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Rapid Deployment Logistics:Lebanon, 1958
by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade
October 1984
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FOREWORD
One of the more consistent patterns in U.S. military operations since the end of World War IIhas been our growing involvement in contingency operations around the world. Recognition of thissignificant role for our military forces has been reflected most recently in the establishment ofseveral new commands-First Special Operations Command, USREDCOM, USCENTCOM-which existin order to improve U.S. capability to respond to worldwide threats on short notice. Concomitantly,there is renewed interest in low-intensity conflict operations, and the Army is pursuing the develop-ment of light divisions especially designed for strategic mobility and rapid deployment.
This CSI Research Survey by Lt. Col. Gary H. Wade, Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon,1958, reminds us that strategic power projection must be founded upon a responsive and syn-chronized logistical base. Indeed, failure to provide the "tail" during short-notice contingency operationswill blunt or even doom to failure the sharp bite of the "teeth," namely, the fighting forces.
This detailed, comprehenisve study of the logistical planning and in-country support of the U.S.military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 is of imminent value to the U.S. Army today. Many ofthe issues faced by the logisticians in Beirut in 1958 are identical to those facing force developersof the light division today, such as the questions of diverting line soldiers to support duties,securing materiel in a potentially hostile lodgment, synchronizing sealift with airlift, and establishingpriorities for deliveries. The study has particular value as well for its analysis of tailoring logisticalunits for contingency operations and for eraits investigation into the unique problems of the noncombatphase of operations. Not surprisingly, a good number of the logistical problems encountered inLebanon in 1958 recurred in the U.S. intervention in Grenada twenty-five years later.
Rapid Deployment Logistics also has much to say about the conduct of joint operations, for inno other arena are the services more intricately intertwined than in the logistical support of"break-in" operations. The lessons contained in this CSI Research Survey will help today's plannersand operators to anticipate and thus avoid the mistakes of the past. Rapid Deployment Logisticsonce again demonstrates the relevance, utility, and necessity of the study of military history to theeffective conduct of the profession of arms.
DAVE R. PALMERMajor General, USADeputy Commandant
Cover: This U.S. Air Force photo shows personnel and equipment disembarking at Beirut.
CSI Research Surveys are doctrinal research manuscripts, thematic in nature, that investigate theevolution of specific doctrinal areas of interest to the U.S. Army. Research Surveys are based onprimary and secondary sources and provide the foundation for further study of a given subject.The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of theDepartment of Defense or any element thereof.
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Rapid Deployment Logistics:Lebanon, 1958
by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade, U.S. ArmyOctober 1984
U.S. ArmyCommand and General
Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900
I:
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Wade, Gary H., 1946-Rapid deployment logistics-Lebanon, 1958.
(Research survey / Combat Studies Institute, U.S.Army Command and General Staff College ; no. 3)
"Operation Bluebat.""October 1984."Bibliography: p.1. Lebanon-History-Intervention, 1958. 2. United
States-Supplies and stores-History-20th century.3. Unified operations (Military science)-History-20thcentury. 4. Lebanon-History-Intervention, 1958-Amphibious operations. I. U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College. Combat Studies Institute. II. Title.III. Series: Research survey (U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College. Combat Studies Institute);no. 3.DS87.W33 1985 956.92'04 84-28543
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
CONTENTS
Illustrations and Tables ............................ vAcknowledgment ................... ................... vii
Introduction ............. . ........................ ix
Chapter1. THE FOUNDATION ............................... 1
Summa ry ..a.....*....... .........*....***** * a 79
AppendixA. Plans .................. ·.....* * ***.....***** 83B. Task Force 201 ............. **.***-******* 85C. Personnel and Equipment for Alpha, Bravo, and
Charlie Forces ............. ...... 89D. On-Hand Supplies, 31 August 1958.........''. 93
1. Organization of a Headquarters, LogisticalCommand A ........... ........................ 4
2. Organization of a Headquarters, LogisticalCommand B ...................................... 4
3. Organization of a Headquarters, LogisticalCommand C ............... .. 5.. .................. 5
4. Organization for Planning ....... ........ 125. Organization of Operation Grandios ............. 226. Support Force ............. ...................... 237. Command Organization of Operation Grandios ..... 248. Organization for Operations ................... 449. Organization for Operations (Final) ............ 4610. Land Force Organization ..................... .... 4811. Organization of the 201st Logistical
Command (A)........... D OD ........ .. ............ 51
Maps
1. Middle East ............... ............. ........ xii2. ATF 201 Deployment Routes to Lebanon in 1958 ..... 323. Security Plan ................................ 73
From the onset of this study, a number of agencies andindividuals provided valuable assistance to my researchand writing efforts. The Combined Arms Research Libraryat the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, FortLeavenworth, -Kansas, was instrumental in providingresearch assistance and in obtaining the necessaryauthority to declassify a number of documents essential tothe study. Members of the Combat Studies Instituteprovided invaluable assistance by providing meaningfulcomments and by editing the numerous drafts.
I am especially indebted to the participants of theLebanon intervention who responded to my many inquiries,particularly Maj. Gen. David W. Gray (U.S. Army, Retired),Brig. Gen Adam W. Meetze (U.S. Army, Retired), Brig. Gen.George S. Speidel (U.S. Army, Retired), Col. Dan K. Dukes(U.S. Army, Retired), and Col. Richard M. Hermann (U.S.Army, Retired). The aforementioned agencies and, moreimportant, the people involved have made this researchsurvey possible and are responsible to a great degree forany contribution it makes to the doctrinal community.
vii
INTRODUCTION
The Operation
The countries of the Middle East experiencedintermittent crises during the 1950s. Lebanon was noexception, as internal turmoil and outside pressuresthreatened its existence. This research survey, however,will not dwell on the political situation of either theentire Middle East or, specifically, Lebanon in the springof 1958.1 Suffice it to say, President Camille Chamounof Lebanon made an urgent plea on 14 July 1958 to thegovernments of France, Great Britain, and the UnitedStates to deploy military forces to Lebanon to stabilizethe situation. Received .in Washington at 0600 on 14 July,this message became the first test of the EisenhowerDoctrine, which had been announced in January 1957.
Through the Middle East Resolution, or EisenhowerDoctrine, Congress authorized the United States to provideeconomic and military assistance to requesting nations topreserve their independence.2 The Eisenhower Doctrinestated that the independence and integrity of these MiddleEast nations were vital to world peace and to the nationalinterest of the United States. If these nations were"attacked from a country under the control ofinternational communism then the President was authorized,upon request, to send forces to resist that attack."3
U.S. military analysts believed that Lebanon wasthreatened internally by strong and numerous rebel bands,"most of which were strengthened by Egyptian and Syrianinfiltrators constituting a fifth column," and externallyby the armed forces of Syria "poised in strength" alongthe border.4 Given this situation, the United Statesintervened. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted "tomove into the Middle East, and specifically into Lebanon,to stop the trend toward chaos."5 Ten hours after thereceipt of President Chamoun's message, the Chief of NavalOperations ordered the U.S. Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean)eastward to land Marines in Lebanon. On 14 July, theJoint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) alerted U.S. forces in Europeand the Tactical Air Command in the United States tobeready for immediate military action. The JCS alsoactivated a Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME), anddesignated Adm. James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief,North Atlantic and Mediterranean, as the Commander inChief, SPECOMME (CINCSPECOMME). According to a JCSmemorandum, "These actions marked the beginning ofoperation 'Blue Bat,' the first United Statesairborne-amphibious operation to occur in peacetime."6
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By 16 July, over 3,000 Marines had landed. The U.S.Army forces making up Army Task Force 201 (ATF 201)consisted of the 187th Battle Group from the 24th InfantryDivision. This force began arriving in Beirut on thenineteenth, and, by the twenty-fifth, over 3,000 personneland approximately 2,500 short tons of equipment had beenbrought in aboard 242 air missions. 7 Shortly there-after, the sealift in support of the Army brought in anadditional 3,650 soldiers and 45,450 measurement tons ofsupplies in three transports and thirteen cargo vessels.8
The U.S. forces landed unopposed and quickly foundthemselves in a role limited to showing force instead ofusing it. With the 31 July election of General FuadShehab, commander of the Lebanese army, as the newpresident and his subsequent inauguration on 23 September,a semblance of order returned, and U.S. forces began theirdeparture. During the three months of Americaninvolvement, one U.S. battle death occurred, while U.S.armed forces caused no civilian casualties. The Americanprojection of power had worked, as the political situationhad at least become stabilized temporarily.
This absence of combat did not radically alter thelogistical support for the force, which still had to befed, clothed, housed, and cared for. Of course,ammunition resupply, casualty evacuation, and combat lossreplacement were not important parts of the effort, butother functions, such as civil affairs, construction, andhealth and comfort activities, came to the fore.
Because the United States has in the past deployedmilitary force without using it in combat (and may do soagain), it is instructive to study the logistical effortbehind the intervention, that is, the deployment andsustainment of this force. This research survey isconcerned with the lowest level of this effort, called insome sources battlefield supply or tactical logistics.This study examines how the Army organized in 1958 to moveand to support itself in the field and what process itused to do so. This research survey discusses aspects ofcombat service support, including such functions asresupply, transportation, procurement, civil affairs, andmedical support. Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon,1958 presents a model for .planning, deploying, andsustaining a task force--a model that offers many lessonsfor today's Army. The absence of combat focused moreattention on these aspects than would have been the casein combat operations, and the participants had the time todocument their problems and recommendations. Thus, astudy of this operation will be of particular benefit for
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the planner, logistician, and combat arms officer. Thisstudy reconstructs the logistical doctrine for a rapiddeployment contingency force as it existed in 1958 andevaluates its implementation in the Lebanese crisis.
Although the Army's logistical doctrine was generallysound, rapid deployment logistical planning forcontingency force operations, such as the U.S.intervention in Lebanon, was weak. Before World War II,contingency planning had focused on technical questionsand tended to ignore organizational issues. Therefore,the basis of "how to accomplish tasks" or doctrine haddeveloped in a haphazard fashion. This doctrinaldevelopment must be examined to understand the status ofcontingency force operations in 1958.
GARY H. WADELTC, FACombat Studies Institute,
USACGSC
xi
Lt
CtTURKEY
SYRIA
LIBYA
Source: Spiller, "NcAt War But Like War," 3.Map 1. Middle East
xii
CHAPTER 1
THE FOUNDATION
Doctrine
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Number 1 defineslogistics as "the science of planning and carrying out themovement and maintenance of forces." Logistics is theprocurement, maintenance, and transportation of materiel,facilities, and personnel in support of a militaryoperation. It can mean anything from acquiring rawmaterials to delivering a bullet to the soldier in thefield.
Gen. George C. Marshall once stated, "The requirementsof logistics are seldom understood. The burdens theyimpose are seldom appreciated." Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhoweradded, "It is logistics which controls campaigns andlimits many."l Logistics, for example, was the reasonthat Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy inWorld War II, and Operation Anvil, the invasion ofsouthern France, could not occur at the same time asplanned.
Today, the U.S. Army is again pondering the doctrineof how we fight and how we sustain the fight. Althoughmoving and supporting the force has traditionally heldless interest than combat, the fight cannot take placewithout materiel and services. Combat and combat servicesupport should be coequal concerns on the battlefield,hence the need for studying logistical doctrine in concertwith battle analysis.
Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General, ArmyGround Forces (1942-44), made great innovations in theorganization of ground combat units (the triangulardivision concept), but organizational planning forlogistical units did not keep pace. The problem oflogistical organization became apparent upon America'sentry into that war. Before World War II, the problem ofsupport for logistical units had largely been confined totechnical studies (i.e., mathematical computation ofsupply rates) rather than to the organization of serviceunits.2
The 1942 North African invasion demonstrated that toomany officers did not yet understand elementary logisticalconsiderations.3 Improvisation all too often replaced aplanned logistical effort. The Pacific theater alsoexperienced numerous instances of misplaced supplies,
1
wasted transportation, hastily organized headquarters, andshortages of critical service units.4 For example,shortages of shipping and service troops came perilouslyclose to costing the United States the Guadalcanalvictory.5 The resupply to overseas theaters appeared tobe an ad hoc process rather than the planned, rational,and efficient system that many had thought existed.
For World War II logistics, it was essential to have asupply stockpile of so many days of materiel on hand inthe forward areas. Instead of relying on a constant flowof supplies, field commanders, by and large, wanted largestocks pre-positioned before they began an operation.They were reluctant to depend on an overseas line ofcommunication that necessitated adequate ports, largesecure supply areas, and a large number of people tohandle the supplies. Thus, when a communications zone(COMMZ) section was established, a headquarters would beformed. A table of distribution and allowances would bewritten specially for that immediate purpose and composedof people who happened to be thrown together on the job.The result was confusion and wasted effort. Furthermore,the procedure led to "empire building" because nopermanent tables of organization existed. 6
In the Continental United States (CONUS), multipleorganizations and agencies were responsible for thelogistical effort, but the importance of a single commandwas recognized by the Army Service Forces. "For the firsttime, there was a full recognition of the importance oflogistics to the Army and the advantage of concentratinglogistic operations in a single command."7 In 1944, theCommand and General Staff College studied the problem andrecommended the organization of a logistical division:
Just as the infantry division was a basic unit ofcombined combat arms, the logistical divisionwould be a basic unit of combined technical andadministrative services. It would have organicservice and administrative units numberingapproximately 26,000 men to provide communicationszone support for a reinforced corps. Theproposals further envisaged a logistical corpswith a strength of some 67,000 men for the supportof a field army.8
This study indicated a need for teams from eachtechnical service to form combined units and forheadquarters staffs to be formed and trained to controlthese teams. Teams would train together in peace forwartime employment. These general conclusions formed the
2
basis for organizing logistical command headquarters ontables of organization and equipment (TOEs).9 Thus, bythe end of the war, World War II logistical divisions andcorps had evolved.
Planning for logistics has not been one of the Army'sstrongpoints. Much of the planning that had occurredbefore World War II had been technical and notorganizational in nature. Without a plan for organizationand a definite chain of command, however, doctrine remainsrather hazy, for either doctrine guides organization ororganization sets the doctrine. In either case, plansshould state how logistical units are to be controlledrather than use the ad hoc process of World War II.
In 1945, the U.S. Army dropped the logistical corps,expanded the logistical division, and tested it in 1946.After-action reports were "generally favorable." In 1949,the "logistical division" became the "logistical command,"a change probably made to reserve the term "division" forcombat units.10
Three types of logistical command TOEs existed in1949, each one configured to support forces of differentsizes. The type A logistical command consisted of aheadquarters designed to command an integratedorganization of technical and administrative service unitsranging from 9,000 to 15,000 men who would supportapproximately 30,000 combat troops* (figure 1).Logistical command type B was established to command35,000 to 60,000 personnel and would support a force of100,000* (figure 2). A type C command consisted ofbetween 75,000 and 150,000 men and would support more than400,000 troops* (figure 3).11
The Korean War saw the first combat use of thelogistical command structure.12 The 2d LogisticalCommand, a type C organization, was formed in September1950 primarily to receive, store, and forward supplies forthe Eighth Army. It also forwarded requisitions to theJapan Logistical Command. After the Inchon landing, the3d Logistical Command, a type B organization, was formedto support the X Corps. Based on their experiences,participants indicated that the concept of a table oforganization logistical command appeared to be "sound inconcept and realistic in proposed mission."13 Oneofficer noted, however, that "a smoother operation and
*Combat troop numbers included the assigned organicsupport troops of the companies, battalions, brigades, anddivisions.
3
I COMP
ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED SERVICE UNITSr - _ __ rM -__ _ASSIGNED E JMISSIONS)
Source: CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-5.
Figure 1. Organization of a Headquarters, Logistical Command A
* - (A S
_REQUIRED I- J
ASSIGNED
__ J-L _ i_ _ MISSIONS) _ _
Source: CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-5.
Figure 2. Organization of a Headquarters, Logistical Command B
4
Source: CGSC,4-6.
LcoL_-
I - (AS REQUIRED FOR 1 1[ LJ . ASSIGNED L
MISSIONS)
Figure 3. Organization of a Headquarters, Logistical Command C
more effective support would have resulted if organizedand trained logistical commands had been available priorto the initiation of hostilities."l4 It would have beenbetter to have had logistical commands in existence andstaffed for a wartime deployment because training andteamwork are just as essential for logistical commands asthey are for combat units.
Once the organization had been determined, the processfor providing supplies needed to be determined. Onesystem, a push system, automatically sent supplies toforward units based on so many days of supplies for aparticular item being on-hand at all times. In a pullsystem, supplies were delivered forward, based on unitrequisitions. A more recent development, the push-pullsystem, had each unit determining its needs beforehand,which were then packaged in sets and sent forward ondemand of the unit. The first two of these systems weretested during World War II.
Based on World War II experience, the War Departmentexpected three successive phases for supply operationswhen opening a new overseas theater. The first phasewould be automatic, with calculated amounts of materielsent to consuming units. Automatic resupply wouldcontinue until phase two was reached, generally after thebeachhead was secure. Phase two would be semiautomatic:
5
replenishment of rations and ammunition would be based onstatus reports, and replenishment of other items, such asrepair parts, would depend on unit requisitions. Phasethree would go into effect when a theater had beenstabilized, and resupply would be by requisition only. Itcan be argued that automatic resupply should have workedbest in a stabilized theater where information would havebeen complete and abrupt changes in status reports lessfrequent. The War Department, however, determined thatthe beginning of an operation, when automatic resupply wasthe most difficult, was precisely when it was mostnecessary.15 Since World War II, the Army has generallycontinued to use this automatic push system at thebeginning of an operation and resorted to unitrequisitions once a front was established, just at thetime when automatic requisitions would have worked bestwith the least confusion.l6 This decision continued tocause problems for later operations.
This dilemma between pushing supplies forward orwaiting for a unit to declare its need has been thetraditional bane of the logistician. The goal of just-in-time logistics, whereby a new item reaches the user justas the old one runs out, proved as elusive as ever.Another problem with the push system was that it requiredmany service personnel and laborers, a problem thatplagued later contingency operations. For example, in theKorean War, the 2d Logistical Command eventually employedover 100,000 Koreans to make the system work.1 7 Thisshould have warned future planners regarding the need forinordinately large numbers of indigenous help to sustainthe system of automatic resupply.
Still, the Korean experience seemed to validate thelogistical command tailoring concept and phased resupply.In the 1950s, logistical doctrine led to the establishmentof the Administrative Support System. This integratedsystem of personnel, units, equipment, organization,principles, procedures, and techniques was geared toprovide administrative support extending from the source(the zone of the interior) to the forces in the combatarea where a logistical command would be in operation.The Administrative Support System was to be designed tosupport tactical operations or campaigns that were to beorganized as task forces tailored to a specific mission.This flexible system was also to provide the requiredsupport for a specific military operation. The origins ofthis system date from World War II.
So, by 1958, our logistical doctrine consisted oftailoring a logistical command, to support a specificoperation and then basing that support initially onautomatic requisitions and phased resupply. In that same
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year, a preplanned logistical command supported a rapiddeployment force in an operational theater. Logisticaldoctrine was about to confront actual planning.
