of theCFSP and that it has an equal right of initiative onexternal relations with member govemments. Inpillar 1, by contrast, the Commission has sole rightof initiative. The European Parliament has to bekept informed of policies and initiatives beingconducted under CFSP, whilst the European Courtof Justice has no role at all. These la tter two institutions have been kept out of CFSP policy making toensure that the member states pre-eminence in thepolicy is maintained .

The enactrnent of the Treaty on European Union(TIU) provided three identifiable sources of externalrelations policy in the EU, binding the states andsupranational institutions together. First are themember states, with their own foreign, defence, andsecurity policies pursued independently of CFSP.Second is the coordinating CFSP framework, whichplaces a responsibility on member states to informand consult each other [on J matters of foreign andsecurity policy with the aim of increasing the

From CFSP to ESDP: the EU s Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 245

BOX 15,3 . .

Key instruments of CFSPThe Maastricht Treaty provided CFSP with the followingkey instruments: Common Positions: these require member states toadopt national policies that comply with a stated EUposition on a particula r issue. For example, the EU has a

Common Pos ition on Myanmar (Burma). This aims tobring pressure on the Burmese government to changeits policies towards the opposition. The CommonPosition bans visas for senior members of the government, military, and security forces, freezes any assetsheld in the EU and suspends aII high-Ievel political visitsfrom the EU

international leverage they can exert workingtogether. The Council can establish a CommonPosition (see Box 15.3), as it has done in the case ofthe eradication of landmines, and then it falls tonational governments to ensme that their policies arein line with these common positions. Thus, the EUhas played a very strong role in supporting the international norm established by the 1997 Ottawa Treatyto ban the use of and eradlcate stocks of anti-personnellandmines. The Union pledged in excess of 400million euros between 1999 and 2005 ta variousprojects that seek to end the use of mines and eleanup mine-affected areas, whilst the EuropeanParliament and Com mission have also performed amonitoring role to ensure compliance with the termsofthe Ottawa Treaty (European Commission 2005a).Following on from Common Positions, the EU canadopt a Joint Action; which reguires a unanimousvote. Joint Actions allow the EU to go beyond merelyconsulting on issues (as had been the case under theEPC framework), obliging member states to conformto the positions they adopt Third, the Cornmission,with its extensive responsibilities over trade policyand its large number of overseas representalions,provides a third source of foreign policy stimuli inthe EU (see Chapter 14).

Joint Actions: these are operational actions agreed bythe member states that fali under the flag of the EU andtherefore CFSP For example, Joint Action 20021210/CFSP11 March 2002) established ttle European Union Poli ceMission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). which was theim EU civilian crisis-management operat ion under

CFSP/ESDP.lt aimed ta establish strong and sustainablepolicing arrangementsby 2005. The EUPM was made upofaround 500 seconded policemen and more than 300international civilian and local staff A similar JointAction of 4 February 2008 was set up to help bolsterKosovo's legal framework and to promote the rule of lawthrough active mentoring (Council Joint Action2 8n 24/CFSP).

The Maastricht Treaty also stated that the EUshould work towards crearing a common defencepolicy and eventually a commondefence. This wouldlater be used as the basis for developing a EuropeanSecurity and Defence policy (see below). In themeantime, the Treaty established a review proce durefor CFSP. This began with the setting up of a reflection group of civil servants in 1996, and culminatedin an Intergovernmental Conference and theAmsterdam European Council in June 1997.

The British and French governments dlsagreedat Amsterdam as to how the policy should develop.The British felt that the Yugoslav experienceconfirmed that the EU was incapable of formulating a common foreign policy (see Box 15.4), whilstthe French government argued that the Yugoslavexperience demonstrated why a common policywas reguired (Howarth 2000). Very few couldargue, however, with the proposition that CFSPhad achieved remarkabl y little in its first few years.There seemed to be hardly any cooperative andcol\aborative work of substance on foreign policyamongst national governments. Moreover, common positions were weak, often reOccting disagreeroents and a lowest common denominatorstyle of politics.

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

5/10

246 Robert Dover

{ C SE STUDV 15.4The EU and the BalkansThe Yugoslavian civil war was an enormous wakeup caIIfor rhe EU as well as profound embarrassment. AherJacques Poos 's rather optimistic s atement that 'now isthe hour of Europe ', and the negotiations to codify CFSp,the EU's response to Yugoslavia 1991-5 highlighted theweaknesses within the EU's foreign and security policies.In unilaterally recognizing Siovenian independence inJune 1991 the German government hastened the crisis;this in turn led to the recognition of independence ofCroatia and Macedonia (June 1991 and September 1991respectively) and political moves to establish a sovereignBosnia fOllowing the Dayton Accords in 1995. Theseattempts to fracture thefederation ofYugoslavia prompteda military response from the predominantiy Serb YugoslavNational Army(JNA) under the civilian control ofSlobodanMilosevic.The EU's response to the genocide, displacement of pOpI./lations,and imperialconquests has beenwidelycondemnedas inadequate (Bellamy 2(02). The institutional historicalmemory of the First and Second World Wars and countryallegiances to Croatia and Serbia partially guided EU governments in the early stages of the conflict. There wasstrong evidence that Croatian forces had been armed byGermany, whilst the French and British governments heldhistorical allegiances with Serbia. This created problemsearly on in formulating a European' response .The need forunanimity in EU foreign policy meant that statements andpolicies that blamed one side or the other in the conflictwere politically untenable . These allegiances were less

