Potential Impacts of the Energy East Pipeline on City of Winnipeg

Potential Impacts of the Energy East Pipeline on The City of Winnipeg

DM LeNeveu 2/1/2015

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CONTENTS

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 3

Properties of Dilbit........................................................................................................................ 4

The Likelihood of a Pipeline Spill .................................................................................................. 5

Causes of Pipeline Failure ............................................................................................................. 5

Internal Corrosion .................................................................................................................... 6

External Corrosion ................................................................................................................... 6

Inspection Methods ................................................................................................................. 7

Spill Volume and Consequence ............................................................................................... 8

Hydrogen Sulphide in the Pipeline ............................................................................................. 11

Explosion and Fire ....................................................................................................................... 12

Pressure Surges .......................................................................................................................... 13

Contamination of the Food Chain .............................................................................................. 14

Contamination of Drinking Water .............................................................................................. 15

Liability........................................................................................................................................ 17

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 18

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... 19

Review ........................................................................................................................................ 19

References .................................................................................................................................. 21

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Energy East Pipeline will carry diluted bitumen, also called dilbit, and other crude oil

products. The main component of the dilbit will be bitumen extracted from the tar sands in

Alberta.

Energy East intends to repurpose a natural gas line that is about forty years old to carry dilbit

and other crude oil products. There are six natural gas lines operated by TransCanada Pipelines

running in a corridor from the Saskatchewan border to Ile-des-Chenes, where they split with

three lines continuing eastward through Manitoba to near West Hawk Lake. One of these

would be the Energy East line.6 The pipelines are subject to corrosion and wear and have

ruptured four times in Manitoba in the last twenty years: at Rapid City in 1995, St. Norbert in

1996, Brookdale in 2002, and Otterburne 2014.

A major cause of the stress in the pipeline is the variation of pressure experienced during batch

operation. Approximately 300 compression/decompression cycles are forecast per year.

Corrosion fatigue was deemed responsible for the rupture, explosion of the line in Rapid City in

1995. The initial rupture and explosion in one line caused the second line to fail and explode.

In the Energy East submission, there is a detailed discussion of ultrasonic and electromagnetic

inspection sensors placed on smart pigs to inspect the lines at assumed intervals of five

years. The results of these tests indicate that the risk of failure from stress corrosion cracking

could be substantial despite inspection.

Leak history and list of probable causes show that spills will occur in the future. A major

determining factor of the consequence is the spill volume. The spill volume could be limited by

judicious valve placement and prompt shut off in the event of a spill. There is no information in

the Energy East submission on the location of shut off valves and especially those around

water crossings. This lack of information could be considered a major deficiency. A report

commissioned by the Ontario Energy Board found that 16,800 barrels or 2 million litres could

be spilled before valve shut-off.

One of the worst spills of dilbit occurred on the Kalamazoo River in 2010. The spill was 3.3

million litres and affected about 60 kilometres of river. The diluent portion of the dilbit floated

and emitted toxic fumes that required the evacuation of residents along the river. The bitumen

portion of the dilbit sank in water and mixed with sediments making clean-up next to

impossible. After four years of cleanup at a cost of one billion dollars, it is now recognized that

the spill cannot be completely remediated.

Any breach of the line near Winnipeg could reach the Red River via the LaSalle, Seine or

Assiniboine River drainage basins. Minor waterways, ditches and drains are all connected in

these drainage basins. Gravity drainage along with the pressure from diluents that would flash

to gas could empty much of the contents of the line between valves and could cause a spill

many times the volume of what occurred in the Kalamazoo River.

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The relatively large amount of sulphur in dilbit can form hydrogen sulphide (H2S) in the line

from thermal decomposition and microbial action. Hydrogen sulphide is extremely toxic. One

breath over 1000 ppm can kill instantly. Lower concentrations can cause permanent health

damage. The H2S concentration in the pipeline would likely increase from thermal

decomposition of sulphur compounds and from microbial action as the dilbit moves down the

line. The Trans-Alaska pipeline was subject to formation of hydrogen sulphide from the sulphur

content in the line verifying the extent of this hazard. There has been no mention of measures

to combat microbial action in the Energy East Line.

