QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT -...

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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT For

BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD

GULBARGA POL DEPOT KARNATAKA

By

Ultra-Tech Environmental Consultancy

January 2018

POL DEPOT OF BPCL, GULBARGA

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA)

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Document Title : Risk Assessment Study Report

Project Title : POL DEOPT of BPCL, Gulbarga.

Client Company Name : Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd

HSE Consultant : UltraTech Environmental Consultancy & Laboratory

Document Number : J-3076-S-RT-1801

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

UltraTech gratefully acknowledges the co-operation received from the management of BPCL,

Gulbarga.

DISCLAIMER

The advice rendered by Consultants is in the nature of guidelines based on good engineering practices

and generally accepted safety procedures. Consultants do not accept any liability for the same. This

Report is not intended to identify all hazards which may exist nor is it intended to be an exhaustive

review of all possible eventualities. Recommendations shown in the report are advisory in nature and

not binding on the parties involved viz. UltraTech, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.

Copying this report without written consent of Ultra Tech, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd is not

permitted.

B1 25/1/18 Issued for Client Review BN SDR JS

Rev Date Comments / Nature of

Changes

Prepared

by Reviewed by

Approved

by

Approved

by(BPCL)



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Table of Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... 6

2. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 11

2.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 11

3. QRA METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................... 13

3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................ 15

3.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 15

3.3 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 15

3.4 RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................... 16

3.5 RISK EVALUATION ................................................................................................... 16

4. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS – BASIS AND RESULTS ........................................................... 17

5. RISK MODELLING – BASIS AND RESULTS ........................................................................ 29

5.1 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................ 29

5.2 RISK CRITERIA .......................................................................................................... 31

5.3 RISK RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 32

6. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................... 36

7. LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS / STANDARDS ............................................................ 37

ANNEXURE 1 CONSEQUENCE CONTOURS ................................................................................... 38

ANNEXURE 2 ASSUMPTION REGISTER ........................................................................................ 53



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ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP

BPCL

CR

ETP

FBR

FRVT

EFRVT

HSE

HZ Tank

IRPA

LFL

LOC

LSIR

NA

NR

PID

PFD

ROV

QRA

As Low as Reasonably Practicable

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited

Catastrophic Rupture

Effluent Treatment Plant

Full Bore Rupture

Fixed Roof Vertical Tank

External Floating Rood Vertical Tank

Health safety and Environment

Horizontal Tank

Individual Risk Per Annum

Lower Flammability Limit

Loss of Containment

Location Specific Individual Risk

Not Available

Not Reached

Piping & Instrumentation diagram

Process Flow Diagram

Remote Operated Valve

Quantitative Risk Assessment



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DEFINITIONS

COMPANY Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL)

CONSULTANT UltraTech appointed by the COMPANY to perform PROJECT.

SITE OWNER BPCL

CONTRACT The contract between COMPANY and CONSULTANT for PROJECT

PROJECT POL Depot at Gulbarga, Karnataka

SERVICES Services being provided by UltraTech as per the CONTRACT for the PROJECT



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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL has proposed POL Depot at Gulbarga, Karnataka for the

purpose of receipt, storage and dispatch of petroleum products (POL) such as Motor Spirit (MS), High

Speed Diesel (HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) and Ethanol. BPCL has awarded UltraTech to carry

out Quantitative risk assessment for the proposed POL Depot.

This document identifies the methodology and results proposed by UltraTech and accepted by BPCL

for the completion of the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study (QRA) study.

As part of the QRA study, hazard scenarios were identified for the project facility and consequence

analysis was carried out using DNV PHAST software version 6.7. The risk analysis was carried out using

DNV PHAST RISK software version 6.7 to obtain risk results in the form of LSIR contours. These risk

results were assessed based on the Risk Acceptance Criteria and overall LSIR was found to broadly lie

in the ALARP region.

OVERALL LOCATION SPECIFIC RISK CONTOUR

Figure 1: LSIR Contour

Note: LSIR contours represent the worst-case scenario, Risk for an individual who is present at a particular

location 24 hour per day, and 365 days per year.



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INDIVIDUAL RISK PER ANNUM

The LSIR values of the personnel in the Gulbarga Depot are provided in the Table 1. From this LSIR

value, the Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) to the personnel based on their exposure are calculated

and presented below:

Table 1 Individual Risk Per Annum

S. No Location of Interest LSIR

(per avg. year) Presence Factor IRPA RISK

1 Admin Building 7.96E-07 0.304 2.42E-07 Acceptable

2 TLF Gantry 8.74E-06 0.304 2.66E-06 ALARP

3 Railway Siding 5.29E-07 0.038 2.03E-08 Acceptable

4 TLF Pump House 1.11E-05 0.304 3.38E-06 ALARP

5 TWG Pump House 2.26E-06 0.038 8.67E-08 Acceptable

6 MS Tank farm 3.01E-06 1.000 3.01E-06 ALARP

7 HSD Tank farm 1.45E-06 1.000 1.45E-06 ALARP

8 SKO Tank Farm 4.86E-06 1.000 4.86E-06 ALARP

9 ETP 1.02E-10 0.304 3.11E-11 Acceptable

Note: IRPA represents the Risk for an individual who is present at different locations during different

periods.

Comparison of the HSE UK Risk Acceptance Criteria and the Individual Risks calculated from the

project facility shows that the estimated values of IRPA, as given in Table above broadly lies in ALARP

region.

SOCIETAL RISK

Assessment of societal risks is even more important than assessment of individual risk because they

involve the likelihood of multiple fatalities. Societal risk is the risk to any person or group of persons

who are not connected to project facilities and are outside the facility fence line.



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FN CURVE:

It is helpful to consider group risk in the demonstration that risks are ALARP. This allows consideration

to be given to events, which, although low in frequency, may cause multiple injuries or fatalities.

Group risk can be presented in the form of a plot of cumulative frequency versus number of fatalities

(F‐N curve).

F = Frequency (experienced or predicted)

N = No. of multiple fatalities.

Figure 2 FN Curve

Hence, from the above graph it is seen that the Gulbarga Depot falls in ALARP category.

