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Project Proponent

Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), HO, Indian Oil Bhavan, G-9, Ali Yavar Marg Bandra (East), Mumbai-400 051

Study Conducted By

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research (A Unit of Shriram Scientific & Industrial Research Foundation)

19, University Road, Delhi-110 007

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

& ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN

for Proposed Petroleum Storage Depot of

IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal (Andhra Pradesh) (March-2017)

Information Format

Project Title Quantitative Risk Assessment and Onsite Emergency Plan for Proposed Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh

Project Proponent Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), HO, Indian Oil Bhavan, G-9, Ali Yavar Marg, Bandra (East), Mumbai-400 051

Project No. ENV-675

Type of Report QRA and OSEP

TC No. 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017

No. of Pages 114 + Annexures (A-1 to A-25)

Report Submitted to Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), HO, Indian Oil Bhavan, G-9, Ali Yavar Marg, Bandra (East), Mumbai-400 051

Project Team 1. Dr.V.K.Verma Joint Director (EPD) Overall Guidance and Supervision 2. Dr.Jagdish Kumar Asstt. Dir & Chief Env. Coordinator & FAE 3. Dr.D.S.Chatterjee Sr.Scientist Co-Env.Coordinator 4. Mr.R.K.Sharma Scientist ‘C’ Site Incharge 5. Mr.Rajiv Kukreja Scientist ‘C’ Project Team Member 6. Mr.Amit Bhadouria Asstt. Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member 7. Mr.Amit singh Jr.Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member 8. Mr.Gaurav Singhwal Jr.Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member 9. Mr.Ravi Singh Jr.Scientist ‘A’ Project Team Member 10. Mr.Jai Prakash Jr.Scientist ‘B’ Project Team Member Authorised Signatories

__________________ _______________ ___________________ Co- Env. Coordinator Env. Coordinator Head of Division (EPD)

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research (A Unit of Shriram Scientific & Industrial Research Foundation)

19, University Road, Delhi-110 007

Project Title : QRA and Onsite DMP of Proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi Project Proponent : Indian Oil Corporation Limited, HO, Mumbai Project No. : ENV-675 TC No. : 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017

Shriram Institute for Industrial Research : Delhi

Table of Contents

Chapter/ Clause

Content Page No.

1. Introduction 1-5 1.1 Prelude 1 1.2 The Purpose of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study 1 1.3 The IOCL Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi 1 1.4 The Assignment 2 1.5 The Statutory/ Legal Requirements 3 1.6 Organization of the Report 4 1.7 Contents of the Report 4 2. Project Description 6-11 2.1 Project Description 6 2.2 Distribution of Petroleum Products 9 2.3 Brief Information on various Facilities 10 3. Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) including

HAZOP (Hazard & Operability) Study 12-35

3.1 Genesis of Hazard Identification 12 3.2 Hazard Potential: Deciding Factors 12 3.3 Identification of Hazards 12 3.4 Applicability of MSIHC Rules, 2000 for proposed IOCL Depot at

Nakkanadoddi 13 3.5 Anticipation of Major Hazards 13 3.6 The objective of HIRA 14 3.7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis 14 3.8 Identification of Emergencies in case of POL Depot 17 3.9 Emergency Classification 17

3.10 General Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot 19 3.11 Specific Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot 19 3.12 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study 22 3.13 Fault Tree Analysis 25 3.14 Event Tree Analysis 26 3.15 DOW Fire and Explosion Index (FETI) 28

4. Maximum Credible Accident Analysis 36-49 4.1 The Prelude (MCCA) 36 4.2 The Process of MCCA 37 4.3 Review of Past Accidents 37 4.4 Credible Accidents Involving Pipelines 41 4.5 Failure Scenarios (Probability of Failures) 42 4.6 The Maximum Tolerable Criteria of Risk: ALARP 47 5. Consequence Analysis 50-80 5.1 The Objective of Consequence Analysis 50 5.2 Modeling of Damage Distance due to Fire & Explosion 50 6. On-Site Emergency Plan and DMP 81-114 6.1 A General Overview of Disaster 81 6.2 The Need for Disaster Management at POL Installations 81 6.3 Objective of Disaster Management for the proposed IOCL Depot at

Nakkanadoddi 82

6.4 Fire and Explosion Hazard Management 83 6.5 Emergency Organization Chart 87 6.6 Emergency Responsibilities (Onsite) 89



Chapter/ Clause

Content Page No.

6.7 Role and Responsibilities of Key Personnel 91 6.8 Emergency Control Center (ECC) 102 6.9 Assembly Points 103

6.10 Off-site Information and various facilities/ resources 103 6.11 Evacuation of Depot 106 6.12 Evacuation & Rehabilitation (Surrounding Areas) 108 6.13 Information to General Public: 108 6.14 Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders including External

Agencies 109

6.15 Reporting of the Incident: 111 6.16 Action after Reporting of Incident by the Depot 111 6.17 Termination of Emergency 112 6.18 Emergency Recovery Procedures 112 6.19 DMP for Road Transportation 113 6.20 Training and Education 113 6.21 Drill and Excercises 113 6.22 Wind Direction Indicator 113 6.23 Protective Actions 113 6.24 Preventive Measures 114 6.25 Emergency Preparedness Plan Review 114

Annexures Annexure-1 Various Formats A-1 to A-6 Annexure-2 Material Safety Data Sheets A-7 to A-19 Annexure-3 Layout of proposed project A-20 Annexure-4 Single Line Diagram A-21 Annexure-5 Equipment Layout of Calibration Tower A-22 Annexure-6 Equipment Layout : Product Pump House A-23 Annexure-7 Emergency Evacuation Plan A-24 Annexure-8 Proposed Project Location on Topo Plan A-25



List of Tables Table No. Description Page No. Table-2.1 (a) Schedule of tanks Class ‘A’ Product (Flash Point <23°C) 8 Table-2.1 (b) Schedule of tanks Class ‘B’ Product (Flash Point 23°C <65°C) 8 Table-2.1 (c) Schedule of tanks Excluded Product (Flash Point 93°C) 9 Table-2.1 (d) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks 9 Table-2.1 (e) TLF point details 9 Table-2.1 (f) Schedule of Dyke 9 Table-2.1 (g) Schedule of Fire Fighting Pumps 9 Table-3.4 Applicability of MSIHC Rules to the proposed IOCL Depot at

Nakkanadoddi 13

Table-3.8 Anticipated Emergencies for POL Depot 17 Table-3.9 Type of Emergencies Anticipated at IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi 18 Table-3.10 General Emergencies Anticipated at proposed IOCL Depot at

Nakanadoddi 19

Table-3.11 (a) Situations leading to emergencies at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakanadoddi

20

Table-3.11(b) Failure Modes & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi 21 Table-3.11(c) Hazard Scenarios & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi 21 Table-3.12 (a) Description of HAZOP Matrix 23 Table-3.12 (b) HAZOP Approach for Risk Identification of operations like TW Receipt;

TLF; PHO, ITT, TLF, TLD etc. 24

Table-3.15 (a) Hazard Matrix of DOW (F&EI) 30 Table-3.15 (b) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for MS 31 Table-3.15 (c) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for HSD 32 Table-3.15 (d) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for SKO 33 Table-3.15 (e) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for Ethanol 34 Table-3.15 (f) Process wise Hazard Classification based on DOW (F&EI) 35 Table-4.5 (a) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for road tankers and tank

wagons 43

Table-4.5 (b) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for atmospheric tanks and vessels

44

Table-4.5 (c) Atmospheric storage tank fire frequencies 44 Table-4.5 (d) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for Pipes 45 Table-4.5 (e) Loss of Containment (LOC) frequencies for Pumps 45 Table-4.5 (f) Centrifugal Pump Failure Rate 45 Table-4.5 (g) Flange Failure Rates 45 Table-4.5 (h) Manual Valve Failure Rates 46 Table-4.5 (i) Actuated Valve Failure Rates 46 Table-5.2 (a) Stability Classes 53 Table-5.2 (b) Impacts of Heat Radiation Flux (IS 15656: 2006) 53 Table-5.2 (c) Impacts of Overpressure (IS 15656: 2006) 53 Table-6.4 (a) Fire-fighting facilities for proposed depot 85 Table-6.4 (b) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks 86 Table-6.4 (c) Schedule of Firefighting Pumps 86 Table-6.6 Onsite-Emergency Organogram of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot 89



Table No. Description Page No. Table-6.7 Firefighting Team of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot 93 Table-6.10 (a) Contact details of district authorities 103 Table-6.10 (b) Demography in project core zone and 10-km buffer zone 104 Table-6.10 (c) Medical facilities in rural areas: Core zone & 10-km buffer zone 104 Table-6.10 (d) Medical facilities in towns 105 Table-6.10 (e) Locations of various hospitals & nursing homes 105 Table-6.10 (f) Contact information of ambulance services 105 Table-6.10 (g) Contact information of blood banks 105 Table-6.10 (h) Anantapur Emergency Numbers Information 106

Project Title : QRA and Onsite DMP of Proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi Project Proponent : Indian Oil Corporation Limited, HO, Mumbai Project No. : ENV-675 TC No. : 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017 Page 1 of 114


1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Prelude The petroleum products are potentially harmful due to their toxic, flammable and explosive properties, if released into the environment, during their processing, handling, storage and transportation. Nonetheless, most intensive precautions are to be taken, accidents are likely to occur, hence the need for contingency planning. Risks can only be minimized, controlled, and managed within defined and acceptable area by effective enforcement & adequate awareness. But total risk can never be reduced to zero. “No Risk is not an Option”. The ultimate objective is to minimize both controllable and unnecessary risks, to make responsible decisions aiming to implement feasible and beneficial courses of preventive and corrective action. 1.2 The Purpose of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study The purpose of QRA study is to identify the potential hazards leading to the risk as well as to work on mitigation measures to reduce or minimize hazards to control risk associated with the receipt, storage and distribution of petroleum products. The QRA includes identification of hazard scenarios and consequence analysis. Scenario identification describes how an accident occurs, while consequence analysis describes the anticipated damage to environment, life and equipment. The overall aim of study would, therefore, be to identify the potential hazards, assess the impacts of all probable accidental hazards and mitigating measures to reduce hazards of the proposed project facilities under the scope of the study to ensure that the risk associated with the design, construction and operational activities of the project shall be reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risk Analysis study requires involvement of various sequential steps as follows: (a) Hazard Identification : To identify sources of process accidents involving release

of hazardous material in the atmosphere and various scenarios of occurrence

(b) Consequence Assessment

: To estimate probable zone of impact of accidents as well as the magnitude/ or scale/ or probability of damages with respect to human beings and equipment and machinery

(c) Accident Frequency : Computation of the average likelihood of accidents

(d) Risk Assessment : Combining accident consequence and frequency to obtain risk distribution within and beyond a process plant

1.3 The IOCL Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi The existing petroleum storage depot of IOCL at Guntakal was commissioned in the year 1964 adjoining the Railway Station in an area of about 4 acres. The facilities in the depot do not meet OISD requirements & due to paucity of space, it is not possible to make this depot OISD compliant. In order to comply to the safety norms & to meet the growing demand for petroleum product of Guntakal & surrounding towns, a bulk storage Petroleum Depot at Nakkanadoddi Village, Guntakal is proposed to be set up on a 82.77 acre land acquired.



Hence, the project primarily aims at improving the Infrastructure Development for Petroleum Product Storage & Transportation by

Developing the storage facility of petroleum product, in compliance with OISD norms and other statutory requirement, to ensure better availability of petroleum product in the state of Andhra Pradesh.

Fulfilling the local petroleum products demand of Guntakal & surrounding towns. The proposed tankage facility would have the capacity to store 55060 KL of petroleum products, with following details

3 Nos. of Internal Floating Roof Vertical Tank (6000 KL each) for storage of MS (Petrol)

3 Nos. of Cone Roof Vertical Tank (10000 KL each) for storage of HSD (Diesel)

2 Nos. of Cone Roof Vertical Tank (1800 KL each) for storage of SKO

2 Nos. of Internal Floating Roof Vertical Tank (1000 KL each) for storage of Ethanol

1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (50 KL) for storage of MS (TTD)

1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (50 KL) for storage of SKO (TTD)

1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (50 KL) for storage of HSD (TTD)

1 No. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (20 KL) for storage of HSD (Own use)

2 Nos. of Under Ground Horizontal Tank (70 KL each) for storage of Ethanol (TTD)

4 Nos. Under Ground Horizontal Tanks (200 KL each) for storage of Biodiesel

1 No. of Above Ground Horizontal Tank (250 KL) for storage of Sludge 1.4 The Assignment The Indian Oil Corporation Limited, HO, Mumbai has assigned Shriram Institute for Industrial Research, Delhi the task to undertake QRA and to prepare Onsite Disaster Management Plan for proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Village Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. The QRA has been carried out by identifying the hazards at the installation estimating the likely hood of occurrence of the hazardous events and mathematical modeling for calculating the consequences of each event. The scope of QRA & Onsite DMP is to carry out study with respect to following: Identification of all probable failure cases for the proposed facilities and consequence

analysis with respect to flammability, thermal radiation, dispersion, explosion, overpressure, toxic release effect, LFL distance etc. as applicable.

Identification of risk by HAZOP/ FETI approaches/ result evaluation & computation of summary.

Hazard analysis/ damage model studies for tanks/ petroleum facilities, thermal radiation effects etc.

Emergency preparedness plan with respect to administration safety, environment, societal risk, fire-fighting, communication power/ lighting, medical facilities, etc.



Two types of accident scenarios to be considered viz. low frequency high consequence and high frequency low consequence. These cases to generate information for guidance, planning, and routine safety exercise and training tools etc. and will also be useful in evaluation of damage to men and material in and around the depot. Failure cases are to be selected by applicable/ relevant modern technical methodologies.

Relevant computer model & programs, methodology and technique to be used to assess the consequence and identify various impact zones and hazard distances. The hazard distances are to be marked in overall plot plan to show the areas affected. The results of consequence analysis also to be shown in form of tables, charts, figures etc.

A detailed risk assessment study, to include the fire hazard in proposed facilities. A consequence analysis for the accidental release of hydrocarbons in water bodies to be made.

Hazard Identification using - Manufacture, storage and import of hazardous chemical rules 1989 of GOI - Fire explosion and Toxicity Index (FETI), a relative ranking technique based on toxic,

flammable and explosive properties of chemical. - Other relevant ranking techniques

Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Analysis - Chemical inventory analysis - Identification of hazardous storage units.

Consequence analysis

Onsite and off-site emergency preparedness plan.

With the use of latest appropriate simulation models, damage distance has to be quantified and recommendations shall be made for specifying safe distance and risk minimization measures which could be needed for safety.

The onsite emergency preparedness plans to be prepared taking into account the various emergency scenarios identified in the risk analysis. Recommendations to be suggested on effective handling of identified emergencies.

1.5 The Statutory/ Legal Requirements The QRA has been prepared in view of various regulations and legal instruments, which deals with management of hazardous chemical in one form or the other. These can be categorized as follows: (a) The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended todate) and following Rules there

under:

The Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 (amended todate).

The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules,

2000.

The Hazardous and other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016.

The EIA Notification, 2006.



The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996.

(b) The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987).

Andhra Pradesh Factory Rules 1950 (c) The Inflammable Substances Act, 1952. (d) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001).

The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (amended 2005). (e) The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 (amended 1992).

The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991 (amended 1993). (f) The Petroleum Act, 1934.

The Petroleum Rules, 2002. (g) The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995. (h) The Explosives Act, 1884 (amended todate).

The Gas Cylinder Rules, 2004,

The Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (Unfired) Rules, 1981 (amended 2002).

The Explosives Rules, 2008. 1.6 Organization of the Report The basic objective of identification of hazard and evaluation of risk is to aid the proponents of the project to rationalize the procedure for an effective management of risk which are controllable by adhering to necessary preventive and corrective actions. Organization of this report includes following: Collection, collation and analysis of baseline data for various attributes associated with

receipt, storage and transportation of the petroleum products. Identification of hazards Evaluation of Risk both in qualitative & quantitative terms Consequence Analysis Onsite Disaster Management Plan

1.7 Contents of the Report The QRA Report is based on the secondary data provided by IOCL, HO, Mumbai for Proposed Development of Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. The analysis of the data together with modeling and interpretation has been carried out for preparation of QRA and Onsite DMP report. Generic structure of the present report includes following chapters in nutshell:



Chapter- 1 : Introduction This chapter provides general information pertaining to purpose of the report, identification of project and project proponent. It also includes legal and regulatory requirements as well as various acts in pertinent to risk involved in operation and requirement of safety procedures. Chapter- 2 : Project Description This chapter provides detailed description of proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, inclusive of tankage, capacity, POL receipt, Tank Truck (TT) loading, unloading, Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) operation etc. It also provides information with respect to P&I diagram and layout diagram. Chapter- 3 : Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis Preliminary Hazard Analysis inclusive HAZOP, FTA and ETA are included in this chapter, which have been carried out considering the process of TW receipt, TT loading, unloading and TLF operations at the facility. DOW Fire and Explosion Index have been estimated based on Material Factor, General Process Hazard and Special Process Hazard. Chapter- 4 : Maximum Credible Accident Analysis This chapter highlights the past accident history of similar kind of operations world over to assess the causes and damage associated with the untoward incidents. Failure frequency of equipment has been illustrated together with individual and societal risk. This would help in analyzing in situation and to take adequate safeguard to prevent the happening of such incidents for the protection of public health, environment and infrastructure. Chapter- 5 : Consequence Analysis Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) has been carried out considering various scenarios. Based on the modeling damage distances have been estimated to envisage adequate safeguard measures. Chapter illustrates modeling results based on Pool Fire, Jet Fire, Vapour Cloud Explosion, BLEVE etc. Chapter- 6 : Onsite Emergency Plan/ Disaster Management Plan This chapter provides various measures to prevent accidents through good design, operation, maintenance and inspection by which it is possible to reduce the risk of an accident. It gives detailed contingency planning for management of disasters and prevention of accidents.



2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 2.1 Project Description (a) Project Location The proposed facility description of IOCL Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot is given below: Facility : IOCL Petroleum Storage Depot

Address : Village Nakkanadoddi ,

Guntakal, Ananthapuram District

Location : The proposed Depot is planned at Nakkanadoddi Village, Guntakal, Ananthapuram District. The nearest Railway station is Guntakal railway station (about 10 km). The depot is approximately at 290 Km from Hyderabad.

Geo codes : Latitude : 15.1647°N to 15.1602°N

Longitude : 77.4504°N to 77.4583°E

Surroundings : East Agricultural lands West Agricultural lands North Chennai-Mumbai Railway line South Agricultural lands, NH 63

Project Layout is given at Annexure-3 (b) The Process of the Project There would not be any manufacturing process involved in the proposed depot. The process involved can be divided into Receipt of finished petroleum products (MS, HSD, SKO) through Rail Wagons. Unloading of Products (MS, SKO & HSD) from Tank trucks occasionally (TLD). Receipt of Ethanol through Tank trucks (TLD) Receipt of Bio Diesel through Tank trucks (TLD) Pump House Operations (PHO) Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) operations of MS, Ethanol Blended MS, HSD, Blended Diesel &

SKO Ethanol, Blue Dye & Bio Diesel Dosing Storage of petroleum products in storage tanks fabricated as per international standards. Dispatch of petroleum products through Tank Lorries. The entire operation of RECEIPT, STORAGE AND DISPATCH of petroleum products would be carried out in a closed system thereby eliminating risk of spillage of products and to achieve enhanced safety.Typical process flow chart is as follows:


PICTORIAL DEPICTION OF THE PROCESS FLOW CHART:

REC

EIPT

FR

OM

BTF

LN/B

TPN

WAG

ON

S

HSD CRVT MSIFRVT

SKO CRVT

8 Bays TLF Bottom Loading

Total Automation

Vapour Recovery System

TANKFARM FACILITIES

TRUCK LOADING FACILITIES

EthanolIFRVT

Bio- Diesel UGHT



(c) Receipt of Petroleum Products The petroleum products viz. MS, HSD, SKO would be received from Vizag & Chennai through Rail wagon rakes. An exclusive Railway siding in line with RDSO standards shall be constructed for the depot. The DPR for setting up of Railway siding has been submitted to Local Railway Authorities & in principle approval has been obtained. (d) Storage for Petroleum Products& Other Facilities Following tankages are proposed to be developed

Table-2.1 (a) Schedule of tanks Class ‘A’ Product (Flash Point <23°C) Tag No.

Size Product Nominal Capacity (KL)

Licensed Capacity

Location Type of Tank

T-01A 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR

T-01B 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR

T-01C 24.00M Ǿ x 16.00M H Motor Spirit 7215 6000 Dyke-1 IFR

T-08A 03.00M Ǿ x 07.50M L Motor Spirit 53 50 UG HDR

T-03C 12.00M Ǿ x 11.50M H Ethanol 1295 1000 Dyke-III IFR

T-03D 12.00M Ǿ x 11.50M H Ethanol 1295 1000 Dyke-III IFR

T-08E 02.91M Ǿ x 10.50M L Ethanol 74 70 UG HDR

T-08F 02.91M Ǿ x 10.50M L Ethanol 74 70 UG HDR

Sub Total for Licensed Capacity of Class ‘A’ Products 20190 KL

Table-2.1 (b) Schedule of tanks Class ‘B’ Product (Flash Point 23°C <65°C) Tag No. Size Product Nominal

Capacity (KL) Licensed Capacity


T-02A 30.00M Ǿ x 15.00M H HSD 10568 10000 Dyke-II CRV

T-02B 30.00M Ǿ x 15.00M H HSD 10568 10000 Dyke-II CRV

T-02C 30.00M Ǿ x 15.00M H HSD 10568 10000 Dyke-II CRV

T-08B 03.00M Ǿ x 07.50M L HSD 53 50 UG HDR

T-08C# 21.00M Ǿ x 06.00M L HSD 21 20 UG HDR

T-03A 14.00M Ǿ x 12.50M H SKO 1916 1800 Dyke-III CRV

T-03B 14.00M Ǿ x 12.50M H SKO 1916 1800 Dyke-III CRV

T-08D 03.00M Ǿ x 07.50M L SKO 53 50 UG HDR

Sub Total for Licensed Capacity of Class ‘A’ Products 33720 KL

# for own use



Table-2.1 (c) Schedule of tanks Excluded Product (Flash Point 93°C) Tag No.

Size Product Nominal Capacity (KL)

Licensed Capacity


T-08G 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR

T-03H 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR

T-03I 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR

T-08J 04.12M Ǿ x 15.00M L Bio-diesel 208 200 UG HDR

Sub Total for Excluded Products 800 KL

Table-2.1 (d) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks Tag No. Size Nominal Capacity (KL)

Pumping Capacity

WT-01/02/03 24.00M Ǿ x 14.00ML 6310 5114

Total 15342 KL

The above tankage shall be developed in line with latest API 650 & OISD regulations.

Table-2.1 (e) TLF point details Product Bay No. Loading Type Sub-total loading

points Motor Spirit 1 to 6 Bottom 6

HSD 1 to 8 Bottom 8

SKO 7 & 8 Top & Bottom 4

Table-2.1 (f) Schedule of Dyke

Dyke Overall Dimensions Capacity

Dyke-I 81.00 M x 81.00 M 11451 KL

Dyke-II 98.00 M x 98.00 M 16919 KL

Dyke-III 74.00 M x 53.00 M 4176 KL

Table-2.1 (g) Schedule of Fire Fighting Pumps Tag No. Description Nos. of Pump Capacity Head

(mWC) Operating Standby

P-22A/B Jockey Pumps Electrical Driven 1 1 72 Cu.M/Hr. 110

P-23A/B/C/D/E Main Pumps Diesel Engine Driven 3 2 850 Cu.M/Hr 105

P-24A/B Foam Pump 1 1 25 Cu.M/Hr 120 (e) Separation Distances The minimum separation distances between various facilities, offsite facilities & tanks within a dyke shall be as per provisions of latest version of OISD 118 & OISD 244 Standards. 2.2 Distribution of Petroleum Products The petroleum products shall be distributed to various Industries / Petrol Pumps through tank trucks of capacity 9000 Litres to 24,000 Litres. On an average, 150 tank trucks are anticipated to be filled on daily basis. 8-bay TLF shed with bottom loading facilities for MS and HSD is proposed. Top loading facilities in addition to bottom loading facilities for SKO would be



provided. The loading facilities shall consist of PD metering system, batch controllers, blending facilities for Ethanol, branded fuels etc. Vapour recovery system to be designed & developed for handling MS. Tank Truck (TT) decantation facility with suitable capacity of Under Ground (U/G) tanks to be provided. 2.3 Brief Information on various Facilities

I. Product Pump House (TWD Receipt & TT Dispatch):

Pump House: 175 Mx 6 M with new product pumps.

Pump House Manifold: 175 Mx 30 M

II. Product Piping:

Set of piping from TW Siding to the Product Tanks Set of piping from Product Tanks to the pump house and

Set of piping from pump house to the Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) shed.

III. Electrical Facilities:

Transformer& HT Breaker

New MCC Panel: 1 Set.

DG Sets: 1250 KVA x 2 Nos.&750 KVA x 1 No. (Shall be as per connected load & design requirements).

Electrical Cabling, Lighting, Earthing.

IV. Fire Fighting Facilities:

24 Mdiax 14 MHigh Water Tank of Capacity 6310 KL x 3 Nos.

Fire Pumps: 5 Nos. x 850 Cu.M/ Hr x 105 M Head.

Water Sprinkler system on proposed MS & HSD as per prevailing safety guidelines issued by OISD

Fixed Foam fighting system on proposed Diesel (HSD) and Petrol (MS) tanks as per prevailing safety guidelines issued by OISD

Centralized Foam Feeding system for fixed foam pourers & HVLR.

Provision of Fire hydrant piping network for the entire depot facilities.

V. Other Civil Facilities:

Room for the Transformer and HT Breaker

Fire Pumps

MCC room

Dyke walls for proposed product tanks

Roads and Storm water drains for the new product tank farms

Driveway around TLF shed



VI. Automation of Entire Terminal:

Tank Farm Management system: These shall comprise of automation of receipt of products from Railway Sidings.

