__**Politics

Politics L—Race Surveillance

The plan is massively unpopular – huge opposition to restrictions on informants Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

While legislation at either the federal or state level could impose judicial supervision requirements and legal standards on the use of informants, the enactment of such legislation seems as unlikely in the current political climate as a reversal of the Hoffa and White cases by the Supreme Court . In 2006, Congress reauthorized the expiring provisions of

the Patriot Act n219 with few changes, despite strong opposition. n220 In the fall [*173] of 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, n221 which, among other things, withdrew the possibility of using the writ of habeas

corpus in cases arising from detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. n222 In addition, the summer of 2007 saw the enactment of legislation that provided additional procedures for the National Security Agency to acquire foreign intelligence through a warrantless wiretapping program. n223

The state laws regulating the use of informants, discussed above, were passed many years ago, n224 and, in more recent years, states have leaned in the other direction, passing their own "Patriot Acts." n225 In all, statutory restraints on the use of informants seem unlikely in today's political climate because a political opponent could easily accuse a legislator advocating such restraints as being soft on terrorism or handcuffing our police and national security forces. Professor Tom Lininger, a scholar who has recognized the complex and difficult issues presented by the use of informants and other law

enforcement surveillance tactics in mosques, n226 agrees that the judicial and legislative routes to reform seem unpromising . n227 He suggests instead the creation of provisions in

state codes of legal ethics that would "prohibit prosecutors from supervising the surveillance and infiltration of religious organizations absent a specific suspicion of criminal activity by the [*174] organization or its members." n228 He argues that because law enforcement agents increasingly work with and rely upon the advice and consent of prosecutors when conducting investigations, n229 prosecutorial ethics rules could serve a gatekeeping function, stopping law enforcement officers from using intrusive surveillance tactics without a specific suspicion of criminal activity. n230

Cuba Politics—Public Health Impact

Normalization key to public health access in Cuba – the status squo causes widespread suffering and death Ollstein 7/1 (Alice, Political Reporter at ThinkProgress. She graduated from Oberlin College in 2010 and has been reporting in DC ever since, covering the Supreme Court, Congress and national elections. Her work has aired on Free Speech Radio News, All Things Considered and Telesur. Alice is originally from Santa Monica, California, “How The U.S.-Cuba Reconciliation Could Save Lives In Both Countries,” http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/07/01/3676059/us-cuba-reconciliation-save-lives-countries/, CMR)

On Wednesday, President Barack Obama announced the U.S. and Cuba will officially reopen their respective embassies by the end of July, ending a nearly six-decade impasse that began at the height of the Cold War. “We don’t have to be imprisoned by the past,” the president told

reporters. “When something isn’t working, we can — and will — change.” Though the United States’ economic embargo against Cuba remains in place, and can only be lifted by an act of Congress, the diplomatic normalization could have a major impact on medical care in both countries . Dr. Roberto Morales, Cuba’s Minister of Public Health, happened to be in Washington, D.C. on the day of the announcement, and

told reporters,in Spanish: “We believe in sharing what we have, and this normalization will allow us to exchange experiences and knowledge and construct projects that respond to problems we have in both countries .” He added, “It will also help people better understand the reality of the Cuban health

system, which is free, accessible, regional, and doesn’t discriminate against anyone, no matter the color of their skin or the political beliefs.” Morales said when the Cuban revolution overthrew Fulgencio Batista’s regime in 1959, most of the island’s doctors fled to the United States. But since then, the government has significantly invested in providing free medical school, free health care, and free medication to the island. Today, Cuba has a lower infant mortality rate than the U.S. and about an equal life expectancy. The country also has the lowest HIV rate in the Americas, according to the United Nations, and just this week became the first country in the world to eliminate the transmission of HIV and syphilis from mothers to children. Today, Cuba collaborates with 60 other countries in the field of health, and more than 25,000 Cuban doctors are

currently serving abroad — taking a lead role in everything from Africa’s Ebola crisis to Haiti’s Cholera outbreak. Still, Morales said, the U.S. embargo has limited their public health efforts .

“The effect of the economic, financial and commercial embargo against Cuba has cost us more than 60 billion dollars. What we can’t calculate is the pain and suffering it has also caused. We hope that it can be lifted so that we can acquire the technologies that we currently can’t buy, that the Cuban people really need.” An Amnesty International investigation found that Cuba’s inability to import some supplements and vitamins has contributed to “a high prevalence of iron deficiency anemia” in the population , while access to breast cancer drugs and other medicine has been severely restricted. Because the embargo bans the export of medicines and medical equipment from the U.S. or any U.S.-owned

company to Cuba, the government has had to learn how to produce the majority of their vaccines and medications domestically. This includes major medical breakthroughs — like an affordable lung cancer vaccine — that the U.S. is already scrambling to get its hands on. Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA), who is pushing bills in Congress to end the embargo, wrote after a recent trip to Cuba about seeing a demonstration for a treatment for diabetic food ulcers. “While I was in Cuba, I saw a treatment that reduces the risk of amputation by more than 70 percent, and is being used in

some 20 countries,” she said. “Should we not be seeking all available treatments for this horrible condition? Let’s renew relations with Cuba and open the door for new ,

improved and more effective medical treatments. In addition, we should be looking to Cuban medical institutions to help train our nation’s doctors. Cuba’s doctors are some of the best in the world

and its medical training institutions are among the world’s finest.” Obama called directly on Congress Wednesday to vote to end the embargo that bars most exports of food, medicine and other goods to Cuba . “It’s long past time for us to realize that this approach doesn’t work. It hasn’t worked for 50 years,” he said. “It shuts America out of Cuba’s

future, and it only makes life worse for the Cuban people .”

Health care should be valued as a moral right – we outweigh Jones 10 (Cynthia M. Jones, PhD, “The Moral Problem of Health Disparities,” Am J Public Health. 2010 April; 100(Suppl 1): S47–S51., http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2837423/, CMR)

But is there a moral right to health care ? Such a right may be established by the application of ethical theories and principles. Additional support can be drawn from statements such as article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and from documents such as Healthy People 2000 and Healthy People 2010. And, as already mentioned, our legally established rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are rendered moot if we do not possess the basic health required to exercise these rights, a basic level of which can more easily be obtained by the White, middle-class majority in the United States than by members of racial/ethnic minority groups. It seems, then, that a moral right to health care can be established on the basis of these distinct sources.

Cuba Politics—Ethics/K Impact

Normalization key to reduce widespread suffering of the Cuban people Kovalik 13—labor and human rights attorney, and teaches International Human Rights at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Senior Associate General Counsel of the United Steelworkers, eceived the David W. Mills Mentoring Fellowship from Stanford University School of Law and was the recipient of the Project Censored Award for his article exposing the unprecedented killing of trade unionists in Colombia. He has written extensively on the issue of international human rights and U.S. foreign policy for the Huffington Post and Counterpunch and has lectured throughout the world on these subjects. (Daniel, The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba, June 28th, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/)ellipsis in original

If it weren’t bad enough that the U.S. has imposed an illegal embargo against Cuba for over 50 years , it has also tried to prevent those interested in learning

about this embargo (more accurately termed a blockade because the U.S. aggressively enforces it against third countries to stop them from trading with the island) from reading Salim Lamrani’s new book, The Economic War Against Cuba. Thus, according to Opera Mundi, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Office Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) – the government agency tasked with enforcing the blockade against Cuba – seized the funds aBritish NGO, the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, attempted to wire to purchase 100 copies of this book from Monthly Review Press. (1) OFAC also demanded that this same NGO describe its relationship with Cuba in detail. This episode is emblematic of the absurd lengths to which the U.S. government will go to stop the world from dealing with Cuba. As an initial matter, author Salim Lamrani, a professor at the Sorbonne in Paris, explains that the U.S. war against post-revolutionary Cuba began on March 17, 1960 – one month before Cuba established relations with Moscow. Lamrani relates that this war, declared by President Eisenhower, was “built on several pillars: the cancellation of the Cuban sugar quota, an end to the deliveries of energy resources such as oil, the continuation of the arms embargo imposed in March 1958, the establishment of a campaign of terrorism and sabotage, and the organization of a paramilitary force designed to invade the island overthrow

Fidel Castro.” This war would then be expanded by President Kennedy in 1962 to include the unprecedented economic blockade against Cuba – a blockade which continues to this day, over 20 years after the collapse of the

Soviet Union. This is important, for it demonstrates what Noam Chomsky has argued numerous times before: that during the Cold War the U.S. intentionally pushed Third World countries guilty of declaring their independence from U.S. hegemony towards the Soviet Union so as to manufacture a convenient pretext for U.S. belligerence. And, the blockade initially imposed by Kennedy did just that.