Pla nning
The commander of the 201st Logistical Command (type A)in 1958 was Col. Adam W. Meetze. Meetze, now a retiredbrigadier general, commented:
Many, many hours went into the planning for thisorganization and how it should operate. Weutilized the philosophy that originated atLeavenworth years ago that combat commanders in anoperational theatre with troops of this magnitudewould have one supply unit--one individual beingresponsible--that he could go to for all classesof supplies, maintenance, and the support requiredfor him to attain his combat objectives. In otherwords the logistics doctrine in Lebanon in 1958was to have a logistical command tailored tospecific combat units for an assigned mission.This was the first time, to the best of myknowledge, that a tailored logistical command hadsupported a combat force in an operationaltheatre.18
Backround
In the late 1950s, the United States was moving awayfrom a policy of massive retaliation toward more flexiblemilitary forces. To meet this requirement, Army plannersreshaped divisions to meet the Pentomic structure, makingdivisions lighter, more mobile, and more flexible. Also,planners devised and tested new logistical concepts with aview to making drastic reductions in the supply pipelinesand stockages for the support of these mobile, flexiblefield armies of the future.
The Army had a rapid deployment force in 1958, theStrategic Army Corps (STRAC). STRAC was to provide aflexible, mobile strike capability by using a two-divisionforce, the 101st Airborne Division and the 4th InfantryDivision. This force should have been able to be"deployed without declarations of an emergency."19 Thecommanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps wasresponsible for properly coordinating the necessarylogistical planning. In case of a general conflict, the1st Infantry Division and 82d Airborne Division would alsojoin STRAC.
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Deficiencies in strategic mobility became theAchilles' heel for the use of STRAC units as an instrumentof national policy.20 These deficiencies werequantitative and qualitative. The Military AirTransportation Service (MATS) had a total of 188 millionton-miles* available for all services. Army plannersfigured that the Army alone would need eighty millionton-miles for a general war. On 10 April 1958, Maj. Gen.Earle G. Wheeler, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff forOperations and Plans, testified before the Department ofDefense (DOD) Subcommittee on Appropriations "that thetotal airlift requirement stated by all the services forthe first month of general war is approximately equal tothe maximum Army airlift requirement for a limited war.If the general war requirement could be met, it would seemlikely that the limited war requirement of the Army couldbe met in most situations."21
A limited war in the Middle East required 123 millionton-miles with a twenty-day close-in, leaving a surplus of20 million ton-miles for additional requirements.22 Outof a possible 188 million ton-miles, 143 million ton-mileswas a sizable portion for such a limited operation. Thiswas significant considering that much of the availableton-miles was already committed to other operationalneeds. Unless the President declared a nationalemergency, MATS probably would not be released from itspriority missions of supporting the Strategic AirCommand. Indeed, the question of whether the Army wouldeven receive priority over other services in a limitedoperation had not been addressed.
Exacerbating the quantitative problem, the capacityfor the 188 million ton-miles included over 350 commercialairline planes. in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)earmarked for supporting military operations in anemergency. CRAF would have been useful for troop lift,but not for more critical cargo lift. More important,CRAF probably would not have been implemented without adeclaration of a state of emergency, which would haveplaced additional new demands on the entire logisticalsystem.
It was unrealistic to expect that 143 millionton-miles would have been allocated because JCS refused togrant any preallocations for Army use. Yet the Departmentof the Army (DA) hoped for these assets and "failed to
*A ton-mile is the lift capacity necessary to carry2,000 pounds one mile. It would take one millionton-miles to carry 1,000 tons 1,000 miles.
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give adequate considerations to the airlift implicationsof theater contingency plans." 23 Moreover, theatercommanders also had been making plans for the deploymentof strong battle groups and supporting elements in similaremergency situations without regard to airliftcapabilities. These problems eventually forced JCS todecide which of the contingency plans were to beimplemented and to assign the lift resourcesaccordingly.24 Basically, it appeared that MATS didhave sufficient airlift for contingency operations, butthis total airlift proved to be unsatisfactory because ofservice priorities, theater requirements, operationalcommitments, and misleading aggregate totals (by includingCRAF).
What MATS lacked in quantity was not made up inquality. The C-124 aircraft in 1958 (134 in regular MATSservice) could carry 12.5 tons for 3,000 miles, but theywere rapidly approaching obsolescence. MATS had twentyC-133 aircraft that could carry twenty-six tons over 4,000miles.25 At the time of the operations in Lebanon, the322d Air Division in Germany had forty-eight C-130s,forty-eight C-124s, and fifty C-119s available(table 1).26
The Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) was insomewhat better condition. The Army was still MSTS'sbiggest customer, although it was moving toward air
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passenger service more and more. Given available sealift,the surface elements of the lead division force and thefull follow-on division force could possibly be in theobjective area within 30 days "but not necessarilyunloaded. "27 The main problem was the long timerequired for conventional shipping to load and dischargecargo. The Army was aware of the problem and had longbeen researching different methods of cargo handling.Roll-on and roll-off ships provided one solution. In1954, Congress authorized DOD to purchase roll-on androll-off vessels, and, in January 1958, the first ofthese, the USNS Comet, was put into service in Europe.Heavy vehicles and armor could drive directly on or offthis ship instead of being loaded or unloaded by a crane.
JCS was confident in MSTS's capability. By JCScalculations, "hot bunking" (two men to a bunk on a shiftbasis) could meet contingency operations. Accordingly,JCS authorized a reduction of the MSTS active troop fleetin fiscal year 1959 to 23 ships (table 2). That thisnumber, many on worldwide service, could not immediatelyprovide enough available ships for troop lift was all tooevident in the Middle East crisis.28
Plans
Since the mid-1950s, the Army Staff had been involvedin planning for contingency operations in the Middle Eastand, by spring 1956, had a deployment plan designed todeter or halt hostilities between Israel and an Arabstate. This plan, Swaggerstick, consisted of having atwo-division force of STRAC units (approximately 16,939personnel) airlifted in approximately fifteen days to anoverseas terminal. Logistical support would come from the
10
United States and designated overseas areas.29Swaggerstick was never submitted to JCS for approval orallocation of resources. Therefore, "Army planning forthe strategic lift of its 'Swaggerstick' forces waslargely speculative."30 In the end, it was the questionof inadequate strategic lift that canceled Swaggerstick infavor of a theater plan.
The Egyptian-Israeli crisis in the spring of 1956prompted JCS to direct the Commander in Chief, NavalElement, Mediterranean (CINCNELM), to initiate contingencyplans at the theater level.31 (See figure 4.) Onreceipt of orders, CINCNELM would become CINCSPECOMME.From the beginning, this plan called for a joint effort:the Sixth Fleet would provide Marines for initiallandings; the Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe(CINCUSAFE), would organize and deploy an air task force;MSTS would provide the sealift; MATS, as directed by JCS,would provide the airlift augmentation to CINCUSAFE; andthe Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), would bedirected to provide the necessary forces to implementthese plans. The Army requirement would be provided fromU.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and would consist initiallyof a regimental-size task force from the 9th InfantryDivision. When the 11th Airborne Division arrived inEurope in 1956, it received the 9th's mission because ofits airland or airborne capability. The 11th AirborneDivision was shortly designated the 24th InfantryDivision, but its two designated airborne battle groupsremained part of this contingency plan. These airbornebattle groups and support units selected from availableUSAREUR COMMZ units (later to become the 201st LogisticalCommand) totaled over 10,000 men and became Army TaskForce 201.
One CINCNELM contingency plan for the Middle East,code-named Bluebat, called for a combined operation ofBritish and U.S. forces. The unilateral U.S. portion ofBluebat, CINCSPECOMME Operation Plan (OPLAN) 215-58,provided for initial action by Marine units followed byArmy forces. Supporting plans developed by subordinateheadquarters were Emergency Plan 201 (EP 201) forUSAREUR, 24th Infantry Division's plan in support ofEP 201, and that division's load-out and marshaling plancalled Grandios.*
Based on these plans, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray,assistant division commander of the 24th InfantryDivision, became the commanding general for ATF 201.
*Appendix A contains a summary of the plans developed.
11
Source: "Infantry Conference Report," Comments, 210.Figure 4. Organization for Planning
General Gray, while assigned to the DA staff, had workedon the original Swaggerstick plan. Assigned to USAREUR in1958, he would have to "execute a mission at a lower levelwhich he [had] helped conceive at a higher level."32Because Bluebat was a joint effort, planning conferenceswere necessary to enable future participants to becomeacquainted with each other's problems and techniques. InDecember 1957, the 24th Infantry Division headquartershosted a three-day conference for representatives of allechelons of command from all three services. A conferencewargame required an airborne assault to seize a specificairfield in a Middle Eastern country. Players wargamedevery phase of the operation and, for the first time,carefully analyzed logistical requirements. According toGeneral Gray, "this wargame did more than anything to putour planning on a sound, realistic basis."33
Such a meeting was imperative due to the multitude ofheadquarters involved and their disparate locations.* Forexample, CINCNELM was located in London; European Command(EUCOM), Paris; USAREUR, Heidelberg; Seventh Army,
*There were at least twelve headquarters or agencies(JCS, DA, DCSLOG, CONUS, CINCNELM, EUCOM, USAREUR COMMZ,USAREUR, SETAF, 24th Infantry Division, MSTS, MATS) thathad to coordinate in implementing the logistical plan.
12
Stuttgart; 11th Airborne Division, near Stuttgart; COMMZ,Orleans, France; U.S. Port, Bremerhaven; 12th Air Force,Ramstein; and the 322d Air Division, Evreux, France.Officers identified more than 100 problems, and "periodicfollowups were made so that by time of deployment most ofthe problems had been resolved."34 Colonel Meetzerecalled that these conferences introduced the teamworkthat was so essential to any type of operation.35
The Army portion of Bluebat, USAREUR EP 201, calledfor military forces to seize the Beirut-Ruzaq-Estabel areaby airdropping and/or airlanding Army forces, byinitiating an amphibious assault of the Marine battalionlanding team, or by combining both methods. Basically,the forces were to deter or stop hostilities betweenIsrael and Arab states, restore order and stability,assure the independence of a sovereign state, protectAmerican lives and property in that state, and provideCINCSPECOMME with an Army task force reinforced withminimum essential combat and combat service supportelements. The first tangible task of the force would beto obtain and develop airfields and facilities. USAREURhad to:
* Provide the logistical support to ATF 201 untilresupply from CONUS was established.
* Continue to furnish emergency resupply.
* Provide staff augmentation for CINCSPECOMME.
* Provide emergency replacements for ATF 201.
* Establish a USAREUR movement coordination center.
* Provide, upon request by CINCUSAFE an engineerconstruction company to the air task force.3 a
USAREUR and CONUS shared logistical support for theforce. Section IV and annex D to EP 201 gave specificlogistical instructions. Logistical support for ATF 201would be provided by USAREUR until E+30 days,* after whichDA would assume that responsibility. CINCUSAFE also hadto provide emergency class I support and support for theadvance party. EP 201 stated that the sea tail arrivingfrom USAREUR COMMZ on E+20 would bring all classes ofsupply for the entire ATF 201 within prescribed levels.The first DA resupply was slated to arrive at E+35
*E-day was the day on which execution of deploymentwas ordered by higher headquarters.
13
days.37 Here was a good place for execution to fallapart because a USAREUR plan was dependent on CONUS forsupport.
Coordination, however, did occur and the CONUSresupply was ready. Lt. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, DeputyChief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), DA, emphasized theneed for advanced planning, stating "we cannot afford towait until the movement is ordered to ask for thenecessary decisions."38 CONUS support consisted ofeleven separate increments, adding up to an estimated48,767 measurement tons of resupply. In response toGeneral Magruder's initiative, CONUS depots physicallyprepared the first of the eleven increments of automaticresupply for shipment early in 1958. In addition, stockswere administratively earmarked for later increments, andvarious other steps were taken to assure theimplementation of the established resupply schedule.39Part of this readiness effort included an unannouncedrehearsal of the capability of technical services toresupply ATF 201 automatically. This exercise began on 17June 1958 and involved the immediate picking, packing, andshipment to terminals of one-half of the first incrementof supplies required to support EP 201. By mid-July, whenthe crisis in Lebanon required execution of EP 201,"virtually all the supplies involved in the exercise hadbeen shipped and were ready for subsequent dispositioninstructions."40
Army logistical planners in the Pentagon limited thefirst and second CONUS convoys to class I, III, and Vsupplies, with only limited II and IV items included.*Repair parts were to be restricted to first- andsecond-echelon parts. After the second ship convoy fromCONUS, class V would be shipped only on call of thecommanding general, ATF 201. Routine resupply was to gointo effect six months after E-day.41
The Army ground forces to be supported by thisresupply effort were identified in EP 201 as a task forcedivided into five elements, called Alfa, Bravo, Charlie,
*In 1958, classes of supply consisted of thefollowing: class I, rations and health and comfort items;class III, petroleum, oils, and lubricants; class V,ammunition; class II, clothing, weapons, and vehicles forwhich allowances were fixed by TOE; and class IV,equipment and supplies for which allowances were notprescribed or which required special measures of controland were not otherwise classified, such as fortificationand construction materials.
14
Delta, and Echo forces. Alfa and Bravo forces consistedof the airborne combat troops and their organic support;Charlie, Delta, and Echo forces consisted mainly of unitsfrom the 201st Logistical Command. (See appendix B for abreakdown of forces.) Alfa and Bravo forces would deploywith class V basic loads to last about ten days and withthe minimum of supplies necessary to maintain combatoperations until the 201st Logistical Command couldestablish resupply at about E+3 days. At that time, thefirst air resupply would arrive with ten days of class Iand five days of class III. Additional air resupply wouldincrease supply levels to fifteen days for class I and tendays for class III, and an emergency sea resupply from theSouthern European Task Force (SETAF), arriving about E+10days, would further increase supplies to twenty-five daysfor class I, twenty days for class III, and ten days forclass V. All logistics would be provided on an extremelyaustere basis, with classes II and IV kept to minimumlevels, just sufficient to sustain anticipatedoperations. If deployed by air, Charlie Force would carryenough supplies for about twenty days. Charlie, Delta,and Echo forces, if deployed by sea, would have minimumaccompanying supplies to sustain the forces until the searesupply from CONUS arrived in the operational area.EP 201 stated that this seaborne shipment was expected toarrive in Turkey at E+20 days and was to contain twentydays of all types of supplies. This plan furtherstipulated that replacement of supplies was automaticallyexpected when levels dropped to ten days.42
EP 201 included plans for a STRAC deployment thatwould have added an additional fifteen days to theresupply timetablei from CONUS, E+45 days as opposed toE+30 days. All the planning for the deployment of a STRACunit under Swaggerstick had to be redone because theentire force was now to be deployed by sea instead of theinitial airlift. This resulted again from a lack ofstrategic airlift and from how the airlift was allocatedto the theater operations.43
Problems
Logistical planning for EP 201 was the responsibilityof small groups of people. As in other cases, plans andannexes were classified top secret, with a strict need-to-know policy enforced at all times. Excessive securityrestrictions nullified much of the good work alreadyaccomplished in the plans and caused the biggest breakdownin planning for the operation. The logistical portion ofEP 201 called for the creation of a type A logisticalcommand to serve as headquarters for the technical andservice units selected for ATF 201. These units had
15
already been carefully selected before the mission. Butbecause of the controlled access to EP 201, few of theconcerned units knew that they would be deployed.Although these units were technically proficient, they hadno idea what they were expected to do, where they were togo, and how many troops they were to support. They had noknowledge of the, planners' accomplishments, such as whatautomatic requisitions the planners had arranged and onwhat basis they had calculated supply units. Lt. Col.(later Col.) Dan K. Dukes, Jr., chief of plans atHeadquarters, USAREUR COMMZ, who later became the deputycommander for the 201st Logistical Command, stated he didnot participate in the planning and, in fact, received nobriefing or any information concerning the plan. Hedoubted that many other officers in COMMZ headquarterswere informed until shortly before the OPLAN wasimplemented .44
Moreover, planners followed the contemporary doctrineand formed a logistical command as a focal point for alltechnical and service functions. They established a pushsystem of supplies via automatic requisitions. But theplanners never passed this information on to the technicalunits that would probably support the operational plans.USAREUR planners prepared requisitions for stocks andrepair parts, but the high security classification of theplan precluded units from identifying or earmarking stocksfor fear of compromising the mission.45 Colonel Meetzecommented:
The pitfalls in this planning evolved into twosegments, with both hampered by the high securityinvolved: First, the selection of units requiredfor the mission, and second, determining the itemsand quantities of materiel desired and when theyshould be available. These two segments, ofcourse, include such details as what is a day ofsupply of the various types of ammunition requiredfor the specific mission involved; how is resupplyto be handled (including automatic); what theatreand organizations are to be the backup forsupplies and for how long; will it be possible toprocure subsistence items in the OperationalTheatre, and so on and on. Remember too thatcoordination was required in the many echelons ofcommand: JCS, CINCSPECOMME, USAREUR COMMZ, etc.
Secrecy prevented us from obtaining valuedinformation from staff specialists and from unitswhich were included in the plan, and determiningthe quantities of all items required was atremendous chore. The combat commanders made the
16
decision of how much ammo and how much food eachman would have with him at the time of the initialdrop or landing but from then on it was theresponsibility of the Support Command. Here iswhere the cooperation and frequent visits betweenthe combat forces and the logistical commandplanners really paid dividends. Again, because ofthe high security of the plan, stocks could not beearmarked or segregated in warehouses or depots.It was only logical then that when thepreprogrammed stocks were outloaded from depots todebarkation points on a rush basis that conditionswere ripe for a "snafu." 4 6
Logistical policies set forth in EP 201 included theprovision that no supplies or equipment were to bestockpiled prior to the implementation of the plan. Thisproved to be a major stumbling block in the comingload-out; moreover, no one, except a small cell of selectplanners, knew what was supposed to happen, and, ofcourse, no one knew when it would happen.
17
CHAPTER 2
THE DEPLOYMENT
Preparation
The primary function of logistics is to sustain aforce during operations away from its base. Planners fordeployment, whether they realize it or not, arelogisticians. In the case of ATF 201, plans to implementBluebat existed for some time. The 11th AirborneDivision, a unit designated for Bluebat, was no strangerto deployments and, since March 1956, had been usingGrandios, an unclassified deployment plan, to implementEP 201.1 This plan, written by an experienced staff,called for the marshaling and loading of the airbornemaneuver forces.
The primary problem was the dual mission of thedivision--its commitment to NATO and to EP 201. GeneralGray related that he developed "a mild case ofschizophrenia and was never really satisfied that [he] wasdoing full justice to either mission."2 Additionally,the Army organized the 11th Airborne Division under theReorganization of the Airborne Division (ROTAD) concept.To complicate matters further, the 11th Airborne Divisionwas about to undergo a major change in force structure andwould become the 24th Infantry Division on 1 July 1958 aspart of the Reorganization of Current Infantry Division(ROCID) model.3 ROCID increased its equipment andpersonnel and added another brigade headquarters.4 Twobattle groups within the division, the 187th and 503d,would retain their airborne capability. Late in 1958,these units would rotate to Fort Bragg, North Carolina,and two infantry battle groups would come from the UnitedStates to replace them. Simultaneously, two airbornebattle groups from Fort Bragg, the 504th and 505th, wouldreplace two infantry battle groups in the 8th Division atMainz, West Germany. "When this rotation occurred the 8thDivision was to assume the TF 201 mission."5 In themeantime, personnel approaching the end of their overseastour filled the 187th and 503d. As a result, both ATF 201battle groups "were jam-packed with officers, NCOs andother ranks who had all served three years in Germany andhad participated in numerous major field exercises andtraining tasks."6
A small staff in the division continued the EP 201planning in spite of having to prepare for two different
19
missions and to deal with the turbulence of a majorreorganization and massive personnel rotation. Theseplanners had to develop a plan to marshal and load out4,963 troops and 2,604 short tons of equipment. (Seeappendix C.) Because of the complexity of marshaling andthe numbers of personnel involved, all units involved hadto understand the plan. But Grandios was a plan solelyfor the airborne units, and it neglected detailed planningfor the nondivisional support units.
