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SSSEA vs. CAG.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

CORTES, J:

FACTS:

SSS filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunctionagainst petitioners, alleging that the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike andbaricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting forwork and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to thePublic Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that thestrikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. Thecomplaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that thestrikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to paydamages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

WHY THE STRIKE? SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:

1. implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining

agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues;2. payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;3. conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of

service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the samesalaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and

4. payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certainamounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices

RTC issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminaryinjunction Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into aninjunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal. Subsequent MR was alsodenied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike? YES.

HELD:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shallguarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, andpeaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].

Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employedin the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary tolaw shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitutionrecognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognitionalso includes the right to strike.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees toorganize, the President issued E.O. No . 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right toorganize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service lawand rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress."


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Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition theCongress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those whichare not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the PublicSector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may notresort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, topressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the

Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof andgovernment- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law andemployees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

The instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9,1988 in CA- G.R . SP No . 13192 is AFFIRMED.

PNB vs. REMIGIOG.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994

VITUG, J.:

Private respondent obtained from petitioner a P65,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage.Respondent defaulted; hence petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and itacquired the encumbered assets for the sum of P87,082.00. The sheriff's sale was registered with theOffice of the Register of Deeds of Isabela only on 11 October 1972.

Petitioner bank invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property for P87,082.00 plusinterest and other charges. Before that, one day after the foreclosure sale, private respondent alreadyhad paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property. On 21 October 1972, P.D. No. 27 was enactedinto law that mandated an agrarian reform. Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program"was launched; among the areas it covered were the parcels of land in dispute.

Private respondent offered to buy the foreclosed property for P284,000.00 and a Deed of Promise toSell was executed between petitioner bank and private respondent. Private respondent, through

counsel, inquired why he was still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00 when, in truth, hehad already paid P40,000.00 of the P87,082.00 previously offered by petitioner for the redemption of the property. There was no reply or response from petitioner.

Private respondent, instituted an action for "Annulment of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sumof Money and Damages" at the CFI, Echague, Isabela, against petitioner bank and its Branch ManagerLeuterio Genato. While the case was pending, petitioner bank additionally received from the Land Bankof the Philippines P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds in payment of theforeclosed property.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioner bank. Private respondent went tothe Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court ordering to set aside the decision and a new oneentered declaring the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties to be without force and effect; orderingthe defendant bank to release the properties and the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the tenants-

beneficiaries in favor of the Land Bank of the Philippines; declaring the deed of promise to sellexecuted by the plaintiff and the defendant bank rescinded; ordering the defendant bank and the LandBank of the Philippines to recalculate the amounts of payments due for the transfer of the subjectproperties in accordance with this Decision subject to the provisions of P.D. No. 27 and in accordancewith the mechanics of the Operation Land Transfer; and annulling the order of the lower court for theplaintiff to pay the defendant the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari .

ISSUE: WON P.D. 27 violated the non-impairment clause of the constitution?


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HELD:

We are aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosureproceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No.27 had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting saidlands. There is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as acceleratedunder P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in theexercise of the police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Courtthat the Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exerciseof the police power of the state (citations omitted). One limitation on the contract clause arises fromthe police power, the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights (citation omitted).

The situation here, is like that in eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates privateproperty for public use, and the only condition to be complied with is the payment of justcompensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy itsobligations, but merely appropriate or take for public use (citation omitted). As the Land Bank isobliged to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without anycompensation.

PEOPLE vs. AYSONG.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989

NARVASA, J .:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved inirregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to beconducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline,and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness tosettle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that hemisused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. Heproffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was chargedagainst Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos writtenadmission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without theaccused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accusedwas not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion forreconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence theadmission and statement of accused? NO.

HELD:

No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only towitnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- notpresent in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a

witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and nota prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory incharacter, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give awitness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed,or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it andcould be waived.

