Pluralism in Historiography a Case Study

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Pluralism in Historiography: A Case Study of Case Studies1

Katherina Kinzel

[Preprint version. An edited version appears in Sauer, Tillman and Raphael

Scholl (eds.). forthcoming. The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies.

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and istory of Science. !ordrecht"

Springer.#

The story of the Scienti$c Revolution in the %&th and %'thcenturies has een

told many times. t has een reconstructed in a discontinuous narrative y

Ale*andre +oyr -ho descried it as a fundamental intellectual

transformation triumphing in the mathematiation of nature (+oyr %/0&).

t has een told as an origin story y erert Butter$eld for -hom it mar1s

the advent of modernity (Butter$eld %/2/). 3ther authors have presented

the story emphasiing continuities et-een modern scienti$c vie-s and

medieval and Renaissance 1no-ledge practices. 4or instance, Alistair

5romie argued that e*perimental science had een practiced $rst y

medieval natural philosophers (5romie %/06). And 4rances 7ates stressed

continuities et-een the ermetic85aalist traditions of natural magic and

scienti$c empiricism (7ates %/92). :ore recently, the prevalence of

microhistory has led to a destailiation of ig picture narratives, calling

into ;uestion the very notion of the Scienti$c Revolution (Secord %//6).


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deologically contested issues li1e these are ound to provo1e

disagreement. The e*istence of plural narratives of the Scienti$c

Revolution may simply re=ect the changing ideological evaluations of

science and its place in society.

o-ever, -e encounter pluralism in the historiography of science

not only -hen it comes to large scale historical transformations of great

political and ideological signi$cance. @ocal historical cases that, at least at

$rst sight, appear to e ideologically innocuous have met -ith the same

fate" they have een reconstructed several times, from a variety of

diEerent vie-points, and they have come to support diEerent philosophical

conclusions. There e*ist rival case studies of events as local as a speci$c

measurement procedure, an e*perimental derivation, or an episode of

theory8choice. 4or e*ample, :ili1anFs oil drop e*periments -hich

measured the charge of the electron have een reconstructed from

competing sociological and rationalist perspectives (Barnes, Bloor, and

enry %//9, %'G20? olton %/&'? 4ran1lin %/'9, %2G%9H). There e*ist

diverging accounts of the historical fate of :endelFs e*perimentally

derived la-s of inheritance (for an overvie- see Sapp %//). And the

victory of @avoisierFs o*ygen8ased over PriestleyFs phlogiston8ased

theory has een interpreted in light of diEerent philosophical accounts of

scienti$c change and theory choice Gpluralist, structural8realist, rationalist

and sociological (5hang H%H? @adyman H%%? :usgrave %/&9? +usch

forthcoming). n some cases, the various reconstructions of the same

historical events are compatile and complement each other. But in the

e*amples mentioned aove, the diEerent case studies are in open con=ict.

They involve incompatile factual claims, give competing causal

e*planations, carry opposed epistemic evaluations, tell diEerent narratives

and reach rival philosophical conclusions.

This paper deals -ith the situations of con=ict et-een diEerent

case studies of the same historical episodes. t addresses t-o ;uestions"

4irst, -hich features of historical reconstruction and representation give

rise to such con=ictsI Second, ho- can -e assess rival historical case

studies and restrict historiographical pluralismI Although elieve that my

ans-ers to these ;uestions apply to historiography in general, focus my

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discussion on case studies in the history of science and in history and

philosophy of science (PS).

n order to ans-er the $rst ;uestion, discuss the interpretative and

constructive dimension of historiographical methodology. :y account

highlights the selective and theory8laden character of historical

representation and argues that the narrative dimension of historiography

is central for the 1no-ledge that a historical case study can convey. Based

on this account, analye in detail four case studies paired around t-o

historical episodes, and the methodological strategies employed in these

case studies. sho- that disagreement aout historical facts emerges from

the selective, theory8laden and narrative aspects of historical

methodology.

The second ;uestion ans-er y discussing diEerent criteria for

assessing historical accounts. note a dilemma in the evaluation of

historical reconstructions. 3n the one hand, there e*ist neutral and almost

universally accepted evaluation criteria. But these criteria are -ea1. They

cannot al-ays decide et-een con=icting reconstructions of the same

historical episodes. 3n the other hand, there are stronger methodological

criteria that constrain historiographical pluralism more drastically. Alas,

these strong criteria are often not neutral -ith respect to the sustantial

theoretical issues at sta1e in situations of con=ict et-een historical

accounts. Because of this dilemma, argue, -e have to accept some

degree of pluralism in historiography.H

:y paper has four parts. n the $rst part, indicate on a general level

-hich features of historical discourse give rise to pluralism. n the second

part, present a $ne8grained account of disagreement in historiography y

analying in detail four historical case studies. n the third part, proceed

to the prolem of assessing rival case studies and discuss diEerent

historiographical evaluation criteria. n the fourth part, apply these

H 5omparale issues arising -ithin the natural sciences have een recentlyaddressed in deates on scienti$c pluralism (5hang H%H? +ellert, @ongino, and>aters H9). Although ac1no-ledge that there may e*ist important parallelset-een pluralism in science and pluralism in historiography, in this paper focuson the latter only. Jote also that my aim in this paper is to provide a descriptiveaccount of pluralism in historiography. do not see1 to ans-er the normative;uestion -hether pluralism is epistemically desirale or not.

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criteria to the case studies analyed in the second part. The upshot of my

discussion is that although historiographical pluralism is limited, it cannot

e completely eradicated.

1. Sources of Historiographical Pluralism

>hat is it aout the character of historical representation that enales

sustantially diEerent retellings of the same eventsI o- are competing

historical reconstructions possileI Part of the ans-er is that historical

discourse is a constructive and interpretative endeavor, and that

historians can dra- on a variety of diEerent methodological strategies

-hen reconstructing the past. n this section, discuss, on a general and

astract level, three features of historical discourse that can help to

understand -hy con=icting accounts of the same events are possile" (i)

selectivity, (ii) theory8ladenness and (iii) narrativity. claim that these are

not merely contingent features of historical discourse. n fact, they seem

necessary. shall discuss each in turn.

(i Selectivity. @i1e the Borgesian map of the Kmpire that has the sie ofthe Kmpire, and coincides point8to8point -ith its territory, the complete

historical account is an asurdity. All historical reconstructions are

selective, and they are selective in three important -ays. 4irst, a historical

account, unli1e past reality, has a clearly mar1ed eginning and an

endpoint. 4rom the in$nite series of historical processes and events, the

historical account selects an episode or case that is identi$ed -ith a $nite

time8span. Second, once the time8span is determined, the historicalaccount selects some events -ithin that time8span and treats them as

constitutive of the episode, -hile e*cluding others. Third, of the events

included, some are highlighted, -hile others are relegated to a

suordinate status.Selectivity is a necessary feature of all representation. And recent

discussions of representation in science have analyed in great detail the

selective choices that structure ho- scienti$c models represent their

target domain. -ill dra- on these discussions, and in particular on

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in line -ith his general aims. The actual selections made are aim8

dependent.3ther e*amples can e generated -ith ease. f our aim is to e*plain

historical change then the selection of discontinuous features of the

historical episode under study, and the isolation of factors that may e

seen to have caused or motivated these changes is the ovious strategy

one should go y. f the aim is to create an e*perience of


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-hich types of sources are relevant for the reconstruction of a given

episode, as -ell as Oudgments regarding -hich types of sources are

reliale are made y reference to theoretical ac1ground 1no-ledge.