CONCLUSION

1. The Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) identified for various locations (Table 1) in the Depot falls

in the ALARP region broadly as per UK HSE Risk Acceptance Criteria.

2. The results of the QRA show that most long-ranging hazards are flash fires due to the large

volumes involved and the buoyancy of the fluid compositions assessed. The flammable gas

dispersion from MS tank Catastrophic rupture (Table 5) show that 100% LFL concentration is

dispersed at the maximum distance of 223 m which encompasses the adjacent HSD/SKO/MS

tanks, TLF gantry, TW pump house.



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3. The Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) results present free field overpressure distances which almost

encompass the entire Depot, and therefore VCE hazards are the second largest hazard range

potential. The peak overpressure of 0.1 bar is reached at a distance of 508m and 0.3 bar is

reached at a distance of 389m affecting the BPCL installation and adjacent facilities across the

plant boundary due to Catastrophic rupture of MS tank.

4. The results of heat radiation due to jet fire from 30 mm leakage of MS pipeline from TLF pump

discharge to gantry (Table 5) show that 12.5 kW/m2 radiation levels were reached at the

maximum distances of 80 m and 37.5 kW/m2 radiation level is reached at the maximum

distances of 65m.

5. The results of heat radiation due to Pool fire from the rupture of HSD pipeline from tank to TLF

Pump shows that 12.5 kW/m2 radiation level is reached at the maximum distances of 84.



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Recommendations

Recommendations of the QRA are as follows,

1. Ensure design and maintenance review are carried out to identify the hazards and corresponding

prevention and mitigation measures are in place.

2. The Flash fire scenario for certain accident scenarios are found to encompass the entire facility,

hence it is recommended to avoid any source of ignition in the depot.

3. Ensure proper access/exit to all the areas of the depot in order to evacuate safely during

emergency.

4. Consider carrying out SIMOPS study.

5. People movement in the TLF gantry should be maintained minimum.

6. Ensure proper fire protection system is in place at gantry and tank farm area to avoid escalation

of fire from TLF pump house.

7. Ensure adequate grounding and earthing arrangements in the loading area are in place to avoid

static charge generation.

8. Ensure regular monitoring in the tank farm and pump house.

9. It is recommended to develop procedures to verify the testing and inspection records of the

tankers at the entry gate.

10. Ensure arrangements and procedures for periodic proof testing of storage tank overfill

prevention systems are in place to minimize the likelihood of any failure that could result in loss

of containment.



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2. INTRODUCTION

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), has awarded UltraTech to carry out Quantitative risk

assessment study for their POL Depot at Gulbarga, Karnataka. The document identifies the

methodology and results proposed by UltraTech and accepted by BPCL for the completion of the

Quantitative Risk Assessment Study (QRA) study.

2.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd(BPCL) has proposed an POL installation at Gulbarga Karnataka for

the purpose of receipt, storage and dispatch of petroleum products (POL) such as Motor Spirit (MS),

High Speed Diesel (HSD), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) and Ethanol.

The terminal is receiving the petroleum products through Railway wagons. These are stored in various

aboveground storage tanks and are distributed to various customers by loading in the tank trucks. A

Quantitative Risk Assessment Study has considered several potential scenarios that could lead to

major disasters. The scenarios considered are

• MS, SKO and HSD TW pump suction and discharge line leaks and rupture

• MS, SKO and HSD TLF pump suction and discharge line leaks and rupture

• Atmospheric Storage Tank Leak/Instantaneous rupture

The consequences could be fire with radiation effects for all the products stored. The risks arising out

of these events are discussed at length in the QRA report.

Table 2 Existing Storage tank details

Tank No Product Stored

Storage Capacity Tank Type

KL A/G OR U/G Roof Type

T-1 HSD 7000 AG FRVT



T-4 MS 4000 AG EFRVT

T-5 MS 4000 AG EFRVT



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Tank No Product Stored

Storage Capacity Tank Type

KL A/G OR U/G Roof Type

T-6 SKO 858 AG FRVT

T-7 Bio-Diesel 500 AG FRVT

T-8 Bio-Diesel 500 AG FRVT

T-9 Ethanol 200 AG HZ Tank

T-10 Ethanol 200 AG HZ Tank

Figure 3 BPCL Gulbarga Depot



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3. QRA METHODOLOGY

This section presents a brief description of the approach and steps followed in the QRA study.

The QRA Study included the following steps:

• Identification of Hazards (Fire / Explosion / uncontrolled release of Hazardous materials /

Flash Fire / Jet Fire / Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion

(UVCE), etc.)

• Identification of Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) scenario.

• Frequency Analysis using internationally accepted database and Evaluation of the

likelihood of occurrence of possible events.

• Consequence modeling and analysis for the identified hazard covering impact on people

and potential escalation by using PHAST Risk.

• Estimation of Individual Risk (IR) and Societal Risk (SR).

• Recommendations.

The overall QRA methodology is shown in Figure 4 and is described in more detail in the subsequent

sections.



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Figure 4: QRA Methodology



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3.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The hazardous scenarios considered in the QRA for the project facility will be identified based on the

properties of the materials handled and the identification of the potential hazards in the pipeline

systems which could lead to loss of containment events.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Class A & Class B petroleum products are received in wagons and stored in atmospheric tanks through

TW Pumps later transferred in road tankers through TLF pumps.

3.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

The following activities comprise the consequence analysis which is carried out for the project facility:

• Review of the P&ID’s to determine process streams;

• Identification of isolatable sections based on the location of Shutdown Valves;

• Review of the design basis to obtain the properties of the stream (e.g. pressure,

temperature, composition and density) and

• Calculation of the inventory within the isolatable sections.

• Consequence modelling is conducted to evaluate the effect distances of the identified loss

of Containment (LOC) scenarios and their impact on people.

3.3 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

Once the potential release scenarios are identified, the next stage is to estimate the failure

frequencies (likelihood for the event to occur) based on international standard databases.

The frequency analysis will be performed as follows:

• Identification of the base failure frequencies applicable to the pipelines from the relevant

international standard databases;

• The total failure frequencies will be derived from the combination of the time in use of the

pipelines/tanks with the base failure frequency data.



