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United States Arms control and Disarmament Agency.Ninth Annual Report to Congress.Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.PUB-5431 Dec 6967p.Superintendent of Documents, U.S. GovernmentPrinting Otfice, Washington, D.C. 20402 (s.35)

FDRS Price MF-$0.65 HC Not Availand? from FDES.Agencies, Annual Reports, Armed Forces, FederalGovernment, *Foreign 2olicy, Foreign Relations,Government Publications, *National Defense, *NuclearWarZare, *Political Science, world hffairs, *AcridProblems*Arms Control, Disatmaolent, Peace, SALT, StrategicArras Limitation Talks

This annual report surveys activities of the ArcsControl and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and summarizes disarmamentdevelopments for the calendar year 1968. An act of Congress, statesthat ACDA must have such a position within the Government that it canprovide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of theexecutive branch, an.d the congress with recommendations concerningUnited States arms control and disarmament policy, and can asses theeftect ot tnese recommendations upon our fcreign policies, ournational security policies, and our economy. Major subjects of thereport ace: 1) Strategic Arms Limitations Talk; (SALT); 2) NuclearArms Control Proposals; 3) Chemical and Biclot2ical Weapms Control;4) Arms Control Measure for the Seabed; 51 Nonproliferation ofNuclear Weapons; 6) Conventional Arms and Military Expenditu. 7)

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe; 8) GeneralAdvisor' Committee; and, 9) Agenc' Operations. ACDA policy, researchactivities, interagency relationslip, status of the Social ScienceAdvisory Board, and public information services ace discussed. It isnoted that a questionnaire was sent to institutions of higherlearning as a result of increasing academic interest in coursesrelated to arms control and. disarmament. Appendices to the reportinclude texts of Presidential messages, policy addresses, treatydrafts, Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as lists of ACDA Depositorylibraries, tter'bers of the Social Scier,:e Advisory Board, andofficials of the Agency. (Author/JSB)

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thAnnual Report to Congress

THE UNITED STATES

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

January 1, 1969 December 31, 1969

2

LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States

It is with a sense of gratification that I transmit to the Congress the NinthAnnual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The events of the past year have shown that through negotiation we canmove toward the control of armaments in a manner that 1% ill bring a greatermeasure of security than we can obtain from arms alone.

There is reason to be hopeful of the possibility that an understanding canbe reached with the Soviet Union which will permit both nations to reducethe burden and danger of competitive development of strategic arms.

The process has begun. The preliminary, exploratory phase of the StrategicArms Limitation Talks was held in Helsinki in November and DecemberAmbassador Gerard Smith, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency, whom I named to head our delegation to the Talks, reportedto me that the exchange of views was serious and augured well for the nextphase to begin in Vienna in April.

We have undertaken these negotiations because it is in our interest to doso. We believe the Soviet Union recognizes a similar interest. In addition,continuing technological ad ances in weapons systems give warning thatdelay will only complicate the arduous task of achieving agreements.

The other nations of the world are looking to the United States and theSoviet Union to limit and reduce our strategic arsenals. I believe that a verifi-able agreement which will limit arms on both sides will in fact enhance mutualsecurity.

The report which I now send to you describes the contribution of the ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency to the preparation for and the conductof negotiations on strategic arms limitation. The report also describes effortsin pursuit of other arms control measures directed to controlling chemicalwarfare and bacteriological research, to bringing the nonproliferation treatyinto effect and to banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of massdestruction from the seabed.

In transmitting this report, I reaffirm my Administration's concern with thesubstance rather than the rhetoric of arms control. Wherever possible, con-sistent with our national security, I want our talents, our energies and ourwealth to be dedicated, not to destruction, but to improving the yrality of lifefor all our people.

THE WittTF. House,

February, 1970

OFFICE OF1-1E DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCYwAS, N,ONI

January 20, 1970

Mr. President:

I submit herewith to you for transmittalto the Congress, as required by the Arcs Contro7and Disarmament Act, the ninth annual reportconcerning the activities of the U. S. ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency.

This report covers the perioo from January 1,1969 to the end of the calendar year. he Agencyhas arranged for it to be printed by the Govern-ment Printing Office.

Resp fully, /

..543414..e:/

/ . .-

t,ed-t,e'/

The President,The White House.

Gerard Smith

/,`

INTRODUCTION 1

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS 3

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS 7

Comprehensive Tea Ban 7

Cutoff of Fissionable Materials Production 8

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONTROL 10

ARMS CONTROL MEASURE FOR THE SEABED 14

NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 18

CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES 22

MUTUAL AN+) BALANCED FORCE Ri:DUCTIONSIN CENTRAL EUROPE 25

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE 27

AGENCY OPERATIONS 30

Organization 3G

Formulation and Coordination of PolicyRecommendations 31

Planning and Coordination of Cesearch 31

Social Science Advisory Board 32

Public Informatio., 32

APPENDIXES

I. President's Message to U.S. Ambassador GerardC. Smith at the Opening of Talks at Helsinki, Finland,November 17, 1969 37

II. Address by Secretary of State William P. RogersBefore Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired onStrategic Arms Limitation Talks, November 13, 1969

III. Communique on the Meeting of the Delegatirns of theUnited States of America end the Union of SovietSocialist Republics on Questions of Curbing the StrategicArms Race, December 22, 1969 44

IV. Statement by the President, Announcing Policy Decisions on Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs,November 25, 1969 45

V. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War ofAsphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bac.teriological Methods of Warfare. Signed at Geneva,June 17, 1925 47

VI. Revised Draft Convention for the Prohibition of BiologIcal Methods of Warfare and Accompanying DraftSecurity Council Resolution Proposed by the UnitedKingdom at the Conference of the Committee onDisarmament, August 26, 1969 48

VII. Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of

tion on the Seabed ant_ the Ocean Floor and in theNuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruc

Subsoil Thereof (Revised), October 30, 1969 51

VIII. The Social Science Advisory Board 54

!X. ACDA Depository libraries 55

X. Officials of the Agemy 60

39

VII

fr

President Nixon addressing theUnited Nvions General Assembly

7

INTRODUCTION

119VaIrmleuseamwmalrarce,lawmus.n.nmonzr...6 rars.vo,usunerOlawres-S060Mr.znr.suatr.r,,,sr./..0, 441

PRESIDENT NIXON TCLD THE AMERI-CAN PEOPLE IN HIS INAUGURALADDRESS, "After a period of con-frontation, we : re entering an era ofnegotiation."

The U.S. Arms Control and Dis-armament Agency (ACDA), in itsactivities during 1969, has played itspart in seeking to implement thispolicy by seeking alternatives to armscompetition in the pursuit of nationalsecurity.

The President stated at the time ofhis appointment of Gerard C. Smithas Director, on January 29, "The tasksof the Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency belong to the most im-porant of my Administration. . . Iam di .cting that the role and statusof the Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency within the U.S. Gov-ernment be upgraded. Mr. Smith willhave direct and ready access to theSecretary of State and to the Presi-dent and will participate in all meet-ings of the National Security Councilat which matters within the scope ofhis mission are considered."

The year 1969 briught progress ina number of areas of endeavor in thearms control field.

The United States and the SovietUnion began the Strategic ArmsLim'tation Talks (SALT) with apreliminary phase in Helsinki fromNovember 17 to December 22.AMA's Director grnith was namedto lead what President Nixon termed

Introduction571-815 0 -70-- -2

"one of the most momentous negoti-ations ever entrusted to an Americandelegation." During this prelimi-nary phase, a work program wasdrawn up as the basis for the sub-stantive negotiations 'o follow, andagreement was rea :hed that the talkswould resume in Vienna on April 16,1970.

The Conference of the Committeeon Ditrmament (CCD) replacedthe Eighteen- Nation Committee onDisarmament (ENDC), meeting inGeneva. The membership was ex-panded to 26 nations in order to makeit more representative of the worldtoday while maintaining its effective-ness as a relatively small negotiatingbody which serves as the world's prin-cipal forum for multilateral armscontrol negotiations.' The Agency

'See ppendix I, p. 37.The Committee. which el-ets at the

Palais des Nations n Geneva, will enterits ninth year ot. Fa. 17, 1970. It ssas

established under a joint 'J S.U.S.S.R,agreement and welcomed by the GeneralAssembly. While it is not a U.N. body.it reports to the General Assembly andthe Disarmament Commission and is seryic-td by the U.N. Secretariat. Membershipis now made up of 6 NATO nationsCanada, France, Italy, Netherlands,United Kingdom, and United States(France has never taken her scat at theconfecence table)and Japan; 6 fromthe Warsaw Pa :tBulgaria, Czecho-slovakia, llungat f, Poland, Romania,and U.S.S Mongolia; and 12nonalignee nations Argentina, Brazil,Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco,Nigeria, Pakistar, , Seeeden, United ArthRepublic, and Yugoslrvia.

1

participated in ENDC and CCD dis-cussio.rs from March 18 to May 22and from July 3 to October 30. TheU.S. delegation was headed at various times by the Directo; of ACDA,the Deputy Director, and the Assist-ant Director for International Re la-"ons. Tn addition, the Director andthe Assistant Director for Interna-tional Relations were members of theU.S. de'egation to the twenty-fourthU.N. General Assembly, which metfrom September 16 to December 17.

The United States and the SovietUnion, as Co-Chairmen of the Con-ference of the Colirmittee on Disarm-ament, ,abled a joint it ift treatybanning nuclear weapons and otherweapons of mass destruction from theseabed. After some revision in re-sponse to the views of other member3of the Committee, the treaty draftwas annexed to the report of theCCD to the U.N. General Assembly.It was the subject of debate in theGeneral lssembly and was then re-manded to the CCD for furtherconsideration.

Substantive discussions too placeat the Geneva Conference and in theGeneral Assembly on arms controlmeasures related to chemical and bio-logical weapons. President Nixongave great impetus to these effortswhen on Nov embc i 25 he announcedsigaificant U.S. policy decisions re-lating to chemical and biologicalagents and warfare.

Progress was made in Geneva indeveloping an international exchangeof seismic data, which can he usefulin effort to reach an agreement toban all nuclear weapons teas, includ-ing those conducted underground.

The United States and the SovietUnion concurrently signed their in-struments of ratification of the Treatyon the Nonproliferatio. of NuclearWeapons. A total of 93 nationshave now signed the treaty and 25have deposited their instruments ofratification. The treaty will enter into:3:Ce when the 3 depositary governments I the United States, the United

2

Kingdom, and the Soviet Union)and 40 other nations have depositedtheir instruments of ratification. It isanticipated this number will bereached early in 1970.

Before multilateral or bilateral ne-gotiations on an arms control measure are begun, exhaustive work mustbe done to insure that the sec'rityinterests of the United States; oothimr..ediate and long-range, are fullyprotected, and that necessary consul-tations with our allies have beenundertaken.

The formulation of U.S. policy onarms control is the result of extensivecoordination and consultatioa withinthe Government. ACDA ha, main-tained (iay-to-clay contact with theDepartments of State and Defense,the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CentralIntelligence Agency, the AtomicEnergy Commission, and other ex-ecutive departments and agencies en-gaged in national security affairs.

The primary device for the reviewand coon"nation of such recommen-dations is the National SecurityCouncil. 'Upon taking office, Presi-dent Nixon revitalized the NSC asthe orgar 'zation responsirr for con-sideration of policy issues requiringPresidential determination. The Di-rector of ACDA participated in tensessions of the NSC on relevant na-tional security question.

ACCA has planned and mannedan integrated research program insupport of its recommendations andits conduct of international nego-tiations. The me, h has been car-ried out by internal stag' analysis sup-ported 1:1/ outside contractors. Thefield of inqc.'ry ranged from the com-plex technology of strategic missilesystems, to political and social sciencefactors bearing on arms control issues.

This report describes the effortsthat have been niada in the past yearby the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-annatirnt Agency toward solvingsome of the major problems whichstand as obstacles to world security.

ACDA NINTH 1NN VAIL REPORT

STRATEGIC ARMSLIMITATION TALKS

471.111.711:110096141br 7.0,1.70://701/1.ENYONZIleralin. aSealraaptlir. MAMOIWOIMIMe"-

Where national security interests may have operated in thepast to stimulate the strategic arms race, those samenational security interests may now operate to stop or slowdown the race. The question to be faced in the strategicarms talks is whether societies with the advanced intellectto develop these awesome weapons of mass destructionhave the combined wisdom is control ad curtail them.,

THE PRELIMINARY PHASE OF THESTRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS(SALT) was held in Helsinki fromNovember 17 to December 22. Thecommunique issued by the Americanand Soviet delegations at the conclu-sion characterized the exchar.r ofviews as "....-eful to both sides." Thepreliminary phase was exploratory innaturea serious effort by both sidesto find common ground toward in-creasing ."atual security throughcurbs on strategic arms. The corn-muniqve reported that as a result ofthe exchange, "each side is able bet-ter to understand the N iews of theother with respect to the problemunder consideration. An understand-ing was reached on the general rangeof questions which v ill be the subjectof further United States-Sovietexchanges."

The stage was thus set for the mainnegotiations, which are scheduled tobegin in Vienne on April 16, 1970.

Secretary of State Rogers. Nov. 13,1969. See Appendix II, p. 39 full textof address.

'See Appendix II f, p 44.

In his message to AmbassadorGerard Smith on the occasion of theopening of the talks in He/sink: onNovember 17, President Nixon said:". . . for our part we will be guidedby the concept of n aintaining 'suf-ficiency' in the forces required to zu-o-tect ourselves and our allies. Irecognize that the leaders of theSoviet Union bear similar defense re-sponsibilities." And he instructedAmbassador Smith and the Americandelegation to approach the negotia-tions "recogniring the legitimatese::trity interests on each side."

Secretary of State Rogers said onNovember 3, "Previous disparity isnuclear strength has been succeededby the sit .tion of sufficiency . . .

and, because this condition will con-tinue for the foreseeable future, thetime seems to be propitious for con-sidering how to curb the race 'n whichneither side in all likelihood can gainmeaningful advantage."

In recent years it has become in-creasingly apparent that competitiveaccumulation of weapons will notguarantee the basic security of eitherside, !x. use any attempt to seek

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 3

10

strategic advantage will be met bycount .rrneasures to preserve a retal-iatory capability. This mutual capa-bility for assured destruction, there-fore, provides a basis for a mutuallimitation of strategic weapons.

"There is one thing stronger thanall the arniies in the world and thatis an idea whose time has come."This quotationattributed to VictorHugo--might thus be applied to theagreement finally reached by theUnited States and she Soviet Unionto 1.old strategic arms limitation talks.

A little over 2 years after theUnited States called on the SovietUnion to explore the possibility of anagreement, Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko said in a speech to the Su-preme Soviet on June 27, 1968, Oneof the unexplored regions of disarma-ment is the search fc: an understand-ing on mutual rest:iction and sub-sequent reduction of strategic vehiclesfor the delivery of nuclear weaponsoffensive and defensiveincludinganti-missile. The Soviet Governmentis ready for an exchange of opinionon this question."

Unfortunately, the Ny,rldwide ex-pectation that at last discussions couldbeg.n to find a way out of the nucleararms competition proved premature.Esen as arrangements were beingmade on a time and place for thetalks, Czechoslovakia svas invaded byWarsas, Pact troops, and the m-Jmentof opportunity dissolved.

When the new U.S. President wassworn in on January 20, the SovietForeign Ministry took that occasiononce again t o e .7,press willingness toenter into discussions. PresidentNixon promptly yoked his supportfor the strategic talks, while pointirg

it that their timing and context alsowere important.

At the same time, President Nixonmade it r that it was the objec-tive of his new Administration to besure that the United States has suffi-cient military poser to defend its

interests and to maintain its commit-ments around the ssorld. In this con-hertion, he discussed the semanticsof the U.S. strategic nuclear postureand observed in the context of to-day's weaponry "sufficiency" is a moreappropriate term than either "supe-riority," or "parity."

Though the work which had beendone by the previous Administrationprior to January 1969 seas extremelyuseful, the President asked for a de-tailed study before engaging in thetalks. In addition to an overall reviewof military requirements, the NationalSecurity Council established an inter-agency steering committee to studythe issue of strategic arms control.This committee was headed byACDA's Director Gerard Smith, andincluded high-level representatives ofthe Department: of State and De-fense, the Joint chiefs of Stiff, theCIA, the Atomic Energy Commission,and the National Security Councilstaff. The group was instructed tostudy the strategic, political, andverification aspects of arms controloptions. Its task included developinga range of options for limiting stra-tegic arms, an evaluating the impli-cations of each

The steering comm+Jec was sup-ported by a number of panels whichworked on detailed technical andstrategic analyses of specific a_pectsof the problem using modem com-puter techniques where required.Thus the steering committee's reportwas the result of the efforts of manyexperts in strategic planning, foreignpolicy and anus control from alt theFederal agencies sharing in the re-sponsibility for national security.

