Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle ... · he Zimbabwe African National...

South African Instit

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African perspectives. Global insights.

South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 9 2

Reconstructing the Implications of Liberation Struggle History on SADC Mediation in Zimbabwe

S e p t e m b e r 2 0 1 1

S a b e l o J N d l o v u - G a t s h e n i

A b o u t S A I I A

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record

as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into

public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs

with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research

excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers

present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in

Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good

governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;

and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the

environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about

SAIIA’s work.

A b o u t t h e S o u t h A f r I c A n f o r e I g n p o l I c y A n d A f r I c A n d r I v e r S p r o g r A m m e

Since the fall of Apartheid in 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy has prioritised the

development of Africa. To achieve its ‘African Agenda’ objectives, South Africa needs to

intensify its strategic relations with key African countries. SAIIA’s South African Foreign Policy

and African Drivers (SAFPAD) Programme has a two-pronged focus. First, it unpacks South

Africa’s post-1994 Africa policy in two areas: South Africa as a norm setter in the region and

South Africa’s potential to foster regional co-operation with key African states and other

external partners, in support of the continent’s stabilisation and development. Second, it

focuses on key African driver countries’ foreign policy objectives that have the ability to

influence, positively or negatively, the pace of regional co-operation and integration.

SAFPAD assumes a holistic examination of the internal and external pressures that inform

each driver country’s foreign policy decisions by exploring contemporary domestic factors;

the scope of their bilateral relations; their role in the regional economic communities; and

lastly their relations with South Africa.

Programme head: Dr Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya [email protected]

© SAIIA September 2011

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Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t r A c t

Former liberation movements are at the helm of government in Zimbabwe, Namibia,

Mozambique, Angola, South Africa and Tanzania. They have maintained close ties

rooted in common liberation histories and personal connections, and during times of

crisis they draw on these linkages and solidarities. The paper explores the implications of

these linkages for current mediation and conflict resolution efforts by the Southern African

Development Community (SADC) in Zimbabwe. It discusses how the Zimbabwe African

National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), with its complicated roots as a splinter group

from the established Zimbabwe African People’s Union, strove to attain recognition as

the sole and authentic liberation movement in Zimbabwe. ZANU–PF built alliances with

dominant liberation movements in the region. These included the Popular Movement

for the Liberation of Angola in Angola, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique in

Mozambique, the African National Congress in South Africa, the Pan Africanist Congress in

South Africa, the South West Africa People’s Organisation in Namibia and the Chama Cha

Mapinduzi in Tanzania. The paper suggests that pre and post-independence, historical

linkages and personal contacts continue to influence the character of SADC mediation and

conflict resolution efforts in Zimbabwe. Even the policy of ‘quiet diplomacy ’ that constituted

South African foreign policy towards Zimbabwe under Thabo Mbeki was partly shaped

by enduring historical and personal linkages dating back to the liberation war period, as

well as by pragmatism and national interests. The paper’s historically grounded approach

to the study of African foreign policy helps to explain why new political structures, like the

Movement for Democratic Change, are finding it difficult to establish strong links and to

attain acceptance within the Southern Africa region, which is still dominated by ‘brother

presidents’ and ‘sister movements’.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o r

Sabelo J Ndlovu-Gatsheni is associate professor in Development Studies at the University of

South Africa and a research associate at the South African Institute of International Affairs.

4

S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 9 2

S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E

A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S

AAPSO Afro–AsianPeople’sSolidarityOrganization

ANC AfricanNationalCongress

BDP BotswanaDemocraticParty

CCM ChamaChaMapinduzi

DRC DemocraticRepublicofCongo

EU EuropeanUnion

FLS FrontLineStates

FRELIMO FrontfortheLiberationofMozambique

FROLIZI FrontfortheLiberationofZimbabwe

GPA GlobalPoliticalAgreement

JOC JointOperationsCommand

MDC MovementforDemocraticChange

MDC–M MovementforDemocraticChange–Mutambara

MDC–T MovementforDemocraticChange–Tsvangirai

MK UmkhontoweSizwe

MPLA People’sMovementfortheLiberationofAngola

OAU OrganizationofAfricanUnity

PAC PanAfricanistCongress

PF PatrioticFront

PF–ZAPU PatrioticFront–ZimbabweAfricanPeople’sUnion

RENAMO MozambiqueNationalResistanceMovement

SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity

SWAPO SouthWestAfricaPeople’sOrganisation

UN UnitedNations

UNITA NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola

US UnotedStates

ZANLA ZimbabweAfricanNationalLiberationArmy

ZANU–PF ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion–PatrioticFront

ZAPU ZimbabweAfricanPeople’sUnion

ZIPRA ZimbabwePeople’sRevolutionaryArmy

ZNA ZimbabweNationalArmy

L I B E R A T I O N S T R U G G L E H I S T O R Y O N S A D C M E D I A T I O N I N z I M B A B w E

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I n t r o d u c t I o n

The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) national

chairperson,SimonKhayaMoyo,toldtheco-ordinatingcommitteemeetingofthe

11thZANU–PFNationalPeople’sConferenceheldinMutareinDecember2010that:1

Noliberationmovementwilleverbereplacedbypeoplecomingfromnowhere.Thisapplies

toZANU–PF inZimbabwe,ANC inSouthAfrica,FRELIMO inMozambique, SWAPO

inNamibia,MPLAinAngolaandChamaChaMapinduzi inTanzania.Wearenot just

neighbourswithSouthAfrica.Weshareacommonliberationhistory,cultureandvalues.

Anyofuswhoarenotpartofthisrevolutionaryjourneyshouldthinkagainbecausethetrain

willnotwaitforanyone.

On15February2011,MoyoreceivedCubanambassador,EnriquePrietoLopez,and

Namibianambassador,Panduleni-KainoShingenge,attheZANU–PFheadquartersin

Harare.MoyocalledforthecloseunityofformerliberationmovementsintheSouthern

AfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)regiontofendoffwhathetermedattemptsby

theWesttoinstallpuppetregimesintheregion.Hestatedthat:2

Whatwewantisthattheformerliberationmovementsmustmeetoften.Thatiswhyweare

workingtohaveasummitofliberationmovementssothatwecanthwarteffortsbytheWest

toimposepuppetsonus.Letusstrengthenthesolidarityofliberationmovements.

AddressingShingengeofNamibia,MoyothankedNamibiansfortheircontinuedsolidarity

withZimbabweansandstatedthat‘ourrelationswithNamibiaarenotjustrelations,we

areliketwins.Yourformerleader,DrSamNujoma,hasalwaysbeenourfatheraswell.’3

Theseexcerptsfromtheengagementbetweenthetwoformerliberationmovements

(ZANU–PFandtheSouthWestAfricaPeople’sOrganisationorSWAPO)indicatehow

history andmemoryof the liberation struggle continue toproduce similarpolitical

discourses of politics and perceptions and realities of the West. However, Henning

Melber,along-standingSWAPOmemberwhowasactiveduringitsexileyears,hassaid

tohaveknownlittleaboutclosecontactsbetweenSWAPOandZANU–PF.Henotedthat

duringSWAPOdebatesinexile,ZANU–PFrarelyfeatured.Therewasalsonomention

ofcollaborationwithZANU–PFintheSWAPO‘liberationgospel’.AccordingtoMelber,

Mugabe ‘wasabouttheonlySADCleadernotattendingindependenceceremonies in

Windhoekin1990.’HesuggestedthatthecloserelationshipbetweenMugabeandNujoma

onlydevelopedduringthemid-1990sina‘jointaversionagainstNelsonMandelaasthe

newlycelebratedleader.’4

Melber’s statementspoint to apossible reinventionofhistories and reframingof

relationships by former liberation movements to create an impression of historical

closeness,regardlessofwhethernoneexistedinthepast.Thispracticemightbeuseful

particularlytoembattledpartieslikeZANU–PF,which,apartfromtheSADCregion,is

survivingunderacloudofglobalisolation.PresidentMugabeconsistentlyemphasises

thestrategicimportanceofhistoryandmemoryoftheliberationstrugglenotonlyin

his own country but also throughout the region, continent and other parts of the

worldthatexperiencedcolonialism.Mugabedeliberatelymodelshimselfandhisparty

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(ZANU–PF) as the guardians of the African nationalist revolution, which is being

threatenedbylatter-dayimperialistsledbytheformercolonialpowerBritainincollusion

withtheUSandmembersoftheEU.PhimisterandRaftopoulossuggesttherealreason

forMugabe’soffensiveagainstforcesopposedtohisruleishisrepeatedattemptstoplace

theZimbabweproblematthecentreofalarger,anti-imperialistandPanAfricanposition.