There is a significant risk of rupture and explosion of the Energy East line from the nearby

natural gas lines. An explosion of one line rupturing and exploding a second has occurred in

1995 in Rapid City. The explosion of a natural gas line in Otterburne in 2014 created a crater 10

metres in diameter and 3 metres deep, large enough to endanger an adjacent pipeline. An

explosion and black toxic smoke plume from a dilbit fire could easily be larger than occurred at

Lac Megantic where 5.7 million litres of crude oil spilled in 2014.

As determined earlier, the spill volume from an Energy East rupture could easily be larger than

occurred at Lac Megantic. The smoke plume from such an explosion and fire could necessitate

the immediate evacuation of the entire population of Winnipeg should it occur nearby.

Most large pipeline companies have computer programs to model and predict the pipeline

pressure, temperature and flow conditions in the line. These models can help to mitigate the

effects of pressure surges associated with oil pipelines through placement of pressure relief

valves and through restrictions on operating pressures and pumping rates. There is no mention

of pressure relief valves or modeling for pressure surges in the Energy East submission.

The drinking water supplies in the province are likely at much greater risk of contamination

from the pipeline than is Winnipegs supply. Many communities draw their water from rivers

that the pipeline directly crosses including Portage La Prairie, Starbuck, Stanford, Kenton,

Rivers, La Salle Rivers, Brandon, Selkirk and Sioux Valley. In the event of loss of water supply

for one or more of these communities Winnipeg might be pressed into supplying water. Some

of these communities such as Sanford have water treatment plants that service a wide

surrounding area impinging on Winnipeg.

Energy East, a wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada, bears the spill liability for the pipeline.

The Energy East subsidiary seems to have been created in part to protect the assets of

TransCanada. It is unknown if Energy East has enough assets of its own to cover the cost of a

large spill clean-up. In the event of a default the cost may revert to the City of Winnipeg and

the province. The City could also be liable to claims for spill compensation.

INTRODUCTION

The potential impacts of the Energy East pipeline that passes through St. Norbert and crosses

both the Seine and Red Rivers at the south end of Winnipeg include:

contamination of city waterways including the Red, Seine and La Salle Rivers;

evacuation due to fire, explosion and airborne toxic plumes including deadly

hydrogen sulphide;

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lengthy clean-up of rivers and affected soil;

contamination of drinking water especially in nearby communities such as Sanford,

Starbuck and La Salle, Kenton, Portage, Selkirk, Rivers, Sioux Valley, and Brandon;

temporary or long term loss of the sport fishery;

devaluation of river bank property;

loss of commercial activity on the river such as boat tours and water taxis;

compromised recreational activities in river walkways and parks due to tar balls and

other lingering sources of contamination;

contamination of the local food chain;

contamination of sources of irrigation;

contamination of two major surface aquifers, the Assiniboine Delta and Sandilands

whose damage could have a detrimental impact on the economy of the province and

of Winnipeg;

litigation and liability incidents flowing from property and health damage due to

inadequate resources of Energy East and inadequate planning and execution by the

City of emergency measures and spill remediation.

PROPERTIES OF DILBIT

The Energy East Pipeline will carry diluted bitumen, also called dilbit, and other crude oil

products. The main component of the dilbit will be bitumen extracted from the tar sands in

Alberta. The bitumen is either mined or steamed out of the ground. The bitumen itself is a

complex mixture of long chain hydrocarbons that contain about 5% sulphur by weight. The

treatment process to form dilbit leaves some sand and silt in the mixture as well as some

water, sulphate salts, heavy metals, other contaminants, and all the sulphur. Up to 30% of the

dilbit will be composed of a diluent, a mixture of light end hydrocarbons from a variety of

sources such as natural gas condensate1,2,3

that is added to enable the dilbit to flow. The exact

composition of the diluents will vary from batch to batch depending on the availability of

diluents. A main constituent of the diluent is expected to be pentane at about 9% of dilbit

overall. A typical composition of dilbit, Christina dilbit blend, as determined by

CrudeMonitor.ca is listed in Table 1.