A Verification Panel was also estab-lished under the chairmanship of Dr.Henry Kissinger for the purpose ofevaluating the many complex verifi-cation problems associated with stra-tegic arms control. The Director of'1,CDA ; the Under Secretary of State;the Deputy Secretary of Defense; theAttorney General; the Deputy Di.

4 ACM N1NTP ANNUAL REPORT

11

rector of CIA; and the Assistant tothe Chairman, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff for Strategic Arms Negotiationsserve as members.

The primary aims of the prepara-tory work were to define the effectsof specific constraints on specificweapons systems, and the verificationmeasures necessary for each possibleagreement in order to insura confi-dence that national security interestsare protected.

On fi se 19 President Nixon an-nounced at a news conference thatthe National Security Council wascompleting t),e preparation ,r tl estrategic talks. Consultation with al-lied nitions was expected to continuethrough the balance of June andthrough July. The President said,"We have set July 31 as a targetdate for the beginning of the talks,and Secretary Rogers has so informedthe Soviet Ambassador."

In early July the President an-nounced that the U.S delegation toSALT would be headed by ACDADirector Smith, with (then) DeputyAssistant Secretary of State Far/c-,, asalternate U.S. representati e. Am-bassador Philip J. Farley was :,sibse-quently appointed Deputy Director ofACDA and retains his role as alter-nate U.S. repr2sentative to SALT inthat positie.1 In addition to theseACDA officials, the delebatiois list in-cluded: former De, Jty Sccretiry ofDefense Pau/ Nitze; AmbassadorLlewellyn Thompson; to. mer Secre-tary of the Air Force Harold Brown;and Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison, USAF.

Altha igh Foreign Minister Gro,,-iy-ko had reiterated Soviet interest inSALT in a speech to the SupremeSoviet in July, official word from theSoviets as to a time and place for thetalks was not received until lateOctober.

On October 25 the Wt to douseannounced that the Strategic ArmsLimitation Talks would begin in

Strategic Arms Limitatior. Talks

Helsinki on November 17, "for pre-lirtinary discussion of the questiorsinvolved." A similar announcementwas made in Moscow. SecretaryRogers held a news conference laterthe same day to elaborate on theGovernment's approarsi to and ex-pectatiuns for the talk.. He explainedthat they would be preliminary innature and devoted to exploring whatsubjects should be covered in the mainnegotiations to follow. Although pre-dicting that success in the talks eouldresult in imrroved relations with theSoviet Union which might have abeneficial ell ect on other problemareas in international relations, theSecretary made clear that no precon-ditions had been laid down for theconduct of the talks.

The Under Secretaries Committeeof the National Security Council w ascharged with providing continuingguidance for the U.S. negotiatingteam. This Committee, in turn, estab-lished a Backstopping Committee,chaired by the Deputy Director ofACDA, to provide day-to-day supportto the delegation in Helsinki.

The bilateral meetings began in anatmosphere characterized as bothcordial and serious. The public open-ing stz..."ments made by AmbassadorSmith and by Ambass. dor VladimirS. Serneriov, the head of the Sovietdelegation, reflected the businesslikeapproach of both sides to the taskahead.

The Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency's contribution to thepreparations for the talks and to theconduct of the discussions themselves,se.skreatly facilitated by the existenceof the extensive data be which hadbeen built from its continuing re-search program. To supplement andsupport its internal research and ana-lytical capabilities, the Agency hasexternal corarcts directed to thetechnical aspects of the arms controlimplications of both defensive andof strategic weapons. TheAgency also draws on the research

5

12

capabilities of other Governmentagencies to insure that all pertinentinformation is brought to bear onSALT considerations. The purpose ofthis research is to gain detailed under-standing of the nature and implica-tions of strategic weapons systems andof methods of verifying compliancewith various strategic arrr.s restric-tions under consideration.

Potential arms control agreementswhich limit the deployment and/ortesting of strategic weapons systemsmay necessitate inspection systemscapable of detecting a change in thecharacteristics of launch vehicles,both offensive and defensive, and, inthe case of submarine launched bal-listic missiles (SLBMs), the sub-marines used to deploy them. ACD:tis currently pursuing research pro-grams to develop inspection systemscapable of detecting upgraded offen-

sive missile performance characteris-tics, the upgrading of ballistic missilesubmarines, upgrading surface-to-airmissiles to give them an ABM capa-bility, and the detection of the pres-ence of nuclear weapons.

A study which will evaluate thecapability of manned and unmannedsensors at a missile to -t range to deter-mine whether or not performancecharacteristics of offensive strategicmissiles have been upgraded is cur-rently in the planning phase.

Research and analysis of the com-plex factors involved is continuing asthe United States prepares for thesubstantive phase of SALT scheduledto begin April 16. In cooperation withother departments and agencies,ACDA will continue to play a leact-ing role in the conduct of the talksand in the supporting act;vities neces-sary to the negotiations.

-14

Ambassador Gerard Smi'h (right), head of the U.S. delegation toSALT, prvpares to confer with the head of the Soviet delegation,Ambassador Vladimir S. Semenov (second from right). Behind theNo neg tiators are two uembers of the U.S. delegation, foinerDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Niue (left) and Lt. Gen. RoyalB. Allison, USAF.

6 AMA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

1 8

NUCLEAR ARMSCONTROL PROPOSALS

. . . the United States supports the conclusion of acomprehensive test ban adequately verified.

. . the United States delegation will continue to pressfor an agreement to cut off the production of fissionablematerials for weapons purposes and to transfer suchmaterials to peaceful purposes.,

Comprehensive Test Ban

SINCE THE LIMITFD TEST BAN CAMEINTO FORCE IN 1953, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament(ENDC) has pursued a comprehen-sive ban on nuclear weapons tests asa logical and necessary further restric-tion on nuclear arms. The Commit-tee has as a mandate the U.N. Gen-eral As embly resolution adopted in1963 "tc continue with a sense ofurgency" negotiation.; for a treaty sus-pending nuclear anc elermonucleartests.

The debate during the 1969 ses-sions of the Geneva Conferences:, need that the discussions whichhave taken place in the interveningyear.: in the ENDC, the General As-sembly, and international scientificmeetings have resulted in an in-creased appreciation of the necessityfor procedures to insure that a com-prehensive ban was bring respected.

' President Nixon's Letter to Ambassa-dor Gerard C. Smith, on the Opening ofthe Conference of the EighteenNationDisarmament Committee, Mar. 18, 1969.Th.r Committee ace s redesignated the G071-lerence of th. Coin nittee on Dina-ina-mont (CCD) i Aug. 2o, 1969.

Nueltar Arms Control Prop s6'r

In his messages to the ENDC in11farch and in July, President Nixonrepeated U.S. support for ar. ade-quately verified comprehensive testban, and called for greater under-standing of the verification issue, sincedifferences regarding this questionhave thwarted achievement of thiskey arms control measure.

On April 1 the Swedish representa-tive to the Conference introduced aworking paper containing a drafttreaty banning underground nuclearweapons tests. She cited the 1968 re-port of the Stockholm InternationalInstitute for Peace and Conflict Re-search (SIPRI) in contending thatthe existing international seismic net-work could differentiate betweenearthquakes and nuclear explosionsdown to very low yields. The Swedishdraft put forth the premise that addi-tional powerful seismic arr'y stationssoon to come into service, along w:ththe establishment of a workable seis-mic data exchang.: 4stem, would im-prove control ..apabilities to the pointtha or-site impection could not benecessary

The U.S. representative, Ambassa-dor ,t.d an Fisher, responded to theSwedish proposal. The SIM! report

7

1 (1

had found, he told the Conference,that a "..lear separation betweenearthquakes and nuclear explosionscould not be made by teleseismicmeans for underground nuclear testexplosions up to tens of kilotons ofexplosive yield." lie pointed out thatnuclear explosions in this range couldhave significant military value andcould not be ignored in negotiating anacceptable treaty.

The Soviet Union endorsed theproposal for an international ex-change of seismic data in the contextof a comprehensive test ban butwould not accept international in-spection on its territory nor permitevaluation of data by an internationalagency.

As a further and important con-tribution to the effort to increase un-derstanding of seismic events, Am-bassador Fisher submitted a workingpaper to the ENDC, describing theimplementation of the U.S. seismicinvestigation proposal. This idea wasfirst advanced in the United Nationsin December 1968, by AmbassadorWilliam C. Foster, who was at thattime Director of the Arms Controland Disarmament Agency and amember of the U.S. delegation to theGeneral Assembly. The proposal of-fered to use nr,-lear explosions, to beconducted by tug United States as apart of its research into peaceful ap-plications of nuclear energy, for thecollateral objective of worldwideseismic investigation. The workingpaper gave a description of the firstexplosion, code-named Project RU-LISON, to be used in implementingthe U.S proposal, and furnishedtechnical facts, such as precise site,depth of the explosion, general geol-ogy in the vicinity, and other datawhich would be pertinent to seismicmeasurements.

Several weeks before the actual det-onation, which occm red on Septem-ber 10, the U.S. Coast and GeodeticSunny alerted seismic stations world-wide. The event proved to be par-

titularly interesting seismically andw s well recorded. The U.S. Coastand Geodetic Survey, under an agree-ment with ACDA, is assembling datacollected from within and outside theUnited States and will prepare a re-port on its computations. The reportwill include an analysis of the datausing seismic identification criteriafor distinguishing between explosionsand earthquakes. Other interestednations will thus have the oppor-tunity to compare these findings withtheir own analyses and to discuss bothin relevant forums.

ACDA is also making use of theProject RULISON nuclear explosionfor continuing its research in severaltr.,:miques which might be used byon-site inspectors under a compre-hensive test ban. A field test is beingcarried out to measure the surfaceeffects produced by the explosionwhich might assist on-site inspectorsin finding and identifying the s;te ofthe explosion, Nfeasurements are alsobeing made, and vvill continue overthe next several months, to determineif any radioactive gases are detectableat the surface. This field test trill fur-ther investigate the usefulness ofradioactive-gas sampling as a tech-nique for or site inspection.

Cutoff of FissionableMaterials Production

The LI ilted States has proposed averified cutqff fissionable-materialsproduction for use in weapons, to beaccompanied by the transfer ofagreed quantities of weaponsstock-pile fissionable materials to peacefulpurposes. In 1965 this offer was ex-panded to provide that the materialsfor transfer be obtained by the dem-onstrated ckstruction of "thousands"of nuclear weapons.

in his letter to Ambassador GerardSmith on the opening of the GenevaConference, March 18, 1969, Presi-dent Nixon said that the United

8 ACM NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

15

States will continue to press for suchan agreement.

In ! Ambassador Fisher offereda new ,nent in the U.S. proposal:In order to provide for compliancewith the agreement, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA)would be asked to safeguard the nu-clear material in each nation's peace-ful nuclear activities and to verifythe continued shutdown of any facil-ities for production of fissionable ma-terial that are closed.

This change was an attempt tosolve the verification problems whichhad previously impeded prospects foragreement. The earlier U.S. proposalhad suggested adversary inspectionarrangements, which had met withrefusal by the Soviet Union. The in-troduction of the IAEA's safeguardssystem as the means for insuringagainst diversion of peaceful nuclearmaterials to weapons use follows theapproach to thr verification problemwhich was adopted in article III ofthe Nonproliferation Treaty.

Ambassador Fisher emphasized tothe Committee two aspects of the cut-off roposal that are particularlyrelevant to recent arms control de-velopments. First he stressed the valueof the cutoff measure as a means ofhalting the nuclear arms race. Fis-sionable material is the essential in-gredient for a nuclear bomb, andlimitation on production of fission-abi: material is one way to preventthe growth of .stockpiles of nuclearwevons. American efforts to reachsuch an agreement go back to 1956,when President Eisenhower first pro-posed a mutual cutoff a time when

stockpiles of nuclear bombs weremuch smaller than they are now. Thepresent nuclear confrontation wouldbe at a much lower level had thatinitial effort been successful.

The second consideration is the im-portance of this measure as a prudentand necessary step toward establish-ing an equitable system of safeguardson all production of fissionable ma-terials. Ambassador Fisher told theCommittee that the United Statesbelieves "the nuclear-weapon Pow-ers should be prepared to accept, inthe context of a cutoff agreement,the same safeguards on their fission-able material production facilities asare appropriate to verify nuclearnonproliferation in the nonnuclear-weapon States."

The proposal was well received bythe nonaligned members and by theUnited Kingdom, Canada, and Ja-pan. A number of delegates made thepoint that a cutoff in the productionof fissionable materials for weaponspurposes by the nuclear powers wouldbalance the restriction accepted bythe nonnticlear-weapon nations insig-nin; the Nonproliferation Treaty.The Swedish representative charac-terized a cutoff agreement, a compre-hensiv,; test ban, and the Nonprolifer-ation Treaty as "parts of one and thesame parcel, as they would assurequalitative and quan '',ative freezeson nuclear weapons development."

The Soviet Union again rejectedthe U.S. cutoff proposal, repeatingits claim that the United States wasmotivated by an "over-production"of nuclear materials for militarypurposes.

Nuclear AM.( Control Proposals 98r8 -81a 0T 0----3

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICALWEAPONS CONTROL

A1INSMERarillIVISEles,2051100,14111:11911WPORatlICSILUIPINI

The specter of chemical and biological warfare arouseshorror and revulsion throughout the world:

WHILE NOT A PARTS' TO THE GENEVAPROTOCOL OF 1925 the United Statesformally pledged at the U.N. Gen-eral Assembly in 1966 and i968 toadhere to its principles and objectives,which prohibit the first use in warof poison gas and biological methodsof warfare. This has always been U.S.practice. It teas apparent, however,that U.S. policy in this field teas notsufficiently defined; and soon aftertaking office President Nixon directeda broad study within the NationalSecurity Council of U.S. policy, pro-grams and operational concepts forchemical and biological warfare andagents.

Participants were the Departmentof State, the Department of Defense,the Central Inttlfigence Agency, theArms Control and DisarmamentAgency, and the President's SpecialAssistant for Science and Technology.The NSC Interdepartmental Politi-cal-Military Group was given the re-sponsibility for leadership.

The study covered every aspect ofthe questior The participants wereinstructed to delineate the nature ofthe threat to the United States and itsAllies and possible alternative ap-proaches in meeting the threat; todiscuss the utility of and circurn-

`Message from President Nixon to theENDC, July 3, 1969.

10

17

stances for possible empinyrnent ofchemical and biological agents; to de-fine research and development ob-jectives; to review current applica-tions of U.S. policy relating to chem-ical riot control agents and chemicaldefoliants; and to assess the implica-tions of chemical warfare and bio-logical research programs for U.S.foreign relations. Task forces wereorganized to analyze the problemfrom the standpoint of foreign ca-pabilities, the U.S. chemical warfareand biological research program, andinternational considerations.

ACDA participated in the taskform chaired by the Departments ofState and Defense. ACDA personnelchaired the task force studying armscontrol considerations, including thequestion of ratification of the 1925Geneva Protocol.'

The protocol had been drafted1925 at the instigation of the UnitedStates. Moved by the large scale de-structive effects of poison gas used byboth sides during World War I, theUnited States proposed to the GenevaConference on Traffic in Arms a con-vention banning the use in war ofpoison gas and biological methoc's ofwarfare. The United states signed theprotocol, and it was favorably re-ported by the Senate Foreign Rela-

' See Appendix V, p. 47.

ACDA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

Ambassador James F. Leonard, head of the U.S.delegation to the Conference of the Committee onDisarmament (left) with Ambassador Alexey A.Roshchin, head of the Soviet delegation. The twoare Co-Chairmen of the Committee.

lions Committee. The protocol wasnever toted uf,ois by the full Senateand was returned to the Committee inDecember, 1926. There it /ay until1947 when it was returned to theexecutive branch as one of a group oftreaties and agreements on which ac-tion had not been taken for manyyears. The protocol came into forcewithout the United States becominga party and now has 84 adherents, in-cluding all other NATO countries,the Warsaw Pact nations, and Com-munist China. Of the major industrialpowers, only the United States andJapan have not yet become parties.