As Lamrani explains, “[o]n September 16, 1962, Kennedy developed a blacklist that included all ships having commercial relations with Cuba, regardless of their country of origin, and banned them from docking in a U.S. port. These measures drastically reduced the links between Cuba and

the Western World and increased the island’s dependence upon the USSR.” Lamrani concludes that the results of this relentless 50-year blockade have cost Cuba more than $751 billion, and has “affected all sectors of Cuban society and all categories of the population, especially the most vulnerable: children, the elderly, and women . Over 70 percent of all Cubans have lived in a climate of permanent economic hostility.” Indeed,

the stated purpose of the blockade all along has been to inflict suffering on the Cuban people to achieve the U.S.’s political objective of regime – the sine a qua non of terrorism . Thus, Lamrani quotes Lester D. Mallory, U.S. Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, who wrote on August 6, 1960: The majority of the Cuban people support Castro. There is no effective political opposition. . . . The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection and hardship. . . . every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba . . . a line of action which . . . makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of

government. According to this plan, which continues to this day, the blockade has caused immense suffering amongst the Cuban civilian population. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of medicine where Cubans are denied critical U.S. pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies – a huge deprivation given that the U.S., according to Lamrani, holds 80% of the patents in the medical sector. And

so, Lamrani sets forth a laundry list of examples in which Cubans have been deprived critical medical aid due to the blockade: *Cuban children suffering from cancer of the retina cannot receive effective treatment because the surgical microscopes and other equipment needed for this treatment are sold exclusively by the U.S. company, Iris Medical Instruments. *The National Institute of Oncology and Radiobiology in Havana cannot use radioactive isotope plaques for the treatment of retinal cancer as they are sold exclusively by U.S. companies, thereby requiring doctors to remove the affected eyes of children altogether rather than treat and preserve them. *Nearly 1600 Cubans a year are denied effective diagnosis of cancerous tumors because Cuba cannot obtain the necessary German-made optical coherence tomography – an item prohibited by the embargo because it contains some American-made components. *Cubans are denied the drug temozolomide (Temodar) necessary for the effective treatment of tumors of the central nervous system. *Cuban children are denied the benefit of the U.S.-made Amplatzer device which

could help them to avoid open heart surgery. *Cubans were denied $4.1 million for treating AIDS, Tuberulosis and Malaria when these monies were seized by the U.S. from an NGO which had earmarked those monies for Cuba.

*Cubans were denied the funds designated by the United Nations Program for Development for Cuba’s health care system when those monies were seized by the U.S. *Cubans are denied critical drugs for treating bone cancer and HIV AIDS. According to the New England Journal of Medicine, as cited by Lamrani, “The Cuban and Iraqi instances make it abundantly clear that economic sanctions are, at their

core, a war against public health .” And still, as the Journal goes on to explain, Cuba has, against the formidable obstacles set up by the embargo, managed to maintain one of the best health systems in the world. As the Journal notes, The Cuban health care system . . . is

exceptional for a poor country and represents an important political accomplishment of the Castro government. Since 1959, Cuba has invested heavily in health care and now has twice as many physicians per capita as the United States and health indicators on a par with those in most

developed nations – despite the U.S. embargo that severely reduces the availability of medications and medical technology. And indeed, Cuba, despite the blockade, continues to give unprecedented assistance to other poor nations through its medical internationalism , sending doctors to 70 different countries throughout the world, including to Haiti where,

according to The New York Times, it has been on the forefront in the fight against cholera since the 2010 earthquake. In addition, for the past 21 years, Cuba has been treating 26,000 Ukrainian citizens, mostly children, affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident at its Tarara international

medical center in Havana. Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts. Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting: Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cuba’s economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even

more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island. The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade. He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place.

Maintaining sanctions is inherently unethical – changing US policy is key Sjoberg 2k—Associate Professor of Political Science and affiliate faculty in Women's Studies at the University of Florida. She has previously taught and researched at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Duke University, Boston College, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Brandeis University, and Merrimack College. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and Gender Studies from the University of Southern California, and a law degree from Boston College. Chair of the International Studies Association Committee on the Status of Women (Laura, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF SANCTIONS, http://www.laurasjoberg.com/BA.pdf)

The United States’ power-over mindset is not just evident in its direct relationship with Iraq, but also evident in the principles behind the institution of sanctions policy for security reasons. The security that is being prioritized is the security of those within the borders of the United States of America, and the quality of life that is being sacrificed is that of people outside those borders. The idea of national sovereignty as the location of the privilege of security is contrary to a feminist interpretation of international relations .

While a feminist interpretation would not necessarily abolish the concept of the state, it would reject the prioritization of one state over another. The feminist interpretation would value equality above absolute security for the few, and would value understanding and cooperation over competitive power .

Sanctions do not fit this model of understanding of the lack of hierarchy of people around the world. The feminist redefinition of power, as mentioned in Chapter 1, necessarily attacks the hierarchy involved in elitism, and dominant-subordinate relationships. Sanctions reinforce elitism in two ways. First, nations cannot have a sanctioner-sanctioned relationship without having a dominant-subordinate relationship . The sanctioner must be dominant, as coercion cannot be described in other terms but an attempt to assert dominance to force change. The sanctioned, even if it does not give into the demands of sanctions, is subordinated, as their quality of life and membership in the international community are damaged by the simple existence of sanctions. While the sanctioned may not give in, they are still subordinated by the destruction of sanctions, which they are powerless to do anything about. The dominant sanctioner makes the rules that the subordinate sanctioned is required to follow, or else. And the ‘or else’ is as subordinating as following the rules. Second, the dominant is fighting for control of the subordinate with the subordinate. Elites compete with non-elites for control of even the most meager things, as power- over is the sustaining breath of elitism. An ambiguity about the feminist

recalculation of international relations’ relationship with sanctions is on the issue of national sovereignty. Jill Steans’ ideas about the problems of sovereignty as it relates to the prioritization

of national interests, an area where we clearly can critique the sanctions policy. But this criterion is a double-edged sword, because national sovereignty is the reason that Saddam Hussein claims he has a right to stop United States’ weapons inspectors from coming into Iraq and looking for weapons. Still, there are differences between these

concepts of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty that the United States utilizes in making sanctions policy is one that prioritizes the possible violation of the sanctity of its borders over the lives of millions of people who live outside of them. The concept of sovereignty that Iraq uses is requiring that another power cannot violate its borders for reasons ultimately damaging to Iraq’s security. In other words, Saddam Hussein’s claim to sovereignty is on balance defensive, and the United States’ claim to sovereignty is on balance aggressive. Also, I think that there is space for a feminist viewpoint concerning international relations to recognize Iraq’s claim to sovereignty and not to recognize the United States’ claim to sovereignty, even if they were equivalent. Because there is a constant power inequality in international relations between the United States and Iraq, where the United States is always more powerful. This power inequality is a barrier

to the sort of interactions between nations that feminist international relations envisions. Recognizing the claim of Iraq while ignoring the claim of the United States

would be a transgression against the normal power structures of international relations, a transgression that would contribute to the deconstruction of those structures. Recognizing that sanctions operate with a power-over mindset of international relations causes a feminist viewpoint of international relations to critique them. Stopping sanctions from being United States policy towards the sanctioned nations will be a step towards changing the unequal power dynamic between the United States

and those nations.

__**Negotiation CP

1NC Negotiation CP

Text: The United States federal government should condition federal funding for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Department of Homeland Security, and state and local police departments on initiation of a process of negotiated rule-making for law enforcement conduct regarding use of informants in Muslim-American communities. Recommended points of dialogue should include, but not be limited to, distinguishing between active and passive informant activity and regulating accordingly, prohibiting encouragement, using informants only as a last resort, and instituting mutual education.

The counterplans negotiated approach solves best and will be adopted by local law enforcement – the process alone enhances local cooperation and trust Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

B. An Attainable Alternative: The Negotiated ApproachIf change with respect to the use of informants seems unlikely to happen via either judicial or legislative action, there is still another way in which change in how law enforcement uses informants in mosques might yet occur. This solution depends not on raw political power or legal reasoning but on something else: the recognition of how the interests of law enforcement and the community overlap. n234 Viewed correctly, these [*176] mutual interests can serve as the springboard for the negotiation of a set of agreed-upon local practices for using informants. Such negotiation could get law enforcement what it most needs: good (or at least

workable) relations with Muslim communities, a continued flow of information from these same communities, and an ability to use informants when a real need exists for them. This process could also

get Muslim communities at least some of what they need: a formal recognition of their opposition to the use of informants, as well as protection from some of the most egregious (as they may see it) uses of informants against them. Law enforcement would give up the right to use informants with total freedom, and the community would find itself protected, to a degree, from the possibility that police would place informants into mosques or other religious settings without a solid, fact-based reason. n235 The path

would be difficult, fraught with obstacles, and, in certain respects, downright unsatisfactory. But it represents the most promising - and

perhaps the only - way forward for both law enforcement and Muslim communities .1. What the Negotiated Approach Is and What It Might Strive to Attaina) Description of the ProcessWhat might such a negotiated approach look like? To start, such arrangements would be both local and informal. Any given mosque or Muslim organization would work toward agreement on the use of informants with its local FBI field office, local agents of the Department of Homeland Security, and the local police department (if the local [*177] department involves itself in this type of informant-based investigation). n236 A negotiation between locals on both sides of the issue stands the best chance of succeeding, because those involved in the negotiations may know each other from efforts already made to build bridges and connections. The negotiations themselves can serve as trust-building measures , enhancing and strengthening relationships that already exist , or helping to create new relationships. These efforts would be informal in the sense that they would strive not for the imposition of a strict set of legal standards - for example, a free-standing system for procuring "informant warrants" - but rather for a set of agreed-upon practices that the parties would then follow. If one of the parties came to feel that

the agreed-upon practices no longer work, the parties could, together, agree to adjust them . Best and

most importantly, these practices could be tailored to fit local facts and circumstances - the specific realities that both the community and law enforcement agencies face daily.Why would any law enforcement agency agree to negotiate away any of its power to use informants as part of an arrangement with precisely the people whom it may want to spy on? The fact that some police agencies already use internal guidelines to - or at least attempt to - limit some of the ways in which they use informants, highlights the idea that limiting agency power to something less than what the Fourth Amendment would allow can in fact

represent the best available practice. n237 Given that the FBI, NYPD, and other law enforcement groups want something from the Muslim communities - continued and increased cooperation, especially intelligence on suspicious activities - and given that use of informants in an unregulated fashion puts those very benefits in jeopardy by undermining connections with the community, law enforcement may prove more willing than one might initially assume to engage in such a negotiation.