Zimbabwe’s‘landquestionhasbeenlocatedwithinadiscourseoflegitimateredressfor

colonialinjustice,alanguagewhichhasresonatedontheAfricancontinentandwithin

thethirdworldmoregenerally’.MugabeandZANU–PFhaveconstructedalternative

discoursesaroundtheneedforrenewedliberationstrugglesolidarity.5Thisresonates

wellwithintheSouthernAfricaregion,whichremainsdominatedbyformerliberation

movementswhoseideologyisstilldeeplyanti-colonialandanti-imperialist.

These historical factors help to explain the ambiguities of SADC’s approach to

theresolutionoftheZimbabweancrisis.Theregionalbodyhasbeenreluctanttouse

stronglanguageandactiontocompelMugabeandZANU–PFtoimplementfullythe

GlobalPoliticalAgreement(GPA)brokeredon15September2008.Asaresult,various

stakeholdersalignedtotheMovementforDemocraticChange–Tsvangirai(MDC–T)6havedoubtedthesincerityandimpartialityofthosecountriesledbyformerliberation

movementstowardsfindinga lastingresolutiontotheZimbabweancrisis that isnot

favourabletoZANU–PF.7OnlytheleadersofBotswanaandZambia(IanKhamaandthe

lateLevyMwanawasa),andtosomeextentTanzania,havedifferedopenlywithMugabe

andcondemnedZANU–PF’spoliticalconduct.8

Botswanahasbeenundertheruleof theBotswanaDemocraticParty(BDP)since

independence.Despitethis,Botswanahasalwaysprojecteditselfasabastionofdemocracy

and is recognised internationally as a stabledemocracy.Powerhasbeen transferred

peacefullywithintheBDPfromoneleadertothenext(fromSeretseKhamatoKetumile

MasiretoFestusMogaetothecurrentleader,IanKhama).Botswanaalsomaintainsstrong

diplomaticlinkswiththeWest,particularlytheUS.ThesenationscondemnZANU–PF

andMugabeforbeingundemocratic.Unlikeotherrulingpartiesintheregion,theBDP

hasneverhadstronglinkswithZANU–PF.9

InthecaseofZambia,neithertheUnitedNationalIndependencePartynortheveteran

nationalist,KennethKaunda,hadclosetieswithZANU–PF.ThiswasdespiteZANU–PF

oncebeingbasedinLusakabeforemovingtoMozambique.Infact,theassassinationof

ZANU–PFnationalchairman,HerbertChitepo,in1975onZambiansoilledKaundato

detaintheentireZANU–PFexecutive.Hesuspectedthemofhavingkilledoneoftheir

ownbecauseofethnicandregionalbickeringforpowerwithintheparty.10Moreover,

KaundahadsupportedtheZimbabweAfricanPeople’sUnion(ZAPU)andJoshuaNkomo

insteadofZANUthroughouttheZimbabweanliberationstruggle.Thedemocratisation

waveof the1990s thathitZambiaswept intopowera labour-backedMovement for

MultipartyDemocracyunderFrederickChiluba,whohadnolinkswhatsoeverwiththe

liberationmovements.11

UnderJuliusNyerereandhisparty,theChamaChaMapinduzi(CCM),Tanzaniahad

closetieswithZANU–PF.However,afterhisdeath,theCCMunderwentseveralleadership

changesatthetop.Thecurrentleader,JakayaKikwete,belongstoadifferentgeneration

fromthatofMugabeandmodelshimself asademocrat.Accordingly,hehasopenly

criticisedthedictatorshipinHarare.


7


Otherkeystatesledbyformerliberationmovements,likeAngola,haveadopteda

regionalisedformof‘quietdiplomacy’.ThisbehaviourbySADCleadersledNkuubiJames,

ayoungMozambicanlegalscholar,todescribetheSADCasa‘clubofbrotherpresidents’

leading‘sistermovements’whoarepronetosupportingratherthancondemningeach

other.12

However,regionalsupportforZANU–PFandMugabe’sgovernmenthasnotbeena

foregoneconclusion.Since2000ZANU–PFhasactivelysoughttoendearitselftothose

formerliberationmovementswithwhichithadweaklinkspriorto1980.ThePeople’s

MovementfortheLiberationofAngola(MPLA)isacaseinpoint.Mugabehassuccessfully

reinventedacommonhistoryforZANU–PFandtheMPLA.Bothmovementshavebeen

bornoutofanarmedliberationstruggleandbothhavefoughtceaselesslytoisolateand

defeatcompetingmovements thatalsoclaimed legitimacy ineachcountry’snational

liberationstruggle,liketheNationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola(UNITA)

andZAPU.Theyarealsobothledbypresidentswiththelongesttermsofofficeinthe

region.

UnderstandingthecomplexrelationsbetweenZANU–PFandotherformerliberation

movements and how they impinge on inter-state relations is a crucial element in

determiningpotentialoutcomes.Angola isakeystate in theSouthernAfrica region

whosevoiceontheZimbabweancrisismightmakeadifference.Itsrichoilanddiamond

resourcesarefacilitatingitsascendancyasaregionalhegemon.TodateAngolahasnot

playedanactiveroleinregionalissues.Thisispartlybecauseofitsrecentemergencefrom

adevastatingandlongcivilwar,whichpromptedittoadoptaninward-lookingpolicy

focusedonnationalreconstruction.AngolanPresidentJoséEduardoDosSantosisnotan

activeforeignpolicypractitionerlikeMugabeorformerSouthAfricanPresidentThabo

Mbeki.However,hisvoicemighthelptostrengthenthehandofSouthAfrica,which

isspearheadingmediationandconflictresolutioninZimbabwe.Angola’simportanceto

theresolutionoftheZimbabweproblemisalsolinkedtoitssuccessiontotheSADC

presidency in July2011.SouthAfricawill chair theOrganonPolitics,Defenceand

SecurityCooperation.Thesetwostrategicstateswillbedirectly involvedinregional

effortstoresolvetheZimbabweancrisis.

Z A n u – p f A n d t h e f o r g I n g o f l I n k A g e S w I t h o t h e r l I b e r A t I o n m o v e m e n t S

Since its formation in1963,ZANUworked tirelessly tobuild closer tieswithother

liberationmovements in the region. Its forgingof linkageswas compromisedby its

controversialbirth,asasplintermovementfromZAPU,intoahostileinternationaland

regionalarenainwhichZAPUwasdominant.13However,ZAPU–aswiththeAfrican

National Congress (ANC), SWAPO, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

(FRELIMO)andtheMPLA–receivedsupportandrecognitionfromtheSovietUnion

andEasternBloccountries.TheOrganizationofAfricanUnity(OAU)designatedthese

organisationsas‘authentic’nationalliberationmovements.Theywerealsolinkedtogether

throughtheAfro–AsianPeople’sSolidarityOrganization(AAPSO).14

By1968the‘authentic’liberationmovementsmountedamajordiplomaticinitiative

topreventsplintergroupslikeZANUandthePanAfricanistCongress(PAC),whichhad

8



brokenofffromtheANCin1959,fromgaininginternationalrecognitionandsupport.