Then, after the sources have een chosen, these sources need to e

interpreted in a consistent manner" the sources need to e related to each

other? past events, actions and meanings need to e inferred from them?

relations (possily causal) et-een the derived events need to e

identi$ed? and the events need to e assigned a certain signi$cance -ith

respect to each other or -ith respect to the present. And each of these

interpretative maneuvers relies on theory. :oreover, there is not only an

up-ards inferential and interpretative process that leads from the sources

to the facts, ut also a do-n-ards process in the concept8dependent

identi$cation of historical events. Kach historical event is an event only

under a description, and hence its identi$cation is only possile if the

identity conditions for the event are speci$ed" hat the unit8event is depends on the telling of

itD(Roth %/'', /).

There are very li1ely many other forms of theory8ladenness in

historiography. But these considerations suce to indicate ho- theory8

ladenness can e a source of pluralism" diEerent theoretical assumptions

and diEerent methodological commitments -ill have conse;uences for the

selection of relevant sources, for ho- historical events are reconstructed

from the sources, for ho- they are interpreted, e*plained and evaluated,

for the individuation of historical events, etc. Since historical facts are

theory8laden, disagreement is li1ely to emerge et-een historical accounts

that reconstruct the past on the asis of diEerent theoretical assumptions.

(iii "arrativity. A third and $nal feature that leads to pluralism is the

narrative character of historical discourse. The narratological tradition

-ithin the philosophy of history has long claimed that the peculiar form of

historical representation G that -hich distinguishes historical

reconstructions from other types of representational discourse G consists in

the use of narrative. Rendering past events, states and processes

intelligile re;uires that a story e told aout them. By ecoming

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entrenched in a story historical events achieve signi$cance and meaning

and -hich story is told is relevant for the 1no-ledge a historical account

can convey.2

ayden >hite oserved that in order to uild a historical account, the

series of historical events (the chronicle) has to e molded into a story

that characteries these events in terms of eginning, transitional phase

and endpoint(>hite %/&6, 0). And according to >hite, in this process, the

choice of narrative form or mode of emplotment is crucial. This is ecause

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and the same historical episode can e rendered intelligile in manifold

-ays y dra-ing on diEerent story types and modes of emplotment.0

Aout the same events, many diEerent stories can e told.

The more general ;uestion that follo-s from the discussion of selectivity,theory8ladenness and narrativity in historical discourse is ho- strong

pluralism is or needs to e. >hite himself remains some-hat amivalent

aout the strength of pluralism. n some passages he grants that there are

epistemic constraints on -hat types of narrative can e plausily told

aout a speci$c historical episode (>hite %/&', 2&82', 0/). n other

passages, ho-ever, he suggests that there are not any limits on

narrativiation? hite %/&6, 266). ere it appears that

>hite is not only a pluralist, ut also an anything goes relativist for -hom

there are no epistemic constraints -hatsoever that -ould restrict -hat

narratives -e can meaningfully and plausily tell.:y o-n pluralist thesis is not that radical. n later sections, -ill

sho- that there are important epistemic restrictions on the range of

permissile alternative historical reconstructions. But efore doing so,

-ant to e*amine historiographical pluralism in actu y studying in detail

the -ays in -hich rival historical methodologies lead to diEerent accounts

of past events.

2. The Structure of isagreement: !our Case Studies

Pluralism is most interesting, or most controversial, -hen t-o conditions

otain? namely (a) -hen there e*ist con=icting accounts of the same

historical episodes, and () -hen it is not ovious -hich of the diEerent

reconstructions is the correct, ade;uate or most plausile one.

0 :any aspects of >hiteFs narratological account are deeply prolematic. 3n theone hand, his structuralist ta*onomy of diEerent modes of historical -riting isstatic, arti$cial and irritatingly ahistorical. 3n the other hand, from insights intothe constructive dimension of historiography, >hite dra-s radical conclusionsaout its suOective and $ctional character. share neither >hiteFs structuralistinclinations, nor his radical suOectivism, and -ish to ta1e from his re=ectionsonly the central theses that historical accounts have a narrative structure andthat there can e*ist plural narrative emplotments of the same historical events.

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n the previous section discussed ho- historiography can ful$ll

condition (a) and discerned three astract features of historical discourse

that lead to pluralism. This section e*plores ho- these astract features

are realied in actual historiographical methodologies. t deals -ith the

concrete structure of disagreement in four historical case studies" arry

5ollins and Allan 4ran1linFs rival accounts of the early gravitational

radiation e*periments and Alan :usgrave and aso1 5hangFs diEerent

reconstructions of ho- phlogiston theory -as aandoned. K*ploring ho-

these case studies ful$ll condition (a), try to remain as neutral as possile

et-een the competing accounts. The prolem of evaluation and the

;uestion to -hich e*tent the rival accounts satisfy condition () address

in later sections.

structure my analysis of disagreement y introducing t-o levels on -hich

diEerences et-een rival case studies can e oserved? () the level of

factual claims, and () the level of methodological strategies. argue that

diEerences arising on the level of factual claims can e traced to

diEerences in methodological strategies. t is on this level of

methodological strategies that the astract features of historiography

discussed aove unfold their pluralist eEects. As -ill sho- in my analysis

of the four case studies, the reconstruction of past episodes of science

involves (i) selective choices, (ii) theory8laden reconstruction procedures

and (iii) techni;ues of narrative emplotment. !iEerences in selection,

theory8ladenness and narrativiation give rise to con=icts aout -hat

e*actly happened in the historical episode under study.

This is, elieve, a general point aout historiography" factual claims

in history are al-ays the result of comple* methodological processes and

these methodological processes al-ays involve selection, theory8

ladenness and narrativiation. o-ever, it needs to e noted that the case

studies have chosen elong to the PS conte*t and that each of them

comes -ith an e*plicit philosophical agenda. t may e argued that case

studies in general history and in the history of science diEer from those

produced in PS ecause they are not to the same degree committed to

e*plicit philosophical doctrines. This is certainly correct. n general history,

and in professional historiography of science, theory8ladenness does not

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typically ta1e the form of e*plicit philosophical concepts eing applied to

the interpretation of the historical material. o-ever, elieve this does

not ma1e case studies in general history and the historiography of science

less theory8laden. t only means that the theoretical assumptions that

structure the reconstruction of the past, and the -ays in -hich they do so,

are more sutle than they are in PS.

