IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THEEASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

ANITA E. BELLE & THELMA L. BELLE, Case Number: 2:08-cv-11465Plaintiffs, Judge: Julian A. Cook Jr.v.FIRST FRANKLIN akaFIRST FRANKLIN LOAN SERVICES akaHOME LOAN SERVICES, INC., NATIONAL CITY BANK aka NATIONAL CITY CORPORATIONFIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,REGIONAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC., GREYHOUND APPRAISAL & INVESTMENTS, LLC., aka GREYHOUND MANAGEMENT LLC,NATHAN B. HOGAN, TIMOTHY COOK, KAREN DUMAS COOK,SKYLINE REALTY GROUP L.L.C.,CEDRIC THORNTON, JANICE THORNTON, EILEEN J. GONZALES,E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, in her official/judicial and individual capacities,MAIA FIELDS, in her official and individual capacities, ROSE WILLIAMS, in her official and individual capacities,JOHN and/or JANE DOE, unknown co-conspirators,TERRI D. SIMS, in her official and individual capacities,ADRIENNE SANDERS, in her official and individual capacities,STERLING HARRISON, in his official and individual capacities, YOLANDA DIAZ in her official and individual capacities, HAROLD N. CURETON in his official and individual capacities,WARREN C.EVANS, in his official and individual capacities, ROBERT A. FICANO, in his official and individual capacities, andWAYNE COUNTY (MICHIGAN),Defendants.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

COME NOW the Plaintiffs, ANITA E. BELLE and THELMA L. BELLE. The Plaintiffs hereby

request a jury trial for primary issues that pertain to federal questions under the jurisdiction of

Page 1 of 47

this court and pendent jurisdiction over related state-court claims. Plaintiffs reserve the right to

seek leave to amend this complaint if additional parties and claims are discovered.

Jurisdiction & Parties:

1. This amended complaint is based upon questions of federal law that include, but are not

limited to, the following:

a. Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.

b. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.

c. Mail and Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. §1341 et seq.

d. Civil Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. §1961 et seq.

e. Deprivation of Civil Rights under Color of Law, 42 U.S.C. §1983.

f. Obstruction of Justice, 42 U.S.C. §1985.

g. The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

2. Plaintiff Thelma L. Belle resides in Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan. She held a

warranty deed as title for land commonly known as 19935 Vaughan, Detroit, Wayne

County, Michigan 48219, as evidenced by an Affidavit of Loss Deed and Warranty Deed

dated November 11, 2004 but recorded on May 7, 2007 in the Real Estate Transfer Index

of the Wayne County Register of Deeds, Liber 46274 Page 535-537. (Exhibit A.) This

Plaintiff is 82 years old, disabled, and has continuously lived in the disputed property for

36 years, as evidenced by a 1977 quitclaim deed from Hugh L. Belle to Thelma L. Belle,

recorded at Liber 19925 and Page 249 in the Wayne County Register of Deeds.

Page 2 of 47

3. Plaintiff Anita E. Belle resides in Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan. Plaintiff ANITA E.

BELLE is the daughter of Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE and is the original holder of a

lease option for the disputed property for the sales price of $86,400. (Exhibit B.) By

virtue of a quitclaim deed, Plaintiff Anita E. Belle was added to the title for the disputed

property in 2008. See Exhibit C.

4. Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN aka FIRST FRANKLIN LOAN SERVICES are assumed

names for HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation.

5. Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK is a federally-licensed bank.

6. Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY is a subsidiary of

First American Corporation and is licensed to provide title insurance in the State of

Michigan.

7. Defendant REGIONAL FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. is a Michigan corporation and a

licensed mortgage brokerage in the State of Michigan.

8. Defendant GREYHOUND APPRAISAL & INVESTMENTS LLC., aka GREYHOUND

MANAGEMENT LLC, are Michigan corporations.

9. Defendant NATHAN B. HOGAN is a resident of Michigan and was a licensed residential

real estate appraiser.

10. Defendant TIMOTHY COOK is married to Defendant KAREN DUMAS COOK, both of

whom reside in Michigan. Defendant TIMOTHY COOK is/was a licensed residential

real estate agent and broker. Defendant TIMOTHY COOK is also the cousin of Plaintiffs

Thelma and Anita Belle.

Page 3 of 47

11. Defendant SKYLINE REALTY GROUP LLC is a Michigan limited liability company

and a licensed Michigan real estate broker company.

12. Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON is married to Defendant JANICE THORNTON, both

of whom reside in Michigan. Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON is/was a licensed real

estate agent.

13. Defendant EILEEN J. GONZALES is/was located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and

purports to be an assistant vice president of Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL

CORPORATION.

14. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES is a sitting judge of the 36th District Court

for the State of Michigan and is being sued in her official/judicial and individual

capacities.

15. Defendant MAIA FIELDS is a licensed court reporter with the 36th District Court of the

State of Michigan and is being sued in her official and individual capacities.

16. Defendant ROSE WILLIAMS is Court Clerk Interim Coordinator for the 36th District

Court of the State of Michigan and is being sued in her official and individual capacities.

17. Defendant TERRI D. SIMS is an employee of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office and is

being sued in her official and individual capacities.

18. Defendant ADRIENNE SANDERS is an employee of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office

and is being sued in her official and individual capacities.

19. Defendant STERLING HARRISON is an employee of the Wayne County Sheriff’s

Office and is being sued in his official and individual capacities.

Page 4 of 47

20. Defendant YOLANDA DIAZ is a notary public and is being sued in her official and

individual capacities.

21. Defendant HAROLD N. CURETON is or was the Undersheriff of Wayne County and is

being sued in his official and individual capacities.

22. Defendant WARREN C. EVANS was the sheriff of Wayne County, Michigan on August

29, 2007, at the time of the 2007 sheriff deed, and is being sued in his official and

individual capacities.

23. Defendant ROBERT A. FICANO was the sheriff of Wayne County, Michigan on August

29, 2002, at the time of the 2002 sheriff deed, and is being sued in his official and

individual capacities.

24. Defendant WAYNE COUNTY (Michigan) is the legal entity subject to suit for actions

involving departments such as the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office.

Count One: Mortgage Fraud

25. Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-24, inclusive, of

its First Amended Complaint as though completely set forth herein.

26. On April 3, 2002, Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Case #02-

47976 (Eastern Michigan Bankruptcy Court) in efforts to prevent foreclosure of her

home. The bankruptcy case was discharged on July 10, 2002.

27. On August 29, 2002, Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE allegedly lost title of the disputed

property by a sheriff’s sale for the foreclosed amount of $23,240.97. The purchaser of

the property at that sheriff’s sale was Mortgage Ltd. At this time, Plaintiff allegedly lost

Page 5 of 47

title to her property due, indirectly, to the predatory lending practices of Household

Finance Corporation. She recovered minimal compensation as a participant in the class

action spearheaded by then-Attorney General and now current Michigan Governor

Jennifer Granholm.

28. On August 29, 2002, the sheriff sale was conducted by Defendant TERRI D. SIMS and

the sheriff deed was notarized by Defendant ADRIENNE SANDERS. (See Exhibit M.)

The Affidavit of Sheriff Sale by Defendant TERRI D. SIMS states that she is a deputy

sheriff, and the notary acknowledged that Defendant TERRI D. SIMS is a deputy sheriff.

However, on the date of the sheriff sale, Defendant TERRI D. SIMS was merely a

civilian employee of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office. Although a purported

appointment exists claiming that this Defendant was actually a special deputy sheriff, that

appointment does not cover August 29, 2002, does not contain the file-date stamp of the

county clerk, and was not recorded with the county clerk. (See Exhibit N.)

29. If Defendant TERRI D. SIMS (a civilian employee), had been appointed a special deputy

sheriff, rather than a deputy sheriff, she still was not statutorily authorized to conduct the

sheriff sale. Consequently, the 2002 sheriff deed is void because the sheriff sale was not

conducted by a sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff as required by the provisions of

MCL Sections 600.3216 and 600.3232.

30. A void sheriff sale of August 29, 2002 means that Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE never

lost title to the disputed property in 2002 and that every subsequent transfer of property

since 2002 had a cloud/defect on its title.