Community outreach results in locally tailored law-enforcement practices that preserve Muslim-American cooperation and counter-terrorism flexibility Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

These four suggestions - distinguishing between active and passive informant activity and regulating accordingly, prohibiting encouragement, using informants only as a last resort, and instituting mutual education - just scratch the surface of what police agencies and the members of American Muslim communities could agree to. Given the local focus of the negotiations, many concerns particular to the jurisdiction might also surface. These focused elements would constitute a major advantage for this process, because the better tailored the process is to its own context, the better its chances for success. The local negotiation of a set of practices acceptable to both sides in the debate presents a workable alternative , and one that takes advantage of mutually reinforcing needs of law enforcement and the Muslim communities in our country, as well as the common need to protect ourselves from terrorism .

The net benefit is terrorism – informants empirically provide valuable intelligence necessary to thwart attacks – regulation of surveillance is preferable to total prohibition Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

ConclusionThe possibility of terrorists on American soil, particularly the prospect of homegrown terrorists, means that we should expect law enforcement to use every legal tool at its disposal to gather intelligence necessary to thwart attacks. Given the law as it now stands, these tools include the almost complete discretion for police to plant and use informants. Thus, we [*190] should expect to see informants do almost anything to succeed in producing cases against targets.Every person living in this country, whether she is an American citizen or not, has a strong interest in securing the nation against terrorist attacks. However, just because the law says that police can use informants at almost any time, in any setting, does not mean that they should do so. And the particular contours of the struggle in which we now find ourselves illuminates this can/should distinction as few others have. As the law enforcement officials and intelligence officers in charge of our safety and security know better than almost anyone, our ability to track

potential terrorists and stop them before they act depends wholly on the availability of intelligence. Because the best, if not the only, source of crucial intelligence on potential extremists with Islamic backgrounds will continue to be American Muslim communities, we must have solid, well-grounded relationships with these communities, both native and foreign-born.These relationships are not just a matter of public relations, political correctness, or appeasement. Rather, these communities must feel that they can regard law enforcement as trusted partners, because such relationships create the avenues and opportunities for the passing of critical information from the communities on the ground to law enforcement. The widespread use of informants in Muslim institutions, particularly mosques, will corrode these important relationships by sowing distrust. By causing Muslims to think that the FBI or any other police agency regards them not as trusted partners but as potential suspects, fear displaces trust. Moreover, fear will cause members of the Muslim community to become less likely to come forward with information - just as the members of any community would, given this type of scrutiny. On the one hand, we simply cannot afford for this to happen, but, on the other hand, we know that there will be cases - indeed,

from the government's point of view, there already have been cases - in which the use of informants can play a crucial role .

Given these tensions, as well as the mutual interests of law enforcement and Muslim communities in the U nited S tates, the situation presents an ideal context in which to try regulating the government's use of informants through local , negotiated agreements on acceptable practices . In at least the four ways identified

here, law enforcement and Muslim communities could agree to limit the use of informants, without either ruling out their use or allowing their unrestricted use. Both sides would benefit. While the approach proposed

here would certainly face substantial obstacles, it represents a chance to recalibrate an important aspect of the government's power to investigate, while at the same time preserving the sanctity of the community's institutions of worship to the greatest extent possible.

2NC Negotiation CP—Funding Trick**

“Success oriented funding” guarantees enforcement and implementation Jawando 14 (Michele L. Jawando, Vice President for Legal Progress at American Progress, and Chelsea Parsons, Vice President of Guns and Crime Policy at American Progress, “4 Ideas That Could Begin to Reform the Criminal Justice System and Improve Police-Community Relations,” Dec 14, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/report/2014/12/18/103578/4-ideas-that-could-begin-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system-and-improve-police-community-relations/, CMR)

4. Increase the federal government’s oversight of police conductThe day-to-day operations of police departments across the country are largely handled at the state and local level. The federal government does have a role in local policing , primarily through the provision of federal funding for law enforcement for a variety of programs such as crime deterrence initiatives, hiring of officers, purchasing equipment, training, and creation of cross-jurisdiction task forces. A Brennan Center for Justice

analysis found that at least $3.8 billion is given to state and local governments each year in federal criminal justice grants. The federal government also becomes involved when a complaint is made to the Department of Justice Office of Civil Rights about issues relating to police officer conduct. The complaints regard either an individual incident in which an officer allegedly violated the civil rights of a community member or an incident in which an entire police department has engaged in a “pattern or practice” of violating the civil rights of the community. In those cases, the DOJ conducts extensive investigations and, upon finding violations of civil rights, commences or threatens litigation against the offending jurisdictions, which often results in consent decrees that reform police practices in the jurisdiction.However, the DOJ engages in relatively little proactive activity to shape police practices on the ground in communities across the country. While the DOJ may enter into a detailed consent decree with a particular jurisdiction that outlines specific policies and practices that officers must implemented on the ground, it does not offer this guidance on a broader basis to law-enforcement agencies across the country. The DOJ should take a more proactive role in providing guidance to local police agencies about best practices —for issues such as use of force, racially discriminatory practices, or officer accountability—before police department practices deteriorate to the point of systematically violating the civil rights of members of the community. While the DOJ has issued some general guidance for police departments over the years, there are certainly lessons learned from pattern and practice investigations of individual police departments—along with

innovative new policies and practices that have arisen from those investigations—that could and should be shared with law enforcement across the country. In recent months, the DOJ has done more of this by issuing guidance to law enforcement on maintaining order during protests and the appropriate circumstances under which federal officers may consider a person’s race or ethnicity.

The DOJ should take a more active approach in setting expectations for police conduct nationwide and ensure compliance with those standards by conditioning participation in federal task forces on the adoption of certain standards, policies, and training and through penalties in federal funding . The Brennan Center recently released a report offering an innovative new approach for rethinking federal funding for law enforcement called

“ Success-Oriented Funding ” that would better connect provision of federal funding with achievement of clearly-established goals. The federal government has an obligation to ensure that police officers in communities around the country are not violating the civil rights of the people they are charged to serve and protect and should be more proactive in ensuring that police agencies are properly training and supervising their officers before individual misconduct rises to the level of systemic violations of civil rights.

2NC Negotiation CP—Solves Cooperation

Negotiations process solves – restores trust between law enforcement and Muslim communities while preserving use of informants to check terrorism – here’s a description of what that entails: Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

b) What Might Negotiations Strive to Attain ?

What exactly might the Muslim community and the police try to agree upon? Both the interests of the parties and the contours of different types of anti-terror investigations suggest some initial goals.[*178] i) Passive Versus Active Informants and the Standards for Using ThemFirst, we must examine the methods by which, and the circumstances within which, law enforcement might use informants. For the sake of simplicity, let us break the methods of using informants - that is, the types of informants - into two categories: passive informants and active informants. In passive informant activity, the informant attends or participates in any activity - goes to a political rally, takes part in a worship service, listens to a speech or a sermon, or the like - to the same extent that any private citizen might. The passive informant observes and reports to the police what she sees and hears. In other words, the passive informant acts as a walking camera and audio recorder, n238 absorbing everything around her and reporting what she sees. The passive informant cannot target any particular individual, and she cannot do anything more than observe. She might interact with other individuals who are present at the scene of the observation, but only in ways that prove necessary to deflect suspicion.An active informant, on the other hand, would target a particular person or specific group for observation and interaction. She would seek to actively connect with these individuals in an effort to gather evidence of wrongdoing, plotting, or other behavior. An active informant might "work" a targeted individual closely, perhaps befriending the target and her family, as long as the informant did not in any way press the target toward illegal conduct. n239[*179] The critical distinction between passive and active informants could serve as the basis for negotiating the circumstances under which law enforcement could use informants. The parties could pledge to have informants work only in a strictly passive way, unless and until some proof of activity indicating possible terrorist or criminal behavior emerged during passive observation - exactly as the FBI's rules used to dictate under the Levi Guidelines. n240 The idea would be an informant who would blend in completely and act no differently from any other person present.Given that we cannot exclude the possibility that religious groups might (knowingly or unknowingly) harbor small groups or individuals bent on terrorism, law enforcement should retain the ability to use informants in these settings, but only passively, as a way to check leads or find out if any activity exists which deserves some greater degree of attention . A negotiated agreement would allow law enforcement to have the presence it sometimes needs, and to have it without any proof of wrongdoing; in other words, they could use passive informants at their discretion, as they may now under existing law. At the same time, law enforcement would agree to exercise this power only passively, so as to minimize intrusion and interference. This arrangement seems like a good idea from both the point of view of law enforcement success, because it allows police and security agencies to look and listen for any indicators of real trouble, and from the point of view of the communities, because they would have assurance that the worship and fellowship that form the core of activities at religious institutions would not encounter government interference or disruption, unless absolutely necessary. n241[*180] Something more would be required for law enforcement to make use of active informants under a negotiated agreement. In particular, the use of active informants would require some evidence. Law enforcement could use active informants only if some reasonable, fact-based suspicion existed to link a particular suspect or suspects to engagement in terrorist activity or other criminal conduct. That is, the police would agree not to use an active informant just to make sure nothing is happening. Rather, the use of active informants would require some minimal evidence - something more than a hunch, feeling, or intuition - indicating that illegal activity has been, is, or will be taking place. Police officers involved in any investigation should have little difficulty understanding this reasonable, fact-based suspicion rule because it comes from Terry v. Ohio, under which courts have