Valve Automation system: All the Tank Body Valves and exchange pit valves shall be automated including remote operation with necessary safety interlocks. Further, the tank body Valves shall be fitted with Remote Operated Shut Off Valves (ROSOV) to be closed by a safety PLC in case of emergency. The same shall be in line with international SIL 2 requirements.

Radar gages on all tanks: Each tank shall be provided with 2 nos SIL 2 certified Radar gauges for automatic level measurement. The gauges shall function in remote for the tank inventory and tank shut down procedures.

Automatic Overspill Protection Switch: In addition to the dual redundant radar gauges on each tank, an independent SIL 3 certified Level switch shall be provided for shut of the tank in case of reaching high level alarm.

Tank Lorry Filling System: The entire process of filling of the Tank Lorries shall be automated along with necessary safety interlocks

Access Control System: The system shall permit only authorized personnel to carry out the operations within the terminal. The access shall be both role and application based system.

Control Room with equipment: The control room shall monitor and log all events pertaining to the operation of the terminal on real time basis.

Others: - MOVs for the tank farm dyke valves for remote operation & real time

indication on status of valves - Push Button Stations outside Tank body valves for remote switching off of

the product tank body valves. - Emergency Shut Down Procedures for various terminal operation activities.

(i) Ethanol/ Bio-diesel/ Branded fuels dosing: Design and provision of suitable dosing system for Ethanol with MS, Bio-Diesel with HSD with feasibility of varying the blending ratio from 5% to 15% to be provided. Similarly design & provision of suitable dosing system for branded fuels with feasibility of changing the dosing ratio (in ppm) to be provided.

(ii) Blue dye/ Bio diesel handling facilities: Suitably designed for online blue dye dosing to SKO storage tanks to be provided.

(iii) Non-plant Facilities: All the ancillary facilities like security, perimeter wall with fencing, gates, internal fencing, internal roads, pavements, driveway, security, Administrative block, Workmen change room, Control room, S & D room, Locker shed, Calibration facility, sludge pits, Effluent Treatment Plant, Scrap yard, PPE/First Aid room MCC rooms, DG sets and rooms, Electrical substation, TT parking area, TT rest room Storage sheds for revenue store/Engineering materials.



3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA) INCLUDING HAZOP (HAZARD & OPERABILITY) STUDY

3.1 Genesis of Hazard Identification "Hazard" is a characteristic of a system, plant or processes that present potential for an accident. Therefore, all the relevant aspects of petroleum oil storage and handling process shall be thoroughly examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unintentional event or sequence of events, which can lead to an accident or disaster. Type, quantity, location & conditions of release of the petroleum oils under various scenarios are to be examined in order to estimate its damage potential, area affected, and the precautionary measures to be taken. 3.2 Hazard Potential: Deciding Factors Factors needs to be considered to identify and analyze the hazard potential are: 1. Flash point & Boiling point of the petroleum oil 2. Inventory of the petroleum oil 3. Potential for loss from containment 4. Pool size & dike capacity 5. Potential for availability of ignition sources in the vicinity of leakage or spillage Apart from the petroleum oil (MS, HSD and SKO) and Ethanol characteristics and process of its handling, size & layout of the depot and its equipment are also to be analyzed in order to assess the hazard potential. Similarly, domino or secondary effects of accidents occurring in one tank of the depot on the other tanks and also from the adjoining area are to be analyzed. 3.3 Identification of Hazards Petroleum oils (MS, HSD and SKO) and Ethanol are highly inflammable in their basic character. These are dangerous because of their intrinsic properties i.e. flash point, ignition energy required, heat of combustion, flammability limits, etc. In addition to such intrinsic properties, extrinsic factors like storage & operating conditions and large storage quantity are also to be considered for hazard identification. Material safety Data Sheets for the products handled are attaché as Annexure-2. The extent of the consequences arising from the petroleum oil depot would depend on quantity of the oil present, mode of containment, and external factors like location, density of population etc. In many cases, realization of hazard and its potential also depend on prevailing meteorological conditions and availability of ignition source. Thus, most serious consequences would arise from a large inventory of petroleum oil surrounded by a densely populated area. Petroleum oils (MS, HSD and SKO) and Ethanol require interaction with air or oxygen for its hazard to be realized. Under certain circumstances vapors of the oil when mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. Following methods of hazard identification have been employed in this study: (a) Characterization of major hazardous units based on manufacture, storage and Import of

Hazardous Chemicals Rules, Ministry of Environment & Forest, Government of India, referred here as MSIHC Rules.

(b) Identification of hazardous installations based on relative ranking technique, viz. Dow’s

Fire Explosion Index and Mond’s Toxicity Index (FEI & TI).



3.4 Applicability of MSIHC RULES, 2000 for proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi Major hazard installations in the country have been identified & characterized by MSIHC Rules, 2000. The rules employ certain criteria based on flammable, explosive & toxic properties and quantity of the chemicals. Indicative criteria adopted in the MSIHC Rules. As per provisions of the MSIHC Rules, 2000 quantity of petroleum oil storage at the depot have been analyzed and the applicable rules are identified based on the type of petroleum oil, quantity of storage and the threshold quantity given in the rules. Applicable regulations of the rules to the proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi are identified in the following Table. Petroleum Oils are covered in MSIHC Rules in Schedule-1 part 1 (b) (ii) & (iii). The threshold quantities are given in Schedule-2 (“isolated storage” at installations, other than those covered by Schedule-4). Applicability of the rules are as follows:

Table-3.4 Applicability of MSIHC Rules to the proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi Product No. of

Tanks Licensed Capacity

KL

Maximum Capacity in MT#

Total Product in MT

Threshold Quantity (MT) as per MSIHC

Rules for Application of Rules

Applicable Rules

4, 5, 7-9 & 13 to 15

10 to 12

MS 04 18050 13177 14867 7000 7000 Sch-1, para (b) (iii)

Ethanol 04 2140 1691 HSD 05 30070 25259

28179 10000 10000 Sch-1, para (b) (iv) SKO 03 3650 2920 Total 16 53910 43046 As indicated above 2 (e) (i); 2 (e) (ii),

3,4 (1) (a); 4(1) (b), 4(2), 5, 7-9, 17,18

# Specific Gravity (MS = 0.73; HSD = 0.84; SKO = 0.80; Ethanol = 0.79) 3.5 Anticipation of Major Hazards (a) Fire The worst scenario as per risk analysis will be catastrophe failure of MS Tank and flooding of dyke. Pool fire is possible in case of ignition source. Since it is petroleum installation, the possibility of ignition source is ruled out. (b) Vapour Cloud Explosion: When a large amount of volatile flammable material is rapidly dispersed into the atmosphere, a vapour cloud forms and disperses. If this cloud is ignited before it is diluted below its LEL, an Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) or Flash Fire occurs. (c) Small Spills Small spills which pose no safety and health dangers are not likely to adversely affect the environment, are to be handled by trained personnel.



Eliminate the source of the spill by closing valves Recover the spilled products Avoid migration of product into the external drain

(d) Large Spills Large spills contained inside the tank bund will be recovered manually / mechanically by using sorbent pads. Ensure closure of drain valves. 3.6 The objective of HIRA The objective of hazard identification is to identify the hazards and the unintended events, which may lead to an accident. The first and foremost task is to identify the hazards that are inherent to the process or plant and then focus on the evaluation of the events, which could be associated with the hazards. A hazard is generally realized as a loss of containment of a hazardous material. The route for such loss of containment can include release from pipelines containing liquid or releases from vents/ relief or from vessel rupture. In case of Proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi, the aim of Hazard Identification would be to identify all possible hazards associated with the operational phase of the Depot. It is necessary to identify what can happen and how and why it can happen. Major POL Operations identified at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, which may lead to hazard, are: Rail Wagon Receipt of MS, HSD & SKO TT Receipt of Ethanol TT Loading & Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) Operations - MS, HSD,& SKO Pump House Operations (PHO): Tank Lorry Filling (TLF); Tank Lorry Decantation (TLD);

Inter-Tank Transfer (ITT) etc. TT Suck Back/ Unloading of MS, HSD & SKO. Ethanol Dosing at TLF Additive Dosing at TLF Tank Water Draining Operations 3.7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (a) Hazard Identification The hydrocarbons to be received, handled, pumped and stored are MS, SKO, HSD and Ethanol. Operations include, pumping, storage, inter tank transfer, dosing in case of kerosene and transfer to Tank Trucks for dispatch to destination. The usual hazards know in these operations with the above products are: Containment failure and fires. Spills and fires Evaporation and forming explosive mixture and Explosion Containment failure and toxic effects of Furfural. (b) Internal Pipeline Failure The pipe system consists of pipelines, isolation valves, pipe supporting racks.

Among many major leaks of flammable material studied the maximum leakage from

pipelines and they have resulted in fires and vapour cloud explosions.



The pipe line failure occurs due to liquid hammer, vibration and fatigue of pipeline or

supporting structure or holding structure, pipeline and flange leaks, vapour lock, cavitations, corrosion due failure of cathodic protection, stress – corrosion cracking, thermal expansion, cyclic stress, structural failure and over pressurizing pipe system.

Pipe blockages are known to unintended valve closure, human error, failure of valve to

operate, impurities and sludge formation blocking flow, broken parts in pipeline, fabrication components, welding electrodes, weld failures, over - stressing, damages during installation.

Other causes of pipeline failures include natural calamities like lightning, storm, flood,

earthquake and vehicle crash and sabotage.

Valve leaks through flanges, seals, stump packing due to drying, corrosion wear or inconsistent engineering practices are also the possible causes.

The other significant reasons which can aggravate the situation are delays in activating

emergency response procedure, settlement of land under pipelines, road work near pipelines resulting in damage to pipelines etc.

(c) Pump Failures Pump failures due to wear, drying at packing, hard substances like grit, packing / seal failure,

blockages on suction and discharge sides, dry running are known.

Control system for valve operations etc. can fail due to incorrect setting or operation, location of instruments, instrument failure, inconsistent maintenance practices including contact failures and incorrect calibration. Such situations include failure of densitometer, inadvertent inhibition of alarm / warning systems, bye-passing of critical interlocks etc.

Engineering practices include Operation, Inspection, start-up/ shutdown practices, leak

detection and maintenance practices.

The failure modes for liquids are significant for the reasons, pipeline pressure falls rapidly following puncture owing to relative incompressibility of liquid. Initial high rate of release reduces rapidly. The drain down the pipeline will be driven by system hydraulic head initially and finally by static head, until equilibrium condition reaches.

Explosion hazards occur in pipelines with release of product transported which comes in

contract with outside atmosphere creates a flammable atmosphere and can present an explosion hazard also. The explosion hazards would be severe, if the contents are subjected to BLEVE. Flame travel within pipe is known as deflagration and propagates from burning gases, Detonation is characterized by pressure of shockwave in material and rate of propagation would be higher than velocity of sound.

(d) Tank Failures In case of tanks (Conical Roof Tank and Floating Roof Tanks) containment failure can take

place and contents spread over. However, spread is limited to dyke size and if ignited, can



form a pool fire and result in intense heat radiation and also endanger neighboring tanks and contents (domino effects), if the fire is not controlled.

The causes for containment failure could be in general, over filling, collapse due to vacuum, mechanical damage, external impact, rupture of tank shell. Reasons for overfill could be instrument failure, lack of attention, wrong settings on instrument etc.

Collapse due to vacuum can occur, if pumping out is carried out when the vent line is closed

or blocked due to other reasons.

In case of floating roof tanks, seal failure, stucking-up of roof in a particular position or sinking of floating roof rapidly and exposing of product to flammable conditions.

The sources of ignition of spilled product or ignition of vapour could be due external source,

lightning or electro static discharge. (e) Fire Hazard Liquid fires in process equipment typically involve leaks from flanges, pump packings,

broken low gauge pipes, corrosion holes, burst vessels, etc. or overflow from tanks and drains. If the leaking liquid is then above the auto ignition temperature, ignition is immediate. Otherwise an ignition source is necessary.

Largest liquid fires involve storage tanks, particularly as a result of an initial, explosion

(cone roof tanks) or rim fires (floating roof tanks or after a small explosion in a cone roof tank).

A typical course of events in such a fire involves an initial spill, an ignition at the tank, and a

resulting local fire. This local fire may then be extinguished if response is rapid and the emergency facilities have sufficient capacity.

Delays, failure of emergency equipment, and inadequate capacity of equipment compared

with the size of the release result in gradual increase in the size of the fire. If the fire is large enough, it can spread through collapse of the tank, or through boil over

and frothing, or through radiation to nearby buildings and other tanks.

In case of release of liquid at high pressure from piping, a different mechanism applies. The liquid forms a spray or jet, which then leads to a jet fire. Such fires can be very intense, and the flame surprisingly long. Additionally they can impinge on other equipment and cause damage, leading to still larger releases.

(f) Domino Effects When large fires and explosions occur elsewhere in the installation, it is possible for these to affect other facilities, thereby resulting into the spread of effect from unit to unit. This is termed as a domino effect. There is also the possibility of cascading effects in the nearby units.



3.8 Identification of Emergencies in case of POL Depot In general, emergencies anticipated for POL Depot operations, may include but not limited to following:

Table-3.8 Anticipated Emergencies for POL Depot

3.9 Emergency Classification

Severity of accident and its likely impact area will determine the level of emergency and the disaster management plan required for appropriate handling of an emergency. In case of the proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels on the basis of seriousness and response requirements. Emergency levels and the action needed for each level are indicated below: Level-I Emergency

This is an emergency or an incident which (a) Can be effectively and safely managed and contained within the site, location or installation

by the available resources. (b) Has no impact outside the site, location or installation.

(c) Is unlikely to be danger to life, the environment or to company assets or reputation.

Sl. Type of Emergency Possible Causes

1 Pipeline leak with fire

Failure of Pipe/ Gaskets/ Valves/etc.

2 Tank farm Area

Tank containment failure and release of flammable petroleum Product.

Pool fires in tank storage, such as rim fires; dyke fires. Vapour cloud explosion in tank storage / dyke areas. Spillage/ leakage due to pipe/ gaskets/ valves failure

followed by fire.

3 Tank truck loading gantry

Containment failure and release of flammable petroleum product

Pool fires Vapour cloud explosion.

4 Fires in the remaining areas

Near captive power DG sets Near fire pumps preemies area Transfer pumps area Sump collection tanks contaminated Vessels Slop tank Electrical fire Tankers sealing area

5 Others

Asphyxiation of persons Structural Collapse Road Accident involving incoming and outgoing Tank

Trucks in the Vicinity of the Depot and may lead to secondary situation manifesting into fire.



Level-II Emergency This is an emergency or incident which (a) Cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the site, location or installation by

available resource. Hence, additional support would be required. (b) Is having or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and

where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved. (c) Is likely to be danger to life, to the environment, to company assets or reputation.

Level-III Emergency This is an emergency or incident which is catastrophic and is likely to affect the population, property and environment inside and outside the installation. Under such circumstances, the management & control is to be done by District Administration. Although the level-III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till the time they step in, it shall be the responsibility of the Unit to manage the Emergency.

Level-1 & Level-II Emergencies shall normally be grouped as Onsite Emergency whereas, Level-III as Off-site Emergency. Type of Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot

Table-3.9 Type of Emergencies Anticipated at IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi Sl. Type of

Emergency Applicable

EAP Description of Emergency

1 Level-1 On site

Oil spills from the flanges/Internal Pipeline /Gate Valves.

Pinhole leakage from Internal Pipelines Failure of gasket resulting in leakage

2 Level-2 On site

Spillages from tank truck due to over flow while loading.

Spillages from storage tank during receipt. Tank containment failure and release of flammable

petroleum Product. Leakage from internal pipeline due to damage Failures caused by corrosion defects, Failures caused by miscellaneous factors such as pipe

material defects, natural hazards.

3 Level-3 Off Site

Burst of product pipelines inside premises. Failure of storage tanks. Pool fires Vapour cloud explosion. Agitation / forced entry by external group of people. Natural Perils – Earthquake, Flood, Cyclone etc. Sabotage, Bomb explosion / Threat

Important Note : The earlier emergency classification as per OISD-117 has been renamed as per PNGRB Regulation- 2010 as follows.



OISD-117 classification ERDMP Regulation-2010 classification

Small Fire Level-1 Emergency

Major Fire Level-2 Emergency

Disaster Level-3 Emergency

3.10 General Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot The emergencies that could be anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot atNakanadoddi, may be as follows, but not limited to:

Table-3.10 General Emergencies Anticipated at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakanadoddi Sl. Nature of Emergencies Level (i) Slow isolated fire / Electrical Fire Slow isolated fire / Electrical Fire Level-1 (ii) Fast spreading fire due to flammable liquids/ Tank on fire Level-2 (iii) Explosion of compressed air vessels Level-2 (iv) Vapour cloud Explosion at Petroleum storage tanks Level-2 (v) Bursting of pipelines inside the premises & vessels Level-2 (vi) Spillage / Handling of petroleum products Level-1 (vii) Major accident such as structural or building collapse. Level-2 (viii) Overturning of truck containing flammable liquids. Level-2/3 (ix) Natural calamities like storm, flood, earthquake, etc. Level-3 (x) Sabotage, Act of terrorism, Civil commotion, Air raid etc. Level-3 (xi) Bomb Hoax Level-3

3.11 Specific Emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot

Specific emergencies anticipated in case of proposed IOCL Depot at Nakanadoddi includes Fire and Explosion. Fire hazard consequences can be disastrous, since these involve release of huge quantities of hydrocarbons either stored or in dynamic condition in internal pipelines, tanks, TLF areas, TTs, pumping from Tank Wagon to storage tanks etc. Toxic releases can affect personnel working around. Detailed Risk Analysis provides a basis for consequence estimation. Consequence Analysis illustrates the type of release, extent of damage and probability of occurrence of such hazards considering various scenarios. The activities of the depot handling POL can broadly be subdivided as follows, where hazardous situation can be anticipated. Activities Place Receipt of petroleum products Pumping from Tank Wagons at Railway Siding. Petroleum products storage Tank Farm Area Petroleum products pumping Pump House Dispatch of petroleum products Tank Truck/ Tanker Lorry Filling



(a) Situations leading to Emergencies Situations leading to hazard can, generally, be classified as Operational Conditions, Natural Calamities and External Factors as illustrated below and are applicable in case of proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi.

Table-3.11 (a) Situations leading to emergencies at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakanadoddi Condition Type of Emergency Level Operational Condition Tank overflow Level-1

Oil escape to outside Level-1 Any tank on fire Level-1 Vapour Cloud Explosion Level-2 Tank Truck on fire at Tank Lorry Filling (TLF) bay Level-1 Fire in filling shed Level-1 Fire in pump house /Generator Room Level-1 Fire in Railway Siding /Rack in Tank Wagon Unloading bay Level-1 Pump manifold on fire Level-1 Dry Grass fire Level-1

Natural Calamities leading to emergencies

Earth Quake Level-3 Severe Storm/ Lightening Level-3 Cyclone Level-3 Flood Level-3

External Factors leading to emergencies

Bomb Hoax Level-3 Riot Level-3 Terrorist Activities Level-3 War Level-3

(b) System elements or events that can lead to major accidents/ emergencies The emergency could be result of abnormal functioning within the facility or by natural factors: Manual / Human error Failure of interlocks Failure in Automation The spillage of products due overflow will lead to formation of vapours and fire (Pool Fire) depending upon physic-chemical properties. Motor Spirit (MS) may produce large volumes of vapour when released in appreciable

quantities to the atmosphere. SKO/HSD are heavier and less volatile. At normal storage temperature these oils release vapour slowly and are hazardous only near the surface of liquid. At elevated temperature class-B liquids attains the characteristics of class-A liquids once the vapour are released. In case of loss of containment of MS, SKO & HSD the liquids shall spill on the ground and form a liquid pool. In case of spillage of MS the rate of vaporization shall be appreciable as its vapour pressure is comparatively higher than of SKO/HSD. The mass of vapour & air mixture may not be sufficient to cause fir / explosion. The liquid pool, if it catches fire, results in pool fire with long smoky flame. The flame may tilt



under the influence of wind and may cause injury to the people and property resulting in vapour cloud explosion. (c) Failure Cases Broadly failure cases associated with the operation of proposed IOCL Depot can be as follows:

Table-3.11(b) Failure Modes & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi

Failure Description Mode of Failure Consequences

Catastrophic failure of MS/HSD/SKO storage tank Random failure Pool fire /VCE

MS/HSD/SKO Storage Tank on fire Random failure Pool fire /VCE

MS/HSD/SKO tank inlet line failure Random Failure Pool fire /VCE

TLF Pump discharge MS/HSD/SKO line failure Random Failure Pool fire /VCE

TW Pump discharge MS/HSD/SKO line failure Random Failure Pool fire /VCE

(d) Hazard Scenarios and effects Various hazard scenarios, which are anticipated in case of the proposed IOCL Depot are described below with significant effects.

Table-3.11(c) Hazard Scenarios & Effects at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi Scenarios Effects

Level of Emergency

Tank on Fire Fire in any one storage tank can damage the tank as well as other tanks in the immediate vicinity and may have a cascading effect.

Level-2

Gasket Failure in Pump Discharge Line

Can cause pool fire/ jet fire and explosion, will damage adjoining pipelines within the premises, tanks and other equipment & infrastructure.

Level-2

Hole in Pump Discharge lines

Can cause pool fire/ jet fire and explosion, will damage adjoining pipelines within the premises, tanks and other equipment & infrastructure.

Level-2

Failure of Loading Arm Can cause fire/explosion; will damage the trucks, internal pipelines and entire loading bay.

Level-2

Mechanical seal failure of pumps

Can cause fire damaging the internal pipelines and other pumps.

Level-2

Vessel connection Failure/ Catastrophic Failure of Storage Tank

Can cause fire damaging all the tanks if the fire is not tackled immediately.

Level-2

Explosion can occur due to failure of tank nozzle failure/ tank catastrophic failure.

Level-2



All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However, maximum damage can happen due to storage tank pipeline connection failure or in case of tank fire. In all the above cases fire / explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapour of petroleum products coming out from the containment. The sources of ignitions may be

(i) Hot work in the vicinity

(ii) Lightning

(iii) Generation of static electricity

(iv) Radiant heat from outside.

(v) Deliberate ignition or sabotage.

3.12 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study The HAZOP technique is fairly widely known and provides a good review of causes and conditions of risk. The basics of a HAZOP involve the understanding of process design, system and equipment operations, equipment testing and maintenance, process chemistry, and safety objectives. It is imperative to assess the process into logical sections and reviews each section by identifying the parameters of the process and detailing the possible deviation of these parameters from their desired values. The possible causes for these deviations can be recorded along with any consequences that could result from such deviations. In this manner, the hazards, accidents and the potential consequences of an accident can be identified and recorded systematically. The HAZOP technique uses special adjectives (such as “more,” “less,” “no,” etc.) combined with process conditions (such as flow, pressure, etc.) to systematically consider all credible deviations from normal conditions. The adjectives, known as guide words, are a unique feature of HAZOP analysis. Guidelines of BS 61882 have been used for HAZOP Study of the proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi. (a) Identification of Failure Scenarios A hazardous material either flammable or toxic, are safe till these are fully contained and maintained at desired parameters during receipt, storage, processing and transportation. In the case of proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, the major causes of hazards could be attributed to external factors like mechanical interference, material failure (corrosion) and other causes like material defects and human error. The failure cases as described below but not limited to, are identified as probable in case of operation of the proposed Depot:

Complete/ partial failure of pump

Complete/ partial failure of flanges

Complete/ Partial failure of valves.

Catastrophic failure of equipment (tanks)



(b) Development of HAZOP Matrix

Table-3.12 (a) Description of HAZOP Matrix Matrix Code Occurrence Frequency 0 Once per 1000 years

1 Once per 100 years 2 Once per 10 years 3 Once per year 4 Once per month

Severity 0 Minor 1 Appreciable 2 Major 3 Severe 4 Catastrophic

Hazard Category 1 Personnel Injury 2 Equipment Damage 3 Production Loss 4 Environment Impact 5 External Reaction

Risk Ranking : Frequency (F) x Severity (S) Risk Matrix F4

0 4C 8R 12U 16U

F = Frequency Code F3

0 3C 6R 9R 12U

S = Severity Code F2

0 2C 4C 6R 8R

F1

0 1C 2C 3C 4C

F0

0 0 0 0 0

RR S0

S1 S2 S3 S4

Legends

U

Unacceptable level of risk-fundamental re-design of system should be considered

R

Risk reduction measures need to be incorporated

C Risk level does not warrant significant expenditure. However, control measures, possibly procedural, should be implemented.



Table-3.12 (b) HAZOP Approach for Risk Identification of operations like TW Receipt; TLF; PHO, ITT, TLF, TLD etc. GW Deviation Cause (s) Consequence Scenario Safeguard & Action

Flow/ Pressure

No Pump suction valve closed

No material inflow.

Rapid damage to pump.

With auto start of standby pump, the other pump would also be damaged.

Frequency [3] To ensure the effectiveness of flow/ pressure/ leak detectors through calibration on regular basis following M&I manual

Regular Maintenance of Pump as recommended by the manufacturer.

Follow Standard Operating Procedures

Category [2] [3] Severity [2] Risk [6R]

Flow/ Pressure

Less Pump not functioning properly.

Leakage/ spillege from valve/ flanges/ joints etc.

Control Valve Failure

Blockage of discharge pump

Rapid damage to pump.

Potential to cause high pressure in the line if the discharge of pump is blocked (partially/ completely).

With auto start of standby pump, the other pump would also be damaged.

Fire Hazard at the spillage areas


Pumping to be stopped immediately. Nearest valves to be closed first to cut off

supplies to leaking lines and subsequently other valves to be closed.

Care to be taken to prevent any spillage at sampling points –exchange pits, Tank farm, Tank Roof

Regular Maintenance of Pumps as recommended by the manufacturer.


Category [2] [3][4] Severity [3] Risk [9R]

Flow/ Pressure

High Pressure/ flow gauge faulty

Control Valve failure

Pressure/ flow gauge faulty

TLF operator set high flow

Potential to overpressurize the tank during filling if the relief valve is not sized to pass sufficient vapours.

Potential to fill tank faster than the stipulated time or to create a situation in which valve cannot be closed.

Leakage/ spillage in surroundings

Fire Hazard at the spillage areas


Pumping to be stopped immediately. Nearest valves to be closed first to cut off

supplies to leaking lines and subsequently other valves to be closed.