Constituent Amount- 5 year average Sulphur (wt%) 3.85 Sediment ppm by weight 93 Nickel mg/L 70.7 Vanadium mg/L 182.4 C3 (propane) vol % 0.04 Butane vol % 0.71 Pentane vol % 8.73 Hexane vol % 6.44 Octane vol % 2.24 Nonanes vol % 1.09 Decanes vol % 0.50 Benzene vol % 0.27 Toluene vol % 0.44 Ethyl benzene vol % 0.05 Xylenes vol % 0.32

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The light end hydrocarbons, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, octanes, nonanes and

decanes, are volatile and explosive. The flash point of dilbit is -35 C and the boiling point is

about 35 Celsius. 2,61

If the proposed Energy East line were warmer than 34 C, as would occur

in summer, the light ends would flash to gas. The temperature of the adjacent natural gas

lines regularly reaches 50 C in summer. 4 The temperature of the dilbit line would be higher

than the natural gas lines due to the higher viscosity and frictional heating of the dilbit.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PIPELINE SPILL

Energy East intends to convert a natural gas line that is about forty years old5 to carry dilbit

and other crude oil products. There are six natural gas lines operated by TransCanada Pipelines

running in a corridor from the Saskatchewan border to Ile-des-Chenes where they split with

three lines going south to the USA and three continuing eastward. One of these would be the

Energy East line.6 The pipelines are subject to corrosion and wear and have ruptured four

times in Manitoba in the last twenty years: at Rapid City in 1995, St. Norbert in 1996,

Brookdale in 2002, and Otterburne 2014.7 Table 2 lists failures of TransCanada pipelines across

Canada.8

Table 2 TransCanada Pipeline Failures

Date Location 1979 Englehart Ontario 1985 Northern Ontario 1985 Ignace Ontario 1985 Lowther Ontario 1986 Callander Ontario 1989 Brandon Manitoba 1990 Marionville Ontario 1991 Cochrane Ontario 1991 Cardinal Ontario 1992 Tunis Ontario 1992 Potter Ontario 1994 Latchford Ontario 1994 Williamston Ontario 1995 Vermillion Bay Ontario 1995 Rapid City Manitoba 1996 La Salle Manitoba 1996 Stewart Lake Ontario 1997 Cabri Saskatchewan 2002 Brookdale Manitoba 2002 Peace River Mainline Alberta 2003 Grande Prairie Alberta 2003 Grande Prairie Alberta (2nd) 2009 Peace River Mainline 2009 Swastika Ontario 2009 Marten River Ontario 2011 Beardmore Ontario 2013 Wabasca Alberta 2013 Boyle Alberta 2014 Otterburne Manitoba 2014 Rocky Mountain House Alberta

CAUSES OF PIPELINE FAILURE

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In Alberta the causes of crude oil pipeline failure from 1990 to 2012 are illustrated in figure 1.9

Figure 1. Causes of oil pipeline failures in Alberta from 1990 to 2012 9

In the Energy East submission, the documented causes of a pipeline failure include internal and

external corrosion, over pressurization and geotechnical causes.10

INTERNAL CORROSION

The Energy East Submission identifies internal corrosion as a topic of concern due to the

potential for water separation and sediment deposit as the pressure drops during the batch

operation of the line. 11

EXTERNAL CORROSION

One major potential cause of rupture discussed in the Energy East submission and in an expert

report commissioned by the Ontario Energy Board is external stress corrosion cracking (SCC).12

The section of pipe through the prairies, constructed mainly in 1971 and 1972, has the original

asphalt tape exterior coating that is acknowledged to have deteriorated in some areas to the

extent that it no longer is protective against stress corrosion cracking.13

A major cause of the stress in the pipeline is the variation of pressure experienced during batch

operation.14

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The Energy East line is considered to be subject to cyclic half of the maximum operating

pressure (MOP) load variation as the line would be shut down and restarted for batch

operation up to 300 times per year. This continual pressure cycling can induce corrosion

fatigue. It is estimated that an equivalent corrosion rate of 0.1 mm a year could be expected

from corrosion fatigue in the Energy East line.15

This corrosion fatigue was deemed responsible for the rupture and explosion of the line in

Rapid City in 1995 put in service in 1971.16

The NEB accident report for the pipeline rupture at

Rapid City in 1995 stated that the MOP for the line based on hydrostatic tests in 1968 was 880

psig or 6069 kPA. This is 77% of the maximum allowable yield strength. The pipelines at Rapid

City were 7 meters apart but are normally 9 meters. The initial rupture and explosion in one

line caused the second line to fail and explode. The nominal wall thicknesses of the ruptured

lines were 9.42 mm and 8.74 mm.17

At an estimated corrosion rate of 0.1 year and a wall thickness of 9.42 mm, after 44 years of

operation to date the pipe thickness could be compromised by stress corrosion cracking and

fatigue by 47%. However excavation and visual examination of 609 meters of pipeline revealed

two cracks that have penetrated to 79% of the pipe thickness illustrating that stress corrosion

can be much worse than estimated. 60

The safety allowance from MOP to rupture is only 23%.

These data show that the entire prairie line is likely in danger of failure from corrosion fatigue.

INSPECTION METHODS

The stated prevention of ruptures due to stress corrosion cracking in the Energy East

submission is to inspect the lines often enough to catch potential weak spots before they fail.

In the submission there is a detailed discussion of ultrasonic and electromagnetic inspection

sensors placed on smart pigs to inspect the lines at assumed intervals of five years. Sections

of the line between 2 and 40 meters were excavated and inspected to determine the

effectiveness of the inspection methods.18

A total of 690 meters of pipe were excavated and

inspected. Of the 27 excavations, 11 contained a total of 15 cracking features or linear features

in the weld region identified by the electromagnetic inspection (EMAT) tool. The tool is

capable of detecting cracks bigger than 40 mm in length and 1 mm in depth. Of the 41 stress

corrosion cracking colonies identified in the excavations and not reported by the EMAT tool,

one met the crack detection specification of 40 mm by 1 mm (40 mm by 1.7 mm). For 16

cracks over the specified detection limit, one undetected crack is consistent with the specified

EMAT detection failure rate of 10%.

The actual depth of the cracks with dimensions over 40 mm by 1 mm as determined by visual

inspection ranged from 2.2 mm to 7.6 with a mean depth of 3.69 mm and a standard deviation

of 1.79 mm. The thickness of the pipeline is 9.42 mm. 59

Cracks over 5 mm in depth are slated

for remediation within one year. Assuming a normal distribution of crack depths and an

average of 16 cracks detected every 0.69 km there will be a remediation rate of 5.39 per km

and a through penetration rate of 0.0158 per km. Over the 940 km length of prairie line these

data predict an astonishing 5067 cracks would require remediation and 15 cracks would

penetrate all the way through causing rupture or leakage. At a detection failure rate of 10%,

these data indicate 2179 cracks over 40 mm by 1 mm would be undetected by EMAT. Of these

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undetected cracks 507 would have required remediation with one being a through crack. This

may be an overestimation if observed cracks in the 690 metres of excavation were not

representative but this preliminary analysis indicates that the stress corrosion cracking

phenomenon is severe.

A large number of smaller cracks were not detected by the EMAT tool. There is no information

on the crack size that will result in failure. The sections where SCC is suspected from the EMAT

tests will be inspected again after conversion with a Shear Wave Ultrasonic crack tool, which

can detect smaller cracks. This is likely to improve the crack detection rate, however no

information is available on how much this improvement would be and leaks could occur before

the shear wave tests are completed. The results of these tests indicate that the risk of failure

from SCC could be substantial despite inspection. The remediation for detected defects could

be specified pressure reduction in a section of line or repair of the affected sections.16

Repair might not necessarily be done immediately upon detection. For instance the Energy

East submission states some sections of the line will not be remediated until the conversion

activities begin.19

This information would indicate that defect inspection alone will not likely prevent line failure.

This is borne out by the failure record. Other mechanisms of failure not detected by inspection

such as geotechnical events described earlier add to the risk.

Geotechnical hazards include landslides and collapsible expandable soils, seismic events and

river bank erosion. The failure at Brookdale Manitoba in 2002 was considered in part to be

due to its being at the junction of two different soil types that were subject to varying ground

water levels and inadequate cathodic protection.

The failure near the town of La Salle in 1996 was caused by river bank instability.56

The

western most portion of the pipeline crosses that Manson oil field in Manitoba where

hydraulic fracturing is been done. Hydraulic fracturing is known to generate seismic events

that could rupture the line, albeit relatively far from Winnipeg.21

SPILL VOLUME AND CONSEQUENCE

The leak history 8

and list of probable causes 9 suggest that spills will occur in the future. A

major determining factor of the consequence is the spill volume. The spill volume could be

limited by judicious valve placement and prompt shut off in the event of a spill. CSA standard

for pipelines Z662-11, clause 4.4.8 requires valves to be installed on both sides of major water

crossings and at other locations appropriate for the terrain in order to limit damage from

accidental discharge.22

There is no information in the Energy East submission on the location of shut off valves around

water crossings. This lack of information could be considered a major deficiency.

A report commissioned by the Ontario Energy Board stated that the time to valve shut off from

the time of leak onset would be up to 22 minutes provided all detection protocols and shut off

systems were not compromised.12

At a pipeline flow rate of 1.1 million barrels per day13

16,800

barrels or 2 million litres could be spilled before valve shut-off.

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One of the worst spills of dilbit occurred on the Kalamazoo River in 2010. The spill was 3.3

million litres and affected about 60 kilometres of river. The diluent portion of the dilbit floated

and emitted toxic fumes that required the temporary evacuation of residents along the river.31

The bitumen portion of the dilbit sank in water and mixed with sediments making clean-up

next to impossible. After four years of clean-up at a cost of one billion dollars, it is now

recognized that the spill cannot be completely remediated.24, 25, 26

Any breach of the line within a radius around Winnipeg that could be travelled by a spill could

reach the Red River via the LaSalle, Seine or Assiniboine River drainage basins. Minor

waterways, ditches and drains are all connected in these drainage basins as illustrated in

Figure 2.27

Figure 2 Drainage pattern in southern Manitoba adjacent to the proposed Energy East pipeline 27

Every township and section has roads with ditches that drain to streams or the drains that

have been constructed around Winnipeg. This means that valve closure on a major water

crossing would not necessarily be effective as a rupture on a minor water crossing could drain

into Winnipeg. The existing valves on the natural gas lines are 30 km apart as shown in Figure

3.

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Figure 3. Shut-off Valves around Winnipeg (orange circles outlined in black) 28

The volume of dilbit between valves would be up to 23 million litres. Upon rupture, the line

pressure would fall to atmospheric. The major constituent of the diluent, pentane would form

a gas above 37 C. The vapour pressure of pentane is twice atmospheric at 58 Celsius. 29

The

next major constituent with a lower boiling point than pentane is butane that would form a gas

above - 0.5 Celsius upon rupture. The vapour pressure of butane is twice atmospheric at 18.8

Celsius. 29

An excess pressure of one atmosphere is equivalent to a height of the dilbit of 11

meters for a dilbit density of 940 kg/m3. Therefore the vapour pressure of gas in line could

overcome gravity and force dilbit to drain uphill for a portion of the pipeline below the rupture

site and enhance drainage for the pipeline portion above the rupture.

Gravity drainage along with the vapour pressure from diluents that would change phase from a

liquid to a gas and could empty much of the contents of the line between valves and could

cause a spill many times the size of what occurred in the Kalamazoo River.24,25,26

The chemicals benzene, toluene, xylene and ethyl benzene (BTEX) found in dilbit are well

known environmental contaminants that are sparingly soluble and can be both airborne and

waterborne.30

The volatile organics would float to the surface of a waterborne spill and could necessitate

evacuation of the population along the banks as occurred in the Kalamazoo river spill.31

There are many sections in the Energy East submission devoted to crude oil spill clean-up

methods;32

however, there is no information related to dilbit that has been shown to adhere

strongly to soil and sediment. There is no mention about the location of spill remediation

equipment and resources and no indication the City of Winnipeg has been consulted in spill

response plans.32

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HYDROGEN SULPHIDE IN THE PIPELINE

The relatively large amount of sulphur in dilbit can form hydrogen sulphide in the line from

thermal decomposition and microbial action.34-38

Hydrogen sulphide is a colourless gas with a

density greater than air that has a characteristic odor of rotten eggs. It is highly toxic,

corrosive, flammable and explosive. One breath over 1000 ppm can kill instantly. Lower

concentrations can cause permanent health damage.58

The dilbit can contain hydrogen

sulphide at the point of entry in the tar sands, especially dilbit with bitumen from Cold Lake

where steam extraction has been used. The heat from the steam extraction can cause thermal

decomposition of sulphur in bitumen to form hydrogen sulphide. One report gives the

hydrogen sulphide content of dilbit from Cold Lake Alberta to be 300 ppm.33

The H2S concentration in the pipeline would likely increase from thermal decomposition of

sulphur compounds and from microbial action as the dilbit moves down the line. The

TransAlaska pipeline was subject to formation of hydrogen sulphide from the sulphur content

in the line verifying the extent of this hazard.34,35,36,37

There has been no mention of measures

to combat microbial action in the Energy East Line.