Asaresult,therewerenodirectlinkagesbetweentheMPLAandZANUthroughoutthe

1970s.TheMPLAremainedastrongallyofZAPUthroughouttheZimbabweanliberation

struggle.After1975theMPLAofferedmilitarytrainingfacilitiestoZAPU.Anumberof

cadresfromtheZimbabwePeople’sRevolutionaryArmy(ZIPRA),ZAPU’smilitarywing,

weretrainedinAngola.15

ZambiatoleratedratherthanwholeheartedlywelcomedZANU,until itshifted its

basetoMozambique.PersonaltieshelpedZANUtogaininitialinternationalsupport

fromTanzaniaandGhana.ZANU’s tieswith the twocountries ‘stemmed from[the]

personalfrustrationoftheirrespectiveleaders–KwameNkrumahandJuliusNyerere

–withZAPUPresidentJoshuaNkomo,andtheappealofZANU’smoreconfrontational

approach.’16Inhisautobiography,Nkomowrotethat‘Nyererehadaspecialproblemwith

mepersonally.Healwayssoughttodominatethepoliciesandthepersonalitiesofthe

liberationmovementstowhichhegavehospitality.’17Nkomowentfurthertostatethat

Nyerere‘hasregularlytakenpositionsopposedtomine,andbackedmycriticsevenwhen

thatdamagedthecauseoffreedominmycountry.’18NkomoblamedNyerereforplayinga

roleinthesplitinZAPU,whichledtotheformationofZANUin1963.AlthoughNyerere

offeredbasestomanyliberationmovementsfromSouthernAfricaandhiscountryhosted

theOAULiberationCommittee,heincreasinglyfavouredZANUoverZAPU.Therefore,

ZANUmaintainedclosetieswithTanzaniaandZanzibar.In2005Mugabewasinvited

astheguestofhonourforthe41stanniversarycelebrationsoftheZanzibarRevolution

of1964.19BothZANU–PFandtheCCMcontinuetoprojectthemselvesasrevolutionary

politicalformations–ChamaChaMapinduziisaSwahilitermfor‘revolutionaryparty’.

NyererewasfurtherpromptedtosupportZANUbecauseofhispersonalrelationship

withHerbertChitepo,whoworkedinTanzaniaasthedirectorofpublicprosecutions.

ChitepobecameZANU’snationalchairman,apositionheservedinuntilhisassassination

in1975.20ZANUalsohadclosetieswiththeConventionPeople’sPartyinGhana.The

Ghanaian leader,KwameNkrumah,haddevelopedpersonal tieswithMugabe,who

livedandtaughtinGhanaandunderwentideologicaltrainingattheKwameNkrumah

Ideological Institute at Winneba before becoming active in Zimbabwean nationalist

politicsinthe1960s.21

Attheinternationallevel,ZANUexploitedtheSino–Sovietcrisistomovecloserto

China,whosesearchforclientscoincidedwithZANU’ssearchforpatrons.22China’spolicy

ofsupportingrivalgroupsthatweresnubbedbytheSovietssuitedZANU.ZANUsent

cadres,likeJosiahTongogaraandEmmersonMnangagwa,toundergotraininginguerrilla

warfareatNankingAcademyinBeijing.Tongogarabecamethecommander-in-chiefof

theZimbabweAfricanNationalLiberationArmy(ZANLA,thearmedwingofZANU)

untilhisdeathin1979inMozambique.Mnangagwaiscurrentlytheministerofdefence

inZimbabwe.ChinaremainedastrongallyofZANU,sendingmilitaryinstructorsto

trainZANLAattheItumbiTrainingBaseinTanzaniaintheearly1970s.23Despitethis

progress,by1969ZANUwasstillstrugglingtoestablisheffectivelinkswiththeolder

liberationmovements,liketheANC,FRELIMO,SWAPOandtheMPLA.Movementswith

SovietlinkagesdominatedtheWorldPeaceCouncilof1969andAAPSO,andreceived

preferentialinternationalsupport.

ZANUmadeastrategicbreakthroughintheearly1970s.Itcapitalisedontheinternal

crisisinZAPUandtheparty’sfailuretotakeuptheofferofitsoldally,FRELIMO,to


9


establishbasesinMozambique.FRELIMOsubsequentlyofferedbasestoZANU,which

ZANUaccepted.24Towinthefavourofitsnewhosts,ZANUdeployedZANLAtoattack

AltenaFarminnorth-easternZimbabwein1972,therebydemonstratingitslegitimacyand

commitmenttoarmedliberation.InthesameyearZANUissuedaradicalpolicystatement,

knownasMwengeII,whereitpresenteditselfasthevanguardofarevolutionforsocialist

transformation.Thepolicystatementalsodividedtheworldintoaretrogressivecapitalist

orimperialistcampandaprogressivesocialistcamp.ZANUplacedtheSovietUnioninthe

retrogressiveimperialistcampandChinaintheprogressivesocialistcamp.25

ZANUconductedthearmedstrugglefromMozambiqueandMugabewonthesupport

ofSamoraMachel,withwhomhesharedcommonMarxistinclinations.FRELIMOassisted

ZANLAinmovingarmsintoRhodesia,andtheybecamecloseallies.Upuntilhisdeathin

1986,MachelremainedclosefriendswithMugabeandthetwoleadersoftenvisitedeach

other.HisdeathignitedangrydemonstrationsinHarare,ledbystudentsattheUniversity

ofZimbabwewhosuspectedfoulplaybytheSouthAfricanApartheidregime.26

From1974–75, internal troublesdevelopedwithinZANU,andMozambiqueand

Angola achieved independence. This period also coincided with South Africa and

Rhodesia’sinitiationofapolicyofdétenteorrelaxation,aimedatsecuringanegotiated

settlementinRhodesia,supportedbytheprincipalregionalactors.Thispromptedthe

independentAfricanstatesofSouthernAfrica(Botswana,Zambia,Mozambique,Angola

andTanzania)toestablisharegionalcommonfrontondecolonisation,knownasthe

Front Line States (FLS).27 The FLS demanded unity among nationalists engaged in

fightingfortheliberationofZimbabwe.ItalsorecognisedZANUasaliberationforceon

conditionthatZANUmergeitseffortswiththeotherZimbabweanliberationmovements

intoonenationalistmovement.By1975theFLShadforcedZAPU,ZANUandtheFront

fortheLiberationofZimbabwe(FROLIZI)touniteundertheANC,ledbyBishopAbel

Muzorewa.28

TheinternalZANUdissensiontooktheformofaleadershipcontest.Thiswasignited

bytheresolveofdetainedleaders,likeMugabe,EnosNkala,MauriceNyagumboand

EdgarTekere,todethroneReverendNdabaningiSitholeasZANU’sleader.29However,

theirdecisionwasrejectedbytheFLSandtheOAU.EvenMacheldidnotsupportthe

ideaofanewZANUleaderotherthanSithole.Whilethisleadershipcrisiswasraging,

ZANUChairmanChitepowasassassinatedbyabombhiddeninhiscarinLusaka,Zambia

in1975.ThishaddrasticconsequencesforZANU.30Thereweresuspicionsthathewas

eliminatedbyhisZANUcolleaguesowingtotribalandregionalcompetitionforpower

andinfluence.PresidentKaundawasparticularlyincensedbythisact.ZANUofficeswere

closedimmediatelyinZambiaandinTanzania,andMozambiquethreatenedtofollowsuit.

ZANUhadlostthelittleregionalrecognitionitwasbeginningtoenjoy.Itwaspartlythis

crisisthatledZANUtoco-operatewithZAPU.ZANUacceptedtheformationofaunited

militaryfront,knownastheZimbabweIndependencePeople’sArmy,whichcomprised

forcesfromZIPRAandZANLA.31ItalsoacceptedtheformationofthePatrioticFront

(PF)asapoliticalalliancewithZAPU.32BothpartieswereunderpressurefromtheFLS

andtheOAUtounite.