In mid-November the interdepart-mental review was presented to theNational Security Council, After con-sideration by the NSC, the Presidentannounced his policy decisions onNovember 25.' Ile reaffirmed ourlong-standing renunciation of the firstuse of lethal chemical weapons and

See Appendix IV, p. 45.

extended this renunciation to the firstuse of incapacitating chemicals.

With respect to the biological pro-gram, his decisions were to renounceany use of lethal or incapacitatingbiological agents and weapons, andall other methods of biological war-fare; to confine biological research todefensive measures such as immuni-zation and safety measures; and tocall on the Department of Defenseto recommend plans for the disposalof existing stocks of biological weap-ons. He associated the United Stateswith the principles and objectives ofthe British draft convention to banbiological warfare which had beenpresented at the Geneva Conferenceof the Committee on Disarmamenton August 26,1969.2

In consonance with these decisions,the President announced that hewould submit the Geneva Protocol to

'See Appendix V/, p. 48.

Chemical and Biological Weapon.; Coot col 13

I is

the Senate for its advice and consentto ratification.

It would clearly be in the interestof the United States to have reliableinternational agreements underwhich all nations would accept pro-hibitions on chemical and biologicalweapons, and it is official U.S. policyto work toward such agreements. Atthe opening of the Geneva disarma-ment talks on March 22, the Presi-dent instructed the U delegationto "join s+1 other delegations in ex-ploring a,.) proposals or ideas thatcould contribute to sound and effec-tive arms control 'elating to theseweapons." This position is consistentwith the strong sentiments for out-lawing chemical and biological war-fare which have found expressionduring the !)ast year in nany inter-national forums.

In December 1968 the General As-sembly adopted a resolution request-ing the U.N. Secretary-General toprepare a report on the effects of thepossible use o' chemical and bacterio-logical (biological) means of warfare.The study, prepared with the assist-ance of experts from 14 countries in-cluding the United States, was issuedon July 1, 1969. Prominent amongthe report's conclusions were (1)the effects (on both victim and ini-tiator) of chemical and biologicalweapons, if used on a large scale inwar, were virtually unpredictable;(2) despite cost factors, any countrycould achieve at least a tninimal ca-pability in these fields; and (3) a banon the development, production, andstockpiling of chemical and biologicalagents i.itended for purposes of warwould facilitate international eF. itstoward broader arms control agree-ments.

The question of chemical and bio-logical weapons was high on theagenda of the Geneva Conference ofthe Commis tce on Disarmament dur-ing its 1969 sessions.

The CCD's report to the UnitedNations, prepared at the end of the

12

session which adjourned October 30,noted the wide support for the pur-poses and principles of the 1925Geneva Protocol and stated that theCommittee would "continue inten-sise work on the problem of chemi-cal and bacteriological (biological)warfare."

In the General Assembly the prin-cipal developments were (1) the in-troduction of a Soviet draft treatywhich would ban all chemical andbiological weapons but which did notprovide fcr adequate inspection; (2)the adoption of a Swedish resolution(which the United States votedagainst), whose purpose was to de-clare as contrary to international lawall chemical and biological agents ofwarfare, including riot control agentsard herbicides; and (3) adoption ofa Canadian Resolution which calledon all nations to accede to the 1925Geneva Protocol, recommended thatthe U.N. Secretary-General's reportbe used as a basis for the CCD'sfurther consideration of the elimina-tion of chemical and biologicalweapons, and referred the British andSoviet draft conventions to the CCDfor further study.

It can be expected, therefore, thatwhen the CCD reconvenes inFebruary 1970, the question ofchemical and biological weapons willreceive considerable attention.

In approaching this problem froman arms control perspective, it is im-po-t int to recognize that there arebast differences between chemicalan biological means of warfare thatindicate they should be dealt withseparately. Thes,.. differences relatenot ail>, to technical aspects, such astoxicity, speed of action, duration ofeffects, controllability and residualeffects, but also to their differentmilitary roles. One of the greatestvalues of the NSC study was theidentification of these differences.

The President has supported theprinciples of the British initiative onbiological Is vapors, although there

ACM NINTH ANN UAL RIPIIRT

zi,e certain aspects of the draft con-vention which in the course of nego-tiations we will seek to clarify orfurther refine.

Limitations cn chemical weaponsraise more difficult problems. Extm-sive research has shown that a skillfitland determined evrder could make itdifficult to detect his violations of aban on production or possession ofchemical weapons. Research intosensors and detection techniques iscontinuing, in coordination with othergovernment agencies, and potentiallypromising developments are beingtested. The current ACDA program

provide more insight into theprobabilities of deortting clandestineor unde-lared activities.

With the cooperation of the De-partment of Defense, ACDA is work-

ing out plans to investigate the prob-lems of verifying the declareddestruction of chemical we. eons;these investigations will be conductedin connection with actual destructionand demilitarization operations to becarried out by the Department ofDefense.

For chemical and biological weap-ons, ACDA research has developeda number of indicators for use byinspectors. In December HowardFurnas, Special Assistant to theACDA Director, told a House For-eign Affairs Subccfimittee, "We be-lieve that major progress can be madetoward resolving the technical prob-lems involved in verificatio: by di-rect observation, and we intend todevote greater efforts to this end."

Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 13

20

ARMS CONTROL. MEASUREFOR THE SEABED

Ar.uaragrameatvesmarmactlaexamasmareo

. . . there is intrinsic merit in our seeking to prevent anuclear arms race on the seabed while there is still time.

. . . The significance of action to preclude new types ofarms races from beginning should never be under-emphasized if we are to be successful in our efforts tohalt the armr race.'

THE SEA AOD THE OCEAN FLOOR {AVE:BEEN CALLED THE WORLD'S LASTFRONTIER for explotation and exploi-tation. The development of food fromthe sea offers high promise towardmeeting the widespread need for pro-tein (malnutrition afflicts one-half ofthe world's peoplesover one and ahalf billion), There are interestingprospects for new discoveries in thefield of medicine. By the year 1985,some 25 percent of the worldwidedemand for oil and gas is expectedto be met by marine sources. Marinemineral deposits include manganese,gold, silver, iron, platinum, titanium,chromium, and tin, to name but afew, and are conservatively valued inthe hundreds of billions of dollars.

But together with the promise ofgreat benefits from technological ad-vances in oceanology there are alsocontinuing advances in the technol-ogy of weaponry, which could resultin the extension of the nuclear Armsrace tc the seabed and ocean floor.

A significz.nt step was taken by theUnited States and the Soviet Unionto mule out this environment to nu-

Addrets by ACDA Director C:erardSmith to the ENDC, Mar. 25, 1969.

clear weapons when they reachedagreement on a joint draft treaty "onthe prohibition ot the emplacementof nuclear weapons and other weap-ons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the oenn floor and in thesubsoil thereof." The joint drat! wasfirst presented to the Conference ofthe Committee on Disarm lment inGeneva, on October 7, by the twonations as Co.Chainnen of the Com-inittee. The treaty project was theresult of intensive negotiations whichhad their origin in the U.N. GeneralAssembly in 1967.

As interest mounted in the almostunlimited resources of the seabed, itbecame evident that a legal frame-work must be established to bringorder to their exploitation, Conceptsof sovereignty vary widely. Existinginternational law is ambiguous andlends itself to disparate interpreta-tions by nations.

With these cc .:erns in mind, theGeneral Assembly in December 1967established ar. ad hoc committee(made a permanent committee a yearlater) to study the scope and variousaspects of the peaceful uses of the

Sc'o Appendix V11, p. 51.

14 ACDA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

21

seabed and ocean floor beyond thelimits of national jurisdiction. Con-siderable atteriti,a was given to the"trends and possibilities regardingthe potential future uses of the seabedand ocean floor for military pur-poses," in the committee's report,which recognized that "efrorts shouldbe made to arrest these tr o.ds beforethey were too advanced for effectivecontrol."

During the course of the workingsessions of the U.N. committee, theU.f3. representative proposed that theGeneva Disarmament Conference ex-amine the question whether a viableinternational agreement :nigh* beachieved in which each party Nvouldagree not to emplace or fix weaponsof mass destruction on the seabed.These discussions would also considerthe need for reliable and effectivemeans of verifying compliance withsuch an agreement.

The question was discussed in apreliminary way during the 1968rummer session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmamentand was included on its provisionalagenda for consideration during the1969 session.

The Conference reconvened onMarch 18, 1969. On the opening day,the Soviet Union submitted a DraftTreaty on Prohibition of the Use forMilitary Purposes of the Sea-Bed andOcean Floor and the Subsoil Then .of.

After consultations with its Allies,the United States, on May 22, sub-mitted its own Draft Treaty Prohibit-ing the Emplacement of NuclearWeapons ^nd Other Weapons ofMass Pestniction on the Seabed andOcean Floor.

The initial U.S. and Soviet draftsdiffered principally in the scope ofwhat was to be prohibited.

The Soviet draft would havebanned all military uses of the seabedand ocean floor beyond a 12-milemaritime aone. It would have preeluded, as an example, bottom

mounted submarine surveillance sys-tems which the United States regardsas essential to its derense. The UnitedStates also objected to such a sweep-ing prohibition because it would poseinsurmountable verification problems.The U.S. draft dealt with the mostrealistic concern that the seabedmight be used as an area for the em-placement of nuclear weapons andother weapons of mass destruction.Such an agreement would remove themajc.r threat to the peaceful uses ofthe seabed while, at the same time,would reduce the verification problemto manageable proportions.

The Soviet draft provided that allinstallations and structures on the sea-bed should be open to inspection forthe purposes of verification, a provi-sion qualified only by the requirementof reciprocity. This language wasmodeled on the provisions in theOuter Space Treaty. But provisionsapplicable to the moon, where allclaims of national jurisdiction are re-nounced, cannot readily be trans-planted to the seabed, where thereare many existing claims of nationaljurisdiction and a multitude of vary-ing types of activity and where thetechnical problems involved in in-spection would be extremely complex.

The U.S. draft suggested simpleprocedures for verifying compliance,based on observation of seabed ac-tivities Such procedures would beconsistent with existing internationallaw. The United States be ved thatits provisions for verification were ap-propriate because the installation oflarge and complicated devices forlaunching nuclear weapons would in-volve extensive activity and would bedifficult to conceal. Furthermore, itis highly unlikely that a nation Ncbichhad decided to violate the treatywould limit itself to the installationof a single weapon. Any violationto be worth the cost would 'lave tooccur on a large scale.

The Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency has undertaken a series

Arms Control Measure for the Seabed 15

22

A transponder and buoy are lowered into the sea todetermine precise navigational position of the USNSMime during the search for the lost submarineThresher. ACDA participated in the search to gainpractical kno,iedge of seabed surveillance.

of field studies and technical reportsconcerned with the technologicalproblems of seabed activity verifica-tion, including analyses of costfactors associated with various Verifi-cation techniques. In order to gainpractical knowledge of some aspectsof seabed search, staff members par-ticipated in two deep seabed searchesconduc ted by the USNS .filar.

The Geneva Conference resumedits second session of 1969 on July 3.The previous submission by theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. ofdraft seabed treaties provided thebasis for concrete negotiations to workout an agreed treaty that might bereferred to the twenty-fourth sessionof the U.N. General Assembly. Mr-ing the folloss in g, weeks, various mein-be, nations voiced thei; views on thetii o versions, particularly with respect

to the verification question and thescope of the prohibitions.

On July 24 AGIV's General Coun-sel, William I lancock, testified beforethe Slrbcorannittee on Ocean Space ofthe Senate Committee on Foreign Re-lations, chair-el by Senator ClaibornePell. The day marked the beginningof a series of public hearings on Sen-ate Resolution 33, introduced bySenator Pell earlier in the year, "aresolution endorsing basic principlesfor governing the activities of nation;in ocean space.- Mr. Ilaacock's testi-mony reviewed for the Subcommitteethe U.S. draft treaty presented to theKNI)C and the pruzress sshich theFMK: had made to date in its dis-cussion of ar: arm; control measurefor the seabed.

In late August the Soviet Go-Chair.man gave the U.S. delegation pri-

16 ACM NINTH ANNUAL RT PORT

23

vately a new text of a treaty. Therefollowed an intensive evaluation ofthe Soviet counter-proposal withinthe U.S. Government. By mid -Sep-tember a coordinated position hadbeen formed, and a special session ofthe North Atlantic Council was calledso that we could consult with ourNATO Allies on the proposed basisfor further negotiations in Geneva. Anew draft was then presented pri-vately to the Soviet delegat;on.

On October 7 the United Statesand the Soviet Union jointly tabledan agreed Draft Treaty on the Prohi-bition of the Emplacement of NuclearWeapons and Other Weapons ofMass Destruction on the Sea-bed andthe Ocean Floor and the SubsoilThereof. On the occasion of the jointtabling, the U.S. representative, Am-bassador James Leonard, told theConference of the intensive discus-sions which had lcd to the new jointdraft and expressed satisfaction that"our labors have proved fruitful."This joint draft formed the basis ofdiscussion.; within the CCD (succes-sor to dr. ENDC) and received acumber of comments, particularlytvith respect to verification, amend-ment procedures, and a review con-

ference. Responding to the viewsexpressed by various delegations, theCo-Chairmen put forth a revised ver-sion on October 30. This revisedtreaty text was annexed to the reportof the CCD to the General Assembly.

At the United Nations, the drafttreaty was considered briefly by theU.N. Seabed Committee and exten-sively in the U.N. First Committee,where a number of amendments weresuggested by various member nations.Although substantial progress wasmade, the questions raised by theseinitiatives were not entirely resolvedduring the course of the debate in theFirst Committee. Accordingly, on De-cember 12 the United States and theSoviet Union offered a resolutionwhich remanded the draft treaty textof October 30 to the Conference ofthe Committee on Disarmament. Theresolution called on the Committee totake into account all proposals andsuggestions made at the General As-sembly and to continue its work sothat the text of a draft treaty can besubmitted to the twenty-fifth sessionof the General Assembly. This reso-lution passed by a vcte of 116 to 0,with 4 abstentions.

Arms Control Mrasure for irle Srabed37 5are

17

2,1

NONPROLIFERATION OFNUCLEAR WEAPONS

This Administreion seeks equitable and meaningfulagreements to limit armaments and to resolve thedangerous conflicts that threaten peace and securi'y. Inthis act of ratification today, this commitment isdemonstrated anew.'

TI,, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF 1HETREATY ON THE NOSPROLIFERATIONLF NUCLEAR WE/ PONS spans theadministrations of three Presidents.The last step in the domestic ratifi-cation process was taken by PresidentNixon on November 24 when he of-ficially signed the instrument of rati-fieatior in a ceremony at the WhiteHouse. Fhe final step will be the in-ternational act of depositing theinstrumenf of ratification.

The treaty was negotiated in theEighteen-Nation Committee on Dis-armament, in Geneva, over a periodof 4 years. It was endorsed by theU.N. General Assembly in the springof 1968 and was signed by PresidentJohnson and the representatives of55 other nations on July 1, 1968.

Soon after his inauguration,President Nixon sent a message to theU S. Senate requesting advice andconsent to ratification. The treaty hadbeen sent to the Senate the precedingyear, but action was suspended in theaftermath of the Soviet invasion ofCzechoslovakia. Al hough the Presi-dent's February 5 call for reties% al of

President Nixon, upon signing the in.moment of ratification of the Treaty onthe Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,Nov. 14,1969.

18

2 ; )

Senate consideration reiterated hiscondemnation of that Soviet action,he said, "I believe that ratification ofthe Treaty at this time would advancethis Administrztion's policy of ne-gotiation rat lei than ccnfrontationwith the USSR."

The Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee held new hearings onFebrua.y 18 and 20, receiving testi-muny from Secretary of State Rogers;Secretary of Defense Laird; Chair-man of the Atomic Energy Commis-sion Scaborg; Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff General Wheeler; andACDA Director Ceiard Smith andhis Deputy, Adrian Fisher. The Sen-ate Armed Semites Committee heldhearings on the military implicationsof the treaty. Director Smith andDeputy Director Fisher testified be-fr this Committee for ACDA. TheChairrnar of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,the Director of Defer.,e Research andEngineering,r,nd the Chainnan of theAtomic Eiv!rs,ey Commission alsotestified.

All of these Administration officialsgave full support to the treaty, and=. iterated the interpretations givenby the previous Administration en thetechnical issues raised and on the int-

ACDA NINTH ANNt AL RESORT

plications for our security commit-ments.