The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigationwhen his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrativeproceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the


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accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authoritiesafter a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements wereobtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in court.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:

1. he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.2. nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be

used against him.3. any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything hesays can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he sodesires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowinglyand intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and untilsuch warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained asa result of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominatedatmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

PEOPLE VS. BRAVOG.R. No. 135562 November 22, 1999

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

A decomposing body of a child was found in a vacant lot along the road leading to Patul, RosarioSantiago City. 1 Her body was found between two concrete fences half naked, shirtless and skirt pulledup, her panty stuffed in her mouth. 2 The body was identified to be that of a nine year old girl named

Juanita Len Len Antolin raped and died by cerebral haemorrhage according to autopsy.

An information for rape with homicide 5 was filed against herein accused; was arraigned and pleadednot guilty to the crime charged. After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and held that abuse of confidence and treachery attended the commission of thecrime. All these based on a so called confession made by the accused during an informal talk of the policeman and accused and on a circumstantial evidence (only 1) appreciated by the judge - thatthe accused was with the girl a day before the killing.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the accused rights? YES.

HELD:

Sec. 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a personunder investigation for the commission of a crime and the correlative duty of the State and itsagencies to enforce such mandate. It states:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall havethe right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent andindependent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford theservices of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waivedexcept in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(1) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation orany other means which vitiate the free will shall beused against him. Secret detention places, solitary,


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incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention areprohibited.

(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible inevidence against him.

(3) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as compensation toand rehabilitation of victims of torture or similarpractices, and their families.

The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the time aperson is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime althoughnot yet in custody. Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate therights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. Any measureshort of this requirement is considered a denial of such right. . Any information or admissiongiven by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the timewithout the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down asinadmissible. It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to aconfidant of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule. 21

The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written extra-judicial confession;the admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an "informal talk" at the police stationafter his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The arresting policemanadmitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and tocounsel. We note that the alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in thecompany of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed.

The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any statement allegedlymade by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of hisconstitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent attempt to circumvent therule by insisting that the admission was made during an "informal talk" prior to custodial investigationproper is not tenable. The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry forany possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the allegedadmission was made the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in therape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission wascoerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such presumption is the absence of awritten extra-judicial confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in court of the alleged oraladmission. The alleged admission should be struck down as inadmissible.

We also agree with both the appellant and the appellee that the trial court erred in rendering judgmentconvicting the appellant based on a single circumstance. Only one circumstantial evidence wasproven i.e ., that the victim went with the accused to buy soda and balut on the evening of January 12,1994. Section 4 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence , when sufficient . Circumstantial evidence issufficient for conviction if:

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived areproven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such asto produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.


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The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequenceleads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. The two witnesses for theprosecution testified to a single circumstance, namely, that the victim was seen in the company of theappellant on the night of January 12, 1994. This circumstance alone cannot be the basis of a judgmentof conviction. There is no other proven circumstance linking the appellant to the crime as theperpetrator thereof to the exclusion of any other possible culprit. The prosecution's theory that theappellant is guilty of the crime charged because he was seen with the victim a few days before she

was found dead is not tenable.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. The appellant Benito Bravo is acquitted.

ERNESTO NAVALLO vs . SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 97214 July 16, 1994

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

Navallo, Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, was chargedwith violating Art. 217 of the RPC, malversation of public funds by appropriating and misappropriating

to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines inthe total sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS and SIXTY-TWOCENTAVOS (P16,483.62), which total sum accused failed to account during an audit and failed as wellto restitute despite demands by the office of the Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of theGovernment equal to the amount misappropriated.

Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it originaland exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the RevisedPenal Code.

On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released on provisionalliberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the prosecution, the RTCtransferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan . On27 January 1989, Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had alreadybeen arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan , the RTC shouldcontinue taking cognizance of the case . The matter was referred to the Office of theOmbudsman which held otherwise . The information was docketed (Criminal Case No. 13696) withthe Sandiganbayan . A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan . The warrantwas returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond.

The bond, having been later found to be defective, on 30 August 1989, a new bond was approved andtransmitted to the Sandiganbayan .

Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over theoffense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned bythe RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.On 15 September 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying Navallo's motion. On 20October 1989, Navallo was arraigned; he pleaded, "not guilty," to the charge. Trial ensued.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan reached a decision, and it rendered judgment convicting Navallo of the crime of malversation of public funds. Accused-petitioner's motion for reconsideration was deniedby the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of 05 February 1991.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES & HELD:


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1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the offense filed againstpetitioner in spite of the fact that long before the law creating the Sandiganbayan took effect, anInformation had already been filed with the then Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte.