Care to be taken to prevent any spillage at sampling points –exchange pits, Tank farm, Tank Roof

Regular Maintenance of Pumps as recommended by the manufacturer.


Category [2][3][4] Severity [3] Risk [9R]



3.13 Fault Tree Analysis Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) focuses on one particular accident event and provides a method for determining basic causes of that event. FTA is used to identify combination of equipment failure and human errors that can result in an accident. FTA is a graphical representation of interrelationship between equipment failure and specific accident. The equipment faults and failure that can be described in FTA can be grouped into three classes, namely: a) Primary faults and failure – attributed to the equipment and not to any other external cause or

condition.

b) Secondary faults and failure – attributed to other external cause or condition.

c) Commands faults and failure – attributed neither to equipment intended nor to any external cause but due to error command.

FTA seeks to relate the occurrence of an undesired event to one or more antecedent events. The undesired event is called the “top event” and the antecedent events are called “basic events”. The top event may be, and usually is, related to the basic events via certain intermediate events. The fault tree diagram exhibits the casual chain linking the basic events to the intermediate events and the latter to the top events. In this chain, logic gates illustrate the logical connection between events. The principal logic gates are : AND Gate (The output event occurs if and only if all input events occur) OR Gate (The output event occurs if any of the input events occur)

The fault tree includes the following: Works backward from an undesirable event or ultimate consequence to the possible causes and

failures.

Relates the occurrence of an undesired event to one or more preceding events.

“Chain links” basic events to intermediate events that are in turn connected to top event.

The probability of the top event can be calculated by the probability of chain events.

It is based on the most likely or credible events that leads to a particular failure or accident.

Analysis includes human error as well as equipment failure.



FTA Diagram for proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi

3.14 Event Tree Analysis

Event Tree Analysis (ETA) begins with an initiating events that describe potential accidents accounting for (i) successes (ii) failure of available “safety function” as the accident progresses. The safety function includes operator response or safety system response to the initiating event. The general procedure for the ETA has following steps: a) Identifying an initiating event of interest b) Identifying safety functions designed to deal with the identifying event c) Construction of the event tree d) Results of accident event sequence

Fire & Explosion

Material Spillage (Rupture/ Severe

Leakage)

Complete/ Partial Failure of Flanges

Sudden Rise in Pressure

Control Valve Failure

Pump Dead-heading

Equipment Failure/ Damage

Catastrophic Failure

Mechanical Failure

Material Corrosion (Internal/

environmental) Pipeline/ Tank/ Valve/

Flange/

Material defect



No

Yes Flare

Vapour Cloud Formation

Ignition

Vapour Cloud Explosion

Toxicity

Pressure Waves Heat Radiation

Equipment Damage & Public Health Impacts Health Impacts

No

Yes Yes

No

Release of Material

Instantaneous Continuous

Bottom Top

Two Phase Outflow Liquid

Ignition

Pool Formation

Ignition

Pool Fire

Vapours

Ignition

Evaporation

Dispersion

Detonation

Scenario of material release due to failure of equipment, valves, flanges etc.

No



3.15 DOW Fire and Explosion Index (FETI) The hazard classification guide developed by the Dow Chemical Company and published by the American Institute of Chemical Engineering provides a method for estimating the potential loss as a result of a fire or explosion in petro-chemical processes. It is a step-by-step objective evaluation of the realistic fire or explosion potential of processing or storage equipment. It is based on empirical analysis of actual events and widely used in many industries. The purpose of evaluation is to: Quantify expected fire and explosion damage. Identify equipment likely to contribute. Communicate F&E risk to management.

F& EI Procedure: This can be explained by following flowchart

Determine F&EI F&EI = F3 x Material Factor

Determine Replacement Value in Exposure Area

Determine Area of Exposure

Determine Process Unit Hazards Factor F3 = F1 x F2

Calculate F1 General Process Hazards Factor

Calculate F2 Special Process Hazards Factor

Select Pertinent Process Unit

Determine Material Factor



Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) is useful in identification of areas in which the potential risk reaches a certain level. It estimates the global risk associated with a process unit and classifies the units according to their general level of risk. FEI covers aspects related to the intrinsic hazard of materials, the quantities handled and operating conditions. This factor gives index value for the area which could be affected by an accident, the damage to property within the area and the working days lost due to accidents. The method for evaluation of FEI involves following stages. Selection of pertinent process unit which can have serious impact on plant safety Step-1 : Selection of the Material, which appropriately represents the Fire/ Explosion

Hazard Determination of Material Factor (MF): This factor for a given substance in the process unit gives intrinsic potential to release energy in case of fire or an explosion. Material Factor can be directly obtained from Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index Hazard classification Guide of American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York. The factor can also be evaluated from NFPA indices of danger, health, flammability and reactivity.

NFPA Health rating (Nh)

NFPA Flammability rating (Nf)

NFPA Instability rating (Ni)

Step-2 : Estimation of General Process Hazards (F1) GPH factor is computed according to presence of exothermic reactions and loading and unloading operations. The penalties due to each of these reactions / operations are summed up to compute GPH factor.

Exothermic Reaction (range of input 0.3 - 1.25)

Endothermic Reaction (input range 0.2 - 0.4)

Material Handling and Transfer (input range 0.25 - 0.8)

Enclosed or Indoor Process or storage Units handling Flammable materials

Ease of Access for Emergency Responders

Drainage and Spill Control

Computation of General Process Hazards Factor (F1)

Step-3 : Select Factors for Special Process Hazards (F2) SPH factor can be evaluated for the operations close to flammable range or pressures different from atmospheric. Penalties of these operations for both factors can be obtained from Dow’s EFI index form.

Toxicity of the material handled.

Process or Storage operates at vacuum (<500mmHg) -penalty 0.5

Operation in or near the flammable range (input range 0.0 - 0.8)



Dust Explosion (input range 0.0 - 2.0)

Pressure Penalty

Operational Temperature

Combustible and Flammable materials in Process

Liquids or gases in Storage

Solids in Storage or Process

Corrosion and Erosion (input range 0.0 -0.75)

Leakage, Joints, packing, flexible joints

Use of Fired Equipment

Hot Oil Heat Exchange Equipment

Rotating Equipment

Computation of Special Process Hazards Factor (F2)

Determination of Unit Hazard Factor: The Unit Hazard Factor is obtained by multiplication of General Process Hazard (GPH) factor and Special Process Hazard (SPH) factor.

Step-4 : Estimation of DOW Fire and Explosion Index DOW Fire and Explosion Index = M.F x F1 x F2 The DOW F&EI is a measure of how hazardous the process is given by following matrix:

Table-3.15 (a) Hazard Matrix of DOW (F&EI) Degree of Hazard Fire and Explosion Index

Light 0-60

Moderate 61-96

Intermediate 97-127

Heavy 128-158

Severe >159



I. Process: Motor Spirit (Operations like TW Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc.) Computation of DOW F&EI based on Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazard (GPH) and

Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of Motor Spirit are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (b).

Table-3.15 (b) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for MS

Sl. Parameter Factor MF Material Factor (MF) of Motor Spirit 16.00

NFPA Health rating (Nh) 1 NFPA Flammability rating (Nf) 3 NFPA Instability rating (Ni) 0

1. Estimation of General Process Hazard (Base) 1.00 1A Exothermic Reaction (range of input 0.3 - 1.25) 1.00 1B Endothermic Reaction (input range 0.2 - 0.4) 0.20 1C Material Handling and Transfer (input range 0.25 - 0.8) 0.50 1D Enclosed or Indoor Process or storage Units handling Flammable

materials 0.90

1E Ease of Access for Emergency Responders 0.35 1F Drainage and Spill Control 0.00 General Process Hazard (F1) 3.95 2. Estimation of Special Process Hazard (Base) 1.00 2A Toxicity of the material handled. 0.20 2B Process or Storage operates at vacuum (<500mmHg) -penalty 0.5 0.50 2C Operation in or near the flammable range (input range 0.0 - 0.8) 0.50 2D Dust Explosion (input range 0.0 - 2.0) 0.10 2E Pressure Penalty 0.05 2F Low Temperature Operation 0.00 2G Liquids or gases in Storage

(Total : 13177000 kg) 1.07

2H Solids in Storage or Process 0.00 2I Corrosion and Erosion (input range 0.0 -0.75) 0.20 2J Leakage, Joints, packing, flexible joints 0.30 2K Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 2L Hot Oil Heat Exchange Equipment 0.00 2M Rotating Equipment 0.30 Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) 4.22 Fire & Explosion Index = M.F x F1 x F2 = 16 x 3.95 x 4.22 267



II. Process: HSD (Operations like TW Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc.) Computation of DOW F&EI based on Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazard (GPH) and

Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of HSD are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (c).

Table-3.15 (c) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for HSD Sl. Parameter Factor MF Material Factor (MF) of HSD 10



materials 0.90

1E Ease of Access for Emergency Responders 0.35 1F Drainage and Spill Control 0.00 General Process Hazard (F1) 3.95 2. Estimation of Special Process Hazard (Base) 1.00 2A Toxicity of the material handled. 0.00 2B Process or Storage operates at vacuum (<500mmHg) -penalty 0.5 0.50 2C Operation in or near the flammable range (input range 0.0 - 0.8) 0.50 2D Dust Explosion (input range 0.0 - 2.0) 0.10 2E Pressure Penalty 0.05 2F Low Temperature Operation 0.00 2G Liquids or gases in Storage (Existing : 25259000 kg) 1.84 2H Solids in Storage or Process 0.00 2I Corrosion and Erosion (input range 0.0 -0.75) 0.20 2J Leakage, Joints, packing, flexible joints 0.30 2K Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 2L Hot Oil Heat Exchange Equipment 0.00 2M Rotating Equipment 0.30 Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) 4.79 Fire & Explosion Index = M.F x F1 x F2 = 10 x 3.95 x 4.79 189



III. Process: SKO (Operations like TW Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc.) Computation of DOW F&EI based on Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazard (GPH) and

Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of SKO are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (d).

Table-3.15 (d) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for SKO

Sl. Parameter Factor MF Material Factor (MF) of SKO 10



materials 0.90

1E Ease of Access for Emergency Responders 0.35 1F Drainage and Spill Control 0.00 General Process Hazard (F1) 3.95 2. Estimation of Special Process Hazard (Base) 1.00 2A Toxicity of the material handled. 0.00 2B Process or Storage operates at vacuum (<500mmHg) -penalty 0.5 0.50 2C Operation in or near the flammable range (input range 0.0 - 0.8) 0.50 2D Dust Explosion (input range 0.0 - 2.0) 0.10 2E Pressure Penalty 0.05 2F Low Temperature Operation 0.00 2G Liquids or gases in Storage (Existing : 2920000 kg) 0.20 2H Solids in Storage or Process 0.00 2I Corrosion and Erosion (input range 0.0 -0.75) 0.20 2J Leakage, Joints, packing, flexible joints 0.30 2K Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 2L Hot Oil Heat Exchange Equipment 0.00 2M Rotating Equipment 0.30 Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) 3.15 Fire & Explosion Index = M.F x F1 x F2 = 10 x 3.95 x 3.15 124



IV. Process: Ethanol (Operations like TT Receipt, Storage, Pumping, Blending etc.)

Computation of DOW F&EI based on Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazard (GPH) and

Special Process Hazard (SPH) in case of Ethanol are described is illustrated in table-3.15 (e).

Table-3.15 (e) Computation of MF, GPH and SPH for DOW (F&EI) for Ethanol

Sl. Parameter Factor MF Material Factor (MF) of Ethanol 16



materials 0.90 1E Ease of Access for Emergency Responders 0.35 1F Drainage and Spill Control 0.00 General Process Hazard (F1) 3.95 2. Estimation of Special Process Hazard (Base) 1.00 2A Toxicity of the material handled. 0.00 2B Process or Storage operates at vacuum (<500mmHg) -penalty 0.5 0.50 2C Operation in or near the flammable range (input range 0.0 - 0.8) 0.50 2D Dust Explosion (input range 0.0 - 2.0) 0.10 2E Pressure Penalty 0.05 2F Low Temperature Operation 0.00 2G Liquids or gases in Storage (Existing : 111160 kg) 0.02 2H Solids in Storage or Process 0.00 2I Corrosion and Erosion (input range 0.0 -0.75) 0.20 2J Leakage, Joints, packing, flexible joints 0.30 2K Use of Fired Equipment 0.00 2L Hot Oil Heat Exchange Equipment 0.00 2M Rotating Equipment 0.20 Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) 2.87 Fire & Explosion Index = M.F x F1 x F2 = 16 x 3.95 x 2.87 181



Table-3.15 (f) Process wise Hazard Classification based on DOW (F&EI) Process DOW F&EI Hazard

Classification

Motor Spirit (Operations like Tank Wagon Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc)

267 Severe

HSD (Operations like Tank Wagon Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc)

189 Severe

SKO (Operations like Tank Wagon Receipt, TLF; PHO, ITT, TLD etc)

124 Intermediate

Ethanol (Operations like TT receipt, storage, pumping, blending etc)

181 Severe



4. MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 4.1 The Prelude (MCCA) A major emergency of any process includes damage to equipment, serious injury or loss of life. It may cause extensive damage to property and serious disruption both inside and outside the facility. Although, the emergency may be caused by a number of different factors, e.g. process failure, human error, earthquake, machine crash or sabotage etc., it will normally manifest itself in three basic forms Fire Explosion Toxic Hazard to Human Health and Environment

Risk Assessment provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility poses to the public. It begins with the identification of probable potential hazardous events and categorization as per the predetermined criteria. The consequences of major credible events are calculated for different combinations of various aspects to simulate worst possible scenario. These consequence predictions are combined to provide numerical measures of the risk for the entire facility. MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice the selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis. Detailed study helps in plotting the damage contours on the detailed plot plan in order to assess the magnitude of a particular event. A disastrous situation is the outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in addition to other natural causes that eventually lead to loss of life, property and ecological imbalances. MCA analysis depends on following factors Preparation of an inventory of major accidents. Identification of potential hazard and representative failure cases from the processing units. Chemical release scenarios. Fatal Accident Frequency Rate (FAFR) is defined as the number of deaths per 108 exposed hours; this corresponds roughly to the number of death over a working life time among a group of thousand workers. This is also referred as Fatal Accident Rate (FAR). The risk ‘R’ to an individual can be computed as:

Where, ‘x’ is number of deaths in a particular type of potential accident, ‘F’ is the frequency of such an accident, ‘n’ is number of the types of potential accident, ‘N’ is total number of people at risk.



Accident Consequence Analysis A hazard assessment is complete only if the consequences of the possible accident are known. For this reason, the last step of a hazard assessment is to analyze the consequences that a potential major accident could have on the plant itself, on the employees, on the neighborhood and the environment. The results of the analysis can be used to determine which protective measures, such as fire fighting systems, alarm system, or pressure-relief systems, have to be installed. An accident consequence analysis should includes the following: A description of the accident (tank rupture, pipe rupture, failure of safety valve, fire) An estimate of the quantity of material released (toxic, flammable, explosive) A calculation of the dispersion of the material released (gas or evaporating liquid) An estimate of the effect (toxic, heat radiation, blast wave). 4.2 The Process of MCCA The MCA analysis, therefore, involves ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential vulnerability. Following steps are involved in the MCA analysis: Review of Past Accidents.

Identification of potential hazardous sections and representative failure cases

Visualization of release scenarios considering type and the quantity of the hazardous

material

Damage distance computations for the released cases at different wind velocities and atmospheric stability classes for heat radiations and pressure waves

Drawing of damage contours on plot plan to show the effect due to the accidental release of chemicals

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis (HIRA) inclusive of HAZOP, FTA, ETA and F&EI as well as Consequence Analysis inclusive of Release Modeling, FHA, and Estimation of Damage Distances etc. are covered in various chapters of this report. 4.3 Review of Past Accidents Analysis of events arising out of the unsafe conditions is one of the basic requirements for ensuring safety in any facility. The data required for such an analysis has either to be generated by monitoring and/or collected from the records of the past occurrences. This data, when analyzed, helps in formulation of the steps towards mitigation of hazards faced commonly. Trends in safety of various activities can be evaluated and actions can be planned accordingly, to improve the safety. Data analysis helps in correlating the causal factors and the corrective steps to be taken for controlling the accidents. It is, therefore, of vital importance to collect the data methodically, based on potential incidents, sections involved, causes of failure and the preventive measures taken. This helps to face future eventualities with more preparedness. Various major accidents occurred in the past relevant to receipt, storage and distribution of POL world over are summarized below to have an overview of what went wrong? Where it went wrong? Are process, operation, maintenance and handling of facility adequate? This would help in devising action plan to prevent the occurrence of such kind of untoward incidents.



Accident Location and Date

Gist of the Incident happened and consequences

November 23, 2003, Crude Oil Tank Explosion

A battery of crude oil tanks exploded on a lease near the intersection of Highway 349 and County Road 300 about 32 km south of Midland, TX. Perenco LLC.

According to the field superintendent for Perenco, an electrical spark caused the fire: “There seemed to have a leak on the ‘lack unit’.” A lack unit measures how much oil moves through the tanks and checks oil content. When the pumper checking the lease turned off the lack unit, an electrical spark set the leaking oil on fire. The workers quickly left the lease to turn off the 18 wells that sent oil to the tank battery. They were about 400 m away from the battery when it exploded 45 minutes later. About 640 barrels of oil; three stock tanks, three water tanks and associated equipment were destroyed

December 20, 2003, Flange Failure Causes Tank Fire

An explosion occurred in a tank at an oil plant, causing a fire which burned for more than an hour near Houston, TX. at Marcus Oil and Chemical. A spokesman for the Houston Fire Department said: “A flange on the south side of the tank broke or cracked and let the hot oil out. When in turn hit the atmosphere at 700 degrees, it burst into flames.”

The fire department said the blaze was never a considerable danger. No one was ever evacuated. There was only one minor injury – a twisted ankle – in the incident.

The Houston Fire Department said this was at least the third time they’ve been called to Marcus Oil and Chemical in the last five or six years.

October 29, 2009, Indian oil corporation Ltd, Jaipur

In the evening shift of October 29, 2009, the Indian Oil Corporation’s POL (Petroleum Oil Lubricants) Terminal at Sanganer in Jaipur was preparing to transfer Kerosine (SKO) and Motor Spirit (MS) to the neighbouring BPCL Terminal, a routine operation for these Installations. A crew of four (one shift officer and three operators) were manning the IOC Installation. Kerosine was “lined up” (pipeline made through) first and thereafter the operating crew proceeded to prepare the MS tank (tank 401-A) for pumping to BPCL installation.

In the process of lining up the MS tank, at about 6.10 pm, a huge leak of the product took place as a jet of liquid from the “Hammer Blind Valve” on the delivery line of the tank leading to the MS pump. This liquid MS which rapidly generated vapours, soon overwhelmed and incapacitated the operator carrying out the “line up”



operation. The shift officer, who was nearby, tried to help the operator, but he too was affected by the vapours and liquid, and had to be removed to hospital in a semi-conscious state. The 2nd operator, who was incidentally in the canteen at the time, also rushed to the spot, but he was also completely overpowered by the strong MS vapours and liquid and could not be rescued. The 3rd operator on the shift, who was supposed to be on site, had earlier left for home on some personal work and was thus not available to initiate any rescue or mitigating steps.

With none of the operating crew being available any more for initiating any control actions, the leak continued unabated, and by the time the senior staff and civil authorities could reach the site, had already engulfed almost the entire installation, making their entry not only difficult but also dangerous. After about an hour and 15 minutes of the leak having started, there was a a massive explosion followed by a huge fireball covering the entire installation. It is estimated that in this one hour and 15 or 20 minutes of uncontrolled leak, about 1000 tons of MS could have escaped out, which would have generated enough vapour to cause an explosion with the equivalence of 20 tons of TNT. The source of ignition, which triggered the explosion and fire could have been from one of the non flame proof electrical equipment in the Administrative Block, or from a vehicle being started in the installation.

The fire which followed the explosion soon spread to all other tanks and continued to rage for about 11 days. The management of IOCL had taken a considered decision to allow the petroleum products to burn out to avoid further possibilities of accident in the installation in the interest of public safety. Ultimately the entire, about 60,000 KL of petroleum products stored in the Terminal (equivalent of about 1000-1200 retail outlets) at the time of the accident was consumed in the fire, and the installation was totally destroyed. Buildings in the immediate neighbourhood were heavily damaged with minor damages and window panes breakages occurring up to around 2 Km from the site. The total loss estimated on account of the fire and explosion as reported by IOC in the Press, which includes the loss for finished products, stores, fixed assets and compensation for third party losses, amounted to approx., Rs. 280 crores.



Eleven people lost their lives in the accident – six from IOCL and five outsiders, and several others were injured. IMMEDIATE CAUSES The immediate cause of the accident was the non-observance of normal safe procedure involving sequence of valve operation in the line up activity and an engineering design which permitted use of a “Hammer Blind Valve”, a device which is used for positively isolating a pipeline. The design of the Hammer Blind valve allows a large area at the top of the valve (at the valve bonnet) to be completely open every time the valve position needed to be changed. It was through this open area that the liquid MS had gushed out, when the tank was being lined up (made ready for pumping to BPCL) because another valve connecting to the tank was also open when the Hammer Blind was in the changeover position

11 December 2005, the Buncefield Incident, Hemel Hempstead

On Sunday 11 December 2005, a series of explosions and subsequent fire destroyed large parts of the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead, and caused widespread damage to neighbouring properties. The main explosion took place at 06.01:32 hours and was of massive proportions. It was followed by a large fire that engulfed 23 large fuel storage tanks over a high proportion of the Buncefield site. The incident injured 43 people. Fortunately, no one was seriously hurt and there were no fatalities. Nevertheless, there was significant damage to both commercial and residential properties near the Buncefield site. About 2000 people had to be evacuated from their homes and sections of the M1 motorway were closed. The fire burned for five days, destroying most of the site and emitting a large plume of smoke into the atmosphere that dispersed over southern England and beyond.



4.4 Credible Accidents Involving Pipelines 14-05-1972 Hearne, TX 11-05-1977 Abqaiq, Saudi 08-07-1977 Fairbanks, AK 21-07-1979 Texas City, TX 30-01-1980 Bayamon, Purto Rico 01-04-1990 Syzran, USSR 25-05-1989 San Bernadino, CA 14-07-1990 Tyumen, USSR 19-07-1990 Rawalpindi, Pakistan 30-11-1990 Middle East 21-02-1991 Nr. Crdoba, Spain 16-03-1991 California 10-04-1991 Selznikha, USSR 21-04-1991 Columbia 04-06-1991 Lake Charles, US 19-10-1991 Mexico, Tabasco 04-03-1992 Chester Creek, US 22-04-1992 Guadalajara, Mexico 20-05-1992 Azerbaijan, Baku 19-08-1992 River Chusovaya, USSR 03-10-1992 Antioquia, Columbia 06-10-1992 Maidstone, Canada 20-10-1992 Caucasus, USSR 10-11-1992 Columbia 06-01-1993 Strelice, Czechoslovakia 12-01-1993 Tyumen, Oblast, USSR 06-03-1993 Siberia, USSR 06-04-1993 Padilla, Bolivia 20-04-1993 Port Neches, TX US 04-06-1993 El Paso, TX US 04-06-1993 Paris, France 07-06-1993 Fazier Park, Calif, US 12-07-1993 Arauca, Columbia 30-07-1993 Quito, Ecquador 04-08-1993 Remeios, Columbia 14-08-1993 Barrancabermeja, Columbia 28-09-1993 Cairo Egypt



4.5 Failure Scenarios (Probability of Failures) (a) Pipeline Failures The pipe system consists of pipelines, isolation valves, NRV, ROV, pipe supporting racks etc. Pipe failure may be due to many reasons, plausible could be:

Pipeline failure occurs due to liquid hammer, vibration and fatigue of pipeline or supporting structure or holding structure, pipeline and flange leaks, vapour lock, cavitations, corrosion due failure of cathodic protection, stress-corrosion cracking, thermal expansion, cyclic stress, structural failure and over pressurizing pipe system.

Pipe blockages are known to unintended valve closure, human error, failure of valve to operate, impurities and sludge formation blocking flow, broken parts in pipeline, fabrication components, welding electrodes, weld failures, over-stressing, and damages during installation.

Other causes of pipeline failures include natural calamities like lightning, storm, flood, earthquake and vehicle crash and sabotage.

Valve leaks through flanges, seals, etc. due to corrosion wear or inconsistent engineering practices are known.

The other significant reasons which can aggravate the situation are delays in activating emergency response procedure, settlement of land under pipelines, road work near pipelines resulting in damage to pipelines etc.

(b) Pump Failures Most plausible reasons for Pump Failure may be following:

Pump failures due to wear, drying at packing, hard substances like grit, packing / seal failure, blockages on suction and discharge sides, dry running are well known.

Control system for valve operations etc. can fail due to incorrect setting or operation, location of instruments, instrument failure, inconsistent maintenance practices including contact failures and incorrect calibration. Such situations include failure of densitometer, inadvertent inhibition of alarm / warning systems, bye-passing of critical interlocks etc.

Engineering practices include Operation, Inspection, Startup shutdown practices, leak detection and maintenance practices.

The failure modes for liquids are significant for the reasons, pipeline pressure falls rapidly following puncture owing to relative incompressibility of liquid. Initial high rate of release reduces rapidly. The drain down the pipeline will be driven by system hydraulic head initially and finally by static head, until equilibrium condition reaches.

Explosion hazards occur in pipelines with release of product transported which comes in contract with outside atmosphere creates a flammable atmosphere and can present an explosion hazard also. Flame travel within pipe is known as deflagration and propagates from burning gases, Detonation is characterized by pressure of shockwave in material and rate of propagation would be higher than velocity of sound.



(c) Tank/ Storage Vessel Failures In case of tanks/ storage vessels containment failure can take place and contents spread over. However, the spread is limited to dyke size (if dyke is properly sized) and if ignited, can form a pool fire and result in intense heat radiation and also endanger neighboring tanks and contents, if the fire is not controlled.

The causes for containment failure could be in general, over filling, collapse due to vacuum, mechanical damage, external impact, rupture of tank shell.

Reasons for overfill could be instrument failure, lack of attention, wrong settings on

instrument etc.