In June 1968 the United States,Great Britain, and the Soviet Unionintroduced a resolution in the U.N.Security Council giving security as-surances to the nonnuclear-weaponsnations who are parties to the treaty.All three governments made separatebut parallel declarations to the Secu-rity Council in explanation of theiraffirmative votes on the resolution. Intheir declarations, the three nuclearpowers state their intention "to seekimmediate Security Council actionto provide assistance, in accordancewith the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty onthe non-proliferation of nuclear

11

weanons that is a victim of an act ofaggression or an object of a three t ofaggression in which nuclear weaponsare used."

In its report on the treaty, the For-eign Relations Committee stated thatit thwght the U.S. Government, byoffering the resolution and thedeclaration, had given up an elementof flexibility in bringing cases of ag-gression or the rats of aggression to theattention of the Security Council,especially with respect to timing. TheCommittee observed, however, that ifthis action results in creating a frame.work for United States-Soviet co-operation in the United Nations, the`gesture will be tt.orth the costs in

diplomatic flexibility."

z

President Niacin signs the Instrument of Ratification for the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty, Looking on arc Secretary of State WilliamP. Rcgers flrft) and Secretary of ifsfense Melvin Laird

Nontrolifc ration of A'ucicar Weapons 19

2 t,

The Committee favorably reportedthe treaty to the full Senate onMarch 6, and the Senate gave itscorrent to ratification on March 13by a vote of 83 to 15.

The Committee's report containeda recommendation that the Adminis-tration endeavor to arrange for theUnited States and the Soviet Unionto deposit their instruments of ratifi-cation concurrently, "thus emphasiz-ing the historic nature of the eventand avoiding insofar as possible mis-understandings which might thcr-wise arise." Accordingly, the UnitedStates proposed to the Soviet Unionthat the final step of ratification becompleted by the two Governmentsin this manner. (Great Britain hadalready deposited its instrument ofratification in November 1968, andFrance and Communist China haveindicated publicly that they do notintend to sign.) Arrangements arebeing worked out between the U.S.and the Soviet Governments, and itis expected that a joint ceremony willtake place early in 1970. The treaty%sill enter into force when the threedepositary governments and 40 othernations have depeAted their instru-[ -lents of ratification.

Under article III, each nonnuclear-weapon state party to the treatyundertakes to accept safeguards on itspeaceful nuclear activities in order toinsure that fissionable materials arcnot diverted to nuclear weapons orother nuclear explosive devices. Thesesafeguards will be set forth in agree-ments to be negotiated and concludedwith the International A toinicEnergy Agency {IAEA) in accord-ance with the Statute of the IAEAand its safeguards system. The agree-ments may be negotiated rsith theIAEA by nations individually or inconcert with other nations. At ticle IIIstipulates that negotiations for theagreements shall begin IRO days fromthe date of entry into force of thetreaty. For those nations depositingtheir instrums iris of ratification or

accession after the 180-day period,negotiation snail commence not laterthan the date of deposit. The agree-ments shall enter into force not late;than 18 months acte. the date of initi-ation of negotiati s.

The IAEA's safeguards system willassume greatly increased safeguardsresponsibilities as the Nonprolifera-tion Treaty comes into force and theagreements are concluded. ACDA'sresearch in support of the treaty isdirected toward the development oftechniques, procedures, instruments,and devices that might be used ininternational safeguards insacetion.

The ACDA safeguards researchprogram is closely coordinated withthe Atomic Energy Commission toavoid duplication and, in fact, drawsupon the expertise of the AEC andits contractors in carrying out someof the projects. The program is alsocoordinated with the IAEA and withother foreign safeguards researchprograms such as those of the Euro-pean Atomic Energy Community(EURATOM), the United King-dom and the Federal Republic ofGermany.

In connection with ACDA's re-search on the instrumentation aspectsof the safeguards problem, a portableinstrument has been designed to de-tect and ['reassure plutonium inside asealed container. A prototype of thisinstrument has been designed andbuilt under ACDA auspices. It hasbeen evaluated by the IAEA andfound to be capable of determiningnot only the presence of plutoniumbut the amount. Pheonisiin is a by-product of the fission process rshichtakss place in certain nuclear reac-tors, and it can be used as the essen-tial clement in the production of nu-clear %%capons. 'f he detection of aclandestine diversion of plutonium' toweapons purposes, therefore, is oneof the }risk reasons a safeguards sys-tem is needed.

The use of unattended sensors foranus control inspection has consider-

20 AGO', NINTH ANNVAI, RFFORT

able appeal from the point of view ofreducing the cost, nianpois-er, and in-trusiveness of inspections. A completesensor system might include a num-ber of sensors of different types, eaclrgathering its own form of informa-tion and transmitting th's through adata link to a central recording mat.There the i»forrnation would bestored for later use by the inspector.Unattended sensor systems should betamper-resistant to the extent theywould reliably detect and reveal anyefforts to insert false information.ACDA is currently working on themajor parts of such a system.

The development. of a prototypetamper- resistant data link is nearingcompletion. The concept for thissecure data transmission system wasoriginally developed under an exter-nal contract %%Rh ACDA. During thepast 18 months, it has been fieldtested by the Agency's Field Opera-tion; Division, working in the fa-cilities of the National Bureau ofStandards. The results of the testshave now produced a cable of proventamp. r-resistance. Preparations areunder way to test a small diametercable of different configurations inorder to broaden the range of appli-cability of this means of data protec-tion The system will be employed inthe inspection of nuclear reactorsunder IAEA control,

The remaining parts of the unat-tended instrumentation system arebeing developed under the directionof a joint U.S. Canadian workinggroup to safeguard a continuouslyrefuelled CAN DU -type reactor.ACDA is funding the fabrication ofthis instrumentation at Sandia Cor-poration, and it will be field testedin two phases. The first phase, devotedto testing individual components andequipment, is now being carried outby ACDA's Field Opera:ions 1)M-S1011, working with the National fu-reaa of Standards. The second pliesewill test the instrumentation operat-ing as a system on the reactor.

Nonprolifcrption of Nuclear Weapons

375-$14 -70----5

Still another area of research, car-ried out jointly with the AEC, isinvestigating the application of minorisotope techniques to safeguards. Afield test of these techniques was madeduring 1969 at the Nuclear Fuel Serv-ices facility at \Vest Valley, N.Y., andpreliminary results are very encourag-ing Prediction of uranium to pin-tom in conversion, "fingerprinting"of reactor fuel, and in-process inven-tory determination all appear feas-ible and practical using massspectrometer measurements of theminor isotopes.

Re-earth into minor isotope safe-guards ter .miques (MIST) is alsobeing conducted by a group in Karls-ruhe, Germany. Evaluation of ,heGerman experiments together iiiththe evaluation of the Nuclear Fire/Services' MIST experiment wilt pro-vide Inc basis for future planned re-search to be conducted by a jointU.S.-German working group. It isanticipated that both the EURA-TOM and IAEA safeguards organi-sations will also participate in theseexperiments.

The Agency has also contributedto preparations for the implementa-tion of article V of the NPT, underwhich potential benefits of peacefulapplications of nuclear explosionsare to be made available to nonnu-clear-weapons states parties to thetreaty. An Agency representative tes-tified in hearings before the JointCommittee on Atomic Energy on pro-posed legislation to give the AtomicEnergy Commission authority tocarry out commercial applications ofpcac'ful nuclear explosions. ACDAparticipated in several interdepart-mental studies related to this subieet,in technical talks held with theSoviets in April 1969, in U.S. con-tributions to the IAEA study ofthis subject, and in discussions at theGem va disarmament conference andthe U.N. General Assembly.

21

23

CONVENTIONAL ARMS ANDMILITARY EXPENDITURES

111111001111110

We must pursue with much more energy and realismour comer 3n responsibility to check the dangerous andcostly arms race. . . . Nor is the need for disarmamentlimited to the great powers and nuclear weapons. All thewars now being fought are being fought with conventionalarms; wt ; the evermounting burden of conventionalarmament which weighs on the poorest nations and isone of the most serkng; impediments to their economic,social, and political development.,

AMONG THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FORURGENT ATTENTION IN THE 1970's ishow to arrest the trend in militaryspending and the proliferation ofarmaments worldwide.

In 1969 worldwide military ex-penditures are estimated to have to-taled $200 billionan increase ofover 40 percent since 1964.2 Evenallowing for the inflation of prices,world military outlays increased byclose to 20 percent in the 6-year pe-riod from 1964 to 1969. The compari-son with expenditures for social needsproduces even more disparate figures.In 1967 the latest year for which com-parative figures are available, theworld was spending about 40 percentmore on military programs than onpublic education; military expendi-tures exceeded those for public edu-cation in about one-third of the coun-tries of the world, including theUnited States and the Soviet l'nion.

Ambassador Charles Si. Farr, in anaddress to the U N. General Assembly, onOct. 23, 1969.

' ;Sloth! Military Expendiruret (ACOAPublic ation N. 53).

22

2'3

In the field of public health, theworld's total expenditure in 1967 wasless than one-third as large as themilitary outlay.

In many parts of the world militaryexpenditures compete for scarce na-tlonal resources and may diminishcurrent consumption and the oppor-tunities for economic development.There is virtual unanimity amongeconomists that a reallocation of re-sources from military purposes to ci-vilian needs would be of generaleconomic benefit. The question iswhat influences can be brought tobear to reverse the upward trend inmilitary spending.

While world attention focuses onstrategic antis negotiations, the ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency be-lieves that the problem of convention-al arms must not be neglected. Meas-ured in money terms. these are theweapons that account for the majorshare of the world's military outlays.Conventional weapons are the %cork-ing tools of modern war. Since 1915conventional forces with conventional%%capons have fought fifty-five wars;

AMA NINTH ANNUAL, RETORT

hundreds of thousands of people havebeen casualties.

The Agency is working on severalapproaches to the control of conven-tional arms. One is con:erned withmutual and balanced force reductionsbetween the NATO and Warsaw Pactcountries, discussed in the followingchapter.

Anotl'er critical problem in thisfield is tl,e control of the internationaltraffic in arms. The value of exportsof military goods worldwide recentlyhas averaged close to $f billion ayear; half or more of this has goneto the less developed parts of theworld. Such purchases of equipment,particularly of the advanced types,may fuel regional a. ms races and havea broad destabilizing effect, While itcan be argued that local disputes arenot normally motivated by possessionof armaments, the escalation of a dis-pute to hostilities and the intensity ofsubsequent fighting can often be di-rectly attributed to the availability ofweapons.

ACDA has been increasingly co a-Cerlled with the proMern of armstransfers since 1966 when a seniorlei I interbureau working group wasset up to coordinate and superviseAgency activities in this field and tomaintain liaison with other depart-ments and agencies on arms transfersand related export control. Duringthe past year, responsibility for thisactivity was centralized in ACDA'sEconomics Bureau.

ACDA is a participant in a varietyof interagency locums dealing witharms trar.sfer policy formulation.These include the State/Defense Coordinating Committee on Aims Saks,the 11.0 tidy meeting of the politico-military 4fieers from the State De-partment's regional bureaus, andconsultations on implementing the re-striction on arms transfers included inforeign assist:nice legislation. ACDA'sparticipation in the National SecurityCouncil, and its subordinate bodies,

i.e., the Under-Secretaries Commit-tee, the interdepartmental groups andad hoc working committees, insuresthe Agency an opportunity to setforth arms control concerns in thepolicy decision process involved inarms sales and military assistance.

ACDA also develops and promotesproposals for controlling conventionalarms traffic for consideration withinthe U.S. Government and possibleinternational acticn. In pursuing thisfunction, ACDA has concentrated onthree general types of initiatives: (1)registration and publication propos-als; (2) arms supplier agreements;and (3) regional arms limitations.

The idea for registering and publi-ci2ing arms transfers has been underintermittent consideration in theUnited Nations and elsewhere since1965. In the immediate aftermath ofthe June 1967 war in the MiddleEast, the United States proposed,without success, that the U.N. mem-ber nations report all anus shipmentsinto the Middle East and that therecords be available for all to see.

Despite the lack of concrete prog-ress, the Agency continues to explorethis initiative as a possible openingapproach to international anus trafficcontrol. A broad study was made ofthe current reporting of arms transfersby foreign countries. An in-house re-port, completed in August 1969,summarized and anal)7ed the policyissues raised by a registration pro-posal. This study can serve as a con-tribution to policy formulation in thefuture.

Efforts at effecting ands supplieragreements have usually been associ-ated with attempts to settle local wars,e.g.. Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Ind:an-Pakistani war in 1965. Prior to andfollowing the outbreak of hostilities in1967, the United States sought agree-ment with the U.S.S.R. in curtailingarms shipments to the Middle East.Plisse efforts Isere to no avail, anddeliveries continue. Following the

Conventional Arm: and Mifitary Eqynditurci 23

outbreak of fighting between Indiaand Pakistan 1965, the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom de-clared immediate embargoes on armsshipments to the belligerents. Theseembargoes probably helped influencethe two countries to accept a truce.The United States has continued toembargo lethal items. We have urgedother suppliers, particularly theU.S.S.R., to fcllow suit, but againunsuccessfully..

These experiences show that, to beeffective, suppliers' agreements mustbe adhered to by the major arms sup-pliers. Although history suggests thatsupplying countries arc reluctant togive up what they regard as a usefulpolitical tool, there are conceivablesituations in which it NVOUld suit theobjectives of all major suppliers toexercise restraint. The Agency is con-stantly ro loving the evolution of thepolitico-military situations in the vari-ous regions of the world in an effortto ascertain when the ingredientsnecessary for such an arms controlagreement are present.

'sgreenicnts which are politicallyfeasible arc more likely to he foundin well-defined geographical areas.!fence, the Agency's concentration onregional arms limitation.

ACDA funds a program of externalresearch to support its activities in thearca of conventional arms control.This program has included researchinto the economic effects of defenseexpenditures on development prog-ress, the volume and patterns of armstrade, the nature and control of localconflict, and political en Viromm: !:,and its relation to arm;. controlproposals.

As preciously pointed out, econo-mists arc agreed that a shift of re-sources from nOtary to civilianpurposes would be economically bene-ficial. About two out of every five

dollars of Federal budget outlays inthe United States ate for nationaldefense purposes. These military re-quirements limit the Federal Gov-er.anent's freedom of action to carryout programs to meet the pressingneeds of an expanding populationand at the same time reduce the taxburden. However, it is recognizedthat if arms control and disarmamentmeasures show promise of leading toreduced defense spending, every ef-fort should be made to bring aboutan orderly transition cliiring thechange. The general urosperity of thecountry must be maintained and con-sideration given to the interests ofthose whose livelihood uepends on thedefense activity to be eli:ninated.

The Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency is enjoined by statute tostudy and assess these problems. Theresearch covers the identification ofthe industries, communities, andworkers dependent on defense-relatedactivity, and the kinds of policies andactions which \could assist them Madjusting to a reduction in that ac-tivity. Supplementing earlier studiesof the electronics and shipbui;dingindustries, a contract study was com-pleted this year on the dependency ofthe metal working machinery andequipment industry on defense work.The study found that, despite the factthat the Defense Department is oneof the largest ultimate consumers forcapital goods, conditions in this in-dustry essentially are "governed bythe overall economic climate.' ratherthan th, changes in levels of defensespending.

Because of its broad research ex-perience on the economics of reduceddefense spending, the Agency hasbeen in a position to assist interde-pa tmental groups established by thePr' iclent to plan for analogous post-N'ic t.Sa in economic adjustments.

24 Acok NINTH ANNUAL RFTORT

31

MUTUAL AND BALANCEDFORCE REDUCTIONSIN CENTRAL EUROPE

aa,rsnr,..axakarrr.,..22,arara,..awnaradscr.a.maas,-..-..., Naa40/27.4. 2. I sara c., as

For many years NATO has given serious study to thedifficult question of how security in Europe, now sustainedby a high balance of armaments, could be maintained ata lower and less expensive level of arms on both sides.Since June 1968, it has explicitly stated its belief thatmutual force reductions could significantly contrity.;;e tolessening of tensions.'

IN 1969 THE NORTH ATLANTICTREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) RE-SUMED ITS STUDY of possible mu-tual and balanced force reduction(MBFR) for the central part ofEurope, which had begun with theDecember 1967 Ministerial Meetingof the North Atlantic Councii, TheSoviet invasion of Czechoslovakia inAugust 1968 dimmed the prospectsfor discussions concerning Europeaasecurity, but even in the face of thatsevere setback the NATO .MinisterialMeeting in mid-November of thatyear issued a communique stating,"Nevertheless, the Allies in close con-sultation are continuing their studiesand preparations for a time when theatmosphere for fruitful discussions ismore favorable."