The Amsterdam TreatyFrOlD the perspective of the British government, theAmsterdam Treaty was negotiated during a changeof government, with the right-wing EuroscepticConservative Party replaced by the pro-EU socialdemocratic Labour Party. Labour won thei victoryin MlY 1997, a matterofweeks before theAmsterda mTreaty was to be concluded. Whereas the Conser

v t i ~ govemment of John Major had been underrnined by infighting over the 'European question',the 'New' Labour government of Tony Blair hadbeen elected on a pro-European platform that

prominent aher events such as the siege of Sarajevo in1994 where a prevailing international norm ofrevulsion atthe military act ion led to a more universal approach.The United States played a very low-key role in the earlystages of the civil war (1992-4),which further exposed theEU's inability to formulate a credible policy towards theconflict.Without being able to deploy a credible threat ofmilitary force, international agreemenrs brokered withMilosevic were breached with impunity by the Serbs.lt was _only when the USA began to take an active role in brokering peace that the implied threat of the use of militaryforce saw these agreements honoured.Furthermore, the EU seemed obsessed with trying todeploy the levers of economic foreign policy to bring theconflict to a close. Economic sanctions and infrastructuralaid were policies that EU governments could agree on oHowever,both the sanctions regime and the distribution ofaid and infrastructural support were strongly critic ized bypractitioners and academics alike as ineffective; and yeteconomic foreign policy was a policy area where the EUwas more confident andexperienced (Keane 2004) ., Sincethe fali of Milosevic, the EU has sought to pacify Serbiawith the promise of EU entry ifit tempers ils nationalisticrhetoric and posturing, and has effectively offered Croatiamembership in exchange for its assistance with the warcrimes tribunals. The EU has also promoted stability in theBalkans through acting as a guarantor for Bosnian andKosovan sovereignty. In these reconstfuction and peacebuilding activities the EU has looked effective, in stark contrast to its attempts as a war-fighting power.

promised to Change the way in which the Europeandebate was conducted in Britain (Forster 2002b).However, the Change of governme nt in the UK cametoo late for th e Amsterdam Treaty's CFSP revision.Efforts to give the EU a defence identity were veryslight indeed. Of the changes that were introduced,'constructive abstention' was notable: This provision enabled less than a third of member states toopt out of a Joint Action ".jthout vetoing it for theothers. This w s later replaced by the so-caUedEnhanced Cooperation provisions.

r:,I

'1I1iI

From CFSP ta ESDP: the EU's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 247Two further significant measures were agreed by

the Amsterdam European Council. The fust was thecreation of the High Representative for CFSP. Theholder of his position was also to act as the SecretaryGeneral of the EU Council. The second w s thecreation of the Policy Planning and Early WarningUnit, which resides in the Council Secretariat and hasbecome known as the 'Policy Unit'. The unit wasexpanded in 2001, when the ESDP w s established bythe Treatyof Nice (see below), to incorporate officialsfrom the newly created Military Staff (EUMS).Theseinitiatives served to bring external relations dos er toBrussels and away from the member states, mthrepresentatives of the Union performi ng more visiblefunctions than in the past Even so, the member states

have stiU managed 10 guarantee the continuation ofcarefully protected intergovemmentalist workingmethods and, as a consequence, thei pre-erninenceover this policy field.

FinaUy, the Amsterdam Treaty also introduced,in Artiele 13,2, the notion of a 'common strateg.y:This is decided unanimously by the EuropeanCouncil on the basis of a recommendation by theCouncil One suCh strategy has been agreed(towards Russia). It is implemenled by adoptingJoint Actions and Common Positions that can beachieved through a qualified majority vote unless amember state argues that the measure runs contrary to its core national interest, in which case itcan exercise a veto (Article 23,2).

u ropean Secu rity and efence Pol icys already noted, the Maastricht Treaty did more

than just set up the CFSP. It also looked forward to apoint in the future when the EU would cooperate onmatters of defence. However, it was not unti 1998that a window of opportunity opened that wouldaUow steady convergence on defence to begin.

The Saint Malo ProcessA process that began at the port of Saint Malo inFrance (December1998) opened the way for a newphase in European foreign policy cooperation, onethat involved defence issues and would contributeto a gradual militarization of the European Union.'The Saint Maia Process' was led by the UK andFrench governrnents. For the newly elected Labolirgovernment in the UK the initiative aimed ta bringdefence cooperation into the heart of the Europeanprogra=e and as such became a symbol theUK govemment's pro-European leanings. t wasalso an initiative to prevent the FrenCh, Italian, andSpanish governments from forcing military andsecurity policy onto the agenda in a way that disadvantaged British interests (Dover 2007).

But Sainl Malo also has to be seen in a more general political context The main 'European' issue ofthe day was the development of the single currency,which the UK government felt it could not support

s a consequence, Blair put out a caU to his cabinetmini sters ta find policy areas in which the UK couldfurther advance integration (Dover 2007). TheMinistry oIDefence (MoD) w s theonly Departmentto reply to this calI, mth a proposal for deepeningEuropean defence integration mthout undermining NATO's role. The MoD proposal resulted in thePortsChach Declaration of October 1998, in whichBlair stated his desire to see doser European cooperation on defence, and the Saint Malo Declarationof December 1998, which pledged Anglo-FrenChcooperation on defence i ~ s u s mthin a EU framework.