TheformationofthePFwasasignificantbenefitforZANU,andtheFLSalsoaccepted

MugabeastheleaderofZANU.UponofficialassumptionofZANU’sleadershipin1977

atapartyconferenceheldatChimoioinMozambique,Mugabefocusedhisattention

ontheinternalconsolidationofZANU.Healsoembarkedonseveraloutreachvisitsto

10



generateinternationalsupportforhisparty.Between1978and1979,hevisitedEthiopia,

Syria,Pakistan,China,Vietnam,NorthKorea,Cuba,Gabon,YugoslaviaandSudan.33

AttheLancasterHouseConferenceinLondon,whereZimbabwe’sdecolonisationwas

negotiated,ZANUremainedwithZAPUaspartofthePFthroughoutthenegotiations,

andintheprocessgainedacceptancebyZAPU’sallies.34BythetimeZimbabweachieved

independencein1980,ZANUwasacceptedfullyasalegitimateliberationmovementby

theinternationalcommunity.

After1980Hararebecameahiveofdiplomaticactivity,asZANU–PFexpandedand

intensifieditssearchforallies.However,theseinitiativeswereguidedbyhistoricalties

andanimositiesthatwereprevalentduringtheliberationstruggle.35Atthegloballevel

theSovietUnion,whichhadsponsoredZAPUthroughouttheliberationstruggle,was

thefirstcountryaffected.Thepre-1980hostilitiesbetweenZANU–PFandthePatriotic

Front–ZimbabweAfricanPeople’sUnion(PF–ZAPU)surfacedbarelytwoyearsafterthe

formationoftheGovernmentofNationalUnityin1980.ZANU–PFrefusedtopermitthe

SovietUniontoopenanembassyinHarareforthreeyearsafterindependencebecause

itsuspectedtheSovietsofsponsoringPF–ZAPUtodestabiliseZimbabwe.Itwatched

withsomeconcernhowtheSovietshadsupportedtheMPLAtoemergevictoriousasthe

newgovernmentinLuandathroughamilitarytakeover.ZANU–PFendeareditselftothe

US,whichemergedasZimbabwe’slargestsingledonorinthe1980s.Thiswasdespite

ZANU–PF’scontinueduseofMarxist–Leninistrhetoric.36

AlthoughZANU–PFrecognisedtheneedtointegrateandalignitselfwiththeregion,it

remainedsuspiciousofmovements,liketheANCandMPLA,thathadclosetieswithPF–

ZAPU.Accordingly,itprioritisedthoserelationshipsdevelopedpriortoindependencewith

TanzaniaandMozambique.ZimbabweandTanzaniasentjointtroopstodefendcentral

Mozambique,particularlytheBeiraCorridor,fromattacksagainsttherebelmovement

(theMozambiqueNationalResistanceMovementorRENAMO)thatwassponsoredby

ApartheidSouthAfrica.37ZANU–PFalso focusedon isolatingPF–ZAPU,whichhad

establisheditselfasamajoroppositionpartytoZANU–PF.Itsentrepresentativesand

formerZANLAmembersasmilitaryattachéstocountrieslikeAngola,38attheexpenseof

formerZIPRAmembersservingintheZimbabweNationalArmy(ZNA),someofwhom

weretrainedinAngola.39

ZANU–PFpreferredtodownplayrelationswiththeANCbecauseofitsalliancewith

ZAPUdatingbacktothelate1960s.TheANC,ZIPRAandUmkhontoweSizwe(MK,the

militarywingoftheANC)hadstagedcombinedoperationsinRhodesiainsuchplacesas

Wankie(nowHwangeNationalPark),SipoliloandManaPools.40Instead,ZANUclaimed

tohaveformedanalliancewiththePAC.TheANCandZAPUstucktogetherandboth

establishedheadquartersinLusaka.ZIPRAandMKcadressharedacommonmilitary

tradition,bothhavingundergonemilitarytraining inMoscow.Therewerealsoclose

linguisticaffinitiesbetweenthelargelyNdebele-speakingZIPRAandthelargelyZuluand

Xhosa-speakingMKcadres,owingtoNgunihistoricalconnections.41Itseemstherewasa

strongbeliefwithintheANCuntiltheMarch1980electionsthatZAPUwasgoingtowin

electionsandformagovernmentinHarare.Throughouttheliberationstruggle,ZANU

advancesandoverturestotheANCwereroundlyrejected.Thisincludedthe1977ZANU

proposalformilitaryco-operationwhichtheANCrejectedonthegroundsthat‘wecan’t

beonbothsides’–meaningonbothZAPUandZANUsides.42



11

WhenZANU–PFwonelectionsin1980aheadofPF–ZAPU,Gevissermentionsin

hisbiographyofThaboMbekithatwithintheANChewastheonlytoprankingofficial

whowasnotsurprised.Mbekihadstudiedtheethnicdemographicsandrealisedthat

ZANU–PF’sShona-speakingbase faroutnumberedtheNdebele-speakingcommunity,

amongwhichPF–ZAPUwaspopular.AccordingtoGevisser,Mbekihadbeguntopush

forrapprochementwithZANU–PF.43Soonafter1980,thetaskofbefriendingZANU–PF

fellonMbeki.Mbeki’sliaisonpersoninZANU–PFwasEmmersonMnangagwa,whohad

spentmanyyearsinaRhodesianjailwithMKoperativesandhadlivedinZambiawhere

hehadestablishedcloselinkswiththeANC.44However,theconfrontationsbetweenPF–

ZAPUandZANU–PFduringthe1980scomplicatedtherelationsthatwerebeingbuiltby

MbekiandMnangagwa.TheANCwasstillinvolvedwithPF–ZAPUwhentheZANU–PF

governmentroundedupex-ZIPRAcommandersalongsideMKcadres,imprisoningand

torturingthem,anddestroyingtheANC’smilitaryinfrastructureinonefellswoop.45Itwas

onlyafter1987whenPF–ZAPUjoinedZANU–PFundertheUnityAccordthatrelations

withtheANCimproved.46

MartinRupiah,aZimbabweansecuritystudiesexpert,notedthatZANU–PFopened

linesofcommunicationwithboththeMPLAandtheANCafterZimbabwe’sindependence.

TheintentionwastoearnthetitleforZANU–PFofbeingthesoleauthenticliberation

movementthatfoughtforZimbabwe’sliberation.Theengagementwasmeanttoisolate

PF–ZAPUfromitsformerallies.47

Zimbabwebegantoactivelysupport forces like theMPLA, in itsstruggleagainst

UNITA, and the ANC, which was fighting for self-determination and a non-racial

democraticsocietyinSouthAfrica.InaninterviewwithGevisser,Mbekimentionedthatin

thelate1980stheZANU–PFgovernmentofferedtheANConeofthemostcomprehensive

dealscomparedwithanyotherAfricancountryatthattimeinsupportofitsstruggle.