At their April 1969 meeting inWashington, the NATO Ministersgave new impetus by issuing anotherstatement declaring their intention to"explore ...id] the Soviet Union andthe caner countries of Eastern Europewhich ccmcrc to issues best lend them-

'Secretary of State Rogers, Brussels,Belgium, Dec. 6, 1969.

selves to fruitful negotiation and anearly resolution" and to pursue theirefforts and studies in the field ofdisarmament and practical armscontrol, including balanced forcereductions.

The work of NATO on MBFR wasintensified and refined at the Juneand September meetings of the SeniorPolitical Committee and experts fromNATO capitals, and an initial reportwas submitted to the North AtlanticCouncil, Consideration of that reportand others on associated Europeansecurity issues led the NATO Minis-ters to announce at their December196:: meeting that "the studies inmutual and balanced force reductionshave progressed sufficil Jai). to permitthe establishment of certain c titeria

h, in their view, such reductionsshould meet" and "they will continuetheir studies in order to prepare arealistic basis for active explorationat an early date and thereby er,tablishislether it codd serve as a startingpoint for ftuitful negotiat' sm." TheMinisters requested that detailedplans of various possable balanced

ForCe Rrductions in Cer fral Eu rope 45

force reductions be prepared for con-sideration and submitted to them as

,r1 as possible. The Ministers cornuded that "significant reductions

under adequate verification and con-trolwhich should also be consistentwith the vital security interests of allpartieswould be another concretestep in advancing 'along the road ofending the arms race and of generaland complete disarmament,' includ-ing nuclear disarmament." Finally,the Ministers directed that furtherstudies should be given to measureswhich could accompany or followagreement on mutual and balancedforce reductions. The Ministers speci-fied that such measures could include"advance notification of militarymovements and maneuvers, exchangeof observers at military maneuversand possibly the establishment of ob-servation posts."

With this detailed guidance it is tobe expected that NATO will con-tinue to intensify its work with a viewto submitting to the Ministers in May1970 detailed plans on MBFR.ACDA ,vill continue to provide ex-perts to work with other responsibleU.S. Government agencies and theNATO Senior Political Committeeon these MBFR studies.

In support of the NATOMBFR studies, the .:1CDA staff con-centrated during 1969 on exploiting

the extensive research conducted overthe past eve 11 years related to armscontrol measures applicable to themilitary confrontation in CentralEurope. Of particular value havepeen those studies on the impact ofpotential arms control measures onground forces capabilities in Europeand those specifically concerned withthe inspection and verification ofvarious form; of balanced force re-ductions in the central part ofEurope. During the year a fina! reportwas completed on Exercise FIRSTLOOK, a field test related to ins:-ec-tion and verification of general pur-pose ground and air forces will( ii wasconducted jointly with the UnitedKingdom in southern England is1968. 'Elie results of that test as wci!as the results of related ACDA research on verification have been use-ful in NATO MBFR studies.

Previous research was supple-mented in 1969 by a newly complc tedcontract study on future Soviet in-terests in arms control Another ex-ternal study will identify the wannerin which European security arrange-ments are likely to change during the1970.s. Such information will serveas a basis for recommending a varietyof policy choices geared to prornotinqboth security in Europe and antiscontrol.

26 nen+. NiNT It ANN l'AL RF PORT

3j

GENERALADVISORY COMMITTEE

THE ARMS CONTROL AND D1SARMA-MENT AGENCY'S LEGISLATIVE AU-THORITY provides for the appoint-ment by the President of a GeneralAdvisory Committee, "to advise thePresident, the Secretary of State, andthe Disarmament Directo respectingmatters affecting arms control, dis-armament, and world peace."

President Nixon reconstituted theGeneral Advisory Committee onJune 5, 1969, with the appointmentof fourteen new members and thereappointment of Mr. John J.Mc Cloy as Chairman. They wereconfirmed by the Senate on July 30and sworn in at a Blair House cere-mony. on October 2.

In charging the new Committeewith its responsibilities, the Presidenttold them that the ". . . advice onthe complex national security issueswith which the Committee will bedealing will be of great value to meand my associates in the Administra-tion. I consider our efforts in thearea of anns control as an integralpart of our security policies and Ihope therefore that your Committeewill examine the problems before itin the context of our over-all securityinterests and objectives." The Presi-dent emphasised to Mr. McCloy thathe wished the Committee to be anindependent advisory body.

In the light of the President's guid-ance, the Committee promptly beganto inform itself on the basic issuesrelating to national security. As apreliminary step, it began a series of

General Adz liar). Cono.littee

intensive meetings to review the sta-tus of the strategic balance. and toconsider the relationship betweenU.S. arms control policy and U.S.national security needs. The Com-mittee called upon a number of dis-tinguished American and forei, nexperts on strategic matter: to thee/with it to discuss these issues.

The President met with the C,mittee during its meeting on Decctn-ber 16. Ile heard a report on wbatthe Committee had done thus fa/ ..ndhe laid several specific problems !,e-fo: e it for study and advice inricction with the Strategic Attl,,Limitation Talks.

Meetings were also held toU.S. relatici,s with the Soviet I'M,Con munist China, and W. .tartEurope as well as 1.117, Specifi( Li/

control 1, :icy centering on th.tegic Antis Limitation Talks. S .1%tary of State Rogers; Under Sir /, ,1

Richardson ; Deputy Sec re tat of j

fense Packard; the i resident.-ant for National Security Alfa/Ls,Kissinger; the Chief of Navaltions, Admiral Moorer; the I ),

of ACDA, Mr. Smith and his 11,Mr. Farley, among others,the Committee to discuss mu 011,curity and arms control t!

In addition, the Commim.Profess r Marshall ShulmanSador LIN% ilhirThomas Wolfe on the So% t

Professors Allen S.Doak Barnett on China: NIFontaine, Director of I

President Nixon Meets With the General Advisory .....mmitteein the White House on December 16, 1969

Kermit Got.: ion

Philip J. Farley

Laurie No7stad

Peter G. Peterson

Harold Brown

John J. NteCItiy

William Scranton

Dean Rusk

C. Douglas Di 11,

1 1)

William C. Foster

james R. Killian

William J. Casey

The President

Dr. Kissinger

1. W. ,11icil

John At ehihalsi Wheeler

Cyrus V,ince

Jas k Riaina

Paris; Dr. Karl Carstens, former ad-viser to the Chancellor of the FederalGerman Republic, Mr. AlastairBuchan, Commandant of the Im-perial Defence College, London; andProfessor Robert Bowie of the Centerfor International Affairs at Halyardon Western Europe. Meetings havebeen scheduled for the beginning of1970 to continue this examinationwith a session on Japan and to addressthe specific problems raised by thePresident relating to the StrategicArms Limitation Talks.

In order to assist the Committee inthe performance of its work, theChairman has a small staff located itthe Committee's offices in the Depart-ment of State.

The members of the Committee,appointed by President Nixon, are:

Jolts J. McCLov, lawyer, formeradviser on Disarmament to PresidentKennedy, retired Chairman of theChase Manhattan Bank, formerChairman of the Ford Foundation, ofthe World Bank, U.S. I Egli Commis-sioner for Germany, and AssistantStcretar, of War during the SecondWorld War.

I. W. ABET, President of the UnitedSteel Workers of America.

Dr. HAROLD BROWN, scientist, Pres-ident of the California Institute ofTechnology and former Secretary ofthe Air Force.

WILLIAM J. CASEY, author, editor,and lass-yen

C. DOUGLAS DILLON, hanker, form-er Arihassidor to France, formerUnder Secretary of State, and Secre-tar of the Treasury.

WILLIAM C. FOSTER, former Di-rector of the Arms Control and Dis-armament Agency and former Dep-uty Secretor, of Defense.

KERMIT GORDON, Cr0/10/DiSI, Pres-ident of the Brookings Institution,former member of the Council ofEconomic Advisers, and Director ofthe Bureau of the Budget.

Dr. JAMES R. KILLIAN, Chairmanof the Corporation of MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, former Spe-cial Assistant to the President forScience and Technology.

Gen. LAURIS NORSTAD, USAF(Ret.), Chairman of the Board andPresident of the Owens-CorningFiberglas Corporation, former Su-preme Allied Commander in Europe(SHAPE).

PETER G. PETER:, os, business exec-utive, Chairman of ihe Board of Belland Howell.

Dr. JACK RuisA, scientist, Profes-sor of Electrical Engineering at Mas-sachusetts Institut, of Teclinologsformer President, Institute for 117-fense Analyses and Assistant Directorfor Defense Research and Engineer-ing, Department of Defense.

DEAN RUSK, former Secretary ofState.

Gov. WILLIANI SCRANTON, lawyer,frnrner Governor of Pennsylvaniaand Member of Congrus.

CYRUS VAscE, lawyer, formerDeputy Secretary of Defense.

Dr. Jolts ARCHIBALD WIILELER,scientist, Joseph Henry Professor ofPhysics at Princeton.

General Advisory Corn mitree 29

3

AGENCY OPERATIONS

InIrataanwsmssinaNseer- ansmosgaawassomus imam assmemearammosmesalmaserwm...2.4.7

Orgaization

THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMA-MENT ACT ASSIGNS TO THE U.S.ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENTAGENCY the primary responsibilitywithin the U.S. Government forsearching out ways to put an end tothe arms race. The Act provides thatthe Agency "must have such a posi-tion within the Government that itcan provide the President, the Secre-tary of State, other officials of theexecutive branch, and the Congresswith recommendations concerningUnited States arms control and dis-anna lent policy, and car. assess theeffect of these recommendations uponour foreign policies, our national se-curity policies, and our economy."

When President Nixon announcedthe appointment of Gerard Smith tobe Director, he specified that the Di-rector will have direct and ready ac-cess to the Sercrary of State and tothe President ant will participate inall meetings ot. the National SecurityCouncil at which matters within thescope of the mission of the Agencyare considered.

In addition to being the principaladviser on arms control and dis-armament to the President and Sec-retary of State, ACD.t's Director isalso the chief U.S. negotiator in thefield of arms control. On Till} 5.1969, the President designated hiiii ashead of the U.S. delegation to theStrategic Anns Limitation Talks.The Director, the Deputy Director,and the Assistant Director for Inter-national Relations, at different pen-

30

ods during the year, also served ashead of the 'U.S. delegation to theConference of the Committee on Dis-armament (formerly the ENDC) inGeneva. 'The Director and the As-sistant Director for International Re-lations were members of theAmerican delegation to the twenty-fourth U.N. General Assembly.

To carry out its functions and re-sponsibilities, ACDA has an organi-zational structure which, in additionto the Offices of the Director andDeputy Director, includes four bu-reaus, each headed by an AssistantDirector. 'These are the InternationalRelations Bureau, the Science andTechnology Bureau, the EconomicsBureau, and the Weapons Evaluationand Control Bureau. Supporting theDirector, Deputy Director, and thefour bureaus are the Office of theGeneral Counsel, the Executive Di-rector and the Public :WaitsAdviser.

The ACDA staff is comparativelysmallslightly more than 200- -andis drawn from a variety of disci-plinespolitical, military, scientific,legal, behavioral, and economic. Thework of the Agency falls primarilyinto two categories: formulation ofanus control and disarmament policyrecommendatlons, including prepara-tion for and management of interimtional negotiations: and researdi intthe myriad complex problem,. relatedto arms control and disarmament. Inaddition to ACD.Vs extensive inter-nal research, field testing, and analy-sis, research projects are conductedby outside contractors, with ACD.1

ACDA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

officers acting as monitors. ACDAalso maintains a list of consultantswhose expertise is drawn upon by theAgency for special projects or otherproblems.

Formulation andCoordination ofPolicy Recommendations

Every major nerve proposal Whichthe United States makes in interna-tional negotiations must first receivethe President's approval.

One of President Nixon's first actsupon taking office was to direct thatthe National Security Council (orig-inally constituted in 1947) bo theprincipal forum for consideration ofpolicy issues requiring Presidentialdetermination. The nature of the is-sues considered by the Council, in itsrevitalized role, range from currentcrises and immediate operationalproblems to middle- and long-rangeplanning. The Director makes policyrecommendations to the Presidentboth directly and through his partici-pation in relevant meetings of me Na-tional Security Council. The Direc-tor's role in NSC deliberations is inkeeping with the underlying principlecontained in the Agency's enactmentbill, that "Arms c. ntrol and disarma-ment polies heii.g an important as-pect of f, ,1 policy, must be con-sistent s, all national security policyas a whole."

Representatives of the Agencyparticipate, when arms control anddisarmament or related matters arebeing considered, in the Under-Secretaries Committee, the NationalSecurity Council Review Group, andthe various interdepartineutal, re-gional, and functional groups estab-lished under the National SecurityCouncil to stud) specific nationalpolicy Fold ins and to plan andcarry out programs.

ACDA staff ;naintain clay-to-daycontacts with IWIS0111)(1 ii; concerned

Agency Operation(

departments and agencies in the de-vtloprnent of ideas, the preparationof position papers, and the dispatchof policy guidance to the negotiatorsat the conference table.

Planning andCoordination of Research

The ACDA Research Council re-views ant! makes recommendationsto the Director on all aspects of theAMA external researc h program,including specific contracts. TheCouncil is made up of the Spec alAssistant to the Director, who servesas chairman; the Assistant Directorswho head the four bureaus; the Gen-eral Counsel; and the Executive Di-rector. A Research Planning Groupassists the Council in developing, co-ordinating, and evaluating the re-search program. The Executive Sec-retary of the Council is chairman ofthe Planning Group and the othermembers are representatives of thefour bureaus,

The Congress has charged theAgency with responsibility for coor-dinating research in the field of aimscontrol and disarmament throughoutthe Government. ACDA str If person-nel maintain working level relation-ships with their counterparts in otheragenciessuch as the Departments ofDefense and State, the Atomic En-ergy Commission, the Central Intel-ligence Agency, and the Departmentsof Commerce and Laborwithwhich ACDA shares mutual interestsand problems, ACM coordinatesfonnalle.,vith these agencies all of theexternal research projects it plans tocarry out. The Agency also reportsto the Bureau of the Budget peri-odically on the proga-.s being made.in am u, control and disarmamentresearch.

sponsmcd oir for-eign areas in the social si icnces isccroalinatcd closely vita the StateDepai mulles Foreign rea IleseardiC000lination G r a u p, svhich is

31

33

charged with coordinating all suchresearch throughout the Government.ACDA sits on the main committee ofthis Group and also participates in anumber of subcommittees concernedwith the interchange of research dataand discussion of future plans. All ofACI)A's foreign area exts.rnal re-search in the social sciences is alsoformally cleared with the Depart-ment of State's Foreign Affairs Re-search Council, in order to insure thatit will not have adverse effects onU.S". foreign relations.

ACDA maintains a Reference fr.-formation Center as a central pointfor storing and retrieving its armscontrol and disarmament informa-tion, much of it derived from theAgency's research program.

To help ACDA coordinate the CNN(talon of its mission in the field of in-spection, verification, and associatedfield testing, a Joint Advisory Gem.mittee has been established. ThisCommittee is chaired by ACDA; itsmembers «mi.; froin the Departmentof State, CIA, AEC, NASA, and keyDOD components including ISA,DDR&E, JCS, DASA, and the mili-tary services.

Social ScienceAdvisory Board

The ACDA Social Science Ad-visory. Board ' was established inNlarch 1961 by the Director under hisstatutory authority to advise on thesocial science aspects of the Agency'sprograms. In 1969 it held two meetings: on March 26 -27 and Novem-ber 6. During these sessions, themembers of the Board were briefed on(intent aims control and disarma-ment programs and on the status ofthe Agency's soc i science I' Og rams.

In the nervals IsetsvcCII meetings,Board omit/yrs wcre c ailed 11p011 for

'For tnend,crs i f the Board, sec APPcn'dix VIII, p. 54.

33

advice atui assistance with regard tospecific research projects under cc ayin ACDA or with regard to new pro-posals under consideration.

Members of the Board represent allimportant channel of communicationbetween the Agency and the academiccommunity. Through diem, universi-ties and individual scholars can beacquainted with ACI).V's plans fornew research, and with the results ofcompleted studies.

Three members of the Board areon the National Academy of SciencesCommittee which advises in the se-lection of candidates for the Agency'sDissertation Support Program whichwas instituted in 1968.