YES. The law is explicit and clear. A case falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be transferred to it so long as the accused has not as yet beenproperly arraigned elsewhere on the date of effectivity of the law, i.e ., on 10 December 1978.

The accused is charged with having violated paragraph 4, Article 217, of the Revised PenalCode an offense which falls under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code and, without question,triable by the Sandiganbayan . Navallo's arraignment before the RTC on 18 July 1985 isseveral years after Presidential Decree No. 1606, consigning that jurisdiction tothe Sandiganbayan , had become effective.

2. Whether or not double jeopardy set in when petitioner was arraigned by the Regional Trial Court on July 18, 1985.

NO. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites: (1) The previouscomplaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain aconviction; (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The accused has been arraignedand has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case isdismissed without his express consent.

When all the above elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b)an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) anyoffense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, canrightly be barred.

In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan . Moreover,neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.

3. Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certificationprepared by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.

NO. Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under"custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined as any"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custodyor otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 5 A person under anormal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself canhardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In anycase, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared byDulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony. Navallo may have been persuaded, butcertainly not pressured, to sign the auditor's report.

GAMBOA vs. CRUZG.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order, toannul and set aside the order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case No. 47622, entitled "People of the Philippines,Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales, Accused," and to restrain the respondent courtfrom proceeding with the trial of the aforementioned case.

Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Palencia. Thereafter,petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detainedtherein together with several others.


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The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After theIdentification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered tostay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner wastold to sit down in front of her.

On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner. Petitioner wasarraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. Petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting hisdefense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer toEvidence on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absenceof, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.

Respondent court issued an order denying the Motion to Acquit. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not right to counsel attaches at the time of the police line up?

NO. The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamentalrights guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a

democratic society, like ours, every person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rightsguaranteed by the Constitution.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigatingofficer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from therespondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted bycounsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessionsfrom the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. Theprovisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, inseveral cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall beconducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by anyperson in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, orby anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be validunless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. 5

As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in thiscase) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled ,at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General states:

When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he hadnot been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not apart of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, itwas held that when the process had not yet shifted from theinvestigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does notelicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of hislawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme Court, 378US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of his Identification in thepolice line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense,he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counselbecause the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could nothave violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontationbetween the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified inthe police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police.He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminalcharge. Far from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact aconfession to be used against him. For it was not he but the complainant who


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was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of thecomplainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition).Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued. 6

Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, petitioner would haveno cause for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel and due process. In Kirby vs. Illinois :

it was held that the constitutional right to counsel did not attach until judicialcriminal proceedings were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating toout-of-court Identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply toIdentification testimony based upon a police station show-up which took placebefore the accused had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with anycriminal offense.

Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing his view and that of three other members 9 of the Court, said:

has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and FourteenthAmendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary

judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. This is not to say that adefendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel only at the

trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches at the time of arraignment and the Court has recently held that it exists also at the time of apreliminary hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, supra . But the point is that, whilemembers of the court have differed as to existence of the right to counsel inthe contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involvedpoints of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminalproceedings whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,indictment, information, or arraignment. (Emphasis supplied). 10

Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to thoseunder police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remindpolice investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect theservices of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even anurge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plaininformation which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect,he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but thewaiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

JUST IN CASE HE ASKS.

[To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980.

It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power,the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common lawtraditions. 3 To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excessthereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despoticmanner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to amount to anevasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplationof law. 4 This is not the situation in the case at bar. The respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as wellas the prosecution's evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.]

2. Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process of law?

NO, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantiveand constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar . He wasaccorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense;


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only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution hadrested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 Thecase at bar is far from this situation.

In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order denying aMotion To Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon arraignment,the defendant shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or pleadthereto, or do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and themotion is withdrawn or overruled, he should immediately plead, which means that trial mustproceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the movant (in themotion to quash), he can appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections(earlier raised in his motion to quash) which would then be subject to review by the appellatecourt.

3. Whether or not certiorari is a proper remedy?

NO. An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) isinterlocutory and not a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the subjectof a petition for certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after trial.

Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his rights tocounsel and to due process is a question which he could raise, as a defense or objection, uponthe trial on the merits, and, if that defense or objection should fail, he could still raise the sameon appeal.

On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information beforehe pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion toquash, except where the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court iswithout jurisdiction of the same. 16

Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its evidenceand rested its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner isdeemed to have waived objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.

Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among thegrounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint orinformation. Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur because it does not appear from the narration of the facts in this case that impropersuggestions were made by the police to influence the witnesses in the Identification of the accused.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring

Pro hac vice.

YAP, C.J., Dissenting:

After the police line-up with other detainees in which the accused was pointed out by the complainantas one of the "companions" of those who allegedly committed the crime of robbery, the investigatorypart of the proceedings started when the accused was singled out and "ordered to sit down in front of the complainant" while the latter gave her statement which led to the filing of the information. Themajority opinion holds that the police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner


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(the herein accused) was not yet entitled to counsel. But this overlooks the fact that the incidentobjected to took place after the police line-up, when the accused was made to confront thecomplainant, and the latter made her statement which became the basis of the information filedagainst the accused. At this point, it can be said that the custodial investigation had already begun.

The applicable provision of the 1973 Constitution states that "any person under investigation for thecommission of an offense shall have the right to counsel, and to be informed of such rights." (Sec. 20,Art. IV, Bill of Rights). A similar provision has been incorporated in the 1987 Constitution. I do notagree with the view that since the accused was not asked any question, he was not "underinvestigation." The investigation commenced the moment he was taken from the police line-up andmade to sit in front of the complainant, while the latter made her statement to the police.

Neither do I agree with the view of the Solicitor General, which is sustained by the majority opinion,that the accused at that point was not entitled to be informed of his right to counsel, because "thepolice did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him." The right to counsel must beafforded to the accused the moment he is under custodial investigation, and not only when aconfession is being exacted from him.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the petitioner should have been informed, at that stage, of his constitutional right to counsel, and accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

The accused was arrested, without a warrant, for vagrancy, on July 19, 1979. It is clear that at thattime, no probable cause to indict him for robbery existed. For this reason, he was "booked" forvagrancy alone and thereafter detained.

Unexplainably, he was made to take part in a line-up the following day, July 20, 1979, upon the behest,apparently, of the complainant, who unabashedly pointed to him as a "companion" in a certain robberycase. He was later made to "sit down in front of" the said complainant while the latter gave herstatement which led to the filing of the information.

It is the view of the majority that "the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of the custodialinquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel." It is my own view, however,that given the particular circumstances of this case, he was entitled to counsel pursuant to theprovisions of Section 12, of Article III, of the Bill of Rights.

It is noteworthy that the accused was already in custody at the time. And although he was detained forsome other cause vagrancy, it left him little or no choice other than to face his accuser. It cannot bethen gainsaid that as far as he was concerned, the situation had reached what American jurisprudencerefers to as the "critical stage" 1 of the inquiry, in which the confrontation becomes an accusationrather than a routine procedure preliminary to a formal prosecution. He was in custody not for the"usual questioning" but for an existing charge, although the investigation was in connection withanother offense. The confrontation, exacerbated by the pressure of actual custody, had becomeadversarial rather than informational, and the assistance of counsel to the accused, a matter of Constitutional necessity. That he was being held for vagrancy whereas the line-up involved a complaintfor robbery does not make a difference to him. He was under detention, a development that made himvulnerable to pressures, whatever offense was involved.

While I am not prepared to hold that a police line-up per se amounts to a critical stage of theinvestigation, for in most cases, it merely forms part of the evidence gathering process, the fact thatthe accused herein stood charged for an offense and has been detained therefor should make thiscase different. 2

So also is it noteworthy that the accused was made to confront the complainant in an interrogationfollowing the line-up. It is my belief that, other than such a line-up, the subsequent confrontation hadreinforced his need for legal assistance. Verily, he was an unwilling audience to his accuser, if a mute


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witness to his own prosecution. In People v. Hassan , 3 we struck down a similar confrontation forrepugnancy to the Constitution. This Court said therein:

The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accusedalone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in a police line-up, was "pointedlysuggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination,and, all told, subverted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highlysingular method of Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commandsneither our respect nor acceptance."