For the French government the Saint Malo process was something of a surprising opportunity. Asthe least transatlantic of anyoftheEU governments,and the keenest to see NATO scrapped at the end ofthe Cold War, the French government was surp risedto be approached by British officials seeking toadvance an EU-based security solution (Howarth

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

6/10

248 Robert Dover

KEV D N ~ i P T S ANO TERMS 15,5 ,The Petersberg TasksThe Petersberg D o o l \ r d t i o n announeed the readiness ofmember governm8,nt to make available a wide range ofconventional militaryforces for European-Ied military tasks .The tasks defined by the Declaration include: .

Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party orParties so attacked by taking forthwith, individuallyand in concert with the other Parties, such action as itdeems necessary, includ ing the use of armed force , torestore and maintain the security ofthe North Atlanticarea ).

Acontribution tO the collective defence in accordancewith Article 5 ofthe Washington NATD) Trealy.(NoteArticle 5 says 'that an armed attack against one ormore of them in Europe or North America shall beconsidered an attack against them aII . Consequentlythey agree that, 'if such an armed attack occurs, eachof them, in exercise ofthe right of individual or coltective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the

Humanitarian and rescue tasks; Peace-keeping tasks; Tasks ot combat forces in crisis management, including

peacemaking.The Petersberg taSks have been incorporated in'Arti ele 17of the Treaty on European Union .

2000). Getting the French government on boardwith plans for Europeanizing security was seen ascrucial by the British, as the agreem ent at Saint Malohad to bring together both ends of the securityspectrum the proactive (French) and highly reactive (British), Officials from both sides concludedthat any agreemeDt on security and defence policywould result, in the medium or long term, in a splitbetween the British position, which saw NATO asthe security institution of choice in the EU, and theFrench view that the EU should become a morecapable independent security actor.

The Saint Malo meeting a nd the tex:ts it producedwere the high-water mark of Anglo-French cooperation. The agreemems struc k in December 1998also demonstrated other facets of European policymaking, The influence of the 'Big Three', the UK,France, and Germany, over large initiatives was certainly in evidence in this case. The German government was seen as America's closest European ally inthe late 1990s and also had a post-war allegiance toNATO as it was on the front line of a potential clashbetween NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries,Convinced that ESDP did not aim to undermine thetransatlantic alliance, the Germa n govemment washappyto lendits support to the initiative,Agreementamong these governments ensured that the policywould be successful.

After Sai nt MaloThrough several Emopean Council meetings inCologne (1999), Helsinki (1999), aDd Sintra (2000),the ESDP proposals were amended and adapted, Ofparticular note was the inclusion of what wouldbecome 'the Petersberg tasks' (see Box 15,5) and a'Headline Goal' for the EU to be able to deploy60,000 troops, in 60 days, sustainable for up to a year(Rutten 2002), Proposals such as these were transformed into a capabilities catalogue', a pool of personne , expertise, and military equipment pledgedby member govemments that could be used inEU-sponsored military actions. ln connecting capabilities explicitlyto the Saint Malo process, its Britishand French govemment sponsors aimed to makeESDP more than just an EU paper policy; indeedthis was a prerequisite for t heir involvemenLThe ESDP is composed of three elements:military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and conflict preven ion, In June 1999, theCologne European Council placed crisis management and the capabilities required to deliver it at theheart of renewed efforts to strengthen the CFSP.Subsequent European Councils refocused efforts onthe military assets avaiJable to the EU to conductautonomous operations including policing andpeace enforcement (see Box 15,6).

ESDP: the military and civilian dimensionsThe military side of ESDP was introduced al Helsinki 1999)and developed at the Nice (200,) European Council.Helsinki res,ulted in the so-called headline goal , whilstNice provided the institutional structures that support thepolicy, namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC),which is assisted by a politico-milltary working group, a.committee for civilian asperu of crisis management, aswell as the Military Committee (EUMC) and the MilitaryStaff(EUMS)

. The Feira 1999) and Gothenburg (2001) Councils developed the civilian element of ESOp, which aimed tO fiII thesoft secuflty gaps left by'the international community.'The Nice Council provided four institutional arrangements: to fiii these gaps, including a civil-military relations corn.: mittee, to ensure that interventions run smoothly. The. civilian dimension 'comprises :, . 'Police Cooperation: creating acapability to deploy 5,000.'. , : police officers, includ ing 1,000 within 30 days, fortasks

British aud French government negotiatorsanticipated that the policy would be fully functiouing by 2003, However, the m embe r states have beenunable to meet the relatively modest targels withinthe'capabilities catalogue',This has been in part dueto internal pressures to spend money on more electorally attractive areas such as health and education ,whilst foreign and security budgets have been consumed by defence equipment inflation, the conflictsin Afghanistan and 1rag, and a shitting priority infavour ofhome land securityas a consequence of theterrorist threat to mainland Europe.

The emphasis on Petersberg-style military tasksreinforces the EU's self-constructed soft securityidentity, and acts as a barrier to military operationslike the US/UK invasion of lraq (2003) or engagement in high-end military posturing, such as thedeployment of a US anti-ballistic missile system inPoland (2008). The inclusion of he Petersberg tasksin ESDP supports the view that ESDP is a produc ofthe EU s iJlability to deal with peacekeeping andpeace-enforcement operations like those presentedby the Yugoslavian civil war and a realization that

rang ing from training local poliee officers io asslstingmilitary forces in restoring order. Rule of Law: an ambition to provide up to 200 judges,prosecutors ,and other legal experts..lo areas in crisis . Civilian Administration: providing officials to assist inthe basic tasks of government administration like establishing eduCation, infrastructure,and elections . . Civil Protection: the abiiity to assist in h ~ m a ~ i t a r i a nassistance at short notice-the EU to be capable, withirithree ro seven hours, cif providing two to three assessment teams as well as intervention teams consisting ofup to 2,000 people. The European Defence Agency EDA) , established in2004 to identify gaps in the EU s military capability andthen 10 suggest programmes and assist in conductingeffort5 to fiii these gaps .