Collapse due to vacuum can occur, if pumping out is carried out when the vent line is closed or blocked due to other reasons.

The sources of ignition of spilled product or ignition of vapour could be due external

source, lightning or electro static discharge. (d) Frequencies of Failures Rates The failure frequency data as given hereinafter represents typical facilities with similar operations. The failure rates have been obtained from review of historical data for storage tanks. The base event frequencies adopted for QRA study of Petroleum Storage Depot are summarized in following tables:

Table-4.5 (a) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for road tankers and tank wagons

Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for road tankers and tank wagons (Atmospheric Tank)

Instantaneous release of the complete inventory

1 x 10-5 y-1

Continuous release from a hole the size of the largest connection (if the tank is partly filled with liquid, the release is modeled from the liquid phase out of the largest liquid connection.

5 x 10-7 y-1

Full bore rupture of the loading/ unloading hose (the outflow is from both sides of the full bore rupture)

4 x 10-6 y-1

Leak of the loading/ unloading hose (the outflow is from a leak with an effective diameter of 10% of the nominal diameter with maximum of 50 mm.

4 x 10-5 y-1

Full bore rupture of the loading/ unloading arm (outflow from both sides of the full bore rupture)

3 x 10-8 y-1

Leak of the loading/ unloading arm (Outflow from a leak with an effective diameter of 10% of the nominal diameter, with a maximum of 50 mm.

3 x 10-7 y-1

(Source: CPR 18E Purple Book)



Table-4.5 (b) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for atmospheric tanks and vessels Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for atmospheric tanks and vessels

Situation Single containment

tank Tank with a

protective outer shell In-ground tank

Instantaneous release of the complete inventory, directly to the atmosphere

5 x 10-6 y-1 5 x 10-7 y-1 -

Instantaneous release of the complete inventory, from the primary container into the unimpaired secondary container or outer shell

- 5 x 10-7 y-1 1 x 10-8 y-1

Continuous release of the complete inventory in 10 minutes at a constant rate of release, directly into the atmosphere

5 x 10-6 y-1 5 x 10-7 y-1 -

Continuous release of the complete inventory in 10 minutes at a constant rate of release, from the primary container into the unimpaired secondary container or outer shell

- 5 x 10-7 y-1 -

Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 mm, directly to the atmosphere

1 x 10-4 y-1 - -

Continuous release from a hole with an effective diameter of 10 mm, from the primary container into the unimpaired secondary container or outer shell

- 1 x 10-4 y-1 -


Table-4.5 (c) Atmospheric storage tank fire frequencies Type of Fire Floating Roof

Tank Fixed Roof

Tank Fixed plus Internal Floating Roof Tank

Rim seal fire 1.6 x 10-3 y-1 - 1.6 x 10-3 y-1

Full surface fire on roof 1.2 x 10-4 y-1 - -

Internal explosion & full surface fire - 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 9.0 x 10-5 y-1

Internal explosion without fire - 2.5 x 10-5 y-1 2.5 x 10-5 y-1

Vent fire - 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 -

Small bund fire 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 9.0 x 10-5 y-1 9.0 x 10-5 y-1

Large bund fire (full bund area) 6.0 x 10-5 y-1 6.0 x 10-5 y-1 6.0 x 10-5 y-1 (Source: OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory)



Table-4.5 (d) Frequencies of Loss of Containment (LOC) for Pipes Description of Item Full bore rupture Leak (outflow is from a leak with

an effective diameter of 10% of the nominal diameter, a maximum of 50 mm

Nominal diameter <75 mm 1 x 10-6 m-1 y-1 5 x 10-6 m-1 y-1

75 mm ≤ nominal diameter ≤ 150 mm 3 x 10-7 m-1 y-1 2 x 10-6 m-1 y-1

Nominal diameter >150 mm 1 x 10-7 m-1 y-1 5 x 10-7 m-1 y-1 (Source: CPR 18E Purple Book)

Table-4.5 (e) Loss of Containment (LOC) frequencies for Pumps Situation Catastrophic failure (full

bore rupture of the largest connecting pipeline)

Leak (outflow is from leak with an effective diameter of 10% of the nominal diameter of the largest connecting pipeline with a maximum of 50 mm)

Pumps without additional provisions

1 x 10-4 y-1 5 x 10-4 y-1

Pumps with a wrought steel containment

5 x 10-5 y-1 2.5 x 10-4 y-1


Table-4.5 (f) Centrifugal Pump Failure Rate Process Pipe diameter Hole Size (mm) Failure Rate (per year) D≤100 mm 5 4.0 x 10-3

20 5.6 x 10-4 50 9.9 x 10-5 Pipe diameter 5.8 x 10-5

D>100 mm 5 4.0 x 10-3 20 5.6 x 10-4 50 9.9 x 10-5 100 2.9 x 10-5 Pipe diameter 2.9 x 10-5

(Source: OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory)

Table-4.5 (g) Flange Failure Rates Process Pipe Diameter (D) Hole Size (mm) Failure Rate (per year) D ≤ 50 mm 5 3.0 x 10-5

20 1.2 x 10-5 50 mm <D ≤ 100 mm 5 3.4 x 10-5

20 6.9 x 10-6 100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 4.4 x 10-5

20 9.5 x 10-6 D >150 mm 5 7.0 x 10-5

20 1.4 x 10-5 (Source: OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory)



Table-4.5 (h) Manual Valve Failure Rates Process Pipe Diameter (D) Hole Size (mm) Failure Rate (per year) D ≤ 20 mm 5 2.6 x 10-5

20 8.2 x 10-6 20 mm <D ≤ 50 mm 5 2.6 x 10-5

20 5.0 x 10-6 50 3.2 x 10-6

50 mm <D ≤ 100 mm 5 3.4 x 10-5 20 6.9 x 10-6 50 1.5 x 10-6 100 2.0 x 10-6

100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 4.2 x 10-5 20 8.6 x 10-6 50 1.8 x 10-6 100 6.3 x 10-7 150 1.8 x 10-6

100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 5.2 x 10-5 20 1.1 x 10-5 50 2.6 x 10-6 100 9.3 x 10-7 300 2.0 x 10-6

(Source: OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory) Table-4.5 (i) Actuated Valve Failure Rates

Process Pipe Diameter (D) Hole Size (mm) Failure Rate (per year) D ≤ 20 mm 5 2.8 x 10-4

20 6.1 x 10-5 20 mm <D ≤ 50 mm 5 2.8 x 10-4

20 4.5 x 10-5 50 1.6 x 10-5

50 mm <D ≤ 100 mm 5 2.6 x 10-4 20 4.4 x 10-5 50 8.3 x 10-6 100 9.4 x 10-6

100 mm <D ≤ 150 mm 5 2.4 x 10-4 20 4.1 x 10-5 50 7.7 x 10-6 100 2.5 x 10-6 150 6.2 x 10-6

(Source: OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory)



IRPA

10-3/yr

10-4/yr

10-5/yr

10-6/yr

Intolerable

The ALARP or Tolerableregion (Risk is tolerated only)

Broadly Acceptable region(no need for detailed working todemonstrate ALARP)

Fundamental improvements needed.Only to be considered if there are no

alternatives and people are well informed

Too high, significant effort required toimprove

High, investigate alternatives

Low, consider cost-effective alternatives

Negligible, maintain normal precautions

4.6 The Maximum Tolerable Criteria of RISK: ALARP The risk is regarded as intolerable if it is above the "maximum tolerable criterion". The objective of risk management is to make the risk "As Low As Reasonably Practicable" (ALARP), which shall be least impacting the neighbourhood. While conducting the risk analysis, a quantitative determination of risk involves three major steps:

IRPA (Individual Risk per Annum)

NOTE : A risk of 10 per million per year, or 10-5/Year, effectively means that any person standing at a point of this level of risk would have a 1 in 100 000 chance of being fatally injured per year. Further, in order to ensure objective of making the risk "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP), the facility has to adhere to following: The site is maintained to an acceptable level and that all statuary regulations are applied. The detailed engineering designs are as per the relevant guidelines. The instrumentation and electrical components comply with the relevant standards

requirements.

All personnel have been adequately trained for their respective tasks and organizational measures are clearly followed.

A number of incident scenarios have been simulated, taking into account the prevailing meteorological conditions, which are described in the consequence analysis alongwith the risk contours.



Individual & Societal Risk (i) Individual Risk Individual risk is the combination of the frequency and consequence data for each hazardous scenario, as has been illustrated below:

FN Curve showing Individual Risk tolerability

Worst Case Scenario Failure/LOC Frequency/year

Area of Impact Anticipated Fatalities

Instantaneous release of complete inventory from tanks 5.0 x 10-6 License Area 05

Full bore rupture of loading/unloading hose 4.0 x 10-6 License Area 02

Full bore rupture of loading/unloading arm 3.0 x 10-8 License Area 02

Catastrophic failure of pumps 1.0 x 10-4 License Area 02

Internal explosion and full surface fire 9.0 x 10-5 License Area 05

No. of Fatalities (N)

Freq

uenc

y (F

)/ Y

r Intolerable Risk

Tolerable if ALARP

Tolerable Risk



(ii) Societal Risk Societal risk is the combination of the frequency and consequence data for each hazardous scenario on the receptors in the vicinity of the project site, as has been illustrated below:

FN Curve showing Societal Risk tolerability

Worst Case Scenario Failure/LOC Frequency/year

Area of Impact Anticipated Fatalities

Instantaneous release of complete inventory from tanks 5.0 x 10-6 License Area & vicinity

05+02 (07)

Failure of Tank Lorry on Road (Release of Complete Inventory) 1.0 x 10-5 License Area & vicinity

02

Internal explosion and full surface fire 9.0 x 10-5 License Area & vicinity

05 + 02 (07)

No. of Fatalities (N)

Freq

uenc

y (F

)/ Y

r Intolerable Risk

Tolerable if ALARP

Tolerable Risk

With appropriate interventions with stringent monitoring of effectiveness and regulatory compliance, the individual and societal risk would further be

curtailed.



5. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 5.1 The Objective of Consequence Analysis

The processes which have potential of risk, needs to be managed in such a way that the inherent and unnecessary risk can be contained and minimized through best practices. In order to achieve this objective potential risk has to be estimated in quantitative terms by means of modeling. Since risk is a combination of frequency and consequence, the impact analysis is a necessary step of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). An accident begins with an incident, which usually results in loss of containment of material, thereby posing hazardous properties such as flammability, explosivity, toxicity etc. Typical incidents may include the rupture of a pipeline, a hole in a tank or pipe, runaway reaction, external fire impinging on the vessel and heating it. Source models are used to quantitatively define the loss of containment scenario by estimating the discharge rate, quantity released, duration of release, extent of flash and evaporation from liquid pool and aerosol formation etc. 5.2 Modeling of Damage Distance due to Fire & Explosion ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) model predicts how a hazardous gas cloud disperses in the atmosphere after an accidental chemical release. ALOHA can predict rates of chemical release from broken pipes, leaking tanks, and evaporating puddles, and can model the dispersion of both neutrally buoyant and heavier-than-air gases. ALOHA is based on a continuous point source with a Gaussian plume distribution. I. Hazard Criteria for Modeling using ALOHA ALOHA is intended for use during hazardous chemical emergencies and has been designed to consider the following hazard criteria: (a) Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) AEGLs estimate the concentrations at which most people—including sensitive individuals will begin to experience health effects if they are exposed to a hazardous chemical for a specific length of time (duration). A chemical may have up to three AEGL values as follows, for a given exposure duration, each of which corresponds to a specific tier of health effects. AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration, expressed as parts per million (ppm) or milligrams

per cubic meter (mg/m3), of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects.

AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.

AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic non-sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.



(b) Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)

The ERPGs are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs), which is predicted by ALOHA for the area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The ERPGs were developed as planning guidelines, to anticipate human adverse health effects caused by exposure to toxic chemicals. The ERPGs are three-tiered guidelines with one common denominator: a 1-hour contact duration.

ERPG 1 : The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor.

ERPG 2 : The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.

ERPG 3 : The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.

(c) Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs)

The TEELs are temporary Toxic Levels of Concern similar to ERPGs, and defined by the U.S. Department of Energy for use when ERPGs aren't available. There are three TEEL levels that are important for responders to consider:

TEEL-1 : Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.

TEEL-2 : Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.

TEEL-3 : Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.

(d) Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) The IDLH level is a limit originally established for selecting respirators for use in workplaces by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). A chemical's IDLH is an estimate of the maximum concentration in the air to which a healthy worker could be exposed without suffering permanent or escape-impairing health effects.

(e) Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE)

ALOHA estimates the thermal radiation hazard from a fireball and/or a pool fire. Other potential BLEVE hazards include overpressure, hazardous fragments, smoke, and toxic byproducts from the fire. A common BLEVE scenario happens when a container of flammable liquid or gas is heated by fire, increasing the inside pressure till its ruptures and failure. When the container fails, the chemical is released in an explosion. If the chemical is above its boiling point when the container fails, some or all of the liquid will flash-boil -- that is, instantaneously become a gas. ALOHA assumes that any liquid not consumed in the fireball will form a Pool Fire. A pool fire occurs when a flammable liquid forms a puddle on the ground and catches on fire. Thermal radiation is the primary hazard associated with a pool fire.



(f) Vapor Cloud Explosion When a flammable chemical is released into the atmosphere, it forms a vapor cloud, which tends to disperse as it travels downwind. If the cloud encounters an ignition source, the parts of the cloud where the concentration is within the flammable range (between the Lower and Upper Explosive Limits) will burn. The speed at which the flame front moves through the cloud determines whether it is a deflagration or a detonation. The severity of a vapor cloud explosion depends on the chemical, the cloud size at the time of ignition, the type of ignition, and the congestion level inside the cloud. Two primary hazards are associated with a vapor cloud explosion: overpressure and hazardous fragments.

(g) Jet Fire A jet fire, also referred to as a flame jet, occurs when a flammable chemical is rapidly released from an opening in a container or pipe and immediately catches on fire - much like the flame from a blowtorch. ALOHA can model a jet fire from the Pipeline and Tank sources. A two-phase jet fire occurs when a gas that has been liquefied under pressure is released. Because the liquid evaporates as it escapes, the chemical is released as an aerosol spray - that is, a mixture of gas and tiny liquid droplets. ALOHA assumes the jet fire release is oriented vertically, although the wind can tilt the flames in the downwind direction. Thermal radiation is the primary hazard associated with a jet fire. Other potential jet fire hazards include smoke, toxic byproducts from the fire, and secondary fires and explosions in the surrounding area.

(h) Flammable Level of Concern (LOC) A Flammable Level of Concern (LOC) is a threshold concentration of fuel in the air above, which a flammable hazard may exist. Generally, this LOC will be some fraction of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). Out of the ALOHA's default LOCs, the red zone represents the worst hazard. In an actual vapor cloud, there will be areas where the concentration is higher than the average and areas where the concentration is lower than the average. This is called concentration patchiness. Because of concentration patchiness, there will be areas, called pockets, where the chemical is in the flammable range even though the average concentration has fallen below the LEL. ALOHA uses 60% of the LEL as the default LOC for the red threat zone. Another common threat level used by responders is 10% of the LEL. ALOHA uses this concentration as the default LOC for the yellow threat zone.

(i) Atmospheric Stability Classes

The atmosphere may be more or less turbulent at any given time, depending on the amount of incoming solar radiation as well as the factor like atmospheric stability classes (A-F), each representing a different degree of turbulence in the atmosphere. Stability class has a big effect on ALOHA's prediction of the threat zone size for dispersion scenarios. Under unstable conditions, a dispersing gas mixes rapidly with the air around it. ALOHA expects that the cloud will not extend as far downwind as it would under more stable conditions, because the pollutant is soon diluted below the LOC, and ALOHA displays a shorter threat zone than it would for more stable conditions.

# Unstable

When moderate-to-strong incoming solar radiation heats air near the ground thereby causing it to rise and generating large eddies, the atmosphere is considered unstable (relatively turbulent). Very Unstable (Stability Class A) Unstable (Stability Class B) Slightly Unstable (Stability Class C)

# Neutral Relatively strong wind speeds and moderate solar radiation are associated with neutral stability (moderate turbulence): Stability Class D



# Stable

When solar radiations are relatively weak or absent, air near the surface has a reduced tendency to rise, and less turbulence develops. The atmosphere is considered to be stable (less turbulent) Slightly Stable (Stability Class E) Stable (Stability Class F)

Table-5.2 (a) Stability Classes Wind Speed Day : Incoming Solar Radiation Night : Cloud Cover Less than 2 m/s A A-B B E F 2-3 m/s A-B B C E F 3-5 m/s B B-C C D E 5-6 m/s C C-D D D D More than 6m/s C D D D D II. Impacts of Thermal Radiation Flux

Impacts of Heat Radiation Flux (as per IS 15656: 2006) are given in table-4.2 (b) to assess the damage distances of jet fire, pool fire and fire ball.

Table-5.2 (b) Impacts of Heat Radiation Flux (IS 15656: 2006) Heat Radiation Impacts 4.0 kW/m2 Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s. 4.7 kW/m2 Accepted value to represent injury. 10.0 kW/m2 Second degree burn after 25 s. 12.5 kW/m2 Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 25.0 kW/m2 Minimum energy required to ignite wood 37.5 kW/m2 Sufficient to cause damage to the equipment

III. Impacts of Explosion

As per IS 15656: 2006, the effect of overpressure on human being is twofold:

(a) Direct effect of overpressure on human organs When the pressure change is sudden, a pressure difference arises which can lead to damage of some organs. Extent of damage varies with the overpressure along with factors such as position of the person, protection inside a shelter, body weight as well as duration of overpressure. The organs prone to get affected by overpressure are ear drum and lung.

(b) Effect of debris from structure damage affecting human. The overpressure duration is important for determining the effects on structure. The positive pressure phase can last for 10 to 250 milliseconds. The same overpressure can markedly have different effects depending upon duration. The explosion overpressures of interest are:

Table-5.2 (c) Impacts of Overpressure (IS 15656: 2006)

Overpressure Impacts 1.7 bar (24.7 psi) Bursting of lung 0.3 bar (4.35 psi) Major damage to plant structure 0.2 bar (2.9 psi) Minor damage to steel frames 0.1 bar (1.45 psi) Repairable damage to plant equipment and structure 0.07 bar (1.02 psi) Shattering of glass 0.01 bar (0.145 psi) Crack in glass



IV. Inputs Parameter for ALOHA (Modeling for MS Tank T-01A, T-01B & T01C in Dyke-I)

Site Data Facility Proposed IOCL Depot Location Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, District Anantapur Geocodes 15°09’45.45”N; 77°27’8.34”E Chemical Data Fuel Gasoline (Motor Spirit) Mol. Wt. 72 g/mol AEGL-1 (60 min) N/A AEGL-2 (60 min) 2900 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min) 8600 ppm IDLH 1100 ppm LEL 10400 ppm UEL 70400 ppm Ambient Boiling Point 66.8°C Vapour Pressure 0.25 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration 26.3% Atmospheric Data Wind Speed 3.0 m/s from 90° true at 3 m Pre-dominant Wind Direction (from) East Ground Roughness Open Country Cloud Cover 5 tenth Stability Class C Inversion No Inversion Height Air Temperature 30°C Relative Humidity 50% Source Strength MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C Tank Diameter 24 m 24 m 24 m Tank Height 16 m 16 m 16 m Tank is 70% full - Tank Contains Liquid Only (MS) Liquid Only (MS) Liquid Only (MS) Internal Temperature 30° 30° 30° Tank Volume 7238 m3 7238 m3 7238 m3 Chemical Mass in Tank 3910008 kg 3910008 kg 3910008 kg Circular Opening Diameter of Leak 5 cm 5 cm 5 cm Opening from tank bottom 1.0 m 1.0 m 1.0 m Ground Type Concrete Concrete Concrete Ground Temperature Equal to ambient Equal to ambient Equal to ambient Modeling Scenario-I : Leaking Tank, Fuel (MS) is not burning & form an evaporating puddle ALOHA limited the release duration to 1 hour Assuming that : MS Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed an evaporating puddle Wind Direction from East Parameters MS Tank

T-01A MS Tank

T-01B MS Tank

T-01C Total Amount Released 10482 kg 10482 kg 10482 kg Max Average Sustained Release Rate (averaged over a minute or more) 217 kg/ min 217 kg/ min 217 kg/ min The spread diameter of the puddle 36 m 36 m 36 m



Model Run Heavy Gas Threat Modelled Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud Tank ID (MS) MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C

Red {8600 ppm = AEGL-3 (60 min)} 39 m 39 m 39 m Orange {2900 ppm = AEGL-2 (60 min)} 80 m 80 m 80 m Yellow {N/A = AEGL-1 (60 min)} No recommended LOC value

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking

TLF Area (8-Bay)

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking

TLF Area (8-Bay)



Model Run Heavy Gas Threat Modelled Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud Tank ID (MS) MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C Red (7200 ppm = 60%LEL = Flame Pockets) 44 m 44 m 44 m Yellow (1200 ppm = 10%LEL) 142 m 142 m 142 m

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking

TLF Area (8-Bay)



Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking

Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking

Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking



Threat Modelled Overpressure (blast force) from Vapour Cloud Explosion

Type of Ignition Ignited by spark or flame Tank ID (MS Tank) MS Tank

T-01A MS Tank

T-01B MS Tank

T-01C 24.7 psi (1.7 bar): Bursting of lung LOC never exceeded 4.35 psi (0.3 bar) : Major damage to plant equipment structure 29 m 29 m 29 m 2.9 psi (0.2 bar) : Minor damage to steel frame 32 m 32 m 32 m 1.45 psi (0.1 bar) : Reparable damage to plant and structure 44 m 44 m 44 m 1.02 psi (0.07 bar) : Shattering of glass 55 m 55 m 55 m 0.5 psi (0.03 bar) : Crack in glass 95 m 95 m 95 m

Blast Area of Vapour Cloud Explosion 24.7 psi (1.7 bar) to 2.9 psi (0.2 bar)

MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking




MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking


MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking




MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking


MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking


MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking



Modeling Scenario-II : Leaking Tank, Fuel (MS) is burning & forms a pool fire ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour Assuming that : MS Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Wind Direction from East Parameters MS Tank T-01A MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C Total Amount Burned 13783 kg 13783 kg 13783 kg Maximum Burn Rate 231 kg/min 231 kg/min 231 kg/min The spread diameter of the burning puddle 6.8 m 6.8 m 6.8 m Maximum Flame Length 18 m 18 m 18 m Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Pool

Fire Tank ID (MS Tank) MS Tank

T-01A MS Tank

T-01B MS Tank

T-01C 4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 34 m 34 m 34 m 4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 32 m 32 m 32 m 10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 23 m 23 m 23 m 12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 20 m 20 m 20 m 25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 13 m 13 m 13 m 37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment <10 m <10 m <10 m



Thermal Radiations from Pool Fire 4 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10 kW/m2

MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire


MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire


MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire



Thermal Radiations from Pool Fire 12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2

MS Tank T-01B (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire


MS Tank T-01A (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire



Modeling Scenario-III : BLEVE, Tank explodes & fuel (MS) burns in fireball ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour Assuming that : MS Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Wind Direction from E

Parameters MS Tank T-01A

MS Tank T-01B MS Tank T-01C

Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 100% 100% 100% Fireball Diameter 914 m 914 m 914 m Burn Duration 40 secs 40 secs 40 secs Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Fireball

Tank ID (MS Tank) MS Tank

T-01A MS Tank

T-01B MS Tank

T-01C 4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 2.9 km 2.9 km 2.9 km 4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 2.6 km 2.6 km 2.6 km 10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 1.8 km 1.8 km 1.8 km 12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 1.6 km 1.6 km 1.6 km 25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 1.1 km 1.1 km 1.1 km 37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment 863 m 863 m 863 m


MS Tank T-01C (Dyke-I) is leaking & burning in pool fire



Thermal Radiations from Fireball (BLEVE) 12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2

MS Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball

Thermal Radiations from Fireball (BLEVE) 4.0 kW/m2, 4.7 kW/m2 & 10.0 kW/m2

MS Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball



V. Inputs Parameter for ALOHA (Modeling for HSD Tanks T-02A, 02B & 02C) Site Data Facility IOCL Depot Location Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, District Anantapur Geocodes 15°09’45.45” N; 77°27’11.69”E Chemical Data Fuel High Speed Diesel Mol. Wt. 142 g/mol PAC-1 6.6 ppm PAC-2 73 ppm PAC-3 440 ppm LEL 7500 ppm UEL 54000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point 445°K Atmospheric Data Wind Speed 3.0 m/s from 90° true at 3 m Pre-dominant Wind Direction (from) East Ground Roughness Open Country Cloud Cover 5 tenth Stability Class D Inversion No Inversion Height Air Temperature 30°C Relative Humidity 50% Source Strength HSD Tank 02A HSD Tank 02B HSD Tank 02C Tank Diameter 30 m 30 m 30 m Tank Height 15 m 15 m 15 m Tank is 70% full - Tank Contains Liquid Only (HSD) Liquid Only (HSD) Liquid Only (HSD) Internal Temperature 30° 30° 30° Tank Volume 10603 m3 10603 m3 10603 m3 Chemical Mass in Tank 5925000 kg 5925000 kg 5925000 kg Circular Opening Diameter of Leak 5 cm 5 cm 5 cm Opening from tank bottom 1.0 m 1.0 m 1.0 m Ground Type Concrete Concrete Concrete Ground Temperature Equal to ambient Equal to ambient Equal to ambient Modeling Scenario-I : Leaking Tank, Fuel (HSD) is not burning & form an evaporating puddle ALOHA limited the release duration to 1 hour Assuming that : HSD Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed an evaporating puddle Wind Direction from E HSD Tanks HSD Tank 02A HSD Tank 02B HSD Tank 02C Total Amount Released 181 kg 181 kg 181 kg Max Average Sustained Release Rate (averaged over a minute or more)

5.26 kg/min 5.26 kg/min 5.26 kg/min

The spread diameter of the puddle 42 m 42 m 42 m



Model Run Gaussian Threat Modelled Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud Tank ID (HSD Tanks) HSD Tank 02A HSD Tank 02B HSD Tank 02C Red (440 ppm = PAC3) 21 m 21 m 21 m Orange (73 ppm = PAC-2) 50 m 50 m 50 m Yellow (6.6 ppm = PAC-1) 353 m 353 m 353 m