TheofferincludedallowingMKtomoveweaponsandcadresthroughZimbabwe;issuing

ZimbabweanidentitydocumentstoANCcadres;supportbytheZimbabweanmilitary

forces;andopeninganANCofficeinHararethatwouldmaskitssecretmilitaryoperations

throughabove-the-grounddiplomaticwork.48

In a recent studyonZimbabwe,Blessings-MilesTendi, aZimbabweanacademic,

revealedthattheCommonwealthSecretary-General,EmekaAnyaoku,hadbrokereda

secretagreementinthe1990sbetweentheZANU–PFgovernmentandtheANC.This

relatedtoZimbabwe’ssacrificeofitscoreplanofradicallandreformforthesakeofSouth

Africa’sstruggleforfreedom.ZANU–PFissaidtohaveshelveditsradicalplansforland

reforminthe1990ssoasnottodisturbthenegotiationsthatwereunderwayinSouth

Africa.49ThisagreementissaidtohaveinfluencedhowSouthAfricahasrespondedtothe

Zimbabweancrisis.TendibelievesitexplainswhytheANChasnotopenlycriticisedthe

controversialfast-tracklandreform,whichhastakenplaceinZimbabwesince2000.50

ThatMbekiwas tasked to lead theSADCmediation inMarch2007,andhowhe

handled this, shouldbeassessedpartlyagainst thebackgroundofhisearlier taskof

openinglinkagesbetweentheexiledANCandZANU–PFinthe1980s,hisideological

inclinationsandhispoliticalvisionasaleader.DarylGlaserdescribedMbekias‘more

thanoneman:charmerofwhitesandrace-baiter,technocratandnationalistromantic,

free-marketconvertanddevelopmentalist-statist,globaliserandthird-worldist,champion

of the black bourgeoisie and bearer-of-warnings about society’s descent into crass

materialism.’51WithspecificreferencetohisapproachtotheZimbabweancrisis,Mbeki

12



hadbecomeassociatedwiththepolicyof‘quietdiplomacy’.Withregardtohismediation

role,theMDC–ThasaccusedhimofbeingbiasedtowardstheZANU–PFposition.This

canpartlybeexplainedbythetiesMbekihascreatedwithZANU–PFsincethe1980s;

his ideological sympathieswith former liberationmovements;hisknowledgeof the

complexityoftheZimbabweansituation;andhisaimtoreframeandpositionSouthAfrica

asaleaderoftheAfricancontinent.52

FourissuesemergefromthisanalysisonthefactorsthatinfluencedMbeki’sapproach

toandmediationoftheZimbabweancrisis.Firstly,Mbekiwasdeterminedtoavoidthe

pitfallsofunilateralismthatSouthAfricahadencounteredinitsdealingswithNigeria,

LesothoandtheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC).53Secondly,Mbekiwishedto

avoidrepeatingthebullyingstrategythatwasassociatedwiththeApartheidregimein

theSADCregion.Thirdly,MbekiconsistentlyavoidedbeingseeninHarareaspushinga

Westernagendaofregimechange.54Finally,Mbekihadhisownambitionsofpositioning

SouthAfricaasaconcernedAfricanstatethatwastakingaleadingroleinstabilisingthe

continentpoliticallyandeconomically,fightingforadignifiedspaceforAfricawithinthe

globalorderandprojectingthephilosophyof‘Africanrenaissance’.55Theseconsiderations

formedthebasisforMbeki’spolicyofquietdiplomacyonZimbabwe,whichemphasised

multilateralismasopposedtounilateralismascoreapproaches.

AcomparisonofZANU–PF’sengagementwithAngolaisinteresting,particularlygiven

thecontemporarycontext.DosSantosandMugabehaveconstructedastrongnationalist–

militaryalliancewithacivilianfaçade.Thedifference,however, is thatalthoughthe

militarysectorplaysacriticalpoliticalroleinAngola,itssubordinationtocivilianrule

hasnotbeenquestioned.Nevertheless,asinZimbabwe,theAngolanmilitaryhasalso

infiltratedthenationaleconomy.Recently,veteranAngolanjournalist,RafaelMarques

deMorais,revealedhowAngolanmilitarygeneralshavemadeinroadsintotheeconomy,

includingtheAngolanoilcompany,Sonangol,andpoliticalpartyhierarchy.56

BothZANU–PFand theMPLAhavemaintainedaspectsof liberation-war,quasi-

militaryqualitiesincludingmaintainingsecretoperationsandlinkagesthatarenotopen

topublicscrutiny.InZimbabwe,thereisincreasingevidenceofthegovernmentbeing

drivenbythesecretiveJointOperationsCommand(JOC)thatisnotclearlysubordinateto

civiliancontrol.TheJOCismadeupoftheheadsofmilitary,police,CentralIntelligence

Organisationandprisonservices,commonlylabelledassecurocratswhoareopposed

tocurrenttransitionalpoliticsinZimbabwe.ThemembersoftheJOCdominatemost

echelonsofthenationaleconomy.Theseincludeowningvasttractsoflandandactively

participatingintheillegalsellingofrecentlydiscovereddiamondsatChiadzwanearthe

easternborderofZimbabwe.57

Since1975theMPLApremiseditsforeignpolicyon‘enfeeblement,ifnotdestruction,

ofitsdomesticsecuritythreat’.58Itsoughttoisolate,destroyorswallowUNITAinthe

samewaythatZANU–PFsoughttodooverthenextdecadewithPF–ZAPU.Angola’s

penchanttodestroyinternalpoliticalopponentscoincidedwithMugabe’sdesiretodothe

sameinZimbabwe,aswellashisconsiderationofestablishingaone-partystateinthe

1980s.

BothDosSantosandUNITAleader,JonasSavimbi,attendedtheGbadoliteSpecial

SummitofAfricanHeadsofStates,convenedbyMobutuSeseSekoon22June1989in

Zaire.59ThiswasthefirstinitiativeincludingbothAngolanprotagonistsandmoulded

alongthephilosophyof‘AfricansolutionstoAfricanproblems’.BythetimeoftheHarare


13


Summiton22August1989,however,Mugabehadmadeitclearthathesidedwiththe

MPLAagainstUNITAintheAngolanconflict.Savimbiwasnotinvitedtoparticipate,

mainlybecauseofMugabe’sopenhostilitytowardsUNITA.Mugabewasnotinaposition

orwillingtogiveSavimbi‘thebenefitofthedoubtasMobutuhad[done]’.60Theoutcome

oftheHarareSummitwasinevitablyadiplomatictriumphfortheMPLA,asitsuggested

voluntaryexileforSavimbiandtheintegrationofUNITAintoexistingMPLAinstitutions.

WhenSavimbirejectedtheintegrationplan,Mugabecontinuedtodenouncehimasan

internationalterrorist.By1999theMPLAhadsucceededinisolatingUNITAandhad

developedclosecontactswithZimbabwe,Namibia,SouthAfrica,theDRCandCongo-

Brazzaville.OnlythemilitarydefeatofUNITAremained.

Thebuild-upofmutual trustbetweenAngolaandZimbabweculminated in their

collaborativeinterventionintheDRCin1998,alongsideNamibia,attheinvitationof

LaurentKabilawhohadoustedMobutufrompower.Zimbabweledtheinitiativeaschair

oftheSADCOrganonPolitics,DefenceandSecurityCooperation.61Zimbabwepushed

foradefencepactwithAngola,theDRCandNamibia,whichSouthAfricawasreluctant

toendorse.Couchedinlanguagethatemphasisedthepreservationofthesovereigntyof

theDRCandSADC’scommitmenttothepromotionofpeaceandstabilityintheregion,

ZimbabweandAngola’s jointcollaboration in theDRCwithNamibiawasprompted

byvariousstrategicinterests.62TotheAngolans,theascendencyofKabilainKinshasa

provideda friendlyallywhoopposedUNITA.Thiswas incontrast toMobutu,who

providedasafehavenfortheFrontfortheNationalLiberationofAngola(ledbyHolden

Roberto)andUNITA.Zimbabwe’sinterestsweredrivenpartlybytheneedtoensurea

consistentsupplyofpowerfromtheIngaDamandaccesstostrategicresources.Following

ZimbabweandAngola’scollaborativeinterventionintheDRC,ZANU–PFintensifiedits

supportoftheMPLAagainstUNITArightuptoSavimbi’sdeathin2002.

Despitethisclose,collaborativerelationshipbetweenbothgovernments,Angolahas

notclearlyexpresseditsforeignpolicytowardsZimbabwe,withtheexceptionofsolidarity

statementswheneverMPLAofficialshavevisitedHarare.Thisviewwasconfirmedinan

interviewwithGordenMoyo,theformerMinisterofStateinthePrimeMinister’sOfficein

Harare.MoyostatedthatAngolahasnotonlyavoidedopenlyexpressingitsforeignpolicy

towardsZimbabwe,butalsoitspositionontheZimbabweancrisis.63

m A k I n g S e n S e o f S A d c m e d I A t I o n A n d t h e m o v e m e n t f o r d e m o c r A t I c c h A n g e ’S p r e d I c A m e n t

Thisbackgroundhistoryofpreandpost-independencelinkagesamongformerliberation

movementsandconcomitantpersonaltieshelpstoexplainSADC’streatmentofMugabe

andZANU–PFwithkidgloves.ItalsohelpstoexplainwhytheMDC–Tisexperiencing

problemsinitsdrivetogarnerpoliticalsupportfromtheregion.