Page 6 of 47

31. Not knowing that she never lost title to her property, Plaintiff THELMA BELLE

contacted her cousin, Defendant TIMOTHY COOK, who was employed/partnered with

Defendants REGIONAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC. and/or SKYLINE REALTY

GROUP L.L.C., to help her keep her property.

32. On March 1, 2003, Defendant TIMOTHY COOK, claiming to be a single male while

married to Defendant KAREN DUMAS COOK, purchased the disputed property from

Mortgage Ltd. for $48,740.12. This closing was conducted by Lincoln Title, an agent of

Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY. Of note is that

Lincoln Title did not detect the afore-mentioned cloud/defect on the title that arose from

the void sheriff sale in 2002.

33. Approximately one month later, on April 4, 2003, Defendant TIMOTHY COOK, still

claiming to be a single man even though married to Defendant KAREN DUMAS COOK,

sold the disputed property for $108,000.00 to Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON, married

to Defendant JANICE THORNTON. Again, this closing was conducted by Lincoln

Title, an agent of Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Again, Lincoln Title did not detect the afore-mentioned cloud/defect on the title that

arose from the void sheriff sale in 2002.

34. At no time did Plaintiffs relinquish possession of the property. Neither does any

Defendants’ color of title meet the 15 year time frame or other elements to justify adverse

possession.

35. Plaintiffs allege that at the April 4, 2003 closing, Defendant TIMOTHY COOK

committed fraud by flipping the occupied property at a nearly $60,000 profit;

Page 7 of 47

a. For which he did nothing to add value to the property commensurate with the

profit,

b. In furtherance of depriving Plaintiff of her home’s equity at the time, and

c. Over-leveraging the property more than $20,000 of it’s realistically value at the

time.

d. For which he did not have clear title due to the void sheriff sale in 2002.

36. Plaintiffs allege that at the April 4, 2003 closing, Defendant TIMOTHY COOK conspired

with others to deceptively and artificially inflate the appraised value of Plaintiff’s home

and forged closing documents to make it appear that Defendants CEDRIC THORNTON

and JANICE THORNTON purchased the home with a sizeable down payment when, in

truth, the home was purchased with no money down. Plaintiffs base this allegation on

data from the website Cyberhomes.com that average homes sales in the 48219 zip code

during the first quarter of 2003 to be approximately $82,000. Plaintiffs therefore allege

that this conspiracy to defraud resulted in Defendants CEDRIC and JANICE

THORNTON obtaining a mortgage, originated by Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN, for

$86,400. Plaintiffs allege that the appraised value was inflated in order to perpetrate the

fraud of converting a no-money-down, 100% financing deal to the appearance of a 20%

down payment and 80% financing deal. Plaintiffs allege that escrow agent, Lincoln Title,

an agent of Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE, is part of the fraud and cover up.

Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN subsequently assigned Thornton’s mortgage to Ocwen

Federal Bank on May 8, 2003.

Page 8 of 47

37. On April 9, 2003, Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON entered into an unrecorded lease-

option with Plaintiff ANITA E. BELLE for the sales price of $86,400.00. (Exhibit C.)

Plaintiff ANITA E. BELLE assigned her option to Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE.

38. Contrary to the lease-option price of $86,400.00, Defendants CEDRIC THORNTON and

JANICE THORNTON, through mortgage/real estate broker Defendant TIMOTHY

COOK and his employers/partners/real estate brokerage, Defendants REGIONAL

FINANCIAL GROUP INC. and SKYLINE REALTY GROUP LLC., sold the disputed

property back to Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE for a purchase price of $115,000.00. Of

note is that such sale was executed without a Purchase Agreement or HUD-1. Plaintiffs

also alleged that Defendants conspired to defeat the lease-option agreement and $86,400

option by delaying closing until after the option’s expiry date.

39. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants conspired to defraud the Plaintiffs by use of an

appraisal that deceptively and artificially inflated the value of the disputed property to

$115,000. The City of Detroit’s Treasury Department assessed the 2004 taxable value of

the property to be $45,885. Although tax assessed value is usually less than market

value, it stands to reason that the market value is not usually 2-1/2 times higher than the

tax assessed value. Moreover, Cyberhomes charted that the average sales price of homes

in the 48219 zip code during the third quarter of 2004 approximated $79,000-$80,000.

40. Plaintiffs allege that the appraised value was inflated in order to perpetrate the fraud of

converting a no-money-down, 100% financing deal to the appearance of a 10% down

payment and 90% financing deal. Defendants GREYHOUND APPRAISAL &

INVESTMENTS LLC and NATHAN B. HOGAN were named in at least one state-court

Page 9 of 47

lawsuit, by Fifth Third Bank, for participating in a scheme to defraud that bank in

Detroit-area mortgage deals secured by inflated property appraisals. Defendant

NATHAN HOGAN’s Michigan real estate appraisal license has since been revoked.

41. According to the Truth-in-Lending Disclosure that Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN

provided to the Plaintiff at closing, in compliance with 15 U.S.C. 1638, the total loan

amount was $103,500.00. However, the same document notes that the amount financed

was $98,366.09. (See Exhibit D.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN’s

TILA disclosure was statutorily inadequate because it failed to disclose Plaintiff’s total

sales price including down payment as required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(j). Further,

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s TILA statement evidences that Defendant FIRST

FRANKLIN knowingly participated in mortgage fraud by omitting mention of the

nonexistent down payment.

42. Although an Itemization of the Amount Financed was provided (Exhibit E), at no time

during the closing did any of the Defendants provide the Plaintiff a copy of the HUD-1, a

copy of the original promissory note, disclosure of affiliated business arrangements, other

disclosures required by RESPA, or a signed Purchase Agreement.

43. Plaintiffs allege that the $5133.91 in prepaid finance charges and the $3115.63 settlement

charges, as detailed on Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN’s Itemization of Amount Financed

are excessive, and falsely exaggerated to cover up kickbacks and unearned fees contrary

to 12 U.S.C. 2607.

44. As a result of Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON’s breach of the option contract, this

Defendant received loan proceeds of $95,250.46, enough to satisfy his $86,400 mortgage,

Page 10 of 47

originated with Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN and was unjustly enriched $8850.46

contrary to Plaintiffs’ lease-option agreement. He was further unjustly enriched because,

in order to clear all encumbrances to regaining title, Plaintiff THELMA BELLE was

forced to allocate loan proceeds to pay the property taxes and water bill that Defendant

CEDRIC THORNTON neglected to pay while the property was titled to him. Of note is

that these payments are not listed on Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN’s Itemization of

Amount Financed.

45. Defendants TIMOTHY COOK, SKYLINE REALTY GROUP, and REGIONAL

FINANCIAL GROUP falsified data on Plaintiff THELMA BELLE’s mortgage

application in order to qualify a recently bankrupted senior citizen for a 30 year fixed

interest rate mortgage whose contained principal and interest payment of $750.45

consumed more than half of her Social Security Retirement income.

46. Even though the aged Plaintiff requested that the closing take place on a day that her

attorney could be present, the Defendants TIMOTHY COOK and REGIONAL

FINANCIAL GROUP coerced her to attend the closing unrepresented by counsel by

claiming that if she did not close that day she would lose the house. Of note is that the

closing occurred on a bank holiday, i.e. Veterans’ Day, observed on November 11, 2004.

47. Defendants conspired to defraud Plaintiffs by having Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE

“buy” the house that she already owned due to the defective sheriff sale in 2002.

48. Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE negligently or deliberately in furtherance of the

Defendants’ scheme to defraud and/or in violation of the Insurance Code of Michigan

failed to record Plaintiff THELMA BELLE’s warranty deed. By so doing, Plaintiff’s

Page 11 of 47

property remained in Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON’s name and the property tax was

assessed at the non-homestead tax rate. Plaintiff THELMA BELLE was eligible for

homestead, senior citizen, and other discounts and tax refunds pertaining to her property

tax assessment. As a result of the failure to file Plaintiff’s deed, Plaintiff’s escrow

account was overcharged, contrary to RESPA. The escrow overcharge for principal,

interest, taxes, and insurance exceeded Plaintiff’s monthly Social Security income and

caused Plaintiff to default.

49. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN received double

mortgage payments, from both the Plaintiff and Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON, for

four months, from November 11, 2004 until Defendant CEDRIC THORNTON’s

mortgage was discharged on March 17, 2005.

50. Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY issued a title

insurance policy for the transaction dated November 11, 2004. (See Exhibit F.) This

Defendant breached the insurance contract by failing to record the deed for two and a half

years, until May 7, 2007. The Plaintiff’s title insurance claim prompted the recording of

an affidavit of lost deed. In addition, this Defendant title insurer is contractually liable to

Plaintiffs for the cloud/defect on the title from the void 2002 sheriff sale.

51. On May 4, 2007, Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

recorded an Affidavit of Lost Mortgage.

52. On May 10, 2007, Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN assigned the mortgage to Defendant

NATIONAL CITY BANK. The assignment of the mortgage was recorded in the Wayne

Page 12 of 47

County (Michigan) Register of Deeds on May 23, 2007 at Liber 46323 and Page 653-

653. (See Exhibit A.)

53. In violation of RESPA requirements, the Defendants FIRST FRANKLIN and

NATIONAL CITY BANK failed to notify the Plaintiffs of the assignment, that Plaintiffs

never made any mortgage payments to Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK, and that

Plaintiffs therefore did not default to Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK.

54. Although the assignment of the mortgage claims to convey to Defendant NATIONAL

CITY BANK the beneficial interest belonging to Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN,

Plaintiffs allege that the original promissory note was lost, destroyed, or bundled as part

of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities. As grounds, Plaintiffs allege:

a. Two and a half years after the closing, Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE

INSURANCE COMPANY recorded affidavits of a lost mortgage and a lost deed.

b. At the time of the closing on November 11, 2004, Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN

was a subsidiary of Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK.

c. In 2006, Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK sold Defendant FIRST

FRANKLIN to Merrill Lynch, with the agreement that Defendant NATIONAL

CITY BANK would buy back Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN’s “bad debts”.

Plaintiffs allege that the 2007 assignment to Defendant NATIONAL CITY

BANK was executed pursuant to the Merrill Lynch agreement. Defendant

NATIONAL CITY BANK was investigated by the U.S. Securities Exchange

Commission due to complaints from Merrill Lynch about its purchase of

Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN.

Page 13 of 47

d. By 2008, Merrill Lynch closed most of the offices belonging to Defendant FIRST

FRANKLIN, stating that this Defendant’s operation had become worthless. With

Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN and other entities contributing to Merrill Lynch’s

penetration in the mortgage-backed securities market, the brokerage’s losses

prompted its sale to Bank of America, for which Bank of America received

federal bailout monies under TARP (the Troubled Assets Relief Program).

e. Also by 2008, Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK had suffered so many losses

due to its role in the sub-prime mortgage-backed securities scandal that it was

sold to The PNC Financial Group Inc. PNC then received federal bailout monies

under TARP (the Troubled Asset Relief Program).

f. Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs allege that the original promissory note was lost,

destroyed, or sold before or since the assignment, thereby rendering the

assignment invalid.

g. The assignment was signed by Defendant EILEEN J. GONZALES, purportedly

an Assistant Vice President for Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL

CORPORATION. If such person exists, Defendant EILEEN J. GONZALES is

not an employee or Assistant Vice President of Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN

and/or does not have authority to execute corporate assignments. Consequently,

the assignment is invalid.

h. Plaintiffs allege that the assignment to Defendant NATIONAL CITY was invalid

because Plaintiffs continued to receive monthly billing statements from Defendant

First Franklin after the purported assignment. In addition, Defendant FIRST

Page 14 of 47

FRANKLIN, aka HOME LOAN SERVICES INC., rather than Defendant

NATIONAL CITY BANK, filed a 2007 IRS Form 1099-A for Acquisition or

Abandonment of Secured Property.

i. Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK aka NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION,

as the previous parent company for defendant FIRST FRANKLIN at the time of

the closing of the disputed mortgage, was therefore not a holder in due course.

55. On May 22, 2007, Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK began foreclosure by

advertisement proceedings against the Plaintiffs with a sheriff’s sale date of June 20,

2007.

56. Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK’s sheriff deed is void because the sheriff sale was

not conducted by and the sheriff deed was not executed by a person who was a sheriff,

undersheriff, or deputy sheriff as required by the provisions of MCL Sections 600.3216

and 600.3232.

57. Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK failed to comply with the notice requirements of

Michigan’s foreclosure by advertisement statutes.

a. Defendants began publishing the notice of default on May 22, 2007, one day

before the assignment was recorded in the Wayne County Register of Deeds. Of

note is that the assignment was recorded on May 23, 2007. If the assignment was

invalid, then Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK did not have the right to

foreclose and was therefore noncompliant with MCL 600.3212.

b. Defendants failed to post a notice of default on the premises, as required in MCL

600.3208.

Page 15 of 47

c. Contrary to MCL 600.3220, Defendants failed to republish the notice of default

after the sheriff’s sale scheduled for June 20, 2007 was adjourned for more than

10 days to August 29, 2007. Plaintiffs allege that there was no week to week

adjournment beginning June 20, 2007 until August 29, 2007.

58. On August 29, 2007, Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK obtained a sheriff deed for

the disputed property. (See Exhibit G.)

59. On January 29, 2008, pursuant to a complaint made that resulted in Inquiry #244371,

HUD administratively closed Plaintiff’s complaint and issued a right to file a civil

lawsuit.

a. Defendant FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY was also

named as a co-defendant with Defendant NATHAN HOGAN in the Fifth Third

Bank lawsuit and accused of mortgage fraud. Defendant FIRST AMERICAN has

at least three previous settlement agreements with HUD for violations of RESPA

statutes. Although the RESPA statutes do not specify with particularity the

requirements for title insurers, the statutes provide that “any person”, including

corporate entities such as title insurers, can be held liable for non-compliance with

the statutes.

b. There is HUD precedent that conference room rental fees can be construed as

kickbacks and referral fees when excessive. Plaintiff’s closing for the disputed

mortgage took place on November 11, 2004, a statutory holiday, at the offices

shared by Defendants REGIONAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC. and SKYLINE

REALTY GROUP LLC. Of note is that if conference room fees were paid, such

Page 16 of 47

was not disclosed to Plaintiff on the Truth-in-Lending disclosure, and the HUD-1

has yet to be disclosed.

60. Plaintiffs allege that, at one or more points between April 4, 2003 until (at least) August

29, 2007, Defendants FIRST FRANKLIN, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE

COMPANY, NATIONAL CITY BANK, REGIONAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC.,

GREYHOUND APPRAISAL & INVESTMENTS, LLC., aka GREYHOUND

MANAGEMENT LLC, NATHAN B. HOGAN, EILEEN J. GONZALES, TIMOTHY

COOK, and CEDRIC THORNTON used the mail and/or wires and/or interstate carrier to

carry out a scheme to defraud that included, but is not limited to, the following acts:

a. Having the Plaintiff buy back a house she already owned due to the flawed 2002

sheriff sale.

b. Inflating the fair market value of real estate appraisals.

c. Flipping of property to defraud and deprive Plaintiffs of their home equity.

d. Breaching the option contract.

e. Failing to disclose the HUD-1.

f. Failing to provide Plaintiffs a copy of the original promissory note.

g. Failing to disclose a signed Purchase Agreement for $115, 000 and/or forgery of

Plaintiff’s signature on said Purchase Agreement.

h. Failing to disclose affiliated business arrangement or other required RESPA

disclosures.

i. Violating Truth-in-Lending requirements, particularly regarding the down

payment.

Page 17 of 47

j. Disbursing excessive fees and kickbacks.

k. Failing to record the deed.

l. Breaching the title insurance contract.

m. Falsifying and/or forging the mortgage loan application.

n. Overcharging the tax and insurance escrow.

o. Assigning the mortgage without authority.

p. Assigning the mortgage and “indebtedness” without proof of assigning the

original promissory note.

q. Assigning the mortgage without notice to the Plaintiffs.

r. Failing to comply with the applicable Michigan laws including, but not limited to:

i. Mortgage Broker, Lenders, and Servicers Act, MCL 445.1651 et seq.

ii. The Consumer Financial Services Act, MCL 487.2051 et seq.;

iii. The Michigan Consumer Protection Act, MCL 445.901 et seq.;

iv. The Michigan Insurance Code, MCL 500.100 et seq.

v. The Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.1101 et seq.

vi. The Michigan foreclosure by advertisement statutes, MCL 600.3201 et

seq.