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud HSD Tank T-02B (Dyke-II) is leaking



Modeling Scenario-II : Leaking Tank, Fuel (HSD) is burning & forms a pool fire ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour. Assuming that : HSD Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Parameters HSD Tanks T-02A HSD Tank T-02B HSD Tank T-02C Total Amount Burned 5167 kg 5167 kg 5167 kg Maximum Burn Rate 87.1 kg/min 87.1 kg/min 87.1 kg/min The spread diameter of the burning puddle 5.0 m 5.0 m 5.0 m Maximum Flame Length 11 m 11 m 11 m Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Pool Fire Tank ID (HSD Tank) HSD Tanks

T-02A HSD Tank

T-02B HSD Tank

T-02C 4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 22 m 22 m 22 m 4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 20 m 20 m 20 m 10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 15 m 15 m 15 m 12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 14 m 14 m 14 m 25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood <10 m <10 m <10 m 37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment <10 m <10 m <10 m

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud HSD Tank T-02C (Dyke-II) is leaking

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud HSD Tank T-02A (Dyke-II) is leaking




HSD Tank T-02B (Dyke-II) is leaking & burning in pool fire



Modeling Scenario-III : BLEVE, Tank explodes & fuel (HSD) burns in fireball ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour Assuming that : HSD Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Wind Direction from E Parameters HSD Tank T-02A HSD Tank T-02B HSD Tank T-02C Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 100% 100% 100% Fireball Diameter 992 m 992 m 992 m Burn Duration 43 secs 43 secs 43 secs Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Fireball

Tank ID (MS Tank) HSD Tank

T-02A HSD Tank

T-02B HSD Tank

T-02C 4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 3.1 km 3.1 km 3.1 km 4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 4.7 km 4.7 km 4.7 km 10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 2.0 km 2.0 km 2.0 km 12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 1.7 km 1.7 km 1.7 km 25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 1.2 km 1.2 km 1.2 km 37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment 924 m 924 m 924 m


HSD Tank T-02A (Dyke-II) is leaking & burning in pool fire


HSD Tank T-02C (Dyke-II) is leaking & burning in pool fire



Thermal Radiations from Fireball (BLEVE) 12.5 kW/m2, 25 kW/m2 & 37.5 kW/m2

HSD Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball


HSD Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball



VI. Inputs Parameter for ALOHA (Modeling for SKO Tanks T-03A, T-03B)

Site Data Facility IOCL Depot Location Nakkanadoddi, Guntakal, Anantapur Geocodes 15°09’42.24”N; 77°27’7.56”E Chemical Data Fuel Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) Mol. Wt. 170 g/mol PAC-1 1.7 ppm PAC-2 18 ppm PAC-3 110 ppm LEL 6000 ppm UEL 49000 ppm Ambient Boiling Point 487°K Ambient Saturation Concentration 282 ppm Atmospheric Data Wind Speed 3.0 m/s from E at 3 m Pre-dominant Wind Direction (from) E Ground Roughness Open Country Cloud Cover 5 tenth Stability Class C Inversion No Inversion Height Air Temperature 30°c Relative Humidity 50% Source strength SKO Tanks Parameters SKO Tank T-03A SKO Tank T-03B Tank Diameter 14 m 14 m Tank Height 12.5 m 12.5 m Tank is 70% full - Tank Contains Liquid Only (SKO) Liquid Only (SKO) Internal Temperature 30° 30° Tank Volume 1924 m3 1924 m3 Chemical Mass in Tank 1000498 kg 1000498 kg Circular Opening Diameter of Leak 5 cm 5 cm Opening from tank bottom 1.0 m 1.0 m Ground Type Concrete Concrete Ground Temperature Equal to ambient Equal to ambient Modeling Scenario-I : Leaking Tank, Fuel (SKO) is not burning & form an evaporating puddle ALOHA limited the release duration to 1 hour; Assuming that : SKO Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) The chemical escaped as a liquid and formed an evaporating puddle Wind Direction from E SKO Tank 03A SKO Tank 03B Total Amount Released 23.1 kg 492 kg Max Average Sustained Release Rate (averaged over a minute or more) 672 g/min 8.51 kg/min The spread diameter of the puddle 43 m 32 m Model Run Gaussian Threat Modelled Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud Tank ID (SKO Tanks) SKO Tank 03A SKO Tank 03B Red (110 ppm = PAC3) 21 m 21 m Orange (18 ppm = PAC-2) 21 m 21 m Yellow (1.7 ppm = PAC-1) 64 m 64 m



Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud SKO Tank T-03A (Dyke-III) is leaking

Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud SKO Tank T-03B (Dyke-III) is leaking



Modeling Scenario-II : Leaking Tank, Fuel (SKO) is burning & forms a pool fire ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour. Assuming that : SKO Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Parameters SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B Total Amount Burned 5222 kg 5222 kg Maximum Burn Rate 88.2 kg/min 88.2 kg/min The spread diameter of the burning puddle 5.3 m 5.3 m Maximum Flame Length 10 m 10 m Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Pool Fire Tank ID (SKO Tank) SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B 4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 22 m 22 m 4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 20 m 20 m 10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 15 m 15 m 12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 14 m 14 m 25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood <10 m <10 m 37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment <10 m <10 m


SKO Tank T-02B (Dyke-III) is leaking & burning in pool fire


SKO Tank T-02A (Dyke-III) is leaking & burning in pool fire



Modeling Scenario-III : BLEVE, Tank explodes & fuel (SKO) burns in fireball ALOHA limited the burn duration to 1 hour Assuming that : SKO Leak from hole in vertical cylindrical tank Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes from tank Wind Direction from E Parameters SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball 100% 100% Fireball Diameter 580 m 580 m Burn Duration 28 secs 28 secs Threat Modelled Thermal Radiations from Fireball Tank ID (MS Tank) SKO Tanks T-03A SKO Tank T-03B 4.0 kW/m2 : Causes pain if unable to reach cover within 20 s 1.9 km 1.9 km 4.7 kW/m2 : Accepted value to represent injury 1.7 km 1.7 km 10.0 kW/m2 : Second degree burn after 25 s 1.2 km 1.2 km 12.5 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required for melting of plastic 1.0 km 1.0 km 25.0 kW/m2 : Minimum energy required to ignite wood 719 m 719 m 37.5 kW/m2 : Sufficient to cause damage to equipment 559 m 559 m


SKO Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball


SKO Tanks explodes & fuel burn in fireball



VII. Modeling for Instantaneous/ Continuous Release of Fuel from areas/ operations like TW Receipt; TLF; TLD; ITT; PHO etc.

Modeling Scenario-I Instantaneous Release of Fuel during various operations

Assuming that : Instantaneous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.1 KL Release Duration : 1 minute Release Rate : 1.09 kg/s Total Amount Released : 65.1 kg Source temperature : Equal to ambient

Threat Modelled : Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud Model Run : Heavy Gas Red : 32 m (7200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets) Threat not drawn

because effects of near-field patchiness makes dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances)

Orange : N/A Yellow : 90 m (1200 ppm = 10% LEL)



Modeling Scenario-II Continuous Release of Fuel during various operations Assuming that : Continuous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.01 KL/s Release Duration : 2 minute Release Rate : 391 kg/min Total Amount Released : 782 kg Source temperature : Equal to ambient Threat Modelled : Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud Model Run : Heavy Gas Red : 81 m (7200 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets) Orange : N/A Yellow : 226 m (1200 ppm = 10% LEL)



VIII. Modeling for Instantaneous/ Continuous Release of Ethanol from various operations of Depot (TT receipt, pumping, storage, blending/ mixing etc.)

Modeling Scenario-I Instantaneous Release of Ethanol during various operations Assuming that : Instantaneous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.1 KL Release Duration : 1 minute Release Rate : 1.29 kg/s Total Amount Released : 77.7 kg Source temperature : Equal to ambient Threat Modelled : Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud Model Run : Heavy Gas Red : No recommended LOC value – (N/A = ERPG-3) Orange : 75 m (3300 ppm = ERPG-2) Yellow : 108 m (1800 ppm = ERPG-1)

Threat Modelled : Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud Model Run : Heavy Gas Red (19800 ppm = 60%LEL = Flame Pockets)# : 22 m Yellow (3300 ppm = 10%LEL) : 75 m # Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable for short distances.



Modeling Scenario-II Continuous Release of Ethanol during various operations Assuming that :

Continuous Release (Direct from the source) : 0.01 KL/s

Release Duration : 5 minute

Release Rate : 466 kg/min

Total Amount Released : 2331 kg

Source temperature : Equal to ambient

Threat Modelled : Toxic Area of Vapour Cloud

Model Run : Heavy Gas

Red (N/A = ERPG-3) : No recommended LOC value

Orange (3300 ppm = ERPG-2) : 173 m

Yellow (1800 ppm = ERPG-1) : 259 m



Threat Modelled : Flammable Area of Vapour Cloud Model Run : Heavy Gas Red (19800 ppm = 60%LEL = Flame Pockets : 53 m Yellow (3300 ppm = 10%LEL) : 173 m


Shriram Institute for Industrial Research: Delhi

6. ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN AND DMP 6.1 A General Overview of Disaster Disaster is termed as an undesirable occurrence of events of such magnitude and nature that not only adversely affects production, causes loss of human lives and property but also cause substantial damage to the environment. The industrial installations are vulnerable to various kinds of natural as well as manmade disasters. Examples of natural disasters are-Flood, Cyclone, Earthquake, Lightening etc. whereas, that of manmade disasters are major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic / poisonous liquids / gases, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities, Plant failures, human error, vehicle crash, sabotage etc. It is impossible to forecast the time and nature of disaster, which might strike the installation. In spite the fact that every industry is expected to take steps to assess, minimize and minimize/ or eliminate the risks by feasible means, the accidents still may occur, as the risk can only be minimized but never be totally eliminated. However, an effective Disaster Management plan helps in minimizing the losses in terms of human lives, plant assets and environmental damage and to resume the working condition as soon as possible. Controlling the emergency will require prompt action by the operating staff, the staff on various emergency teams and outside agencies/ organization, when involved in combat operations. Minimizing the effect on the people may be achieved through prompt rescue, evacuation, rehabilitation and communication, if situation so warrants. In spite of various preventive and precautionary measures taken to be envisaged and implemented, the possibility of a mishap can never be totally ruled out. Hence, the need to prepare a contingency Plan for dealing with incidences which may likely to occur and are likely to affect Life and / or Property or both within the Depot and in the immediate neighborhood. Such an emergency could be the result of malfunction of the Plant & Equipment or non-observance of operating instructions. It could, at times, be the consequence of acts outside the control of plant management like severe storm, flood, or deliberate acts of arson or sabotage. A Major Emergency in the plant is one which may cause serious injury or loss of life, damage to the property and /or environment. This Onsite Disaster Management Plan also known as Onsite Emergency Plan (OEP) explains the code of conduct of all personnel in the plant along with the actions to be carried out in the event of an Emergency. This plan gives the guidelines for employees, contractors, transporters, etc. It not only defines responsibilities but also informs about prompt rescue operations, evacuations, rehabilitation, co-ordination and communication. 6.2 The Need for Disaster Management at POL Installations A hazardous material either flammable or toxic are safe till these are fully contained and maintained at desired parameters during receipt, storage, processing and transportation. Nonetheless, most extensive precautions are to be taken, accidents are likely to occur, hence the need of CONTINGENCY PLANNING. Risks can only be minimised, controlled, and managed within defined and acceptable area by effective enforcement & adequate awareness. But total risk can never be reduced to zero. “No Risk is not an Option”. The ultimate objective is to minimise both controllable and unnecessary risks, to make responsible decisions aiming to implement feasible and beneficial courses of corrective action. Vasudevan Committee appointed by the Government of India to enquire into a major fire incident that occurred in the Indian Oil Corporation Limited LPG plant in May 1983 recommended various safety measures to avoid recurrence of such incidents in future. As per the report submitted by Vasudevan Committee, a contingency plan is to be framed for all LPG plants as well as Petroleum Storage Points. Ministry of Home Affairs and Director of Civil



Defence, Government of India have also issued instructions in this context from time to time for all storage installations. The Disaster Management Plan illustrated in this chapter covers the steps required for handling emergencies at proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi, However, the disastrous situation would be handled under instructions from Civil Authorities in Anantapur District as the part of Off-site Emergencies. Further, Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) issued Draft Regulations on Codes of Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) Regulation, 2008, which are applicable to:

(a) Hydrocarbon Processing Installation (Refinery, Gas Processing, LNG Regasification,

Installations etc.)

(b) Pipeline such as Natural Gas, Propane, Butane etc) and the hydrocarbon product which remains in gaseous state at NTP.

(c) Liquid Petroleum Product Pipeline.

(d) Commercial Petroleum Storage Facilities and Terminals including LNG Terminals.

(e) Hydrocarbon gas bottling installations having receipt, storage and handling facilities including storage for LPG, Propane and Butane.

(f) City or local natural gas distribution facility.

(g) Dispensing stations and POL retail outlets.

(h) Transportation of petroleum products by road.

(i) Any other installation as may be notified by the Board from time to time. 6.3 Objective of Disaster Management for the proposed IOCL Depot at

Nakkanadoddi The objective of any plant should be to have safe and trouble free operations for smooth production. This has to be ensured through taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipments, pipelines, etc. as per standard codes; ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes / rules and instruments for safe operation of the plant. Safety must be ensured afterwards by operating the plant not only considering feasible safeguards but also by imparting training to staff periodically to build capacity to handle emergency situation. In spite of all precautions, accidents may likely happen due to human error or system malfunction or natural calamities. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as manmade disasters. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster. However, an effective disaster management plan, i.e. pre-planned procedure involving proper utilization of in-house as well as outside resources, helps to minimize the loss to a minimum and resume the working conditions as soon as possible. Hence, the overall objective of the preparation of DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP) is to prepare contingency planning to prevent accidents through good design, operation, maintenance and inspection by which it is possible to reduce the risk of an accident, but it is not possible to eliminate it. Since, absolute safety is not achievable and an essential part of major hazard control must also include mitigating the effects of major accidents. Disaster Management



Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and post disaster. DMP is to formulate and provide organizational set up and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any emergency situation in order to:

(a) Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources

(b) Protect the personnel inside the depot as well as public outside.

(c) Safeguard the depot as well as outside property and environment.

(d) Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties.

(e) Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry

(f) Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions.

The major aim of the Disaster Management Plan is to make use of the combined resources of the project and the outside services to ensure:

Effectiveness of the rescue operation and medical treatment of affected

Safeguard other people

Minimize damage to property and the environment

Initially contain and ultimately bring the incident under control

Provide authoritative information to the news media

Secure the safe rehabilitation of affected area

Preserve relevant records and equipment for the subsequent inquiry into the cause and

circumstances of the Emergency

In effect, it is essential to optimize operational efficiency for rescue, rehabilitation and render medical help and to restore normalcy. The desired objectives can, therefore, be achieved through: Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential and

identification of maximum credible hazard scenario.

Arrange/augment facilities for firefighting, safety, medical (both equipment and manpower)

Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and communication facilities as well as warning procedure.

6.4 Fire and Explosion Hazard Management I. Fire Hazard Management (a) Fire Hazard Summary Petroleum products especially Motor Spirit are highly flammable liquid. Vapors are heavier than air and may travel a considerable distance to a source of ignition and flash back to a leak or open container. Vapor can spread along the ground and accumulate in low-lying areas or in confined spaces, thereby resulting in a toxicity, flammability and explosion hazard. Liquid can float on water and may travel to distant locations and/ or spread fire. During a fire, irritating, toxic and/



or hazardous gases, such as sulfur and nitrogen oxides and unidentified organic compounds, may be generated. Closed systems may rupture violently when exposed to the heat of a fire or excessive heat for a sufficient period of time. (b) Extinguishing Media Carbon dioxide, dry chemical powder or polymeric foam could be the good extinguishing media. Water can extinguish the fire if used under favorable conditions and when hose streams are applied by experienced firefighters trained in fighting all types of flammable liquid fires. Fire-fighting foams are the extinguishing agents of choice for most flammable liquid fires. (c) Fire Fighting Measures In order to ensure effectiveness in management of fire hazard, following instructions could

be envisaged: Evacuate area and fight fire from a safe distance or protected location.

Approach fire from upwind to avoid toxic decomposition products.

Stop leak before attempting to stop the fire. If the leak cannot be stopped, and if there is no

risk to the surrounding area, let the fire burn itself out.

If the flames are extinguished without stopping the leak, vapors could form explosive mixtures with air and re-ignite.

Water can extinguish the fire if used under favorable conditions and when hose streams are

applied by experienced firefighters trained in fighting all types of flammable liquid fires.

If possible, isolate materials not yet involved in the fire, and move these from fire area if this can be done without risk, and protect personnel.

Fire-exposed material should be cooled by application of hose streams sprinklers and this

should begin as soon as possible (within the first several minutes).

Water sprinklers can be used to dilute spills to nonflammable mixtures and flush spills away from ignition sources.

Do not enter in the area of fire without wearing specialized protective equipment suitable for the situation. Firefighter's normal protective equipment (Bunker Gear) may not provide adequate protection. Chemical resistant clothing (e.g. chemical splash suit) and positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (MSHA/NIOSH approved or equivalent) may be necessary.

(d) Fire Fighting Equipment/ Material as well as Life Saving Equipment to be made

available at proposed Depot

Inventory of firefighting equipment/ material as well as lifesaving equipment available at Depot are listed below:



Table-6.4 (a) Fire-fighting facilities for proposed depot Sl. Description of Item

Quantity / Details

1. Fire Water storage Static Tank 3 x 6375 KL 2. Fire Fighting pump sets 5 x 850 KL/Hr x 105 m Head 3. Jockey pump sets 2 x 72 KL/ Hr x 110 m Head 4. U/G Tank of 100 KL capacity with pumps & provision to

receive water from outside 1 set

5. Bore well pumps 3 Nos. 6. Well spread fire hydrant piping layout for the entire plant Approx. 4000 m 7. Remote operated & Fixed High Volume Long Range Foam

cum water monitor 5 Nos.

8. Trolley mounted High Volume Long Range Foam cum water monitor

2 Nos.

9. Medium Expansion Foam Generator (Fixed) 4 Nos. 10. Medium Expansion Foam Generator (Portable) 2 Nos. 11. Mobile Foam Trailer with 3% AFFF (9000 litre) 3 Nos. 12. ATC Foam for Alcohol fire 1 KL 13. Hydro-carbon Gas Detectors (OP Type) 6 Nos. 14. Hydro-carbon Detectors (Point Type) 14 Nos. 15. Portable Gas Detector 1 Nos. 16. Explosimeter 1 No. 17. Oxygen meter 1 No. 18. Fire proximity suit 1 No. 19. SCABA with spare O2 cylinder 1 Set 20. Wheeled Portable Water cum Foam monitor 2 Nos. 21. Fixed water spray system for Storage Tanks 11 Nos. 22. Fixed Foam Pourer System for Storage Tanks 13 Nos. 23. Fixed Water monitors 45 Nos. 24. Double Hydrant points on stand post 75 Nos. 25. Jet Nozzle 5 Nos. 26. Universal Nozzle 5 Nos. 27. Foam Branch Pipe 5 Nos. 28. Stretcher with blanket 2 Nos. 29. First Aid Box 2 Nos. 30. Shock resistant Rubber Hand Gloves 2 pairs 31. Oil Sorbent Booms 2 Nos. 32. 75 kg DCP Fire Extinguisher 15 Nos. 33. 25 kg DCP Fire Extinguisher 15 Nos. 34. 10 kg DCP Fire Extinguisher 135 Nos. 35. 2.5 & 4.5 kg CO2 Fire Extinguisher 60 Nos. 36. Safety Hand lamp 2 Nos. 37. Leak arrestor kit with clamps 1 Set

Note: Any other additional firefighting equipment for which need is felt during design & detailed engineering will be appropriately added to be compliant with the provisions of OISD 117 & OISD 244



Table-6.4 (b) Schedule of Fire Water Tanks Tag No. Size Nominal Capacity (KL) Pumping Capacity

WT-01/02/03 24.00M Ǿ x 14.00M L 6310 5114

Total 15342 KL

Table-6.4 (c) Schedule of Firefighting Pumps Tag No. Description Nos. of Pump Capacity Head

(mWC)

Operating Standby

P-22A/B Jockey Pumps Electrical Driven 1 1 72 Cu.M/Hr. 110

P-23A/B/C/D/E Main Pumps Diesel Engine Driven 3 2 850 Cu.M/Hr 105

P-24A/B Foam Pump 1 1 25 Cu.M/Hr 120

II. Toxicity Hazard Management Petroleum Products like MS, HSD, SKO and Ethanol have toxic effects on inhalation, ingestion and on contact with skin. Hence, there is a need to envisage strategic planning to reduce the effect of toxicity on exposure both short term and long term. Following measures could be envisaged on direct exposure to the product: Inhalation Remove source of contamination or move victim to fresh air. If breathing has stopped, properly trained personnel should begin artificial respiration or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) immediately. Obtain medical attention immediately. Skin Contact As quickly as possible, remove contaminated clothing, shoes and leather goods (e.g. watchbands, belts). Quickly and gently blot or brush away excess chemical. Wash gently and thoroughly with water and non-abrasive soap until the chemical is removed. Obtain medical attention immediately. Completely decontaminate clothing, shoes and leather goods before re-use or discard. Eye Contact Quickly and gently blot away excess chemical. Immediately flush the contaminated eye(s) with lukewarm, gently flowing water until the chemical is removed, while holding the eyelid(s) open. Obtain medical advice immediately. Ingestion Never give anything by mouth if the victim is rapidly losing consciousness, is unconscious or is convulsing. Do not induce vomiting. Have victim drink 200 to 300 ml of water to dilute material in the stomach. If vomiting occurs naturally, have victim lean forward to reduce risk of aspiration. Repeat administration of water. Obtain medical attention immediately.



Effectiveness of First Aid Measures Ensure the effectiveness of First Aid Measures by Providing general supportive measures (comfort, warmth, and rest).

Consulting a doctor for all exposures except minor instances of inhalation or skin contact.

All first aid procedures should be periodically reviewed by a doctor familiar with the

material and its conditions of use in the workplace. Artificial Respiration Give artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. Use the mouth method. Resuscitator can also be used. Mouth to mouth method In case, there is any obstruction in breathing, remove if with your fingers or with a cloth wrapped round your fingers. Several sharp blows between the shoulder blades will also help to dislodge any obstruction. Lay person affected on his back. Put some support under his shoulder to raise them and

allow his head to fall backwards the head should be a little lower than the trunk.

Remember speed is essential. Kneel beside the causality’s head and grasp his arms at the wrist. Cross them firmly over the lower chest. This movement can force out air out of his lungs. Press with hand crossed on the lower part of chest and maintain pressure for two seconds. Release this pressure and pull his arm with a sweeping movement upwards and outwards above his head and backward as far as possible.

This movement should cause air to be drawn in his lungs. Retain the arm in this position for three seconds. This will keep equal amount of time at every cycle.

Repeat this movement rhythmically about twelve times per minute checking the mouth frequently for obstruction. Each cycle there four take five seconds, two seconds for chest pressure and three seconds for arm lift.

With the casualty on its back there is danger of aspiration of vomit mucus or blood re-entering the system. This risk can be reduced by keeping his head extended and a little lower than the trunk. It should also be ensured that the mouth is kept open as far as possible turning head to one side if necessary

6.5 Emergency Organization Chart

Role of key personnel of the proposed Depot has been defined so as to undertake combat operations in the event of emergency in effective ways. The Chief Incident Controller and the Site Incident Controller are most important key persons for effective control of an emergency at



site. They shall be supported by Emergency Management Team comprising of technical resources from Operations & Maintenance, mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, civil, communications, technical services etc. Fire & Safety, Security, HR (Personnel & Administration), Finance & Accounts personnel will also have due roles & responsibilities as defined in the Onsite Emergency Organogram of proposed IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot.

1. Support Services Include Communication Services, Engineering/Maintenance Services, Medical and Occupational Health, Human Resource and Welfare Service, Security, Media/Public Relations, Transport and Logistics, Finance, Contract and Procurement and Environmental Services.

2. Role of both CIC and SIC can be merged depending upon the requirement.

SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER

Support Services

Administrative & Communication

Coordinator

Fire Safety and Fire Team/ HSE

Coordinator

Operation Team; Technical Team, etc.

CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER

Offsite Incident Commander

(District Magistrate)

Affected Stakeholders

& Government Authorities

District/ Municipal Transport Rescue & Rehabilitation Team

Police Services

Medical Services & Ambulance

Fire Brigade Services

Mutual Aid Agency

Level-1

Level-2

Level-3



6.6 Emergency Responsibilities (Onsite) Key personnel of the organization and responsibilities assigned to them in case of an emergency

Table-6.6 Onsite-Emergency Organogram of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot

Sl. Emergency Organization Chart Depot Official Responsibilities

1 Chief Incident Controller Location Incharge (Depot Manager)

Overall In-charge of Fire Combat

2 Site Incident Controller Deputy Manager Fire Combat Team Leader Stop immediately filling

operations & remove hoses from tank wagons & TTs after closing the valves.

Rush to the scene of fire with available fire extinguishers & try to extinguish the fire immediately.

Rush to the spot with available hoses & nozzles & start firefighting as per the instructions of the fire chief (CIC).

3 Administration Coordinator S&D Officer All operations to be stopped,

tank valves to be closed, electric mains to be switched off.

If necessary, all filled TTTs should be allowed to go through the emergency gate.

4 Communication Coordinator S&D Officer Inform about the incident to Industry Members, Local Police and State Government Agencies like Fire Brigade, Factories Dept., nearest Hospitals (as per the priority displayed) and DGM (O), TAPSO.

Coordinate with DSP (Rural) & DCP (Traffic) for ease of flow of traffic en route for Fire Brigade & Ambulance to reach the site.

Coordinate with District Administration in shifting the injured persons to hospitals.

5 Fire & Safety Coordinator HSE Officer Organize supply of firefighting equipments as well as personnel to the Fire Combat Team as per the instructions of Fire Chief (CIC).

Replace all firefighting equipments that are exhausted after the fire is brought under control.