The #ravity $aves %pisode

egin my analysis -ith the dispute over the interpretation of the high8=u*

gravity -aves episode. arry 5ollinsF reconstruction of the early attempts

to measure gravitational radiation e*perimentally is central to the

sociology of scienti$c 1no-ledge canon, ecause it highlights the

relevance of social factors in the closure of scienti$c controversies. Allan

4ran1lin formulates his o-n account of the episode in direct opposition to

5ollins, arguing that social factors -ere not necessary for the closure of

the deate. The historical events oth authors can agree on can e

summaried as follo-s" &n the late ')*s and early '+*s, oseph $eber

developed the rst gravitational -ave detectors and claied to have

ac/uired positive results. &n the years to follo-, other laboratories tried to

replicate his results -ith slightly di0erent e1periental setups, but they

did not anage to reproduce his observations. 2y the late '+*s, $eber3s

clai to have observed high 4u1es of gravitational radiation had lost all

credibility and -as re5ected by the scientic counity. !espite their

agreement on these points, 5ollins and 4ran1lin accounts diEer so radically

that the t-o authors ta1e the case of >eer to support t-o con=icting

philosophical doctrines. o- is this possileI There are oth ovious and

sutle diEerences et-een the rival reconstructions.

(& 6actual clais. 5ollins and 4ran1lin disagree on ho- and -hy >eerFs

claims -ere reOected. They ma1e diEerent factual claims aout the

historical episode. 5ollins claims that the availale evidence and rational

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arguments underdetermined the decision against >eer, and that,

eventually, social processes led to the reOection of his results. 4ran1lin

claims the e*act opposite. According to him, rational delieration -as

causally sucient for a decision to e reached. Both authors claim that the

historical material in fact supports their respective vie-s of the relevant

causal relations. According to 5ollins, the po-erful rhetorical intervention

of one of >eerFs critics (scientist ) -as decisive in tipping the scales to

>eerFs disadvantage (5ollins %/'0, /6G/0). 4ran1lin, y contrast, thin1s

Fs rhetorical attac1 played only a minor role and argues that it -as the

sheer ;uantity of negative evidence against >eer that eventually led

scientists to discard his results (4ran1lin %//2, 29'G9/).

(&& 7ethodological Strategies. To understand ho- these diEerent factual

claims come aout, -e have to ta1e a loo1 at the diEerent methodological

strategies that the t-o authors apply. n the follo-ing, -ill argue that

5ollins and 4ran1lin select diEerent aspects of the past to e represented,

reconstruct events on the asis of diEerent philosophical assumptions and

tell diEerent narratives. This accounts for the disagreement et-een them.

(i Selection. >hen 5ollins reconstructs the scienti$c deates surrounding

the e*periments, he not only focuses on ho- the scientists -ho attempted

to replicate >eerFs initial results responded to his claims and arguments.

e also presents in great detail ho- they responded to each other. And he

reveals that scientists -ere in severe disagreement as to ho- to interpret

and e*plain their failures to replicate >eerFs $ndings. They found fault

not only -ith >eerFs e*perimental setup, ut also -ith each otherFs

e*perimental strategies (5ollins %/'0, '28'', /8/H). 5ollins selects those

aspects of the deate that indicate that there -as profound disagreement

in the scienti$c community.

But these aspects are almost completely asent from 4ran1linFs

reconstruction. 4ran1lin presents the arguments in such a -ay that they

fall into t-o opposed camps" >eer and his critics. The interrelations

et-een >eerFs critics and their mutual criticisms are not ta1en into

account. 4ran1lin is ;uite clear that, for him, the situation is one of

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agreement rather than disagreement" eerFs critics might

have disagreed aout the force of particular arguments does not mean

that they did not agree that >eer -as -rong.D (4ran1lin %//2, 2&H) So

-hile 5ollins devotes much attention to the various points of disagreement

et-een >eerFs critics, 4ran1lin selects and highlights points of

agreement rather than disagreement.

Another salient diEerence regarding the selection of historical events

concerns the role of scientist . 5ollins places at a central point in the

narrative" 4rustrated y the scienti$c communityFs hesitance to reOect

>eerFs results, -hich he too1 to e mista1en from the eginning, sets

out to destroy the crediility of >eer and his oservation claims in a

series of polemical attac1s. n 5ollinsF reconstruction, Fs rhetorical

intervention constitutes the social cause that tips the scales against >eer

and leads to the closure of the deate (iid., /68/0).4ran1lin, in contrast, emphasies the continuity of negative results

that e*isted efore and after Fs intervention. e e*cludes s intervention

from his account. According to him, it -as the accumulation of negative

results that led to the eventual reOection of >eerFs claims, not the

rhetorical intervention of one scientist.5ollins and 4ran1linFs diEerent factual claims are a result of the

selective choices they ma1e. These choices structure -hich historical

events and -hich aspects of the scienti$c deates under study are

included and emphasied in their rival historical reconstructions.

(ii Theory!ladenness. A asic diEerence et-een the t-o authors concerns

their handling of the sources. 5ollins e*tends the realm of sources fromthe pulished record to also include intervie-s -ith the scientists involved,

-hile 4ran1lin puts the emphasis on the pulished material. These

decisions are informed y theoretical assumptions -hich the authors

themselves ma1e e*plicit. 5ollins dra-s on intervie-s so as to avoid

pulication ias (5ollins %//2, 2/'), -hile 4ran1lin elieves the pulished

record to e more reliale than other sources (4ran1lin %//2, 290).

:ore comple* forms of theory8ladenness can e oserved in ho- the

t-o authors interpret the historical material. 5ollin descries the

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disagreement among >eerFs critics y referring to the concept of the

e*perimentersF regress. The e*perimentersF regress typically occurs at the

frontiers of en;uiry -hen ne- phenomena are measured -ith ne-

e*perimental apparatus. n these situations, ascriptions of -hen the

apparatus is -or1ing properly hinge on -hether it produces the -anted

outcome, -hile, at the same time, -hat the correct outcome is ecomes

de$ned y reference to the ;uality of the e*perimental setup (5ollins

%/'%, 62? 5ollins %/'0, '2).Because he applies the theoretical concept of the e*perimentersF

regress to the historical material, he can interpret the situation not only in

terms of disagreement, ut also in terms of contingency and open8

endedness. e claims that the historical process could have ta1en a

diEerent traOectory than it actually did.

3viously the sheer -eight of negative opinion -as a factor,

ut given the tractaility, as it -ere, of all the negative

evidence, it did not have to add up so decisively. There -as a

-ay of assemling the evidence, noting the =a-s in each

grain, such that outright reOection of the high =u* claim -as

not the necessary inference. (iid., /%)

4ran1lin engages his reconstruction of the historical events -ith a

philosophical agenda diametrically opposed to 5ollinsF. e see1s to sho-

that the resolution of the deate -as not contingent, ut the only

rationally acceptale outcome. e applies the concept of roustness to the

historical material to argue his point. >hen 5ollins concluded that the

plurality of interpretative options mar1ed the situation as open8ended and

contingent, 4ran1lin elieves that the diEerent arguments reinforced one

another. The fact that a series of slightly diEerent e*perimental setups

failed to replicate >eerFs claims renders the negative results more

roust? it strengthens the argument against >eer.Again, the diEerences in factual claims can e seen to rest on

diEerent theory8laden reconstruction procedures. 5ollins and 4ran1lin

select diEerent sources and then interpret these sources y reference to

diEerent theoretical concepts. 5ollins applies the concepts of the

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e*perimentersF regress and contingency, -hile 4ran1lin dra-s on the

concept of roustness.