61. Plaintiffs allege that in violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1001, 18

U.S.C. 1010, RESPA, TILA, Regulation Z, RICO, Americans with Disabilities Act, and

other federal statutes and constitutional provisions, the Defendants’ conspired to defraud,

committed predatory lending, and discriminated against the elderly and disabled African-

American female Plaintiff and her daughter.

Page 18 of 47

62. Wherefore, Plaintiffs seek from Defendants FIRST FRANKLIN aka FIRST FRANKLIN

LOAN SERVICES aka HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC., NATIONAL CITY BANK

aka NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE

COMPANY, REGIONAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC., GREYHOUND APPRAISAL &

INVESTMENTS, LLC., aka GREYHOUND MANAGEMENT LLC, NATHAN B.

HOGAN, TIMOTHY COOK, KAREN DUMAS COOK, SKYLINE REALTY GROUP

L.L.C., EILEEN J. GONZALES, CEDRIC THORNTON, and JANICE THORNTON,

the following:

a. Joint and several liability for actual, compensatory, special, consequential,

punitive, and other damages, refund of all monies paid to the mortgagee, and

interest on the escrow in the amount of $1,000,000.00.

b. Temporary and permanent injunctive relief.

c. A cease and desist order.

d. Enjoin the parties from pursuing foreclosure actions in the state courts pending

the outcome of this litigation.

e. Declaratory judgment that Defendants’ acts were unlawful.

f. Rescission of the 2004 mortgage and promissory note and/or satisfaction in

full/release of security interest with no derogatory credit report.

g. Cancellation of the mortgage.

h. Set aside or void both the 2002 and 2007 sheriff deeds.

i. Quiet title in the name of the Plaintiffs.

Page 19 of 47

j. Title insurance due to the cloud on the 2004 title arising from the defective 2002

sheriff deed.

k. Costs and attorney’s fees.

l. Suspension and revocation of applicable licenses.

m. Criminal investigation and prosecution.

n. Whatever other relief the court deems just.

Count Two: Invalid Sheriff Deeds

63. Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-62 inclusive, of

its First Amended Complaint as though completely set forth herein.

64. Defendant STERLING HARRISON conducted the sheriff sale and signed the sheriff

deed of August 29, 2007. (See Exhibit G.)

65. In the sheriff deed, Defendant STERLING HARRISON states, “Whereas, by virtue of

said power of sale, and pursuant to the statute of the State of Michigan in such case made

and provided, a notice was duly published and a copy thereof was duly posted in a

conspicuous place upon the premises described in said mortgage, that the said premises,

or some part of them, would be sold at 1:00 P.M. on the 20th day of June, A.D. 2007 (sale

adjourned from June 20, 2007 to August 29, 2007), at the Immediately inside the

Jefferson Avenue entrance to the Coleman A. Young Municipal Center in Detroit,

Michigan, that being the place of holding the Circuit Court for Wayne County where the

premises are situated…[Emphasis added.]

Page 20 of 47

66. MCL 600.3220 regarding sale, adjournment, notice, posting, and publication states,

“Such sale may be adjourned from time to time, by the sheriff or other officer or person

appointed to make such sale at the request of the party in whose name the notice of sale is

published by posting a notice of such adjournment before or at the time of and at the

place where said sale is to be made, and if any adjournment be for more than 1 week at

one time, the notice thereof, appended to the original notice of sale, shall also be

published in the newspaper in which the original notice was published, the first

publication to be within 10 days of the date from which the sale was adjourned and

thereafter once in each full secular week during the time for which such sale shall be

adjourned. No oral announcement of any adjournment shall be necessary.”

67. Defendant STERLING HARRISON deprived Plaintiffs of their due process rights by

failing to require that Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK republish notice of sheriff

sale that was adjourned more than one week.

a. In his affidavit for the sheriff deed, Defendant STERLING HARRISON admitted

that the adjournment was from June 20, 2007 to August 29, 2007. Of note is that

this was an adjournment of more than two months.

b. That Defendant STERLING HARRISON knew or should have known that the

sheriff sale was defective for failure to comply with MCL 600.3220 that required

Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK to republish notice of the sheriff sale.

68. MCL 600.3216 states, “The sale shall be at public sale, between the hour of 9 o'clock in

the forenoon and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the place of holding the circuit court

within the county in which the premises to be sold, or some part of them, are situated, and

Page 21 of 47

shall be made by the person appointed for that purpose in the mortgage, or by the sheriff,

undersheriff, or a deputy sheriff of the county, to the highest bidder.” [Emphasis

added.]

69. Special deputy sheriffs have been in existence in Michigan since the 19th century, but the

Michigan foreclosure by advertisement statutes were enacted in 1963. If the Michigan

Legislature had intended for special deputy sheriffs to conduct sheriff sales, then the

Legislature should have enumerated such among the persons authorized to conduct a

sheriff sale.

70. Although in the affidavit of sheriff deed, Defendant STERLING HARRISON states that

that he is a deputy sheriff, according to his oath of office, Defendant STERLING

HARRISON is a special deputy sheriff. Moreover, Defendant STERLING

HARRISON’s appointment was signed by the Undersheriff rather than the Sheriff. (See

Exhibit H.) This Defendant therefore uttered a false and misleading statement on the

sheriff deed regarding his deputy sheriff job title.

71. In addition to his appointment being signed by the undersheriff, the appointment of

Defendant STERLING HARRISON states that it pertains to “the year ending December

31, 2008.” Accordingly, this appointment does not cover the time period of the second

sheriff sale on August 29, 2007. Also, Defendant STERLING HARRISON’s oath of

office is sworn before one “LaKeisha Washington”, a person who purports to be a notary,

yet her stamp does not appear on the appointment/oath.

72. Pertaining to the appointment of special deputy sheriffs, MCL 51.70 states, “Each sheriff

may appoint 1 or more deputy sheriffs at the sheriff's pleasure, and may revoke those

Page 22 of 47

appointments at any time. Persons may also be deputed by a sheriff, by an instrument in

writing, to do particular acts, who shall be known as special deputies and each sheriff

may revoke those appointments at any time. A sheriff shall not be responsible for the

acts, defaults, and misconduct in office of a deputy sheriff. The appointed deputy or

deputies, other than special deputies, before entering upon the duties of office shall

execute and file with the county clerk an official bond running to the people of this state

in the amount of at least $2,500.00, if the county board of commissioners determines an

individual bond is necessary, which bond shall be conditioned in the same manner as the

bond required of the sheriff, and with sufficient sureties as the presiding judge of the

circuit court for the county approves. A county by resolution of its county board of

commissioners may pay premiums on the individual bond running to the people of this

state in the amount of at least $2,500.00 as prescribed by the county board of

commissioners. A bond required by this section shall be conditioned in the same manner

as the bond required for the sheriff and have sufficient sureties.” [Emphasis added.]

73. MCL 600.3232 requires that the person conducting the sheriff sale must sign the sheriff

deed, stating, “The officer or person making the sale shall forthwith execute,

acknowledge, and deliver, to each purchaser a deed of the premises bid off by him; and if

the lands are situated in several counties he shall make separate deeds of the lands in each

county, and specify therein the precise amounts for which each parcel of land therein

described was sold. And he shall endorse upon each deed the time when the same will

become operative in case the premises are not redeemed according to law. Such deed or

deeds shall, as soon as practicable, and within 20 days after such sale, be deposited with

Page 23 of 47

the register of deeds of the county in which the land therein described is situated, and the

register shall endorse thereon the time the same was received, and for the better

preservation thereof, shall record the same at length in a book to be provided in his office

for that purpose; and shall index the same in the regular index of deeds, and the fee for

recording the same shall be included among the other costs and expenses allowed by law.