Contd.



Table-6.6 contd. Sl. Emergency Organization Chart Depot Official Responsibilities 6

Emergency Management Team Operations & Maintenance Mechanical Electrical Instrumentation Civil Communication Services

HSE Officer Implement Orders as per the instructions of Fire Chief (CIC)

7 Security Coordinator Security Officer Half-filled TTs should not go out without documents.

8 Support & Auxiliary Services Team HR & Welfare Coordinator Transport & Logistics Media & Public Relations Medical Services Finance Coordinator Material Coordinator

Finance Officer To be in touch with CC Team in region.

Note: 1. Senior Depot Manager shall be Chief Incident Controller for over all coordination. 2. HSE Officer Incharge of Safety shall be Site Incident Controller at Site. 3. All Coordinators shall report to the Site Incident Controller at site. 4. All IOCL Employees working inside shall assemble at ASSEMBLY POINT in front of

Administrative Office. (All IOCL Employees means the persons whose role is not defined in the action plan)

6.7 Role and Responsibilities of Key Personnel I. Chief Incident Controller (CIC) [Location In-charge/ Senior Depot Manager] The Chief Incident Controller (CIC) will have overall responsibility to protect personnel, site facilities, and the public before, during, and after an emergency or disaster. The CIC will be present at the main emergency control centre for counsel and overall guidance. Responsibilities of the Chief Incident Controller includes the following: (a) Preparation, review and updation of the ERDMP (b) Assessment of situation and declaration of emergency. (c) Mobilization of main coordinators and key personnel. (d) Activation Emergency Control Centre. (e) Taking decision on seeking assistance from mutual aid members and external agencies like

Police, Fire Brigade, Hospitals etc. (f) Continuous review of situation and decide on appropriate response strategy.



(g) Taking stock of casualties and ensure timely medical attention.

(h) Ensuring correct accounting and position of personnel after the emergency. (i) Ordering evacuation of personnel as and when necessary. (j) Taking decision in consultation with District Authorities when an Off-site emergency to be

declared.

II. Site Incident Controller (SIC) [HSE Officer Incharge of Safety] The Site Incident Controller (SIC) as identified by the Chief Incident Controller and will report directly to him. SIC will be nominated by the depot in each shift of 24-hrs. Responsibilities of the Site Incident Controller shall include the following: (a) The SIC will maintain a workable emergency control plan, establish emergency control

centers, organize and equip the organization as per OSEP and train the personnel; (b) The SIC will be capable of making quick decisions and taking full charge; (c) The SIC will communicate to the Emergency Control Centre where it can coordinate

activities among groups; (d) The SIC will be responsible for ensuring that appropriate local and national government

authorities are notified, preparation of media statements, obtaining approval from the CIC and releasing such statements once the approval is received;

(e) The SIC will also ensure the response to the incidents or the emergencies, as the case may

be, is in line with the depot procedures, coordinating business continuity or recovery plan from the incident.

(f) He must ensure next of kin are notified in a timely manner; (g) The SIC will also co-ordinate if any specialist support is required for the above purpose; (h) The SIC will decide on seeking assistance of mutual aid members and external agencies like

police, fire brigade, hospital etc.

III. Administration and Communication Coordinator Responsibilities of the administration and communication controller will include the following: (a) To coordinate with mutual aid members and other external agencies;

(b) To direct them on arrival of external agencies to respective coordinators at desired locations;

(c) To activate the medical centre and render first aid to the injured. arrange ambulance and

coordination with hospitals for prompt medical attention to casualties;

(d) To ensure head counts at assembly points;

(e) To arrange procurement of spares for firefighting and additional medicines and drugs;



(f) To mobilize transport to various teams for facilitating the response measures;

(g) To monitor entry and exit of personnel into and out of premises;

(h) To ensure only authorized personnel enter into the premises;

(i) To regulate the flow of traffic into and out of premises and control the mob outside, if any, with the assistance of the police.

(j) To provide administrative and logistics assistance to various teams; and

(k) To arrange evacuation as directed by the chief incident controller, and in coordination with

the civil authorities like police, panchayat/municipal authorities etc.

IV. Fire & Safety Coordinator and Fire Team Responsibilities of the Fire and Safety Coordinator will include the following: (a) To activate emergency sirens as per the practiced codes.

(b) To take charge of all firefighting and rescue operations and safety matters.

(c) To ensure that key personnel are called in and to release crew of firefighting operations as

per emergency procedure.

(d) Assess functioning of his team and communicate with the CIC and or administrative controller for any replenishment or, replacement of manpower or firefighting equipment.

(e) Direct the fire brigade personnel and mutual aid members to their desired roles as also proper positioning of the manpower and equipment.

(f) To decide the requirement of mutual aid and instruct fire station, who, in turn will contact mutual aid members.

(g) To coordinate with outside fire brigades for properly coordinated firefighting operation.

(h) To ensure that casualties are promptly sent to first aid centre / hospital.

(i) To arrange requirement of additional firefighting resources including help from mutual aid partners.

(j) Ensure empty and loaded trucks are removed to safer area to the extent possible so as not to affect emergency handling operations.

(k) Continually liaise with the SIC and or CIC and implement the emergency combat strategies as communicated by him.

(l) Ensure adequate hydrant pressure in the mains and monitor water level in the reservoir.

(m) Fire Organization Chart; Composition & Responsibilities of Teams



Fire organization chart as per table-6.7 depicts the duties and responsibilities of each IOCL officer and staff member has prominently been displayed at appropriate locations in the depot. Scope of responsibilities of firefighting team is given below: Combating team will fight the fire Auxillary team will supply the material and equipment. Rescue team will provide medical aid and equipment and remove the injured. Raising of Alarm Person seeing/ noticing the fire will raise the alarm by shouting “fire-fire-fire” to attract the

attention of all. Person hearing the word fire shall operate nearby hand siren to give signal of emergency.

Security personnel at gate shall operate electric siren to communicate emergency to all

personnel for action plan. If possible control and extinguish fire by operating nearest fire extinguisher. If it is not possible to extinguish, raise alarm through nearest hand operated siren.

Table-6.7 Firefighting Team of IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot

Chief of Firefighting Team Location Incharge (Depot Manager)

Dy. Chief of Firefighting Team Deputy Manager (Depot)

Fire Combat Team Incharge HSE Officer

Fire Auxiliary Team Incharge S&D Officer

Fire Rescue Team Incharge Security Officer Duties on Hearing the Fire Alarm Fire-in-charge (Alternate in-charge)

To take control as Overall in-charge of the situation.

To rush to the scene of fire and issue instructions for speedy combat.

To work as Liaison Officer between outside Fire Brigade & Police, State Administration.

To withdraw the staff in case the human life is in peril.

To give clearance signal when everything is in normal.

Fire Combat Team

On hearing the fire alarm the in-charge will rush to the scene of fire and Issue instructions for speedy combat.

The Fire Combating Member to ensure that the Fire Hydrant system start in the auto mode.

Other members of the team to rush to the scene of the fire with fighting equipments to extinguish fire as per the instructions of Fire-In-Charge.



The Fire Combating Team to go for full action to extinguish the Fire.

Withdraw men to safe distance if any danger is expected resulting into casualties.

Simultaneous stopping of loading, closing of filling valves and vehicles from fitting Area as per the Instructions from Fire Chief.

If outside help is required inform Fire-In-Charge for Fire Brigade / Police

Fire Auxiliary Team

Immediately to take care of Telephone calls and take instructions

from Fire-In-Charge to contact outside parties for Assistance if required.

To take care of important documents.

Assemble outside the office for detailing for further instructions.

Restrict the Entry of outside unauthorized persons to the Depot Premises.

Allow outsider public to go to out of the Depot under noting of security gate.

Control Traffic at the Main Gate and keep clearance for outside assistance.

Give First Aid and Treatment to the Injured.

Remove the Injured Persons to Hospital as per Instructions from Fire Chief.

Fire Rescue Team

Report to In-Charge of the team and carry out duties as ordered by him.

Get all operations in the field stopped and all tank valves closed with switching off Electric Main.

Get all Tank Trucks and other vehicles out of gate and park outside. Part Loaded TTs to be checked with dip Rod for the Quantity. Take Down all TTs Nos.

Ensure filling valves are closed.

To get stores, Ware Houses and other Buildings premises closed.

Take control of all the employees, other than the Fire Combating Team.

Organize supply of fire combating equipments, like Foam etc. as well as the personnel to the Fire Combating Team.

Replace all fire combating equipments that are used in fire combating after the fire is brought under control.

Keep the fire equipments in operating condition at all items.



Action Plan for Fire Fire in Tank

Wet down the outside of the burning tank with water to cool it and to prevent it from melting down and also to cool the oil as much as possible.

Start the sprinklers of the nearby oil storage tanks and structures to keep down the temperature of burning tank.

Apply the foam on the surface of burning oil, it should be applied to the surface cautiously so that it does not overflow the tank and it should be applied gently so as not to scatter the burning oil and thereby to spread the fire. Apply the foam on one side of fire and build the foam blanket from that side across the oil pool.

Water should not be applied on burning oil tank since it being heavier than oil settles at the bottom and would result in raising the height of flames.

Call for help from local fire brigade as per the instructions of chief fire in charge.

If space is available to take the oil from the burning tank, pump out the oil to other tanks. DO NOT ATTEMPT this unless the efforts to extinguish the fire are not successful and adequate help is available.

Vapour Cloud Explosion

When gaseous flammable material is released, a vapour cloud forms and if it is ignited before it is diluted below its lower explosive limit, a vapour cloud explosion or a flash fire will occur. Insignificant level of confinement will result in flash fire.

The vapour cloud explosion will result in overpressures.

In case of vapour clouds, there is a good probability that this would get ignited from an ignition source at a remote location, perhaps outside the site boundary giving rise to a vapour cloud explosion / flash fire.

The explosion would cause widespread damage to buildings and structures and may be lethal to people present in the vicinity of cloud. Also demolition of buildings and throwing of splinters may cause death/ injury to people.

Fire at Tank Truck/ Lorry or Tank Wagon

Be sure that master valves are closed.

When oil is burning under the truck and tank truck is not leaking, move it away from fire, if possible use water to cool the burning tank truck and adjoining tank trucks.

Put foam on the burning oil surface.

Use foam or sand to fight fire around engine of tank trucks

Where the leakage is near the bottom of tank, try to fill water into the truck so that the oil level will be above the leak.

Close valves and dome covers of the tank wagons and cool the tanks with water, if enough help is available move the wagons away from fire.



Fire in Pump House

Call for help from all available employees and also from outside as per standing instructions, call for medical help if required.

Work to prevent fire from spreading.

Shut down the pumps by cutting off the power supply.

Remove any person who might be trapped inside the pump house at the start of the fire.

Close tank valves and manifold valves to prevent oil from running from tanks to pump house.

Put sand on minor oil spills to absorb and smother the fire.

Use CO2 extinguisher or sand on fire inside the motor.

Fire on Person’s Clothing

Lay down the person flat to prevent him from drawing flames into his lungs. Do not allow him to run in panic to avoid spread of fire.

Wrap the burning person in water blanket at the earliest possible time. Be sure that the blanket does not cover the face of person on fire.

Small fire in clothing’s can often be beaten out with sacks / blankets or merely by rolling on the ground.

Call doctor immediately or rush the person to hospital.

Fire on a Large Leak in Internal Pipelines

Call for help of other employee, outside help as per mutual aid also to be called.

Take preventive necessary steps to avoid spread of fire.

All pumping operations to be stopped and close valves on both sides of the breach.

Do build earth dykes around oil pool to prevent its flow to the undesired area.

If possible drain out contents from the pipeline on fire and cover pipeline with sand or earth.

Cool/wet down adjoining structures that might get affected by heat.

Water fog has to be used to extinguish the fire, but be careful to ensure that the water does not float away burning oil to a point where it will spread the fire.

Fire at Small Leak in Internal Pipelines

Fire at a small leak in pipeline to be attacked with the nearest fire extinguisher before it gets a chance to spread and get out of control.

Preventive steps to ensure that the fire does not spread are to be taken.

Shut of flow of oil by closing bumps and valves on both sides.

Cover oil pool with sand and cover pipeline with sand to plug the leak.

Apply foam on oil pool with foam generator,

Build earth dykes around the pool to prevent spread of burning oil.



Do not leave oil trapped in short length of pipes exposed to fire between closed valves since oil so trapped and heated often bursts spreading the fire .

Cool adjacent structures.

Fires in Structures adjoining installation

Call for help of other employees.

Cooperate with fire fighters to prevent spread of fire.

Clear away barrels / packages/unsafe material endangered by the nearby fire.

Suspend all filling operations and drive tank trucks to a safer place.

If burning pieces fall in the installation beat out flames and splinters with wet sacks or throw sand / earth on it

Pipelines closed to fire should be covered with sand and if possible drain out their contents by suction into tank.

Cool adjacent structures.

Fire at Office Building

Disconnect supply to the affected area.

Attempt to extinguish fire with DCP/CO2 fire extinguisher or sand.

If large fire use hydrant system

Remove all flammable material {curtains. papers} from the vicinity of fire.

Attempt to save all records.

Closed the cash box and arrange to move important document to a safer place.

After extinguishment of fire check thoroughly that the building is safe and fire has been totally extinguished.

Action Plan for Electrical Fire

Disconnect electrical supply to affected area.

Extinguish fire with CO2 /DCP fire extinguishers.

After isolating supply water can also be applied for the extinguishment of fire

First Aid for Electrical Burns

Remove clothing of the affected area without breaking the blisters.

Apply lavishly at the affected part a warm solution of either. One desert spoon of bicarbonate of soda mixed with a pint of warm water.

A teaspoonful of salt mixed with a glass of warm water.

Cover the affected area with link soaked with similar solution and bandage lightly if blisters are formed. If above solution are not available cover affected area with a sterile dressing.

Warm weak sweet tea may be given when the patient is able to swallow.



V. Support and Auxiliary Services for proposed IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi

The following additional coordinators are nominated and delegated with specific responsibilities falling under the basic functions of SIC and CIC.

VI. Human Resources and Welfare Service Coordinator

VII. Transport and Logistic Services Coordinator

VIII. Media and Public Relations Coordinator

IX. Operations and Technical Coordinator

Roles & Responsibilities Immediately take charge of medical, welfare and media.

Activate medical Centre and render first aid to the injured by assigning first-aid personnel to

specific duties.

Arrange additional medical supplies, drugs and equipment’s, spares for firefighting, as required.

Arrange ambulance for transporting casualties and coordinate with hospitals for prompt medical attention to casualties.

Keep all the vehicles and drivers in readiness and send vehicles as per requirement of different coordinators and officials. to mobilize transport to various teams for facilitating the response measures;

To monitor entry and exit of authorized personnel into and out of premises;

Head Counts at assembly points.

Take care of public relation, inform relatives of injured.

Arrange canteen facilities and proper food / refreshment.

Arrange to meet emergency clothing requirement.

Arrange to contact the families of the injured.

Maintaining public relation and arrange media briefing wherever necessary

To control the mob outside, if any, with the assistance of the police and to provide administrative and logistics assistance to various teams;

Issue press statement with the approval of Competent Authority / OIC.



Take help of welfare bodies, social organizations, NGO’s, local administrations, blood bank, blood donors, hospitals, doctors, ambulance services, water supply department, transport hire service, catering services as per requirement.

Inform police, civil authorities, statutory authorities etc. with the approval of OIC, if necessary.

Haulage & House Keeping Team To work in close association with SIC.

To assist SIC in assessing scale of emergency and take corrective action to minimize damage

to equipment/Depot in consultation with other coordinators.

To ensure that key mechanical personnel are present at site with proper tools.

To render technical guidance and logistics to mechanical personnel. Electrical supervisor & Electricians (OO/DSO/Shift Incharge)

To work in close association with SIC.

To assist SIC in assessing scale of emergency and take corrective action to minimize damage

to equipment/Depot in consultation with other coordinators.

To ensure that key instrument personnel are present at site with proper tools.

To render technical guidance and logistics to instrument personnel.

To provide assistance to control room engineer for Depot shut down/instrument control requirement.

To ensure that key electrical personnel are present at site with proper tools.

To render technical guidance and logistics to electrical personnel.

To ensure electric supply of affected equipment/area isolated, if required.

To ensure proper lighting is provided during handling of emergency, if required. Operations Coordinator (OO/DSO/Shift Incharge) To assess the situation and apprise CIC, SIC and other key persons about the emergency

situation

To handle Depot operations under directions of CIC.

To direct emergency management team for appropriate action.



To monitor all critical process parameters, alarms and ensure safety of Depot & equipment’s.

To warn all the employees in the affected section / depot area and evacuate them to assembly point if need arises.

To assign time recorder to start Log of emergency as well as time recording. To initiate rescue activities; and first aid need to be given to injured persons pending arrival

of ambulance.

To notify the adjacent areas.

To ensure that only persons having authorized duties enter their area.

X. Security Coordinator The Security Coordinator reports to the Chief / Site Incident Controller and is responsible for security of the depot during any incident or emergency situation and for implementing the actions below:

# Obtaining an approved visitor list from the security department or reception for ensuring that personnel on the list are escorted to reception by security staff. # Maintaining security of the office in the event of an office evacuation. # Providing office security and assisting authorities in the event of civil unrest or when required organizing additional security at the emergency scene. # Obtaining initial briefing from Chief / Site Incident Controller and providing security information and or status reports to Site Incident Controller during the emergency. # Assuming responsibility for any task delegated by Chief Incident Controller. # Assessing the emergency, identify security specific problems and recommend solutions to Chief Incident Controller.

XI. Communications Services.

The Communications Coordinator will ensure the following actions:

# Ensuring the ECC equipment and systems are maintained to a high standard and remain functional throughout the emergency.

# Ensuring a back-up communication system is available in the event of the ECC Room is not available.

# Providing quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency situations.



Communication Flow Chart

Site Command Control Centre Incharge Inform to respective sections/coordinators about the emergency.

Inform Chief incident controller and site incident controller.

Take suitable action to protect the depot in consultation with site incident controller, Section

Operations.

Communicate message (telephone) to person(s) working in area/ depot.

Clearly note down type of emergency and the location.

Inform State Emergency coordinators as per emergency telephone list. Public Relations In charge: A competent and well equipped Public Relations / Information officer well trained in media

relations shall be assigned responsibility of interacting with media, government agencies, local organizations and the general public.

Initial releases shall be restricted to statements of facts such as the name of the +installation involved, type and quantity of spill, time of spill, and countermeasure actions being taken. All facts must be stated clearly and consistently to everyone.

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER

MANAGEMENT TEAM

(Head Operations, Head Maintenance, Head

Technical, Head HSE, Head Security, Head

(HR)

Employee/ Security

Fire safety/HSE Coordinator and

fire team

CRISIS MGMT GROUP

Mutual Aid Members

Info. to Fire Brigade, Police,

Medical and Government Authorities

First Responder

Fire and gas detection system

System

Police

Public

District Administration

and Central Govt. agencies

CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER

Note: Level I Level II

Level III

Others (required coordinators of the

installation)



Plans shall also be developed to utilize local media and television stations for periodic announcements during an emergency. This shall also assist in reducing rumours and speculation.

Siren Codes 1. The Emergency siren/s are be located suitably to cover the whole area with the operational

control within the depot, which includes Hand Siren, Electric Siren & Push Button of MOV etc. These are to be tested periodically to keep them in working condition.

2. Emergency siren codes are as follows, namely: -

(a) Emergency Level-I: A wailing siren for two minutes.

(b) Emergency Level-II and III: Same type of siren as in case of Level – I and II but the same will be sounded for three times at the interval of one minutes i.e.( wailing siren 2 min + gap 1 min + wailing siren 2 min + gap 1min + wailing siren 2 min) total duration of Disaster siren to be eight minutes.

(c) ALL CLEAR: Straight run siren for two minutes.

(d) TEST: Straight run siren for two minutes at frequency at least once a week

(e) Public address system provided with message.

6.8 Emergency Control Center (ECC) The S&D room near the entrance gate will be the emergency control center. The ECC is away from potential hazards and provides maximum safety to personnel and equipment. The buildings outside the licensed area will be the shelter for employees and other personnel. Walkie-Talkies as listed would be provided along with intercom for internal communication inside the Depot. Also, electrical sirens, hand operated siren and manual call points would be provided at various locations inside the Depot. Following supplies and dedicated equipment are made available at the ECC. (a) A copy of the QRA & OSEP is made available.

(b) Maps and diagrams showing buildings, roads, process lines, drainage trenches, and other

utilities are displayed.

(c) Maps showing the site, surrounding area, facilities etc. are displayed,

(d) Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of employees displayed.

(e) Updated lists of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of off-site groups and organizations are made available that might have to be contacted during emergency.

(f) Dedicated and reliable communication equipments.

(g) Emergency lights and back up/ UPS power so that operations can continue in the event of power failure.

(h) Logbooks for recording the sequence of events to assist in investigating causes, evaluating performance, and preparing reports.



(i) ECC would have dedicated computer with LAN / internet facility to access the installation data and also it has the latest and updated soft copies of all standard operating practices (SOP) etc.

(j) Locations of ECC and Assembly Points are marked on the map.

6.9 Assembly Points 1. Emergency Assembly Point in front of S&D room is pre-designated areas in safe zone as per

quantitative risk assessment, where the personnel like workers, staff, contractor workers etc. not involved in emergency operations (as per OSEP) shall assemble in case of an emergency.

2. The Designated assembly point are clearly marked with directional display board along the

route. Routes are well lighted with florescent marking.

3. During an emergency, pre-designated persons would take charge of this point and take the roll call of the people reporting. Provisions are made for assembly points, communication and headcount facilities at assembly points, and personnel to control the movement of assembled employees.

4. The assembly point coordinators shall rush to their designated assembly point in the event of

emergency.

5. The assembly point coordinators will

Keep in touch with Chief Incident Controller for further instruction.

Ensure the assembling of people present in depot at Assembly point.

Request the assembled persons, not to get panic and be ready for evacuation (if required).

Keep in touch with Transport & Logistic Coordinator for arrangement of transport facility for evacuation (if required)

Carryout the head count of the assembled persons at the assembly point and report the same to the CIC.

6.10 Off-site Information and various facilities/ resources 1. Contact details of district authorities are given in following table

Table-6.10 (a) Contact details of district authorities

District Authority/ Officer E-mail

Contact Number

Collector & District Magistrate [email protected]

08554-275806, 240801

Joint Collector & Addl. District Magistrate

[email protected]

IG/DIG/ Addl.DIG of Police, Anantapur range -

08554-240866, 274433

Superintendent of Police, Anantapur range -

08554-240105



2. Demographic information in Nakkanadoddi & 10 km Buffer Zone of Project Site are given in following table.

Table-6.10 (b) Demography in project core zone and 10-km buffer zone

Village Households and Population Area of the Village (ha)

Total Households

Total Population

Total Male Total Females

Nakkanadoddi (Core Zone) 1778 697 3098 1628 1470 Kasapuram 2672 859 3692 1863 1829 Sangala 670 95 386 199 187 Gundala 1375 377 1740 906 834 Ameenpalle 431 160 697 357 340 Konganapalle 2666 807 3886 1971 1915 Sakarabanda 755 150 715 360 355 Patha Kothacheruvu 2483 681 3064 1616 1448 Thimmapuram 1915 425 1840 936 904 Guntakal Rural 3686 462 1872 908 964 Donimukkala 1222 247 1035 527 508 Nelagonda 3034 1186 5403 2719 2684 Dancherla 1924 609 2489 1314 1175

3. Medical facilities in rural areas (project core zone & buffer zone) is given in table-6.10 (c), medical facilities in towns is given in table-6.10 (d), details of hospitals, ambulance services and blood banks are given in tables-(e), (f) & (g) respectively.

Table-6.10 (c) Medical facilities in rural areas: Core zone & 10-km buffer zone Village Medical Facilities in Rural Areas : Core Zone & Buffer Zone

[a for <5 km; b for 5-10 km and c for >10 km; value in bracket indicates number] CHC PHC PHS HA HO D MHC FWC

Nakkanadoddi (Core Zone) b b (1) b b b (1) b Kasapuram a a (1) a a a (1) a Sangala b b a b b b b b Gundala b b a c b b b b Ameenpalle c c b c c c c c Konganapalle c c (1) c c c (1) c Sakarabanda c c a c c c c c Patha Kothacheruvu c c (1) c c c (1) c Thimmapuram b b a b b b b b Guntakal Rural b b (1) b b b (1) b Donimukkala a a a a a a a a Nelagonda b b (1) b b b (1) b Dancherla b b b c c b (1) C CHC : Community Health Centre D : Dispensary PHS : Primary Health Sub-centre MHC : Mobile Health Clinic HA : Hospital Allopathic FWC : Family Welfare Centre HO : Hospital Alternate Medicine



Table-6.10 (d) Medical facilities in towns Town Hospitals

(Allopathic & others) Dispensaries/

Health centres

Family welfare centres

Charitable Hospitals

Medicine Shops

No. No. of beds No. No. of beds No. No. of beds

Anantapur 2 650 1 30 1 30 15 240 Guntakal 2 130 1 0 1 10 0 51 Gooty - - 1 50 - - 1 33 Dharmavaram 1 20 1 50 1 10 3 24 Kadiri 1 100 - - 1 10 3 50 Hindupur 2 110 1 0 1 20 6 110

Table-6.10 (e) Locations of various hospitals & nursing homes Name of Hospital/ Nursing Home Location Telephone No.