Public Information

The Arms Control. and Disarma-ment Act gives the Agency responsi-bility for "the dissemination and co-ordination of information concerningarms control and disarmament.-

Daily liaison with the press is main-tained by the office of Public Affairsby responding to individual calls andvisits from members of the pressemirs. In addition, the Public AffairsOfficein coordination with otherGovernment agencies --pH oc ides theState Department News Office withbackground mato iel on al-MS controland disarmament policy and factualanswers to press in,luilies on develop-ing news stories Which might ariseduring the Daily News Briefing.

Either the Public Affairs Adviser ora senior member of his 'AFT is a 'num-ber of the U.S. delegations to majorinternational arms control and dis.

inainclit COnferCIIC cc. During 1969,in addition to providing members ofthe press with news guidance at theGeneva Disa moment Conferciiiand Genet al Assembly, thePublic Affairs Inlviser attended theStrategic Arms Limitation Talks heldin Helsinki. I n csccss of 450 news rep-

32 ACIM NINTH ANNUAL RFT3RT

resentatives from various parts of theworld covered the opening of thetalks.

Direct information service to thepublic is provided through prepara-tion and distribution of publications,booking of Agency officers to addressorganizations, schools, and publicmeetings, participation by Agency of-ficers in conferee tes and seminars, as-sistance to schools and colleges, con-sultation with organization leaders,briefings for student and adult visi-tors d response to direct inquiries.

ACM publications circulated dur-ing 1969 included the 8t1. Annual Re-port which surveys the igency's ac-tivities and summarizes disarmamentdevelopments for the previous calen-dar year; Documents on Disarma-ment, 1968 (one of a series whichannually reprints significant speeches,proposals and documents), WorldMilitary Expcnditurer, a statisticalsummary; the Quarterly Bibliogra-phy, produced under contract forACI)A by the Library of Congress,which summarizes articles and books;Arms Control and National Security,a "primer" on contemporary disarma-ment consepts and issues. These itemsmay be obtained by writing to theAgency, although supplies are limited.They are sold by the U.S. Govern-ment hinting Office. All pamphletsand unclassified research reports areavailable to readers at the 96 deposi-tory libraries listed in Appendix IXof this report. These publications andunclassified research reports are in-creasingly finding use in college class-rooms and study programs.

Agency Operations

The Agency, upon request, pro-vides speakers for schools, orgartions, and public meetings. It re-quests that travel costs be defrayed bythe host organization. The Agency re-gards "platform" travel of this sortas all opportunity to learn as well asto teach; officers arc requested to re-port interesting ideas and suggestionsdeveloped in the course of questionperiocs and discussions. Several im-portant innovations have been gen-erated through such contacts.

An ever-wider acceptance of armscontrol i.s an aspect of internationalrelations has resulted in requests fromschool and university instructors forassistance in preparing arms controland disarmament segments of coursesin political suence, history, defense,and other subjects. Assistance hasbeen rendered through office, tele-phone and mail consultations, andthrough direct briefings to students atthe Agency's offices and on collegecampuses.

In order to learn something aboutthe burgeoning academic interest inthis field, the Agency, last September,sent a questionnaire to all institutionsof higher learning in the UnitedStates, seeking information on in-struction relating to anus control. Thequestionnaire asked what courseswere devoted primarily to arras con-trol. and also hit-piked about inciden-tal references to arms control incourses in political science, sociology,other bhavioral sciences, physical ornatural sciences, law, internationalrelations, military security or strategy,and other courses. The responses tothe questionnaire are urns beirg ana-lyzed and a repots is tieing prepared.

33

APPENDIXES

41

APPENDIXES

I. President's Message to U.S. Ambassador Gerard C.Smith at the Opening of Talks at Helsinki, Finland,November 17, 1969 37

II. Address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers BeforeDiplomatic and Consular Officers Retired on StrategicArms Limitation Talks, November 13, 1969 39

III. Communique on the Meeting of the Delegations of theUnited States of America and the Union of SovietSocialist Republics on Questions of Curbing theStrategic Arms Race, December 22, 1969 44

IV. Statement by the President, Announcing Policy De-cisions on Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs,November 25, 1969 45

V. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As-phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Signed at Geneva, June 17,1925 47

VI. Revised Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Bio-logical Methods of Warfare and Accompanying DraftSecurity Council Resolution Proposed by the UnitedKingdom at the Conference of the Committee on Dis-armament, August 26, 1969 48

VII. Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement ofNuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass De-struction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in theSubsoil Thereof (Revised), October 30, 1969 51

VIII. The Social Science Advisory Board 54

IX. ACDA Depository Libraries 55

X. Officials of the Agency 60

36 ACDA NINTH ANNI.AL REPORT

Appendix I

Message From President Nixon to Ambassador Gerard C.Smith at the Opening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talksat Helsinki, Finland, November 17, 1969

You arc embarking upon one of themost momentous negotiations everentrusted to an American delegation.

I do not mean to belittle the 1st.

The Antarctic Treaty, the LimitedTest Ban Treaty, the Outer SpaceTreaty, and most recently the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we hopewill soon enter into force, were allimportant steps along the road to in-ternational security. Other tasks re-main on the ailenda of the UnitedNations and the Conference of theCormnitte, on I)isarmainunt. Today,however. you will begin what all ofyour fellow citizens in the UnitedStates and, I believe, all peoplethroughout the world, profoundlylope will be a sustained effort notonly to limit the build-up of strategicforces but to reverse it.

I do not underestimate the diffi-culty of y oil:- task, the nature ofmodern weapons makes their controlan exceedingly complex endeavor.But this very fact increases the im-portance of your effort.

Nor do I underestimate the suspi-cion and distrust that must be dis-pelled if you are to succeed in }ourassi.6mment.

I am also conscious of the histori-cal fa( t that wars and crises betweennations can arise not simply fenny theexistence of anus but from clashinginterests or the ambitious pursuit ofunilateral interests. That is oily weseek progress toward the solution of

Appendixes

the dangerous political issues of ourday.

I am nevertheless hopeful that yournegotiations with representativesfrom the Soviet Union will scree toincrease mutual security. Such a re-sult is possible if we approach thesenegotiations recognizing the legiti-mate security interests on each side.

I have stated that for our part wewill be guided by the concept of main-taining "sufficiency" in thic forces re-quired to protect ourselves and ourallies, I recognize that the leaders ofthe Soviet Union bear similar defenseresponsibilities. I believe it is possible,however, that we can carry out ourrespective responsibilities under a mu-tually acceptable limitation andeventual reduction of our strategicarsenals.

We are prepared to discuss limita-tions on all offensive and defensivesystems, and to reach agreements inwhich both sides can have confidence.As I stated in my address to theUnited Nations, we arc prepared todeal with the issues seriously, care-fully, and purposefully. We seek nounilateral advantage. Nor do we seekarrangements which could be preju-dicial to the interests of third parties.We are prepared to engage in bonafide negotiations on concrete issues,avoiding polemics and extraneousmatte

No one can foresee what the out-come of your work still be. I believe

37

43

your approach to these talks will vinced that the limitation of stra-demonstrate the seriousness of the tegic arms is in the mutual interestUnited States in pursuing a path of of our country and the Sovietequitable acconmiodation. I am con- Union.

38 ACOA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

Appendix II

Address by the Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary ofState, November 13, 1969

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Net Monday in Helsinki theUnited States and the Soviet Unionwill open preliminary talks leading towhat could be the most critical nego-tiations on disarmament ever under-taken. The two most powerful na-tions on earth will be seeking a wayto curb shat to date has been anunending compet,tion in the strategicarms race.

The Government of the UnitedStates will enter these negotiationswith serious purpose and with thehope that we can achieve balancedunderstandings that will benefit thecause, of world peace and security.Yet we begin these negotiationsknowing that they are likely to belong and complicated and with thefufl reali,ation that they may notsur eyed.

While I will not be able to discussspecific proposals tonight, I thoughtit might he helpful to outline the gen-eral approach of our Govern= nt inthese talks.

Nearly a quarter of is century ago,when we alone possessed 1111i kai;Not% Cr, the United States proposedthe Coiroation of a Nations'1 torn', Ileerlc pn, .ot little rite soitha world lr.rollOprly 01e/ :ill (Ling( Ionsape, is of nuclear r' fury. his pill-I/OS.11. 111112,1it cell have eliminated forall nations the dangers and bur dr nsof atomic VSe31)021.S Unhappily, as la eall 1:110%%', it %%as rejected.

d4pp(ndixrs

The implications were obvious.Others intended to develop nuclearweapons on a national basis. TheUnited States then would have tocontinue its own nuclear program. Itwould have to look to its own securityin a nuclear-armed world. Thus weestablished a national policy of main-taming nuclear weapon strength ade-quate to deter nuclear war by anyother nation or nations. It was ourhope then, as it is now, to make cer-tain that nuclear weapons wouldnever again be used.

The intervr,,in,g decades have seenenormous resources devoted to the

velop- nt nuclear seapons sys-tems. ,ts both sides expanded theirforce levels, an action/reaction pat-ter seas established. This pattern wasfed by rapid progress in the technol-ogy of iruclear weapons and ad-vanced delivery systems. The mere

ih such sophisticated tech-nology ruade it d.flieult for either sideby itself In refrain from translatingthat tech no!, into offensive and de-fensive trategic arimuents.

Nfean,,,hilc. strategic planners, op-erating ii ,Lil atmosphere of secree),were obliL,ed to make conservativeassumpti,q,, including calculationson lN .1 1.11 1 ',11e 1,11roIN 11 as the "c,orkt1.3S('," i Lt p', 01)7C responsible for1.1.1111 1 fir Si'll/1 ;Is had 1,1

lake , (mint o , the worst a,arinptionsaisuit i.i the-'s iritentions, the max-inwm. jilaw-ible estimate of the other's

apabil dr, s ar fccolance. and thelowest plale.illc performance of our

39

43

own forces. The Soviets no doubt didthe same.

Under these circumstances it wasdifficult during these many years foreither side to conclude that it hadsufficient levels of destructive power.

Yet that point in time has nowclearly been reached. As absolute lev-els of nuclear power and deliverycapability increased, a situation de-veloped in which both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union couldeffectively destroy the society of theother, regardless of which one struckfirst.

There are helpful mutual restraintsin such a situation. Sane nationalleaders do not initiate strategic nu-clear war and thus commit their peo-ple to national suicide. Also, theymust be careful not to precipitate aconflict that could easily escalate intonuclear war. 'They have to take elab-orate precautions against accidentalrelease of a nuclear weapon whichmight bring on a nuclear holocaust.

In brief the nuclear deterrent, dan-gerous though it is, has worked.

The present situationin whichboth the United States and the SovietUnion could effectively destroy theother .egardless of which struckfirstradically weakens the rationalefor continuing the arms race.

Competitive accumulation of moresophisticated weapons would not addto the basic security of either side.Militarily it probably would producelittle or no net advantage. Economi-cally, it would divert resources neededelsewhere. Politically it would per.vitiate the tensions and fears that arethe 50031 fallout of the nuclear anusrace.

So a capacity for mutual dicirtic-tion leads to a filth nal interest in put-ting a stop to the strategic nucleararms race.

Nonetheless technology advancesremorselessly. It offers new opportu-

nities to both sides to add to theiroffensive and defensive strategic sys-terns. Both sides find it difficult toreject these opportunities in an at-mosphere of rivalry and in the ab-sence of a verifiable agreement. Itraises temptations to seek strategicAdvantages. Yet now such advantagescannot be hidden for long, and bothsides will certainly take whatevercountermeasures are necessary to pre-serve their retaliatory capability.

This is the situation in which thetwo sides now find themselees. Wherenational security interests may haveoperated in the past to stimulate thestrategic arms race, those same rational security interests may now op-elate to stop or slow down the race.The question to be faced in the strate-gic arms talks is whether societieswith the advanced intellect to developthese awesome weapons of mass de-struction have the combined wisdomto control and curtail them.

In point of fact, we have alreadyhad some successes in preliminarylimitations.

--We have a treaty banningmilitary activities in Antarctica.

--We have a treaty banningthe orbiting of weapons of massdestruction in outer space andprohibiting the establishment ofmilitary installations on themoon or other celestial bodies,

--1Ve have reached agreementwith the Soviet Union on thetext of a treaty forbidding theemplacement of weapons of massdestruction on the ocean floors,about to he considered atthe -Caited Nations GeneralAssembly.

These are agreements not to armsenvironments previously inaccessibleto s' eapons. Manifestly there arefewer obstacles to such agreementsthan There are to agreements control-ling weapons alr.ady deployed orunder development.

40 ACPA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

4h

But even in already "contami-nated" environmen there have beentwo important control agreements:

--We have negotiated andratified a Test Ban Treatyprohibiting the testing of nuclearweapons in the atmosphere,under water, and in outer space.

--We have negotiated and areprepared at any time to ratifysimultaneously with the SovietUnion a Nuclesr Non-Prolifera-tion Treaty.

It should be pointed out, though,that the main objective of a NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty is to pre-vent nonnuclear powers from acquir-ing atomic weapons. The treaty doesnot restrain any of the present nuclearpowers from further development oftheir capabilities. The nonnuclearcountries therefore tend to look uponthe treaty essentially as a self-deny ingordinance.

Accord;ngly, during the negotia-tions they insisted upon assurancesthat the nuclear powers would seri-ously pursue strategic arms negotia-tions. We concurred and incorporateda paragraph in the treaty whichwould require us to do so.

I mention this to underscore twopoints. First, that the disarmamentagreements previously concludedhave widely been regarded as con-fidence building, preliminary stepswhich hopefully might lead to moremeaningful agreements on strategicanus. Second, when the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union ratifythe NTT, they will agree to under,akenegotiations in good faith fora ccs.tion of the nuclear arms race.

However, given the complexity ofthe strategic situation, the vital na-tional interests involved, and thetraditional impulses to seek protec-tion in military strength it is easy tobe cynical :bout the prospects for thetalks into which we arc about to enter.

Appendixes

Nonetheless some basis for hopeexists.

First is the fact that the talks arebeing held at all. The diplomatic ex-changes leading up to these talkswere responsible in nature. And thetai cs themselves gill require discus-sion of military matters by both sidesin which the veil of secrecy will haveto be, if not lifted,at least refashioned.These factors lead us to the hope thatthe talks are being entered into ser-iously,.

Serond is the matter of timing.Previous disparity in nuclear strengthhas been succeeded by the situation ofsufficiency of which I have alreadyspoken. And because this conditionwill continue for the foreseeable fu-ture, the time then seems to be pro-pitious for considering how to curbthe race in which neither side in alllikelihood can gain meaningful ad-vantage.

Third is a mutuality of :iterest.Under present circumstances an equi-table limitation on strategic nuclearweapons would strengthen the nation-al security of both sides. If this ismutually perceivedif both sidesconduct these talks in the light of thatperception- the talks may accomplishan historic breakthrough in the pat-tern of confrontation that has char-acteri7ed the postwar world.

May I pause to point out againthat I do not wish to predict that thetalks will be easy or that progress isimminent or for that matter likely.Mutuality of interest for states ac-customed to rivalry is difficult toixceive. Traditions arc powerful.Temptations to seek advantage runstrong. Developments in other areasare bound to have an impact on thesediscussions.

Both patties trill approach thetalks with great caution and pursuethem with it nmaculate care. TheUnited States and the Soviet Unionare entirely capable of protecting

41

4 7

Who knows the rewards if we suc-ceed in diverting the energy, time andattention -the manpower and brain-powerdevoted to ever more so-phisticated weapons to other andmore worthwhile purposes?

Speaking before the United Na-tions General Assembly 2 months agPresident Nixon said that he hopedthe strategic arms talks would beginsoon because "there is no more im-portant task before us." And headded that we must "make a deter-mined effort not only to limit thebuild-up of strategic alms, but toreverse it."

Just last week President Podgomyof the Soviet Union said: "A positive

outcome of the talks would undoubt-edly help improve Soviet-Americanrelations and preserve and strengthenthe peace." To that I say "Amen."

Ile added that: "The Soviet Unionis striving to achieve precisely suchresults." Well, so are we and in thiswe have the sdpport of the militaryservices, of the Congress, and of theAmerican people.

To that end this Gm eminent ap-proaches the Strategic Arms Limita-tion 'Talks in sober and serious deter-!Minion to do our full part to bringa halt to this unproductive and costlycompetition in strategic nucleararmaments.