used the same standard to test police officers' decisions to stop and frisk suspects for almost forty years. n242 A system regulating informant use according to whether the facts would support a passive or active informant operation would allow the government to use relatively unintrusive passive informants without seeking permission; more intrusive (i.e., active) informant activity would require fact-based suspicion that terrorist or other criminal activity might be afoot. This bifurcation would give the government the flexibility it needs to gather information or investigate leads, but it would also require some evidence to conduct active informant investigations and limit these investigations to situations potentially posing danger.[*181] ii) The "Entrapment" Problem: No EncouragementSecond, communities and police departments could use negotiated agreements to address the issue of entrapment. As earlier discussion makes clear, neither the entrapment defense nor its cousin, the claim of outrageous government conduct, does much to safeguard targets of police informants against government or informant overreaching. n243 At worst, entrapment actually permits the government to create crimes as long as the defendant has the appropriate "predispostion." n244The lack of protection these defenses provide targeted individuals in practice begins to rankle when viewed with an eye more lay than legal. For example, in Hamid Hayat's case in Lodi, California, the jury convicted Hayat of providing material support or resources to terrorists, even though an informant deliberately and purposely pushed and goaded Hayat to attend a terrorist training camp. n245 Even the U.S. Attorney whose office charged and convicted Hayat stated that he wished that "other things had occurred" during the course of conversations between the informant and Hayat. n246Cases like these may not constitute entrapment in the legal sense, but they leave the impression that law enforcement may not play fair in pursuit of a conviction. Put another way, just because the police can use informants in this aggressive way without running afoul of entrapment law, does not mean that law enforcement should do just that. All Americans want law enforcement to apprehend dangerous terrorists and halt their plans. However, the government's use of overly aggressive and possibly unfair tactics to pursue individuals who seem to pose no real threat to our national security undermines the public's confidence in anti-terror work. Whether right or wrong, these perceptions that the government has not played fair do damage to law enforcement's ability to obtain cooperation from the public.Thus, as an element of their negotiations, police and Muslim communities could agree that informants would not act in any way to encourage or shape the behavior of those under surveillance, either through incitement or agitation. In some instances, it might be difficult to [*182] tell the difference between encouragement and providing an opportunity for criminal conduct, but an agreed-upon rule against pushing or goading targets would, in most cases, not prove difficult to apply. For example, a rule of this nature would not allow the type of behavior reflected in the testimony in the Hayat case, in which the informant threatened the target and belittled him for failing to go to a terrorist camp. n247iii) Use of Informants as a Last (or at Least Latter) OptionWhen it becomes known or suspected, the placement of informants in religious institutions like mosques does considerable damage. The presence of informants, either real or imagined, can undermine religious custom and practices, undercut the ability of believers to trust each other, and pull apart the social fabric that binds co-religionists together. n248 Given the explicit First Amendment protections provided for the free exercise of religion in the United States n249 and the chilling effect that even the possibility of informant use may have, the use of informants in mosques and other religious settings ought not to occur regularly.As part of an agreement, communities and local police or the FBI might agree that, because the insertion of informants into religious institutions carries with it significant First Amendment implications and the potential for damage both to individuals and to the whole religious community spied on, the use of informants in religious settings will not be a routine practice. The agreements can establish that law enforcement can use informants in these settings only when other, less intrusive methods either have not worked or could not work, and where use of an informant will most likely produce evidence. Both law enforcement and Muslim communities gain if the use of informants becomes a tactic of last resort (or nearly so) and not a method employed regularly. For many Muslim communities, the use of informants only when other methods will not work will reassure them that they need not fear the presence of informants at every point and that the government will exercise some restraint in using this tactic. It should also maximize the chances that informants will catch those who pose a real danger and minimize the chances that informants [*183] will snare only those most susceptible to persuasion.iv) Education Across the DivideFourth, the parties might agree on a process of mutual education. For its part, law enforcement might educate Muslim groups and congregations so that they could recognize actual suspicious behavior, as opposed to simply relying on hunches about people who have unusual opinions. It has become common for police departments and the FBI to appeal to Muslim communities to report anything suspicious, much as FBI Director Mueller did in the speech quoted at the beginning of this article. n250 While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mueller's exhortation, it was also quite general. It is all very well to ask community members to report their suspicions, and even such a general request may produce leads for law enforcement. It is true that not all leads may actually help law enforcement; this is true even when all the leads in an investigation originate from law enforcement professionals. It seems likely that an untrained member of the public, if asked to provide information to the police about something as unusual as possible terrorist activity, would, in good faith, inevitably produce mostly (if not wholly) useless leads, which officers and agents must then spend their

valuable time pursuing. Without some concrete indication of what "suspicious action" means, most lay people would stand little chance of spotting the real thing.Training communities regarding the types of information that law enforcement agencies want is one way to improve the amount of useful information law enforcement receives. Moreover, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and even local police are in a good position to provide such training. For

their part, Muslim communities could educate law enforcement about social and religious customs, particularly habits of language. Considerable amounts of such cultural and religious training regarding the customs and mores of Islam, by Muslims for police and FBI agents, already takes place. n251 Many police chiefs and law enforcement administrators at all levels have expressed enthusiastic support for these efforts and stated that this type of training has greatly enhanced their agencies' capabilities, as well as relationships with the Muslim communities. n252

2NC Negotiation CP—AT: Perm Do the CP

The permutation is obviously severance – the CP just conditions federal funding on initiation of community outreach, it doesn’t ban or curtail surveillance – severance is a voting issue – makes the aff a moving target, destroys clash and education

2NC Negotiation CP—AT: Perm Do Both

Permutation “do both” does not solve the terrorism net-benefit – the plan would prohibit use of informants by ending all surveillance based on race, religion, and ethnicity – the CP preserves law enforcement flexibility

“Curtail” means to restrictWebster’s 15 – Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th Ed., “curtail”, http://www.yourdictionary.com/curtailverbTo curtail is defined as to restrict something , stop something or deprive of something.An example of curtail is when a town wants to stop drunk driving.

That refers only to outright prohibitions, not any action that has the consequence of decreasing surveillanceCaiaccio 94 (Kevin T., “Are Noncompetition Covenants Among Law Partners Against Public Policy?”, Georgia Law Review, Spring, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 807, Lexis)The Howard court began its analysis by examining the California Business and Professions Code, which expressly permits reasonable restrictive covenants among business partners. 139 The court noted that this provision had long applied to doctors and accountants and concluded that the general language of the statute provided no indication of an exception for lawyers. 140 After reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that, since it had the authority to promulgate a higher standard for lawyers, the statute alone did not necessarily control, 141 and the court therefore proceeded to examine the California Rules of Professional Conduct. 142 The court avoided the apparent conflict between the business statute and the ethics rule by undertaking a strained reading of the rule. In essence, the court held that the word "restrict" referred only to outright prohibitions , and that a mere "economic consequence" does not equal a prohibition . 143

2NC Negotiation CP—AT: Negotiations Fail

CP is on-balance the best approach – preserves valuable use of informants and restores trust – empirics prove Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

Given these obstacles, the outlook for local control of policy on informant use is decidedly mixed, but it is not hopeless . In the recent past, locally-generated ideas have proven very helpful to the FBI in some sensitive anti-terrorism efforts. For example, after the Department of Justice ordered the FBI to conduct 5000 "voluntary" interviews with young Arab and Muslim men not suspected of terrorism in late 2001, n271 many in law enforcement expressed doubts about this plan. n272 More important, many thought that the FBI would endanger the budding relationships it had built with the Arab and Muslim communities after 9/11. n273 When FBI agents and others in Detroit came up with an alternative plan - sending letters to potential interviewees - the Department of Justice showed flexibility and allowed them to try this. n274 The alternative plan was unmistakably successful ; the Detroit field office had the highest rate of successfully completed interviews of any office in the nation. n275 Thus, it is certainly possible that the FBI and its governmental parent could negotiate localized solutions to intelligence gathering.

2NC Negotiation CP—AT: Law Enforcement Reject

This applies to the AFF as well – any reason they reject the plan just proves circumvention

Law enforcement will agree to the CP – sustains Muslim-American cooperation and avoids politics Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

Both the courts and legislative bodies seem extremely unlikely to move toward greater regulation of police use of informants in this setting, n28 so any initiative must come from somewhere else. Fortunately, the

unusual circumstances of the situation m ay provide an answer. While the idea may seem counterintuitive at first, close study reveals that the interested parties - law enforcement on the one hand and Muslim communities on the other - stand in a unique relationship of reinforcing mutual need. This situation thus presents an exceptional opportunity for the negotiation of

cooperative agreements in which both sides might gain. Law enforcement might agree to (at least mildly) restrict its own ability to use informants in the most sensitive situations; in turn, the Muslim community would pledge to continue and, when possible, to increase its voluntary cooperation. All of this could be accomplished through local agreements governing the use of informants that both police and the community could accept. While negotiated limits on law enforcement power represent a novel approach to police regulation, few other possibilities for change seem promising. Even though parties traveling this path would surely encounter formidable obstacles, the status quo offers little hope of averting harm to the different but overlapping goals that law enforcement and Muslim communities have. To state the matter simply, a [*132] negotiated set of limitations on the use of informants represents the last best chance to salvage the relationships that law enforcement and Muslim communities must have in order to fight terrorism, as well as to use informants judiciously and carefully to infiltrate possible terrorist cells when real danger exists.