Government General Hospital Anantapur 08554– 275043

Sri Sathya Sai Institute of Higher Medical Science Prasanthi Nilayam, Anantapur 08554-287388

Ravi Teia Nursing Home Anantapur 08554-221865

Teia Nursing Home Hindupur 08554-222911

Akhila Praia Vyadyasala Dharamvaram 08554-222747

Table-6.10 (f) Contact information of ambulance services

Ambulance Service Location

Contact Number

Harshita Ambulance Service Dharamvaram Road, Near Government Hospital, Anantapur

9866679507

Bhavani Ambulance 15-180, Raju Road, Anantapur 9393711367

Naresh Ambulance C/O STD Booth, Government General Hospital, Anantapur

9908479051

Pavani Ambulance Anantapur 9959470741

Indian Ambulance Anantapur 9000092700

Javahar Ambulance Service 6-1-911 a, Kovur Nagar, Anantapur 08554-248712 Jeevan Jyothi Hospital Ambulance Service

Kamala Nagar, Anantapur 08554-249987

Table-6.10 (g) Contact information of blood banks

Blood Bank Location

Contact Number

Government General Hospital Blood Bank

Government Hospital Road, Aravindanagar, Anantapur

08554-275043

Indian Red Cross Society Blood Bank Engineering College Road, Maruthi Nagar, Anantapur

08554-246344, 9393711178

Y.S.R.Red Drop - 9490180001 Alambana 15/50; Kamala Nagar, Anantapur;

9247421198

Rural Development Trust Bangalore Highway, Anantapur

08554-244208, 275503



4. Emergency number information of district Anantapur is given in following table.

Table-6.10 (h) Anantapur Emergency Numbers Information Services Contact Number Anantapur Help Line 09550105453 Ambulance 108 Electricity Complaints 1912 Fire 101 Health Information 104 Police 100 Traffic Help 1073 D.I.G 9440627223, 240866 S.P 9440796800, 240105 A.S.P.(A) 9440796801, 240333 A.S.P.(O) 9440796802, 274006 S.D.P.O 9440796803, 240303 Anantapur-1; Town police station (C.I ) 9440796804, 274033 Anantapur-1; Town police station(S.I) 9440796805, 274033 Anantapur-2; Town police station (C.I) 9440796806, 274333 Anantapur-2; Town police station (S.I ) 9440796815, 274333 R.D.T. Ambulance 275626 A.T.D.Ambulance 9849179539 Appolo Ambulance 274832 Anantapur Fire Station 220229 R.T.C Depot Manager 9848540651 R.T.C Enquiry 9959225866 R.T.C Reservation Counter 08554-243399 Railway Station 244444 Railway Enquiry 231053 6.11 Evacuation of Depot Planning and training on evacuation techniques are important in preventing injuries. Evacuation of local communities or people near the site may be prudent depending on the situation and down-wind dispersion information etc. Although this action will normally be initiated and handled by district authorities, the IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi will extend all necessary help to implement such evacuation.

The Chief Incident controller will intimate regarding evacuation. Evacuation of the

personnel shall be carried out in a planned manner along the escape route to assembly points. Personnel will be evacuated at right angle to wind or opposite the wind direction.

All Team Coordinators /Security will provide the exact head count details of depot Employees during the emergency. Accounting for site personnel, visitors and contractors, particularly those known to have been in the affected area will be done.

Details of contract labor may vary depending upon day and time, but the exact numbers

(inside the depot) will be available at main gate (Security Supervisor keeps record of contract person/ visitor etc. who have entered inside the depot. Total number of persons available within the depot will be estimated by means of above information.



Rescue operation will be carried out by the Rescue/Incident Control Team immediately attending to the emergency. The above operations will be led by the Incident Controller at site. The list of casualties etc. shall be reported to the Communication Coordinators who in turn will be reporting the same to the Chief Incident Controller at site. Casualties will be shifted to hospital, if required, by communication coordinators in consultation with Chief Incident Controller.

Evacuation of those personnel who are not required to be present will be carried out in consultation with the Site Incident Controller. When required, all personnel shall proceed to Assembly Point through designated routes.

All Section heads/ Team Coordinators will ensure that the employees nominated by them from their respective Sections must report at emergency site to extend their support to Team Coordinators.

Evacuation Plan When the emergency message received, all personnel will ensure that nearby personnel are aware of the emergency, quickly shutdown operating equipment by pressing ESD buttons (e.g., Valves, Pumps, flow meters etc), close doors and exit the building using stairwells.

During emergency at IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi:

TTs will be evacuated by TLF In-charge with the help of security personnel through emergency route.

All the workers/personnel whose role is not defined, are to be evacuated through emergency route to assembly point (in front of safety store room) with the help of security personnel.

Location of the Assembly Point is being intimated to the visitors by security supervisor and also covered at the time of safety talk to the workers.

The practice for evacuation would be done at the time of mock fire drill. Emergency Evacuation Plan is given in Annexure-7

The instructions for evacuation would be displayed with following information:

All personnel must know where primary and alternate exits are located, and be familiar with the various evacuation routes available.

Be aware of all marked exits and evacuation routes from your area of the building. Know the evacuation routes from your work area.

When officially told to evacuate, leave by the nearest exit and alert others to do the same.

Assist the disabled in exiting the building, if requested.

Once outside, move to the assembly point designated for your building. Stay there until an accurate head count has been taken.

Keep streets and walkways next to exits clear for emergency vehicles and personnel. Keep the street side of buildings clear so that emergency equipment can reach buildings.

Do not return to an evacuated depot/ building until & unless directed to do so by the Safety & Fire Department personnel.



6.12 Evacuation & Rehabilitation (Surrounding Areas) In the event of major accident, the general public in surrounding areas will have very little time to react and save themselves. The local population will have to be warned in a very short period. Time available to population for a safe escape and threatened by the accident will depend on the nature of accident. The effects of a fire on population may be injuries due to thermal radiation. An explosion will give little time to warn population and area affected may be much larger than that in case of a fire. Effects of an explosion on the population may be injuries caused by shock wave, flying debris collapsing structures as well as exposure to thermal radiation. Periodic Assessment Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, Anantapur will carry out periodic assessment of the action taken by the depot personnel during emergency through Emergency Response Drill. Actions by General Population

On being warned of a major accident general public should take the following actions: Immediately go outdoors. Extinguish all flames. Keep torches handy. Store water for emergency use. Do not engage emergency phone lines by calling emergency services. Wait for further instructions from emergency services before moving out.

In the event of major disaster, it may become necessary to evacuate people from and around the area likely to be affected by the accident. Sometimes, the evacuation may have to be made to safe places within the complex area itself. At other times, however, especially in cases of catastrophic disaster, it will be necessary to shift the entire population outside the complex area to certain pre-designated places fixed in advance. 6.13 Information to General Public:

(1) The general public, likely to be affected shall be informed about safety measures to be taken in the event of an emergency.

During On-site emergency Fire Mock Drill, the information will also be given to nearby public for their participation to have holistic experience of the emergency & precautionary measures to be adopted during emergencies.

Awareness camps will also be organised regularly for sensitizing the people about the emergency nature.

(2) Display boards carrying Do’s and Don’ts would be located outside the gate. Do’s &

Don’ts during emergency situation for the public as well for the staff/ visitors would be prepared & displayed appropriately.

(3) Safety leaflets with the information on Hazards of Petroleum products & action in case of emergency will be distributed among population.



Public Awareness System Programs will be conducted in villages through Corporate Social Responsibility and various developments schemes. To avoid any panic, the necessary announcement would be made in nearby villages, in the event of emergency. The use of Electronic & Print Media

In order to bring awareness among the external public at large, the use of electronic media like TV, Air & Press coverage will be used. The Welfare & Media co-coordinator of the depot would prepare the Press release to the issued for the local press & other important dailies 6.14 Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders including External

Agencies 1. The stakeholders include external agencies such as District Authority, police, fire service,

revenue department, health department, pollution control board, National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and State Disaster Response Force (SDRF).

2. The roles and responsibilities of stakeholders are given below. These roles and

responsibilities are in line with National Disaster Management Guidelines on Chemical Disasters, April, 2007, brought out by National Disaster Management Authority.

The Responsibilities of Various Stakeholders (a) IOCL Nakkanadoddi Depot will provide necessary information to Mutual Aid

Association, District Authority, Police and Fire Services.

List of Hazardous Chemical and Systems which have potential to cause danger to Human, Environment and Property.

On-Site Emergency Plan and Periodic Mock Drill.

Above information would help authorities in mitigation, rescue and rehabilitation, with resources identified and agreed with the authorities in advance. (b) The district authority is responsible for the Off-Site emergency plan and it shall be

equipped with up-to-date Major Accident Hazard units, website, control room etc., with provisions for monitoring the level of preparedness at all times. Regular meetings of various stakeholders of Chemical Disaster Management will be conducted by district administration/District Disaster Management Authority to review the preparedness of Chemical Disaster Management and IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi would be participating actively in all disaster management review meetings.

(c) The police will be an important component of all disaster management plans as they will be

associated with investigation of incident s/disasters. Police take overall charge of the Off-Site situation until the arrival of the district collector or its representative at the scene.



(d) The fire services are one of the first responders and shall be adequately trained and equipped to handle chemical emergencies. Fire services are to acquire a thorough knowledge of likely hazards at the incident site and the emergency control measures required to contain it.

(e) In a chemical emergency, the revenue department shall coordinate with other agencies for evacuation, establishment of shelters and provision of food, etc.

(f) When required for evacuation purposes in a chemical emergency, the department of transport should made transport promptly available.

(g) The health department needs to assure that all victims get immediate medical attention on the site as well as at the hospitals/health-care facility where they are shifted. In addition, the department needs to network all the health-care facilities available in the vicinity for effective management and also take effective measures to prevent the occurrence of any epidemic.

(h) Pollution control boards need to ascertain the developing severity of the emergency in accordance with responsive measures by constant monitoring of the environment. If and when an area is fit for entry will depend upon the results of the monitoring. A decontamination operation would be required to be carried out with the help of other agencies and industries.

(a) The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and the State Disaster Response Force

(SDRF) are the specialized forces to manage these disasters in a longer run according to the severity and nature of the disaster. Their specialized training is an effective measure that needs to be built up and maintained with time for achieving a higher standard of preparedness. They need to coordinate with other local agencies such as the Central Industrial Security Force that may be responsible for security at the industrial site.

Roles of Various Outside Agencies in Off-site Emergency Assistance may be required from outside agencies during the course of an emergency & SICs will be responsible for establishing liaison with these agencies for effective assistance.

(a) District Magistrate, Police & Fire Brigade:

In case of Petroleum Product Spillage, to ensure security at site to cordon off the areas and post guards for preventing the villagers going near the site of the spillage.

In case of fire, mobilization of Foam Tenders and Crew from local Fire Stations. Deployment & Home Guards , if necessary Traffic Control and Diversion Wireless Communication facilities. Evacuation of Civilian Population, if necessary Maintenance of communication with the public (b) Irrigation Authorities:

To make available earth-moving equipments like bulldozers, drag line etc. for making approach road and constructing bunds in the canal / river for containing the spread of products for reclaiming the same.



(c) PWD Authorities:

For construction of any temporary diversion. For repair of any damage to Roads or Bridges. Assistance for mobilizing equipment labour contractors (s) for de-watering the canal,

exposing the line and digging Bore-wells etc. for carrying out of the repairs. (d) Assistance required from Mutual Aid Partners: Mutual Aid Members will render the help at the time of emergency. They will mobilize the

man power and available resources Equipments, Manpower, etc. to mitigate the loss due to disaster or accident. They will

provide support In order to combat the disaster situation in an efficient way and will provide.

- Fire Tender and Crew - Firefighting material, First Aider, their hospital facilities etc.. - Technical expertise, communication facilities, vehicles as required

6.15 Reporting of the Incident:

1. All incidents covered under Level-I should be maintained by the depot for inspection

whenever called for inspection and Level-II and Level-III shall be reported to the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) in the following format specified including near miss incident. The above report should be submitted within 48 hours after occurrence of the incidents or any other reason triggering major incident.

2. Investigation report of all major incidents shall be submitted to the PNGRB. An incident

shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs; (a) fire for more than 15 minutes

(b) explosion / blowout

(c) fatal incident.

(d) loss above Rs. 10.0 Lac

(e) cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.

(f) plant shutdown / outage due to the incident

(g) Level-III incident

Any incidents in the depot will be reported to the concerned authority based on the guidelines of the regulation & the format (given in Annexure-1).

6.16 Action after Reporting of Incident by the Depot After reporting of the incidents to PNGRB, Nodal Officer of the Board (head of Technical Standards the specifications and safety group) shall have responsibility of informing all the Members of the Board and shall coordinate with appropriate level in National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) till normalization of the situation



6.17 Termination of Emergency 1. Termination activities should concentrate on giving accurate information to people who need

it most especially employees, neighborhood, District Authorities engaged in offsite emergencies, and should begin as soon as the emergency phase of the operation is completed.

2. The termination of emergency shall be declared through siren as per the Siren Code defined

by industry in case of Level- I and II. For Level-III termination of emergency shall be declared by District Authority through appropriate mode of information transfer so as to reach each and every one.

6.18 Emergency Recovery Procedures 1. After the emergency, the following activities need to be carried out in detail by the

concerned coordinator. (a) Information to statutory authorities. (b) Incident investigation. (c) Damage assessment. (d) Salvage of products, de-contamination, clean-up and restoration. (e) A detailed report shall be prepared based on the entire experience of the incident,

including restorations, limitations and lessons learnt. (f) Ambient air monitoring at the site as well as 5 km radius of the depot by State Pollution

Control Board to determine the contamination level affecting health. Termination of Emergency

Business restoration planning is as important as having an emergency response plan. All the management personnel need to be involved in bringing the operation to normalcy after an emergency situation has occurred. This involves an emergency response planning and follows up. The Location Incharge will be completely responsible for restoration of site. Job Identified; Executives Responsible for Execution: Retrieval of Data for Insurance Claim Enabling Objective Investigation Information to Insurance Co. : Finance Section of the Depot with management’s

approval Agencies and Lodging Claims

Information to District/State : Insurance Company Authorities on Casualties/ Permanent Disabilities Individual station Start-up Plan : Insurance Company in consultation and approval of the IOCL management. Format for Emergency Recovery Measures is given in Annexure-1



6.19 DMP for Road Transportation

The road transport of Petroleum product needs special attention. Resource mobilization for road transport emergency as per PNGRB regulations shall be provided, the format for which is given in Annexure-1. 6.20 Training and Education

Regular training shall be provided to all personnel who have a role in planning and operational response to an emergency. The main goal of training for emergencies would be to enable the participants to understand their respective roles in the response organization, the tasks associated with each position and the procedures for maintaining effective communication with other response functions and individuals. 6.21 Drill and Excercises

Emergency drills and exercises constitute another important component of emergency preparedness. It refers to the enactment, under the assumption of a mock scenario, of the implementation of response actions to be taken during an emergency The frequency of the drills should vary depending on the severity of the hazard and shall be conducted as per the schedule. Scenarios may be developed in such a manner as to accomplish more than one event objective. Drills and exercises will be conducted as realistically as possible Evaluation of drills and exercise will be carried out and include comments from the participants and observers. Discrepancies noted by the drill observers during the drill will be pointed out during the drill. A written evaluation of the drill or exercise shall be prepared by the individual responsible for conducting the drill or exercise. The evaluation would facilitate to devise appropriate actions for Areas that needs immediate corrective actions Areas where additional training is needed Correcting deficiencies in equipment, training, and facilities. Records of drill, exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions would be duly maintained. 6.22 Wind Direction Indicator

A centrally located wind direction indicator shall be needed for on the spot measurement of

wind direction, which shall be helpful for in the selection of the evacuation site, assembling site etc. in case of any minor/major leakage/fire. All the evacuated personnel to be shifted to upward wind direction.

6.23 Protective Actions Protective actions are aimed at protecting the life and health of pumping station personnel and the public during an emergency. These typically include: Search and rescues operations Maintaining an account of personnel Depot evacuation Sheltering Control of access to affected areas

There are two distinctly different areas for the protection of personnel: the “ on-site” and “off-site” areas. Planning differs for these two areas, due to the nature of the population affected.



6.24 Preventive Measures Following preventive measures are suggested to ensure the safety of the proposed operation:

(a) Maintenance and Monitoring

IOCL shall establish the process maintenance and monitoring schedule for proper function of safety related systems. Following tasks can be included in the above schedule:

Checking of safety related operating conditions both in the control room and on site.

Checking of safety related parts of the plant or site by visual inspection.

Monitoring of safety related utilities such as electricity, coolant and work zone hazard control measures, etc.

Preparation of a maintenance plan and documentation of maintenance work specifying the different maintenance intervals and the type of work to be performed.

(b) Inspection and Repairs

It is necessary to establish a plan for onsite inspections to ensure that schedule and the operating conditions are stringently adhered to. 6.25 Emergency Preparedness Plan Review The EPP and associated implementing procedures shall be reviewed to ensure compliance with relevant regulations and applicable state and local emergency plans. The review should comprise the plan, response procedures, equipment, training, drills and interfaces with local emergency management agencies. The need for changes will be based on the following aspects. Written evaluation of drill and exercises which identify deficiencies Incorporation of more desirable methods, procedures, or organizations Changes in key personnel involved in the organization Changes in the organization structure of the facility Changes in the state regulations Modifications to the pumping station, which could affect emergency planning Recommendations received from other organizations and state agencies.

Emergencies occur very rarely, as such it is not a day to day activity nor a planned activity at a fixed time schedule. The activities during the emergencies are to be coordinated and this could be achieved by an organizational approach, which has quick response and capabilities. The organization shall be capable of providing quick response at any time round-the-clock to meet the disasters. The emergency response coordination is critical to the protection of properties and lives of the workers and the community.

Annexures Annexure-1 Various Formats Annexure-2 Material Safety Data Sheets of MS, HSD, SKO & Ethanol Annexure-3 Layout Plan of IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi Annexure-4 Single Line Diagram of IOCL Depot at Nakkanadoddi

Annexure-5 Equipment Layout of Calibration Tower Annexure-6 Equipment Layout : Product Pump House Annexure-7 Emergency Evacuation Plan Annexure-8 Proposed Project Location on Topo Plan

Project Title : QRA and Onsite DMP of Proposed Greenfield Petroleum Storage Depot at Nakkanadoddi Project Proponent : Indian Oil Corporation Limited, HO, Mumbai Project No. : ENV-675 TC No. : 000377159 & 000377160 dated 21.03.2017 A-1


Annexure-1 (Various Formats) Format-I Incident Reporting Format

1. Organisation 2. Sector 3. Location 4. Incident Sr. No. 5. Date of Incident 6. Time of Incident 7. Major / Minor / Near miss 8. Report -

Preliminary / Final 9. Fire / Incident 10. Duration of fire -

Hrs / Min 11. Type of Incident with loss of life / injury, Fire, Explosion, Blowout, Electrocution, Fall from Height, Inhalation of Gas, Driving, Slip / Trip, Others, NA

12. Location of Incident ( Name of Plant / Unit / Area / Facility / Tank farm / Gantry / Road / Parking area etc )

13. Whether plant shutdown / caused outage of the facility? Yes / No 14. Fatalities nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others = 15. Injuries nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others = 16. Man - hours Lost a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others = 17. Direct Loss due to the incident (Rs. In Lacs). Loss to equipment / Machinery as per Insurance claim etc.

18. Indirect Losses : Through put / Production Loss, etc. 19. Status of the Facility: Construction / Commissioning / Operation / Shutting down / Turn around, Maintenance / Startup / Any other.

20. Brief Description of the Incident including post incident measures. ( Attach details in separate sheet )

21. Whether similar Incident has occurred in past at the same location, If yes, give brief description of the incident and attach details in separate sheet.

22. Whether Internal Investigation has been completed. If no, likely date by which it will be completed.

23. Whether internal investigation report (Major Incident) has been submitted to PNGRB. If no, likely date by which it will be submitted.

24. Cause of the Incident ( Tick the most relevant cause preferably one, maximum two ) A) Deviation from Procedure I) Not using the PPE B) Lack of Job Knowledge J) Equipment failure C) Lack of supervision K) Poor design / Layout etc. D) Improper Inspection L) Inadequate facility E) Improper Maintenance. ( Mech. / Elec. / Inst) M) Poor House Keeping F) Improper material handling N) Natural Calamity



G) Negligent Driving O) Pilferage / Sabotage H) Careless walking / climbing etc. P) Any other (give details) 25. Cause of leakage - Oil, Gas or Chemical ( Tick one only ) A) Weld leak from equipment / lines E) Leakage due to improper

operation B) Leak from flange, gland etc. F) Leak due to improper

maintenance C) Leak from rotary equipment G) Normal operation - Venting

/ draining D) Metallurgical failure H) Any other 26. Cause of Ignition leading to fire ( Tick only one cause ) A) Near to hot work F) Static Electricity B) Near to Furnace / Flare etc. G) Hammering / Fall of object C) Auto - ignition H) Heat due to Friction D) Loose electrical connection I) Lightning E) Near to hot surface J) Any other ( pyrophoric etc ) 27. Was the incident Avoidable? ( Yes / No ) 28. The incident could have been avoided by the use of / or by ; ( Tick the most relevant point preferably one, maximum two ) A) Better supervision F) Personal Protective

Equipment B) Adhering to specified operating procedure G) Better equipment C) Imparting Training H) Management Control D) Giving adequate time to do the activity through proper planning. I) Adhering to specified

maintenance procedure E) Adhering to the work permit system J) Adhering to specified

Inspection / Testing procedures.

K) Any other information; Guidelines for filling the Incident Report: 1. All Major, Minor and Near miss incidents shall be reported in the quarterly report. 2. Incident Reporting form shall be filled up for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents. 3. Summary report shall be enclosed with every quarterly report. 4. Investigations shall be carried out for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents. 5. Investigation report of all Major incidents shall be submitted to PNGRB. An incident shall be treated as Major if

any of the following occurs; - Fire for more than 15 minutes - Explosion / Blowout - Fatal Incident. - Loss above Rs. 5.0 Lac. - Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs. - Plant Shutdown / Outage due to the incident

6. Loss time Incident shall be monitored till the affected person joins duty. In case the affected person is yet to join

the duty, then the status of report submitted will be preliminary. Final report against the same incident shall be sent once he joins duty and the man - hours lost are known.

7. All columns must be filled up. 8. For any additional information use separate sheets as required. 9. Quarterly report shall be sent to PNGRB within 15 to 30 days of end of quarter. 10. Immediate reporting of incident through fax/telephone shall continue as per the prevailing system.

Signature Name

Designation of the Occupier/Manager



II. Format for Emergency Recovery Measures

Sl. Check-point Yes No Remarks Post Emergency Recovery

Salvage of product

1. Check that spilled / accumulated product contents are transferred to the OWS or collected in drums.

2. Check whether the quality and quantity estimation of the product extracted from OWS has been done for further disposal in line with standing QC guidelines by either transferring to service tanks or to nearest refinery for blending / reprocessing or not.

3. Check that correct stock accounting of spilled product as loss has been completed in accounting system.

4. Check that affected area has been completely cleaned and dried after evacuation of spilled product.

5. Declare that affected area after salvage operations is fully clean and safe for movement of the working personnel.

6. Check that all drains are not having any residual oil and are thoroughly cleaned and dried.

7. Check that all control valves on product lines and OWS lines outside dyke area and drains are completely closed after removal of the spilled product.

8. Check that interlocking system of tanks/gantry has been re-activated for normal operations.

9. Check whether the soil testing of the affected area, if required, has been done to assess the soil contamination level to meet the Environmental – SPCB norms / requirements.

Taking care of affected manpower

10. Whether physical accounting of all personnel on duty during and after the incident are ascertained by the Site Incident Controller and reconciled immediately

11. Whether the first-aid treatment and post-incident health check of the affected personnel has been undertaken in time

12. Whether these personnel are declared fully physically fit before allowing them to resume their normal duties

13. Whether the records for such first aid and treatment of the affected personnel are maintained in a well defined format

Addressing media and outside bodies

17. Whether the incident was appropriately informed to the local media in line with the respective company’s Press and Media Policy

18. Whether the role of neighbouring population during the drill / disaster is suitably informed to the population during subsequent meetings with local administration / panchayat etc. for necessary improvements

19. Whether the awareness and preparedness on disaster is regularly assimilated / shared with nearby public / societies and stake holders.

Reporting

20. Check whether that disaster incident report was communicated to respective controlling office / HQ promptly in a standard format.

21. Whether the incident reports are also sent to concern State Level Industry Coordinator on time.

22. Check that detailed report on disaster in proper format was communicated to PNGRB/ Factory inspector / Labour inspector / SPCB / District Magistrate /PESO.

Investigation

23. Whether investigation teams are constituted as per respective company policies



24. Whether RCA (Root Cause Analysis) of the disaster is conducted by the investigating team

25. Whether detailed investigation into effective functioning of interlocks, detection devices, automation controls and applicable norms are carried out to find out possible improvements in design / construction / operations / maintenance and training aspects etc.

26. Whether a system of initiating appropriate corrective measures including suitable revisions to the Disaster Management Plan are adopted based on findings of the investigation

Damage Assessment – Monetary and Physical

27. Check the valuation / cost of product loss / down gradation on account of contamination, if any / Property / Structures / damaged assets – equipments.

28. Whether repairs and maintenance cost of property, assets and equipment are assessed.

29. Whether any penalty by statutory authorities like SPCB / Factory Inspector and Labour Commissioner are assessed.

30. Whether possible impact on environment are also assessed and appropriate measures are taken

31. Whether damage assessment also include potential erosion of reputation – from company, industry and national perspectives

Clean up and Restoration

32. Whether the affected area has been fully cleaned and cleared after due clearance from investigation team

33. Check whether heat detectors, high level alarms, in built safety systems (NRV, TSV etc.) are fully functional after the disaster incident.