Firstly,SADCisaregionalsecuritycomplexconsistingof14memberstateswhose

national security concerns cannot realistically be considered separately. Since 1980

ZimbabwehasbeenakeymilitaryplayerinSouthernAfrica.64Zimbabweintervenedin

MozambiqueonthesideoftheFRELIMOgovernmentinthe1980s.Itactivelyparticipated

inUNpeacekeepingoperations inAngola in the late1980s, includingassuming the

positionofUNforcecommander.Zimbabweplayedanactiveroleinthemediationprocess

14



inMozambiqueandAngolafrom1989–1991.ItintervenedintheDRCin1998,assuming

theoverallcommandofacombinedforceofZimbabweans,AngolansandNamibians.65

OvertheyearsMugabecreatedanameforhimselfintheSADCregionasastatesman

andcommittedrevolutionarywhospokeeffectivelyonAfricanissues.Throughthese

activities,coupledwithMugabe’sconsistentanti-imperialismandanti-colonialspeeches,

Zimbabwewonmanysupportersintheregion,continentandinthebroaderSouth.66

Angola,Mozambique,theDRCandevenSouthAfrica,inonewayoranother,areindebted

toZimbabwe.Thismakesithardforthesecountriestomusterthecouragetoopenly

criticiseMugabeandZANU–PF.

Secondly,SADC’sreluctancetoapplydirectandopenpressureonMugabetofully

implementtheGPAisbecauseMugabeandhisassociateshavebeensosuccessful in

projectingthemselvesasvictimsofanimperialistonslaught.Onlysmallerpowerslike

Botswana,ZambiaandTanzaniahaveraisedconcernsaboutZANU–PFandMugabe’s

handlingof the resultsof the2008presidentialpolls.Byusing the term ‘imperialist

sanctions’,MugabehassoughttoinvokesympathyfromSADC’sleadersforhiscause.

He has also used the imposition of sanctions by the EU and the US to explain the

causesoftheeconomicmeltdownthatengulfedZimbabweafter2000,andtojustifyhis

reluctancetoimplementtheGPA.Thisstrategyhashadsomeregionalsuccess.Unanimity

hasemergedinSADCcallingfortheunconditionalremovalof‘sanctions’imposedon

Mugabeandhisclosepoliticalassociates.AsthekeySADCnegotiatorforZimbabwe,

SouthAfricanPresidentJacobZumahastakentheleadintryingtoconvinceBritain,the

EUandtheUStoremoverestrictivemeasuresandsmartsanctionsimposedonthose

accusedofcommittingvarioushumanrightsabuses.67EvenKhamaofBotswanacalledfor

theremovalofsanctionsduringhis2010statevisittoSouthAfrica.ZANU–PFhasmade

theremovalofsanctionsaconditiontoimplementtheGPAinfull.68

Thirdly, there seems to be a general fear among governments controlled by the

former liberationmovements that allowing theMDC–T to takepowerwould set an

uncomfortableprecedent,whichmightberepeatedintheirowncountries.Thisispartlya

resultoftheApril2010visittoZimbabwebyJuliusMalema,presidentoftheANCYouth

League.HeopenlyindulgedandembracedZANU–PFasaformerallyinthestruggles

againstcolonialismandApartheid.Incontrast,MalemasnubbedthetwoMovementfor

DemocraticChange(MDC) formationsas ‘popcorn’and ‘MickeyMouse’movements

withoutliberationwarcredentials,whoseexistenceservedtoreversetheachievements

made by former liberation movement governments. Malema also called for former

liberationmovementsintheregiontocloseranksandworktogethertosafeguardthe

nationalistliberationtraditionthatisbeingthreatenedbynewformations,liketheMDC.

Tosomeextent,Malema’sutterancesandbehaviourduringhisvisitconfirmedopposition

andcivilsocietyfearsthatZANU–PFenjoyedthesupportoftheSADCregionbasedonits

historyasaliberationmovement.69However,thesubsequentreprimandofMalema,and

thediscontenthisstatementsgeneratedwithinsomequartersoftheANC,indicatedalack

ofconsensusregardingtherelationshipwithZANU–PF.Yethiscallforformerliberation

movementstocloserankswasinlinewiththeANC’sPolokwaneconferenceresolutions

in2007,whichemphasisedstrengtheninglinkagesbetweentheANCandotherformer

liberationmovements.70Thedrivebyformerliberationmovementstomovecloserto

eachotherwasformalisedbytheirmeetinginTanzaniainMay2010.Thepartiesshared


15


experiencesandnotesonissuesofgovernance,development,aswellasstrategiesand

tacticsofdealingwithnewthreatsofimperialism.71

However,thereismoretotheMDC’sregionalisolationthantheideologicaldisjunctures

anddifferenceswiththeregion’sformerliberationmovements.TheemergenceoftheMDC

asaformidablepoliticalopponenttoZANU–PF,andofTsvangiraiasastrongchallenger

toMugabe’sleadership,promptedZANU–PF’sstrategytostrengthenitstieswithregional

powers.Itsoughttodothisparticularlywiththosecountriesledbyformerliberation

movements.TheMDCinturnonlysucceededincultivatinggoodrelationswiththeWest

andtheUS.AlthoughitmanagedtoisolateZANU–PFandMugabesuccessfullyfromthe

Westsince2000,italsostrengthenedZANU–PF’shandinportrayingtheMDCasaTrojan

HorseofWesternimperialisminSADC.

ThebotchedelectionsofMarchandJune2008broughthomeforcefullytheimportance

ofregionalalliancesandsupport,whentheMDCrealisedthelimitationsofitsWestern

allies.TheWestcouldnotintervenetohelptheMDCtranslateelectoralvictoryintostate

power.ThisrealisationalsoexplainswhytheMDC–Thasmadesuchdeliberateefforts

tocounterZANU–PFpropagandathroughengagementoftheregion.Aftertheelections,

Tsvangirai visitednumerousAfrican capitals, includingPretoria,Maputo,Kinshasa,

Gaborone,TripoliandLuanda, toexplain theMDC’sposition.ByOctober2009, the

MDC–TandZANU–PFhadbecomelockedinaseriouscompetitiontowinthesupport

oftheregion.

Tsvangirai’svisittoAngolatomeettheAngolanpresidentpromptedZANU–PFtosend

theMinisterofDefenceandZANU–PFstalwartMnangagwatoLuandainNovember2009.

ThissignalledtheimportanceofAngola’ssupporttoZANU–PF.Thisisinsharpcontrast

withitsengagementoflesserplayersinSADC.ZANU–PFseemedunconcernedwhen

TsvangiraitookrefugeinBotswanasoonaftertheMarch2008elections.