Appendixes 43

4J

Appendix III

Communique on the Meeting of the Delegations of the UnitedStates of America and the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics on Questions of Curbing the Strategic Arms Race,December 22, 1969

In accordance with the agreementreached between the Governments ofthe United States of America and theSoviet Union to enter into negotia-tions on curbing the arategie armsrace, the delegations of the USA andthe USSR met in Helsinki from No-vember 17 to December 22, 1969. forpreliminary discussions on the ques-tions involved.

The U.S. Delegation was headedby the Director of the Arms Controland Disarmament Agency, GerardSmith. Members of the delegation in-cluded Paul Niue, Llewellyn Thomp-son, Ilarold Brown, and RoyalAllison.

The USSR Delegation seas headedby Deputy It linister of Foreign Af-fairs of the USSR, V. S. Sernenov.Members of the delegation includedN. V. Ogarkov, P. S. Pleshakov, A. N.Schchukin N. N. Aleksev, and G. M.Kornienko.

The delegations were accompaniedby advisors and experts.

'clic preliminary exchange of viewswhich took place concerning thelimitations of strategic arms was use-ful to both sides. As a result of thatexchange, each side is able better tounderstand the views of the otherwith respect to the problems underconsideration. An understanding wasreached on the general range of ques-tions which will be the subject of fur-ther US-Soviet exchanges.

The two sides express their appre-ciation to the Government of Finlandfor creating favorable conditions forholding the negotiations. They aregrateful for the traditional Finnishhospitality which was extended tothem.

Agreement was reached that nego-tiations between the US and theUSSR Delegations will be resumed onApril 16, 1970, in Vienna, and thatthey will be held again in Helsinki ata later time.

44 ACDA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

5 0

Appendix IV

Statement by the President, Announcing Policy Decisions onChemical and Biological Wa: Fare Programs, November 25,1969

Soon after taking office I directed acomprehensive study of our chemicaland biological defense policies andprograms. There had been no suchreview in over 15 years. As a result,objectives and policies in this fieldwere unclear and programs lackeddefinition and direction.

Under the auspices of the NationalSecurity Council, the Departments ofState and Defense, the Arms Controland Disarmament Agency, the Officeof Science and Technology, the In-telligence Community, and otheragencies -eorked closely together onthis study for over 6 months. Thesegovernment efforts were aided by con-tributions from the scientific com-munity through the President's Scien-tific Advisory Committee.

This study has now been com-pleted and its findings carefully con-sidered by the National SecurityCouncil. I am now reporting the deci-sions taken on the basis of this review,

Chemical Warfare Program

As to our chemical watfare pro-gram, the United States:

Re4flinns its oft-repeatedrenunciation of the first use oflethal chemical weapons.

Extends this renunciationto the first use of incapacitatingchemicals.

Appendixes

Consonant with these decisions, theAdministration will submit to theSenate, for its advice and 7onseAt toratification, The Geneva Protocol of1925 ihich prohibits the first use inwar of "asp4xiating. poisonous orother Cases and of BacteriologicalMethods of Warfare." The UnitedStates has long supported the prin-ciples and objectives of this protocol.We take this step toward formal rad-ficatien to reinforce our continuingadvocacy of international constraintson the use of these weapons.

Biological ResearchProgram

Biological weapons have massive,unpredictable and potentially uncon-troli.,ble onsequences They mayproduce global epidemics and impairthe health of future generations. Ihave the,efore decided that:

--The U.S. shall renounce theuse of lethal biological agentsand weapons, and all othermethods of biological warfare.

The U.S. will confine itsbiclogical reseats II to defensivemeasures such as immunizationand safety measures.

The 1)01) has been askedto make recommendations as tottrc disposal of existing stocks ofbacteriological weapons.

In the spirit of these decisions, the

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5

United States associates itself withthe principles and objectives of theUnited Kingdom Draft Conventionwhich would ban the use of biolog-ical methods of warfare. We willseek, however, to clarify specific pro-visions of the draft to assure thatnecessary safeguards arc included.

Neither our association with theConvention nor the limiting of ourpt ogram to research will leave us vul-nerable to surprise by an enemy whodoes not observe these rational re-straints. Our intelligence community

will continue to watch carefully thenature and extent of the biologicalprograms of others.

These important decisions, whichhave been announced today, havebeen taken as an initiative towardpeace. Mankind already carries in itsown hands too many of the seeds ofits own destruction. By the exampleswe set today, we hope to contributeto an atmosphere of peace and under-standing between nations and amongmen.

46 ACIA 14: INTII N VAL RETORT

5

Appendix V

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methodsof Warfare. Signed at Geneva, June 17, 1925

The undersigned plenipotentiaries,in the name of their respectiveGovernments:

Whereas the use in war of asphyx-iating, poisonous or other gases, andof all analogous liquids, materials ordevices, has been justly condemnedby the general opinion of the civilizedworld ;

Whereas the prohibition of suchuse has been declared in Treaties towhich the majority of Powers of theworld are Parties; and

To the end that this prohibitionshall be universally accepted as a partof International Law, binding alikethe conscience and the practice ofnations;

Declare:

That the High ContractingParties, so far as they arc not al-ready Parties to Treaties pro-hibiting such use, accept thisprohibition, agree to extend thisprohibition to the use of bac-teriological methods of warfareand agree to be bound as be-tween themselves according tothe terms of this cleciaratioa.

The High Contracting Parties willexert every effort to induce otherStates to accede to the present Proto-col. Such accession will be notified tothe Government of the French Re-

public, and by the latter to all signa-tory arid acceding Powers, and willtake effect on the date of the notifi-cation by the Government of theFrench Republic.

The present Protocol, of which theFrench and English texts are bothauthentic, shall be ratified as soon aspossible. It shall bear today's date.

The ratifications of the presentProtocol shall be addressed to theGovernment of the French Republic,which will at once notify the depositof such ratification to each of the sig-natory and acceding Powers.

The instrument of ratification ofand accession to the present Protocolwill remain deposited in the archivesof the Government of the FrenchRepublic.

The present Protocol will comeinto force for each signatory Poweras from the date of deposit of its rati-fication, and from that inornent, eachPower will be bound as regards otherPowers which have already depositedtheir ratifications.

WIINVSS WHY Ruor- the Pleni-potentiaries have signed the presentProtocol.

Doscr. at Geneva in a single copy,the seventeenth day of June,' OneThousand Nine !lumina! andTwenty-Five.

Appendixes 47

53

Appendix VI

Revised Draft Convention for the Prohibition of BiologicalMethods of Warfare and Accompanying Draft SecurityCouncil Resolution Proposed by the United Kingdom at theConference of the Committee on Disarmament, August 26,1969

THE STATES CONCLUDING haISCONVENTION, hereinafter referred toas the "Parties to the Convention".

RECALLING that many States havebecome Parties to The Protocol forthe Prohibition of the Use in War ofAsphyxiating, Poisonous or otherGases, and of Bacteriological Meth-ods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on17 Jone, 1925.

RECOGNISING the contribution thatthe said Protocol has already made,and continues to make, to mitigatingthe horrors of war,

Rte.:m.1ml FURTHER United Na-tions Genera! Assembly Resolu...-ms22628 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,and 2454A (XXIII) of 20 December1968, which called for strict observ-ance by all States of '-e principlesand objectives of the Geneva Proto-col and invited ar. States to accede toit,

144.1Evixo that chemical and bio-logical discoveries should be used onlyfor the betterment of human life,

RECOGNISING nevertheless that thedevelopment of scientific knowledgethroughout the world will increasethe risk of eventual use of biologicalmethods of warfare,

CONVINCED that such use would berepugnant to the conscience of Irian-kind and that no effort should bespared to minimise this risk,

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DESIRING therefore to reinforce theGeneva Protocol by the conclusion ofa Convention making special provi-sion in this field,

DECLARING their belief that, in par-ticular, provision should he made forthe prohibition of recourse to bio-logical methods of al fare in anycircumstances,

I lAvE AGREED as follows:

Artide I. Each of the Parties to theConvention undertakes, insofar as itmay not already be committed in thatrespect under Treaties or other in-struments in force prohibiting the useof chemical and biological methodsof warfare, never in any circum-stances, by making use for hostile pur-poses of microbial or other biologicalagents causing death, damage or dis-ease by infection or infestation toman, other animals, or crops, to en-gage in biological methods of warfare.

i4rticic II. Each of the Parties to theConvention undertakes:

1,a) not to produce or otherwiseat quire, or assist in or permitthe ereduction or acquisitionof :

microbial or other bio-logical agents of typesand in quantities thathave no inorpendentjustification for pros

ACDA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

phylactic or otherpeaceful purposes;

(ii) ancillary equipment orvectors the purpose ofwhich is to facilitatethe use of such agentsfor hostile purposes;

(b) not to conduct, assist or per-mit research aimed at produc-tion of the kind prohibited insub-paragraph (a) of thisArticle; and

to destroy, or divert to peace-ful purposes, within threemonths after the Conventioncomes into force for that Party,any stocks in its possession ofsuch agents or ancillary equip-ment or vectors as have beenproduced or otherwise ac-quired for hostile purposes.

(c)

Article 111

1. Any Party to the Conventionwhich believes that biological meth-ods of warfare hr-..ve been used againstit may lodge a complaint with theSecretary-General of the United Na-tions, submitting all evidenee at itsdisposal in support of the complaint,and re'quest that the complaint beinvestigated and that a report on theresult of the investigation be submit-ted to the Security Council.

2. Any Party to the Conventionwhich believes that another Party hasacted in breach of its undertakingunder Articles I and II of the Con-vention, but sr. hich is not entitled tolodge a complaint under ParagraphI of this Article, may lodge a cormplaint with the Security Council.submitting RBI:vide:Ice at its disposal,and request that the complaint heinvestigated.

3. Each of the Parties to the Con-vention undertakes to co-operate fullywith the Secretary - General and hisauthorised representatives in any in-vestigation he may carry out, as aAppendixes

result of a complaint, in accordancewith Security Council ResolutionNo

Article 1V. Each of the Parties tothe Convention affirms its intentionto provide or support appropriate as-sistance, in accordance with theUnited Nations Charter, to any Partyto the Convention, if the SecurityCouncil concludes that biologicalmethods of warfare have been usedagainst that Party.

Article V. Earls of the Parties to theConvention undertakes to pursue ne-gotiations in good faith on effectivemeasures to strengthen the existingconstraints on chemical methods ofwarfare.

Article VI. Nothing contained inthe present Convention shall be con-strued as in any way limiting or der-ogating fr nil obligations assumed byany State under the Protocol for theProhibition of the Use in War ofAsphyxiating, Poisonous or otherGases, and of Bacteriological Nfeth-ods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on17 June, 1925.

Article VII. [Provisions for amend-ments,]

Article 1'111. [Provisions for Signa-ture, Ratification, Entry into Force,etc.]

Article IX

1. This Convention shall he of 11111limited duration.

2. Each Party shall in exercising itsnational sovereignty have the rightto withdraw from the Convention, ifit decides that extraordinary events.related to the subject matter of thisConvention. have jeopardised thesupreme interests of its country. Itshall give notice of such withdrawalto all other Parties to the Conventionand to the United Nations SecurityCouncil three months in advance.Such notice shall include a statementof the extraordinary events it regards

49

as having jeopardised it supreme Article X. (Provisions on languagesinterests. of texts, etc.]

Revised Draft Security Council Resolution

TUE SECURITY COUNCIL,

WFICOMING the desire of a largenumber of States to subscribe to theConvention for the Prohibition ofBiological Methods of Warfare, andthereby undertake never to engage insuch methods of warfare; to prohibitthe production arid research aimed atthe production of biological weapons;and to destroy, or divert to peacefulpurposes, such % capons as may al-ready be i their possession,

NOTING that under Al tide III ofthe Convent:: n, Parties will have theright to lodge complaints and to re-quest that the complaints beinvestigated,

RrecroNisING the need, if confi-dence in the Convention is to be es-tablished, for appropriate arrange-ments to be made in advance for theinvestigation of any such complaints,and the particular need for urgencyin the investigation of complaints ofthe use of biological methods ofwarfare,

NOTING further the declared inten-tion of Parties to the Convention toprovide or support appropriate as-sistance, in accordance with theCharter, to any other Party to theConvention, if the Security Councilconcluded that biological methods ofwarfare have been used against thatParty,

REAFFIRSIING in particular the in-herent right, recognised under Article51 of the Charter, of individual andcollertive self-defence if an armedattack occurs against a Member ofthe United Nations, until the SecurityCouncil has taken measures neces-sary to maintain international peaceand security,

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I. Requests the Secretary-General

(a) to take such measures aswill enable him

(i) to investigate withoutdelay any complaintslodged with him in ac-cordance with Al tideIII.1 of the Convention;

(ii) if so requested by theSecurity Council, to in-vestigate any complaintmade in accordance withArticle I11.2 of the Con-vention; and

(b) to report to the SecurityCouncil on the result ofany such investigation.

2. Declares its readiness to giveurgent consideration

(a) to any complaint that maybe lodged with it under Ar-ticle 111.2 of the Conven-tion; and

(b) to any report that the Sec-retary-General may submitin accordance with opera-tive paragraph 1 of thisResolution on the result ofIris investigation of a com-plaint; and if it concludesthat the complaint is Well-founded. to consider ur-gently n hat action it :take or tecommend in ac-cordance with the Chatter.

3. Calls upon Member States andupon Specialised Agencies of theUnited Nations to co-oi-terate as ap-propriate with the Secretary-Generalfor the fulfillment of the purposes ofthis Resolution.

AGO.% NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

Appendix VII

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States ofAmerica Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacementof Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruc-tion Dn the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the SubsoilThereof (Revised), October 30, 1969

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Recognising the common interestof mankind in the progress of the ex-ploration and vse of the seabed andthe ocean floor for peaceful purposes,

Considering that the prevention ofa nuclear arms race on the seabedand the ocean floor serves the inter-ests of maintaining world peace, re-duces international tensions, andstrengthens friendly relations amongSlates,

Convinced that this Treaty con-stitutes a step towards the exclusion ofthe seabed, the ocean floor and thesubsoil thereof from the anns race,and detennined to continue negotia-tions concerning further measuresleading to this end,

Convinced that this Treaty consti-tutes a step towards a treaty on gen-eral and complete disonnament un-der strict and effective internationalcontrol, and determined to continuenegotiations to this end,

Convinced that this Treaty willfurther the purposes and principles ofthe Charter of the United Nations,in a manner consistent with the prin-ciples of international law and with-out infringing the freedoms of thehigh seas,

Have agreed as

Appendixes

Article 1

1. The States Parties to this Treatyundertake not to emplant or emplaceon the seabed and the ocean floorand in the subsoil thereof beyond themaximum contiguous zone providedfor in the 1958 Geneva Conventionon the Territorial Sea and the Con-tiguous Zone any objects with nu-clear weapons or any other types ofweapons of mass destruction, as wellas structures, launching installationsor any other facilities specifically de-signed for storing, testing or usingst, ch weapons.

2. The undertakings of paragraph1 of this Article shall also applywithin the contiguous zone referredto in paragraph 1 of this Article, ex-cept that within that zone they shallnot apply to the coastal state.

:3. The States Parties to this Treatyundertake not to assist, encourage orinduce any State to commit actionsprohibited by this Treaty and not toparticipate in any other way in s,tchactions.

Article 11

1. For the purpose of this Treatythe outer limit of thr contiguous zonereferred to in Article I shall be meas-ured in accordance wit), the provi-sions of Part 1. Section II of the19511 Geneva Convention the Ter-

51

5

Appendix VII

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States ofAmerica Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacementof Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruc-tion on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the SubsoilThereof (Revised), October 30, 1969

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Recognising the common interestof mankind in the progress of the ex-ploration and use of the seabed andthe ocean floor for peaceful purposes,

Considering that the prevention ofa nuclear arms race on the seabedand the ocean floor serves the inter-ests of maintaining world peace, re-duces international tensions, andstrengthens friendly relations amongStates,

Convinced that this Treaty con-stitutes a step towards the exclusion ofthe seabed, the ocean floor and thesubsoil thereof from the arms race,and determined to continue negotia-tions concerning further measuresleading to this end,

Convinced that this Treaty consti-tutes a step towards a treaty on gen-eral and complete disarmament un-der strict and effective internationalcontrol, and determined to continuenegotiations to this end,

Convinced that this Treaty ',sillfurther the purposes and principles ofthe Charter of the United Nations,in a manner consistent with the prin-ciples of international law and with-out infringing the freedoms of thehigh seas,

I las c agreed as follows:

Appendixes

Article I

1. The States Parties to this Treatyundertake not to emplant or emplaceon the seabed and the ocean floorand in the subsoil thereof beyond themaximum contiguous zone providedfor in the 1958 Geneva Conventionon the Territorial Sea and the Con-tiguous Zone any objects with nu-clear weapons or any other types ofweapons of mass destruction, as wellas structures, launching installationsor any other facilities specifically de-signed for storing, testing or usingsuch weapons.