Ir

the threats to the EU come from non-st ate militar)'1actors in the medium to long term (Smith 2001).Civil wars and the consequences of failing states, {

similar to those of the 1990s in the Balkans, demaIld thesorts of responses the Petersberg tasks aim to deliver:humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks;peacemalcing; and crisis management. To give the EU a 1chance of tackling these scenarios effectively it was Jlec- \essary to ensure that the EU had access to NATO assets.The negotiations to secure this access were one of themost important tasks at the periphery of the Nice 1European CounciJ meeti.ng, The so-called 'Berlin-plus'artangements were a key marker of whether the ESDPmight function as an independent policy area, avoidiugduplication with the instirutions and assets of NATO \and the UN, In this matter the NAJD member Turkey(of course, not yet a member of the EU) proved to be aconsiderable stumbling block to securing EU rights tothese assets, with the Turkish govemment keen to tieaccess to NATO equipment to their efforts 10 join theEU. Turkish opposition was removed through inlensive diplomacy by NATO and the British and Americangovernrnents in December 2000.

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

7/10

250 Robert Dover

The ice TreatyThe negotiations for ESDP were largely conductedoutside the formal EU negotiating frameworksso as to avoid the input of Commission officialsand MEPs, and were bi-laterally agreed betweengovernments before the final signatures at theNice European Counci . The Cologne, Helsinki,and Simra Councils had provided the opportuoities between Saint Malo in December 1998 andthe Nice Treaty negotiations in December 2000to cond ude much of the detaiJ of ESDP beforeit was codified at Nice. As such, the finalnegotiations at Nice were conduded quickly.

The Nice Treaty empowered the Commissionto ensure that the EUs actioos are consistent anddesigued to meet the objectives laid out bynational governments. The Nice Treaty alsosecured further iostitutional reform. The Treatyentrenched a move towards supranationalism inthe form of Artide 24, which allowed the Councilto use qualified majority voting (QMV) for decisions relating to internal matters-that is, institutional design or the adoption of Joint Actions.QMV was also to be used where the Councilappointed a Special Representative. Moreover,the Treaty replaced the Political Committee withthe Political and Security Committee (PSC). TheHigh Representative could chair the PSC instead

K V PO NTS 1he end of the Cold War opened the way or new rounds

r enlargement

of a representative from the Presidency, onceaga in suggesting further drift away from themember states to Brussels. Still further evidenceof this drift can be found in the role of theso-called CFSP 'ambassadors' who had previouslytravelled from capital to capital, but who afterNice were to be based in Brussels insemi-permanent session. Despite these changes,the Brusselsization of foreign and security policyis taking place at an incredibly slow pace, with themajority of foreign and security activity in theUnion controlled, as ever, by national governments. The stillborn Constitutional Treaty (2005)sought to bring ESDP and CFSP closer to Brusselswithin a policy named 'Comrnoo Security andDefence Policy and mamtained the Maastrichtwording of CFSP. The Treaty demanded that allmember governments improve theiI militarycapabilities to meet the demands of the capabilities catalogue and the Union's internationalcomrnitments (Artide 1-41). The EUs comrnitment to the formation of a common Europeandefeoce was reaffirmed, although the right ofindividual governments to veto this and retainindepeodent defence policies remained.Uofortunately for those who drafted these provisions, the Constitutional Treaty feU as a completedocument, with its rejection by Dutch and Frenchvoters in the summer of 2005.

NATO s role in European security was initially in doubttut the organizat ion managed to recast ilS role duringrne 1990s.

The Amsterdam Treaty revisions SQught to rectify someof the institutional problems. but failed to address thequestion of a European defence poliey

.. The British and r ~ n c h governments agreement inSaint Malo in December 199B ereated an overwhelmingmomentum towards a common European Seeurity andDefence Policy.The negotiations resulted in the production of a capabilities catalogue whieh placed an expectation on member states to provide eapabilities As of late200B they had yet to provide aii of these eapabilities ,

1he Maastricht Treaty established a Common Foreign2Tld Security Policy.whieh was largely intergovernmentalio character,The outeome of the fi rst te5tS of the CFSPwas farfrom impressive ,

From CFSP to ESDP: the EU s Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies 251

The isbon Treaty and the institutionalframeworkThe subsequeotattempts to revivethe ConstitutionalTreaty s securityand defence provisions were n c p ~sulated in the Lisbon Treaty (2007). The LisbonTreaty aimed to move the EU further mto securityissues, particularly those relating to countering terrorism. The Treaty malces a provision for a corumondefeoce response if any EU member is subject ta aterrorist attack or natural disaster. t also incorporates changes to the institutional framework (seeBoxs 15.7 and 15,8).

Significantly,a High Representative of the Union sCommon Foreign and Security Policy (Mr/Ms CFSP )is created by the Treaty (Article 18), and this individual willserve as a Vice-President ofthe Unioo, reflecting the seriousness with whlch external relations arenow talcen. Similarly, the Cornmission and the HighRepreseotative can submit joint proposals on externalaction-thus bringing together the economic andmilitary sectors (Article 22-2). The Brusselsization ofCFSP is further deepened by the creation of theEuropean External Action Service (Artide 27), whlchacts as the diplomatic corps of the EU, and whlch ismade up of seconded staff from the member states,the Cornmissioo, and the General Secretariat of theCouncil. This is an important move whlch centralizesforeign policy activity within Brussels, something thatis supported bytheEnhancedCooperation Provisions.The latler allow a group of nine states to agree todeepen their cooperation on foreign and defence policywithin a European framework, but without havingto get ilie agreement of the remaining member states.TIle European Parliament continues as the juniorpartner when it comes to foreign and security policy,with MEPs views only being solicited twice a year.