The marshaling of an airborne unit is a time-consumingand labor-intensive operation. It involves theestablishment of a departure airfield control group.Control group personnel must provide transportation andestablish messing, latrine, and sleeping areas for thetroops at the departure airfield, plus handle such dutiesas sealing off the area for security, providing guards,and setting up command and briefing tents. A second groupof personnel has to establish and operate a marshalingarea to process airborne personnel and their equipment forloading. Adjutant general, ordnance, maintenance, andquartermaster personnel need to be stationed in themarshaling area to provide last-minute administrativeservices; to check identification cards, shot records, andGeneva Convention cards, to notify next of kin; to performmyriad personnel matters; and to repair and replaceequipment. The division believed that the plan formarshaling procedures was workable. Then came a realtest.7
Growing tensions in the Middle East caused an alert tobe called on 17 May 1958. At that time, the 503d BattleGroup was the designated Alfa Force. This alert addedrealism to the paper contingency plan and exposed seriouserrors that would require major revisions in futureplanning. Both the 187th and the 503d marshaled accordingto plan. Planners soon discovered, however, that therewere not enough people to process the battle groupsquickly. Their planning also failed to marshal the unitseffectively because of a lack of control and coordinationamong the various support units. The alert ended on24 May when the 503d conducted a mass airdrop near Munich,Germany. This alert, however, clearly demonstrated thatthe task force could not then move at the speed requiredin actual contingency operations.8
As long as the 11th Division remained an airborneunit, it was simple to detail individuals and unitsfamiliar with airborne marshaling and departure tasks. Asthe division gradually converted to an infantry unit, itlost its airborne personnel (other than the 187th and503d) and also lost much of its ability to marshal itsunits quickly and effectively.
20
To overcome this deficiency, Major General RalphC. Cooper, CG 11th Airborne Division, taskedBrigadier General George Speidel, 11th DivisionArtillery Commander, to operate the departureairfield. In addition to his long experience as aparatrooper, General Speidel was stationed atFUrstenfeldbruck near Munich. He supervised allthe division troops located in the Munich area andcould draw on their resources for his task force.Furthermore, as an assistant division commander,he could make decisions and resolve problems morequickly than could an officer of lesser rank.9
This force become known as Support Force Speidel. Itsmission was "to provide for the movement of task force andsupporting elements from home station, by air, forcommitment in an area of operations, or to an intermediatestaging area ."10
Grandios, upon implementation, reorganized thedivision as shown in figure 5. Support Force Speidel wasthe heart of Grandios. The personnel included one battlegroup, two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion,and one engineer battalion (figures 6 and 7). The plandefined responsibilities for all the required marshalingtasks, such as providing guidance for supply loads,individual equipment, vehicle preparation, publicinformation, communications, and even special serviceslike post exchange and movies at the marshaling area.11
After the practice in May, the alert system becamemore precise and graduated as shown in table 3. Theairborne force now had workable procedures for deployment,and coordination continued for possible deployment.Problems still remained for the support elements ofATF 201. Because of the security classification of EP201, the 11th Airborne Division could not provide detailsof the plan to the support units that would constitute the201st Logistical Command. In short, logistical unitscould not be integrated into the operational plans.Consequently, the working units did not have anopportunity to prepare loading plans, movement schedules,or airfield departure routes. According to anafter-action report, coordination and review of theair-loading plans for nondivisional Charlie Force unitswere not effected prior to the alert, and detailed loadingplans for the Delta and Echo forces were not coordinatedwith the port of embarkation.12 Only a small cell ofheadquarters planners fully understood the nature 'of therequirement. Detailed planning for these units began onlyafter a relaxation of the need-to-know restriction -lacedon EP 201, but this was- less-s than a month and a halfbefore the actual deployment in July. The plans for the
21
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movement were sound and the forces were deployed, but asmoother deployment could have been possible. Theairborne planning was thorough, but restricteddistribution of the plan resulted in faulty execution.
The logistical command leadership understood themission and held many planning conferences. ColonelMeetze even made a liaison trip to Adana, Turkey, theproposed intermediate staging area, to coordinatelogistical support.13 While the headquarters wasbecoming well versed in the prepared plan, the specificsupport units were not. Unlike the airborne units, thenondivisional support units lacked the experience forrapid deployment and thus required extensive preparationand planning. They did not receive it because of the highsecurity classification of the plan.
The lessons of the May alert helped to integratesupport units into the detailed marshaling plans. GeneralGray described the outcome:
.. another result was that it let the cat outof the bag, that a U.S. NATO force had a secondarymission. As I recall, the main reason for theextreme "need to know" imposed upon us was theconcern that our allies, and particularly WestGermany, might find out that the U.S. planned touse forces fully committed to NATO on a distantmission. As it turned out the only concernexpressed by anyone was that of Germanentrepreneurs who stood to lose revenues upondeparture of U.S. forces. In all probability,despite our precautions, NATO knew about it allalong, to say nothing of the Russians. 14
The May alert finally brought Charlie Force units intothe detailed planning picture. For the first time, theseunits calculated airlift data and prepared loading plans,but, reflecting their inexperience, they had to relyheavily on the airborne units for help. An 8 July commandpost exercise (CPX) for all Charlie Force unitsaccelerated this process, but units were still unpreparedwhen deployment came.15
After the May alert, the Air Force agreed to furnish acomponent to a joint command post at FUrstenfeldbruck tocoordinate aircraft and provide advance notice of types ofarriving aircraft.l6 The Air Force, however, haddifficulty forecasting aircraft by type. The replacementof C-119s with C-130s, then in progress, caused thisconfusion. As General Gray related, "it was impossiblefor the Air Force to give us at any one time an accurateforecast of their potential lift."17
26
In the wake of the experiences gained from the Mayalert, airlift was again the subject of a 9 July 12th AirForce conference at Ramstein, Germany. Brig. Gen.B. O. Davis said to General Gray, "We gave you what youasked for in May and now you want more. When are yougoing to stop raising the ante?" General Gray repliedthat General Davis had been misinformed because "TF Alfa'srequirement had been met only by taking C-124 augmentationfrom the States meant for TF Charlie." General Gray hasrecalled, "The simple fact was that there was not enoughlift immediately available in the theater to meet the fulllift requirements of TF Alpha."18 The differencebetween requirements and lift availability remainedunresolved.
Planning and coordination continued. ATF 201 wasfortunate to have had the benefit of CPXs, rehearsals, andmarshaling and load-out practices. Charlie Force was nowinvolved in the planning, and the Army and Air Force werediscussing joint planning. The May full-dress rehearsalrevealed areas where corrective action was necessary, butthose involved had too little time--only a month and ahalf--before the next alert to correct the problems.
On 14 July 1958, USAREUR issued a warning order byphone to the 24th Division headquarters; on 15 July, a"message [arrived] from USAREUR which indicated that thetask force would have to be prepared for either air dropor air land in Lebanon 24 hours after receipt ofnotification to move."19 The same day, USAREUR GeneralOrder Number 194 activated the ATF 201 Support Commandheadquarters.20 General Speidel activated his force andmoved to FUrstenfeldbruck Air Force Base. The first taskof the headquarters was to determine lift availability.
Movement
On 14 July, the 322d Air Division had availableforty-eight C-130 aircraft from the 317th Troop CarrierWing at Evreux, France; twelve C-124 aircraft from the322d Division's 3d Troop Carrier Squadron at Rhine-Main,West Germany; fifty C-119 aircraft from the division's60th Troop Carrier Wing based at Dreux, France; andthirty-six C-124s turned over to the 322d by MATS EasternAir Transport Force.21 The next day, General Gray againmet with General Davis, 12th Air Force, and ColonelMcCafferty, deputy commander of the 322d Air Division(322d was commanded by Col. Clyde Box), to receive anestimate of the airlift available for his mission.General Gray recorded in his personal notebook that "finalairlift [was] not formed up until about 2000."22 Grayelaborated: "In fairness to the Air Force, the 322d was
27
0LL
U.
w
Troops leaving Germany
sort of a vagabond airline that on any one day might haveaircraft scattered all the way from India to Africa to theUnited States. They simply couldn't all be whistled in ina matter of a few hours. . ."23
Like the Air Force, Army elements were prepared forcontingencies but were not ready for an unannounced alertbecause of their attention to daily operations. Mostsoldiers familiar with alert situations would have empathyfor ATF 201's quandry. Despite the contingency mission,the units had to do other jobs and continue training. On14 July, for instance, the 503d, designated Alfa Force,was preparing to depart for Bad Tolz to act as aggressorsagainst special forces troops in an exercise. They werealso in the midst of readying a company-size jump for Gen.Clyde D. Eddleman, the new Seventh Army commander. Thistask required the rigging of several dummy demonstrationloads.24 On the other hand, the 187th (Bravo Force) hadjust returned to garrison from two weeks' training atHohenfels where it had conducted a group jump. Before itsdeparture from home station, the 187th reviewed itsportion of Grandios and readied its B-bags, whichcontained an individual's clothing, some designated TOEequipment, and some personal items. Preparing for hisportion of the special forces exercises, Colonel Sharkey,the 187th's commander, sent many of his officers to
28
reconnoiter the operational area. At that moment, theywere scattered over a 200-square-mile area of the BavarianAlps. In addition, Colonel Haynes, the Alfa Forcecommander, had injured his leg in a recent jump. Based onthese factors, General Gray replaced the 503d with the187th as the Alfa Force.25 At 0545 on 15 July, thedivision initiated a green alert, and the 187th beganloading.
By this time, Support Force Speidel had establishedthe departure airfield control group. General Speidelrecalled, "During marshaling and loading many minorproblems occurred which were corrected without too muchdifficulty. This was a standard operating procedure thathad been 'dry run' many times."26
The most nettlesome minor problem was the Air Force'sfailure to send the required airmen to the joint commandpost as previously agreed on during the 9 Julyconference. 7 The American Land Forces (AMLANFOR)Bluebat critique mistakenly states: "They [the Air Force]furnished one officer; however, he departed in theincrement with the ATF 201 Commander. This caused muchconfusion and delay in aircraft use and in briefings untilan Air Force component, with command and clerks, wasre-established much later."28 In actuality, the AirForce officer, Colonel McCafferty, was the designatedcommander of the Air Force element of Alfa Force whileairborne. If the 187th had to jump, McCafferty would havebeen in command en route to the target area.29 The AirForce did send additional personnel. A combat airlogistic support unit (CALSU), under Col. TarletonH. Watkins, worked with General Speidel, but not accordingto any prior agreements.30 The result was confusion andlack of coordination. The Army contributed its share tothis disorder by its last-minute scramble to completeloading plans for Charlie Force.
The mission of Support Force Speidel was soon modifiedto include the establishment of priorities for movementand the determination of lift requirements for all unitsin ATF 201. This meant supporting not only thewell-prepared airborne units but also the nondivisionalsupport units, many of which had just recently beenincluded in the plans.31 This presented a significantproblem. As a plan, EP 201 was sound, but the loadingrequirements of the support units had not been computed.Many of these units, reporting increased lift requirementsfor the first time, expected Support Force Speidel toreact immediately to their needs. However, unless clearedby higher headquarters, Support Force Speidel and the 322dAir Division headquarters lacked authority to dispatchaircraft other than those contained in the basic
29
plan.32 Despite the revious months of preparation, itrequired a great dea of last-minute coordination andtelephone calls to rectify the aircraft shortfall.
Another of General Speidel's problems was all the"help" he received.33 It is a truism that seniorcommanders have the right, possibly the need, to go wherethe action is and to expect a briefing on their arrival.But the price is interruption of the operation inprogress. General Gray counted fourteen stars in onegroup. "At one time there was General Hodes, CGUSAREUR;LTG Eddleman; LTG Roger; MG Cooper; andBG B. O. Davis."34 General Gray erected a briefing tentto keep the visitors away from Speidel's workers, but thegenerals avoided the briefing area and wandered over tothe hangars, asking questions that a briefing officercould have answered and interfering with troops engaged inmore important duties. Indicative of events to come, onlyGen. Paul D. Adams, Commanding General, 7th SupportCommand, listened to a complete briefing.35 (GeneralAdams later became Commander in Chief, AMLANFOR.)
Besides visitors, General Speidel's force wasunprepared to handle the press. Apparently, there was nofixed policy for press accommodations. For example:
Two representatives from the "Stars and Stripes"arrived by an Army helicopter from Frankfurt(Germany) with orders issued by "Stars andStripes" for travel to the Middle East. Thisheadquarters (Support Force Speidel) had noauthority to allow them aboard aircraft basedsimply on their "Stars and Stripes" orders. TheInformat ion Division, USAREUR, was con-tacted. . . . Eventually, 22 July, this head-quarters was notified through Division PIO thatthese men had no authority to go to the MiddleEast and in fact should not even be on the baseproper. Yet these same two men were provided Armyhelicopter transportation from Frankfurt toFUrstenfeldbruck, and had USAFE approval for airtransportation to the Middle East. Good pressrelations are a necessity for favorable releasesconcerning the military profession. A policy,known to all, must be forthcoming in relation tothe access of press representatives to sensitiveareas .36
To add insult to injury, "Even the Russians," General Graynoted, "were at the fence taking pictures."37 Theresult was an unplanned diversion of additional personneland resources to handle the demands of the press, thusallowing troops to deal with the problems at hand.
30
Plans and weight estimates did not match the actualloads, creating further difficulties. Nearly everyelement of the well-practiced Alfa Force had overloadedits equipment bundles. In addition, the operation wasdelayed from the start. Riggers incorrectly loaded thetruck convoy by putting the items needed initially on theground into the trucks first; therefore, that equipmentwas unloaded last. The convoy also took a longer routethan necessary to the airfield and arrived late and inreverse order. The riggers then had to wait until thelast truck arrived with the materiel needed first beforethey could begin their work.
On 15 July, these riggers in the parachute maintenancecompany moved to the airfield at 0500. But it took until1600 to establish the rigging line. At 1800, when theforce received clearance to depart, only the first of 125heavy drop-loads were ready.3 Fortunately, the weatherdelayed the departure of the C-119s as did the failure toreceive overflight rights from Austria.* These factorsforced departure time to be rescheduled for 0730 the nextday.
ATF 201 continued to marshal. Fortunately, it had aunique headquarters staff, Support Force Speidel, thatconsisted of experienced personnel and a general officerto operate the departure airfield. Thus, effectiveorganization and well-qualified people helped overcomesome of the attendant confusion. However, even withthorough preparation and experienced personnel, ATF 201was not ready when cleared for departure.
The first Alfa Force plane actually departed Germanyat 0817 on 16 July for Adana, Turkey, a staging area(map 2). Meantime, Charlie Force was also marshaling inFrance. Because Charlie Force would use Alpha Force'sturnaround aircraft, Charlie Force had time toreorganize. Col. Adam W. Meetze, commander of the 201stLogistical Command, Lt. Col. Isaac King, director ofsupply and services, and Maj. Paul I. Wells, a signalofficer, left Orleans, France, and joined General Gray atAdana on 17 July to coordinate logistics.39 ColonelMeetze immediately supported ATF 201 with B-rations,tents, tables, chairs, and other expendable supplies from
*The need for overflight rights had been considered byUSAREUR planners, but it was decided that, where they werenot granted, they would be ignored. Evidently, the StateDepartment had not cleared this decision because Austriahad to be bypassed.
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pre-positioned Air Force supplies at Adana. Meanwhile,the airlift continued. By 17 July, a total of 1,526troops in Alfa Force and 495 short tons of supplies hadarrived at Adana, Turkey.40 Most of these aircraftparked on the airfield, fully loaded. Bravo Forceremained on alert at its home station in Germany.*
In Lebanon, the situation was stable, so Charlie Forceprepared to land directly at the Beirut airport. Elementsof Charlie Force left Orleans, France, by bus on 17 Julyfor the airfield at Chateauroux. Unfortunately, the buscrashed near Olivet (Loiret), France, killing threemen.41 Headquarters, COMMZ, sent replacements who hadno notion of the plan they would implement. The rest ofthe air elements of Charlie Force marshaled withoutincident at FUrstenfeldbruck, Rhine-Main, Chateauroux, andEvreux.
General Gray visited Beirut on 18 July to prepare theway for the task force. After coordination meetings withAdmiral Holloway, CINCSPECOMME, Gray returned to Adana.There, he ordered two changes based on the situation inLebanon: first, "that a truck platoon be placed as toppriority on TF Charlie and [second] that TF Alfa's B-bagsbe sent by air rather than by sea."42 Unfortunately,the last request was garbled in transmission. The 24thDivision interpreted the message to mean that Bravo Forceshould advance. So a few days later, the advance party ofthe 503d arrived in Beirut, happy as could be. The end ofthis story is that Alfa's B-bags, which went by shipanyway, were extensively damaged and looted on the seavoyage.43
On 18 July, USAREUR cleared Charlie Force for movementto Lebanon, and Alfa Force prepared to move on to Beirut.General Gray earlier found that Lebanese airport officialsinsisted on integrating the task force flights with theirnormal civilian traffic control. The Beirut airport hadtwo main runways, but one was closed for construction.Gray made arrangements with Lebanese officials forequipment storage and use of Lebanese army trucks, but,when he and the advance party arrived, "to our dismay wefound that the Lebanese Army trucks promised us had notarrived; the taxiway had not been reserved and no space
*The reader may wonder about the care of familymembers left behind. Support Force Speidel took care ofmost of the problems. General Speidel briefed the familymembers, and his staff took care of many problems causedby a spouse's quick departure, such as "He took the keysto the car."
33
had been allocated for our heavy drop." The advanceparty's "high-pressure staff activity" solved all theseproblems just as the first group of C-119s appeared in thedistance. 4
Alfa Force began arriving in Beirut at 2230 on19 July; some of Charlie Force had landed earlier thatsame day. But because Alpha Force was using many of theaircraft Charlie Force had counted on for transport, muchof Charlie Force was delayed. In addition, it took longerto load Charlie Force than anticipated: unit planners hadmanifested vehicles according to the basic weight of thevehicle, but, when the vehicles arrived at the aircraftfor loading, they frequently contained rations or otheritems of equipment that added more weight to the loadwithout appearing on the manifest.45 So, as aircraftbecame available, riggers loaded them with whatever wasavailable and sent the aircraft on their way. The bulk ofCharlie Force, 1,580 personnel and 1,825 short tons ofequipment and supplies, had arrived at Beirut by 26 July.In all, during the first eleven days of the Army'smovement, the Air Force flew a total of 242 sortiescarrying 3,234 troops and 2,500 short tons of cargo.46
187th arriving in Beirut
34
Airhead
The first priority of the logistical command was airterminal operations. The unloading of airborne units wasno problem. The ATF commander, General Gray, describedthe airborne's airlanding:
As each aircraft turned into the taxiway stillrolling at considerable speed, a soldier jumpedoff and sprinted forward to establish an assemblypoint for his plane load. The other soldiers cametumbling out behind him while the plane was stillrolling, neatly stacked their weapons andequipment in a line designated by the guide, thenraced back to the plane to unload the A-7containers and weapons bags. In a matter ofseveral minutes the plane was proceeding to therunway for takeoff.47
The unloading of supplies and heavy equipment was notas smooth, however. Evidently, considerable confusionexisted about who was in charge of unloading. All theservices used the Beirut International Airport as theirair terminal. In addition, the international airportwould eventually serve, on a continuing basis, as the mainbase of operations for helicopter, light plane,aeromedical evacuation, and antisubmarine warfareoperations. All these military activities weresuperimposed on the constant, heavy commercial use of theairfield. The initial contacts between U.S. and Lebaneseofficials to coordinate air traffic consisted of littlemore than a Lebanese army officer and a U.S. Marinerepresentative working with civilians to control landingsand takeoffs. During the initial Army airlift, the AirForce provided a CALSU of the 6th Aerial Port Squadron.This unit attempted to control and coordinate all U.S.activities until the arrival of an aeromedical evacuationdetachment. Then, the CALSU established a passenger andcargo operations area in the terminal. While thesepersonnel made a commendable effort to carry this extraworkload and did manage to operate a limited military baseoperations center, their numbers and technical ratingswere not adequate to handle all airport and terminalactivities.48
Confusing instructions exacerbated the problem.CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 stated that Commander, U.S. AirForces, SPECOMME, would establish and operate airtransport facilities to improve the handling of personneland cargo and to arrange for use of the commercial airtransport terminal.49 A military regulation
35
(AR 59-106/OPNAV Instruction 4660.1/AFR 76-7/MARCURJSAR 2-56-3000, 21 September 1956) delineated thefunctional responsibilities of the military services inconnection with handling and moving traffic through AirForce air terminals, including those at advanced landingfields and airheads. Responsibilities differed somewhatfor the air movement of units and the air movement ofother traffic, such as cargo, mail, passengers, andbaggage.
For air movement of units, the respective service(Marine, Navy, Air Force, or Army) being moved wasresponsible for loading, tying down, and unloading itssupplies and equipment into or out of aircraft. Air Forcepersonnel, however, provided technical assistance andsafety inspections. In contrast, cargo to be airdroppedwas tied down and dropped by the Air Force. For movementof traffic other than units, the Air Force was responsiblefor accepting properly authorized and packaged traffic atthe departure air terminals. Acceptance includedinspecting, receiving, and unloading traffic fromconsigner vehicles. The Air Force also had theresponsibility of loading, tying down, providing en routeservice and supervision, unloading, notifying consignees,and delivering traffic at the destination airfield.Delivery at the destination air terminal included loading
Equipment on the runway
36
traffic on the consignee's vehicles. The Air Forceunloading capability at the Beirut airport wasinsufficient to support an operation of Bluebat's size;therefore, the command pressed combat troops into serviceas cargo handlers.50
The cargo handling organization consisted of an AirForce team of seven to ten men for each shift; the teamunloaded aircraft with two forklift trucks and rollerconveyers. The Air Force, however, did not have enoughpersonnel to do the job. The 201st Logistical Commandprovided a team headed by a transportation officer whosupervised the unloading of passengers and cargo. Armycombat troops, one officer an twenty men, augmented eachof the Air Force shifts.51 Under combat conditions, itis doubtful whether these combat troops could have beenspared for that purpose. The movement priority did notinfiltrate support troops soon enough to preventcongestion and confusion.
Maritime Operation
As with the airlift, the sealift began almost ontime. Because only a single airhead was available and toassure adequate supplies for the task force, the Armyloaded two vessels with planned emergency resupply atLeghorn and Brindisi, Italy. On 19 and 20 July, the shipssailed to Beirut, opening the first phase of the seaoperation.52
On 20 July, Delta and Echo forces moved to the portsof Bremerhaven, La Pallice, and Saint-Nazaire. Ingeneral, rail and highway movements to the ports wereeffected with minimum disruption of normal traffic flow.At these ports, the men and materiel were promptly loaded,and the first vessel sailed for Beirut on 24 July. Thissea tail eventually consisted of 4,862 passengers and72,011 measurement tons of cargo.53
Before departing for Beirut, Colonel Meetze had senthis S3, Major Kaufmann, to Bremerhaven to supervise theloading of the main elements of Delta and Echo forces onthe USS General Randall, the USNS Upshur, and USNSGeiger.54 According to Colonel Meetze, Major Kaufmannhad no experience in port operations and was content tolet the civilian workers handle the operation.55Unloading problems resulted in Beirut because thelongshoremen did not "combat load" the ships; instead,they loaded the ships "civilian style," even the newroll-on and roll-off vessel, the USNS Comet.
37
Longshoremen at Bremerhaven loaded the Comet with10,711 measurement tons, "a remarkable lift consideringthe 'balloon' nature of much of the cargo" (tanks andtrucks).56 Participants estimated that the Comet heldthe same amount of cargo as four or five World War IIVictory ships. The lack of loading ramps and the narrowpier aprons at Bremerhaven, however, prevented roll-onloading, but crane loading took no longer than forconventional vessels. Once aboard, the vehicles weredriven to their parking areas.57 Additionalcrane-loaded cargo, however, blocked the passageways ofthe Comet, causing problems at the receiving end because"vehicles had to be lifted out of the vessel before othervehicles could be rolled off."58
Two officers and seven enlisted men, the initial Armystaff of transportation personnel in Beirut who organizedport operations, encountered difficulties whileunloading. As described by a staff officer, "failure ofoperators and staff officers involved in port operationsto have knowledge of the overall plans restricted theircapabilities to cope with certain facets of the oper-ations."59 Furthermore, local stevedoring services werenot immediately available because of unsettled laborconditions, the language barrier, and certain Lebanesebureaucratic features. Accordingly, initial unloadingoperations went slowly and would probably not have met therequirements of a combat situation.60
Cargo manifests compounded the problem of too fewpeople to carry out the mission. Many manifests wereincomplete or missing altogether, and stevedores literallyhad to unload a ship to discover what was aboard it. Forexample, no one identified the 299th Engineer Battalion'sD-7 bulldozers until 15 August because the shippingmanifest listed them as D-8 dozers assigned to the 79thEngineer Construction Battalion.61
Conflicting instructions given at home stations forpreparing trucks for sea movement caused more problems.Longshoremen removed considerable materiel from truck bedsat the port of embarkation to permit efficient storage inthe ship holds. They stored the removed materiel withoutany regard for unit or requirement. On arrival,stevedores unloaded and transported this materiel toassorted dumps where others identified it and shipped itto the proper unit. A dump located at the 299th EngineerBattalion contained communications equipment, ammunition,hospital beds, tents, a fluoroscope, and dump truckheadboards. Units had to send labor details to the beachand staging areas to pick up much-needed supplies. Oncethere, however, the details faced long hours of waiting
38
Unloading the USNS Comet
39
without any assurance that any of their equipment would beunloaded.62
The 229th Engineer Battalion explained the implica-tions of incorrect cargo manifests:
The identification of this unit's TAT ["toaccompany troops" equipment] was extremelydifficult on debarkation from the [USNS] Upshur.A correction to the personnel manifest erroneouslyawarded a portion of this unit shipment number74,000 DTX in addition to its correct shipmentnumber 74,000 DMX. Consequently, half of thisunit's TAT was marked DMX and the other half DTX.Shipment number 74,000 DTX was shared with the79th Engineer Construction Battalion which wasalso aboard the USNS Upshur. As a result, much
General Adams and Colonel Meetze meet the USNS Upshur
40
time was spent opening all shipping boxes markedDTX to determine the rightful owner, andconsiderable effort was required in doublehandling much of this equipment. The TAT wasloaded in a haphazard manner aboard the ship andwas not identifiable by unit on the ship's cargomanifest.63
Once again, faulty execution negated contingency planning.
Result
Problems like incomplete instructions, faultymanifests, and scarce labor could have seriouslyjeopardized the success of the mission. Unlike the Marinebattalion landing teams that arrived ashore with thirtydays' combat supplies, Army troops carried a minimum levelof supplies. Furthermore, the planned resupply by air wasalso minimal, as the Army chose to rely on surfaceresupply. Accordingly, planners should have provided foradequate military personnel to unload MSTS and commercialships early in the buildup phase. This provision wouldhave allowed Army forces to operate independently ofindigenous labor. Personnel for port operations mighthave been phased into the theater in incrementscommensurate in size to the off-loading requirements andlocal labor. In special cases, qualified personnel, suchas winch operators, might have accompanied the initialdeployment to be readily available as needed at theport.64 Finally, planners should have defined theresponsibilities of units more clearly.
Nevertheless, under ATF 201, Americans did deploy tothe operational area. In the broad sense, the planworked. General Gray explained later: "No basic changehad to be made in our plan, and such adjustments as wererequired fell entirely within its framework. On the otherhand, we were not loaded and locked within the time framewe had projected and, therefore, did not achieve ourobjective. In sum, the plan succeeded; we failed in itsexecution."65 The plans, however, lacked the detailsnecessary for a smooth deployment, such as the confusionnondivisional units had over load-out procedures,incomplete manifests, and cargo loading at the port inBremerhaven. Other failures in execution resulted becauseof the high security classification of plans. This wasthe most significant drawback to well-integrated execution.
41
CHAPTER 3
THE FULCRUM
A fulcrum is the support on which a lever turns, andcombat service support was the fulcrum of rapid deploymentlogistics for ATF 201. Combat service support propped upthis logistical lever sustaining the force by providingresupply and services.
These services are difficult to discuss as a singleissue because of the specific nature of each. But thesesomewhat interdependent services were organized in asingle logistical command. Their combat service supportfunctions need to be examined, and the following separate,but related, sections describe certain ones. The chapterbegins with a discussion of the organizational processthat orients the service support mission. Followingsections then discuss resupply; procurement; civilaffairs; medical support; and, finally, security, a commonproblem of all service support units.
Organizat ion
Because the Lebanese operation was a unilateralaction, the JCS directive executing the U.S. portion ofBluebat (CINCAMBRITFOR OPLAN 1-58) substituted U.S. forcesfor British units. This action resulted in the creationof two sizable provisional organizations--one Marine, oneArmy--each commanded by a brigadier general.1CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 had no provisions for a jointground force command, although both the respective Armyand Marine planners understood that their forces could beemployed under five of the eight courses of actiondiscussed in the plan. The three remaining courses ofaction involved combined operations with the British.Probably because of a lack of guidance, the USAREURplanners of EP 201 established the organization shown infigure 8. The commander of the service with the mostforces would act as the senior overall commander.2
The two ground force commanders reported to differenthigher headquarters: the Army to Commander, U.S. ArmyForces, SPECOMME, and the Marines to Commander, U.S. NavalForces, SPECOMME. Therefore, it was unclear who commandedthe ground forces, and participants quickly realized thatthese units would have to coordinate their activities.3
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General Gray recalled that coordination between theArmy and Marine Corps was good and that they accomplishedtheir missions. The noncombat situation, however,provided the breathing space to establish a unified groundcommand. As General Gray described it: "More and more ofmy time was being spent coordinating with CINCSPECOMME,General Wade (the Marine ground commander), Admiral Yeager(Naval commander), Ambassador McClintock and theLebanese. It was becoming apparent to me that most ofthat coordination could better be done at a higher levelthan my own."4
CINCSPECOMME recognized the accuracy of Gray'sobservation and created another headquarters, one forwhich planners had not foreseen a need.
CINCSPECOMME considered three solutions to increasecoordination between the services. First, the seniorbrigadier general would become Commander, American LandForces (COMAMLANFOR); second, CINCSPECOMME wouldcoordinate the ground operations; and, third, a separatesenior ground force commander would be appointed by thepresident.5 CINCSPECOMME rejected the first course ofaction because both commanders were fully occupiedcommanding their own organizations and subsequentoperations might have required the geographic separationof the two forces, further complicating command andcontrol. CINCSPECOMME considered direct coordinationinadvisable because such action would have made him, ineffect, one of his own component commanders. Therefore,the establishment of a separate senior ground forcecommand was the only realistic solution.6 (Seefigure 9.)
On 21 July, CINCSPECOMME requested the Chief of NavalOperations, as executive agent for the President, toassign an Army or Marine major general or lieutenantgeneral as COMAMLANFOR. On 23 July, DA, as directed bythe JCS, designated Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams for thisassignment. As early as 15 July, General Adams hadcommented to General Gray that he might be sent to Lebanonto take command of all land forces.7 Thus, Adams hadabout a week to prepare for his new assignment. But hestated later, "I was a little suprised that I didn't haveany kind of definitive orders . . ."8 General Gray,however, endorsed the decision:
We probably would have muddled through without thenew command structure but might well have madesome mistakes that need not have been made.General Adams gave firm direction to the entireoperation and played a pivotal part in the many
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actions which were never publicized but whicheventually nudged the Lebanese into burying theirfirearms for awhile and allowing the US to retractits forces.9
General Adams's first priority was to translate thebroad mission directive into an operational missionstatement. The overall goal was twofold: protectAmerican lives and interests in Lebanon and sustain theindependence of Lebanon. Adams identified the followingspecific tasks required to accomplish his mission:
* Maintain security around selected points such asthe U.S. embassy, the Lebanese presidential palace, andthe U.S. military base at the Beirut International Airport.
* Keep all principal routes of communications in andaround Beirut and to the international airport and portarea open and secure by frequent patrolling and by placingstrongpoints along the routes.
* Secure Beirut from rebel invasion.
* Order frequent aerial reconnaissance missions overLebanon and detailed aerial surveillance of routes leadinginto Beirut and routes leading from the Syrian border.
* Maiaintin general reserve composed of twoechelons: an immediate reserve of one airborne companyand one tank company on the edge of Beirut along theairport road and a follow-on reserve of battalion strengthsupported by artillery and tanks.10
To accomplish these tasks, General Adams organized hisforces as depicted in figure 10. The combat forces, theairborne brigade and the Marines, divided the specificground tasks. Adams placed the 201st Logistical Commandon an equal footing with the combat commands it supported.
Based on General Adams's guidance, Colonel Meetzedetermined that his mission was "to exercise command ofthe Army Supply and Service troops, ATF 201; to providelogistical support of all army troops in Lebanon; and toaccomplish other missions that may be directed by CG,American Land Forces."ll Specifically, the supportcommand was to:
* Exercise command over all logistical troopsassigned to ATF 201.
* Plan and conduct support operations with Armysupport forces assigned.
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* Conduct liaison with local Lebanese Army elementsthrough the commanding general of the U.S. airbornebrigade (all other liaison was required to go throughAMLANFOR headquarters).
* Achieve a full support capability as rapidly aspossible and provide local security of supportinstallations an activities in coordination with theairborne brigade.
* Plan and conduct training of support personnel asnecessary for operational support requirements.
* Receive and quarter incoming technical andadministrative troops and coordinate security with theairborne brigade.12
Furthermore, Colonel Meetze subdivided theselogistical missions into fifteen discrete functions:
* Procure, receive, store, maintain, and distributesupplies and equipment.
* Manage transportation service.
* Operate facilities for essential military oper-ations, especially for the maintenance and repair ofequipment, roads, railroads, and buildings.
* Provide medical care, including evacuation andhospitalization of the sick and wounded.
* Train troop units and individuals assigned orattached to the 201st Logistical Command.
* Control traffic within the assigned area.
* Procure necessary real estate.
* Provide rest camps, leave facilities, and welfareand recreational programs and facilities.
* Provide chaplain service.
* Operate the Army exchange service.
* Operate the Army postal service.
* Handle legal claims and judicial services.
* Handle finance and accounting services.
49
* Provide rear area defense and area damage controlwithin the 201st Logistical Command area.
* Conduct civil affairs.1 3
Colonel Meetze organized the logistical command staffto command, control, coordinate, and direct theadministrative and logistical support operations performedby its subordinate units (figure 11). The commander had adeputy commander, a directorate staff, a technical staff,and the normal administrative staff to assist him indischarging his responsibilities. The directorate staffhad six sections, each charged with distinct staffresponsibility in one of the following areas: personnel,security, plans and operations, supply and services,procurement, and civil affairs. The special staff had thenormal administrative and technical responsibilitiesassociated with its titles. In addition, it exercised"operational control of service units of [its] respectiveservices."14
The 1957-58 curriculum of the Command and GeneralStaff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, taught officersto organize a primary staff for the logistical command.Possibly because of the enlarged responsibility and spanof control, the primary staff officers were designated asdirectors. These directors had the general functions ofassisting and advising the commander and deputy commander;formulating policies, plans, and directives; andcoordinating and supervising the execution andimplementation of plans by subordinate commanders.15
Interestingly, the 1959 Field Manual 54-1, The LogisticalCommand, contained an organization similar to the one usedin Lebanon in 1958 that specified directors instead of aprimary staff.. Evidently, those Army officers responsiblefor teaching and writing at the Command and General StaffCollege and those in field operations did communicate witheach other. The result was a field manual based, in part,on practical experience.
The actual staff organization, however, did not matchany pre-1959 field manual. It did follow a basicdoctrinal tenet--that the organization should be flexibleto support the operational mission. The former deputycommander of the 201st Logistical Command, Col.Dan K. Dukes, commented that "the entire organization andoperation was a series and conglomeration of changes tothe extent that if there was an original it could hardlybe recognized."16 This statement can be taken either asa positive reflection of a flexible doctrine or as areaction to an operational problem without regard- to
doctrine. In sum, it appears that existing field manualsdid not greatly influence the organizational process.
A major change during the operation was the additionof an Adana, Turkey, support group, adding even greaternumbers to an already large support force. Requirementsto handle the supply storage and issue at Adana Air Basejustified creation of the group because there was nopermanent organization to manage a de facto pre-positionedstorage site.
A primary purpose for the creation of the 201stLogistical Command was to have a single point of contactfor all logistical matters. It succeeded in thatpurpose. The absence of combat contributed to the sizeand showmanship of the logistical effort. The G4/S4 ofthe airborne brigade and AMLANFOR headquarters, lackingserious operational planning duties, became more involvedin the daily logistical operations by requesting data forbriefing charts. The creation of AMLANFOR headquartershad a minimal effect on logistical operations except toadd one more person to the briefings and statisticaldistribution lists. Coordination between the staffs wasnot a problem because sufficient time existed toaccomplish this coordination through meetings andunhurried conversations.
The 201st Logistical Command experienced a fewproblems in its internal operation. Colonel Meetze'sgreatest difficulty was melding the command'sapproximately fifty separate military units and teams intoa close, cohesive, functioning command. His task was allthe more demanding because none of these units or teamshad ever served, worked, or trained together as ateam.17 His deputy, Colonel Dukes, added this importantpostscript to the operation: "By the time Lebanon was allover, this conglomeration was just beginning to be sortedout and identified and able to function . . ."18
Critics have charged that this command was too large.However, if the planned numbers of combat troops hadactually been deployed to Lebanon for combat operations, alogistical organization of this magnitude would have beennecessary to support the combat troops. Because therewere no combat operations, the command appeared, inretrospect, to have been too large for the forces itsupported. But it would have been foolhardy to plan adeployment without considering the risks and logisticalrequirements of combat. The support force turned itsefforts from basic resupply to making life comfortable forthe task force--better for the troops to be blessed withabundance than to suffer deprivation because of unforeseencircumstances.
53
The major difference between adequate plans and actualoperations lay in the teamwork and practical operationalprocedures that naturally develop in realistic trainingexercises. The 201st Logistical Command was well plannedand did provide one point of contact for all logisticaloperations. It was not, however, a smooth-runningcommand until several months after deployment. Itsufficed in Lebanon in 1958, but, to sustain a wartimedeployment, combat service support elements need realistictraining and exercises in peacetime. Such traininginstills teamwork and assures adequate, timely materielsupport. Just as infantry units train as a team to assurebattlefield success, so must support elements traintogether to ensure that battlefield success can besustained.
Resupply
In Lebanon we unloaded mountains of supplies andequipment even after it was known there was noenemy; no fighting. This created problems andlost flexibility, gained nothing, indeed createda liability that could have caused great troubleand loss of life.19
Logistical doctrine requiring that X-days of supply*be on hand at any given time was the reason these"mountains" of supplies were delivered. They had beenpreordered and were automatically shipped in bulk toLebanon from both USAREUR and CONUS.
Planning
Three factors governed logistical support planning forATF 201: the requirement to deploy two battle groups, thenecessity for rapid deployment, and the availability ofaircraft. Annex D of EP 201 divided the logisticalresponsibilities, stipulating that USAREUR would beresponsible for all logistical support of ATF 201 untileither E+30 days or E+45 days if STRAC deployed, at whichtime DA would assume the task. USAREUR would furnish Alfa
*A day of supply was a unit used in estimating theaverage expenditure of various items of supply, usuallyexpressed in pounds per man per day and in quantities ofspecific items.
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and Bravo forces with the minimum basic supplies requiredto maintain combat operations until routine statesideresupply was established. Directly behind the deployedforces, airlift would carry the initial resupply andarrive in the staging area about E+3 days. This resupplywould establish an initial level of about ten days' supplyof class I and five days of class III, with additional airresupply ultimately increasing levels to about fifteendays of class I and ten days of class III. After settingthese initial priorities, the plan stated that, in orderto reduce the airlift requirements and increase troopdeployment rates, all logistics would be on an extremelyaustere basis. Air logistical support was to be theminimum necessary to sustain operations and any unforeseencontingencies.
Normal supply buildup as dictated by the contemporarydoctrine and overall logistical support would begin witharrival of sea resupply from both the USAREUR COMMZ andCONUS. USAREUR COMMZ would ship the initial resupply forthe entire ATF, which would arrive at Iskenderun, Turkey,around E+20 days. This convoy would contain twenty daysof all classes of supply. If required, emergency searesupply from SETAF, then stationed in Italy, would arriveat about E+10 days and increase the buildup to twenty-fivedays of class I and twenty days of class III. EP 201further charged SETAF to send an additional three basicloads of class V by E+10 days. Classes II and IV would beprovided at the minimum to sustain operations; plannersconsidered rationing class III in the early stages adistinct possibility.
The plan also directed USAREUR to support CharlieForce initially. If Charlie Force deployed by air,USAREUR was to provide enough supplies to sustain theforce until arrival of sea resupply, about E+20 days.Delta and Echo forces deploying by sea would carryaccompanying resupply in their transports to sustain themfor about twenty days.
DA would ship an additional twenty days of all classesof supply to arrive at Beirut around E+30 days.20 Thoseshipments from stateside would raise available supplylevels from ten to thirty days. In addition, CONUS depotswould continue automatic resupply with convoys, whichcontained supply for twenty days, arriving at twenty-dayintervals in order to maintain a supply level of thirtydays. The Army restricted the CONUS convoys to classes I,III, and V, with only limited quantities of classes II andIV and repair parts. Routine resupply would beoperational after E+6 months.
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Execution
On implementation of the plan, supply operators cratedsupplies stored in USAREUR. As noted earlier, supplieswere not earmarked in Europe, so, although these supplyworkers found the supplies, the loading was haphazard.They loaded the first two scheduled COMMZ shipments(twenty days of resupply) on time and sealifted them fromSaint-Nazaire and La Pallice to Beirut and to Iskenderunfor transshipment to Adana, Turkey.21
Colonel Meetze later recalled that all went well until
the arrival of the COMMZ first sea resupplyshipment; identity of stocks as to shipment waslost. . . . This required many days to inventoryand completely smothered the Quartermaster inreceiving and documenting Class I supplies. Iremember well the gracious gesture by GeneralGray, ATF 201, in loaning us a few men who workedaround the clock with the Logistical Commandpersonnel to make some semblance of order frompiles of jumbled stocks.22
As noted in chapter 1, stateside resupply had alreadybegun. In fact, because of a readiness exercise in June1958, a month before the Lebanese crisis, most ofincrement one had already reached the U.S. ports.Following EP 201, DCSLOG released increment two forshipment to the ports and issued orders for depots topick, pack, and hold increment three supplies. The totalCONUS resupply was originally to consist of elevenincrements, but developments in Lebanon soon made suchmassive resupply unnecessary, and only increment one wascompletely shipped. These supplies, a total ofapproximately 13,000 measurement tons, were loaded aboardthree vessels at New York, Sunny Point, and Charleston.The vessels departed on 8 August. Because of lower thanexpected consumption rates, the troops in Lebanon did notrequire the class III and V supplies of increment two.Only the class I portion of this increment finally wentforward. At New York, 900 measurement tons were loadedaboard Dalton Victory. Then, before the ship departed forBeirut on 25 August, it was further loaded at HamptonRoads with 1,100 measurement tons for the Marine Corps.23
The sealift cargoes arrived on time. However, becauseof the absence of hostilities and because resupply rateswere based on wartime consumption, a huge surplus ofsupplies accumulated. It soon became clear that thetheater could directly handle the reduced requirements ofthe Army forces in Lebanon. On 19 August, USAREURindicated that it was prepared to assume complete resupply
56
responsibility after the second CONUS shipment, theportion of increment two that left the port on 25 August.Consequently, no further EP 201 resupply shipments weremade from the United States.24
The readiness exercise that had begun on 17 Juneenabled supplies to arrive as scheduled because most ofincrement one was already at the port ready for loading byE-day, 15 July 1958. This might have caused the statesideresupply to arrive too soon, but that was not the case.It took until 8 August to load the vessels fully, andthese ships arrived in Beirut approximately fourteen dayslater, or a total of thirty-eight days after E-day, eightdays longer than the planning figure. Starting from thetime the readiness exercise began in June--and assumingthe exercise was a full-scale effort--it took sixty-sevendays for the resupply shipment to arrive in Beirut--thirty-seven days over the planning figure! Thus, underthe worst possible circumstances, ATF 201 would have hadto rely on an emergency resupply effort for twenty-sevendays, an unenviable position to be in. In short, ifresupply had started from scratch, the logistical planwould not have been sufficient. Even under theartificially favorable circumstances of a readinessexercise, execution took eight days longer than planned.Obviously, the national supply system did not respond asfast as planners had envisioned.
The switch from CONUS to theater resupply was thefirst significant deviation from EP 201. Essentially, itwas made to simplify the resupply effort and to turn offthe stateside tap. According to Colonel Meetze, "Sinceonly one battle group had been committed to Lebanon, andour situation did not reflect true combat conditions, ourexpenditure rates were found to be less for all classes ofsupply and timely action was necessary to reduce or divertautomatic resupply to preclude large stock piles in theBeirut area. "25 The cancellation of the next nine andone-half increments from CONUS eased the stockpilesituation in Lebanon but did not resolve the problemcompletely. Doctrine called for a specified amount ofsupplies to be available to deployed troops, sostockpiling was inevitable in an operational area.
Moreover, operational problems could have beenavoided. Security considerations caused one difficulty.Another was the old curse of incomplete loading plans andcargo manifests. It was also apparent that the supplyoperators did not understand what constituted a basic dayof supply. As the AMLANFOR after-action report made clear:
The effectiveness of the Logistical Command insupply control function was hampered by the lack
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of preparation of elements of the command for theoperation. The supply personnel of the commanddid not know what items, in what amounts shouldbe available for a day of supply for ATF 201 nordid they know the basis on which automatic supplywas sent to the command from COMZ. The personnelof these teams by and large came from sourceswhich depend on centralized supply control. Theywere not informed in advance of their role in EP201 for security reasons, therefore, they did nothave the official publication to compute days ofsupply at combat rates or to reconcile any ratesthey knew about with the quantities received inthe automatic resupply shipment.26
Entire cargoes, most without manifests, were unloaded,inventoried, and temporarily stored, which caused furtherdelay in the distribution and final storage of supplies.The delay was not critical (although it might have beendisastrous had hostilities occurred). The most difficultcargoes were bulk loads. On 7 August, for example, onebulk load of forty commercial vans of class I suppliesreached the quartermaster supply point at Beirut. Thesevans contained mixed loads of different types of rations(five-in-one, B, and C). The conditions of the loads andquantities of trucks made selective off-loadingimpossible. Soldiers unloaded the trucks' cargo in bigpiles. Hundreds of cases and domestic packs were broken,and loose items were scattered around the trucks.Shipside unloading caused most of the damage. Besides theimmediate losses, it took time to organize all the looseitems, inspect the damaged packages, and then properlydistribute the rations to the field.27
Repair parts also arrived, for the most part, inbulk. In addition to confusion caused by incompletemanifests and bulk loads, the engineers, ordnance, andquartermaster personnel lacked technical manuals toidentify properly these repair parts. These specialistswere so busy trying to find what was available that, whena demand for a part arose, if they could even find it,they issued the part without proper accountingprocedures. In fact, they never did develop the necessarysupply planning.28
Once supply planners determined the days of supply,*reducing levels from thirty days to fifteen,2 the
*In mid-September, the status of days of supplycomputation began to be based on the actual troop strengthin Beirut.
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COMAMLANFOR approved a plan that allowed for the selectivedischarge of cargo,30 or taking only necessary items outof the ships and leaving the remaining cargo aboard. Inthat process, inaccurate or missing manifests made the taskeven more difficult. "[Because of] the lack of propermanifesting of vessels and because selective discharge wasnot contemplated at point of origin many items had to beoff-loaded then back-loaded after required items [were]discharged."31 This was a process not unlike unloading afull automobile trunk to get to a jack and then reloadingthe trunk.
Other unforeseen factors influenced the amount ofmateriel on hand, such as the local availability ofpetroleum products. Logistical planners, however, wereunaware of this because the intelligence officers evidentlydid not route their estimates through the logisticians.With the amounts of materiel and petroleum products far inexcess of that needed already in the resupply pipeline,more than selective discharge had to be done to avoidfurther port congestion. Staff officers had to divertsupplies to Europe or to the Adana subcommand.
The importance of the base at Adana became readilyapparent when the operational area, Beirut, began to bulgeat the seams. Adana was therefore established as aprestockage point for the operation. "The mission of thesubcommand as received from the 201st Logistical Commandwas to receive cargo from the port of Iskenderun, transportit to Incirlik Air Base, and establish a depot storage areafor, at that time, approximately 15,000 tons of all classesof cargo."32 Adana would maintain ten days of classes I,III, and IV and twenty days of classes II and V so theoriginally planned stockage would be available in the samepart of the world.33 As with supplies arriving inBeirut, Adana had problems with supply planning,particularly the acquisition of adequate storage areas,because of "a lack of firm information relative to thequantity and type of supplies to be received atAdana."34 Confused procedures for diverting incomingships to Adana caused added complications. AMLANFORheadquarters reported that "actions to accomplishadjustment in resupply were complicated by the need to makerequests for diversions of CONUS shipments through severalagencies, such as Department of the Army, the OverseasSupply Agency, N.Y., USACOMZEUR and CINCUSAREUR."35
Despite the problems, supply bundles accumulated inBeirut and Adana in sufficient numbers to meet the requireddays of supplies. (See appendix D for examples of on-handsupplies.) Except for class I (rations), the suppliesgenerally remained in storage areas. Critics of theoperation strongly recommended that a centralized on-call
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supply system would have been more efficient than automaticresupply. Although the automatic resupply satisfactorilymet supply needs, a more efficient system for making atransition to an on-call resupply arrangement was neededfor contingency operations.36 With the noncombatsituation in Beirut, the supply operators found itdifficult to stop the incoming materiel because of theinflexibility of the automatic resupply system. As anafter-action report stated: "Some energetic thought mustbe given to ways of adopting logistical support for STRACtype forces by providing fast dependable transportation andsmaller increments of balance resupply rather than the 15to 30 day ones used for this operation."37
The transportation of these supplies from the storagepoints to units did not present a problem oncetransportation companies arrived about two weeks into theoperation. Until that time, combat troops used their owntransportation. The static situation allowed thelogistical command to consolidate all transportationoperations under the 38th Transportation Battalion.38That battalion had adequate time to organize for itsmission because it did not have to support a fast-moving,fluid situation requiring immediate attention. One mightspeculate on whether this battalion could have handledcombat resupply, but, given the assets shown in theorganization chart (figure 11), the transportationbattalion would have done the job once ashore. If combatunits had lacked organic truck transportation, there mighthave been problems because the majority of the trans-portation assets arrived too late in the operation to be ofany use. In case of armed opposition after landing, thecombat troops would have required the transportationbattalion earlier, and it probably should have had a higherlanding priority regardless. As the operation slowlyunfolded, transportation was adequate. The central problemremained the unraveling of resupplies on the ground.
Colonel Dukes, in charge of supervising the resupplyoperation, recommended: "Where possible, and Lebanon is agood example, a water borne base should . be used,facilitating a very gradual build-up on land only asconditions warranted and required it. I refer to a streamconcept, vis-a-vis, the old line of so many days of supplyASAP and on the ground in the forward position."39 Dukesmakes a good argument for just-in-time logistics,water-borne, prestockage points, and a push-pull system ofprepackaged bundles of resupply.
In Lebanon, the doctrine of maintaining X-days ofsupply on the ground was inefficient. Doctrine caused thediversion of combat troops from other duties to help unload
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unnecessary or redundant supplies. The resulting stock-piles offered a lucrative target and encouraged waste; forexample, sixteen tons of Marine and ten tons of Armyammunition were dumped at sea due to damage in storage.40
Procurement
Under normal combat conditions, indigenousfacilities, services and supplies would beobtained by seizure; however, in the Lebanonsituation this was not practicable because of JCSdirectives relating to minimum interference withnormal activities of the host nation.41
As the U.S. armed intervention in Lebanon lengthened,a predicament developed. Instead of a fast-moving assaultoperation, a large U.S. peacekeeping force staged a showof force in cooperation with the local government.Furthermore, the situation did not require the task forceto live under combat conditions for extended periods. Asa result, consumption of combat supplies remained belowanticipated levels (although such supplies remainedplentiful because of the automatic resupply system), whiledemand for other services soared. Normally, assaulttroops would have seized these other services, facilities,and supplies during the course of combat operations, but,since ATF 201 was cooperating closely with the Lebanesegovernment, confiscation could not be considered.Instead, the U.S. government had to arrange for and buysupplies and services to maintain the image as an invitedguest. Thus, an additional, unplanned procurement burdenarose when obtaining supplies earmarked for troop welfareand adequate headquarters facilities. Specifically, theArmy does not content itself to live on C-rations formonths when other options exist. Even though piles ofcombat supplies were available, the task force undertook alarge local procurement operation without adequateplanning.
In the 201st Logistical Command, EP 201 established aprocurement staff section of two officers and two enlistedmen, plus a one-man procurement policy office in theDirectorate of Supplies and Services to coordinateprocurement policies.42 One officer of this procurementsection arrived in Beirut on 20 July. He had no suppliesor equipment of any kind. Thus, no procurement forms,regulations, or other directives were available. He didnot know what fiscal appropriations existed, and, ofcourse, no fiscal officer was available to provide fundcertification.43 The primary cause of his predicamentwas operational security. The director of procurement for
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the 201st Logistical Command said later: "Guarding of thedetails, meaning, and objective of the plan must naturallybe effected. However, in the recent operation, securitywas exercised to the point that the great majority ofparticipants in key positions were not informed. "44Conceivably, he could have been referring to thisparticular officer or himself, or both.
The procurement officer, immediately on arrival, wasverbally appointed as a contracting officer by ColonelMeetze, who instructed him to obtain locally those itemsneeded to support the AMLANFOR ashore.45 Items procuredincluded:
* Quartermaster--paper, pencils, stencils, and otherexpendable supplies; fresh fruits and vegetables for troopmesses; coffee, brooms, maps, soaps, ice, and embalmingservice.
* Engineer--lumber, nails, plywood, hinges, crushedrock, paint, D-4 dozer parts, and use of bucket crane withoperator.
* Medical--items required for use by the fieldhospital in patient treatment, laborarory servicesperformed by the U.S. hospital in Beirut, and drugs.
* Transportation--stevedoring, bus transportation,and rail and truck transportation.
* Miscellaneous--minor signal, ordnance, and chemicalitems .46
How one man without supporting materiel was supposedto accomplish this task was not clear. Only theassistance of the U.S. embassy made the officer's jobpossible. The procurement officer immediately used theembassy to help contact Lebanese vendors. On 2 July, theembassy set up a liaison procurement section to contactand receive applications from local vendors and to dealwith specified sources of supply. The embassy providedinterpreters who overcame the formidable language barrier,and the system worked. The contracting officer made hisneeds known to the embassy. A liaison officer would thencontact a local merchant and conclude a verbal agreementon price, quantity, and delivery. Verbal agreements werenecessary because of the urgency of the demand and due tothe lack of requisition forms and procurement personnel.The embassy provided limited typing assistance for ten ortwelve purchase orders but could not cite funds becausethe appropriation data was unknown. The U.S. governmentfound itself obligated, in most instances, by verbalcontract, even to include requisition of real estate and
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property for use by the task force personnel.47 To pafor these items, the logistical command received $25,600on 18 July and an additional $100,000 on 1 August fromUSAREUR.48
Evidently, the planners forgot to make provision forreal estate procurement because no provision had been madeto establish a real estate office. It was expected thatthese duties would be performed in the engineer staffsection of Headquarters, 201st Logistical Command.49Moreover, real estate transactions were a significantproblem because "no one with procurement experience in thereal estate field was included in any of the troopcomplements."50 The volatile political situationrequired quick action to find billets for the combattroops. This forced the contracting officer into verbalagreements with local landowners. Luckily, no majormistakes were made.
Water, which is of prime importance for militaryoperations, particularly in the Middle East, was anotherimmediate need. Each man had a five-gallon supply ofwater on the initial lift. Planners supposed that potablewater could be obtained locally. Even with thecooperation of the local authorities, however,considerable effort was needed to acquire adequatesupplies for the U.S. troops. No lakes or springs were inthe area of operations, and the streams were bone dry.The city distribution system had branch lines that skirtedmost of the bivouac areas. However, Lebanese authoritiesrationed this supply, and peak demands for military usewould have overtaxed the antiquated system. Also, rebelshad sabotaged three distribution mains and associatedbranch lines. Consequently, wells were the only reliablesource of water. Although the wells were numerous, accessto them was poor and most had a small yield. Furthermore,while most well owners agreed to sell water to the U.S.Army, they insisted on reserving the right to use theirwell for six to eight hours each day for irrigation. Onlya few wells produced a reliable yield on a twenty-fourhour basis. Eventually, one. well supplied 75 percent ofthe water for the command. The average consumptionreached about nine gallons per capita per day for allpurposes, including laundry service, showers, and roadsprinkling. Civilian contractors offered to drill wellsfor the Army, but no contracts were let.51
The organization of the 201st included well-diggingteams, but the need to procure land and the availabilityof other wells probably precluded activation of theseteams. In a secured area, these teams could haveeventually provided necessary water. But in a fightingsituation, the unexpected difficulty in obtaining water
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might have caused serious problems. Greater attentionshould have been given to the procurement of water; merelyassigning well-digging teams to the force was notsufficient.
Other procurement shortages included shop, warehouse,and refrigeration storage, which became acute when theoperation turned into a peacekeeping mission inconjunction with the automatic resupply procedures. Inaddition, the need to conduct fair and legal rentalagreements contributed greatly to the lack of warehousespace.
The 201st Logistical Command found itself unpreparedfor the large procurement demands it faced as there was noprocurement annex in the plans. The procurement officerrecommended that, in the future, "such an annex shouldinclude instruction on the proper method of submission ofpurchase requests, funding requirements, procurementprocedures (to include time required to effectprocurement), and a listing of items which by law may notbe procured under any circumstances and/or unless certainconditions exist."52
Even without planning, the procurement activities didsucceed, largely because of the presence of the U.S.embassy. Moreover, enough time was available to rectifythe procurement effort, and the established procurementoffice in theater (USAREUR) responded readily to requestsfor funds to compensate for local procurement activitiesin Beirut.
Civil Affairs
". .. establish a base in the large olive grove justeast of the airport . . matter of military necessity.Send the bills to the Ambassador."53 These few linescreated yet another difficulty. "One of the most seriousproblems involving the civil affairs staff," according toColonel Meetze, "was the harvesting of the Olive crop."4
The decision to laager ATF 201 in the olive grovesouthwest of Beirut was probably made on the basis of bothspace requirements and the tactical situation as thenknown by the commander. The decision, however, did notconsider civil affairs implications. U.S. forceseventually occupied 20 percent of the largest olive grovein Lebanon. This one grove produced an annual revenue ofaround $100,000 that was vital to the local economy. Tofurther complicate the problem, some 200 different peopleowned the trees. With proper troop discipline, the trees
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would not be damaged, for the groves contained existingroads and open spaces for tents. The tactical situationwas static, so, with the approach of harvest time(September through February), pickers could have beenallowed in the area with the proper security measures.However, the Lebanese women, the traditional oliveharvesters, refused to enter the groves while U.S. troopswere present. This impasse could have caused the loss ofthe crop and created a serious unemployment problem.55A simple, seemingly logical decision had turned into asocial as well as an economic problem. The United Statesmight have been stuck with a substantial bill.
Many Americans and Lebanese spent long hours finding asolution. Eventually, the U.S. Army, embassy, and localLebanese mayors reached agreement. A joint team made aninitial estimate of the olive crop's value and agreed to afinal assessment upon departure. The team encouragedowners to harvest their crops because only if the ownermade a reasonable effort to harvest his crop would a claimfor damages be considered. For security purposes, theU.S. Army issued passes to harvesters whose names appearedon lists submitted by local mayors. Landowners did makeclaims, but, more important, it took many meetings, muchtime, formation of ad hoc committees, and extensive staffwork by the U.S. embassy and civil affairs section tocorrect a serious problem created by a simple tacticaldecision (table 4).56
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For contingency operations in support of friendlynations, civil affairs activities are obviously important.Tactical planners, however, tend to ignore civil affairs,believing it is one of those things that others will takecare of. The logistician must pay particular attention tocivil affairs, for his activities are directly affected bythe availability of local real estate, labor, supply,transportation, and the need for security. Generally,logistical commands have had a civil affairs staff becausecivil affairs was considered a service. As such, civilaffairs needs to be preplanned.
Civil affairs planning for the operation, at best, waslimited and, at worst, nonexistent prior to deployment.The civil affairs annex to CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 wasdated 11 September 1958, nearly two months after U.S. Armyforces had landed and civil-military relations had become aproblem. 57 The civil affairs annex for CINCAMBRITFOROPLAN 1-58 (Bluebat) did delegate authority, fixresponsibility, and establish certain detailed functionalpolicies for administration of civil affairs. Overallpolitical direction was to be issued in supplementalpolitical directives by the concerned governments. USAREUREP 201 of 18 February 1958 called for supplementing theheadquarters of the logistical command with three civilaffairs teams (headquarters, language, and labor teams),thus creating a civil affairs staff of five officers andeleven enlisted men.58 A recurring comment inafter-action reports about these plans was that commandersdid not receive adequate policy guidance from higherheadquarters.59 The reason planning is difficult forcontingency operations is that actual employment locationsmay not be identified and that the conditions of employmentcannot be determined in advance.
Still, it is possible to design in advance anorganizational structure to handle such problems.Regardless of the situation, qualified personnel can betrained, and the headquarters level of responsibility canbe determined in advance. For the Lebanese operation,there was no predetermined responsibility; instead, it hadto evolve. To ensure consistency with official U.S.government guidance, the American ambassador wasresponsible for all public relations activities regardingU.S. military operations in Lebanon. CINCSPECOMME (withthe J3 as supervisor) was responsible for developing civilaffairs agreements with the Lebanese government, a statusof forces agreement, and liaison with the U.S. embassy onall matters relating to military policy consideration. Onthe other hand, the J4 for the COMAMLANFOR established andconducted civil affairs within the area of groundoperations.60
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The civil affairs staff designated in EP 201 for thelogistical command began arriving in Lebanon on 20 July.For reasons not clear, "none of these teams were used assuch and all except two officers and two enlisted men werereassigned to other than Civil Affairs duties." These twoofficers and two enlisted men formed the Directorate ofCivil Affairs for the 201st Logistical Command, and eventhey had the additional duty of special serviceactivities .61
It is doubtful that the four-man team could havehandled a situation similar to the one in Lebanon if it haddeployed to a nation that had no diplomatic ties with theUnited States. Through the U.S. embassy liaison office inBeirut, the State Department negotiated with the Lebanesegovernment about contracts between U.S. forces andLebanese civilians. "This [diplomatic] office provedextremely valuable to the military and assisted greatly inthe accomplishment of the [military] mission. "62 ALebanese-American Civil Affairs Committee (eventuallyelevated to "commission" status) was established by U.S.embassy and Lebanese officials to set policy, carry outcoordination, and monitor indigenous resources. "Thecommittee met weekly and its activities were instrumentalin avoiding unnecessary adverse publicity and lengthynegotiations ."63 This committee worked with the civilaffairs office and helped to identify such operationalproblems as violations of public security, claims, use ofpublic domain, use of indigenous labor, communityrelations, procurement, and monitoring of local resources.The committee also developed data about the Lebanesegovernment, population densities, political aspects ofinterest to the U.S. forces, and other information relatingto military and governmental activities and plans.64
The civil affairs staff considered a variety ofeveryday socioeconomic activities. These included legalmatters, such as the status of forces agreement and foreignclaims, public safety, curfews, fire and sabotageprevention, and general disaster relief as well as policeand military cooperation, control of vendors, labor andunion liaison, public health, food and agriculturepolicies, property control, public transportation, civilinformation, and political affairs. The civil affairsoffice handled all of these activities a month after U.S.forces landed in Lebanon. The Americans developed policiesas problems arose, and the ambassador or a State Departmentrepresentative was available to set the policy. However,such may not always be the case.
After-action assessments deemed the civil affairs stafffor the Lebanese operation inadequate. These reports
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strongly recommended that civil affairs annexes includeguidance for the military commander and the ambassador.These annexes must detail procedures so that the commandermay effectively carry out the military and politicalpolicies of the United States. "This guidance must alsoprovide for the contingency that U.S. diplomatic rep-resentatives may not be available in the national area inquestion."65 The after-action reports asserted that thecivil affairs mission was successful only because theambassador diverted nine foreign service officers from theForeign Service Institute, Arabic Studies Center, to theembassy liaison office.66
Because U.S. forces were in Lebanon twenty-three dayswithout a status of forces agreement, a legal officerqualified in international law was required to adjudicateclaims and draft a status of forces agreement. Such anagreement was essential for defining the legal guidelinesfor U.S. military personnel in a host nation. Status offorces agreements normally include rights of criminaljurisdiction, freedom of U.S. military personnel from civilaction, exemption of U.S. military forces from taxation,free entry into a sovereign nation without inspection, theright to implement appropriate security measures to protectU.S. forces, and freedom of movement by U.S. personnel.For a contingency operation, it obviously is difficult toprepare a status of forces agreement in advance. It ispossible to prepare a draft agreement and execute it at afavorable moment, probably as close as possible to the timewhen a nation requests U.S. aid. 6 Therefore, civilaffairs annexes must also have sufficient guidance (perhapsin the form of a model or draft outline) so that thecommander can negotiate an agreement with the foreigngovernments if no U.S. diplomatic representatives areavailable.
The civil affairs officers in Lebanon understood thatexact, detailed planning might not be possible in thefuture, but they raised several questions that tomorrow'splanners must address:
1. Should claims be accepted from the foreigngovernment when United States forces are presenton an invitational basis? On a noninvitationalbasis?
2. Should payment of fees for services, use ofpublic domain or facilities be entertained fromthe foreign government or its legal entities whenforces are present on an invitational basis? On anoninvitational basis?
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3. Should the United States consider the claimsof the indigenous private citizen or should suchclaims be shifted to the foreign government?
4. Should the claims function rest with themilitary forces or with embassy officials? (Ineither case, staff augmentation will be requiredvery early in the operation. If military,component commanders should be granted authorityto appoint foreign claims commissions. Thisauthority should be effective upon assumption ofcommand.)
5. Is the use of private property and facilitieslimited to normal contract, lease andpurchase-type agreement, or mutually acceptablefree use?6
Finally, based on the Lebanese experience, civilaffairs officers recommended that, when a foreigngovernment invites U.S. troops to enter its nation, thesovereign government should make provisions for adequatebivouacs for troops. Because such laager space was notprearranged, the Lebanese government assumed that the U.S.forces would locate their own areas. This placed the U.S.commander in the embarrassing position of bargaining withindividual Lebanese citizens who did not want to releasetheir property to the Americans.69 As a final comment,an after-action report warned that civil affairs succeededonly because, in the noncombat situation, commanders hadtime to devote to it and because the U.S. embassy providedexcellent support.70
Medical S uppor t
. . majority of fleet medical officers .ashore were gynecologists, psychiatrists, andobstetricians. . .71
It is a long established fact . . that anyforce deployed overseas requires the full rangeof medical support on a continuing basis,regardless of the combat situation, becausediseases and injuries are normal to all militaryoperat ions.72
Medical support for U.S. personnel was left to theservice commanders. CINCSPECOMME supervised, coordinated,and monitored supporting plans and operations of theservice commanders, but CINCSPECOMME made each serviceresponsible for providing medical support for its own
69
forces in accordance with existing interserviceagreements. The plan did not provide or referencespecific medical planning information for, mostsignificantly, local area health problems, prevalent areadiseases, and local sanitation conditions. All of thesefactors might have had a debilitating effect on the healthof U.S. forces.73
The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, SPECOMME, wasresponsible for providing medical care for the amphibioustroops while they were embarked with his command. Theplan failed to specify which commander assumed thisresponsibility after the troops had landed. Surprisingly,at the CINCSPECOMME level, Army and Air Force medicalpersonnel neither wrote nor reviewed the operationalplan.74
Based on CINCSPECOMME's plan, each component (theArmy, Air Force, or Navy) developed its own respectivemedical support plans, with little apparent coordination.The Army, for instance, did not even receive a copy ofeither the Air Force or Navy medical plan. Each serviceworked in isolation "without reference to the over-allmedical needs of the operation."75 The Army medicalrepresentatives were unaware of the overall medicalservice responsibilities until the operation had begun.Army planners did not interpret SPECOMME's plan to meanthe Army had responsibility to support the Marinesashore. As the operation progressed, the Army did provideclearing company and evacuation hospital support as wellas certain supply and other services for all forcesashore. This action stretched Army resources thin becauseplanners had anticipated only the demands of Armytroops.76
A lack of planning coordination forced each service toconduct an independent medical support program. There wasno overall coordination or cooperation on supplyoperations, medical evacuation, or locations of medicalsupport units. This oversight interrupted the flow ofinformation concerning the medical organization withineach service, proposed locations of field hospitals, andthe extent of medical resources and support each servicewould provide.77 For example, "while the Army and Navywere moving specially qualified personnel and units intothe area, the Air Force was withdrawing personnel withthese same skills. Supply shortages developed in oneservice necessitating extraordinary procurement action,while another service apparently had quantities of theneeded items immediately available in the area."78
The Army eventually had adequate organic medicalsupport. Surgical facilities and operating rooms aboard
70
the SPECOMME commander's flagship were available, althoughonly because of local coordination. When necessary, andnot through planning, the American University Hospital inBeirut treated overflow cases. An evacuation hospital didnot become operational until eight days after the alert,and resupply remained a serious problem.
Although medical supplies were adequate at first, thesupply system did not respond readily to the medical needsthat developed. "Medical resupply did not take intoconsideration specific items that were very 'fast moving'due to environmental conditions experienced." 79 Medics,however, used expedients, such as local procurement. Theitems in short supply were the common, but necessary, onesneeded for treatment of diarrhea and heat exhaustion.Medical officers had difficulty requisitioning emergencymedical items through the military supply system becausemedical supplies were integrated into the routine supplysystem along with all other items. Priorities alreadyestablished within that supply system slowed respon-siveness.80 (In the 1950s, evidently to centralize theresupply system, medical items became part of the overallresupply system. Thus, a winch part could have hadpriority over a medical item. Medical resupply has sincereturned to medical channels.)
The medical supply system was also overburdenedbecause, in April, USAREUR COMMZ ordered the Army tosupport all U.S. forces during an operation. The medicalsupply officer, however, did not learn of this addedrequirement until Delta Force, with the field hospital,had already arrived at the operational area in August.Then the logistical command informed the medical supplyofficer for the 58th Evacuation Hospital that he wouldissue medical supplies to all troop units within the taskforce and act as head of the force medical depot. Thisconfusion and late notification resulted in a shortage ofthe medical supplies needed to perform the new addedmission. Stocks of fast-moving items were depleted withina short time. While still in Germany, the medical supplyofficer tried to ascertain where medical supplies would beissued. Unable to do that, he assumed the Navy was incharge. As it turned out, the Navy did not havesufficient medical supplies available and even had to drawon Army stocks occasionally.81
Other problems abounded. The initial high securityclassification of the plans also affected the resupplyeffort. Even the twelve-man medical supply depot team"had no medical supplies nor information thereof"; theteam never saw the classified plan and had no idea of whatto do.82 Some supplies were outdated; for example, the
71
plaster paper used in casts was dated 9 March 1944. Themedical personnel were carried in one ship and theirequipment in another, with the resultant confusion andloss of equipment after landing that was characteristic ofother task force elements. A majority of the medicalofficers involved in the operation believed that "ifcasualties (combat) had been encountered, it would nodoubt have been a medical calamity and many saveable liveswould have been lost" because of the lack of surgicalfacilities ashore during the initial stage.83 This is avalid conclusion and again illustrates that the lack ofprior coordination and the unclear division ofresponsibility might have proved fatal to the task forceif it had met determined resistance.
Security
Plans for the operational security of the airhead weredrawn up by General Gray's staff the day before theairborne force left Adana for Beirut. These plans seemedas if they had been "lifted from the diagram in the fieldmanual for defense of an airhead." 84 (See map 3.)General Gray wrote later:
It would have disposed our troops in company-sizestrong points on the semicircular ridge of hillsthat rose to the south and east of the airport andthe open sand dunes to the north with the ocean tothe west. I believed that if we had trouble itwould come from small forays or acts ofindividuals such as snipers, fanatics or thieves,and it would be better to initially, at least,dispose ourselves in a tight perimeter, largely inthe olive grove east of the airport where we couldprotect ourselves by mutual support as well asprovide a secure area for the support units thatwere to follow.85
To counter the threat preceived by General Gray, theforces built defenses based on the current mobile defensedoctrine that located troops so they could be quicklyassembled at rendezvous areas. Without enough men to stopall small-scale infiltration, Gray's staff officers basedtheir plans on the capability of the Lebanese army andcivilian agencies to acquire the necessary intelligencefor them to assemble the requisite forces to counter anattack. The forces finally deployed in positions insidethe area indicated by the broken line on map 3 with threerifle companies occupying forward ready positions. Someplatoons within each company developed tactical positions;however, the majority of each company remained in anadministrative bivouac ready for rapid movement. The
brigade commander detailed one company as an airfieldguard and kept one company in reserve in the olive groveto provide security for brigade troops, the supportcommand, and the line of communication to Beirut. Therewere sixteen rendezvous areas located throughout thesector where troops could quickly move in case of anemergency.86
The airborne staff developed six contingency plans tohandle these emergency situations:
* OPLAN Cover moved U.S. forces to block any entry oforganized combat forces into Lebanon.
0 OPLAN Extraction covered the withdrawal of U.S.troops when ordered.
* OPLAN Deep Freeze provided for winter dispositionsin the event the U.S. occupation was prolonged.
* OPLAN Rescue implemented the rescue of key U.S. andLebanese officials and family members from their officesor residences.
e OPLAN Shoforce called for the movement of tacticalunits in and around Beirut to impress continually on the
Brig. Gen. David W. Gray inspecting a guard post
74
dissident elements the U.S. presence and readiness tointervene.
* OPLAN Cyclone called for tank-infantry teams tomove quickly to any locality in the city of Beirut toreduce roadblocks or establish tactical positions.87"These cyclone forces were used on quite a few occasionsand were very effective in quieting the situation down, asneither side wished to get us involved. They were alsoeffective in keeping our troops on their toes and thusassisted in the maintenance of high morale."88
The airborne force expected to conduct securityoperations and apparently had little difficulty in doingso. However, the logistical command was less flexible.After-action reports discussed the perennial conflictwithin technical units between operational effectivenessand physical security. As with many modern-day supportunits, ordnance, quartermaster, medical, transportation,and other units claimed that their operationaleffectiveness declined when they had to provide guarddetails. The ordnance units claimed a loss of 60 percenteffectiveness due to guard requirements.89 The supportunits probably assumed, as they do today, that "someone"would provide security so that mechanics could bemechanics, supply people could perform supply functions,ammunition handlers could care for ammunition, and soforth. The plans for the Lebanese operation, however,assumed that each support unit would protect itself anddid not specify a separate security force to guard thebulging supply stocks that filled the area because of theautomatic requisition system.
The logistical plan did provide for a Directorate ofSecurity that was charged with typical security duties,including communications, plans, intelligence, andcounterintelligence. On arrival in Beirut, though, thisdirectorate discovered that it was unprepared for suchduties: when those assigned to the directorate openedtheir sealed classified folders of maps and intelligencestudies, they found the material was revelant only toTurkey.90
Initially, then, the Directorate of Security lackedinformation and current intelligence. Later, physicalsecurity for the mountains of supplies bedeviled thissecurity office. Other security matters rested with theAMLANFOR headquarters and the airborne brigade. Thedirector of security established liaison with the G2 ofATF 201, the Lebanese port security officer, the Lebaneserailway maintenance officer to U.S. forces, and the Beirut
75
U.S. Army guard post in Lebanon
municipal police chief. The director of security insistedthat tactical troops of the 187th Airborne Group performguard duty. However, in a 12 September 1958 memorandumfor record, General Adams told the logistical command thatthe supply personnel were responsible for the security ofstorage areas and that every unit was subject to the guardrosters. A 201st Logistical Command report stated thatthe major security problem since the arrival of technicalservice supplies and equipment was finding guardpersonnel. Because the logistical command had no organicguard unit, the technical service troops worked at theirnormal duties during daytime and stood guard duty atnight. Numerous guards were needed to prevent pilferageor sabotage of supplies during unloading at the port areaand airfield and during truck or rail transport to storageareas. Also, many guard posts were required to protectthe open storage areas. The technical service personnelalready had a heavy work load just to sustain the resupplyeffort. They worked abnormally long hours under primitiveconditions, and their performance of both duties naturallysuffered. These factors physically exhausted them to thepoint that their efficiency as guards was questionable.91
General Meetze later gave an example of the problem inhis description of one pilferage incident:
76
Petty pilferage of Class I stocks in the olivegrove at night by native Lebanese was always aproblem. I remember quite well a securityincident involving the Quartermaster Depot area inthe olive grove. Trees were spaced roughly 10-20feet apart and not an olive tree could be removedwithout the personal authority of commanders ofAMLANFOR's subordinate elements. The QM Depotarea in the olive grove was protected by sixsections of concertina wire which encircled theentire storage area. Three sections were placedtogether . . . and separated by a path the widthof a jeep which made periodic circles of the areaat night. There were no lights in the area. Onemorning, the company commander of the provisionalquartermaster company informed me that a circustent, folded in sections, had been stolen thenight before. How anyone, or even many persons,could get these huge pieces of canvas across sixsections of concertina wire without arousing thesentry on duty or being observed by the jeepdriver will never be known. . .92
Nonetheless, whether they liked it or not, the serviceunits had to provide their own security. This probablywas fair, for combat units had specific missions andshould not have been tied down on guard duty. To avoidunneccessary reduction in the efficiency of technicalservice units, planning must consider rear area security.Reserve brigades may be able to fulfill the large reararea security mission, but serious thought should be givento troop lists and service unit strength so that theseunits have adequate security and are capable of performingtheir mission.
77
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
Retraction
AMLANFOR staff officers began planning for retractionof U.S. forces shortly after their arrival. The lessonslearned in the initial load-out proved valuable asretraction proceeded smoothly. The units, especially theservice units, now had practical experience in makingloading plans and manifests for sea and air movements. Bydeparture time, they had diverted unneeded supplies andfinished the final inventory of supplies on the ground.The greatest benefit of the deployment was the applicationof lessons learned for a smooth retraction. Mostimportant, the tactical and political environment enabledthe unit to plan and implement a phased withdrawal.
The withdrawal went well because it was the entirecommand's sole task after October 1958. Headquarters,AMLANFOR, terminated operations on 20 October, and allexcept a small rear party of the 201st Logistical Commandhad departed by 24 October 1958.1 The small rear partydeparted in November, and the 201st Logistical Command wasformally deactivated on 14 November 1958.2
General Adams was determined to take all on-handsupplies back with the command. His men did this, withthe exception of several tons of ammunition that had beendumped into the sea. The force could do this because theunits had just completed a traumatic move and they had thetime to inventory available supplies and to plan for theirretrieval. Most U.S. units moved to Lebanon in less thana week, while the withdrawal took over thirty days. Thelesson of the retraction operation is that all the unitsknew the plans and, thus, were better able to execute themwithout major snags.
Summary
General Adams's forces accomplished the overallmission in Lebanon. They followed existing contingencyplans, and the U.S. Army demonstrated its ability todeploy rapidly. The operation also served as a practicaltest of an emerging logistical doctrine of tailoringsupport forces to a specific ground force mission.Furthermore, the planning process provided valuablelessons for future operations.
79
The tailoring of logistical forces worked, but notwithout drawbacks. The designated support units must havea working knowledge of the plans so that they can devisecomplementary plans. Support units, like combat units,must train together to ensure teamwork. Higherheadquarters must integrate the nonorganic combat servicesupport units into the planning process and ensure thatthose units have an opportunity to rehearse the aspects ofplans that affect their operations.
Another critical aspect of the planning process isworst-case planning. Worst-case planning meansforecasting the worst situations that a deployed force mayencounter. Worst-case planning, in conjunction with alogistical doctrine of pushing supplies forward, mighthave led to the problems encountered in Lebanon during1958 and to similar problems in the Dominican Republicduring 1965. The after-action reports of the DominicanRepublic operation read as if they applied to Lebanon.These reports stated that the automatic resupplyprocedures were not sufficiently flexible to cope withchanging requirements. One of these after-action reports,Operation Debrief, declared that "all interviewees statedthat to some degree the automatic resupply was wasteful,inadequate, uneconomical, and generally mixed up."Moreover, the procedures to change automatic resupply wereinadequate or nonexistent. Similar conclusions werereached for the earlier Lebanon operation. Although theautomatic resupply or push system (the buildup of suppliesaccording to levels for X number of days) metrequirements, it was labor intensive and did not readilyadapt to changing situations. It also required secure,spacious areas for storage, particularly if units did notconsume the supplies immediately. This system createdwaste and piles of unused supplies.
As mentioned earlier, these factors were caused byworst-case planning in conjunction with this particularlogistical doctrine. In Lebanon, the lack of fighting (abest-case situation) freed manpower to handle massiveresupply shipments. In this situation, worst-caseplanning did not balance the need for combat power againsta labor-intensive logistical effort. If worst-caseplanning had come to fruition and heavy fighting hadensued, then the logistical effort would have beenseverely taxed. A dilemma develops in planning for heavycombat between the size of the fighting forces and that offollow-on support. Only by engaging in limited or nofighting would the manpower be freed to manage thelogistical system. A solution is to combine the push-pullsystems. Furthermore, such a system comes closest to thegoal of just-in-time logistics.
80
The logistical doctrine used by the U.S. Army duringthe 1983 operation in Grenada was a combined push-pullsystem. Logistical personnel had prepackaged suppliesdesigned for a Grenada-type contingency operation. Theunits that deployed to Grenada also preconfigured resupplypackages. Generally, these supplies were sent to theoperational area on request by the deployed unit, but anautomatic system was also used for certain resupply(mainly ammunition) items. In this case, the system wasflexible enough to change the packages based on actualrequirements. In some instances, supply personnel onGrenada made requests for special items, which normallywould have taken at least a day; yet, a few minutes aftertheir request, a plane would land carrying the neededitems. The logistical personnel had already anticipatedthat request, and these instances indicated the closeworking relationship between the deployed force and thelogistical personnel. It may be years before fulldisclosure of the Grenada operation can be made, but,based on the Lebanese and Dominican Republic experiences,the combined push-pull system appears to be the best ofboth worlds.
The operational lessons of the Lebanese operation areas old as military art itself and are just as critical nowas at any time in the past. The detailed execution ofplans, such as the proper implementation of loading plans,and the meticulous marking of cargo manifests arecrucial. Practice exercises and rehearsals are needed toensure this capability. Unrealistic loading plans willdisrupt the best-made plans for a strategic movement.Inattention to detail adds confusion in the objective areaand belies efficient planning.
Planning for the deployment of the airborne battlegroup was, in the sense of mission accomplishment,effective. But there were significant omissions in jointand theater planning, particularly for the resupply ofpotable water and medical support and for civil affairs.
In planning for water resupply, well-digging teamswere assigned to the force. Finding a potable watersupply in Lebanon, even within a secure area and withlocal cooperation, proved difficult. In a hostileenvironment, it could have proved catastrophic. Even suchsolutions as providing off-shore water tankers orsaltwater converters would have been vulnerable in ahostile environment.
The cooperation, coordination, and planning formedical support were inadequate. More must be done forfuture operations, for this is a fairly simple joint
81
planning task. After the Lebanese operation, the Armyagain streamlined medical resupply and confirmed a need tokeep medical resupply in medical channels.
Civil affairs and procurement activities were otherareas in which planning failed. The plans did not provideadequate guidance to the commander, and, therefore, theseactivities were only accomplished through support providedby the U.S. embassy and the time available because of thenonhostile situation. Any future planning must seriouslyconsider the civil-military arena.
Finally, at the unit level, the commander and staffofficers involved in a deployment will inevitablyencounter varying degrees of confusion and poorcoordination. Once the unit is en route to the objectivearea, the commander will feel relieved, but many naggingquestions will remain. Overclassification and rigidplanning compartmentalization breed confusion. Therefore,the planner must balance security requirements with theunits' need to know. Improperly disseminated plans notonly promote confusion, but also occasion slovenlyappearance and poor performance. The most importantplanning lesson from the Lebanese experience is thatplanners must use a classification commensurate withsecurity requirements and not create a smug in-the-knowelite. If security restrictions prevent units fromlearning their assigned roles in a mission, it isself-defeating.
Prior planning and rehearsal of the support functionare equally important to the success of a mission. In thecase of Lebanon, Grandios, the deployment rehearsal planfor the combat units, proved to be the U.S. forces'salvation. Equal consideration must be given tologistical units. Rehearsal also implies training, andtraining logistical units as a team must be accomplished.
82
APPENDIX A
PLANS
Swaggerstick: Unilateral U.S. Army plan for Middle Easterncontingency operations.
CINCSPECOMME 215-58: A plan prepared by the Commanderin Chief, Specified Command, Middle East, forconducting various types of military operations inMiddle East countries. Primary consideration was themilitary implications of the Eisenhower Doctrine forthe Middle East.
CINCAMBRITFOR OPLAN 1-58 (Bluebat): A combined plan inwhich the U.S. portion was an adaptation of the planfor Lebanon contained in CINCSPECOMME 215-58. This wasthen coordinated with the British War Office forconducting a combined U.S.-U.K. operation. The JCSordered that the U.S. portion of this plan be executedfor the Lebanese operation.
USAREUR EP 201: A plan prepared by USAREUR in supportof the CINCSPECOMME plan for Middle East operations.
24th Infantry Division EP 201: A plan prepared by the 24thInfantry Division in support of USAREUR EP 201.
Grandios: The 24th Infantry Division's load-out andmarshaling plan in support of EP 201.
83
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APPENDIX C
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FORALPHA, BRAVO, AND CHARLIE FORCES
Aerial Sup Tm, 557th AS CoSup Tm, 2d QM GpMag Pit, Ammo Co, 57th Ord GpTF HQDet, 724th Ord Bn (Abn)HHC, Log Comd APOL Sup Pit (-), 215th QM BnProv Port Sup Det, 1lth Trans BnMP Co (-lst Pit), 382d MP BnEvac Hosp (Semi-Mbl), 58th Evac HospSig Spt Co (-), 595th Sig Spt GpUnit Mess Tm, 15th QM BnBath Pit (-), 2d QM GpEngr Co (Cbt), Engr BnTrp C (Recon) Abn, 2d Sqd, 9th CavA Btry, 13th FA Bn (Abn)C Btry, 13th FA Bn (Abn)
181930
1514669549
10218155420165157115115
90
1041
294016
12
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15309.5
27954.416801.2
21.2161.3224.610.2
23694
107.7107.7
Number Weight
Prov Arty HQ 39 21.9D Btry (762 Rkt), 34th FA Bn 56 123.1Prov Det ASA (USASAE) 64 104E Co (-) 3d Engr Bn (Abn) 42 165Det 24th Sig Bn (Abn) 62 241st Amb Pit (Abn) 124th Med Bn 28 14.3Det, 24th Avn Co 62 0Det, 24th QM Co 39 38
1T77 2 1, /40.1
91
APPENDIX D
ON-HAND SUPPLIES, 31 AUGUST 1958
Beirut Adana
Class I
A RationsB RationsCbt RationsTotal TonsDays of Sup
200,18549,005
249,190.29.3
Classes II and IV
Total Tons
Class III
AVGASMOGASMOGAS (Bulk)TotalDays of Sup
18,709 gal96,000 gal4,773 gal
119,482 gal26.8
2,106 gal
Class V
OrdnanceChemicalTotal Tons
1,102 STON16.8 STON
1,118.8
Total Consumption for August
WaterMOGASAVGAS
1,469,296 gal199,209 gal23,093 gal
1,227.2 514
1,000
1,000
93
Stored Supplies
Adana
Stored 1-14 Sep
QM II and IVOrd II and IVSig II and IVQM IIIOrd VOrd VehCml VTotal Tons
2.45.2
24.10
2,090.06.7.5
2,138.9
Total
12.528.533.0
1,775.42,890
136.5
4, 875.9
Beirut
On-Hand (14 Sep)
Class I
B RationsCbt RationsFive-in-One
69,51047,6941,095
Class II and IV
Class III
MOGASAUGAS
Class V
OrdCml
1,975.3 STON
128,44063,606
1,0341,683
galgal
STONSTON
94
NOTES
Introduction
1. For further study, see Roger J. Spiller, "Not War ButLike War": The American Intervention in Lebanon,Leavenwor th-aper -o -TFort Leavenworth, S CombatStudies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege, January 1981).
2. H. H. Lumpkin, "Operation Blue Bat," appendix dated4 November 1958, to an enclosure, by U.S. European Commanddated 17 November 1957, and with subject "Chronology ofOperation 'Blue Bat,'" to a Memorandum for the Director,J-2, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC, 26 November1958), 4 (hereafter cited as Lumpkin, "Operation BlueBat").
3. Press Release no. 280, 6, John Foster Dulles Papers,Princeton University Library, Princeton, NJ.
4. U.S. American Land Forces, Lebanon, "After ActionReport, 15 July 58 to 25 October 58, 2d Prov. MarineForce, 24th ABN Brig., 201st Log Cmd," 25 October 1958, 1(hereafter cited as AMLANFOR, "AAR").
5. "The History of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,"sanitized ed., 442, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Record Group 218, National Archives, Washington, DC.
6. Lumpkin, "Operation Blue Bat," 4.
7. Support Force Speidel to Commanding General, 24thInfantry Division, 9 August 1958, 4 (hereafter cited as SFSpeidel to CG), in U.S. Army, 24th Infantry Division,"After Action Report Operation Grandios, 15-31 July 1958,"5 November 1958 (hereafter cited as 24th ID, "AARGrandios"). Robert E. Farrell, "Beirut Tests One-ManagerAirlift Concept," Aviation Week 69 (11 August 1958):25-27,quotes an unofficial source that set the number of airsorties at 418. This number appears in several latersources. The number 242 denotes the number of aircraftloaded by Support Force Speidel.
8. H. B. Yoshpe and J. Bykofsky, comps., "Lebanon, aTest of Army Contingency Planning," Brief Surveys of thePost-Korean Experience Series (Washington, DC: Chief ofTransportation, U.S. Army, 25 November -1958), 21(hereafter cited as Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon").
95
Ch aper 1
1. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, CGSC1957-58, "Regular Course Afteraction, Subject nr.5600-1/8: Introduction to Administrative Support WithinTheaters of Operation (Atomic)," pt. 1, "Introduction toLarge-Scale Administrative Support," by H. G. Stover, Lt.Col., MPC (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 February 1958), 2-1(hereafter cited as CGSC, "Regular Course").
2. Ibid., 4-1.
3. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics,1775-1953, Army Historical Series (Washington, DDC: Otficeof the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1966), 518.
4. CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-1.
5. U.S. Army Service Forces, Logistics in World War II,Final Report of the Army Service Forces, A Report to theUnder Secretary War and the Chief of Staff by theDirector of the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division,War Department General Staff, 1 July 1947 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 49 (hereaftercited as ASF, Logistics).
6. Huston, Sinews, 557-78.
7. ASF, Logistics, 23-24.
8. Huston, Sinews, 578.
9. CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-1.
10. Ibid., 4-2.
11. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-10, Field ServiceRegulations: Administration, 21 October 1954, 29.-
12. Huston, Sinews, 639.
13. Ibid.
14. CGSC, "Regular Course," 4-2.
15. Ibid., 497.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 640.
96
18. Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Adam W. Meetze to Col. William A.Stofft, 30 July 1982.
19. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 3-4.
20. Ibid., 6.
21. Ibid., 8.
22. Ibid., 8 n. 9.
23. Ibid., 8-9.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 10. So as not to "jeopardize higher priorityprojects," the Air Force, in 1957, canceled production ofthe new C-132, which was designed to carry 60 tons about3,500 miles. This action conflicted with the Army's needfor newer, heavier, and longer range aircraft. Studieswere being conducted, including one for new water-basedaircraft, but these were ongoing projects at the time ofthe Middle East crisis. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon,"10.
26. Farrell, "Beirut Tests," 25.
27. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 11.
28. Ibid., 13-14.
29. Ibid., 14.
30. Ibid., 15.
31. U.S. Army, Infantry Conference, Fort Benning, GA,1958, "Infantry Conference Report 1958: The LebanonOperation (U)," comments presented by Brig. Gen. David W.Gray, Assistant Division Commander, 24th InfantryDivision, 20 February 1959, 211-12 (hereafter cited as"Infantry Conference Report," Comments).
32. Ibid., 212.
33. Ibid.
34. Maj. Gen. (Ret.) David W. Gray, manuscript of hisexperiences in Lebanon, Combat Studies Institute, U.S.Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,KS, 9.
35. Interview with Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Adam W. Meetze,Princeton, NJ, 12-15 September 1982.
97
36. U.S. Army, Europe, "Emergency Plan 201," 26 February1958, (hereafter cited as EP 201).
37. Ibid., sect. IV, 6-7.
38. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 17.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 18.
41. EP 201, annex D.
42. Ibid.
43. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 24.
44. Col. (Ret.) Dan K. Dukes to Col. William A. Stofft,9 November 1982.
45. Meetze interview.
46. Meetze to Stofft.
Chapter 2
1. 24th ID, "AAR Grandios," 1.
2. Gray manuscript, 11.
3. Ibid., 9.
4. 24th ID, "AAR Grandios," 12.
5. Gray manuscript, 9.
6. Ibid., 10.
7. Ibid., 16.
8. U.S. Army Task Force 201, Provisional AirborneBrigade, "Command Report for 15-31 July 1958 (U)," Reportto Adjutant General, Department of the Army, 13 August1958, 2 (hereafter cited as PAB, "Command Report").
9. Gray manuscript, 17.
10. SF Speidel to CG, 1.
11. U.S. Army, 11th Airborne Division, "AdministrativePlan Grandios," 26 May 1958, 3.
98
12. AMLANFOR, "AAR," pt. 2, sect. 3, 2.
13. Meetze interview.
14. Gray manuscript, 16.
15. Ibid., 54.
16. U.S. European Command, "Blue Bat Critique, 2-3December 1958: Final Report on Critique of USCINCEURparticipation in CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58," 12 December1958, 15 (hereafter cited as "Blue Bat Critique").
23. Gray manuscript, 24. One airplane was produced in amatter of minutes because it happened to be overFUrstenfeldbruck en route to Evreux when the pilot got theword; the pilot simply lowered the wheels and landed.
24. ,PAB, "Command Report," 3-4.
25. Gray manuscript, 21-22.
26. Brig. Gen (Ret.) George S. Speidel to Col. William A.Stofft, 20 September 1982.
27. PAB, "Command Report," 4.
28. "Blue Bat Critique," 15.
29. Gray manuscript, 56.
30. Farrell, "Beirut Tests," 26.
31. SF Speidel to CG, 1.
32. Ibid., 4-5.
33. Speidel to Stofft.
99
34. Gray manuscript, 26.
35. Ibid.
36. SF Speidel to CG, 5.
37. Gray manuscript, 25.
38. PAB, "Command Report," 3.
39. Meetze to Stofft.
40. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 20.
41. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, "Historical andCommand Report," 15-31 July 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as201st LC, "Report").
42. Gray manuscript, 32.
43. Ibid., 32-33.
44. Ibid., 34.
45. "Blue Bat Critique," 49.
46. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 20.
47. Gray manuscript, 35.
48. "Blue Bat Critique," 18.
49. Ibid., 18.
50. Ibid., 53..
51. Ibid., 21.
52. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 21.
53. Ibid.
54. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 2.
55. Meetze interview.
56. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 21.
57. Ibid.
100
58. U.S. Army, Europe, "Lessons Learned from the LebanonOperation," Memorandum from the Office of the Chief ofStaff to the Deputy Chief of Staff for MilitaryOperations, n.d., tab D, 2.
8. Oral history, Gen. (Ret.) Paul D. Adams Papers, U.S.Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 24.
9. Gray manuscript, 48.
10. Oral history, Adams Papers, 24-25.
11. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, TFSPO 250/16:"Mission Statement of Headquarters, 201st LogisticalCommand," 26 September 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as"Mission Statement, 201st Log Comd").
12. Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Commanding Officer, U.S.American Land Forces, Specified Command, Middle East, to
101
Col. Adam W. Meetze, Commanding Officer, Support Command,"Letter of Instructions," 30 July 1958.
13. "Mission Statement, 201st Log Comd," 1-2.
14. Ibid., 3.
15. Ibid.
16. Dukes to Stofft.
17. Meetze to Stofft.
18. Dukes to Stofft.
19. Ibid.
20. Gray manuscript, 4. In determining class II suppliesfor individual equipment, General Gray noted that pithhelmets were included. General Gray related, "I hadparticipated in a test of this headgear at Ft. Benning in1934, a test which rejected the helmet as unsuitable forfield duty, so I asked that it be stricken from theplan." It was not, but he made "excellent use of aboutten of them for the lifeguards on the swimming beach thatwe established."
21. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 22.
22. Meetze to Stofft.
23. Yoshpe and Bykofsky, "Lebanon," 22-23. Concurrentwith a reduction in sealift, a CONUS emergency airresupply provided a total of sixty-seven Signal Corpspersonnel and 164 short tons of Signal Corps,Quartermaster Corps, and Army map service cargo. Thissuggests planners had ignored these specialists andspecial technical items or else the men had not beenavailable for deployment with the troops stationed inEurope.
24. Ibid., 23.
25. Meetze to Stofft.
26. AMLANFOR, "AAR," sect. 4, pt. 2, subsect. B, 6-7.
27. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 25.
28. Ibid., 10, 19-20.
102
29. U.S. American Land Forces, Lebanon, "AdministrativeOrder 1-58," 31 August 1958, 1 (hereafter cited asAMLANFOR, "AO 1-58").
30. AMLANFOR, "AAR," sect. 4., pt. 2, subsect. B, 5.
42. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, "LocalProcurement of Real Estate, Services and Supply," StaffStudy, 12 November 1958, 1 (hereafter cited as 201st LC,"Local Procurement").
43. U. S. Army Communications Zone, Europe, Office of theDirector of Procurement, "After Action Report onProcurement, 201st Log Cmd (A)," 16 October 1958, 1(hereafter cited as ACZE, "AAR").
44. Ibid., comment 1, AEZPD 250/17: "After Action
Report, EP 201," 31 October 1958, 1 (hereafter cited asACZE, "AAR," comment 1).
45. ACZE, "AAR," 1-2.
46. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 7-8.
47. Ibid., 7. The director of procurement described theprocurement practice in a 16 October 1958 report. As
definite requirements became known, the contractingofficer contacted the appropriate vendors through theembassy. One or more vendors would respond and, after aprice was agreed on, the vendor would receive a verbal
103
order to deliver the required supplies or services. Thegovernment thus became obligated through the verbal orderof the contracting officer and the subsequent performanceof the contractor(s). Occasionally, some typingassistance was available from embassy personnel and, by31 July 1958, thirteen purchase orders, totaling $5,375.00had been written. However, the government was alsoobligated, without benefit of written contract(s), forvarious supplies; building rentals; petroleum, oils, andlubricants; quarters rental; rail transportation (cargo);and motor transportation (cargo and personnel) and for thecost of unloading ships. As of 31 July, these additionalknown obligations were estimated to be approximately$30,000. ACZE, "AAR," 1-2.
48. 201st LC, "Local Procurement," 2.
49. Ibid., 1.
50. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 7.
51. U.S. Army, 201st Logistical Command, "Answers toCONARC and XVIII ABN Questionnaire," 6 October 1958, 2.
52. ACZE, "AAR," comment 1, 2.
53. Gray manuscript, 3.
54. Meetze to Stofft.
55. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Civil AffairsMilitary Group, Plans, Policy, and Operations Division,"Civil Affairs in the Lebanon Operation," 19 January 1959,7-8 (hereafter cited as DOD, "Civil Affairs").
56. Meetze to Stofft; DOD, "Civil Affairs," 7-8.
57. DOD, "Civil Affairs," 3.
58. Ibid.
59. "Blue Bat Critique," 28-30.
60. DOD, "Civil Affairs," 4.
61. Ibid., 5.
62. Ibid.
63. "Blue Bat Critique," 29.
64. Ibid.
104
65. DOD, "Civil Affairs," 9.
66. Ibid., 9-10.
67. Ibid., 10-11.
68. Ibid., 13.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., 14.
71. Col. (Ret.) Richard M. Hermann to Col. William A.Stofft, 25 August 1982.
72. U.S. Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary(Health and Medical), "Evaluation of Medical ServiceSupport for the Lebanon Operation," 18 February 1960, 15(hereafter cited as DOD, "Evaluation").
73. Ibid., 3.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 14.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 13.
78. Ibid., 14.
79. "Blue Bat Critique," 37.
80. DOD, "Evaluation," 7-8.
81. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 40.
82. Ibid.
83. DOD, "Evaluation," 12.
84. Gray manuscript, 3.
85. Ibid.
86. "Infantry Conference Report," Comments, 228.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
105
89. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 24.
90. 201st LC, "Report," 15-31 July 1958, 3.
91. 201st LC, "Report," 1-31 August 1958, 7.
92. Meetze to Stofft.
Chapter 4
1. 201st LC, "Report," 13 October-30 November 1958, 1.
2. U.S. Army, Europe, General Order 348, 10 November1958.
106
GLOSSARY
AMLANFOR: American Land Forces.
ATF 201: Army Task Force 201.
Automatic requisitions: Equipment, materiel, repair parts,and resupply necessary to support an operation in theplanning phase and would on a predetermined timeschedule be sent to a using unit. Automaticrequisitions are used to maintain a specific stockagelevel in the forward areas.
BG: Battle Group.
CALSU: Combat air logistic support unit.
CINC: Commander in Chief.
CINCNELM: Commander in Chief, Naval Element, Mediterranean.
CINCSPECOMME: Commander in Chief, Specified Command,Middle East.
CINCUSAFE: Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe.
COMAIRSPECOMME: Commander, U.S. Air Forces, SpecifiedCommand, Middle East.
COMAMLANFOR: Commander, American Land Forces.
Combat loaded: A method of loading essential equipment andsupplies so that they can be unloaded ready for action.
Combat service support: Services provided to combattroops, such as maintenance of equipment, repair parts,quartermaster resupply, laundry services, ammunitionresupply, etc.
Communications Zone (COMMZ): The region that connects thepart of an army actually fighting with its sources ofsupply. It is a part of the theater of operationsbehind the combat zone. Within this zone are supplyand evacuation establishments, repair shops, and otherservice facilities.
CONUS: Continental United States.
CPX: Command post exercise.
CRAF: Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
DA: Department of the Army.
107
DCSLOG: Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
DOD: Department of Defense.
E-day: The day plans became orders.
EP 201: Emergency Plan 201.
EUCOM: European Command.
Indigenous labor: Native people hired for various tasks insupport of a military operation.
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Logistics: Art of planning and carrying out militarymovement, evacuation, and supply.
MATS: Military Air Transportation Service.
Measurement ton: Measure of cubic volume of cargo,expressed in units of 40 cubic feet. It is also usedto indicate the cubic capacity of a ship's availablecargo space.
MSTS: Military Sea Transporation Service.
OPLAN: Operations plan.
Organic support troops: Personnel assigned to a combatunit whose duties are to provide the internal combatservice support for that unit.
Pentomic: A divisional organization consisting of fivebattle groups, each a self-contained force capable ofindependent operations. This organization was toprovide the mobile units necessary for nuclear war.
Precut requisitions: The system of filing requisitionforms in support of automatic resupply.
Pull system: A system whereby a unit asked, by means of arequistion, for materiel that was then acquired by thesupport unit and sent to the asking unit.
Push-pull system: A system whereby a unit predeterminesits own needs for an upcoming operation. The materielis then packaged in sets of determined quantity, and,after the unit is deployed, it requests by requisitiona specific number of these sets as needed. The supportunit then sends the required number of sets.
108
Push system: A system whereby automatic requisitionedmateriel is sent by support units to using units on apredetermined time schedule.
ROCID: Reorganization of Current Infantry Divisions.
Roll-on/Roll-off ship: A ship in which vehicles can driveon and drive off under their own power.
ROTAD: Reorganization of the Airborne Division.
Sea tail: That part of an airborne or air-transported unitthat is not committed to combat by air and will jointhe organization by sea travel.
SETAF: Southern European Task Force.
Short ton: 2,000 pounds or 0.907 metric tons. Often usedin place of long ton (2,240 pounds) to simplifycalculations.
SPECOMME: Specified Command, Middle East.
STRAC: Strategic Army Corps.
Supported forces: Forces receiving support either fromcombat units or combat service support units.
Supporting forces: Forces providing the support to thesupported forces and not under the command of thesupported forces.
Technical service: One of the branches of the Army, suchthe Quartermaster Corps or the Ordnance Department,whose chief mission was the procurement anddistribution of supplies needed by various units of theArmy.
TOE: Table of organization and equipment.
Ton miles: The lift capacity to carry 2,000 poun s onemile. It would take one million ton miles to carry1,000 tons 1,000 miles.
Unit requisitions: A method of filing requisitions insupport of a pull system.
USAREUR: U.S. Army, Europe.
109
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Paul D., Maj. Gen., Commanding Officer, U.S.American Land Forces, Specified Command, Middle East,to Col. Adam W. Meetze, Commanding Officer, SupportCommand. "Letter of Instructions." 30 July 1958.
, Gen. (Ret.). Papers. U.S. Army Military HistoryInstitute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Clarke, Philip C. "Rapid Deployment Force: How Real aDeterrent?" The American Legion Magazine 110 (June1981): 18-19, 37-39.
Collins, John M., and Clyde R. Mark. "Petroleum Importsfrom the Persian Gulf: Use of U.S. Armed Forces toEnsure Supplies." Library of Congress CongressionalResearch Service, Major Issues System, Issue Brief no.1B 79046. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 26April 1979, updated 4 January 1982.
DiLeonardo, Anthony D. "The Persian Gulf: Can the UnitedStates Defend the Flow of Oil?" Master of MilitaryArt and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1981.
Dukes, Dan K., Coi. (Ret.). Letter to Col. William A.Stofft, 9 November 1982.
Dulles, John Foster. Papers. Princeton UniversityLibrary, Princelton, NJ.
Farrell, Robert E. "Beirut Tests One-Manager AirliftConcept." Aviation Week 69 (11 August 1958):25-27.
Gordon, Michael R. "The Rapid Deployment Force--TooLarge, Too Small, or Just Right." National Journal 14(13 March 1982):451-55.
Gray, David M., Maj. Gen. (Ret.). Manuscript of hisexperiences in Lebanon. Combat Studies Institute,U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, FortLeavenworth, KS.
Hadd, H. A. "Orders Firm But Flexible." U.S. NavalInstitute Proceedings 88 (October 1962):81-89 8.
Hermann, Richard M., Col. (Ret.). Letter to Col.William A. Stofft, 25 August 1982.
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"The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Sanitizeded. Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.Record Group 218. National Archives, Washington, DC.
Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics,1775-1953. Army Historical Series. Washington, DC:Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army,1966.
Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1957-1958. New York:McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957.
Jane's Fighting Ships, 1957-1958. New York: McGraw-HillBook Co., 1957.
Lumpkin, H. H. "Operation Blue Bat." Appendix dated4 November 1958 to an enclosure, by U.S. EuropeanCommand dated 17 November 1957 and with subject"Chronology of Operation 'Blue Bat,'" to a Memorandumfor the Director, J-2, Joint Chiefs of Staff.Washington, DC, 26 November 1958.
McClintock, Robert. "The American Landing in Lebanon."U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 88 (October 1962):65 79.
Meetze, Adam W., Brig. Gen. (Ret.). Interview withauthor. Princeton, NJ, 12-15 September 1982.
. Letter to Col. William A. Stofft, 30 July 1982.
_ . Papers Dealing with the Lebanon Intervention.Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command andGeneral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Meloy, Guy S. "A Look Back at Lebanon." Infantry 50(January 1960):22-25.
Nielsen, John, et al. "The Carter Doctrine: Can WeDefend the Gulf?" Newsweek, 4 February 1980:25-26.
Qubain, Fahim I. Crisis in Lebanon. Washington, DC:Middle East Institute, 1961.
"Rapid Deployment Task Force to Become Separate Command."Aviation Week & Space Technology 114 (11 May 1981):77.
Record, Jeffrey. "Rapid Deployment Force: Problems,Constraints, and Needs." Annals of the AmericanAcademy of Political and Social Science 457 (September1981): 109-20.
112
Speidel, George S., Brig. Gen. (Ret.). Letter to Col.William A. Stofft, 20 September 1982.
Spiller, Roger J. "Not War But Like War": The AmericanIntervention in Lebanon. Leavenworth Paper no. 3.Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S.Army Command and General Staff College, January 1981.
Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York:Harper & Brothers, 1959.
U.S. American Land Forces, Lebanon. "Administrative Order1-58." 31 August 1958.
"After Action Report, 15 July 58 to 25 October 58,2d Prov. Marine Force, 24th ABN Brig., 201st LogComd." 25 October 1958.
___ . Lebanon Crisis 1958. 6 boxes. Record Group 338.National Archives, Washington, DC.
U.S. Army. 11th Airborne Division. "Administrative PlanGrandios." 26 May 1958.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. CGSC1957-58. "Regular Course Afteraction, Subject nr.5600-1/8: Introduction to Administrative SupportWithin Theaters of Operation (Atomic)." Pt. 1."Introduction to Large-Scale Administrative Support."By H. G. Stover, Lt. Col., MPC. Fort Leavenworth, KS,1 February 1958.
U.S. Army Communications Zone, Europe. Office of theDirector of Procurement. "After Action Report onProcurement, 201st Log. Cmd (A)." 16 October 1958.With Comment 1 AEZPD 250/17: "After Action Report,EP201." 31 October 1958.
U.S. Army, Europe. "Emergency Plan 201." 26 February1958.
General Order 348. 10 November 1958.
"Lessons Learned from the Lebanon Operation."Memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Staff tothe Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.n.d.
113
U.S. Army. Infantry Conference, Fort Benning, GA, 1958."Infantry Conference Report 1958: The LebanonOperation. (U)." Comments presented by Brig. Gen.David W. Gray, Assistant Division Commander, 24thInfantry Division, 20 February 1959. Pages 210-29declassified.
U.S. Army. 24th Infantry Division. "After Action ReportOperation Grandios, 15-31 July 1958. 5 November1958. With enclosure, "Operation Plan GRANDIOS,"1 July 1958.
U.S. Army. 201st Logistical Command. "Answers to CONARCand XVIII ABN Questionnaire." 6 October 1958.
"Historical and Command Reports, 15 July to 30November 1958, of 201st Log. Command." Including"Letter of Instruction, 30 July 1958.
"Local Procurement of Real Estate, Services, andSupplies." Staff Study. 12 November 1958.
TFSPO 250/16: "Mission Statement of Headquarters,201st Logistical Command." 26 September 1958.
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U.S. Army. Task Force 201. Provisional AirborneBrigade. "Command Report for 15-31 July 1958. (U)"Report to Adjutant General, Department of the Army.13 August 1958.
U.S. Department of Defense. Assistant Secretary (Healthand Medical). "Evaluation of Medical Service Supportfor the Lebanon Operation." 18 February 1960.
U.S. Department of Defense. Office of Civil AffairsMilitary Group. Plans, Policy, and OperationsDivision. "Civil Affairs in the Lebanon Operation."19 January 1959.
U.S. Department of the Army. FM 54-1. The LogisticalCommand. July 1959.
. FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations:Operations. September 1954.
_ FM 100-10. Field Service Regulations:Adminstration. 21 October 1954. With changes 1-3.
114
"Lessons Learned from Lebanon Operation."Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff for MilitaryOperations to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, n.d.
U.S. European Command. "Blue Bat Critique, 2-3 December1958: Final Report on Critique of USCINCEURParticipation in CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58."12 December 1958.
Weigley, Russell Frank. The American Way of War: AHistory of United States Military Strategy andPolicy. New York: Macmillan Co., 1973.
Yoshpe, H. B., and J. Bykofsky, comps'. "Lebanon, a Testof Army Contingency Planning." Brief Surveys of thePost-Korean Experience Series. Washington, DC: Chiefof Transportation, U.S. Army, 25 November 1958.
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1991 554-001/42037
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
5. Supervise the Fort Leavenworth Museum.
Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade is a Research Fellowfor Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC. He receiveda bachelor's degree in history from Cameron Uni-versity and a master's in history from LincolnUniversity. Lieutenant Colonel Wade was commis-sioned upon graduation from the Field ArtilleryOfficer Candidate School in 1967 and served acombat tour in Vietnam. A 1982 graduate ofUSACGSC, he has taught in the ROTC departmentof Lincoln University and has commanded troopsat Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the Federal Republic ofGermany; and Turkey.
Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade
COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE-
Mission
The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level activitywithin the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has thefollowing missions:
1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to doctrinal concerns of the Army and publishthe results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve components.
2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other USACGSCdepartments in integrating military history into their instruction.
3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for the developmentand coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in theTRADOC service school system.
4. Direct the Combined Arms Center's historical program.
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