(iii "arrative. 4inally, 5ollins and 4ran1lin tell diEerent stories of the

historical events. The con=icting factual claims they ma1e rest on diEerentnarrative emplotments of the episode. n order to estalish this point,

propose a slightly unconventional practice of analysis" -ill read the

historical case studies as one -ould read a novel or a short story and

apply some asic lessons from literary criticism. This -ill enale me to

identify the narrative structure of the respective case studies and to sho-

ho- diEerent narrative structures carry diEerent claims aout the past.

Proceeding in this manner, 5ollins historical narrative is estdescried as an ironic tragedy. t resemles a tragedy ecause it tells the

story of a social do-nfall and does so in discontinuous terms. According to

the literary theorist Jorthrop 4rye, a tragic plot is essentially a story of

e*clusion in -hich the hero is e*pelled or isolated from his society (4rye

%/0&, 60G26). The story of >eer, as 5ollins presents it, is such a story"

>eer is e*cluded y the society to -hich he tries to elong. :oreover,

the tragic plot is usually discontinuous, characteried y a radical rea1"efore and after 3edipus $nds out that he 1illed his father and married his

mother, efore and after @ady :aceth dies and :aceth $nally realies

he has een tric1ed y the -itches. n 5ollinsF narrative the discontinuity is

Fs intervention. By structuring events in terms of discontinuity the tragic

plot re=ects the demand for identifying a causally decisive turning point.

>hat ma1es the tragedy an ironic one is that the hero is not causally

responsile for his fate. As 4rye e*plains, eerFs do-nfall is

not a result of him eing in error. >hat happened to him -as at least

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partly due to circumstance and the story could -ell have ended diEerently.

is -as a contingent do-nfall. The historical claims 5ollins defends are

thus emodied in the narrative structure of the account.

Jot surprisingly then, 4ran1linFs narrative is fundamentally diEerent

from 5ollinsF. t can e read as an adventure story. Adventure stories

organie time in a strictly serial order. As :i1hail Ba1htin oserves, the

adventure story is constructed


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turn to a second e*ample, the 5hemical Revolution. Although this

historical episode is more comple* than the gravity -aves case, my

discussion -ill e relatively rief and schematic. discuss and compare

t-o reconstructions of the episode, Alan :usgraveFs @a1atosian rational

reconstruction, and aso1 5hangFs attempt to moilie the episode as a

case in point for normative scienti$c pluralism. ere is -hat oth authors

can agree to have ta1en place in the 5hemical Revolution" The heyday of

phlogiston!based e1planations of cobustion and calcination occurred

bet-een '+** and '+*. &n the early '++*s ho-ever, 8ntoine 9avoisier

began to develop an alternative e1planatory frae-ork that dispensed

-ith phlogiston and instead postulated the e1istence of another

substance, naely o1ygen. 2oth the phlogiston and the o1ygen theories

en5oyed e1planatory and predictive successes, as -ell as deonstrating

appreciable proble!solving abilities. Ho-ever, both frae-orks also

faced anoalies and failures. Precise -eight easureents in later

e1perients favored the o1ygen!based frae-ork. %ventually, phlogiston

theories -ere abandoned. Beyond this asic agreement, :usgrave and

5hang oEer rival accounts of the processes through -hich phlogiston8

ased theories -ere replaced -ith o*ygen ased ones, rival e*planations

of -hy this occurred and competing epistemic evaluations of the

rationality and legitimacy of the victory of o*ygen.

(& 6actual Clais. :usgrave claims that phlogistonism constituted a

degenerating research program and -as reOected for that reason.

According to him, the 5hemical Revolution -as a rational process

(:usgrave %/&9, H0G9). 5hang, y contrast, claims that the phlogiston

theory -as not clearly inferior to its competitor (5hang H%H, %/GH/), and

that its potential had not een fully e*hausted at the time of its

aandonment (id., 26G2'). 4or these reasons, the reOection of phlogiston

-as a non8rational and premature decision.

(&& 7ethodological Strategies. As efore, an analysis of methodological

strategies -ill provide a etter understanding of ho- such diEerent factual

claims can emerge.

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(i Selection. :usgrave and 5hang delineate the episode of the 5hemical

Revolution in diEerent -ays. T-o aspects of their selective choices are

particularly salient. 4irst, 5hang situates the reOection of phlogiston theory

-ithin the roader conte*t of a long8term transformation of epistemic

practices, the rise of -hat he calls the compositionist system of 5hemistry.

According to 5hang, the reOection of phlogiston theory -as not rational in

itself, ut a mere epiphenomenon of this roader shift (iid., 6982H).

:usgrave, in contrast, chooses to represent the concrete interactions

et-een Priestley, 5avendish and @avoisier, ut he e*cludes long8term

transformations in 5hemistsF practices from his account.

Second, 5hang chooses to represent not only the actual historical

events, ut also -hat could have ecome of phlogiston theory, had it not

een aandoned. e presents a counterfactual history that phlogiston

theory could have fostered scienti$c progress had it een retained. n this

-ays, the counterfactual history ecomes part of the episode under study.

t is y including the roader conte*t of epistemic transformations in

5hemistry and the counterfactual ene$ts of phlogiston that 5hang can

claim the reOection of phlogiston theory to have een non8rational and

premature. :usgrave and 5hangFs diEerent verdicts on the rationality of

the 5hemical Revolution are underpinned y the diEerent selective choices

they ma1e.

(ii Theory!ladenness. A fundamental diEerence et-een :usgrave and

5hangFs reconstructions concerns temporality. :usgrave reconstructs the

development of the phlogistonist and o*ygenist rivals diachronically,

distinguishing et-een diEerent successor versions of the theories. e

applies @a1atosF conception of competing research programs to the

historical material? and a @a1atosian research program consists in a

diachronic series of successor versions of a theory.:usgrave also uses the concept of progressive and degenerating

research programs to evaluate the rivals. n his interpretation, oth

programs -ere successful efore %&&, and it -as only et-een %&& and

%&'0 that @avoisierFs o*ygen theory egan to outperform the phlogistonist

%'


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program of Priestley and 5avendish. !uring that time span, the o*ygen

program developed in a coherent manner, according to :usgrave, each

ne- version mar1ed an increase in predictive po-er and theoretical

gro-th. The program -as progressive. The phlogiston program, in

contrast, -as confronted -ith increasing diculties and degenerated

(:usgrave %/&9, H0). This evaluation then allo-s for the verdict that the

reOection of the phlogistonist e*planations -as entirely rational" chemists

at the time realied that the phlogiston8ased system -as degenerating

and changed their allegiances.5hang reaches a very diEerent verdict. This is possile primarily

ecause his reconstruction is systematic rather than temporal. 5hang does

not recount the successive steps in -hich the t-o theories developed. e

applies a diEerent concept to the historical material, reconstructing the

rivals as holistically understood systems of practice. e analyses static

and systematic features of the phlogistonist and o*ygenist approaches,

listing the ;uestions the t-o systems addressed, the prolems they found

signi$cant and the epistemic values they emodied (5hang H%H, %/GH').5omparing the t-o systems, 5hang applies the concept of

methodological incommensuraility. According to his interpretation, othsystems -ere ale to solve the prolems -hich they considered important

in a manner that satis$ed the epistemic values that they adhered to.