Artides 77 and 78 of the Treaty link up internaland external security via policies 00 border checksand asylum and immigration. Tb.is has happenedbi- or multilaterally across member states who havebeen affected by terrorism and mass migration, butit is now subject to some leve\ of European

cooperation. This cooperation a1so applies to thepolicy on organized crime and counter-terrorismspheres, where member governments are expectedto liaise closely on policing issues, operationaUy, andin the realm of inforrnation shaiing (Artide 87).The Treaty makes it dear that the member governments should malce milita ry assets available forcorumon EU activities, but also that member statesshould actively support the work of the EuropeanDefence Agency (EDA), whose purpose it is to identify operational requirements and then stimulatemeasures and programmes to fi l the gaps. Theestablishment of the EDA looks \ike a centralizinginitiative, but in fact it streogthens the hand of hosegovernments that have strong defence industries. Ineffect the EDA provides a shorter route into anexpanding European defence market for defencerelated businesses and, because of the peculiaritiesof the trade, a boost to the influence of those governments who sponsor successful manufacturers.The EDA constitutes, therefore, a very Milwardianrescue of he nation state, and whilst in theory seemsto address the shortfalls in the capabilities catalogue,is actually premised on a different logic, that of theso-called 'Lisbon Agenda t h e idea of a Europeaneconomy supported by innovative technologies thattrickle down into mainstream manufacturing.

TIle most important inst:itutions withi n CFSP andESDP are the foreign and defence ministries of themember states. Within these institutions policy initiatives are formulated and agreements struckon whetherto accept Corumon Posirtoos and Joint Actions.Neitller the Comruissioo nor the High Representativehas demonstrated an ability to act in the same way as adomestic ministry. For exarople, there have beendoubts about the quality of internal security in theCornmission, with leaked inforrnation potentiallyendangering the safety of officials in the field, something that is particularly sensitive in counter-terrorismoperations (Dass u and Missoroli 2002).

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

8/10

252 Robert Dover

'The institlJtioris (1)The European This body is composed ofthe Headsof Governmem and ( >,s Commission President, who meetat least once every si 'omhs ta set priorities and discussthe large issues domifialing the policy agenda, includingCFSP. The European (cuncil lays down the guidelines forC FSP and adopts Common Strategies .The EU Counci/ (Counci/ of Ministers): The EU Foreign

;Ministers and the Foreign Policy Commissioner meet at, least monthly under the banner of the General Affairs

Council. This body makes decisions an external relationsnssues, includ ng CFSP. Their decisions can lead to JointActions and Common Positions, whose implementat on is

. nainly the responsibility of the country holding the EU s

.Presidency and that of the High Representative, following~ h e ratification ofthe lisbon Treaty.The Presidency: The country holding the six-monthly CouncilPresidency l ~ y s an important o l e within CFSp, as it sets theagenda for the political decision-making process_1t providesthe background administrat on for aii meetings and isresponsible for trying to resolve disagreement5 and difficul-1ies on aII pOlicy issues .This is particularly important in reiation to CFSP as decisions are made unan mously, althoughthe provision for Enhanced Cooperation does change thisdynamic slightlyThe Presidency is assisted in its work by theCouncil Secretariat and, since the Amsterdam Treaty, by theSeeretary-General/High Representative for CFSP.Commission: The strengthening ofthe Couneil with re gardta CFSP has Implications for the role of the Commlssion,The Commission is an important part of the Union, notonly because it has such a large role in concluding agreements and managing aid and trade initiatives,but also as ithas diplomatic offices (representations) in virtually everycountry in the world. This is something the Commissionjealously guards. It is in many respects the public face ofthe EU abroad, A Declaration added ta the AmsterdamTreaty outlined how the Commissi on proposed to reorganize its Directorates-General to bring external relationsunder the rem it ofa Vice-President, rather than under thecontrol of four Commissioners. However, the formerCommission President, Romano Prodi (1999-2004) didnor observe the Declaration and appointed four externalrelations commissioners with functional rather than geographic responsibilities (see H igh Representative).The High Represemative ofthe Union for ForeignAffalfs andSecurlty Policy: Acts as aVice-President ofthe Commission,

and presides over the Foreign Affairs Couneil._ The HighRepresentative ensures the consistency of the EU s external act on;, along with the Council and the Commission.The High Representative nas the rightlO submit Joint proposals wi{h the Commission in other areas of externalaction, The High Representative is assisted bythe EuropeanExternal AEtion SerVice .The European External Action Service: Works with the d plomatle services of member states ahd coniprises offieialsfrom relevant departments of the General Secretariat ofthe Council and Commission as well as seconded officialsfrom national governments.The European Par/iament The Parliament has no formalCFSP role but is kept informed and consulted an CFSPissues and on the general direction of the policy. MEPshave been very keen to engage in foreign policy issues-they were particularly active through debates and declarations during the Yugoslavian eivil war and A f g ~ a n a n d Iraqicampaigns,continually pushing their case for an enhancedparliamentary rale in external relations.The Po/iey P/anning and Ear/y Warning Unit: The EarlyWarning Unitwasestablished within the Couneil Secretariatimdtlas a responsibility for monit oring and assessing international developments, as well as analysing emerging