34. Check whether all firefighting equipments like – hoses / nozzles / Fire Extinguishers etc. have been put back at designated places and are fully ready for reuse

35. Whether clear procedures are in place to allow resumption of normal operations

III. Format for Road Transportation of Petroleum Products including format

for Transport Emergency Card (TREM) Sl. Item Qty Mechanical Equipment 1. Gaskets (Carbon Asbestos Filled) 2. Studs and bolts. 3. Teflon tapes. 4. ½” / ¾” crowbar (1 m long) 5. Spade / blind flange 6. Rope (Manila / Jute) 7. Spark arrestors. 8. 1” tapered wooden pegs. 9. Chopper 10. Spare fan belt for tank lorry with P.T.O. unit 11. Wind sock 12. M-Seal / epoxy-base cold-welding compound. 13. Wooden slippers 14. Teflon-taped spanners, wrenches 15. Spark-proof wrenches hammer and tools. 16. Barricading masts and ropes / tapes 17. Hoses



18. Chain pulley blocks and stay pipes 19. Small valve keys for operating valves in the tank truck Electrical Equipment 1. Gas Explosi-meter 2. Flame-proof torches 3. Earthing wires (10 m long) with crocodile clips Other Safety Items: 1. 1 roll of gunny / hessian cloth (about 10 mts. long) 2. First aid box (containing water gel compounds) 3. Soap 4. Blanket 5. Water Gel Blanket 6. Breathing Apparatus (With spare filled cylinder and Canister

gas masks)

7. Fire proximity suit Fire Fighting Equipment: 1. Portable Dry Chemical Powder Fire Extinguishers 2. Fire-water Hoses 3. Triple Purpose diffuser nozzle for use with fire hoses. Communication Equipment: 1. Hand operated sirens 2. Whistles 3. Megaphone, Mobile Phones, VHF sets. Traffic Control Equipment: 1. Red lights (Battery operated) - for traffic diversion 2. Area maps 3. Diversion Boards (a) In order to handle Emergencies, which may arise due to incident involving Petroleum

Product Transportation, it is required that a comprehensive Emergency Management Plan is readily available with the industry as well as with other related authorities all along the routes. The DMP/OSEP should be clearly understood by its users so that the emergencies can be handled in a systematic manner with minimum response time in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

(b) Copies of the QRA/DMP/OSEP shall be made available by the Industry to all the field locations i.e. Installations, POL Depot / Installations, Refineries, Gas Processing Plants, Dispatch units of etc., the concerned District Administration, Police Stations and Fire Brigades en-route and within vicinity of specified tank truck routes, oil industry sales personnel of concerned area as may be required.

TREM Card (Specific to Road Transportation) TREM Card format including sample as per details shown in and Route Map shall is provided to the Tank Truck Crew which shall be referred in case of an emergency



Transport Emergency Card Format Nature of Hazard: Protective Devices: Emergency Action Spillage Fire First Aid Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) No (For universal acceptance of material, both numbers should be mentioned on TREM Card) Emergency Telephone Numbers/mobile numbers Name and contact numbers of the control room/contact person of the supplying company Name and contact numbers of the control room/contact person of the receiving company Name and contact numbers of Transporter Other important Name and contact numbers of civic authorities, fire and police Note: The format is designed & provided in English, Hindi and local language where crews are operating

The following is the sample transport emergency card formatted & circulated to the transporter by the company.

SAMPLE TRANSPORT EMERGENCY CARD FORMAT:

Cargo: Petroleum Products

Nature of Hazard : Highly volatile and Inflammable. Can cause Cold Burns Inhaling vapour can cause nausea, breathlessness &headache. Air / vapour mixture highly explosive. Leakage can cause Vapour Cloud explosion and BLEVE. Protective Devices : Hand gloves (Rubber / low temperature) Safety Goggles Self-contained Respiratory device to work in vapour-rich area Low temperature / fire proximity suit Emergency Action :

Try to move the vehicle to open area. (In case of the fuel is leaking from a stationary tanker whose engine is shut, don’t try to start the engine). Stop Engine. Vehicle should not be left unguarded. Contact Police, Fire Brigade, Sarpanch, nearest Oil Company by sending helper /passerby Keep public and traffic away by displaying ‘Danger Boards’ at sufficient distance. “No Smoking” and “No Naked Lights” within the cordoned off area. Keep ready for action Fire Extinguishers and Safety Kit. Stay Upwind. Don’t park the vehicle blocking the route. Spillage : Check the valves and caps for tightness by hand and stop leak if possible Fire : If minor, try to extinguish by suitable fire extinguishers First Aid : Pour water in case of cold or hot burn Seek medical help, if necessary Emergency Telephone Numbers/mobile numbers IOC _______________ HPC_______________________ BPC _____________________ IBP________________________ FIRE 101 _______________ POLICE 100_________________



Annexure-2 Material Safety Data Sheets

I. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) : Motor Spirit

(i) Identity of Material Product Name Petrol, Motor Spirit Trade Name Gasoline Formula Complex Mixture of Hydrocarbons UN No. 1203 CAS No. 86290-81-5 Hazchem Code 3Y*E Label/Class Red & White Flammable Liquid/3.2 Group II

(ii) Physical and Chemical Properties Physical State at 15°C and atmospheric pressure Liquid Appearance Colourless Solubility in Water Insoluble Calorific Value (Kcal/Kg) 4.5E + 07 Vapor Pressure at 20°C, mm Hg 300 to 600 Evaporation Rate at 30oC 10 Approx. Boiling Point/Range (oC) 32-215 Melting/Freezing Point/Range (°C) 90 to -75 Vapor Density (Air = 1) 3 to 4 Specific Gravity, 20°C (kg/m3) 720 - 775 Heat of Vaporization, Kcal/Kg 2.93E + 05 Specific Heat Liquid J/Kg 2.2E + 03

(iii) Fire and Explosive Data Explosivity Moderate Flammability Dangerous Auto Ignition Temp °C 257 Explosive Limits % 1.4-7.4 Flash Point °C -43 Burning Rate 4 mm/min Extinguishing Media Foam, CO2, DCP. Water may be ineffective and cause fire to spread.

May be used to cool fire exposed containers. Special Procedures If leak or spill has not ignited use water spray to disperse vapors and to

protect men attempting to stop leak. Water spray may be used to flush spills away from exposures.

Unusual Media Flash back may occur along vapor trail.

(iv) Reactive Hazards

Stability Stable Incompatibility Oxidising Agents Conditions to Avoid Keep away from Heat & Open Flame Hazardous Combustion/ Decomposition Products Toxic Gases /Vapors



(v) Health Hazard Data

Entry Route Inhalation/ Skin Absorption TLV-TWA, ppm 300 TLV-STEL ppm 500 Odor Threshold, ppm 0.25 Toxicity by Ingestion, LD50, g/kg 0.5 to 5

(vi) Sign/Symptoms of Exposure Inhalation In very high concentration causes loss of consciousness, coma and sudden death. In less

severe cases headache, nausea, mental confusion and depression occurs. Moderately toxic by inhalation.

Ingestion Irritation of gastrointestinal tract with vomiting, colic and diarrhea. Fatal dose for adult is 350 gms and for children 10-15 gm.

Contact Skin-irritation, prolonged contact can result in drying of skin, dermatitis and eye irritation.

(vii) Emergency Treatment (Immediate Action Required)

Inhalation Remove victim to fresh air, give artificial respiration (not mouth to mouth), if breathing has stopped, oxygen if breathing is labored. Rescuers should take suitable precautions to prevent being overcome by high vapor concentration.

Ingestion Give conscious victim water to drink, do not induce vomiting. Liquid paraffin, olive oil or some vegetable oil is to be given orally to retard absorption of gasoline.

Contact Remove contaminated clothing and wash affected part.

(viii) Hazard Specification

NFPA Rating Health (Nh) 1 Flammability (Nf) 3 Instability (Ni) 0 Material Factor 16

(ix) Safe Usage Data Ventilation Adequate Ventilation Protective Equipment

Eyes Goggles / Face Shields Respiratory Self contained breathing apparatus for containment/clean-up

operations Gloves & Clothing Rubber

(x) Precautions

Handling & Storage

Gasoline should be stored in well ventilated, properly labeled and approved containers. Sniffing, siphoning and use as a solvent and cleaning agent should be avoided. Do not transfer to



unlabeled, unsuitable or incorrectly labeled containers. All containers should be kept out of reach of children and kept fully closed when not in use. Cleaning and inspection/maintenance of storage tanks should be done according to proper procedures and precautions (work permit system, gas freeing of tanks, using lifelines and wearing air supplied breathing apparatus). Additional precautions are required where tanks may contain leaded gasoline. Emergency Response Data (Release / Spill) Avoid spillages. Should they occur, sand or earth are useful means of containment and absorption. Because the vapors can travel along the ground for considerable distances, naked flames n surrounding areas should be extinguished. Any action which might cause ignition of gasoline/vapors should be avoided. Anybody in the nearby low-laying confined space should be evacuated immediately until the area has been thoroughly ventilated and checked as safe to re-enter. The sand/earth should be removed to safe area.

(xi) Motor Spirit/ Gasoline (Quality Requirements as per IS 2796-2000)

S. No. Characteristics BS III 1. Grade MS 91 2. Colour, Visual Orange 3. Density at 15°C kg/m3 720-775 4. Distillation

a) Recovery upto 70°C (E-70) percent by volume 10-45 b) Recovery upto 100°C (E-70) percent by volume 40-70 c) Recovery upto 150°C (E-70) percent by volume 75 d) Recovery upto 1800°C (E-70) percent by volume - e) Final Boiling point, °C max 210

5. Research Octane Number (RON), min 91 6. Motor Octane Number (MON), min 81 7. Anti-Knock Index (AKI), min - 8. Existent Gum, g/m3, max 40 9. Potential Gum, g/m3, max -

10. Sulphur Tota, Percent by mass, max 0.015 11. Lead Content(as Pb), g/l, max 0.005 12. Reid Vapour Pressure (RVP) at 38°C kPa 60 (67) Max 13. Vapour Lock Index (VLI)

(VLI = 10RVP + 7E70)3, max a) Summer b) Other month

750 (900) 950 (1050)

14. Benzene content, Percent by volume max 1 15. Copper strip corrosion (for 3hr @ 50°C), max Class 1 16. Water tolerance of gasoline-alcohol blends, Temperature for phase

separation °C, Max a) Summer b) Winter

10 0

17. Engine intake system cleanliness Report MFA used 18. Olefin content, percent by volume, max 21 19. Oxidation stability, minutes, min 360 20. Aromatic content, percent by volume, max 42 21. Oxygen content, percent by mass, max 2.7 22. Oxygenates, percent by volume, max Ethanol 5



II. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) : High Speed Diesel (HSD)

(i) Identity of Material Product Name Diesel Oil,Gas Oil Trade Name HSD Formula Complex Mixture of Hydrocarbons UN No. 1202 Hazchem Code 3Y* Label/Class Red Flammable Liquid

(ii) Physical and Chemical Properties Physical State at 15°C at atmospheric pressure Liquid Appearance Liquid Brown Solubility in Water Insoluble (30 ppm) Calorific Value (Kcal/Kg) 4.34E+07 Vapor Pressure at 20°C, mm Hg <1 Kinematic Viscosity, cSt at 40°C 2.0 to 5.0 Boiling Point/Range (oC) 150-400 Vapor Density (Air = 1) >3 Specific Gravity, 15°C, kg/m3 820 to 845 Heat of Vaporization, Kcal/Kg 2.71E+05 Specific Heat Liquid J/Kg 2.343E+03

(iii) Fire and Explosive Data Explosivity Moderate Flammability Moderate Auto Ignition Temp °C 256.6 Explosive Limits % 1.3 to 6.0 Flash Point °C 35-54 Burning Rate 4 mm/min Extinguishing Media Foam, CO2, DCP. Water may be ineffective and cause fire to

spread. May be used to cool fire exposed containers.

Unusual Media Flash back may occur along vapor trail.

(iv) Reactive Hazards




(v) Health Hazard Data

Entry Route Inhalation/ Skin Absorption TLV-TWA, mg/m3 5 (Inhalation) TLV-STEL, mg/m3 10 Odor Threshold, ppm 0.1 LD50, Rabbit, g /kg. 0.2 (oral) LD50, Rat, g/kg 28 (oral)

(vi) Sign/ Symptoms of Exposure Inhalation Dizziness, headache. Aspiration – rapidly developing, potential fatal chemical pneumonitis

Ingestion Nausea, vomiting

Contact Skin-irritation, eyes–irritation. Dermatitis may result on prolonged contact

(vii) Emergency Treatment (Immediate Action Required) Inhalation Remove victim to fresh air, give artificial respiration of necessary. If unconscious but

breathing place in the unconscious (recovery) position. Give external cardiac massage if necessary.

Ingestion Do not induce vomiting.

Contact Remove contaminated clothing and wash affected part (skin/eyes) with plenty of water.

(viii) Hazard Specification

NFPA Rating Health 0 Flammability 2 Stability 0 Material Factor 10

(ix) Safe Usage Data Ventilation Adequate Ventilation

Protective Equipment

Eyes Goggles / Face Shields

Respiratory Self contained breathing apparatus for containment/clean-up operations

Gloves & Clothing Rubber

(x) Precautions

Handling & Storage

Diesel should be stored in well-ventilated, properly labeled and approved containers. Sniffing, siphoning and use as a solvent and cleaning agent should be avoided. Do not transfer to unlabeled, unsuitable or incorrectly labeled containers. All containers should be kept out of reach of children and kept fully closed when not in use. Cleaning and inspection/maintenance of



storage tanks should be done according to proper procedures and precautions (work permit system, gas freeing of tanks, using lifeline and wearing air supplied breathing apparatus.)

(xi) HSD (Quality Requirement as per IS 1460-2005) S.No. Characteristics BS III

1. Acidity, inorganic Nil 2. Acidity, total mg of KOH/g, max To Report 3. Ash, percent by mass, max 0.01 4. Carbon residue (Ramsbottom) on 10 percent residue percent by

mass, max 0.30

5. Cetane number, min 51 6. Cetane index, min 46 7. Pour points, max

a) Winter b) Summer

3°C

15°C 8. Copper strip corrosion for 3 hr at 100°C Not worse than

No.1 9. Distillation, percent (v/v) recovered

a) at 350°C - b) at 360°C 95 c) at 370°C -

10. Flash Point a) Abel°C, Min 35 b) Pensky Martens closed cup°C, Min 66

11. Kinematic Viscosity, cSt, at 40°C 2.0 to 5.0 12. Sediments, percent by mass, max - 13. Total contamination, mg/kg 24 14. Density at 15°C, kg/m3 820-860 15. Total sulphur, mg/kg, max 350 16. Water content, percent (v/v)

Water content, mg/kg, max -

200 17. Cold Filter Plugging point (CFPP), max

a) Winter b) Summer

6°C

18°C 18. Total Sediments mg per 100 ml, max - 19. Oxidation Stability, g/m3, max 25 20. Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) percent by mass, max 11 21. Lubricity corrected wear scar diameter (WSD 1.4) at 60°C, micron,

max 460

22. Oxygen content percent by mass, max 0.6



III. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) : Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO)

(i) Identity of Material Product Name Kerosene, Stove Oil, Illuminating Oil Trade Name SKO Formula Complex Mixture Of Hydrocarbons UN No. 1223 Hazchem Code 3Y Label/Class Red Flammable Liquid/ 3.3 Group II

(ii) Physical and Chemical Properties Physical State Liquid Appearance Colourless Solubility in Water 0.0002 to 0.0004 Calorific Value (Kcal/Kg) 4.35E+07 Vapor Pressure at 20°C, mm Hg 5 Melting/ Freezing Point (°C) 43/ -49 Boiling Point/Range (oC) 145-300 Vapor Density (Air = 1) 4.1 Specific Gravity, 15°C, kg/m3 800 to 850 Heat of Vaporization, Kcal/Kg 2.72E+05 Specific Heat Liquid J/Kg 2.09E+03

(iii) Fire and Explosive Data

Explosivity Moderate Flammability Moderate Auto Ignition Temp °C 228 Explosive Limits % 0.7 to 5 Flash Point °C 35 Burning Rate 4 mm/min Extinguishing Media Foam, CO2, DCP. Water may be ineffective and cause fire to

spread. May be used to cool fire exposed containers. Special Procedures If a leak or spill has not ignited, use water spray to disperse the

vapors and to provide for men attempting to stop a leak. Water spray may be used to flush spills away from exposure.

(iv) Reactive Hazard




(v) Health Hazard Data & Hazard Specification Health Hazard Data Hazard Specification Entry Route Skin Absorption NFPA Rating TLV-TWA, mg/m3 100 Health 0 Odor Threshold, ppm 1 Flammability 2 LD50, Rabbit, g /kg. 0.2 (oral) Stability 0 LD50, Rat, g/kg 20 (oral) Material Factor 10

(vi) Sign/ Symptoms of Exposure Inhalation Dizziness, headache and nausea; cns depressant/anesthetic effect. Continued

inhalation produces visual and auditory, hallucinations, delirium and mania. Also symptoms of fatigue, somnolence, staggering gait, loss of memory.

Ingestion Spontaneous vomiting, low to moderate oral toxicity. Irritation of mouth, throat & gastro intestinal tract, nausea, weakness, dizziness, slow and shallow respiration, convulsions, unconsciousness.

Contact Skin-irritation, prolonged contact can result in drying of skin, dermatitis and eye irritation.

(vii) Emergency Treatment (Immediate Action Required)

Inhalation Remove victim to fresh air; give artificial respiration if breathing has stopped,

oxygen if breathing is laboured.

Ingestion Give conscious victim water to drink. Do not induce vomiting. Liquid paraffin, olive oil or some vegetable oil is to be given orally to retard absorption of gasoline. Gastric lavage and induction of vomiting are not advisable.

Contact Remove contaminated clothing and wash affected part (skin/eyes) with plenty of water.

(viii) Safe Usage Data

Ventilation Adequate Ventilation

Protective Equipment

Eyes Goggles / Face Shields

Respiratory Self contained breathing apparatus for containment/clean-up operations

Gloves & Clothing Rubber



(ix) Precautions (Handling & Storage) Kerosene should be stored in well-ventilated, properly labeled and approved containers. Sniffing, siphoning and use a solvent and cleaning agent should be avoided. Do not transfer to unlabeled, unsuitable or incorrectly labeled containers. All containers should be kept out of reach of children and kept fully closed when not in use. Cleaning and inspection/maintenance of storage tanks should be done according to proper procedures and precautions (work permit system, gas freeing of tanks, using lifeline and wearing air supplied breathing apparatus.

(x) Superior Kerosene Oil (Quality Requirements as per IS 1459-1974)

S. No. Characteristics

Requirement

1. Acidity, inorganic

Nil

2. Burning quality a) Char value, mg/kg of oil consumed, Max b) Bloom on gas chimney

20

Not darker than grey

3. Colour (Saybolt), Min

10

4. Copper strip corrosion for 3 hr at 50°C

Not worse than No. 1

5. Distillation

a) Percent recovered below 200°C, Min 20

b) Final boiling point °C ,max 300

6. Flash Point (Abel)°C, min

35

7. Smoke point, mm, min

18

8. Total sulphur, percent by mass, max

0.25



(IV) Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) : Ethanol

1. IDENTIFICATION COMMERCIAL PRODUCT NAME: Ethanol (Ethyl Alcohol,

Spirit, Alcohol) FORM: Liquid COLOUR: Colourless ODOR: Characteristic

2. COMPOSITION INFORMATION INGREDIENT NAME: Ethanol CHEMICAL FORMULA: C2H5OH MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 46.07 CAS NO: 64-17-5 EU INDEX NO: 603-002-00-5

3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

HIGHLY FLAMMABLE (R16 S43) FLASH POINT: (R11) 9°C IGNITION TEMPERATURE: 425°C EXPLOSION LIMITS: LOWER: 3.5%v/v UPPER: 19%v/v PROTECTION AGAINST FIRE & EXPLOSION: Combustible vapours heavier than air. May form

explosive mixtures with air. Take measures to prevent electrostatic charges.

4. FIRST-AID MEASURES

4.1 SKIN CONTACT Irritating to skin. Remove affected person from source of contamination. Wash contaminated skin promptly with soap or mild detergent and water. Remove clothing promptly, if soaked through, and wash as above.

4.2 EYE CONTACT

Irritating to eyes. Can be damaging if large amount is splashed into eyes. Wash eyes promptly with plenty of water, while lifting the eye lids. Continue to rinse for at least 15 minutes, and get medical attention.

4.3 INGESTION

Intoxicating if ingested. (If ingested in undiluted form, it has a severe drying effect on mucous membranes of mouth and throat.)

Never Make an unconscious person vomit or drink fluids. Wash out mouth thoroughly, and give plenty of water to drink. Do not induce vomiting. Get medical attention immediately.

4.4 INHALATION

Occupational exposure limits (8-hour reference period) 1000 ppm (1900 mg/m³). Intoxicating if continuously inhaled for a long period of time. Move the person to fresh air,

immediately perform artificial respiration if breathing has stopped. When breathing is difficult, properly-trained personnel may administer oxygen. Keep the person warm and at rest. Get medical attention promptly.



5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES EXTINGUISHING MEDIA Use extinguishing media appropriate for surrounding fire.

Water, dry chemicals, (BC or ABC powder), CO2, sand, dolomite, etc. Foam.

DO NOT extinguish fire unless flow can be stopped first. 5.1 SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING

PROCEDURES

Keep upwind. Shut down all possible sources of ignition. Water may be ineffective but use to keep fire-exposed

containers cool. Keep run-off water out of sewers and water sources. Dike

for water control. Avoid water in straight hose stream; will scatter and spread

fire. Use spray or fog nozzles. Cool containers exposed to flames with water from the

side until well after the fire is out. Move container from fire area if it can be done without

risk. If risk of water pollution occurs, notify appropriate

authorities.

5.2 UNUSUAL FIRE & EXPLOSION HAZARDS

Makes explosive mixtures with air. Extremely flammable. May explode in a fire.

May travel considerable distance to source of ignition and flash back.

5.3 HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION

PRODUCTS Gases of: Carbon monoxide (CO) Carbon dioxide (CO2)

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

SPILL CLEANUP METHODS Ventilate well, stop flow of vapour or liquid if possible. Shut off or remove all possible sources of ignition. Do not allow chemical to enter confined spaces such as

sewers due to explosion risk. Sewers designed to preclude formation of explosive

concentrations of vapour may be permitted. Absorb small quantities with paper towels and evaporate in

safe place (fume hood). Allow sufficient time for vapours to completely clear the

hood ducts, then burn the paper in a location away from combustible materials.

Collect for reclamation or absorb in vermiculite, dry sand or similar material.

Clean-up personnel should use respiratory and/or liquid-contact protection.

Provide ventilation and confine spill. Do not allow runoff to sewer.

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE 7.1 USAGE PRECAUTIONS Keep away from heat, sparks and open flame.

Avoid spilling, skin and eye contact. Ventilate well, avoid breathing vapours. Use approved respirator if air contamination is above

acceptable level. Do not use contact lenses



7.2 STORAGE PRECAUTIONS Flammable/combustible. Keep away from oxidizers, heat

and flames. May attack some plastics, rubber and coatings. Keep in cool, dry, ventilated storage and closed containers. Ground the container and transfer equipment to eliminate

static electric sparks.

7.3 STORAGE CRITERIA Flammable liquid storage.

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS AND PERSONAL PROTECTION

.8.1 VENTILATION

Store in a well-ventilated area.

8.2 RESPIRATORS No specific recommendation made, but respiratory protection must be used if the general level exceeds the Occupational Exposure Level (OEL).

8.3 PROTECTIVE GLOVES

Use protective gloves made of butyl rubber.

8.4 EYE PROTECTION Wear approved chemical safety goggles where eye exposure is reasonably probable.

8.5 OTHER PROTECTION

Use engineering controls to reduce air contamination to

permissible exposure level. Provide eyewash station and safety shower. Wear appropriate clothing to prevent repeated or

prolonged skin contact. 9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

APPEARANCE Liquid. Clear. Hygroscopic COLOUR Colourless ODOUR/TASTE Characteristic. Pleasant, agreeable SOLUBILITY DESCRIPTION Miscible with water. Soluble in most organic solvents. BOILING POINT (°C) ~78 MELTING POINT (°C) -117.3 SPECIFIC GRAVITY (water = 1) 0.79 @ 20°C VAPOUR DENSITY (air = 1) 1.59 VAPOUR PRESSURE 44 mm Hg @20°C EVAPORATION RATE 3.10 VOLATILE BY VOL. (%) 100 VISCOSITY 1.19 cps @ 20°C FLASH POINT (°C) ~13 (Closed-cup method) AUTO IGNITION TEMPERATURE(°C) 422 FLAMMABILITY LIMIT (lower %) 3.3 FLAMMABILITY LIMIT (upper %) 19 pH VALUE Neutral 10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY STABILITY: Avoid heat, sparks, flames. Normally

stable. CONDITIONS TO AVOID: Reacts strongly with alkali

metals, alkaline earths, oxidizing agents (such as: Perchlorates, CrO3, halogen oxides, peroxy compounds, perchloric acid, non-metallic oxides, nitric acid, KMnO4, salts of halogen, oxyacids), halogen-halogen compounds, alkali oxides, non-metallic halides, anhydrides/sodium



acetate/acids, ethylene oxide, fluorine, hydrides, mercury compounds, silver compounds, chromyl chloride, UF6; capable of exploding with air in a vaporous/gaseous state.

HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION: Will not polymerize.

MATERIALS TO AVOID: Strong oxidizing agents. HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS:

Vapours/gases/fumes of: - Carbon monoxide (CO). - Carbon dioxide (CO2).

11. TOXICOLOGICAL

INFORMATION TOXIC DOSE 1-LD50 : 7060.00 mg/kg (oral rat) HEALTH WARNINGS: Vapour is harmful on prolonged

exposure or in high concentration. When in a concentration of more than 50%, ethanol causes local mucosal lesions through dehydration and albumin precipitation. Absorption, which occurs swiftly from the gastrointestinal tract, causes euphoria, with subsequent dizziness, inebriation, paralysis, diminished reflex, excitability, cyanosis, narcosis and respiratory paralysis. Dangerous intolerance reactions and increased absorption occur through the simultaneous action of disulfiram, trichloroethylene, tetra-chloromethane, nitrobenzene, carbon disulfide, aniline, lime-nitrogen, arsenic, lead and mercury. CNS depressant. Repeated exposure may cause chronic eye irritation. Defatting, drying and cracking of skin. Mild dermatitis, allergic skin rash. Swallowing concentrated chemical may cause severe internal injury.

MEDICAL SYMPTOMS: Rhinitis (inflammation of the nasal mucous membranes). Upper respiratory irritation. Skin irritation. Nausea, vomiting.

MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS: Convulsive disorders, CNS problems.

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Onsite Emergency Plan (OSEP) for proposed Petroleum Storage Depot of IOCL at Nakkanadoddi

Annexure-3: Layout of Proposed Project A-20


Annexure-4: Single Line Diagram A-21


Annexure-5: Equipment layout of calibration tower A-22


Annexure-6: Equipment layout: Product Pumphouse A-23


ECC Assembly

Area

Emergency Evacuation Plan

Annexure-7: Emergency Evacuation Plan A-24


Annexure-8: Proposed Project Location on Topo Plan A-25

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