2NC Negotiation CP—AT: Enforcement

This applies to the AFF as well – any reason they reject the plan just proves circumvention

Yes enforcement – law enforcement have a huge incentive and will comply Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

[*187] Surely, both of these ideas constitute fair criticism. Still, both merely redirect us to the underlying premise of the whole negotiated approach. The police both want and need the cooperation of the community and the crucial intelligence that a cooperative relationship facilitates. If and when law enforcement recognizes this fact, the desire of the police to further the building of such relationships will serve as the enforcement mechanism . This will not always be enough to restrain law enforcement and force it to consistently honor its

obligations under a negotiated agreement, but it is preferable to the alternative. It is better than the current "we make the rules" approach, and certainly preferable from the perspective of the community, for which a negotiated arrangement limiting the use of informants can only be an improvement.

2NC Negotiation CP—Terrorism NB

The CP is a middle-ground approach – preserves cooperation and anti-terrorism tools Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

As it stands, the law - whether in the form of Fourth Amendment doctrine, defenses in substantive criminal law, or cases and statutes

supporting lawsuits against government surveillance - offers little help in resolving this dilemma. Further, change in either

statutes or Supreme Court doctrine that might help address the problem seems vanishingly unlikely . Locally-negotiated agreements on the use of informants represent the best alternative route toward both

security against terrorists and keeping Muslim communities inclined to assist in anti-terrorism efforts.

In these agreements, law enforcement might agree to limit some of its considerable power to use informants in exchange for the continued cooperation of the community . The article discusses how such agreements might be reached, what they might strive to do substantively, and the problems they might encounter.

AFF—Negotiation CP 2AC

Negotiated approach fails – lack of enforcement and law enforcement opposition Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

2. Obstacles and Shortcomings of the Negotiated ApproachTo be sure, the negotiated approach has flaws. It is not a perfect system for accomplishing the twin goals of winning help and intelligence for law enforcement on the one hand, and winning respect for the Muslim [*186] community on the other. As things stand, no existing solution can put these two objectives perfectly in balance. But while some degree of tension between them seems inevitable, the negotiated approach comes closest to a reasonable balance. Nevertheless, any proponent of this approach must reckon with at least three specific problems.First, the negotiated approach would carry with it substantial questions concerning enforceability. What if police agree to an arrangement with their Muslim partners, perhaps including the four points described above, but in some particular case decide that they will not abide by it, for what they believe to be good and sufficient reasons? For example, suppose that law enforcement were to hear rumors of suspicion surrounding a very religious foreigner, new to the Muslim community. Besides the religious nature of the person's appearance and practices, no known factual basis for suspicion exists. The police may simply decide that they do not want to take a chance that someone harmful will slip through their fingers, so they decide, without any reasonable suspicion, that the case calls for the use of an active informant. Should this become known, no one

- no institution, no court, no judge, no inspector, no arbiter - could do anything to enforce the rules that the police had agreed to with the Muslim community; neither the community nor anyone else would have standing to litigate the matter or

any enforceable right to take action. Without any kind of enforcement mechanism, negotiated agreements of the type proposed here would bind the police only in the loosest sense.

Second, it is impossible to ignore the unbalanced power inherent in such a negotiation. Law enforcement does not have to agree to anything; it now has all the power it needs to use informants in any way and at any time it wants, and it need not seek permission from anyone to use this power, least of all from the (Muslim) community under scrutiny. While this unilateral approach clearly has costs, n264 law enforcement may freely ignore them under the status quo if it wishes. Muslim communities, for their parts, have no power to force the police to the bargaining table, and they cannot force any change in police policy. They can only caution the police that, if they perceive informants being used and overused in their religious institutions, many Muslims will become more fearful and less trusting of law enforcement, as well as less likely to approach police with vital information. n265

Bureaucratic hurdles kill the process Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

Third, the local aspect of the negotiated approach proposed here, explained as one of its strengths, may also constitute a weakness. Because of the stratified nature of law enforcement in the United States, there would be multiple law enforcement entities with which any Muslim community wishing to negotiate an agreement would have to deal. There are local departments for cities and counties, often with overlapping [*188] jurisdiction. A local police department - even a large one, like the NYPD - could adopt its own policies on these matters. There are also federal agencies, such as the FBI, that play primary anti-terrorism roles. To make matters even more complex, the federal level is itself stratified. The FBI has fifty-six field offices around the country, as well as more than 400 regional agencies in smaller towns and cities. n266 Each one of these field offices reports to FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., and must follow national FBI policy. n267 Moreover, the FBI itself is only one part of U.S. Department of Justice, which has the final say over FBI policy. As a result, even if a local FBI

office wishes to negotiate and agree to a set of limits and rules for the use of informants, it remains less than clear whether it would have the power to do so, or whether FBI headquarters or the Department of Justice would allow it.

__**Warrants CP

1NC Warrants CP

The United States Federal Government should require warrants and probable cause for domestic surveillance on the basis of race, religion, and ethnicity.

CP minimizes abuses while preserving law enforcement capabilities – the net-benefit is terrorism Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

A. Bringing the Use of Informants Under the Warrant Clause and Getting Rid of the Hoffa and White "Assumption of the Risk" StandardOne solution would begin with the reconsideration of the Supreme Court's decisions in the Hoffa and White cases, in which the Court declared the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the government's placement and use of informants, thereby giving police unfettered discretion to use informants without having to submit the reasons for their suspicion to independent examination by a court. n206 Ordinarily, obtaining a warrant by meeting the probable cause standard constitutes the sine qua non of general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but the Court's holdings in these cases virtually eliminated the warrant requirement in the informant context. Because unfettered police discretion almost inevitably leads to abuse at some point, n207 and because of the sensitivity of placing government spies in homes, political gatherings, or religious institutions, it seems especially wise to have a judge decide whether the available evidence gives the government probable cause to support an intrusion.

Professor Tracey Maclin has made the case for subjecting the use of informants to traditional constitutional restraints, consistent with his belief that "the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power." n208 Maclin argues:

The government's authority to use informants and secret agents can and should be controlled by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Police operations involving the planting of informants in a home or the recording of private conversation [*170] should be subject to the same [rules] that currently control governmental wiretapping and bugging. n209

The type of judicial supervision that Maclin recommends would not form any significant barrier to the legitimate use of informants because the Supreme Court has stressed that lower courts should understand and apply the probable cause standard in a non-technical, non-legalistic way, through the lens of police officers making common-sense judgments. n210 As a result, requiring a warrant and probable cause would simply recognize that these intrusions have a cost and that they should occur only with a reason.

Moreover, returning to the warrant and probable cause requirements would have the salutary effect of implicitly forcing an overdue reexamination of the "assumption of the risk" doctrine the Court adopted in Hoffa and White. The idea that we should base the scope of constitutional protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment on a common law tort concept seems antiquated. Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected similar reliance on property concepts in United States v. Katz, the case that established the "reasonable expectations of privacy" test as the fountainhead of much of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more than forty years ago. n211

__**Wyden CP

2NC Wyden CP—Solves FBI**

The CP solves – the commission process will result in FBI self-regulation while preserving law enforcement flexibility to respond to terrorism Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

C. Internal Regulations

The regulation of the use of informants in religious institutions has also taken the form of internal police agency regulation . Internal police regulation can serve as an effective method of controlling police behavior. n145 The FBI, which has had internal regulations on the use of informants for decades, makes a particularly pertinent example.

During the 1970s, congressional investigations led by Senator Frank Church revealed a long pattern of abusive and illegal domestic surveillance of political, religious, and social groups. According to committee findings, "The Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power." n146 Targets of illegal government surveillance included proponents of racial and gender equality and advocates of non-violence, most notably, the [*156] Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King. n147 Besides spying on political figures, the federal government also investigated and conducted surveillance on religious groups, including church youth groups and priests' conferences. n148 But, among all of the government's illegal spying tactics, "the most pervasive surveillance technique [was] the informant. In a random sample of domestic intelligence cases, 83% involved informants [while only] 5% involved electronic surveillance." n149 Informants were often used against "peaceful, law-abiding groups," the investigation found, and informants sometimes engaged in violent activity as members of the targeted groups. n150

These abuses led the Attorney General, Edward Levi, to establish internal guidelines for the use of informants by the FBI. Beginning with the first version of these guidelines, which became known as the Levi Guidelines,

n151 the FBI restrained its investigations into political and religious groups by requiring that, to recruit or place

informants in such groups, the FBI needed "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities which involve the use of force or violence." n152

In addition, the guidelines required permission from FBI headquarters for any and all full investigations. n153 The bottom line was that the FBI, either through its own sworn agents or through informants, could not infiltrate religious groups without some factual basis to suspect that the persons concerned had taken part, or were about to take part, in a crime. n154During succeeding decades, the Department of Justice modified the guidelines several times in reaction to scandals concerning the use of informants, n155 without changing the overall structure and operations of the [*157] guidelines. In 2002, however, Attorney General John Ashcroft made major changes to the guidelines. Citing the attacks of September 11, 2001, as a justification, n156 Ashcroft issued general guidelines on crimes, racketeering, and terrorism investigations that allowed the use of informants and other types of monitoring in religious and other settings without any predicate of suspicious conduct. n157 From May of 2002 forward, therefore, the FBI no longer needed a basis in fact in order to place [*158] informants in a mosque or a church. Rather, these investigations could be undertaken without any prior reason to suspect any illegal conduct by congregants. In 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey reaffirmed the Ashcroft position with the new Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. n158 As a result, the use of internal regulation regarding informants, utilized by the FBI itself in years past, no longer presents a viable method for regulating most informant behavior in mosques or any other religious setting.Thus we are left with one overarching impression of the law that governs the use of informants. The Fourth Amendment affords law enforcement nearly full discretion to decide when and how to use informants. n159 Defenses like entrapment remain available at trial, but these defenses seem more theoretical than real in terms of what they might do to reign in informant activity. While individuals can bring civil suits, relief seems unlikely. Finally, the FBI has largely abandoned internal regulation as a way to regulate discretion over when and why agents can place informants in First Amendment-sensitive places like religious institutions.III. Benefits, but Also CostsGiven what we know now concerning the terrorist threat we face and the almost unlimited discretion that police have on this issue, it seems certain that the FBI and local police agencies will continue to place informants into Muslim communities to gather intelligence. To some degree, this is not just unavoidable, but also necessary. But it is too simplistic to view this as an unalloyed good - that is, to pretend that one can pursue the benefits of this strategy without incurring costs. We may decide that the benefits we receive outweigh the costs, but we cannot simply assume the truth of this proposition, or, worse yet, pretend that no costs exist.