. threats and erises. The Early Warning Unit's analytical raleis important insofar as it provides the member states withthe informat on they require to formulate a common foreign policy.COREPER: The Committee of Permanent Representatives(COR EPER) is eomposed of member states' ambassadors tothe EU and the Commission Deputy Seeretary-General'whomeet at least once a week ta prepare Couneil meetings anddecisions, including those related to the General AffairsCouneil and CFSP. Anecdotal evidence from senior offleialsshows that CORE PER plays a erucial role in organizing thework of CFSPand smoothing over policY disagree,ments.The Political and Security Committee (PSC, or COPS): T h PSC il. central ta CFSP and ESDP. It .organizes the EU';response tO'any crlsis . lt s c o m ~ s e d of national representatives. The PSC p r e p ~ r e s recommena ations on how CFSP(and ESDP) should :develop, and 'also deals with the routineelements of these polic ies. ln the'event of a erisis, t he PSCis the body that analyses the options open ta membersand manages the EU s approaeh ta the crisis, but withoulpreventing countervaillng decisions being made by otherEU institutions.

. . . . ~ r ~ . f 1 1 ~ ~ ~ r . t o ESDP the EU ' s o r e i ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ r l ~ _ ~ n d Defence POlicies 253

European Correspondents: A group of 'comispondents: in'aII EU member states and within theTommissioncoordinate the day-(Q-day business ofthe CFSPand prepare the

. PSCmeetings. The correspondents are also responsible for.ensuring that CFSP business is inctuded on the agendas of

. the General Affairs Council and European Couneils.Relex Counsel/ors: This group analyses the instrtutional,

... Iegal, and flnancial aspects of proposals made under the

OX 15 8

JheJnstiMions (II)-Within the Council four new committees have been estab: Iished since 2001 to help the smooth implementation of:CFSP.,The European Union MiJitary .Committee (EUMC): This

\.committee is formed by Chiefs of Defence Staff, although. n practice they are deputized by Gther military representa

.. tives:The EUMC provides the PSC with military advice and:recommendations on military issues. T h ~ committee has adirectoiial role overthe EU s military iictiviiies, intluding

:: the EU Milit ary Staff. The Chairman ofthe EUMC is present:at Council meetings where defence-related decisions aretaken

. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS): The EUMS::sits . .within the Council structure and gives military

related advice and support to ESDP-related operations,

CFSP umbrella. The Counsellors prepare COREPER s workon'Joint Actior.s and ti}< to ensure consistency aeross thethreeEU pillars.CFSP workirigGroups T h e ; ~ g r o ~ p s 'staffedby expertsfrom EU member'States and the Commission, 'and meetalong geographical (that s, regional) and functional'lines toexamine 'policy 'documents 'and . options :for . theconsiderat on of.the ya rious CFSP instituti onal bodies.

The EUMS provides analysis.about emerging threats andconducts some strategic planning_ Pa.rt of its role is toidentify, as an' extensionof the capa'bilities catalogue,the forces of meniber states that can assis " n EU-Iedmilitary activities and the implementaiion of'EUMCpolicies.The P o i i t i ~ O M i l i t d r y Group This g r o ~ p of i v i i s ~ r v a n tresearchers and external experts (including ac act emics)functions to explore the poli tico-militar y aspects of aiiCFSP praposals.The Committee for ivi/ian Aspects of Cr;sis Mamigemenr:This committee gives .advice'on .the political.aspects and .consequences of non-military erisis management and conflict prevention. Much of its workto date has focused onthe role and capabilities of EU policing nd strengtheningthe rule of aw in crisis areas. .

The global war on terrorThe global war on terror (GWOT), as former USPresident George W_ Bush described his quest toeradicate people, groups, and governmems who mhis administration designated as presenting athreat to li berty and the 'Western way of ife', haspresented the EU with a new set of security andjustice issues, Because of th e number of active

plots across Europe b) Jihadist terrorists, theGWOT is likeJy to remain one o f the largestforeign and security chaUenges for the EU in themedium to long term . t raises issues th al cutacross foreign and securi ty policy as well asimpinging on the justice and home affairs sphere(see Chapter 19 .

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

9/10

254 Robert DoverGWOT has generated new domestic and externaagendas. The domestic agenda has centred on

immigration , policing, and intelligence, whilst theexternal agenda has focused on the expeditionarywarfare efforts of the USA a.nd its allies inAfghanistan and lraq. Since 2003, attention hasturned to the extraterritorialityof efforts to identiJY,contain, and roU back jihadisl groups, includingstate-sponsored kidnapping (extraordinary rendition) and the outsourcing of torture to states in theMiddle fast and the Magbreb (special measures)which has publicly appalied European governments, even though they had previously given privat e support to these programmes . The inaugur ation of President Obama in January 2009 has seen anotable change in the rhetoric away from theexuaordinary measures of the Bush era. The polic)'outputs generated as a result of GWOT bave causedlengthy and divisive political debates in tbe EU andamo.ngst the Union's member governments.Questions of how to cooperate effectively on intelligence and c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s ~ operations, alongwith more philosophical debates about humanrig hts, sovereignty, and military interventions havehad serious implications for internal political harm ony within the EU, with mistrust and rankli.ngaver security policy spilling over into ostensiblyunconnected issues like agricultural refonn and theEU budget.The invasion of Iraq in 2003, the subsequentremoval of Saddam Hussein from power, andthe conduct of the counter-insurgency campaigncat;Sed a significant strain in relations among theEU member states and a1so between the EU and theUSA. Whilst the 2001 war in Afgha.nistan had international approval, the 2003 lraq campaign wasdeeply divisive and legally problematic, and seemedto o based on the personal emnity fel by the USAdministration towards Saddam Hussein.The divisions within Europe over the Iraq war were moststarkly seen in the strong opposition to it from theFrench and German governments, the former forgood intelligence-Ied reasons and the latter for clearele:toral reasons (Peterson 2004). The anti-warstance of Belgiurn, France, and German)' brought