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3.4 RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment will be undertaken to evaluate the risk associated with the Storage tanks and the

associated facilities. The consequence analysis results and failure frequencies will be combined using

PHAST RISK 6.7 software. The risk shall be typically presented as Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)

contours.

3.5 RISK EVALUATION

The next stage of the QRA study includes the evaluation of the individual risk results against the Risk

Acceptance Criteria to determine whether the risks are broadly acceptable, ALARP or unacceptable

and to make some professional judgments about the significance of the risks.



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4. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS – BASIS AND RESULTS

This section describes the approach used for the consequence analysis whereby consequence models

are built based on the identified LOC scenarios of the project facility. The consequences of the release

of hazardous substances by failures or catastrophes as well as the damage to the surrounding area

can be determined by means of consequence modelling. Models help to calculate the physical effects

resulting from a release of hazardous substances and help to translate the physical effects in terms of

injury or fatality to the exposed personnel.

The techniques used to model the consequences of the hazardous material releases cover the

following:

• Modelling of discharge rates when holes develop in pipeline systems.

• Modelling of the flammable gas clouds from releases to the atmosphere.

• Modelling of the heat radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as jet

fire and flash fire.

• Modelling of explosion overpressure from releases.

Table 3 Process Parameters for Pipelines

IS No Description Scenario

points Leak

Size,mm

Pipeline Dia, inch

Pressure kg/cm2

Temperature °C

Mass flow rate

m3/hr

IS 1 MS Pipeline from

Rail Gantry to TWG Pump Suction

TWG BAY 25 10 3 55 350

FR 10 3 55 350

IS 2 SKO Pipeline from

Rail Gantry to TWG Pump Suction

TWG BAY 25 10 3 55 350

FR 10 3 55 350

IS 3 HSD Pipeline from Rail Gantry to TWG

Pump Suction TWG BAY

30 12 3 55 500

FR 12 3 55 500

IS 4 MS Pipeline from

TWG Pump Discharge to Tank

TWG PUMP

25 10 5 55 350

FR 10 5 55 350

IS 5 SKO Pipeline from

TWG Pump Discharge to Tank

TWG PUMP

20 8 5 55 350

FR 8 5 55 350

IS 6 35 14 5 55 500



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points Leak

Size,mm

Pipeline Dia, inch

Pressure kg/cm2

Temperature °C

Mass flow rate

m3/hr

HSD Pipeline from TWG Pump Discharge to Tank

TWG PUMP

FR 14 5 55 500

IS 7 From MOV MS

tank to TLF Pump suction

TLF BAY 40 16 3 55 200

FR 16 3 55 200

IS 8 From MOV SKO


TLF BAY 20 8 3 55 250

FR 8 3 55 250

IS 9 From MOV HSD


TLF BAY 50 24 3 55 350

FR 24 3 55 350

IS 10 TLF MS pump

discharge to TLF gantry

TLF PUMP 30 12 5 55 200

FR 12 5 55 200

IS 11 TLF SKO pump


TLF PUMP 15 6 5 55 250

FR 6 5 55 250

IS 12 TLF HSD pump


TLF PUMP 40 16 5 55 350

FR 16 5 55 350

Table 4 Process Parameters for Storage Tanks


points Leak Size, mm

Pressure kg/cm2

Temperature °C

Capacity, m3

IS 13 TANK 1 HSD 10 ATM 55

7000 CR ATM 55


7000 CR ATM 55


7000 CR ATM 55

IS 16 TANK 4 MS 10 ATM 55

4000 CR ATM 55

IS 17 TANK 5 MS 10 ATM 55

4000 CR ATM 55

IS 18 TANK 6 SKO 10 ATM 55

858 CR ATM 55

IS 19 TANK 7 BIODIESEL 10 ATM 55 500



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points Leak Size, mm

Pressure kg/cm2

Temperature °C

Capacity, m3

CR ATM 55

IS 20 TANK 8 BIODIESEL 10 ATM 55

500 CR ATM 55

IS 21 TANK 9 ETHANOL 10 ATM 55

200 CR ATM 55

IS 22 TANK 10 ETHANOL 10 ATM 55

200 CR ATM 55



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Table 5 Consequence Result

Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point

Flash Fire Effects: Radiation Effects: Jet Fire

Ellipse Radiation Effects: Pool

Fire Ellipse Overpressure

100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters

Radiation Levels (kW/m2)

Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

IS-1

MS Pipeline from Rail Gantry to

TWG Pump

Suction

Leak 25 mm

TWG BAY 26.23 21.11

4 51.07 49.75 4 58.32 68.37 0.01 241.13 160.12

12.5 39.74 37.56 12.5 27.81 27.19 0.1 66.62 52.57

37.5 32.67 30.23 37.5 NR NR 0.3 48.29 41.27

FBR TWG BAY 26.03 24.88

4 71.51 80.96 4 80.22 98.69 0.01 298.52 217.66

12.5 56.02 61.84 12.5 39.20 38.82 0.1 74.76 62.55

37.5 46.25 50.39 37.5 NR NR 0.3 52.35 46.25

IS-2

SKO Pipeline from Rail Gantry to

TWG Pump

Suction

Leak 25 mm

TWG BAY 15.56 9.53

4 24.08 23.79 4 66.38 78.33 0.01 71.46 40.18

12.5 18.61 17.83 12.5 33.48 32.80 0.1 28.93 15.24

37.5 15.21 14.24 37.5 NR NR 0.3 24.46 12.61

FBR TWG BAY 13.16 10.14

4 25.72 29.64 4 79.85 96.20 0.01 113.69 69.26

12.5 20.10 22.60 12.5 39.78 39.66 0.1 27.99 20.28

37.5 16.54 18.37 37.5 NR NR 0.3 18.98 15.13

IS-3 HSD

Pipeline from Rail

Leak 30 mm

TWG BAY 8.65 8.28

4 11.64 11.69 4 77.47 90.66 0.01 NH NH

12.5 8.89 8.66 12.5 40.72 40.25 0.1 NH NH

37.5 7.11 6.74 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

POL DEPOT OF BPCL,GULBARGA


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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