t seems clear that each of the o*ygenist and phlogistonist

systems had its o-n merits and diculties, and that there

-ere diEerent standards according to -hich one or the other

-as etter supported y empirical evidence. [# [B#oth

systems -ere partially successful in their attempts to attain

-orth-hile goals and [# there -as no reason to clearly favor

one over the other. (id., H/)

As in the aove e*ample, -e can oserve ho- diEerences in the

theoretical assumptions that guide the historical interpretation translate

into diEerent factual claims" :usgrave engages in a diachronic

reconstruction and interprets the situation in terms of @a1atosian

con$rmation theory, using the concept of research programs. 3n this asis

%/


20/38

he reaches the conclusion that the 5hemical Revolution -as a rational

process. 5hang, in contrast, interprets the situation in terms of the

theoretical concept of methodological incommensuraility and $nds that

the decision -as not rational.

(iii "arrative. As in the e*ample aove, the historical claims are also

rought across y the -ay the story is told. :usgraveFs historical account

is -ell descried as a comedy. n a comedy, according to 4rye, the

complications, plot t-ists and revelations that the hero has to live through

efore succeeding are more important in determining the course of events

than the moral or intellectual ;ualities of the characters(4rye %/0&, %&).

Uust li1e a comedy, :usgraveFs narrative is driven not y the intentional

action of the characters, ut y une*pected plot t-ists. 4rom the moment

that @avoisierFs research program enters the stage, -e are confronted -ith

a series of sudden and une*pected changes of fate, some of -hich reveal

a deep historical irony. Repeatedly, @avoisierFs opponents are also his

helpers. They provide the insights -hich enale @avoisier to verify his

prediction (of -hat -ould later e called o*ygen), and later, to solve the

anomalies that troule his o*ygen program (:usgrave %/&9, %/2, HG%).

The comic emplotment in terms of une*pected plot t-ists accords -ith

:usgraveFs interpretation of the episode as rational. Scienti$c rationality

e*erts itself in the narrative as a egelian


21/38

prematurely deceased hero, 5hangFs narrative mourns unrealied

possiilities. t conOures up an image of -hat could have ecome of the

deceased had they not passed a-ay and see1s to estalish that

phlogiston, in line -ith 5hangFs normative pluralist agenda, should not

have een aandoned. To prove this point, 5hang engages in

counterfactual history aout -hat might have happened had phlogiston

theory een maintained (iid., 2H80). This counterfactual imagination

enales the Oudgment that the death of phlogiston -as not only not

rationally -arranted (and in this sense unOust) ut also premature if

measured against the possiilities for innovation, development and

discovery that it entailed. The elegiac practices of emoaning and praising

the deceased $t 5hangFs evaluation of the situation li1e a glove.

aving provided a detailed analysis of selected historical case studies,

hope to have made plausile t-o points. The $rst point is that there is not

one unprolematic -ay of deriving historical facts from the sources.

Rather, historians engage in comple* methodological strategies in order to

reconstruct, interpret, evaluate and e*plain past events, and the

methodological strategies of historiography involve selective choices,

theory8laden interpretations and narrative emplotments.Second, hope to have sho-n that diEerences arising on the level of

factual claims can e traced to diEerences in methodological strategies.

>hich selections are made -hen reconstructing historical happenings,

-hich theoretical assumptions guide the interpretation and evaluation of

past events, -hich narratives structure the historical material has

conse;uences for -hat factual claims a historical account can reach. Liven

these features of historiography, the e*istence of severe disagreement

et-een case studies of the same episodes does not appear surprising.

". #$aluating Historical Accounts

n my analysis aove, tried to stay as neutral as possile et-een the

rival historical accounts, and did not present one side of the con=ict as

more plausile or etter -arranted than the other. n this section, turn to

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the prolem of -hether and ho- -e can assess historical case studies and

settle con=icts such as those discussed.As stated efore, historiographical pluralism is most interesting if (a)

it occurs et-een con=icting historical accounts, and () the alternatives

on oEer are plausile to roughly similar e*tents. The ;uestion as to

-hether and ho- -e can assess competing historical case studies is of

central importance to historiographical pluralism, ecause it ears on

condition (), the issue of comparative plausiility" the stronger our

grounds for assessing case studies and for deciding et-een rival

reconstructions, the -ea1er is our pluralist scenario. f -e can al-ays

reach une;uivocal decisions et-een competing accounts, then there is

no room for pluralism in historiography. 3r at least the more controversial

forms of pluralism that occur et-een incompatile and con=icting

reconstructions -ill e ruled out. 3n the other e*treme, if -e can never

Oudge -hich of t-o or more alternative accounts is the most plausile,

then -e are confronted -ith a situation of e*treme pluralism, or even

anything8goes relativism.:y o-n approach ta1es a middle position et-een these t-o

e*tremes. argue that there indeed are epistemic considerations thatallo- for an evaluation of competing historical case studies. These

considerations place restrictions on the space of permissile alternatives

and hence restrict pluralism. o-ever, they are not strong enough to

al-ays yield an une;uivocal verdict as to -hich of t-o or more competing

reconstructions to prefer. n some cases, a neutral decision et-een rival

accounts may not e possile. n order to ma1e my point, egin y

considering -hat types of epistemic considerations -e can dra- on inorder to evaluate historical case studies. distinguish et-een (α) asic

and (β) comple* evaluation criteria. Then proceed to evaluating the

aove discussed case studies in terms of these considerations.

( α 2asic criteria. >hen historians and philosophers of science discuss the

merits of diEerent historical reconstructions and case studies, their

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23/38

evaluation criteria often remain implicit.9 o-ever, there seem to e*ist a

fe- rough and ready rules that one can dra- on -hen assessing the

;uality of a historical reconstruction. Some of them are related to the

practices of source criticism (ho- reliale are the sources used, ho- -ell

are the 1no-n sources covered, and ho- varied is the evidence citedI).

3thers concern the composition of the historiographical te*t itself (is the

historical argument consistent and intelligileI). 7et others relate to ho-

-ell the historical reconstruction $ts -ithin a roader system of 1no-ledge

(is the historical account consistent -ith accepted, incontrovertile

ac1ground 1no-ledgeI). Standards regarding source8reliaility and

source8variance, internal consistency, and consistency -ith accepted

ac1ground 1no-ledge are relatively uncontroversial and they are

commonly relied upon even -hen they are not made e*plicit. refer to this

type of evaluative standards as asic criteria.

The asic criteria have the advantage of eing relatively neutral -ith

regards to philosophical con=icts. That is, -hen using them to decide

et-een con=icting historical accounts, -e can usually e relatively

certain that -e are not already assuming a point at sta1e in the deate.