them into public disagreement with the USA, and inparticular with the then Secretary of State forDefence, Donald Rumsfeld, who described them asold ' Europe (with overtones of defeatism), whilstimplyi.ng that the UK and the EU candid ate states ineastern and central Europe were clearly newEurope.

The effects of this diplomatic schism were seenalmost immediately. The French and British governments, who had worked very closely together onEU security and defence matters between 1998 and2000, immediately saw a dramatic deterioration indiplomatic relations. President Chirac is even saidto have ordered bis diplomatic staff not to assist UKdiplomats in the further development of ESDP.More recent tensions between the USA and the UKon tbe one hand and, broadly speaking, the rest ofEurope on the other relate to the issue of burdensharing in Iraq and, especially, Afghanista n. TheBritish and American governments feeI a particularsense of grievance towards Germany, whose armedforces are tucked away in a relatively qUlet part ofAfghanistan and who are operating under their ownonerous risk-averse rules of engagement; the issueof lraq is recedi.ng as ali the Western powers seek towithdraw.In terms of its homeland security, the EU went tofu st principles and wrote a European SecurityStrategy in 2003 that was widely seen as a reply tothe National Security Strategy of the United States,written the year before. The Strategy identifies keythreats to the EU as terrorism, the proliferation ofweapons of mass destrucrion, regional conilict,failed states, and orgauized crime, ali of which fitinto the general thrust of ESDP and its formulatiollbetween 1998 and 2000. To complement the focuson terrorism alld organized crime, the Commissiontabled a proposal that there should be a compulsorysharing of inteUigence between na tional intelligenceagencies, but this was strongly rejected by ali EUgovernments.This wholesale rejection carne for thevery simple reason that ali European member statesjealously guard their secret intelligence, and intelligen ce liaison between agencies is conducted on abilateral basis.

From CFSP to ESDP : the EU's Foreign , 5ecurity, and Defence Policies 255n 2005, the Commission made a proposa thatmobile phone and internet data should be stored tohelp with cOlUlter-terrorism efforts. The British andFrench governments have introduced their ownmeasures a10ng these lines with the Interception

Modernization Prograrnme (2008), which wouldalIow the Brit.5h government to store ali UK internet activity for future intelligence use; and theFrench EDVIGE aud CRISTINA programmes(2007-8), which allow the French police and domestic intelligence agency (DST) to store details on theopinions, social cirele, and even sexual preferencesof anyone over 13 who may be con sidered, or mightbecome, a person of note within society; tbisincludes teachers, nurses, and accountants withinthe French government's very wide definition . nsum, the case of intelligence cooperation is inform-

K YPOlNTS

The GWOT has focused EU securit) efforts on 'homea nd security'and, in terms ofthe political debate, on theefficacy of military interventions in the Middle East, andon human rights issues.

This refocusing of securit) has seen a large pan-European investment in techno logy-Ied measures, such aselectronic intelligence (emails, phone calls, global posi-

onclusionFrom the European CommW1ity's inception morethan 50 years ago, defence, foreign , and securitypolicy has been a controversial and contested policyarea. Policies made by the EU, as a large economictradi.ng bloc and 'civili an superpower', have wideranging impacts on its global partners, but this economic influence was n ot transferred across to theforeign, security, and defence sphere. Institutionallyand procedurally the main areas of disagreementbetween the EU institutions and the member stateshave been the desire of the supranational institu-

ative. This is an area that will remain solely the preserve of member states, SO whilst the EU puts forward policies on common arrest procedures, recentprecedents indicate that they will be super seded bynational governments putting in place their ownarrangements.

The terrorist threat to Europe and the policyresponses to it have seen some deepening of Europeanintegration. These have been pragmatic responses tovarious plots. Closer police cooperation has broughta greater nurnber of ordi.nary security competencesW1der European scrutiny and this has produced agreater day-to-day lUlderstandi.ng between the policeand justice officials of the different member states.Thus European integration in this area has deepenedoutside the treaty-making conferences and often outsi de EU f rameworks a1together.

tioning technology) and broader surveillance and control measures .

These issues have had a mixed effect on the internalharmony and politica cohesion of the member states,and the transatlantic alliance , which have occasionallysp illed over into 'unrelated policy sphe res.

tions to ceotralize foreign and security policy andreduce the number of areas where dec isions have tobe made by unanimity Whilst member governments have been resolute in their desire to maintainunanimity and therefore a veto over a J issues thatreia te to their security and defence. These cootrolshave been slightly relaxed with the introduction ofthe Enhanced Cooperation mechanisrn.