Gantry to TWG Pump

Suction

FBR TWG BAY 5.48 5.24

4 11.30 12.87 4 92.83 109.5

3 0.01 17.28 NR

12.5 8.73 9.74 12.5 48.40 48.26 0.1 11.26 NR

37.5 7.14 7.77 37.5 NR NR 0.3 10.63 NR

IS-4

MS Pipeline

from TWG Pump

Discharge to Tank

Leak 25 mm

TWG PUMP

35.71 29.48

4 69.76 63.02 4 64.39 70.69 0.01 306.64 212.90

12.5 54.07 47.25 12.5 32.81 30.53 0.1 86.25 69.99

37.5 44.45 37.80 37.5 NR NR 0.3 63.10 54.98

FBR TWG

PUMP 26.06 24.54

4 69.93 79.61 4 91.79 112.4

9 0.01 330.44 223.73

12.5 54.82 60.84 12.5 45.78 45.31 0.1 82.11 63.61

37.5 45.27 49.61 37.5 NR NR 0.3 56.02 46.78

IS-5

SKO Pipeline

from TWG Pump

Discharge to Tank

Leak 20 mm

TWG PUMP

19.74 13.27

4 33.30 34.85 4 72.11 84.10 0.01 63.74 78.81

12.5 25.64 25.92 12.5 37.73 36.97 0.1 27.59 30.20

37.5 20.98 20.60 37.5 NR NR 0.3 23.79 25.09

FBR TWG PUMP

11.51 8.67

4 21.44 24.49 4 84.14 101.4

4 0.01 125.54 68.89

12.5 16.81 18.75 12.5 41.94 41.84 0.1 30.04 20.21

37.5 13.84 15.29 37.5 NR NR 0.3 20.01 15.10

IS-6 HSD

Pipeline Leak 35

mm TWG

PUMP 12.48 12.71 4.00 19.72 20.67 4.00

114.94

134.01

0.01 23.97 31.78



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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

from TWG Pump

Discharge to Tank

12.50 15.13 15.31 12.50 64.70 64.70 0.10 12.42 13.78

37.50 12.30 12.10 37.50 NR NR 0.30 11.21 11.89

FBR TWG PUMP

6.71 5.93

4.00 12.81 14.42 4.00 115.0

2 135.0

6 0.01 23.96 NR

12.50 9.92 10.91 12.50 62.33 62.12 0.10 12.42 NR

37.50 8.04 8.74 37.50 NR NR 0.30 11.21 NR

IS-7

From MOV MS tank to

TLF Pump suction

Leak 40 mm

T TLF BAY 38.66 29.23

4.00 70.18 68.94 4.00 87.61 100.3

2 0.01 475.03 220.88

12.50 54.46 51.91 12.50 45.31 41.91 0.10 123.73 71.38

37.50 44.72 41.69 37.50 NR NR 0.30 86.81 55.67

FBR TLF BAY 30.17 27.75

4.00 80.32 91.50 4.00 102.8

0 125.5

3 0.01 335.84 267.18

12.50 62.90 69.85 12.50 52.41 51.89 0.10 79.58 79.41

37.50 51.94 56.91 37.50 NR NR 0.30 56.29 59.68

IS-8

From MOV SKO

tank to TLF Pump

suction

Leak 20 mm

TLF BAY

14.30 8.48

4.00 20.62 20.28 4.00 64.76 76.17 0.01 31.11 40.98

12.50 15.94 15.20 12.50 32.30 31.43 0.10 13.66 15.37

37.50 13.01 12.12 37.50 NR NR 0.30 11.83 12.68

FBR TLF BAY

9.51 7.46 4.00 17.85 20.21 4.00 74.73 90.48 0.01 118.58 64.73

12.50 14.05 15.56 12.50 36.14 36.10 0.10 28.83 19.49



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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

37.50 11.59 12.73 37.50 NR NR 0.30 19.40 14.74

IS-9

From MOV HSD

tank to TLF Pump

suction

Leak 50 mm

TLF BAY

10.95 10.48

4.00 15.66 15.94 4.00 147.4

8 171.1

5 0.01 34.68 23.21

12.50 12.03 11.87 12.50 84.77 84.24 0.10 22.55 12.29

37.50 9.74 9.38 37.50 NR NR 0.30 21.27 11.14

FBR

TLF BAY

7.69 7.02

4.00 15.58 16.78 4.00 141.4

0 165.1

8 0.01 26.52 24.47

12.50 12.09 12.72 12.50 79.63 79.41 0.10 12.87 12.51

37.50 9.86 10.24 37.50 NR NR 0.30 11.43 11.25

IS-10

TLF MS pump


Leak 30 mm

TLF PUMP

39.75 33.21

4 82.02 74.15 4 70.17 77.97 0.01 436.19 219.98

12.5 63.48 55.52 12.5 36.51 33.72 0.1 116.99 71.22

37.5 52.15 44.38 37.5 NR NR 0.3 83.45 55.59

FBR

TLF PUMP

35.63 33.97

4.00 100.0

7 106.5

8 4.00 83.98

102.75

0.01 318.25 280.08

12.50 77.93 80.85 12.50 42.32 41.92 0.10 79.03 81.65

37.50 64.06 65.44 37.50 NR NR 0.30 56.16 60.79

IS-11 TLF SKO pump

discharge

TLF PUMP

11.33 9.53

4 28.00 29.48 4 55.51 64.49 0.01 66.10 61.33

12.5 21.58 21.95 12.5 27.36 28.27 0.1 28.00 18.90

37.5 17.66 17.45 37.5 NR NR 0.3 23.99 14.45



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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