Re;uirements for internal consistency merely raise demands concerning

the logical or argumentative structure of the historical reconstruction.

Such demands seem to e neutral in relation to the theoretical

assumptions that might e at sta1e in a con=ict et-een rival historical

reconstructions.

5onsiderations regarding the reliaility, variance and completeness

of the sources are, as descried aove, not -ithout theoretical

presuppositions. >hether a historical account has covered the relevant

sources to a sucient degree and hence is


24/38

determined since it depends upon the aims and purposes of the historical

account that dra-s on these sources. Selectivity and the restriction of

covered sources is legitimate in principle, if it accords -ith and is

conducive to the aims of the historical account. 5ompleteness only refers

to the completeness of the sources relevant to the satisfaction of a speci$c

historiographical aim.

Jevertheless, a historical account that involves more varied sources

can e considered more roust than an account that restricts its sources to

a speci$c type. Also, there may e clear violations of the conte*tually

understood completeness re;uirement. 4or e*ample, if 1no-n sources that

-ould e relevant to the historiographical aim ut -hich are not in line

-ith the argument that the historical account -ishes to carry along are

e*cluded, then the selective choices may e considered iased. This -ould

strongly undermine the plausiility of the historical account in ;uestion.

elieve that although they are conte*t8dependent and theory8laden,

evidential considerations such as the ones Oust presented can sometimes

serve as neutral evaluation criteria. At a later point provide an e*ample

for -hat an evaluation in terms of conte*tually determined source

completeness can loo1 li1e.

( β Cople1 criteria. But there are also more comple* considerations that

can e and often are used in the assessment of historical reconstructions.

5omple* criteria are evaluation standards dra-n from deates aout

intricate historiographical issues such as conte*tualism, internalism, and

e*ternalism (are historical events ade;uately conte*tualiedI)?

hermeneutics, understanding, and translation (are the historical actorsF

conceptions and understandings faithfully reconstructed and appropriately

conveyedI)? te*tual interpretation (is the original meaning of the te*t

restoredI)? present8centeredness (are ac1-ards8proOections,

anachronisms and >hig8history avoidedI)? historical e*planation (have the

right causes een identi$ed, has reductionism een avoidedI)? micro8 and

macrohistory (does the account address the correct level of descriptionI)

etc. 5omple* criteria, unli1e asic ones, have the advantage that they are

suOect to e*plicit discussion. They are therefore relatively -ell understood

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and usually rendered e*plicit -hen they are used in the evaluation and

critical assessment of a historical reconstruction.3n the do-nside, unli1e asic ones, comple* criteria are not

generally agreed upon or uncontroversial. And disagreement regarding

comple* criteria can arise on at least t-o levels. 4irst, it may not al-ays e

evident -hether a comple* criterion has een met. 4or e*ample, it is not

al-ays evident -hether illegitimate ac1-ards proOections and

anachronisms have een avoided in a given reconstruction, or -hether a

historical account e*hiits e*planatory po-er. But second, and more

importantly, the comple* criteria themselves are contested.4or e*ample, in discussions concerning >hig history and present8

centeredness there is sustantial disagreement regarding theidenti$cation of the e*act vices that result from present8centered

historiography of science. There is also disagreement concerning -hether

all or only some speci$c uses of present8day 1no-ledge and categories in

the interpretation and e*planation of past science are to e avoided

(Ashplant and >ilson %/''? 5unningham %/''? 5unningham and >illiams

%//6? Uardine H). :oreover, it has een suggested that the evaluation

of past 1no-ledge y present8day standards might not al-ays eprolematic (Tosh H6), or at least that it is not as prolematic as other

practices that have come to e criticied under the heading of present8

centeredness, for e*ample, a triumphalist siding -ith the -inners of past

scienti$c deates (5hang H/).Regarding ade;uate levels of analysis and e*planatory po-er, it is

deated -hether the capacity of the historiography of science to provide

comprehensile e*planations depends on micro8perspectives. !oes

historical e*planation need to trace the local and particular causes that

prompt speci$c historical events or can it e concerned -ith large8scale

factors and processes as -ellI (4or a useful discussion of the respective

epistemic capacities of macro8 and microhistorical perspectives see

Pomata %//'). :ore fundamentally, it is not even universally agreed upon

that e*planation, and in particular causal e*planation, should e a central

aim and method in the historiography of science (4or e*ample, the

relevance of causal e*planations in history has recently een denied y

!aston and Lalison H&, 62G6&? for critical discussion see +inel H%H).

H0


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Apart from not eing generally agreed upon, the comple* methodological

criteria often are connected -ith theoretical assumptions aout the

character of science, or aout the relations et-een past and present8day

1no-ledge. They are connected -ith sustantial philosophical issues and

hence are seldom neutral -ith regards to philosophical deates. The case is most ovious -ith methodological deates concerning

ade;uate conte*tualiation. 5learly, in the dispute et-een 5ollins and

4ran1lin, ;uestions regarding the method of ade;uate conte*tualiation

are intimately related to -hat is ultimately at sta1e in the con=ict et-een

them" the social nature of scienti$c decision8ma1ing. The other comple*

criteria are philosophically laden in a similar manner. :ethodological

deates over anachronism and >hig8history are related to philosophical

;uestions regarding continuity and discontinuity in the history of science,

scienti$c change and progress. 5onsiderations regarding e*planation and

understanding in history carry over into philosophical issues concerning

the relations et-een reasons and causes, scienti$c rationality, and the

driving forces of theory change. And to the degree that the comple*

criteria are not independent of philosophical positions and claims, they

should also not e e*pected to e neutral -ith regards to the theoretical

issues at sta1e in con=icts et-een rival historical reconstructions. >hen

-e are relying on a comple* criterion in order to decide et-een

con=icting historical accounts, -e cannot al-ays e sure that -e are not

already assuming a point at sta1e in the deate. n some cases, the failure

of a historical account to satisfy a certain comple* criterion may e more

indicative of that same criterion eing de$ned in a philosophically invested

manner, rather than of a neutrally assessale =a- of the account in

;uestion.