On the contrary, we must acknowledge both costs and benefits , and then attempt to work out the right accommodation between them . Any perspective that includes only the benefits risks an incomplete and [*159] therefore incorrect calculus on the question of whether to use this tactic.A. The Benefit: Using Informants to Address a Risk That We Cannot Discount EntirelyGiven the fact that no terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States since September 11, 2001, and that the plots allegedly foiled since then seem much smaller in scale than the 9/11 attacks, one might conclude that no terrorist presence exists on U.S. soil. In fact, at least one authoritative source has seemed to imply

just that. n160 Yet even if there is no terrorist presence today, that does not mean that members of new cells

could not enter the U nited S tates now or in the future. Moreover, we must also ask whether "homegrown terrorists" - people from inside our country, either citizens or long-time residents - might turn to terrorism, as FBI Director Robert Mueller fears. n161 Homegrown terrorism has become a real problem in Western Europe, as demonstrated by the attacks on public transit in London in July of 2005 n162 and the assassination of the filmmaker and commentator Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands n163 - both by extremists native to those countries.Next to the scope of this problem as it presents itself in Western Europe, the United States seems to face far less danger. n164 Nevertheless, we cannot completely

discount the possibility of either sleeper cells introduced into our country or homegrown terrorism on our soil. Nor can we say that infiltration by informants could not serve as an effective , even decisive , weapon against such groups. Approximating the risk of another terrorist attack in the United States seems difficult, but, if estimating this risk is not easy, saying no risk exists is impossible, and probably foolhardy. Moreover, we need only look to recent events in this country to see that this is true. For example, the three terror suspects charged in Toledo, Ohio, seemed not to have formed any plan to launch an attack in the [*160] United States, but federal prosecutors allege that at least one actually traveled to Jordan in a failed attempt to deliver tactical assistance to the anti-American insurgents killing American soldiers in Iraq. n165In the spring of 2007, authorities made arrests in two terrorism cases in the New York region, both of which raised the specter of so-called homegrown terrorism. First, in May 2007, six foreign-born men were arrested and charged with plotting an attack on Fort Dix, in New Jersey. Of the six, all lived in the United States - some for more than two decades - highlighting law enforcement's fears about the "homegrown" nature of the danger. n166 Then, in June 2007, four men, including one naturalized American citizen, were arrested and charged with plotting to attack Kennedy Airport in New York City by bombing the jet fuel lines that supply the airport. n167 According to the government's allegations, the leader of the plot was a naturalized American citizen, who hatched the plans, conducted surveillance,

and went to Trinidad to seek financing and support from a violent Muslim group. n168 In at least these three cases - the [*161] Toledo case, the Fort Dix plot, and the targeting of Kennedy Airport - the authorities used informants to gather crucial facts . n169 In the Fort Dix and Kennedy Airport plots, one can certainly conclude that, had the plots matured, they could have presented some real danger, even if not as much as the terrorists would have liked. n170

All of this shows that the potential danger of homegrown terrorist plots, though perhaps not great, remains real; in any event, we cannot dismiss it. Since law enforcement has sometimes used informants to nip these nascent dangers in the bud , we should not expect police to abandon this tactic now .

__**Terror D

Squo Solves MA Coop

Cooperation high in the squo – empirics prove their examples are exceptions to the rule Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

Despite the substantial residue of mistrust accumulated through events [*139] like the post-9/11 roundups and the "voluntary" interviews, n61 most Muslim communities have begun working with law enforcement. n62 They have supplied invaluable anti-terrorism information and cooperation - witness the

Lackawanna and Toledo cases. Muslim citizens and community members have also joined task forces, advisory boards, and multicultural councils with law enforcement, and they have taught classes for police in the basics of Islam and Middle Eastern cultures. n63 They have also served as liaisons between their communities, the FBI, and their local police departments n64 - all in an effort to make our country safe from the threat of terrorism.

SQUO solves cooperation Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

Looking at the cases the government has brought against terrorist suspects since September of 2001, one cannot help but notice that Muslim communities have done exactly what Mueller wants: they have actively brought the FBI and other police agencies crucial information in terrorism cases. For example,

the FBI's six cases in Lackawanna, New York, still stand as some of its greatest anti-terrorism victories . These cases involved a group of six young men of Yemeni descent accused of engaging in terrorist activity by, among other things, attending terrorist training camps. n10 The cases, announced with great fanfare by the FBI and the office of then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, n11 resulted in guilty pleas from, and sentences of up to ten years in prison for, all of the accused. n12 Few people seem to remember that the arrests occurred only because Lackawanna's Yemeni community itself brought the men to the FBI's [*128] attention. n13 Without that information, the Lackawanna cell might have remained undiscovered, perhaps with disastrous results. The success of the Lackawanna case (and others like it) explains the strong consensus among law enforcement and security experts, both nationally and internationally, that cooperation and partnership between law enforcement and Muslim communities represent the key to success against terrorists. n14

Can’t Solve MA Coop—Circumvention

No solvency – FBI empirically circumvents and the plan does nothing to regulate informants Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

Two possible explanations for the FBI's failure to regulate itself with successive sets of guidelines stand out. First, the FBI and the Department of Justice have always said explicitly that the various guidelines create no enforceable rights . n182 That is, the FBI's failure to follow the guidelines does not give any person any legal right to sue over what the FBI did and thus carries no penalty either against the FBI or the individual agent in a lawsuit brought by the victim. This effectively makes the guidelines unenforceable from outside the FBI.

Second, and just as important, the guidelines focus on how to use informants; n183 they do not consider under what circumstances the government should use informants - i.e., with how much justifying evidence, and for what purpose, the

government should deploy informants. This omission is especially grave because it is the very issue the Supreme Court's cases on the subject failed to address , since (according to the Hoffa and White cases) everyone "assumes the risk"

that anyone could be a government informant. n184 Without any rules concerning the circumstances [*165] under which the law should allow law enforcement to use informants, the FBI retains full flexibility without supervision or accountability. Without any standards that the FBI must follow in order to avoid real consequences imposed from the

outside, nothing will change and abuses will continue . We would be naive to hope for anything different.

Can’t Solve MA Coop—Trust Dead

Aff can’t solve – Community engagement beyond repair Akbar 15 (Amna, Assistant Professor of Law at Michael E. Moritz College of Law, the Ohio State University, “National Security's Broken Windows,” 62 UCLA L. Rev. 834, May, lexis, CMR)

Is community engagement salvageable? Moving community engagement toward its most democratic aspirations - toward a more genuine exercise in community consultation, contestation, and collaboration - would involve ridding the program of its pernicious baggage. For example, law enforcement could end community engagement's integration with community-wide intelligence gathering, or could decouple community engagement from CVE and counterradicalization.Certainly there are strong normative reasons, including those that motivate this Article, to expect and demand that law enforcement account

for the realities of marginalized communities. But we cannot expect that dialogue will necessarily lead to accountability,

meaningful contestation, or realignment of police approaches in marginalized communities. After all, law enforcement is itself a significant vehicle for marginalization and racialization in the United States. It is reasonable to question whether community policing - or policing at all - can be expected to be the vehicle for the change we are seeking. The problem and the solution may be entirely mismatched .The allure of community policing rests in part on a broader construct of dialogue as inherently valuable. While dialogue can certainly be valuable, its value will depend on the context and the point of view from which it is being evaluated. Dialogue often serves a different function for the more powerful in the conversation than the less powerful. The idea that dialogue is the cure-all for poor relationships between police and marginalized communities emerges from a failure to recognize the structures and histories of police impunity in these communities , as well as the material realities that keep inequality in place. When the dialogue in question is with the police, initiated by the police, and on the police's own terms, not

only is the function of the dialogue necessarily limited, the entire initiative should raise red flags. How will the dialogue change the material reality of policing in the community? Does the dialogue further exacerbate inequality or simply validate preexisting policing practices through the performance of democratic legitimacy? Or is it really allowing for messy democratic contestation, and the possibility for change in the material conditions of the relationship between the police and the marginalized?

Can’t Solve MA Coop—Education

Outreach fails – lack of mutual education ensures bad information Harris 10 (David A, Prof of Law @ University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN MUSLIM AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11,” 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 123, lexis, CMR)

Fourth, the parties might agree on a process of mutual education. For its part, law enforcement might educate Muslim groups and congregations so that they could recognize actual suspicious behavior, as opposed to simply relying on hunches about people who have unusual opinions. It has become common for police departments and the FBI to appeal to Muslim communities to report anything suspicious, much as FBI Director Mueller did in the speech quoted at the beginning of this

article. n250 While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mueller's exhortation, it was also quite general. It is all very well to ask community members to report their suspicions, and even such a general request may produce leads for law enforcement. It is true that not all leads may actually help law enforcement; this is true even when all the leads in an investigation originate from law enforcement professionals. It seems likely that an untrained member of the public, if asked to provide information to the

police about something as unusual as possible terrorist activity, would, in good faith, inevitably produce mostly (if not wholly) useless leads, which officers and agents must then spend their valuable time pursuing . Without

some concrete indication of what "suspicious action" means, most lay people would stand little chance of spotting the real thing.