Moreover, the corfrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter tocounsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime especially atits most crucial stage the Identification of the accused.

As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At thatcritical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young,poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in whichonly the a d was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in thepresence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselledconfession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenchedprotection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted. 4

It is in such cases indeed that the more questions are asked, the more convinced is the complainant of the accused's guilt, and in extreme cases, the better "convinced" is the accused himself that he is trulyguilty. The presence of counsel would have obviated the one-sidedness of the investigation.

To be sure, the majority itself would concede that something is amiss in such a procedure, at least inthis case ("this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that, while the Courtfinds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment thereis a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plaininformation which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should thenand there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writingand in the presence of counsel"). 5 The point, however, is that such a police procedure is invariablyintended to secure admissions from the accused (assuming that he is Identified), unless the authoritiesare possessed of other evidence. They would not be so obtuse to do a useless act.

To my mind, the accused herein was not only denied the right to counsel which I hold to be availableunder the circumstances, he was deprived of due process the day he was arrested. Albeit it does notappear to have been put in issue in his petition, he was not apprised of his rights when he wasapprehended for vagrancy. The next day, he was placed in a line-up upon a complaint for robbery. Tomy mind, he was a readymade suspect for an offense in which no probable cause existed to warrant acustodial interrogation. If this is a customary police procedural, I do not hesitate to condemn it forConstitutional reasons.

While it is true that he was not denied the right to present his defense, it does not cure the defectsurrounding his arrest, or make admissible whatever evidence gathered in the course of theconfrontation and investigation. The resulting unfairness has deprived him of the opportunity toprepare a meaningful defense.

I agree that in terms of the provisions of the Rules of Court, the accused may not challenge, oncertiorari, a denial of a motion to acquit. But it seems to me that the case, for all its Constitutionalimplications, should stand on its merits and not on the errors of the counsel for the accused on hischoice of judicial remedies. Accordingly, I am for denying the Rules of their rigidity and for deciding onthe petition on Constitutional grounds.

I vote to grant the petition.


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Aberca vs. Ver Case DigestL-69866 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights andliberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as TaskForce Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against knowncommunist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sowdisturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order,elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial searchwarrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purelypersonal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued bythe courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; thatplaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men whointerrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtainincriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffsconstitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information andincriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans beingpreviously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as

public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in theperformance of official duties or function

ISSUE:

whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages forillegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteedunder the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for suchviolations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

HELD:

We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The

cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of officialduties written the ambit of their powers.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merelyresponding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellionand subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikesagainst alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanketlicense or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgressupon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution.

The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian ormilitary, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liablein damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, doesnot exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the saidarticle, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penalstatute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegalarrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render


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valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual toseek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining hisliberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of allegedphysical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and libertiesenumerated therein, among others

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs'constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impairedby defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants orbased on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, withoutproper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property whichwere not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffswithout warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs atseveral undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected tophysical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purposeof extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetratedupon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be heldliable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as wellas indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It iswell established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that thecomplaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 Todetermine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others,should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by thePhilippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,vs .HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:

Private respondent Muoz was charged before then Hong Kong Court with three (3)counts of theoffense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Preventionof Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offenseof conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest wereissued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for eachcharge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice arequest for the


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provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrestagainst private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Privaterespondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, JudgeBernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine lawgranting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge

Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed anurgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, theinstant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potentialextradite? NO.

Held:

Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of thearrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given theforegoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she isnot a flight risk and should be granted bail.

1. Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the objectof placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against

him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of therequesting state or government."

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to upholdthe fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly,the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in thelight of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and

protection of human rights.

Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines shouldsee to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Extradition is not a trial to

determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, butone that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a personaccused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the

purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treatyobligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due

process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also byinternational conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprivean extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is


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satisfactorily met. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposedthat a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting

bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyondreasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extradite must prove

by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders

and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show tha the is not a flight risk.

Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether privaterespondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court todetermine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincingevidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediatedetention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

PEOPLE vs. BANDULAG.R. No. 89223 May 27, 1994

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS

After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked, JUANITO GARAY, a lawyer,was found dead with three (3) gunshot wounds. For his death and the loss of their things on theoccasion thereof, AURELIO BANDULA, PANTALEON SEDIGO, TEOFILO DIONANAO and VICTORIANO EJANwere haled to court for robbery with homicide.