In case such premises shall be redeemed, the register of deeds shall, at the time of

destroying such deed, as provided in section 3244 of this chapter, write on the face of

such record the word “Redeemed”, stating at what date such entry is made, and signing

such entry with his official signature”

74. Because MCL 51.70 requires that only a sheriff may appoint a special deputy sheriff,

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant STERLING HARRISON was not a “special deputy” by

virtue of his appointment being signed by the undersheriff rather than the sheriff.

75. Because MCL 600.3216 specifies that only the sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff

may conduct a sheriff sale, Defendant STERLING HARRISON did not have statutory

authority to conduct such sale by virtue of his being a civilian employee. Because MCL

600.3232 requires that the person conducting the sale must sign the sheriff deed,

Defendant STERLING HARRISON did not have statutory authority to sign the sheriff

deed.

76. In the jurat for the sheriff deed, Defendant YOLANDA DIAZ knowingly or negligently

notarized that Defendant STERLING HARRISON is a deputy sheriff, even though such

is a false and misleading statement.

Page 24 of 47

77. Defendant WARREN C. EVANS, as sheriff of Wayne County, should have appointed,

sworn, and bonded deputy sheriffs to conduct the sheriff sales and should have trained

such deputies regarding the acts that constitute full compliance with Michigan’s

foreclosure by advertisement statutes.

78. By custom, usage, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, some other decision, or

acquiescence, Defendant WARREN C. EVANS, as sheriff of Wayne County, permitted

improperly appointed special deputies/civilian employees to conduct sheriff sales in

contravention of Michigan foreclosure by statute laws.

79. By custom, usage, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, some other decision, or

acquiescence, Defendant WARREN C. EVANS, as sheriff of Wayne County, permitted

improperly appointed special deputies/civilian employees to fraudulently concealing the

employees’ true job title from the content of the sheriff deed.

80. Defendant WARREN C. EVANS, as sheriff of Wayne County, is vicariously liable for

the acts and omissions of his civilian employees/improperly appointed special deputies.

81. By custom, usage, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, some other decision, or

acquiescence, Defendant WAYNE COUNTY permitted Defendant WARREN C.

EVANS to conduct sheriff sales in a manner that violated Michigan law.

82. Defendant WAYNE COUNTY is liable for the unlawful and unauthorized acts of

“special deputies” or civilian employees acting in contravention of the requirements of

the foreclosure by advertisement statutes.

83. Defendant HAROLD N. CURETON, as undersheriff of Wayne County, knew or should

have known that special deputies did not have the statutory authority to conduct sheriff

Page 25 of 47

sales, and even if special deputies had such authority, that as undersheriff, this Defendant

did not have the statutory authority to sign the appointment of Defendant STERLING

HARRISON as a special deputy sheriff.

84. Defendant HAROLD N. CURETON knew or should have known that a sheriff deed

issued by a non-deputy was defective because such failed to comply with the Michigan

foreclosure statutes.

85. Defendant STERLING HARRISON’s appointment as special deputy sheriff is null and

void, and sheriff deeds signed by this Defendant are null and void. There are state and

federal precedents that have set aside the sheriff deed and sale because the undersheriff

did not have statutory authority to appoint “special deputies”.

86. The August 29, 2002 sheriff deed (see Exhibit M) that conveyed title from Plaintiff

THELMA L. BELLE to Mortgage Ltd. was signed by Defendant TERRI D. SIMS.

87. On the 2002 sheriff deed, Defendant TERRI D. SIMS uttered a false and misleading

statement by describing her job title as that of a deputy sheriff.

88. On the 2002 sheriff deed, Defendant ADRIENNE SANDERS uttered a false and

misleading statement in the jurat by notarizing that Defendant TERRI D. SIMS is a

deputy sheriff.

89. The purported appointment of Defendant TERRI D. SIMS by then-sheriff, Defendant

ROBERT A. FICANO, states TERRI D. SIMS’ job title as that of special deputy rather

than deputy sheriff. However, such appointment states that it is for “the year ending 12-

31-04”, does not contain the dated file stamp of the county clerk, and was not recorded in

the county clerk’s office. (See Exhibit N.)

Page 26 of 47

90. The purported special deputy appointment of Defendant TERRI D. SIMS for the time

period of August 29, 2002 is invalid for want of a file-date stamp of the county clerk,

recording in the county clerk’s office, and because the appointment states that it is for the

year ending 12-31-2004. Although this appointment was signed by then-sheriff,

Defendant ROBERT A. FICANO, of note is that Ficano was not sheriff of Wayne

County during the year 12-31-2004 but was county executive, making his appointment of

Defendant TERRI D. SIMS invalid.

91. The statutorily required file-date stamp from the county clerk serves as a check and

balance to ensure that sheriff appointments are not back-dated by the notary. Moreover,

MCL 51.73 requires that sheriff appointments be filed and recorded in the county clerk’s

office.

92. Because the special deputy appointment failed to comport with MCL 51.70 and MCL

51.73, Defendant TERRI D. SIMS was not a special deputy sheriff on the date of August

29, 2002. Moreover, even if such special deputy appointment was in compliance with the

afore-mentioned Michigan statutes, MCL 600.3201 et seq. does not authorize special

deputy sheriffs to conduct sheriff sales or execute sheriff deeds.

93. By custom, usage, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, some other decision, or

acquiescence, Defendant ROBERT A. FICANO, as sheriff of Wayne County, permitted

improperly appointed special deputies/civilian employees to conduct sheriff sales in

contravention of Michigan foreclosure by statute laws.

94. By custom, usage, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, some other decision, or

acquiescence, Defendant ROBERT A. FICANO, as sheriff of Wayne County, permitted

Page 27 of 47

improperly appointed special deputies/civilian employees to fraudulently conceal the

employees’ true job title from the content of the sheriff deed.

95. Defendant ROBERT A. FICANO, as sheriff of Wayne County, is vicariously liable for

the acts and omissions of his civilian employees/improperly appointed special deputies.

96. By custom, usage, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, some other decision, or

acquiescence, Defendant WAYNE COUNTY permitted Defendant ROBERT A.

FICANO to conduct sheriff sales in a manner that violated Michigan law.

97. Defendant WAYNE COUNTY is liable for the unlawful and unauthorized acts of

“special deputies” or civilian employees acting in contravention of the requirements of

the foreclosure by advertisement statutes.

98. By virtue of the long-standing practice of having civilian employees/special deputies

issue invalid sheriff deeds, Defendants WARREN C. EVANS, ROBERT A. FICANO,

and WAYNE COUNTY have committed slander of title and conversion in deprivation of

Plaintiffs’ civil rights under color of law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983.

99. The false and misleading representation of job titles, that Defendants TERRI D. SIMS

and STERLING HARRISON were deputy sheriffs, placed on the 2002 and 2007 sheriff

deeds are affirmative acts that constitute fraudulent concealment that covered up that

these Defendants were not deputies.

100. Until October 7, 2009, Plaintiffs relied upon the fraudulent misrepresentations

contained in the 2007 sheriff deed. On October 7, 2009, Plaintiffs discovered that

Defendant STERLING HARRISON was actually a civilian employee that purported to

be a special deputy, rather than a deputy sheriff, by virtue of an improper appointment.

Page 28 of 47

101. Not until October 7, 2009 did Plaintiffs discover that Defendant STERLING

HARRISON’s appointment as special deputy was invalid.

102. Prior to October 28, 2009, the purported appointment and oath of office of

Defendant TERRI D. SIMS was unavailable at the county clerk’s office. Accordingly,

until October 28, 2009, Plaintiffs relied upon the fraudulent misrepresentations contained

in the 2002 sheriff deed. On October 28, 2009, Plaintiffs discovered that Defendant

TERRI D. SIMS was actually a civilian employee that purported to be a special deputy,

rather than a deputy sheriff, by virtue of an improper appointment.

103. Not until October 28, 2009 did Plaintiffs discover that Defendant TERRI D.

SIMS’s appointment as special deputy was invalid.

104. The 2002 sheriff deed was drafted by Marshall R. Isaacs of Orlans Associates

P.C. representing Bank One Columbus.

105. The 2007 sheriff deed was drafted by John T. Harrison of Trott & Trott P.C.

representing Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK.