2. The undertakings of paragraph1 of this Article shall also applywithin the contiguous zone referredto in paragraph 1 of this Article, ex-cept that within that zone they shallnot apply to the coastal state.

3. The States Parties to this Treatyundertake not to assist, encourage orinduce any State to commit actionsprohibited by this Treaty and not toparticipate in any other way in suchactions.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this 'Freakythe outer limit of the contiguous zonereferred to in Article I shall be meas-ured in accordance with the provi-sions of Fart 1, Section 11 of the1958 Geneva Convention on the l'er-

51

ri to r: al Sea and the Contiguous Zoneand in accordance with internationallaw.

2. Nothing in this Treaty shall beinterpreted as supporting or prejudic-ing the position of any State Partywith respect to rights or claims whichsuch State Party may assert, or withrespect to recognition or nonrecogni-tion of rights or claims asserted by anyother State, related to waters off itscoasts, Cr. to the seabed and the oc anfloor.

Article 111

In order to promote the objec-tives and ensure the observance of theprovisions of this Treaty, the StatesParties to the Treaty shall have theright to verify the activities of otherStates Parties to the Treaty on theseabed and the ocean floor and in thesubsoil thereof beyond the maximumcontiguous zone, referred to in ArticleI, if these activities raise doubts con-cerning the fulfillment of the obliga-tions assumed under this Treaty,without interfering with such activi-ties or otherwise infringing rightsrecognized under international law,including the freedoms of the highseas.

2. The right of verification rec-ognized by the States Parties inparagraph 1 of this Article may beexe:cised by any State Party using itsown means or with the assistance ofany other State Party.

3. The States Parties to the Treatyundertake to consult and cooperatewith a v:eav to removing doubts con-cerning the fulfillment of the obliga-tions assumed under this Treaty. Inthe event that consultation and co-operation have not removed thedoub:s and there is serious questionconcerning the fulfillment of the obli-gations assum xi under this Treaty,States Parties to this Treaty may, inaccordance with the provisions of theCharter of the United Nations, referthe 'natter to he Security Council.

52

r

Article 11". Any State Party to theTreaty may propose amendments tothis Treaty. Amendments shall enterinto force for each State Party to theTreaty accepting the amendmentsupon their acceptance by a majorityof the States Parties to the Treaty andthereafter for each remaining StateParty on the date of acceptance by it.

Article I'. rive years after the entryinto force of this Treaty, a conferenceof Parties to the Treaty shall be heldin Geneva, Switzerland, in order toreview the operation of this Treatywith a view to assuring that the pur-poses of the preamble and the pro-visions of the Treaty are beingrealized. Such review shall take intoaccount any relevant technologicaldevelopments. The review conferenceshall determine in accordance withthe views of a majority of thoseParties attending whether and whenan additional review conferenceshall be convened.

Article 1'1. Each Party to thisTreaty shall in exercising its nationalsovereignty have the right to with-draw from this Treaty if it decidesthat extraordinary events related tothe subject matter of this Treaty havejeopardized the supreme interests ofits Country. It shall give notice ofsuch withdrawal to all other Partiesto the Treaty and to the United Na-tions Security Council three monthsin advance. Such notice shall includea statement of the extraordinaryevents it considers to have jeopardizedits supreme interests.

Avila.' VII

1. This Treaty shall be open forsignature to all States. Any Statewhich does not sign the Treaty be-fore its entry into force in accordancewith paragraph 3 of this Article mayaccede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall he subject toratification by signatory States. in-struments of ratification and of acces-

ACPA NINTH ANNVAI, REPORT

sion shall be deposited with thc Gov-ernments of which archereby designated the DepositaryGovernnic nts.

3. This Treaty shall enter intoforce after the deposit of instrumentsof ratification by twenty-two Govern-ments, including the Governmentsdesignated as Depositary Govern-ments of this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments ofratification or accession are depositedafter the entry into force of thisTreaty it shall cuter into force onthe date of the deposit of their hi-struments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governmentsshall forthwith notify the Govern-ments of all Status signatory and ac-ceding to this Treaty of the date ofeach signature, of the date of depositof each instrument of iatification orof accession, of the date of the entry

into force of this Treaty, and of thereceipt of other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registeredby the Depositary Governments pltr-stiant to Article 102 of the Charterof the United Nations.

Ariinrc FM. This Treaty, the Eng-lish, Russian, Fiends, Spanish andChinese texts of which arc equallyauthentic, shall be deposited in thearchives of the Depositaly Cavern -merits. Duly certified copies of thisTreaty shall be transmitted by theDepositary Governments to the Gov-ernments of the States signatory andacceding !hereto.

IN 'WITNESS whereof the under-signed, being duly authorized thereto,have signed this Treaty.

Dom: in atday of _.

Appindixes 53

53

Appendix VIII

The Social Science Advisory Board

Chairman

PHILIP MOSELY

Professor of InternationalRelations and Director of theEuropean Institute atColumbia UniversityNew York, N.Y.

Members

ABRAM BERGSON

Professor of Economics atHarvard UniversityCambridge, Mass.

URIE BP.ONFENBRENNEY.

Professor of Psychology and ofChild Development and FamilyRelationships atCornell UniversityIthaca, N.Y.

\VILLIAM M. CAPRON

Associate DeanJohn F. Kennedy Schoolof GovernmentIlarward UniversityCainbridge, Mass.

60

GORDON A. CRAIG

Professor of History atStanford UniversityStanford, Calif.

W. PHILLIPS DAVISON

Professor of Journalism andSociologyColumbia UniversityNew York, N. Y.

E. ADAMSON HOEBEL

Professor of AnthropologyUniversity of MinnesotaMinneapolis, Minn.

ALICE LANGLEY HSIEH

Institute for Defense AnalysesArlington, Va.

Moms JANON'177.

Professor of Sociology at theUniversity of ChicagoChicago, Ill.

AUDA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

Appendix IX

ACDA Depository Libraries

Alaska

University of AlaskaUniversity LibraryCollege, Alaska 99735

Arizona

Arizona State UniversityUniversity LibraryTempe, Ariz. 85281

Arkansas

University of ArkansasUniversity LibraryReference DepartmentFayetteville, Ark. 72701

California

Claremont CollegesI lonnold LibraryDocuments DepartmentClaremont, Calif. 91711

Los Angeles Public Library630 West Fifth StreetLos Angeles, Calif. 90017

San Francisco Public LibraryCivic CenterSan Francisco, Calif. 94102

San Jose State CollegeCollege LibraryDocuments DepartmentSan Jose, Calif. 95114

Stanford UniversityLaw LibrarySerials DepartmentStanford, Calif. 91305

Stanford UniversityHoover Institute, LibrarianStanford, Calif. 91305

Appendixes

University of CaliforniaGeneral LibraryDocuments DepartmentBerkeley, Calif. 94720

University of CaliforniaUniversity LibraryGovernment Documents DepartmentDavis, Calif. 95616

University of CaliforniaUniversity LibraryLos Angeles, Calif. 90024

Colo redo

Denver Public. Library1357 BroadwayDenver, Colo. 80203

U.S. Air Force AcademyAcademy LibraryColorado Springs, Colo. 80901

University of Colorado LibrariesGovernment Documents DivisionBoulder, Colo. 80302

Connecticut

Olin CollegeCollege LibraryMiddletown, Conn. 06157

Vale University LibraryUniversity 1.ibrary, DocumentsNew haven, Conn, 06520

Delaware

University of Delaware LibraryGovernment Documents DepartmentNewark, IA. 19711

Diitrict of Columbia

Aine.ican UniNTr5ityUniversity LibraryWashington, D.C. 20016

55

61

Georgetown UniversityUniversity LibraryWashington, D.C. 20007

Howard UniversityFounders LibraryWashington, D.C. 20001

Library of CongressAC DA Bibliography SectionWashington, D.C. 20450

Florida

St. Johns River Jr. CollegeCollege LibraryPalatka, Fla. 32077

Georgia

Emory UniversityUniversity LibraryDocuments CenterAtlanta, Ga. 30322

University of GeorgiaUniversity LibrariesDocuments DivisionAthens, Ga. 30601

Hawaii

University of IlawaiiUniversity LibraryGovernment Dormnents CollectionHonolulu, I Iawaii 96822

Idaho

Idaho State UniversityUniversity LibraryDocuments DepartmentPocatello, Idaho 83201

Illinois

Chicago Public Library78 E. Washington StreetChicago, Ill. 60602

University of Chicago LibraryDocuments DepartmentChicago, Ill. 60637

Indiana

Indiana UniversityUniversity LibraryDocuments SectionBloomington, Ind. 47401

Indiana State UniversityCunningham Memorial LibraryTerre Haute, Ind. 47809

Purdue UniversityGeneral LibraryMemorial CenterLafayette, end. 47907

Iowa

Iowa State UniversityUniversity LibraryGovernment DocumentsAmes, Iowa 50010

Kansas

Kansas State UniversityUniversity LibraryDocuments DepartmentManhattan, Kans. 66502

Wichita State UniversityUniversity Library, DocumentsWichita, Kans. 67208

Kentucky

Louisville Free Public LibraryFourth and York StreetsLouisville, Ky. 40203

University of KentuckyMargaret I. King LibraryLexington, Ky. 40506

Western Kentucky UniversityMargie I lam LibraryBowling Green, Ky. 42101

l.ouiciana

New Orleans Public Library219 Loyola AvenueNew Orleans, I.a. 70140

.Maine

University of MaineRaymond IL Gogler LibraryOrono, Maine 01473

Morylond

Enoch Pratt Free Library400 Cathedral StreetBaltimore, Aid, 20201

toucher CollegeCollege LibraryTowsonBaltimore, ;lid. 21204

56 ACDA NINTH ANNUAL REfORT

fi 2

U.S. Naval AcademyAcademy LibraryAnnapolis, Md. 21402

University of MarylandMcKeldin LibraryCollege Park, Md. 20740

Afassachusetts

Boston Public LibraryCopley SquareBoston, Mass. 02117

Harvard UniversityCenter for International Affairs Li-

braryCambridge, Mass. 02138

Massachusetts Institute of Tech-nology

M.I.T. LibrariesDocuments Section/14E-210Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Michigan

Detroit Public Library5201 Woodward AvenueDetroit, Mich. 48202

Michigan State UniversityUniversity LibraryEast Lansing, Mich. 48823

University of MichiganGeneral LibrarySerials and Documents SectionMn Arbor, Mich. 18104

1Vayner State UniversityDirector of LibrariesDetroit, Mich. 48202

Minnesoir

Minneapolis Public Library300 Nicol let AvenueMinneapolis, Minn. 55101

ississippi

Mississippi State UniversityUniversity LibraryState College, Miss. 39762

Missouri

St. Louis Public LibraryOlive, 13th and 14th StreetsSt. Louis, Mo. 63103

Appendixes

Southeast Missouri State CollegeKent LibraryGovernment DocumentsCape Girardeau, Mo. 63701

University of MissouriUniversity Library, DocumentsColumbia, Mo. 65201

Montana

University of Montana LibraryDocuments DepartmentMissoula, Mont, 59801

Nebraska

University of NebraskaUniversity LibrariesAcquisition DepartmentLincoln Nebr, 68508

Nevada

University of NevadaUniversity LibraryGovernment Publications

DepartmentReno, Nev. 89507

New Hampshire

Dartmouth CollegeBaker LibraryHanover, N.1 I. 03755

New Jersey

Princeton UniversityUniversity LibraryDocuments DivisionPrinceton, N.J. 08540

New Mexico

University of Ness. MexicoZimmerman LibraryAlbuquerque, N. Mex. 87106

Ness. Mexico State UniversityUniversity LibraryLas Cruces, N. Mex. 88001

New York

Cornell University Libraries(1crirral Serial Record DeprtincertIthaca, N.Y. 14850

57

6J

Dag Hammarskjold LibraryUnited NationsAcquisitions SectionNew York, N.Y. 10017

New York Public LibraryFifth Avenue and 42d StreetNew York, N.Y. 10017

State University of New YorkUniversity LibraryDocuments SectionBinghamton, N.Y. 13901

U.S. Military AcademyAcademy LibraryWest Point, N.Y. 10996

United States MissionU.N. Library, 799 U.N. PlazaNew York, N.Y. 10017

North Carolina

Duke UniversityWilliam Perkins LibraryDurham, N.C. 27706

University of North CarolinaUniversity LibraryBA/SS DivisionChapel I u ll, N.C. 27514

North Dakota

University of North DakotaUniversity Law LibraryGrand Forks, N.D. 58201

Ohio

Batelle Memorial InstituteACTIACColumbus, Ohio 43201

Bowling 1.;reen UniversityUniversity LibraryBowling Green, Ohio 43102

Cleveland Public Library325 Superior Avenue, N.F.Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Oberlin CollegeCollege LibraryOberlin, Ohio 41074

Oklahoma

Oklahoma State UniversityUniversity LibraryDocuments DivisionStillwater, Okla. 74074

Oregon

University of OregonCffice of Federal Government

RelationsEugene, avg. 97403

Pennsylvania

Bryn Mawr CollegeCollege LibraryEllyn Mawr, Pa. 19010

Free Library of PhiladelphiaLogan SquarePhiladelphia, Pa. 19144

University of PennsylvaniaUniversity LibrarySerials DepartmentPhiladelphia, Pa. 19104

University of PittsburghIlilhnan Library, G- 8Pittsburgh, Pa. 1.5213

Rhode island

Brown UniversityUniversity Library DocumentsProvidence, R.I. 02912

South Carolina

Clemson UniversityUniversity LibraryClemson, S.C. 29631

Tenne.,see

Joint University LibrariesAcquisitions DepartmentNashville, Trim. 37203

Texas

Baylor UniversityUn:versity LibraryWaco, Tex. 76706

58 ACDA NINTH ANNUAL REPORT

6,1

Dallas Public Library1951 Commerce StreetDallas, Tex. 75201

Rice UniversityFondren LibraryP.O. Box 1892Houston, Tex. 77001

University of TexasUniversity Library, DocumentsAustin, Tex. 78712

Virginia

Defense Documtniation Center,Headquarters

Cameron StationAlexandria, Va. 22314

University of VirginiaAlderman LibraryPublic DocumentsCharlottesville, Va. 22901

Washington

Seattle Public Library4th and MadisonSeattle, Wash. 98101

Vest Virginia UniversityUniversity LibraryDocuments CollectionMorgantown, W. Va. 26506

Wisconsin

Milwaukee Public Library814 West Wisconsin AvenueMilwaukee, Wis. 53233

Switzerland

United NationsPalais des Nations LibraryGeneva, SwitzerlandU.S. MissionCCD, 80 rue de LausanneGeneva, Switzerland

Appendixes 59

65

Appendix X

Officia!s of the Agency

Director

GERARD C. SMITH

Deputy Director

PHILIP J. "'ARLEN

Assistant Director, Inlet nationalRelations Bureau

JAMES F. LEONARD

Assistant Director, Science andTechnology Bureau

SPURGEON M. KEENS', Jr.

Deputy Deputy

ARTHUR R. DAY SIDNEY N. GRAVBEAL

.-issistant Director,Weapons Evaluation andControl Bureau

Assistant Director,Economics Bureau

ROBERT H, B. WADEJOHN J. DAvis, Lt. Gen., USA

Deputy Deputy

WALTEr, L. DEEMER (Vacant)

General Counsel

WII LIAM W. HANCOCK

Deputy

CHARLES N. VAN DOREN

Speevrt Assist 70 to theDirector ard Eveeut,veSecretor)

I IONS ARD FURNAS

Public Affairs Adviser

N Enyti I F: E. NURDNESS

Deputy

RALPH STUART SNIITH

Executive Director

JOHN GEORGE BACON

Dept: ty

END- RY J. ADAMS

Counselor

EWRENCE D. WI- R

60 ACDA NINTH ANNUAL RETORTGOVERN.ENT C./TICE:197Q 0 -3'8.816

6t;

67