On 5 May 1989, after hearing twelve (12) prosecution and nine (9) defense witnesses, the trial courtrendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime charged. However, his three(3) co-accused were acquitted "for insufficiency of evidence." 1

Thus the trial court disregarded the following defenses of the four (4) accused.Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed sufferfrom constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extractedunder duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, bythe nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidenceto convict him of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there were violations of the constitutional rights of the accused? YES.

HELD:

From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanaowere investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came inonly a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks laterwith respect to appellant Bandula . And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty.Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are tell tale signs that violencewas used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution


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In the twin cases of Morales, Jr., v. Enrile 22 and Moncupa, Jr. v Enrile , 23 and the subsequent caseof People v. Galit , 24 all promulgated even before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, we laiddown the procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and conducting a custodialinvestigation

. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer toinform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The personarrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone hechooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter ormessenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this isaccomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in thepresence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, orappointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on hisbehalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unlessmade with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of theprocedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,shall be inadmissible in evidence.

We further said in Gamboa v. Judge Cruz 25 that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of aninvestigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/orconfessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person beinginterrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coercedadmissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense." Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statementelicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. Custodial investigation is the stagewhere the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began tofocus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated bylaw enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of hisfreedom of action in any significant way. 26

Indeed, the instant case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De Jesus 27 where we saidthat admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel

although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawedunder the Constitution.

The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel,public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedlyadverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when theyexecuted their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible inevidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel . As a legalofficer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipalityin carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people , including the maintenance of peace andorder. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accusedwithout running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannotrepresent the accused during custodial investigations. 28

What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused that they weremauled into owning the crime. Based on the records, we are strongly drawn to the belief that violence indeed attended the extraction of statements from the accused.

For, why did the investigators not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even before attempting to elicitstatements that would incriminate them? Why did the investigators not advise the accused that if theycould not afford the services of counsel they could be provided with counsel free of charge beforeconducting any investigation? Why did the investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests


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of the accused for medical assistance? How did accused Sedigo get his "black eye" which even Pat.Baldejera admitted? How and why did accused-appellant Bandula suffer a fractured rib?

We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions. This Court is greatly disturbed with the waythe accused were treated or maltreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of theaccused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to theirvoluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto . 29

JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner , vs . FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, respondent .[G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000]

PANGANIBAN, J .:

When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing mustbe conducted by the trial judge before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, theorder granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. In parricide, theaccused cannot be considered an offended party just because he was married to the deceased. In theinterest of justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of the victim may bedeemed to be an "offended party"; hence, she has the legal personality to challenge the void order of the trial court. Jlexj

The Facts of the Case

After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso. Joselito was charged with parricide. Thereafter he asked for a review of theprosecutors resolution [before] the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied. moved forreconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ.

Failing before DOJ, the accused on February 6, 1992, filed in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an"Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest". The Motion was granted andthe case was set for reinvestigation by another prosecutor

Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was assigned for reinvestigation, found noreason to disturb the findings of the previous prosecutor and recommended the remand of the caseto the court for arraignment and trial.

Accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte ( Ex Abundanti Cautela ) to Post Bail. The Public Prosecutorregistered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bailat P150,000.00.

private complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accuseds deceased wife, filed an "UrgentMotion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail. Not obtaining any resolution on her Motion To LiftOrder Allowing Accused to Post Bail, private complainant filed this petition [before the CA]."

As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private respondents Petition for Certiorari . Hence,this recourse to us via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [5]

The Issues

Whether or not trial court erred in granting bail? YES.

The Courts Ruling

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offensespunishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailableby sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
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not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shallnot be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of thecriminal prosecution."

Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion perpetua , he arguedbefore the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. Hecontended that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that theprosecution evidence against him was not strong.

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing hadbeen conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found thatonly ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order grantingbail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate anyevidence. We agree with the CA.

Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo [8] that the judge had the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: Supreme

"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showingthat the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly beexercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since thediscretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properlybe weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that aproper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted tothe court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his ownevidence in rebuttal.

x x x x x x x x x

"Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted todetermine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Asummary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and consideringthe evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing whichis merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On suchhearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as tothe weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor willit speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be thereinoffered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the courtwhich may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantialmatters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and crossexamination. If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be aviolation of procedural due process." (Emphasis supplied.)

"The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the Court ruled thateven if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion forbail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which itmay infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused."

"The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is leftto the sound discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not ahearing should be held but in the appreciation and evaluation of the prosecutions evidence of guiltagainst the accused. x x x A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in aposition to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong."
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"It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.However, such discretion may only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or not he should be granted liberty."

Basco v. Rapatalo [13] summarized several cases [14] that emphasized the mandatory character of ahearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the trial judge insuch petition: Esm

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him tosubmit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;

"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not theprosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strongfor the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,supra);

"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on thesummary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);

"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval

of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."

Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for theprosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether suchevidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered anaspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidatethe grant or the denial of the application for bail. [15]

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals wascorrect in reversing him.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES

G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008Facts:

On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning todestabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedlybetween the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of theCommission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.

Later, in a Malacaang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape, onesupposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, "doctored" or altered version, which wouldsuggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results inthe Presidents favor.

It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but subsequentlymade a retraction.

On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequentlyreleased an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purportedconversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC CommissionerGarcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/134504.html#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/134504.html#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/134504.html#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/134504.html#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/134504.html#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/mar2000/134504.html#_ftn15


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Respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who hadcopies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liableunder the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He alsostated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject toarrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed intheir presence.

In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to goafter media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of thecontents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes inthe 2004 national elections.

Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine DailyInquirer and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was ableto disseminate the contents of the tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting theeditors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, "I [have] asked theNBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned."

On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARSON PROGRAM STANDARDS

NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP).NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP issueda Joint Press Statement.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents SecretaryGonzales and the NTC, "praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, asextraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutionaland oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents.

Issues:

(a) Does the petitioner has a legal standing of the case?

(b) What is the extent of the right to information of the public?

(c) Whether free speech and freedom of the press have been infringed?

Held:

The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing

Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts andstatements made by respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and a freepress. For another, the recipients of the press statements have not come forwardneither interveningnor joining petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondentNTC that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to itsaddressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping withthe Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that theyhave not abused the discretion given to them.


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Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society, it brushes aside technicalities of procedure and takecognizance of this petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights,the freedom of expression.

Re-examining the law on freedom of speech, of expression and of the press

Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democraticgovernment, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economicfreedom or other liberties.

This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognitionnow enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.

In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamentalpostulate of our constitutional system. This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, thatfreedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom. Moreover, ourhistory shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was, atbottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms. For it is

only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened judgments.

Abstraction of Free Speech

Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing politicalbeliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in theexisting climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.

To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage thearticulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view"induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs peopleto anger."

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes,and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, soas to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutionalprotection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political,economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or sharedby a majority.

While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause,the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedomaccorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.

Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speechand a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex societypreclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridgesuch freedom. For freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an "unbridled license that givesimmunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse thisfreedom."


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Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulationby the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society.

Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissiblescope of restrictions on various categories of speech.

A study of free speech jurisprudencewhether here or abroadwill reveal that courts have developeddifferent tests as to specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversivespeech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media; libelousspeech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic speech;speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and petition.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once arational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the dangercontemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balanceconflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed considerationof the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear andpresent danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there issubstantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.

This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremelyserious and the degree of imminence extremely high."

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clearand present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that wehave generally adhered to the clear and present danger test.

In Focus: Freedom of the Press

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of publicaffairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of freespeech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life maysuffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear

conscience.

Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra protection. Indeed,the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions of writers are classified as intellectualand proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain aperiodical publication are liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials.

Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized fouraspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom frompunishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation.

At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute priorrestraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge, considering that the cases in our

jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the governmental actor issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always about whetherthe restraint was justified by the Constitution.

And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against thecircumstances in which they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with which toevaluate.


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Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

Finally, comes respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground that broadcastmedia enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print media.

The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other. Contrasted with theregime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and traditi

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