106. By simply reading the proposed sheriff deeds drafted by the attorneys for

mortgage companies, Defendants WAYNE COUNTY, ROBERT A. FICANO,

WARREN C. EVANS, STERLING HARRISON, YOLANDA DIAZ, TERRI D. SIMS,

and ADRIENNE SANDERS knew or should have known that the proposed sheriff deeds

contained false and misleading statements regarding the deputy sheriff job title.

107. Defendants STERLING HARRISON, YOLANDA DIAZ, TERRI D. SIMS, and

ADRIENNE SANDERS committed gross negligence by signing documents falsely

purporting to be sheriff deeds, which were notarized as affidavits, and

Page 29 of 47

which contained false and misleading statements of fact regarding the deputy sheriff job

title.

108. By signing the affidavit sheriff deeds that contained the misrepresentation of

Defendant STERLING HARRISON being a deputy sheriff, this Defendant violated MCL

750.215 and committed the crime of impersonating a deputy sheriff.

109. By signing the affidavit sheriff deeds that contained the misrepresentation of

Defendant TERRI D. SIMS being a deputy sheriff, this Defendant violated MCL 750.215

and committed the crime of impersonating a deputy sheriff.

110. By affirming in the jurat that Defendant STERLING HARRISON is a deputy

sheriff, Defendant YOLANDA DIAZ, a notary, committed official misconduct by

notarizing a false statement in violation of MCL 55.261 et seq.

111. By affirming in the jurat that Defendant TERRI D. SIMS is a deputy sheriff,

Defendant ADRIENNE SANDERS, a notary, committed official misconduct by

notarizing a false statement in violation of MCL 55.261 et seq.

112. By custom, usage, policy statement, ordinance, regulation, some other decision, or

acquiescence, Defendants WAYNE COUNTY, WARREN C. EVANS, and ROBERT A.

FICANO had knowledge of and consented to or permitted the official misconduct of the

notaries, Defendants YOLANDA DIAZ and ADRIENNE SANDERS, while acting

within the actual or apparent scope of their employment by the Wayne County Sheriff’s

Office.

113. Defendants WAYNE COUNTY, WARREN C. EVANS, and ROBERT A.

FICANO had knowledge of and consented/acquiesced to or permitted Defendants

Page 30 of 47

STERLING HARRISON and TERRI D. SIMS to execute sheriff deeds that contained the

fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the deputy sheriff job title.

114. Defendants WAYNE COUNTY, ROBERT A. FICANO, WARREN C. EVANS,

STERLING HARRISON, YOLANDA DIAZ, TERRI D. SIMS, and ADRIENNE

SANDERS were grossly negligent in executing sheriff deeds that contained the false and

misleading statements regarding the deputy sheriff job title, and in fraudulent

concealment of the fact that special deputies/civilian employees were conducting sheriff

sales in contravention of the Michigan statutes.

115. Because Defendants STERLING HARRISON and TERRI D. SIMS are special

deputies or civilian employees rather than deputy sheriffs, then WAYNE COUNTY,

ROBERT A. FICANO, WARREN C. EVANS are liable for their acts and defaults via

the doctrine of respondeat superior and vicarious liability, MCL 51.70, and Monell v.

Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

116. Because Defendants YOLANDA DIAZ and ADRIENNE SANDERS are notaries

acting within the actual or apparent scope of their employment, Defendants WAYNE

COUNTY, ROBERT A. FICANO, WARREN C. EVANS are liable for their official

misconduct via the doctrine of respondeat superior and vicarious liability, MCL 55.297,

and Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

117. Defendants WAYNE COUNTY, WARREN C. EVANS, ROBERT A. FICANO,

STERLING HARRISON, YOLANDA DIAZ, TERRI D. SIMS, and ADRIENNE

SANDERS act of fraudulent concealment and cover up constitutes gross negligence and

Page 31 of 47

exhibits a behavior so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether

an injury results.

118. The sheriff deeds containing the false and misleading statements that the persons

conducting the sheriff sale and executing the sheriff deeds were deputy sheriffs became

the proximate cause of Plaintiffs losing title to their property.

119. Plaintiffs allege that even though they still possess the disputed property, they

have been harmed by the defective sheriff deeds because:

a. Even though the sheriff sale of 2002 was void, meaning that Plaintiff THELMA

L. BELLE never lost title to the disputed property, as a result of the color of title

conferred by the sheriff sales, there have been numerous transfers of title since the

2002 sheriff sale.

b. Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE should not have had to buy back the house (that

she already owned) for a purchase price of $115,000.00 from Defendants

CEDRIC THORNTON and JANICE THORNTON.

c. Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE may owe Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK or

Defendant FIRST FRANKLIN some or all of the $103,500.00 principal on the

2004 mortgage. Plaintiffs concede that their mortgage losses from this hidden

risk/title defect may be mitigated by title insurance through Defendant FIRST

AMERICAN TITLE.

d. Plaintiff THELMA L. BELLE has endured derogatory credit due to the

delinquency, default, and foreclosure of the 2004 mortgage that was recorded in

2007.

Page 32 of 47

e. Michigan 36th District Court judge, Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES,

granted a Judgment of Possession in favor of Defendant NATIONAL CITY

BANK, thereby putting Plaintiffs at risk of eviction based upon the defective

sheriff deeds and causing Plaintiffs to endure emotional distress, court and

litigation costs, attorney fees, and other damages.

120. The Michigan foreclosure by advertisement statutes, MCL 600.3201 et seq.,

attempt to give property owners constitutional protection. By circumventing the

foreclosure by advertisement statutes, Defendants WAYNE COUNTY, WARREN C.

EVANS, ROBERT A. FICANO, HAROLD N. CURETON, STERLING HARRISON,

YOLANDA DIAZ, TERRI D. SIMS, and ADRIENNE SANDERS violated Plaintiffs’

property, due process, protection from unreasonable seizure, and equal protection rights

as guaranteed by the Michigan and United States Constitutions.

121. Wherefore, Plaintiffs request that this Court enters judgment and orders that the

Defendants STERLING HARRISON, YOLANDA DIAZ, HAROLD N. CURETON,

TERRI D. SIMS, ADRIENNE SANDERS, WARREN C. EVANS, ROBERT A.

FICANO, and WAYNE COUNTY:

a. Are jointly and severally liable for actual, compensatory, special, consequential,

and other damages that include costs and attorney’s fees in state and other federal

courts, such damages and costs totaling in excess of $100,000.00;

b. Their acts are declared unlawful;

c. They are enjoined from committing similar acts in the future;

Page 33 of 47

d. They are mandated to explain the errors that arose from the void sheriff sales to

credit reporting agencies;

e. The sheriff deeds of 2002 and 2007 are set aside;

f. Title is quieted in the name of the Plaintiffs; and

g. Whatever other relief the court deems just.

Count Three: Judicial Misconduct

122. Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1-121,

inclusive, of its First Amended Complaint as though completely set forth herein.

123. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES is the 36th District Court of Michigan

judge assigned to case number 08-311916 LT, National City Bank v. Thelma Belle &

Occupants, that case being a Petition for a Judgment of Possession.

124. Defendant MAIA FIELDS is the 36th District Court of Michigan court reporter, a

staff member of the Clerk of Court, assigned to Defendant Judge E. LYNISE BRYANT-

WEEKES’ courtroom.

125. Defendant ROSE WILLIAMS is an interim coordinator of the Clerks of Court at

the 36th District Court of Michigan.

126. Defendants JOHN and JANE DOE include, but are not limited to, currently

unknown clerks of court at the 36th District Court of Michigan.

127. At a hearing on March 23, 2009, Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES

denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss for reasons stated on the record. Defendant E.

LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES then ruled that there were no genuine issues of triable

Page 34 of 47

facts and rendered a Judgment of Possession in favor of Defendant NATIONAL CITY

BANK.

128. On April 1, 2009, Plaintiffs made a timely appeal that included submission of a

$200 personal bond. Plaintiffs’ copies of the submitted court documents were date-

stamped by an unknown 36th District Clerk of Court. (See Exhibit I.)

129. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES and co-conspirators, Defendants

MAIA FIELDS and unknown clerks of court at the 36th District Court, participated in a

scheme to sabotage Plaintiffs’ appeal and thereby obstruct justice and deprive Plaintiffs

of their constitutional and property rights. The acts in furtherance of this scheme include,

but are not limited, to the following:

a. A stay of an order of eviction is had when an appeal is filed with a bond.