to TLF gantry FBR

TLF PUMP

10.79 8.24

4.00 20.14 22.20 4.00 68.16 82.41 0.01 101.24 54.66

12.50 15.77 16.98 12.50 32.82 32.75 0.10 25.83 17.75

37.50 12.97 13.82 37.50 NR NR 0.30 17.90 13.87

IS-12

TLF HSD pump


Leak 40 mm

TLF PUMP

13.00 13.29

4 20.90 21.81 4 113.4

5 132.3

7 0.01 21.84 28.36

12.5 16.03 16.16 12.5 63.98 64.09 0.1 12.05 13.19

37.5 13.05 12.77 37.5 NR NR 0.3 11.03 11.59

FBR

TLF PUMP

8.75 8.61

4 18.04 18.86 4 105.8

8 124.0

8 0.01 NH NH

12.5 13.96 14.22 12.5 57.67 57.47 0.1 NH NH

37.5 11.38 11.41 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

IS-13 TANK 1

Leak 10 mm

HSD

4.24 3.98

4 2.21 2.08 4 45.13 51.94 0.01 NH NH

12.5 NR NR 12.5 20.27 21.49 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

CR

HSD

93.46 118.4

7

4 NA NA 4 85.08 163.6

2 0.01 327.98 348.17

12.5 NA NA 12.5 41.61 103.6

3 0.1 131.28 151.31

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 110.61 130.63

IS-14 TANK 2 HSD 4.24 3.98 4 2.21 2.08 4 45.13 51.94 0.01 NH NH



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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

Leak 10 mm

12.5 NR NR 12.5 20.27 21.49 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

CR

HSD

93.46 118.4

7

4 NA NA 4 85.08 163.6

2 0.01 327.98 348.17

12.5 NA NA 12.5 41.61 103.6

3 0.1 131.28 151.31

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 110.61 130.63

IS-15 TANK 3

Leak 10 mm

HSD

4.24 3.98

4 2.21 2.08 4 45.13 51.94 0.01 NH NH

12.5 NR NR 12.5 20.27 21.49 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

CR

HSD

93.46 118.4

7

4 NA NA 4 85.08 163.6

2 0.01 327.98 348.17

12.5 NA NA 12.5 41.61 103.6

3 0.1 131.28 151.31

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 110.61 130.63

IS-16 TANK 4

Leak 10 mm

MS

11.53 5.59

4 14.00 12.64 4 40.98 44.20 0.01 48.75 NR

12.5 10.96 9.63 12.5 18.95 22.40 0.1 16.72 NR

37.5 8.96 7.72 37.5 12.58 11.40 0.3 13.36 NR

CR MS 222.9

8 202.3

6 4 NA NA 4 99.44

123.45

0.01 1745.5

8 1729.6

3



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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

12.5 NA NA 12.5 48.32 48.34 0.1 507.76 451.77

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 388.72 339.84

IS-17 TANK 5

Leak 10 mm

MS

11.53 5.59

4 14.00 12.64 4 40.98 44.20 0.01 48.75 NR

12.5 10.96 9.63 12.5 18.95 22.40 0.1 16.72 NR

37.5 8.96 7.72 37.5 12.58 11.40 0.3 13.36 NR

CR

MS

222.98

202.36

4 NA NA 4 99.44 123.4

5 0.01

1745.58

1729.63

12.5 NA NA 12.5 48.32 48.34 0.1 507.76 451.77

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 388.72 339.84

IS-18 TANK 6

Leak 10 mm

SKO

6.74 3.62

4 4.92 4.44 4 43.72 50.15 0.01 NH NH

12.5 3.50 3.13 12.5 19.15 20.81 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

CR

SKO

33.64 41.52

4 NA NA 4 54.01 66.26 0.01 221.88 240.80

12.5 NA NA 12.5 22.85 23.19 0.1 63.28 74.83

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 46.62 57.39

IS-19 TANK 7

Leak 10 mm

BIODIESEL 3.60 3.31

4 NR NR 4 42.38 48.34 0.01 NH NH

12.5 NR NR 12.5 18.92 20.72 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

CR BIODIESEL 27.47 33.58 4 NA NA 4 52.39 62.97 0.01 96.41 111.28



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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

12.5 NA NA 12.5 22.48 22.85 0.1 33.25 44.10

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 26.62 37.04

IS-20 TANK 8

Leak 10 mm

BIODIESEL 3.60 3.31

4 NR NR 4 42.38 48.34 0.01 NH NH

12.5 NR NR 12.5 18.92 20.72 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 NR NR 0.3 NH NH

CR BIODIESEL 27.47 33.58

4 NA NA 4 52.39 62.97 0.01 96.41 111.28

12.5 NA NA 12.5 22.48 22.85 0.1 33.25 44.10

37.5 NA NA 37.5 NR NR 0.3 26.62 37.04

IS-21 TANK 9

Leak 10 mm

ETHANOL 6.37 2.49

4 7.85 6.63 4 25.68 24.58 0.01 NH NH

12.5 7.25 5.07 12.5 16.43 17.26 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 8.79 8.18 0.3 NH NH

CR ETHANOL 46.71 43.40

4 NA NA 4 51.69 53.66 0.01 517.38 499.78

12.5 NA NA 12.5 32.05 36.08 0.1 131.07 119.75

37.5 NA NA 37.5 13.95 14.88 0.3 93.81 83.38

IS-22 TANK 10

Leak 10 mm

ETHANOL 6.37 2.49

4 7.85 6.63 4 24.07 23.58 0.01 NH NH

12.5 7.25 5.07 12.5 14.82 16.26 0.1 NH NH

37.5 NR NR 37.5 7.18 7.18 0.3 NH NH

CR ETHANOL 38.14 38.33 4 NA NA 4 26.88 28.14 0.01 452.37 447.51

12.5 NA NA 12.5 16.25 18.86 0.1 110.69 103.57



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Isolatable

Section

Scenario Descriptio

n

Release categor

y

Release point




100% LFL Ellipse

Distance in meters


Distance in meters


Distance in meters

Overpressure level

bar

Distance in meters

2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D

37.5 NA NA 37.5 7.18 7.18 0.3 78.69 71.74

Where,

NA – Not Applicable

NR – Not Reached

NH – No Hazard



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5. RISK MODELLING – BASIS AND RESULTS

5.1 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

This section presents a brief description of the methodology and approach adopted for the frequency

analysis. To calculate the risk associated with a LOC scenario, it is necessary to estimate the failure

frequency. The frequency of occurrence of such an event is based on the probability of the LOC

scenario and the presence of constraints that influence the development of the event.

In case of leakage in the pipeline systems, flammable substances may be released into the

atmosphere. This can occur in the form of a small gasket failure in a flanged joint, a bleeding valve,

inadvertently left open valves, failure of pipeline, corrosion, or any other external factors.

BASE FAILURE FREQUENCY

The failure frequencies of full release cases are considered since the release is consistent with flow

through the defined hole, beginning at the normal operating pressure, and continuing until controlled

by emergency shutdown or inventory exhaustion.

TOTAL FAILURE FREQUENCY

The total failure frequencies for isolatable section are calculated by combining the base failure

frequency obtained from the international database and time in use factor. The details of the total

failure frequencies determined for the identified LOC scenario are given below:

Table 4 Total Failure Frequency

Isolatable section identification

Description Leak Size,

mm

Total failure frequency avg

per year

IS 1 MS Pipeline from Rail Gantry to TWG Pump

Suction

25 1.37E-06

FR 2.74E-07

IS 2 SKO Pipeline from Rail Gantry to TWG Pump

Suction

25 1.37E-06

FR 2.74E-07

IS 3 HSD Pipeline from Rail Gantry to TWG Pump

Suction

30 1.37E-06

FR 2.74E-07



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mm


per year

IS 4 MS Pipeline from TWG Pump Discharge to Tank 25 3.42E-06

FR 6.84E-07

IS 5 SKO Pipeline from TWG Pump Discharge to

Tank

20 3.42E-06

FR 6.84E-07

IS 6 HSD Pipeline from TWG Pump Discharge to

Tank

35 3.42E-06

FR 6.84E-07

IS 7 From MOV MS tank to TLF Pump suction 40 2.74E-06

FR 5.47E-07

IS 8 From MOV SKO tank to TLF Pump suction 20 2.74E-06

FR 5.47E-07

IS 9 From MOV HSD tank to TLF Pump suction 50 2.74E-06

FR 5.47E-07

IS 10 TLF MS pump discharge to TLF gantry 30 2.05E-06

FR 4.11E-07

IS 11 TLF SKO pump discharge to TLF gantry 15 2.05E-06

FR 4.11E-07

IS 12 TLF HSD pump discharge to TLF gantry 40 2.05E-06

FR 4.11E-07

IS 13 TANK 1 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 14 TANK 2 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 15 TANK 3 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 16 TANK 4 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 17 TANK 5 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 18 TANK 6 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 19 TANK 7 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07



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mm


per year

IS 20 TANK 8 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 21 TANK 9 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

IS 22 TANK 10 10 9.00E-06

CR 4.50E-07

5.2 RISK CRITERIA

The risk associated with the project facility can be seen as the probable frequency of an event in

combination with its magnitude and is determined based on both consequence analysis results and

failure frequency. In order to take decisions based on these quantified risk levels, comparison with

numerical risk criteria is essential. These criteria are used to determine whether the risks are

unacceptable, tolerable if ALARP or broadly acceptable.

In order to be able to make HSE Risk management decisions, adopted the Risk Acceptance Criteria

which are discussed in this section.

RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

In India, there are no defined criteria for risk acceptance. However, in IS 15656 – Code of Practice for

Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, Annexure E summarizes the risk criteria adopted in some

countries. Extracts for the same is presented below,

Table 6 HSE UK Risk Criteria

AUTHORITY AND APPLICATION MAXIMUM TOLERABLE RISK

(PER YEAR)

NEGLIGIBLE RISK

(PER YEAR)

VROM, The Netherlands (New) 1.0 x10-6 1.0 x10-8

VROM, The Netherlands (existing) 1.0 x10-5 1.0 x10-8

HSE, UK (existing-hazardous industry) 1.0 x10-4 1.0 x10-6

HSE, UK (New nuclear power station) 1.0 x10-5 1.0 x10-6



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AUTHORITY AND APPLICATION MAXIMUM TOLERABLE RISK

(PER YEAR)

NEGLIGIBLE RISK

(PER YEAR)

HSE, UK (Substance transport) 1.0 x10-4 1.0 x10-6

HSE, UK (New housing near plants) 3*1.0 x10-6 3*1.0 x10-7

Hong Kong Government (New plants) 1.0 x10-5 Not used

LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK (LSIR)

The term “Location-Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)” is used for the calculations of the risk of fatality for

someone at a specific location, assuming that the person is always present at the location and

therefore, is continuously exposed to the risk at that location. This makes the LSIR a measure of the

geographic distribution of risk, independent of the distribution of people at that location or in the

surrounding area. The LSIR is presented as iso-risk contours on a map of the location of interest.

5.3 RISK RESULTS

The risk modeling has been performed using DNV PHAST RISK 6.7 software. Thereby, the details of

the input data used for the risk modeling such as, ignition probability and occupancy data are given

in the QRA Assumption Register. This section focuses on the outcome of the risk results and the

comparison of the risk results with risk acceptance criteria.

LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK (LSIR) RESULTS

The location specific individual risk (LSIR) contour for the project facility is presented below:



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INDIVIDUAL RISK PER ANNUM

The LSIR values of the personnel in the Gulbarga Depot are provided in the Table below. From this

LSIR value, the Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) to the personnel based on their exposure are

calculated and presented below:

S. No Location of Interest LSIR

(per avg. year) Presence Factor IRPA RISK

1 Admin Building 7.96E-07 0.304 2.42E-07 Acceptable

2 TLF Gantry 8.74E-06 0.304 2.66E-06 ALARP

3 Railway Siding 5.29E-07 0.038 2.03E-08 Acceptable

4 TLF Pump House 1.11E-05 0.304 3.38E-06 ALARP

5 TWG Pump House 2.26E-06 0.038 8.67E-08 Acceptable

6 MS Tank farm 3.01E-06 1.000 3.01E-06 ALARP

7 HSD Tank farm 1.45E-06 1.000 1.45E-06 ALARP

8 SKO Tank Farm 4.86E-06 1.000 4.86E-06 ALARP

9 ETP 1.02E-10 0.304 3.11E-11 Acceptable

Note: The presence factor has been calculated as shown below (e.g. person in the TLF gantry):



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Total working hours in a year = 333 (days) x 8 (hours a day)

= 2664 hours

Number of hours in a year = 24 (hours a day) x 365 (days a year)

= 8760 hours

Presence Factor = Total working hours in a year / Number of hours in a year

= 2664 / 8760

= 0.3041

Comparison of the HSE UK Risk Acceptance Criteria and the Individual Risks calculated from the

project facility shows that the estimated values of IRPA, as given in Table above lies broadly in ALARP

region for all the identified locations in the Depot.

SOCEITAL RISK

Assessment of societal risks is even more important than assessment of individual risk because they

involve the likelihood of multiple fatalities. Societal risk is the risk to any person or group of persons

who are not connected to project facilities and are outside the facility fence line.

F-N CURVE

It is helpful to consider group risk in the demonstration that risks are ALARP. This allows consideration

to be given to events, which, although low in frequency, may cause multiple

injuries or fatalities. Group risk can be presented in the form of a plot of cumulative frequency versus

number of fatalities (F-N curve).

F = Frequency (experienced or predicted)

N = No. of multiple fatalities.

‘N’ includes indirect deaths caused as a result of the main event occurring and can therefore be

difficult to predict e.g. many people may die years after exposure to a toxic chemical.



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6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations of the QRA are as follows,

1. Ensure design and maintenance review are carried out to identify the hazards and

corresponding prevention and mitigation measures are in place.

2. The Flash fire scenario for certain accident scenarios are found to encompass the entire

facility, hence it is recommended to avoid any source of ignition in the depot.

3. Ensure proper access/exit to all the areas of the depot in order to evacuate safely during

emergency.

4. Consider carrying out SIMOPS study.

5. People movement in the TLF gantry should be maintained minimum.

6. Ensure proper fire protection system is in place at gantry and tank farm area to avoid

escalation of fire from TLF pump house.

7. Ensure adequate grounding and earthing arrangements in the loading area are in place to

avoid static charge generation.

8. Ensure regular monitoring in the tank farm and pump house.

9. It is recommended to develop procedures to verify the testing and inspection records of the

tankers at the entry gate.

10. Ensure arrangements and procedures for periodic proof testing of storage tank overfill

prevention systems are in place to minimize the likelihood of any failure that could result in

loss of containment.



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7. LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS / STANDARDS

• Guideline of Quantitative Risk Assessment - PGS 3 [Purple book]

• Methods for the determination of possible damage – CPR 16E [Green book]

• DNV SAFETI manual

• Population density survey of pipeline

• www.Meteoblue.com

• Piping & Instrumentation diagram

• Layout of the Depot

• OISD 244 –Storage and Handling of petroleum products at depots and terminals.

• Safety and Environmental standards for fuel storage sites, process safety leadership group final report- HSE UK.

http://www.meteoblue.com/



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ANNEXURE 1 CONSEQUENCE CONTOURS



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FLASH FIRE

IS 1 MS Pipeline from Rail Gantry to TWG Pump Suction

IS 5 SKO Pipeline from TWG Pump Discharge to Tank



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IS 7 From MOV MS tank to TLF Pump suction

IS 12 TLF HSD pump discharge to TLF gantry



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IS 13 TANK 1

IS 16 TANK 4



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IS 18 TANK 6

IS 22 TANK 10



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JET FIRE ELLIPSE





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VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION





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IS 13 TANK 1

IS 16 TANK 4



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IS 18 TANK 6

IS 22 TANK 10



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POOL FIRE ELLIPSE





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IS 13 TANK 1

IS 16 TANK 4



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IS 18 TANK 6

IS 22 TANK 10



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ANNEXURE 2 ASSUMPTION REGISTER

BPCL GULBARGA TERMINAL

Assumption No: 1

Subject: Risk Calculation Tool

The risk analysis within this study is conducted using DNV Software’s Phast Risk program

Version 6.7, which is an industry standard method for carrying out QRA for POL terminal

tanks and pipelines (chemical and petrochemical) facilities.

• Phast Risk allows efficient identification of major risk contributors, so that time and

effort can then be directed to mitigating these highest risk activities.

• Phast Risk analyses complex consequences from accident scenarios, taking account

of local population, land usage and weather conditions, to quantify the risk

associated with the release of hazardous materials.

• Phast Risk incorporates the industry standard consequence modeling of Phast.

Phast Risk is intended as a set of models for risk analysts to enable them to provide timely,

accurate and appropriate advice on safety related issues. It models all stages of a release

from outflow through a hole or from a pipe end, through atmospheric dispersion, rain-out

and re-evaporation of liquid, to thermal radiation from fires, explosion overpressures and

toxic lethality. Phast Risk combines recognized and validated models for the various physical

phenomena, automatically selecting the appropriate model depending on the

circumstances of the release. It provides an experienced risk analyst with a tool that allows

them to focus their attention and experience on the real problem areas rather than the

administration of large quantities of data.

Reference:

1. www.dnvgl.com/services/hazard-analysis-phast-1675

http://www.dnvgl.com/services/hazard-analysis-phast-1675



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Assumption No: 2

Subject: Facility Description

BPCL GULBARGA is POL terminal which distributes MS/HSD/SKO/ETHANOL to nearby districts

The risk analysis is based on the onsite population and off-site population

Table 7 Onsite Population

Population No.

Admin 15

TLF gantry 10

TLF & TWD pump house 2

Tank farms 5

Main Gate Security cabin 5

MCC room 1

Tanker parking area 80

TW Gantry & ETP 5

Calibration shed and Fire pump

house 5

Table 2 Offsite Population around 2 KM range

S. No Village/District Name Population

1 Gulbarga 261/km2 (Density)



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Assumption No: 3

Subject: Material Composition

Composition of MS, SKO, HSD considered is given below:

Product Composition Mole %

MS N-HEPTANE 10

N-OCTANE 90


SKO

N-OCTANE 5

N-NONANE 10

n-DECANE 15

n-UNDECANE 30

n-DODECANE 15

n-TRIDECANE 20

n-TETRADECANE 5

n-PENTADECANE 5

n-HEXADECANE 3

n-HEPTADECANE 2


HSD

n-DECANE 2

n-UNDECANE 8

n-DODECANE 12

n-TRIDECANE 15



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Assumption No: 3

Subject: Material Composition

n-TETRADECANE 20

n-PENTADECANE 20

n-HEXADECANE 10

n-HEPTADECANE 8

n-OCTADECANE 5

Implication of assumption:

Key influence in determining the dispersion results.