ZANU–PFacceptedtheGPAmerelyasanopportunitytogaintimetoreconfigure

and renegotiate the termsof its existencewith theopposition, civil society and the

internationalcommunityafterhavinglosttheelectionsandrefusingtoleavepower.Itis

partofastrategytotranscendanorchestratedpoliticalandeconomiccrisis.72TheMDC

formationsacceptedtheGPAbecausetheyhadfailedtotranslateelectoralvictoryinto

statepower,thefearofongoingrepressionandtheexhaustionoftheirsupporters,and

theobviouslimitsofWesternsupportinassistingtheMDC–Ttoascendtopower.The

MDC–TalsorealisedtheimportanceofengagingtheSADCregiontoolate.73SADCsought

tosecureparticipationthroughtheGPAfrombothMDCformationsandZANU–PFin

aunitygovernment,withoutgivingintotheforcesof‘regimechange.’74Itisclearfrom

oneoftheletterswrittenbyMbekitotheHararedisputants(Mugabe,Tsvangiraiand

ArthurMutambara,theleaderofthebreakawayMDCfaction,MDC–M)thattheregional

concernwasabouttherestorationofstabilityratherthantheintroductionofdemocracy

and‘regimechange’.75

c o n c l u S I o n

Apost-liberationpoliticalformationliketheMDC–T,withitsrootsincivilsocietyrather

thanintheliberationstruggle,hashadtocontendwithresilientpreandpost-liberation

subtextsofhistories,memoriesandreconstructionofmythsofsolidaritywithinSouthern

16



Africa’snational-liberationmovements.ThesehavefavouredZANU–PFasoneoftheir

own.Theregion’sresponseisunderstandable,giventhatformerliberationmovements

arestillinpowerinstrategicstatesofAngola,SouthAfrica,Mozambique,Tanzaniaand

Namibia. Suchmovementshave consistentlydrawn legitimacy from their liberation

warcredentials,withcompetitiveelectionsbeingreducedtomereritualsandmythsof

legitimation.Intheregion,ZANU–PFwasthefirstnationalliberationmovementwhose

holdon statepowerwas challenged significantlyby anewpolitical formation.The

developmentsofthelast10yearshavedemonstratedtheclosingofranksagainstany

electionresultthatleadstoaradicalpowerchangefromaformerliberationmovementto

apoliticalformationwithoutliberationwarcredentials.

Atanother level, theZimbabweancrisishascreatedauniquechallenge toSADC

leadersusedtodealingwithoneprotagonistwhohasarticulatedasimilardiscourseof

liberationandnationalsovereignty.In2008SADCleadersfoundthemselvesconfronted

forthefirsttimebyasituationwhereaformerliberationmovementlostanelectiontoa

post-liberationpoliticaloppositionwithoutrootsintheliberationtradition.SADCstates

aretakingtimetoadjusttothesenewrealities,astheytoohavenotmadethetransition

fullyfromnationalliberationmovementstopoliticalparties.Ironically,insteadofthe

SADCregionpreparingitselftoaccommodatenewpost-liberationmovementslikethe

MDC,keyformerliberationmovementsinpowerarereinventingtheirpre-liberation

solidaritiestofendoffnewpoliticalformations.

Thus, theMDCisavictimof this liberationwarconservatism,whichis likelyto

continuetobeafeatureoftheSouthernAfricanpoliticallandscapeatleastforthenext

decade.Thiswillbefuelledbythestill-powerfulrallyingcryonthecontinentofanti-

imperialism.Asthegenerationwhoparticipatedintheliberationwarsstartstodisappear,

themythmakingofsolidarityandthecommonfrontcontinuestocolourtheperspectives

ofsomeoftheyoungergenerations,althoughoftenwithouttheidealismthatspawnedthe

nationalliberationmovement.

TheMDC,throughthemannerofitsengagementearlyinitslife,gaveimpetusto

Mugabe’sabilitytobranditspoliticsimperialistandaninstrumentoftheWest.Relying

onplayersoutsidetheSADCregionhasprovencostlyfortheMDC,inaregionthat

isstillsaturatedwithanti-colonialandanti-imperialistmemories,andwheretheland

questionincountrieslikeNamibiaandSouthAfricaisstillanemotiveissuethatneeds

a resolution. Belatedly the MDC recognised the importance of courting the ruling

liberationmovements,althoughinitsdefencethesemovementswerenotwelcomingof

anyovertures.

ThelikelihoodofaresolutionoftheZimbabweancrisisinthelongertermremains

tobeseen.Onthesurface,Mugabe’span-Africanistmessageandanti-imperialistframing

ofthecrisishaswonthesupportoftheSADCregion.YetSADCstatesdonothavea

commonpolicytowardsZimbabwe.Undoubtedly,countrieslikeBotswanaandSouth

Africaareconcernedaboutthepossibilityofatotaleconomicandpoliticalimplosionin

Zimbabwe,notleastbecauseofthedomesticfalloutofafloodofZimbabweanrefugees

pouringovertheborder.Zambia,Kenyaand,tosomeextent,Tanzaniahaveindicatedthey

mayaccommodatetheMDC–Tasalegitimatepoliticalformationthatmustbeallowedto

assumepowerifitwinselections.

SADCstateswouldbewellservedtomovebeyondtheself-imposedsolidaritytiesof

formerliberationmovements.Thisisespeciallyasthelatter,toacertainextent,pointsto


17


afalsesharingofexperiences,whicharelocatedinkeyindividualsratherthaninabroad-

basedsharingofideals,principlesandvisionfortheregion.Thisrathershallowpremise

forco-operationbetweenstatescreatesafalsesenseofsecurity.Astherecenteventsin

NorthAfricahaveshown,thereisnoguaranteethatacontinuationofthecurrentcourse

willensurethestabilityoftheregionindefinitely.Thepursuitofstabilityaboveallelse

alsohasitsprice.Besidestheneedforagreateracceptanceofthevalueofdemocracy,good

governance,pluralism,humanrights,socialpeaceandhumansecurityasfundamentalfor

thefuturestabilityoftheregion,individualstatesneedtoclearlyassessthecoststothe

nationalinterestofthecontinuationoftheimpasseinZimbabwe.Theyshouldconsider

thepolitical,economic,socialandsecuritycostsofacontinueddiversionofnationaland

regionalresourcestotheZimbabweancase.Theyshouldalsoreflectonthelosteconomic

opportunities(bothregionalandnational)asaresultoftheZimbabweancrisis.

Thecoincidenceof the leadershipof theSADC troika and theSADCpresidency

bySouthAfricaandAngolarespectively,providesauniqueopportunityforastronger

regionalvoiceonZimbabwe.However,thequestionremainswhethertheregionisready

tograsptheZimbabweannettle.

e n d n o t e S

1 MushanawaniC, ‘Liberationmovementstostay’,ZimVest,22October2010,http://zimvest.

com/liberation-movements-to-stay.

2 MurphyBJ, ‘ZANU–PFNationalChairmanKhayaMoyocalls for integrationofSouthern

African liberationmovements’,Red Ant Liberation Army News, 15February2011,http://

redantliberationarmy.wordpress.com/2011/02/16/zanu-pf-national-chairman-kh, accessed

4March2011.

3 Ibid.

4 E-mailcommunicationregardingSWAPO–ZANU–PFrelations,ExecutiveDirectorHenning

Melber,DagHammarskjoldFoundation,Uppsala,Sweden,andresearchassociate,Department

ofPoliticalSciences,UniversityofPretoria,4February2011.

5 PhimisterI&BRaftopoulos,‘Mugabe,Mbekiandthepoliticsofanti-imperialism’,Review of

African Political Economy,31,101,2004,pp.385–401.

6 TheMovementforDemocraticChange(MDC)wasformedin1999.In2005itsplitintotwo

politicalformationsoverthedecisiontoparticipateinsenatorialelectionsandotherissues,

whichrangedfromethnicity,powerstrugglesandalackofrespectforpartyconstitution.Since

thattime,thepartyledbyMorganTsvangiraidecidedtousethenameMDC–T(Movementfor

DemocraticChange–Tsvangirai)andtheothergroupbecameidentifiedasMDC–M(Movement

forDemocraticChange–Mutambara).

7 ThissuspicionwasexpressedbyanacademicintheDepartmentofPoliticsandAdministration

at theUniversityofZimbabweduringmyfieldworkvisit.Theacademicemphasised the

continuationofliberationwarsolidaritiesintothepresentanddoubtedwhethertheMDC’s

regionaloffensivetowinovertheregioncouldwork.