%. Constraints on Pluralism

aving distinguished et-een asic and comple* criteria, -ant to return

to the four historical case studies analyed earlier in order to evaluate ho-

-ell they fare -ith respect to the neutral evaluation criteria -e introduced.

n this analysis, see1 to sustantiate t-o claims. 4irst, asic evaluation

criteria reduce the space of permissile alternatives and hence restrict

H9


27/38

pluralism. But second, the verdicts that -e can reach on their asis are

relatively -ea1, and in order to reach a more de$nite decision, -e -ould

have to refer to comple* criteria. egin -ith applying the asic evaluation criterion of internal

consistency to the competing historical accounts of the 5hemical

Revolution. The criterion of internal consistency restricts the space of

permissile alternatives, ecause, of the t-o case studies have

discussed, only one meets its standard. :usgraveFs account fails the

consistency re;uirement. t involves a straightfor-ard contradiction in its

central factual claims. This contradiction emerges as follo-s" At the end of

the historical narrative, and after having given his presentation of the

historical development of the t-o competing research programs, :usgrave

passes the follo-ing verdict on them"

Bet-een %&& and %&'0 the o*ygen programme clearly

demonstrated its superiority to phlogistonism" it developed

coherently and each ne- version -as theoretically and

empirically progressive, -hereas after %&& the phlogiston

programme did neither.(:usgrave %/&9, H0)

This verdict is indispensale for assessing the aandonment of phlogiston8

ased theories as rationally -arranted. And yet, this verdict does not

accord -ith claims made earlier in the historical reconstruction. n

particular, :usgrave had claimed that in %&&0 e*periments spo1e as

much against @avoisier as they did in his favor (iid., %/9), and that in

%&'6 Priestley -as having great predictive success -ith his phlogiston

theory (iid., %//). f these claims are correct, :usgraveFs statement thatafter %&& the phlogiston theory -as starting to degenerate -hile the

o*ygen theory -as progressing cannot e right. The historical facts he

cites contradict his interpretation of the situation in terms of progressing

and degenerating research programs. The claim that the choice for o*ygen

-as rational y @a1atosian standards appears ill8grounded. 5hangFs

account is less prolematic in this respect. At least, it does not involve

historical claims -hich directly contradict each other and hence it passes

the asic criterion of internal consistency. Applying the asic criterion of

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internal consistency to the con=icting reconstructions leads to the

e*clusion of :usgraveFs case study and hence restricts historiographical

pluralism.n the dispute et-een 5ollins and 4ran1lin, evidential

considerations ecome crucial. As mentioned aove, the t-o authors dra-

on diEerent types of sources. 5ollins goes eyond the pulished sources to

also include e*tensive intervie-s -ith the scientists involved in the

episode under consideration. n fact, in the presentation of his historical

account intervie- e*cerpts are much more prominent than pulished

material, since the interpretations and arguments surrounding the

gravitational radiation e*periments are primarily reconstructed on this

asis. The consideration ehind this strategy is that of circumventing

pulication ias and gaining insight into the reasoning processes of

scientists efore they are straightened to $t the format of a scienti$c

Oournal. 5ollins e*plicitly criticies 4ran1lin for only dra-ing on the

pulished record. According to 5ollins, the restriction to scienti$c

pulications only is simply ad historiographical practice (5ollins %//2,

2/&G//). s 4ran1linFs decision to cover only the pulished sources indeed

as prolematic as 5ollinsF suggestsI !oes 4ran1lin fail the asic standards

of completeness and variance of the evidenceI thin1 he does, although the situation is comple* ecause of the

theory8laden character of source selection. The main prolem -ith

4ran1linFs account is that it e*cludes a -hole class of 1no-n sources -hich

-ould in principle e relevant to the historical argument at sta1e. The

restriction on pulished sources cannot e Ousti$ed on the asis that they

-ere the only ones availale. 3n the contrary, the original account that4ran1lin -ishes to disprove includes unpulished material. This means that

4ran1lin dra-s on a suset of the types of sources used in the original

account. o- a less complete consideration of e*isting sources could e

etter suited for representing the actual process of scienti$c decision8

ma1ing remains unclear and -e should at least e s1eptical -hether

4ran1linFs account passes the completeness re;uirement. o-ever,

4ran1lin Ousti$es his restriction on source material y contending that the

arguments that scientists themselves $nd to e the most convincing, the

H'


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strongest reasons that they had for accepting or reOecting certain $ndings,

are most li1ely to e found in the pulications. According to 4ran1lin, the

pulications display those reasons that scientists eerFs

oservation claim. To regard the restriction as legitimate in light of this

aim, one -ould have to suscrie to the thesis that pulished results are

the est indicators of the rational reasoning processes that rought them

aout, and that they are etter e;uipped for this tas1 than other types of

sources, such as intervie-s, unpulished manuscripts, letters and

noteoo1s. This assumption is almost universally reOected in the historiography

of science. But perhaps more -orryingly for 4ran1lin, he himself does notconsistently uphold the methodological principle of primarily dra-ing on

the pulished record. 4or e*ample, in his case study of :illi1anFs oil drop

e*periments 4ran1lin engages in great detail -ith :illi1anFs noteoo1s in

order to interpret the formerFs e*perimental Oudgments as rationally

Ousti$ed (4ran1lin %/'9, %2G%0&). This ma1es the choice of sources for his

reconstruction of the early gravitational -aves episode seem aritrary,

rather than methodologically Ousti$ed. Argualy, 5ollinsF account faresetter in this respect. 3ne may point out though that, although 5ollinsF

sources are more varied than 4ran1linFs, they are still not roust enough,

since the strong emphasis on intervie-s is not suciently alanced -ith

other types of source material. n the con=ict et-een 4ran1lin and

5ollinsF, neutral evaluation criteria favor 5ollinsF reconstruction, ut they

do so only y a thin margin. This is -here turn to my second claim. Jeutral criteria can decide

some historiographical con=icts, ut the decisions they yield are relatively

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-ea1. A stronger decision could only e reached y dra-ing on some of

the comple* evaluation criteria. There are t-o reasons -hy asic criteria are -ea1 ariters. 4irst,

they are only necessary ut not sucient for a historical account to e

plausile. Therefore they act only as constraints on the space of

alternatives, ut do not single out one account as the correct or most

plausile one. To illustrate this point, let us return to the dispute et-een

:usgrave and 5hang. The application of the internal consistency criterion

e*cludes :usgraveFs account from the range of legitimate historical

reconstructions. But of course, this does not turn 5hangFs account into the

one une;uivocally correct representation of -hat happened in the

5hemical Revolution. 3n the one hand, internal consistency is not the only

evaluation criterion -e can dra- upon and there may e many reasons to

e critical of 5hangFs reconstruction that have nothing to do -ith -hether

it is internally consistent or not (for t-o recent criticisms of 5hangFs

account see Blumenthal H%6? +usch forthcoming). 3n the other hand,

have only considered t-o of the many diEerent and possily con=icting

reconstructions of the 5hemical Revolution. There e*ist myriad alternative

retellings of that episode (a comprehensive overvie- of the past 0 years

of historical -riting aout the 5hemical Revolution can e found in :cKvoy

H%), and even -ithout having analyed them in detail, contend that at

least some of them -ill meet the asic criteria. These criteria restrict the

space of possile alternatives, ut they do not shrin1 it do-n so radically

that it -ould only include one permissile account. Kven after having

applied them, there is still room for historiographical pluralism.