Experiments on bitumen cores from the tar sands illustrate that substantial thermal

decomposition will occur from the sulphur compounds found in the bitumen at the elevated

temperatures expected in the pipeline as illustrated in figure 4.38, 39

Figure 4 Thermal decomposition of bitumen core samples from the tar sands 39, 62

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There has been no detailed thermal analysis modelling studies or data presented in the Energy

East submission to determine the maximum temperature of dilbit in the line. The five natural

gas lines parallel to the dilbit line have been reported to reach 50 C in the summer.40

The dilbit

line would be hotter due to the higher viscosity. The adjacent natural gas lines could contribute

to the heat of the dilbit.

CSA standard, CSA Z662-11, Clause 16.2.1(b) defines sour service for pipeline systems not

containing a gas phase (gas-free liquid pipeline systems), such as the Energy East Pipeline,

as "service in which the effective hydrogen sulphide partial pressure exceeds 0.3 kPa at

the bubble point absolute pressure" and requires that the hydrogen sulphide content of the

line be monitored. An audit of the Keystone pipeline by the NEB in 2012 states 41

:

Based on the fact that TransCanada has not monitored the H2S content of the different

batches of products it carries on the Keystone Pipeline, and based on the fact that

TransCanadas planned practice is not to monitor the H2S content of the different

batches of products it carries, or will carry in the future, on the Keystone Pipeline,

TransCanada is not in compliance with the requirements of this audit sub-element and

CSA Z662-11, Clause 3.2.

In the US, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has approved requests from oil pipeline

companies to restrict H2S content in oil to 5 ppm to protect workers.42

The concentration of hydrogen sulphide released in a spill would be unknown as would the

extent of evacuation required. Determination of the hydrogen sulphide concentration in the

line would be next to impossible as it would vary with location, composition of dilbit batches,

temperature and other variables. Air monitoring and measurement at a spill site would likely

arrive too late to be effective. The only means to ensure protection from adverse exposure to

hydrogen sulphide gas from a spill would be to remove the sulphur from the bitumen before it

goes in the pipeline as is done in upgrader facilities in the tar sands 61

.

EXPLOSION AND FIRE

Five natural gas lines run parallel to the proposed Energy East line through Manitoba from the

western border to the Ile-des-Chenes pumping station as shown in figure 5.43

Figure 5. Parallel natural gas lines 43

13

There is a significant risk of rupture and explosion of the Energy East line from a nearby natural

gas line. An explosion of one line rupturing and exploding a second has occurred in 1995 in

Rapid City. The lines are only about 9 metres apart.17

The explosion of a natural gas line in

Otterburne in 2014 created a crater 10 metres in diameter and 3 metres deep, large enough to

endanger an adjacent pipeline.44

An explosion and black toxic smoke plume from a dilbit fire could easily be as large or larger

than occurred at Lac Megantic where 5.7 million litres of crude oil spilled in 2014.45,46

As

determined earlier, the spill volume from an energy east rupture could easily be larger than

occurred at Lac Megantic.

The smoke plume from such an explosion and fire could necessitate the immediate evacuation

of the entire population of Winnipeg should it occur nearby. There is no mention of danger of

explosion, toxic plumes and evacuation in the Energy East submission and no emergency

evacuation plans. This is a clear and dangerous omission.

Even without ignition from a natural gas explosion, a dilbit spill could be ignited from any other

source of ignition given that the flash point is -35 Celsius.2

PRESSURE SURGES

Pressure surges occur regularly along oil pipelines especially during pump shut down and start

up in batch lines, such as the proposed Energy East line, during valve failure or sudden closure,

pump trips, and emergency shut-down. In an oil pipeline the resulting pressure surges can be

more than twice normal pipeline pressure and could exceed the maximum allowable operating

pressure causing pipeline failure. Most large pipeline companies have computer programs to

model the pipeline to mitigate the effects of pressure surges through placement of pressure

relief valves and through restrictions on operating pressures and pumping rates.47

There is no

mention of pressure relief valves or modeling for pressure surges in the Energy East

submission. Figure 6 shows a typical pressure surge profile with and without surge protection.

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Figure 6 Pressure surges in the pipeline 47

Computational methods for determination of pressure surges and valve placement have been

developed over a long time and are readily available.48-51

Relief valves vent automatically to relieve the pressure releasing gases and or oil into surge

tanks and into the air. These valves are typically located downstream of pump stations where

pressure is the highest and at vulnerable locations such as down slopes. Toxic volatile

hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulphide gases would be vented to the atmosphere from surge

tanks or directly from the relief valves at random intervals. Venting could expose workers or

nearby public to toxic and potential deadly hydrogen sulphide gas. There are no known relief

valves near Winnipeg; however, the Red and La Salle River banks, where the pipeline crosses,

are candidate locations as is the pumping station at Ile-des-Chenes just east of Winnipeg.