8 Botswana and Zambia’s ruling parties have no deep history of engagement with armed

liberationstruggles,althoughbothcountriessupportedAfricanliberationmovementsand

offeredbasesforrefugeesduringtheliberationstruggle.ThismightexplainwhyIanKhama

andLevyMwanawasawereabletospeakopenlyagainstMugabeandhisrulingparty.

18



9 PicardLA(ed.),The Evolution of Modern Botswana.London:RexCollins,1985,pp.7–13.

10 RepublicofZambia,Report of the Special Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire

Chitepo.Lusaka:GovernmentofZambia,1976.

11 RichardJ, ‘Zambia:Amodel fordemocraticchange’,Current History,91,565,May1992,

pp.365–382.

12 James N, ‘When “Messiahs” Turn “Persecutors”: Reflections on the Blocked Transition

ofLiberationMovements inAfrica–CaseStudyofZANU–PF’, inMasterofLaw thesis,

UniversidadEduardoMondlane,30October2009,pp.36–37.

13 ReedWC,‘Internationalpoliticsandnationalliberation:ZANUandthepoliticsofcontested

sovereigntyinZimbabwe’,African Studies Review,36,2,September1993,pp.31–59.

14 Ibid.

15 Personalinterview,colonelintheZimbabweNationalArmy(ZNA),Bulawayo,Zimbabwe,13

March2010.

16 ReedWC,op. cit.,p.37.

17 NkomoJ,Nkomo: The Story of My Life.London:Methuen,1984,p.110.

18 Ibid.

19 Cameron G & SR Dorman, ‘Problems of nationalism and democracy in Zimbabwe and

Tanzania’,p.1,http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/events/democratization-2009/cameron-

dorman.pdf.

20 RepublicofZambia,Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire

Chitepo, governmentreport.Lusaka:GovernmentofZambia,1976.See,alsoMartinD&

PJohnson,The Chitepo Assassination.Harare:ZimbabwePublishingHouse,1985.

21 Reed,op. cit.,p.38.

22 Reed,op. cit.,p.40.See,alsoNdlovu-GatsheniSJ,Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist? Trajectories of

Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State.Oxford&Bern:Peter

Lang,2009,pp.315–317.

23 MartinD&PJohnson,The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War.Johannesburg:Ravan

Press,1981,p.84.

24 WhenZANU initially approachedFRELIMOto request access to its territory,FRELIMO

repliedthatitremainedalliedwithZAPUandofferedtoco-operatewithitratherthanZANU.

However,bytheearly1970s,ZAPUwassufferingasecondmajorsplitthataffecteditsexternal

winginZambia.JamesChikeremaandGeorgeNyandoroasleadersofZAPUwerefightingwith

JasonZiyapapaMoyo,GeorgeSilundikaandEdwardNdlovu.Thein-fightingwassoterrible

thatitledtoChikeremaformingasplinterpoliticalformation,knownasFROLIZI.

25 NyangoniW&GNyandoro,Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Selected Documents.London:

RexCollings,1979.

26 SamoraMachelwaskilledinasuspiciousaeroplanecrashin1986.SouthAfrica’sApartheid

governmentwassuspectedofbeingresponsibleforluringtheplanewithafalsebeaconinto

ahillsideasitwasmakingitswaytoMaputo.OnhearingthenewsofSamoraMachel’sdeath,

University of Zimbabwe students organised a demonstration where they attacked white

motoristsontheirwaytothecityofHarare.

27 ThompsonCB,Challenge to Imperialism: The Front Line States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe.

Boulder:WestviewPress,1986,p.14.

28 Themid-1970ssawtheemergenceoftwonewnationalistpoliticalformationsthatclaimedto

standforunity,unlikeZAPUandZANUthathaddividedpeoplefightingfortheindependence

of Zimbabwe. The two new movements were FROLIZI, which was dominated by such


19


personalitiesasJamesChikeremafromZAPUandNathanShamuyarirafromZANU,andthe

ANC,whichhadtheblessingsoftheFLSandtheOAUandwasledbyBishopAbelMuzorewa.

29 SincetheformationofZANUin1963anditsinauguralcongressheldinGweruin1964,there

wasaleadershipcontestbetweenReverendNdabaningiSitholeandRobertMugabe.When

SitholewaselectedpresidentofZANUin1964,somedelegateshadputforwardMugabe’s

namebutMugabewithdrewfromthecontest.WhileSithole,Mugabe,EnosNkala,Edgar

TekereandMauriceNyagumbowereindetentioninSalisburyprison,theleadershipissue

emergedagain.Sitholewasaccused,justlikeJoshuaNkomobeforehim,ofnotproviding

decisiveleadershipandalackofcommitmenttothearmedliberationstruggle.Sitholewassaid

tohavesuggestedthattheZANUdetaineesrenouncethearmedstrugglesoastowinrelease

fromdetention.Sitholemadethissuggestionashewasfacingapossibledeathsentence.

30 ThetopleadershipofZANUwasaccusedofhavingtakenpartintheassassinationtheparty’s

nationalchairmanduetotribalbickering.ChitepobelongedtotheManyikatribethatwas

eliminatedbytheKarangatribe.SeeSitholeM,Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle, 2nd

edition.Harare:Rujeko,1999.

31 MooreDB,‘TheZimbabwePeople’sArmy:Strategicinnovationormoreofthesame?’,inBhebe

N&TRanger(eds),Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War.London:JamesCurrey,1995,

pp.73–103.

32 StedmanS,Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980.Boulder:

WestviewPress,1991.

33 ReedWC,op. cit.,pp.46–7.

34 StedmanS,op. cit., pp.110–113.



37 TheBeiraCorridorwasastrategicoilroutetoZimbabwe.SeeVinesA, Renamo: Terrorism in

Mozambique.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress.1991.

38 Personalinterview,colonelintheZNA,op. cit.

39 Ibid.

40 Between1967and1968,ZAPUinalliancewiththeANCsent150heavilyarmedtroopsinto

theWankieGameReserveandintoSipoliloandManaPoolsinRhodesia.

41 GevisserM,Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred.Johannesburg&CapeTown:JonathanBall,

2007,pp.431–446.

42 GevisserM,op. cit.,p.434.

43 Ibid.,p.434.

44 Ibid.,p.435.

45 Ibid.,p.437.

46 EllisS&TSechaba,Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist

Party in Exile.BloomingtonandLondon:IndianaUniversityPressandJamesCurrey,1992.

47 Interview with retired Lieutenant Colonel Martin Rupiah, Munhumutapa Government

Buildings, Harare, Zimbabwe, 11 March 2010. Rupiah’s analysis of the development of

ZANU–PF’srelationswiththeANCandMPLAwasechoedbyaformerZIPRAcombatantwho

iscurrentlyservingasacolonelintheZNA.Accordingtohim,ZANU–PFtreadedcarefully

initsrelationswithnationalliberationmovementsthathadpreviouslysupportedZAPUand

ZIPRAduringtheliberationstruggle.Personalinterview,colonelintheZNA,op. cit.

48 GevisserM,op. cit.,p.436.

20



49 TendiBM,Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals and Media.Oxford:Peter

LangAG,2010,pp.73–93.

50 Ibid.,pp.84–86.

51 GlaserD,‘Mbekiandhislegacy:Acriticalintroduction’,inGlaserD(ed.),Mbeki and After:

Reflections on the Legacy of Thabo Mbeki.Johannesburg:WitsUniversityPress,2010,p.4.

52 LandsbergC,‘ThaboMbeki’slegacyoftransformationaldiplomacy’,inGlaserD(ed.),ibid.,

pp.209–241.

53 Raftopoulos B, ‘The Global Political Agreement as a “passive revolution”: Notes on

contemporarypoliticsinZimbabwe’,TheRound Table,99,411,2010,pp.705–718.

54 HabibA,‘SouthAfrica’sforeignpolicy:Hegemonicaspirations,neoliberalorientationsand

globaltransformation’,South African Journal of International Affairs,16,2,2009,pp.143–159.

55 Freeman L, ