Power And StructureCourse: Theories of International Relations

Department of British StudiesFaculty of world Studies

University of Tehran

Professor : Vaez-zade

Semester 2, (1392 Esfand 20th)By: Azam Hashemi

Power and StructureIn Realists’ Point of view

International Politics = Power Politics at each other’s expense

State competition:- To maintain a substantial amount of

power- To prevent a shift of balance of power

Three Substantial Questions

Why do states want power? How much power do they want? What causes war?

Why do states want power?

1. Classical Realists: Human Nature (born inclined to gain more power)

2. Structural Realist:Survival-The Structure (architecture) Of the International

System -(trapped in and iron cage)- States are black boxes: (Regime type or cultural

differences: irrelevant)

Why Do states Want Power? (structural Realists’ Point of view)

5 assumptions on the international system:a ceaseless security competition

1. Great powers, actors of an anarchic international system -No night watchman to rescue the states - A self-help world - Ever-present possibility of war - Anarchy: an ordering principle - Anarchy: Opposite hierarchy (ordering principal of

domestic politics) 2. All states possess some offensive military capabilities

(potentially harmful)

5 assumptions…

3. No certainty about other nations’ intentions (Politicians lie, conceal true intentions, future intentions unknown) the best policy: to assume the worst about other states’ intentions

-Revisionist States: To shift balance of power -Status quo States: No interest to change the balance of power

4. The main goal: Survival. Without it no other goal feasible to achieve. (Josef Stalin, 1927, “we can and must build socialism in the Soviet Union, but to do that first of all we have to exist”

5. States: rational actors ( opting sound strategies to maximize their prospect of survival, though miscalculation is possible) they pay attention to long term as well as immediate consequence of their actions

2. How Much Power Do States Want?

Classical Realists: Power an end in itself

Structural Realists : Defensive and Offensive Defensive Realists:-unwise to maximize a country’s share of world power

(system punishment)

Offensive Realists:-As much power as possible (ideal situation: to pursuit

hegemony)-Domination : not good in itself (guarantee of survival)-power as a means

Security Dilemma(an inevitable vicious circle in an anarchic

system)

Steps a state takes to

enhance its security

(increasing a state’s

prospects of survival)

Decrease of other states’

level of security

(threatening other stats’

security)

=

How Much Power is needed?

Structural Defensive Realist:- Strategically foolish to be after

hegemony-While a state becoming too powerful=

occurrence of Power balancing through coalition

e.g. : Napoleonic France (1792-1815), Nazi Germany(1933-45)

Offensive-Defensive Balance (maintained by Defensive Realists)

Illustrating how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or overcome a defender.

Usually heavily weigh in the defenders’ favor

Pyrrhic Victory : Even when conquest possible, it does not pay (the costs outweigh benefits)

Offenders’ Point of View

The more power, the better ( not losing a chance even once)

The ultimate goal: Hegemony Threatened states balance against the

offender, still it is inefficient, especially when coalition.

Also “Buck-Passing” probable. Historical evidence: the initiators of

wars, most often the winner of wars.

Defensive & Offensive Realist see eye to eye on nuclear

weaponswhen both sides enjoy having nuclear power:

Little use for offensive purposes No side gains an advantage to initiate the war. Conventional war possible but not likely.

Offensive Realists also maintain: Conquest might not pay, but it sometimes does

(information technology having an Orwellian dimension)

Deficiency of Defensive Realists Theory

&the alternative theory Great powers’ behavior not always in accordance

with Defensive Realists theory

States mostly behave in strategically foolish ways

(Their justification: in these cases are not behaving logically, they undermine their prospects)

Deficiency of Defensive theory:

not able to explain when they are prone to behave rationally, when they are not ( an alternative theory of foreign policy needed, beyond structural realism)

In contrast with Offensive theory (exclusively relying on structural arguments.

What Triggers War?(In Structural Realists’ Point of View)

No single reason. For any number of reasons Enhancing power and therefore security,

economic or ideological considerations…(nationalism, Bismarck’ war against Denmark)

Architecture of international system determines the likelihood of war

- the key variable:- 1) The number of great powers (poles) in the

system (a static indicator)- 2) The distribution of power among them (a

dynamic indicator)

Bi-polarity or Multi-polarity,

More Prone to War? A look at the history: International system: multi-polar since its

inception (1648) till 1945, two world wars. Bi-polar only during the Cold War (1945-

1989), no shooting war Conclusion : bipolarity, more peaceful Contradiction : The nineteenth century

timeline, relative stability - No war in 1815-1854, & in 1871-1914 ( Pax

Britannica)

Bi-Polarity Proponents’ reasoning (3 arguments)

Less opportunity to wage wars More equality between great powers

( more equal distribution of wealth and population)

Less potential for miscalculation in bipolarity (miscalculation often contributes to wars)

Also Balancing of Power, more efficient in bipolarity (no buck-passing possible) & alliances, uncertain processes

Multi-Polarity Proponents’ reasoning (2 arguments)

Deterrence, much easier in multi-polarity (balancing though might be less inefficient, coalitions more probable against aggressors)

Less hostility emerges, due to less attention paid to each other

Besides: variety of interactions (complexity),

dampens the prospects for great powers war

Three General Patterns of state Behavior

1. Fear ( suspicion, little room to trust) e.g. Reaction of France and the UK to German Reunification at the end of the Cold War (though used to close allies), & the 911 problem and absence of a central authority.

2. Self-help (God helps those who help themselves) alliances, temporary marriages, no

subordination of a state’s interests to that of the international community

3. Power maximization: to ensure their survival, weaker states, reluctant to pick war with the more

powerful ones. - The bigger the gap, the less likely (ideal

situation: being a hegemon)