Although Plaintiffs filed a bond and possess a date-stamped copy of a filed bond,

(see Exhibit I), their bond does not appear on the 36th District Court’s Register of

Actions (see Exhibit J) or in the court file. No notice was given to Plaintiffs to

explain why their bond was not filed or removed from the court file.

b. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES removed Plaintiffs’ bond from the

court file or told, directed, or ordered unknown others to remove Plaintiffs’ bond

from the court file.

c. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES told, directed, ordered, or otherwise

communicated her wishes to unknown court clerks to remove Plaintiffs’ bond

from the Register of Actions.

Page 35 of 47

d. On April 1, 2009, Plaintiffs requested from Defendant MAIA FIELDS, the

transcripts of hearings before Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKS on

February 10, 2009; March 10, 2009; and March 23, 2009. Because the court

reporter stated that she accepted personal checks, Plaintiff Thelma Belle tendered

a $20 personal check as deposit for preparation of the transcripts.

e. On April 14, 2009, without a hearing, Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-

WEEKES substituted a bond of $2500 and ordered escrow of $900 per month,

prorated $480 for the remainder of April, 2009. These orders were not timely

mailed, being postmarked on May 5, 2009.

f. Sometime during the month of April 2009, Defendant MAIA FIELDS contacted

Plaintiffs’ attorney in the state court case and informed him that Plaintiffs needed

to pay not just the deposit for the transcripts, but the expected full cost of $175.

Plaintiffs tendered a second check for $175 on May 1, 2009.

g. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeal on May

26, 2009. Plaintiffs did not receive timely notice of the dismissal, the order being

postmarked June 3, 2009. (Exhibit K.)

h. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES dismissed the appeal citing MCL

7.101(P), stating that “Appellant failed to pay bond on appeal and escrow order

non compliance of appeal procedure.”

i. MCL 7.101(P) grants circuit court judges the discretion to dismiss vexatious and

frivolous appeals. Of note is that Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES is a

Page 36 of 47

district court judge and therefore does not have subject matter jurisdiction to

dismiss appeals based upon MCL 7.101(P).

j. Although Michigan district court judges may dismiss appeals for non-compliance

with an escrow order, MCL 7.101(G) requires that the parties receive at least 7

days’ prior notice before such dismissals.

k. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES blamed the 36th District Clerk of

Court for failing to provide the notice required in MCL 7.101(G), even though she

likewise failed to issue an Order to Show Cause.

l. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES told, directed, ordered, or otherwise

communicated her wishes that the court clerks not notify Plaintiffs, as required in

MCL 7.101(G), prior to dismissal of their appeal.

m. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES failed to provide notification to

Plaintiffs, as required by MCL 7.101(G), prior to dismissal of their appeal.

n. On the same day that Plaintiffs went to the applicable appellate court, the 3rd

Circuit Court of Michigan, for an order to reinstate the appeal or vacate the 36th

District Court’s dismissal of the appeal, the 3rd Circuit dismissed the appeal for

want of a transcript.

o. The judicial assistant for 3rd Judicial Circuit Court Judge Robert Ziolkowski cited

that notice of the pending dismissal was mailed in a May 21, 2009 letter to

Plaintiffs’ state court attorney. (Of note is that Plaintiff’s state court attorney has

yet to receive such letter and only learned of its existence upon filing the judge’s

copy of Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the state district court appeal.)

Page 37 of 47

p. Plaintiffs contacted Defendant MAIA FIELDS to ascertain the whereabouts of the

requested transcripts. Defendant MAIA FIELDS told Plaintiff Anita Belle and

her state court attorney that she was told not to prepare the transcripts because the

appeal was dismissed.

q. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES told, directed, ordered, or otherwise

communicated her wishes to Defendant MAIA FIELDS to not file and record

Plaintiffs’ transcripts, and/or to not prepare and file the Notice of Filing of

Transcripts and Affidavit of Mailing to parties.

r. On June 9, 2009, Plaintiffs replaced the two checks given to Defendant MAIA

FIELDS with $175 in cash and again requested the transcripts and a certificate of

ordering the transcripts.

s. When the certificate of ordering the transcripts was finally filed, Defendant

MAIA FIELDS, accompanied by a supervisor, refused to sign a certificate

reflecting the April 1, 2009 date that the $20 deposit was tendered. Only under

protest from Plaintiffs’ state court attorney did the court reporters relent and file a

certificate reflecting the date of May 1, 2009.

t. At no time before June 9, 2009, when the Plaintiffs recovered possession of their

April 1 and May 1 checks, did Defendant MAIA FIELDS endorse or deposit the

checks or otherwise attempt to cash the checks and collect the funds claimed

necessary for commencement of the transcript preparation, even though the

Michigan Court Rules require appeal transcripts to be prepared within 28 days of

being ordered.

Page 38 of 47

u. Although Defendant MAIA FIELDS finally prepared the requested transcripts

and provided copies to Plaintiffs on June 19, 2009, the transcripts have yet to be

placed on the 36th District Court of Michigan’s Register of Actions or in the file.

v. When questioned on September 29, 2009 why the transcripts have yet to be filed,

Defendant MAIA FIELDS said that the transcripts have not been filed because the

bond and escrow have not been paid. Of note is that the Michigan Court Rules do

not require payment of bond or escrow as a condition for filing court transcripts.

w. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES has claimed on the record that her

order of May 26, 2009 contained a “clerical error”. However, this Defendant has

neglected to correct this error.

x. The 36th District Court Register of Actions (ROA) (Exhibit J) contains a notation

of a motion which was set for hearing and adjourned. Although the ROA claims

that motion was presented by the Plaintiffs, a clerk of court designated the motion

with the code “MOE”, (see Exhibit L). Because the file was in Defendant E.

LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES’ chambers, Plaintiffs made a written request to this

Defendant’s judicial clerk, A. Renee Shepard, to provide them with a copy of this

motion, notice of hearing, and adjournment. The Plaintiffs never received a

response to their request.

y. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES told, directed, ordered, or otherwise

communicated her wishes to court clerk, A. Renee Shepard, to not respond to

Plaintiffs’ inquiries about the motion coded “MOE”, its scheduled hearing, and its

subsequent adjournment.

Page 39 of 47

z. The motion bearing the clerk of court transmittal code “MOE” is a motion filed

by Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK requesting an order of eviction.

aa. Neither Plaintiffs or their state court attorney received a copy of Defendant

NATIONAL CITY BANK’s motion for order of eviction. Neither did Plaintiffs

receive notice of a motion hearing or its adjournment.

bb. Michigan Court Rule 4.201(L)(4) regarding limitations on time for issuance and

execution of an order of eviction states, “Unless a hearing is held after the

defendant has been given notice and opportunity to appear, an order of eviction

may not:

i. (a) be issued later than 56 days after judgment is entered,

ii. (b) be executed later than 56 days after it is issued.”

cc. Because the Judgment of Possession was issued on March 23, 2009, and because

the motion coded “MOE” was filed on June 23, 2009, then more than 56 days had

transpired between the date of the Judgment of Possession and the concealed

motion for eviction, thus requiring Plaintiffs to be noticed of a hearing.

dd. These Defendants’ acts of concealing the motion coded “MOE” and scheduling of

a secret hearing were done in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of

their civil rights of due process, equal protection, and protection from

unreasonable seizure as guaranteed by both the U.S. and Michigan Constitutions.

ee. The motion for order of eviction, notice of hearing, and adjournment that has not

been served on Plaintiffs or their counsel constitutes ex parte communication

Page 40 of 47

between Defendants E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES and NATIONAL CITY

BANK.

ff. Plaintiffs have moved that the $200 personal bond, filed but not recorded by the

36th District Clerk of Court on April 1, 2009, be reinstated. Plaintiffs have also

moved that the escrow order be modified due to Plaintiff’s indigency and due to

the escrow being excessive.

gg. Plaintiffs have moved that this Defendant disqualify herself, a motion she has

denied both when initially presented and upon motion for reconsideration. When

Plaintiffs asserted their right, consistent with Michigan Court Rules, to have the

Chief Judge of the 36th District Court consider their motion to disqualify

Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, this Defendant threatened to impose

$700 in sanctions.