The second reason -hy the asic criteria are -ea1 is that they serveto evaluate only speci$c case studies, ut not more general principles of

reconstruction, interpretation and narrative emplotment. >hile :usgraveFs

case study has een reOected on grounds of inconsistency, the :usgrave8

type of historical analysis has not. nternal consistency is not endemic to a

speci$c type of historical analysis. 5ould one not tell the story of the

5hemical Revolution in a similar manner as :usgrave does, y

reconstructing the diachronic development of phlogistonism and

o*ygenism as competing research programs and y emplotting historical

6


31/38

events in a comic form, ut -ithout repeating his mista1eI >e may not e

ale to e*press -ith :usgraveFs vigor the conclusion that after %&& the

o*ygen8ased program -as clearly superior. But -e could proaly still tell

the story of the success of the o*ygen program as one in -hich scienti$c

rationality prevailed through comple* plot t-ists.3r thin1 aout the deate et-een 5ollins and 4ran1lin. >e have

seen that 4ran1linFs reconstruction fails ecause the evidence he adduces

is insucient. o-ever, -hen analyed the methodological diEerences

et-een the t-o accounts, argued that the most important diEerences

do not concern the mere choices of sources, ut rather, ho- historical

facts are derived from these sources. sho-ed that 5ollins arranges and

interprets his sources in such a -ay as to highlight disagreement and

open8endedness, -hereas 4ran1lin reconstructs from his sources a

historical situation of agreement and roust negative evidence. The fact

that the set of covered sources is not e*actly coe*tensive in 5ollinsF and

4ran1linFs reconstructions very li1ely facilitates them reaching diverging

reconstructions and interpretations. o-ever, is it not at least possile

that such diverging reconstructions and interpretations could e reached

even if the same sources -ere usedI :aye 4ran1lin -ould have served

his point etter had he chosen the same sources as 5ollins, yet interpreted

them according to his o-n methodological principles. The same seems to

e true for narrative structure. >hether the story of the early searches for

gravitational radiation is an inverted adventure story in -hich negative

evidence piles up or -hether it is a discontinuous tragedy does not seem

to e completely determined y the availale sources. >e need to at least

consider the possiility that 4ran1lin could have told his adventure story on

the asis of the same sources that -ere also used y 5ollins. istorians do

enOoy some degree of freedom -hen it comes to choosing their

methodological strategies and forms of narrative emplotment. The asic

evaluation criteria help to identify the =a-s in speci$c historical

reconstructions. But they are not strong enough to rule out, on a more

general level, speci$c methods of interpretation or forms of emplotment as

clearly illegitimate.

6%


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n comparison, the comple* criteria are signi$cantly stronger as

ariters. 4irst, considerations regarding methodological principles, such as

conte*tualiation, e*planation and present8centeredness can restrict the

space of permissile alternatives much more radically than asic criteria

do. The set of historical accounts of the same episode that are internally

consistent and that handle the 1no-n evidence in a satisfying manner -ill

argualy e much larger than the set of historical accounts that, in

addition to satisfying the asic criteria, are also appropriately

conte*tualied (according to a speci$c understanding of relevant

conte*ts), e*hiit e*planatory po-er (according to a speci$c criterion of

e*planatory po-er), avoid anachronisms (according to a speci$c de$nition

of anachronism), etc.Second, if -e restrict the range of permissile methodological

principles, -e have ipso facto restricted the range of permissile types of

historical reconstruction, not Oust the set of actually e*isting acceptale

case studies. f -e can sho- that the fault -ith 4ran1linFs reconstruction

goes eyond his handling of the sources, and that it lies in ho- he uses

present8day 1no-ledge in the interpretation and evaluation of >eerFs

arguments, then -e have not only e*cluded 4ran1linFs particular historical

case study, ut any historical reconstruction that dra-s on similar

reconstructive and interpretative principles. f -e can sho- that there is

something -rong -ith the practice of rational reconstruction in :usgraveFs

account, then -e have not only e*cluded this particular case study, ut

any account of the 5hemical Revolution that dra-s on a @a1atosian

conception of scienti$c rationality.

ence, the comple* methodological evaluation criteria aresigni$cantly stronger than the asic ones. But applying them rings us into

the center of sustantial philosophical con=icts aout the nature of

science, the relation et-een past and present 1no-ledge, scienti$c

rationality, theory change and progress. The comple* criteria are strong,

ut they are highly controversial and anything ut neutral -ith regards to

philosophical con=icts.

Conclusion

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There appears to e a dilemma -hen it comes to evaluating historical

reconstructions. 3n the one hand, there are asic evaluation criteria such

as source8reliaility, range of the evidence cited and internal consistency.

These criteria are relatively neutral -ith regards to higher8level theoretical

and philosophical con=icts. o-ever, these neutral evaluation criteria are

not very strong. They restrict pluralism ut only to a relatively lo- degree.

3n the other hand, there are comple* evaluation criteria that are stronger

than the asic ones and restrict pluralism more radically. But the comple*

criteria are themselves contested and are seldom neutral -ith regards to

the fundamental issues that are at sta1e in a con=ict et-een diEerent

historical reconstructions. Put in a nutshell" neutral criteria are -ea1,

strong criteria are not neutral. This implies that -e -ill have to live -ith some degree of pluralism

in historiography, at least if -e -ish our decisions et-een competing

historical accounts to e grounded in neutral criteria that are shared y

everyone -ho participates in the deate. This pluralism -ill e limited

ecause there are at least some neutral considerations that can serve to

e*clude unacceptale historical accounts. o-ever, even after the clearly

illegitimate historical reconstructions that do not meet the asic criteria

have een e*cluded, there can still e plural historical reconstructions of

the same historical episodes that support diEerent philosophical doctrines.3f course, -e may not -ish to remain neutral in our evaluations of

historical reconstructions. A convinced social constructivist may -ell $nd

duious the methodological principles that 4ran1lin employs, the

interpretations he reaches, as -ell as his narrative strategies. The

constructivist may -ish to reOect 4ran1linFs historical account on the asisthat it is internalist and present8centered and hence fails those comple*

methodological criteria that call for a more thorough conte*tualiation and

historiciation of scienti$c deates. But in doing so, the constructivist has

assumed some of the points at issue, namely that a reconstruction of the

deate in terms of its technical contents only is de$cient and that past

eliefs should not e evaluated y present8day standards. The

constructivist may have good reasons for holding these vie-s, ut a

decision et-een con=icting case studies that is ased on them is not a

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neutral decision. :oiliing comple* criteria in con=icts et-een historical

accounts reinforces historiographical pluralism rather than eradicating it.

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&eferences

Ashplant, T. L., and Adrian >ilson. %/''. higgish (Aout Phlogiston).DCentaurus 0% (2)" H6/G92.

XXX. H%H. &s $ater H>:? %vidence, Realis and Pluralis. BostonStudies in the Philosophy of Science. !ordrecht et al." Springer.

5ollins, arry :. %//2.


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!aston, @orraine, and Peter Lalison. H&. :b5ectivity . Je- 7or1" YoneBoo1s.

4eldhay, Riv1a. %//2. riting. The5ase of the Scienti$c Revolution.D Science in Conte1t & (%)" &GH2.

4ran1lin, Allan. %/'9. The "eglect of %1perient . 5amridge" 5amridgeNniversity Press.

XXX. %//2.


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@inderg, !avid 5. %//. hite, ayden. %/&6. 7etahistory. The Historical &agination in"ineteenth!Century %urope. Baltimore, @ondon" Uohn op1ins NniversityPress.

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XXX. %/&'.

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Pluralism in Historiography a Case Study

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