1NC Agro-Terrorism

No agro-terrorism – bad target, empirics, lack of interest – their evidence is alarmism from insiders to secure funding Hirsch 13 (Jesse, Staff Writer for Modern Farmer, “Food (In)security: Are Farms The Next Terrorist Target?,” Dec 13, http://modernfarmer.com/2013/12/food-insecurity-farms-next-terrorist-target/, CMR)

But the very reasons that make agroterrorism so accessible also reduce its impact . Simply put: Killing a few thousand cattle in Manhattan, Kansas, is never going to create the same panic as killing a few thousand people in Manhattan, New York.

To some farmers, the notion of farms as terrorist targets is absurd . “Why in the world would terrorists attack my feedlot?” laughs Teske, whose farm is just north of Manhattan. “I’ve certainly got a lot more things to keep me up at night worrying.”Teske thinks NBAF has the whiff of a pork barrel project — a billion dollars spent on an issue that most farmers are unconcerned with. “[Agroterrorism] is a hot topic for politicians right now,” he says. “As long as that’s true, those dollars are going to keep flowing .”

As it is with many matters of defense and security, the U.S. is leading the world in agroterrorism preparedness . Other countries have NBAF-level facilities to study livestock disease (see sidebar on p. 42), but few countries are girding for intentional farm attacks. For a 2006 BBC story on agroterrorism, the reporter couldn’t even find someone in British government who was familiar with the concept.Distributing pathogens that kill plants and animals certainly has advantages over attacks on humans.

The fact remains that the urgent rhetoric voiced by U.S. politicians and academics has largely failed to bear out in the real world . Attacks on livestock and crops have been spotty and isolated , and besides those

alleged cave documents found in 2002 (or 2004, depending on whom you ask), there is little proof that groups are actually interested in agroterrorism.

Won’t collapse the economy Dyer 7 (Graham, Director of AgriFood Innovations, http://www.agrifood.com/documents.cfm?itemid=270&smocid=95&categoryid=123, CMR)

Another complication is the difficulty of differentiating between a naturally occurring outbreak and a deliberately induced one. For example, Cuba has repeatedly alleged that the U.S. military has targeted Cuban crops such as sugar cane, tobacco, and coffee with plant pathogens, but it

has offered no credible proof that these diseases were anything other than naturally occurring outbreaks. It is extremely unlikely that any agricultural bioterrorist could fatally wound the entire U.S. agricultural sector or national economy, both of which are strong and diversified . Local, regional, and national effects, however, could be significant. Even to the extent that the U nited S tates is vulnerable, it is unlikely that terrorists could strike successfully.

Agro-terror irrelevant, America imports most agricultural products USDA, ’14 (United States Department of Agriculture, “Imports”, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-

markets-trade/us-agricultural-trade/imports.aspx)

Imports' share of total domestic food consumption was relatively low in the 1970s and 1980s, but that share is rising. Imports of fish and shellfish, many fresh fruits and vegetables, fruit juices, tree nuts, and salad and cooking oils account for particularly large shares of domestic consumption. Many agricultural imports with a large share of domestic consumption are products the

United States does not produce in large quantities, such as bananas or coffee. All U.S. agricultural import groups have continued to grow since 1990. By far the largest

U.S. agricultural imports are horticultural products, which since 2002 have accounted for about half of all U.S. agricultural imports. Horticultural products include fruits, vegetables, nuts, wine, malt beverages, and nursery products. Much of these imports come from two leading suppliers, Canada and Mexico. The North American Free Trade

Agreement is partly responsible for expansion of this type of trade between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Sugar and tropical-product imports have exceeded livestock and livestock

product imports since 2005. Most sugar and tropical products-such as coffee, cocoa, and rubber-come from Indonesia, Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. Animals and animal products are next in

importance among U.S. agricultural imports. Canada, Mexico, and Oceania are large suppliers of animals and animal products to the United States. In the last decade, U.S. imports came

primarily from Canada, Mexico, the European Union, Australia, Brazil, and China. The top import sources have varied little since 1990, but imports from the European Union are slowing, while

imports from Canada, Mexico, and the rest of the Americas are increasing. Imports from China have been rising steadily since 2001. (For data on top import sources, see Top 15 U.S. import

sources by fiscal or calendar year). The value of U.S. agricultural imports has expanded since 2000, with significant growth across bulk and high-value product categories. Processed high-value

products like coffee, wine, and malt beverages continue to account for the largest share of U.S. agriculture imports, although raw and semi-processed high-value product imports like rubber and rapeseed oil are also registering strong growth. High-income

countries have historically supplied most U.S. agricultural imports, but with relatively strong growth in imports from upper middle-income countries since 2000, high-income and upper middle-

income countries are now equally important suppliers for the U.S. market. Since 2000, upper middle-income countries have become increasingly important sources of U.S. imports of raw and

semi-processed high-value products. High-income countries remain the most important source of U.S imports in the largest agricultural import category of processed high-value products.

Agriculture products don’t effect economy- doesn’t even make the top 10 of America’s exports

Workman, ’15 (Daniel, founder of World’s Top Exports (WTEx). He graduated with top marks in attaining a Business Systems Analysis and Design degree from Ryerson University, “United States Top Ten Exports” 7/20, http://www.worldstopexports.com/united-states-top-10-exports/2001)

In 2014 exports from America amounted to US$1.623 trillion, up 27.1% since 2010. United States top 10 exports accounted for 68.3% of the overall value of its global shipments.Based on statistics from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database, America’s total Gross Domestic Product amounted to $17.416 trillion in 2014.Therefore, exports accounted for about 9.3% of total US economic output. Given America’s population of 318.9 million people, the total $17.416 trillion in 2014 US exports translates to roughly $5,091 for every person in the country.

The following export product groups represent the highest dollar value in American global shipments during 2014. Also shown is the percentage share each export category represents in terms of US overall exports.

1. Machines, engines, pumps : US$219,566,232,000 (13.5% of total exports)2. Electronic equipment: $171,966,197,000 (10.6%)3. Oil : $157,213,437,000 (9.7%)4. Vehicles : $135,797,903,000 (8.4%)5. Aircraft, spacecraft : $124,831,567,000 (7.7%)6. Medical, technical equipment : $84,879,104,000 (5.2%)7. Gems, precious metals, coins : $65,522,480,000 (4.0%)8. Plastics : $63,025,216,000 (3.9%)9. Pharmaceuticals : $43,967,977,000 (2.7%)10. Organic chemicals : $42,255,264,000 (2.6%)

Many of the industries supporting these exports, such as manufacturing aircraft and medical apparatus, involve highly sophisticated and advance processes. America’s unemployment rate

improved to an estimated 5.8% as of October 2014 compared to 7.3% in July 2013 according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. One driver for that improvement is that scientists, skilled

tradespersons and international trade professionals supporting the above exports are in demand.Please note that the results listed above are at the 2-digit Harmonized Tariff System code

level. Among the top 10 U.S. exports above, mineral fuels including oil represent the fastest-growing export product posting a 94.2% gain over the five-year period ending in 2014. Aircraft and

spacecraft were up 57.5% while automobiles improved 37.2% over the same period.

The U.S. agriculture industry is already failing, no impact Ikerd, March/April 2015 (John, Professor Emeritus of Agricultural & Applied Economics , University of Missouri Columbia College of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. “The Failure of Modern Industrial Agriculture”, http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2015/0315ikerd.html)

Americans are being subjected to an ongoing multimillion-dollar propaganda campaign designed to “increase confidence and trust in today’s agriculture.” Food Dialogues, just one example of this broader trend, is a campaign sponsored by the U.S. Farmers and Ranchers Alliance—an industry organization whose funders and board members include Monsanto, DuPont, and John Deere. The campaign features the “faces of farming and ranching”—articulate, attractive young farmers, obviously chosen to put the best possible face on the increasingly ugly business of

industrial agriculture, which dominates our food- production system. Genetically engineered crops, inhumane treatment of farm animals, and routine feeding of antibiotics to confined animals—among many other problems—have eroded public trust in American agriculture . In response, the defenders of so-called modern agriculture have employed top public relations firms to try to clean up their tarnished public image. Their campaigns emphasize such issues as water quality, food safety, animal welfare, and “food prices and choices.” Mounting

public concerns in each of these areas are supported by a growing body of scientific evidence. For example, a 1998 EPA study found 35,000 miles of streams in 22 states polluted with biological wastes from concentrated animal feeding operations. The number of “impaired waters” in Iowa has tripled since the late 1980s, as industrial farming systems, such as factory farms, have replaced traditional family farms . On food safety, a recent U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study reviewed dozens of studies linking routine feeding of antibiotics in concentrated livestock operations to people being infected with antibiotic-resistant bacteria, such as MRSA. “Use of antibiotics in food-producing animals allows antibiotic-resistant bacteria to thrive,” they concluded. “Resistant bacteria can be transmitted from food-producing animals to humans through the food supply.” The big agricultural corporations claim that they are committed to the humane treatment of animals—while advocating legislation to criminalize unauthorized photography in concentrated animal feeding operations. Numerous scientific studies over the past 50 years have documented inhumane treatment in these “animal factories.” The mistreatment is not only a result of inevitable overcrowding in confinement operations, but also results from routine management practices, transportation, and even in the genetic selection of animals for maximum productivity. The Food Dialogues campaign claims to advocate consumer choice by supporting all types of farming. However, its language strongly suggests that industrial agriculture is essential to keeping food affordable. It considers organic agriculture and other sustainable faming alternatives to be no more than “niche markets.” In reality, the only clear “benefit” of industrial agriculture is that it requires fewer farmers. There is no indication that industrial agriculture has produced more food than could have been produced with more sustainable methods, only that it has employed far fewer farmers. Any production-cost advantage has been more than offset by higher margins, including profits, elsewhere within the corporate food supply chain. Over the past 20 years, an era of intensive agricultural industrialization, U.S. retail food prices have risen faster than overall