CONTAMINATION OF THE FOOD CHAIN

In the tar sands contamination of the food chain has been documented from toxins released

during bitumen recovery operations.

The food chain could be similarly affected from a dilbit spill near Winnipeg. This could have an

impact on the commercial fishery, livestock and farming operations, hunting and first nations

harvesting in and around Winnipeg.52

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CONTAMINATION OF DRINKING WATER

The Energy East pipeline runs just north of Falcon Lake. A pipeline rupture near here would

likely contaminate Falcon Lake as occurred on the Kalamazoo River spill. The Falcon River

drains from Falcon Lake into Shoal Lake which is the source of Winnipegs water supply. There

has been concern that the Citys water supply could be contaminated by a pipeline rupture

near Falcon Lake. The Citys public works committee has set aside one million dollars to study

this problem.53

In fact, the concerns of contamination reaching the drinking water inlet on Shoal Lake are likely

overblown. The Falcon River meanders about 20 kilometres through low swampy land and

provides only about 15% of the positive water balance for Shoal Lake.54

It should be possible to intercept the surface portion of the spill at the entrance to the river.

Dissolved toxins will be diluted and filtered through the swamps and bogs on the Falcon River.

The portion of the dilbit that sinks will not likely get out of Falcon Lake. A dam on Indian Bay

and a narrow diversion channel, shown in Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 have been built to protect the

Shoal Lake aqueduct inlet from undesirable drainage from the Falcon River, which is already

responsible for the boil water advisory for the Shoal Lake Indian Reserve #40.55

Figure 7. Shoal Lake Drainage Basin 54

16

Figure 8. Falcon River 63

Figure 9. Shoal Lake Dam and Diversion Channel

17

Figure 10. Shoal Lake First Nation 55

Any toxins from dilbit would have to pass through the narrow man made channel into the

larger Shoal Lake body. At this point toxins could be measured and removed if necessary.

We should question why the City should spend scarce resources on a problem not of its

making. Funds should be made available through the NEB process to address this issue.

Certainly the aqueduct contamination problem should be studied; however, there appears to

be a focus by the City only on this aspect to the exclusion of consideration of other detriment

from Energy East pipeline failure. This tunnel vision can lead to neglect of more dangerous

consequences such as explosion, fire, required evacuations, contamination of river bank

property owned by the city, and contamination of Winnipegs rivers and Manitobas aquifers.

The drinking water supplies of other communities in the province are likely at much greater

risk of contamination from the pipeline than is Winnipegs supply. Many communities draw

their water from rivers that the pipeline directly crosses including Portage La Prairie, Starbuck,

Stanford, Kenton, Rivers, La Salle Rivers, Brandon, Selkirk and Sioux Valley. In the event of loss

of water supply for one or more of these communities Winnipeg might be pressed into

supplying water. Some of these communities such as Sanford have water treatment plants that

service a wide surrounding area impinging on Winnipeg.

LIABILITY

Energy East, a wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada, bears the spill liability for the pipeline.

Energy East subsidiary seems to have been created in part to protect the assets of

TransCanada. It is unknown if Energy East has enough assets of its own to cover the cost of a

large spill clean-up. In the event of a default the cost may revert to the City of Winnipeg and

the province.

18

The spill cleanup would be disruptive and detrimental to the residents and businesses on the

river bank and activities on the river itself. Large scale dredging equipment would be needed to

attempt to retrieve toxins in dilbit that sink and mix with river sediment. Deployment of booms

and other surface equipment to contain the diluent potion of the spill that floats would be

disruptive. There would likely be a long term impairment of the sport fishery and loss of

irrigation water for golf courses, market gardens and other uses due to toxins from the dilbit.

Liability issues would flow from this damage and impairment.