130. The improper and unlawful acts of the Defendants undermined and sabotaged the

Plaintiffs’ appeal by right, and collectively these acts constitute bias, corruption, gross

negligence, intentional and constitutional torts beyond the scope of authorized judicial

acts. These unlawful acts include, but are not limited to: Untimely notices, no notices at

all, dismissal of appeal without subject matter jurisdiction, excessive bond and escrow,

removal of documents from the court file and docket, delay in preparation of transcripts,

refusal to file transcripts, concealment of the motion coded “MOE”, concealment of the

notice of hearing for the motion coded “MOE”, and concealment of the notice of

adjournment for the hearing on the motion coded “MOE”.

Page 41 of 47

131. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES’ acts are not shielded by absolute

immunity because she did not have subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiffs’

appeal citing MCL 7.101(P).

132. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES’ acts are not shielded by absolute

immunity because the following are not judicial acts:

a. Directing the court reporter to not file the requested transcripts;

b. Removing or directing others to remove Plaintiff’s bond from the court file;

c. Directing the clerks of court to remove the bond from the Register of Actions;

d. Directing the court clerks to not notice Plaintiffs, and/or the trial court judge

herself failing to provide to Plaintiffs the required notice, at least 7 days prior to

the dismissal of the appeal, because of bond and escrow issues;

e. Directing the court clerks to not notice the Plaintiffs regarding the hearing or

adjournment of hearing on the motion coded “MOE”; and

f. Other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to sabotage Plaintiffs’ appeal.

133. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES’ sabotage of Plaintiffs’ appeal is all

the more egregious given that the Michigan’s 36th District Court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction to render a Possession Judgment in favor of Defendant NATIONAL

CITY BANK given that title to the property was legitimately contested and in dispute.

a. Both the 2002 and 2007 sheriff deeds are void because of their failure to comply

with the requirements of the foreclosure by advertisement statutes, MCL

600.3201 et seq.

Page 42 of 47

b. MCL 600.2932(1) regarding quieting title; interest of plaintiff; action by

mortgagee; establishment of title; tenancy in common; actions states, “Any

person, whether he is in possession of the land in question or not, who claims any

right in, title to, equitable title to, interest in, or right to possession of land, may

bring an action in the circuit courts against any other person who claims or

might claim any interest inconsistent with the interest claimed by the plaintiff,

whether the defendant is in possession of the land or not.” [Emphasis added.]

c. Because title disputes are to be heard in the Michigan circuit court, the 36th

District Court did not have jurisdiction to order a Possession Judgment in favor of

Defendant NATIONAL CITY BANK.

134. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, a judicial officer for the State of

Michigan, committed an intentional or constitutional tort or gross negligence because her

acts and omissions violated at least three canons of the Michigan Code of Judicial

Conduct by:

a. Failing to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary,

b. Failing to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and

c. Failing to perform the adjudicative and administrative duties of office impartially

and diligently.

135. Defendant MAIA FIELDS, a certified court reporter for the State of Michigan,

committed gross negligence because her acts and omissions violated MCL 600.2516 by

virtue of demanding and receiving payment for services not rendered because the

transcripts requested were not filed in the court record and no Notice of Filing of

Page 43 of 47

Transcripts was prepared, filed or mailed to the parties.

136. MCL 600.2519 makes it a misdemeanor, grants treble damages for the aggrieved

party, and causes a court reporter to forfeit her office when a court reporter, such as

Defendant MAIA FIELDS, violates MCL 600.2516.

137. Defendant MAIA FIELDS failed to comply with MCR 7.210(B)(3) because she

failed to timely file the requested transcripts into the court.

138. Defendant ROSE WILLIAMS, a clerk of court, and/or the unknown court clerks

under her supervision committed gross negligence by violating MCR 8.119.

139. Defendants MAIA FIELDS, ROSE WILLIAMS, and unknown other court clerks

are not shielded by absolute immunity because, even though they were acting under the

direction of a judge, Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, the judge’s acts of

sabotage were not shielded because these acts are not adjudicative functions.

140. The sabotage of Plaintiffs’ appeal by the Defendants enumerated in Count Three

are the proximate cause of harm to Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs’ appeal has been delayed

for so long that anything but a modified order for nominal escrow will cause their appeal

to be dismissed with prejudice. Such a dismissal with prejudice puts Plaintiffs at risk of

eviction from their property even though the sheriff deeds are void.

141. Plaintiffs therefore allege that the afore-mentioned acts in Count Three constitute

state action in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their appeal by right,

obstruct justice, and deprive Plaintiffs of their due process and equal protection rights, as

well as their right to protection from unreasonable seizure, pursuant to the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

Page 44 of 47

142. Defendant ROSE WILLIAMS, as interim coordinator of the 36th District Court,

under the doctrine of respondeat superior and vicarious liability, has immediate

supervisory control over the court clerks and is responsible for training the court clerks

regarding the clerks’ failure to record documents on the Register of Actions, place

documents in the file, and send notices when necessary.

143. The mailing of untimely notices of an order dismissing an appeal without subject

matter jurisdiction, (see Exhibit K), in furtherance of a scheme to defraud Plaintiffs of

their property rights and rights of appeal, constitutes mail fraud and renders Defendant E.

LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES a co-conspirator in the RICO claims enumerated in Count

One.

144. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, in a continuing course of

misconduct and sabotage, directed Defendant MAIA FIELDS to not file the requested

transcripts.

145. Defendant E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, in a continuing course of

misconduct and sabotage, directed unknown court clerks of the 36th District Court, under

the supervision of Defendant ROSA WILLIAMS, to fail to record, fail to file, and/or

remove from the file documents beneficial to Plaintiffs’ case.

146. The communication between and participation among these three Defendants, E.

LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES, MAIA FIELDS, and ROSA WILLIAMS, in actions

which undermined Plaintiffs’ appeal and deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional, due

process, equal protection, and freedom from unreasonable seizure of property rights,

Page 45 of 47

render said Defendants as co-conspirators in the RICO claims enumerated in Count One

and Paragraph 143.

147. It is not within a judge’s actual scope of authority or discretion to sabotage and

conspire to sabotage Plaintiffs’ appeal and thereby deprive Plaintiffs of their

constitutional rights to protection from unreasonable seizures, due process, and equal

protection as guaranteed by the U.S. and Michigan Constitutions.

148. It is not a function normally performed by a judge or expected to be performed by

a judge that Plaintiffs would be subjected to sabotage and conspiracy to sabotage their

case and thereby deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights to protection from

unreasonable seizures, due process, and equal protection as guaranteed by the U.S. and

Michigan Constitutions.

149. The communication between and participation among Defendants E. LYNISE

BRYANT-WEEKES, MAIA FIELDS, ROSE WILLIAMS, and unknown court clerks in

a conspiracy to sabotage Plaintiff’s appeal demonstrate bad faith and/or that the

Defendants were acting outside of their scope of actual authority.

150. Wherefore, Plaintiffs seek from Defendants E. LYNISE BRYANT-WEEKES,

MAIA FIELDS, ROSE WILLIAMS, and JOHN and JANE DOE, UNKNOWN

DEFENDANTS, the following:

a. Joint and several liability in the amount of $1,000,000.00 for actual,

compensatory, special, consequential, treble, and other damages that include costs

and attorney’s fees in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts.

Page 46 of 47

b. Stay the proceedings in the Michigan courts pending the outcome of this

litigation.

c. Declaratory judgment that Defendants’ acts were unlawful.

d. Referral to the applicable Judicial Tenure, Michigan Bar, or licensing agency for

investigation of dereliction of duty, malfeasance of office, and misconduct.

Respectfully submitted on this _______ day of November 2009,

___________________________ ____________________________Anita E. Belle, Plaintiff in Pro Per Thelma L. Belle, Plaintiff in Pro Per19935 Vaughan 19935 VaughanDetroit, Michigan 48219 Detroit, Michigan 48219313-532-0161 313-532-0161

Page 47 of 47