Since 1991 there has been a constant demand forcoUective EU action in foreign and security policyfrom governments and groups within member

8/13/2019 PESC&PESA__Cini&Boragan

10/10

56 Robe it Dover

states and r o ~ :he Parliament and Commission._ \ common criricism of the EU is that it has notioeen able to generate sufficient capabilities to meet1hese demands and has therefore been an ineffec-1ive foreign polic) actor. The key successes ofEuropean p o l i c ~ have been the formulation of]oint Actions and Common Positions, which havehelped create international agreement on issuesJike landmines polic) . Thes e policies have beensuccessful because of the cohesion of member gov.ernments on the selected issues and because thefinancmg is already in place. Neither Joint Actionsnor Conunon Positions have produced radical ora.mbitious policies. They have been subject to the1ell-tale EU trait of lowest common denominatorpolicy making.

Since J998 the EU s foreign and security policya.genda has been dominated by the ESDP, whilefighting agamst an emerging reahty: without thecapabilities gap being addressed, European policywill remain piecemeal and ineffectIVe. However, thefoundation of the European Defence Agency andthe European Extern al Action Service demonstratesa commitment to bridging military and diplomaticcapabilities and fostering cooperation and commonpositions across the Umon.

Relaxing the grip of member governments overthese policies may take several decades more, andmay never happen at all. For the militarily capablestates the power and infJuence their capabilit),affords them is lDvaluable, whilst for les s capablestates the financial investment required to impro;,e

their capabilities is just too much for them to contem plate. So the soft power functions seem here tostaywhilst a common, actionablevision ofEuropeandefence remains to be reconciled with a paucity ofoverall European ambition.

In sum, EU foreign, security, and defence policieshave been a mixed bag of successes and -failures.The notable successes have come institutionallywith the provisions of the failed ConstitutionalTreaty being enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. TheHigh Representarive, the European External AcrionService and the European Defence Agency are alipositive institutional developments aimed at stabilizing and developing the EU s foreign anddefence policies. The development of bilateralre\ationships and coordinati on across police forcesand intelligence agencies has been positive in asmuch as an informal Europeanization is developing in these areas, whilst these developments alsoherald a determinatioD on the part of nationalgovernments to retain control of these competences. Positively, the Europe-wide schism overlraq seems to have dissipated, but new rensionshave emerged over member states military commltments in Iraq and particularly Afghanistan,and in how to deal with resurgent Russia (in termsof both its military and energy profiles). Greaterlevels of cooperation between member states willcome with greater exposure to colJective foreignpolicy responses and through a shared foreign

.policy vision, which itself can only come throughgreater levels of dialogue.

To what extent do CFSP/ESDP cover soft-securlty functions and NATO hard-security Issues72. Has a Europeamzed forelgn and securlty pohcy strengthened the posltlon of the member states m

international afr.ms?

4

Has the Lisbon Treaty removed the mam hlndrances to a fully functional cornmon forelgn and secumyDohcy7What dO CSFP and ESDP tell us about the EU as a polltlcal entlty7

6.7

8.

From CFSP to ESDP the EU > Forel gn, SecurI,y, and Defence PoIICle5 257Is the EU destmed to remaln a soft securlty actor?To what extent do the Big Three (France, Germany, and tne Unlted Klngdom) dommate CFSP I ESOp?Would it be deslrable for the European Commlsslon and European Parl,ament to have greater powersover CFSP/ESDP?Ooes a resurgent Russla mean that the EU should revl5e IlS secunty stance away from homelandsecunty7

E Howarth, J. Security and Defence Pohcy In the European Unlon (Baslngstoke: Palgrave, 2007 , A corn.prehensive survey of the hlstory and polltlcs ofthe ESDp, and the transformat Ion of the EU as an Interne.tlonal actor.Kagan, RParadlse and Power: America nd Europe in the New World Order (New York: AtlantiC Books2004 Thls book has generated a great deal of academiC commentary about the nature of the eXlstlngtransatlantiC alilance and the prospects for the future aiilance. Key to understandmg how US EU milita )effom coexlst.

111 Kagan, R. The Return of HI51:ory nd rhe End of Dreoms (New York: AtlantiC Books, 2008 Suggesrs tnereal clash of clvillzatlons S between democracles and non-democracles

II Jones, S. TIle R se of European Securiry Cooperatlon (Cambrioge. Cambridge Unlverslt) Pres52007 . Provldes a compelling yet counter-mtultlve account ofthe EU sstrateglc relevance In tne l.ntern2-tlonal system

l van der Pijl, K. Global Rlvalnes: from the Ca ld War ta lraq (London Pluto Press, 2006 Th,s comprehenslve work Includes a radical Cfltlque of the formation of the European Umon and wnat dnves Its externa lrelations pollcy

Il Smlth, M E. Europes Forelgn ond Seeumy Poliey: the InmwtlOnallsatlOn of Coooeration (CambrlogeCambridge UniverSlt) Press, 2008 . A heoretlcally Informed exploratlon of the polltlcs offorelgn polic\cooperatlon.

el http://europa eu.lnt/comm/external_relatlonsl EU external relatlons webslte .e http://www.nato.int The Nortn Atlantic Treaty Organlzatlon s webslteII http://www.cer.org.uk / The Centre for European Reform based In London publish5 useful bneflngpapers, often on CFSP/ESOP-related IssuesCI> http://wwwepc.eu The European Pohcy Centre has adistinct stream of OUtput whlch focuses on defenctand secuflly I s s u e ~ http://www.ceps.be One of the larger Brussels-based thmx tanks, whlch has a research semon an EUnelghbourhood, forelgn and securrry poliCleI

Vislt the Online Resource Centre that accompanles th,s Dook for l o t ~ of Interestlng add,tlon21mate r ai http://www.oxfordtextbooks.ca. uklorc/Cin _ Borragan3 el