inflation rates. Agricultural industrialization has had a devastating effect on the quality of rural life. Industrial agriculture has replaced independent family farmers with a far smaller number of farm workers, most of whom are paid poorly. In 1960, farmers were still more than 8% of the U.S. workforce. They are less than 1% today. Rural communities have suffered both economically and socially from this loss of traditional farm families. More than 50 years of research demonstrates that communities supported by small to mid-size family farms are better places to live, both economically and socially, than are communities dependent on large farming enterprises. Perhaps most important, industrial agriculture

has failed in its most fundamental purpose: providing food security. The percentage of “food insecure” people in the United States is greater today than during the 1960s—early in the current phase of agricultural industrialization. (See Gerald Friedman, “Food Insecurity in Affluent America,” pp. 41-42) Furthermore, the industrial food system is linked to a new kind of food insecurity: unhealthy foods. A recent global report by 500 scientists from 50 countries suggested that “obesity is [now] a bigger health crisis than hunger.” There is growing evidence that America’s diet-related health problems are not limited to poor consumer food choices or processed “junk foods” but begin with a lack of essential nutrients in food crops produced on industrial farms. It’s high time for fundamental change in American agriculture. The growing litany of farm/food

problems today cannot be solved by redesigning the USDA “food pyramid,” placing warning labels on junk foods, or imposing more stringent regulations on farmers. Today’s problems are deep and systemic. They are inherent in the worldview from which industrial agriculture emerged and upon which its evolution depends. In economic terms, industrialization allows capital and technology to be substituted for workers and managers. In other words, it allows raw materials or natural resources to be transformed into more valuable products while employing fewer, lower-skilled workers—in both labor and management positions. In a world with an abundance of natural resources and a scarcity of workers, industrialization seemed a logical strategy for economic development. With increases in populations and depletion of natural resources, the economic benefits of industrialization have

declined while the negative consequences for unemployment and envi-ronmental degradation have grown. For agriculture, the benefits of industrialization have been fewer and the costs have been greater. The reality of agriculture is in conflict with the worldview that supports industrialization. Industrialization is rooted in a mechanistic worldview: the industrial world works like a big, complex machine that can be manipulated by humans to extract natural resources and use them to meet our needs and wants. In reality, the world is an extremely complex living ecosystem, of which we humans are a part. Our well-being ultimately depends

on working and living in harmony with nature rather than conquering nature. We are currently seeing the disastrous consequences of treating living ecosystems as if they were inanimate mechanisms. Thankfully, a new kind of agriculture is emerging to meet these ecological, social, and economic challenges. The new farmers may call their farms “organic,” “ecological,” “biological,” “holistic,” or “biodynamic.” Their farming methods may be called “agroecology,” “nature farming,” or “permaculture.” They all fit under the conceptual umbrella of sustainable agriculture. They are committed to meeting the food needs of all in the present without diminishing opportunities for those who will live in the future. The strength of this movement is most visible in the growth of the organic-foods market, although some types of “organic farms,” especially those mimicking industrial agriculture, may not be sustainable. Sales of organic foods grew by more than 20% per year during the 1990s and early 2000s, before leveling off at around 10%�12% annual growth following the recession of 2008. Organic foods now amount to around $35 billion in annual sales, something less than 5% of total food sales. The local food movement, as exemplified by farmers markets and “community supported agriculture,” has replaced organics as the most dynamic sector of the food market, although it is only about half as large in sales. Some question whether organic or other sustainable farms can meet the food needs of a growing global population. A comprehensive review in the journal Nature compared organic and conventional crop yields in “developed” countries, concluding: “Under certain conditions—that is, with good management practices, particular crop types and growing conditions—organic systems can . . . nearly match conventional yields.” The challenge in the United States and the so-called developed world is to create a food system that will meet the basic food needs of all without degrading its natural and human resources. Ecological and social sustainability, not just yields, is the logical motivation for organic agriculture in the so-called developed world. Globally, industrial agriculture is not needed to “feed the world.” Small, diversified farms already provide food for least 70% of the world’s population and could double or triple yields without resorting to industrial production methods.

Everywhere we look, we can see the failure of the grand experiment of industrial agriculture. It’s time for fundamental change.

1NC AT: Olson ’12 (Aff Internal Link)

Their internal link is a report from *the FBI website* and obviously bias – the thesis of their advantage proves the FBI continually manufactures threats to secure funding Greenwald 15 (Glenn, journalist, constitutional lawyer, and author of four New York Times best-selling books on politics and law, “Why Does the FBI Have to Manufacture its Own Plots if Terrorism and ISIS Are Such Grave Threats?,” Feb 26, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/26/fbi-manufacture-plots-terrorism-isis-grave-threats/, CMR)

Threats that are real, and substantial, do not need to be manufactured and concocted. Indeed, as the blogger Digby, citing Juan Cole, recently showed, run-of-the-mill “lone wolf” gun violence is so much of a greater threat to Americans than “domestic terror” by every statistical metric that it’s almost impossible to overstate the disparity:In that regard, it is not difficult to understand why “domestic terror” and “homegrown extremism” are things the FBI is desperately determined to create . But this FBI terror-plot concoction should, by itself, suffice to demonstrate how wildly exaggerated this threat actually is.UPDATE: The ACLU of Massachusetts’s Kade Crockford notes this extraordinarily revealing quote from former FBI assistant director Thomas Fuentes, as he defends one of the worst FBI terror “sting” operations of all (the Cromitie prosecution we describe at length here):If you’re submitting budget proposals for a law enforcement agency, for an intelligence agency, you’re not going to submit the proposal that “We won the war on terror and everything’s great,” cuz the first thing that’s gonna happen is your budget’s gonna be cut in half. You know, it’s my opposite of Jesse Jackson’s ‘Keep Hope Alive’—it’s ‘Keep Fear Alive.’ Keep it alive.That is the FBI’s terrorism strategy — keep fear alive — and it drives everything they do .

--- 2NC Agro-Terror

SQUO solves – high-level of preparedness Aronson 11 (Adam, Forbes Staff, CEO of Arrowsight, a provider of remote video auditing services for the food processing, quick-serve restaurant and health-care industries, “Agroterrorism: Managing Risk In The Food Supply Chain,” 4-19, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/04/19/agroterrorism-managing-risk-in-the-food-supply-chain/2/, CMR)

That’s why manufacturers, law enforcement, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Food and Drug Administration are more focused than ever on protecting the nation’s food supply from intentional acts of contamination or tampering through introduction of a biological, chemical, physical, radioactive contaminant.A risk assessment tool from the FDA called CARVER + Shock, originally developed by the Pentagon, takes food processing companies through more than 100 questions about their facilities to help them identify areas that may be vulnerable to an attack and whether a biological or chemical agent might be used in an attack. The recent Food Safety Modernization Act extends these guidelines with new requirements for FDA regulated food companies to establish food defense plans to protect these highest risk production and storage areas.

Agterror unlikely and no impact – experts agreeNeild 6 (Barry, Writer for CNN, “Agroterrorism: How real is the threat?,” Sept 25, www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/09/25/agroterrorism/, CMR)

Not everyone is convinced of the risk. Dr. Jean Weese, a professor of food science at the U niversity of Tennessee , says that while the food chain is certainly vulnerable to attack, agricultural targets lack the deadly appeal of the World Trade Center or the Pentagon.

"Even if you contaminate all of the spinach in a field, although it sounds terrible to say, only one or two people die," she

says. "It is not going to reach the same level of devastation as flying a plane into a building."

"Not that it couldn't be done. It could be and it could cause terror in terms of the alarm it would spread, but I don't think it would get the results the terrorists would want, which is killing a lot of people."

Agroterror is a joke Cameron 1 (Gavin, lecturer of terrorism and nonproliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons at the Department of Politics and Contemporary History at the University of Salford, Jason Pate, senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Covert biological weapons attacks against agricultural targets: Assessing the impact against US agriculture, Terrorism Polit. Viol. 13:61-82, August 2001, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/covert_biological_weapons_attacks_against_agricultural_targets.pdf, CMR)

It would be extremely difficult for a terrorist group to perpetrate a significant biological attack against the agricultural economy in the United States, however, for several reasons. First, obtaining and effectively delivering a biological

agent against an agricultural target is a task fraught with technical hurdles . Although some agricultural agents can be obtained relatively

easily and crudely delivered, to cause a catastrophic incident would require a more sophisticated approach.

Second, because crops and livestock in the United States are generally not concentrated, eliminating a segment of the agricultural economy would require a multipronged attack and a sophisticated understanding of the

economy. Although not impossible, this type of attack presents significant obstacles . Third, the U.S. agricultural economy has in place networks and plans to respond to an attack once detected, and surveillance of crop and animal disease in the U nited S tates is extraordinarily sophisticated. Even if a terrorist group managed to deliver a

biological agent effectively against a target, the effects of the attack would likely be severely limited by the U.S. response.

Fourth, although a determined group could conceivably carry out a devastating attack, there is no evidence of terrorist groups with the motivation to carry out a catastrophic attack against U.S. agriculture. It is clear however that more research is required before an accurate assessment can be made of the threat terrorism poses to the U.S. agricultural economy.