Evacuation of residents and businesses could well open the City to litigation for personal injury

and property damage. City employees working in buildings near rivers where the spill occurred

could be required to evacuate. In the Kalamazoo River spill 150 homes were permanently

relocated due to spill damage. 25

City and privately owned buildings could be similarly

permanently damaged. Energy East is primarily responsible for such loss and damage;

however, resources and emergency personnel employed by the City and Province would be

required to participate and therefore could be culpable for compensation claims. 57

The Energy East submission details methods of cleanup of land from a conventional crude oil

spill but contains no information on evacuation procedures. No mention is made of the

location or availability of remediation equipment and resources or how the City would be

involved in the liaison and deployment of these resources. The City could be held liable

especially for a lack of planning and coordination leading to compensation claims related to

spill damage and necessary evacuation.57

A proper exclusion distance should be enforced based on scientific studies of plume dispersion

from venting of toxic volatile hydrocarbons and deadly hydrogen sulphide gas from pressure

relief valves in the vicinity of Winnipeg. Since there have been no such studies both Energy

East and the City could be liable for harm relating to venting of toxic gases as both bodies are

aware or should be aware of this hazard. Should relief valves not be placed in areas susceptible

to pressure surges, such as along the down slopes to the river crossings of the La Salle and Red

Rivers, ruptures could occur due to lack of adequate protection.

Winnipeg and/or the province could be held liable for compensation claims from

contamination of the food chain in the event of insufficient funds from Energy East and/or by

lack of due diligence and preparedness of Winnipeg to address such eventualities.57

A dilbit fire and explosion and the potential ensuing massive toxic black smoke plume could

cause extensive injury and loss of life and could require the immediate emergency evacuation

of the entire city. The City could be held partially liable for such indelible tragedy.57

Of particular concern is the focus of the City on the potential contamination of the water

supply and neglect of other spill contingencies such as water and airborne toxins from a spill

and or fire and explosion. This tunnel vision and lack of adequate attention to the plethora of

other risks could expose the City to liability.

CONCLUSION

From this analysis it appears that Winnipeg has much to lose from the pipeline crossing in its

area and nothing to gain. It also appears that Winnipeg should apply due diligence to address

19

the wide array of potential detrimental effects outlined here and not focus solely on the likely

minimal risk of contamination of its water supply.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author acknowledges the editing of this document by members of the Manitoba Energy

Justice Coalition, in particular, Mary Robinson, Alex Paterson and Alana Lajoie-OMalley. A peer

review of the technical content has been completed by J. G. Hayles.

REVIEWER S COMMENTS

Dennis LeNeveu has prepared this work from public documents using his considerable

understanding of science and technology. Dennis has added his broad and deep understanding

in the physics and chemistry of manmade and natural materials and phenomena into this

work. The list of 63 references with links to the actual document, and section, in many cases, is

impressive. No one person has an intimate understanding of all the phenomena described here

but Dennis is probably as close as anyone. I have known and worked with Dennis, on and off,

for over twenty years and I know his attention to detail and truth in modelling complex

physical phenomena is exemplary.

There are far more conventional fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) on Earth than humanity

dares to burn. We should be alarmed by Canadian industry developing an unconventional fossil

fuel like the tar sands. Why would you develop a resource that you really dare not use, without

first having global agreements on carbon in the atmosphere, and propose to ship it across

Canada in such a risky fashion? We need to hold industry and governments to account. Experts

in atmospheric physics and chemistry demand an 80% reduction in fossil fuel use by 2050.

Theres not much time left to correct this problem. Our children are watching.

John G. Hayles B. Sc. Geological Engineering, Queens University 1970; M.Sc. Geophysics, UBC

1973; P.Eng. P.Geo. (MB) FEC

(Retired exploration geophysicist)

Selkirk, Manitoba

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

D.M. LeNeveu, M.Sc. Biophysics, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario; B. Sc. (Hons) Physics,

University of Manitoba; B.Ed. Queens University Kingston Ontario

Dennis LeNeveu worked for twenty years at the Atomic Energy of Canada Research Centre in

Pinawa, Manitoba in the area of Radiation and Industrial Safety and Nuclear Fuel Waste

Management. He was one of the authors of the Environmental Impact Statement for the Long-

Term Environmental Assessment of the Canadian Concept for the Disposal of Canadas High-

level Nuclear Fuel Waste. He has written numerous peer reviewed papers and research reports

on the disposal of nuclear fuel waste. Subsequently he worked as an environmental consultant

in many projects including the long term assessment of the risk of storage of carbon dioxide

for the IEA GHG Weyburn CO2 Monitoring and Storage Project. He has also authored several

20

peer reviewed scientific papers on the risk of carbon dioxide and acid gas underground

disposal.

21

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Potential Impacts of the Energy East Pipeline on City of Winnipeg

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