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Assumption No: 4

Subject: Meteorological Data

Data on the wind direction, wind speed and atmospheric stability are combined to form a set of

representative weather categories in the surroundings of GULBARGA. Figure 1 show the wind

rose for GULBARGA.

Weather condition chosen for the study: 2 F & 5 D.

Wind rose diagram of GULBARGA is considered for the study which gives the wind proportion

for whole year. Wind Proportion table interpreted from the wind rose diagram of GULBARGA is

given below;

wind speed m/s

0 >0.3 >1.6 >3.4 >5.5 >8 >10.8 >13.9 >17.2

N 0.0003 0.0086 0.0245 0.0105 0.0043 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NNE 0.0003 0.0088 0.0465 0.0131 0.0032 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NE 0.0001 0.0100 0.0581 0.0183 0.0041 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

ENE 0.0005 0.0161 0.0492 0.0178 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 E 0.0000 0.0096 0.0291 0.0094 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

ESE 0.0005 0.0105 0.0317 0.0086 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SE 0.0001 0.0074 0.0322 0.0256 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

SSE 0.0000 0.0056 0.0235 0.0144 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 S 0.0008 0.0081 0.0160 0.0090 0.0019 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

SSW 0.0001 0.0045 0.0086 0.0043 0.0013 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 SW 0.0003 0.0051 0.0111 0.0113 0.0152 0.0023 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000

WSW 0.0000 0.0040 0.0158 0.0403 0.0763 0.0193 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 W 0.0003 0.0080 0.0240 0.0373 0.0474 0.0083 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

WNW 0.0001 0.0053 0.0160 0.0180 0.0112 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NW 0.0002 0.0064 0.0152 0.0105 0.0043 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

NNW 0.0000 0.0050 0.0143 0.0086 0.0041 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Other Meteorological details are;

Atmospheric Temperature : 55° C Atmospheric Pressure : 101.325 KN/m2 Relative Humidity : 81%



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Assumption No: 4

Subject: Meteorological Data

Surface Roughness : 0.3 Solar Flux : 0.12 kW/m2

WIND ROSE

Reference:

1. https://www.meteoblue.com/en/weather/forecast/modelclimate/gulbarga_india_127

0752

2. Purple book CPR 18E- Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment

3. http://www.kspcb.gov.in/PH/Thagadur_Mines_MML_EIA.pdf

https://www.meteoblue.com/en/weather/forecast/modelclimate/gulbarga_india_1270752

https://www.meteoblue.com/en/weather/forecast/modelclimate/gulbarga_india_1270752



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Assumption No: 5

Subject: Ignition Sources & Ignition Probability

Specification:

Ignition sources in the QRA study considered are of 3 types

Type Description In site Ignition

Probability

Point

Known specific sources such as

flares, workshops, equipment’s

etc.

Parking Area

Canteen

DG Room

0.4

0.9

0.4

M&R shed 1.0

Line

Roads

Railways

Electrical transmission lines

As Applicable

As Applicable

As Applicable

As Per no. of

Vehicles

0.2

Areas Population in the facility, mutual aid and surrounding village

As Applicable 0.01 Per person

Reference:

1.Purple book CPR 18E- Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment



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Assumption No: 6

Subject: Inventory Calculation

Specification:

The inventory of a given section is defined as the isolatable mass within that section under

normal operating conditions and in addition to that, the inventory released prior to the segment

isolation.

i.e. Total inventory= static+ Dynamic inventory

Static Inventory is calculated from volume of pipe line section considered.

Dynamic inventory is given by the product of flow rate and release time duration taken.

Isolation time will be considered based on the type of isolation proposed for the terminal.

Provide type of isolation proposed to be provided in BPCL GULBARGA

Scenario Inventory Release Duration

Leak 10min

Rupture 2min

Reference:




J-3076-S-RT-1801 Rev B1

Page | 61


Assumption No: 7

Subject: Release Sizes

Specification:

To define the hazardous release events applying to each Process Accident release scenario (QRA

section), representative hole sizes are modeled. The selection of the hole sizes is made based

on the guidelines given in purple book.

For pipelines a leak size of 10% of nominal diameter is taken. And for storage tank a leak size of

10mm is considered.

Reference:




J-3076-S-RT-1801 Rev B1

Page | 62


Assumption No: 8

Subject: Event Failure frequencies

Specification:

The basic failure frequency data taken from the purple book for above ground pipelines are given

below which are then multiplied with the length of pipes respectively along with it to give the

calculated failure frequency per year.

Installation Leak Rupture

Pipeline

pipeline, nominal diameter < 75 mm

5 × 10-6 m-1 y-1 1 × 10-6 m-1 y-1

pipeline, 75 mm ≤ nominal diameter ≤ 150 mm

2 × 10-6 m-1 y-1 3 × 10-7 m-1 y-1

nominal diameter > 150 mm 5 × 10-7 m-1 y-1 1 × 10-7 m-1 y-1

Tank

Tank 1x10-4 y-1 5x10-6 y-1

Reference:




J-3076-S-RT-1801 Rev B1

Page | 63


Assumption No: 9

Subject: Damage Criteria

Specification:

The damage criteria give the relation between the extents of the physical effects

(exposure) and the effect of consequences.

Effects due to incident radiation

Incident Radiation (Kw/m2)

Type Of Damage

4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first degree burns are likely)

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing’s etc.

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to the equipment

Damages due to over pressure effect

Peak Overpressure Damage Type Description

0.30 bar Heavy Damage Major damage to plant equipment

structure

0.10 bar Moderate Damage Repairable damage to plant equipment

& structure

0.03 bar Significant Damage Shattering of glass

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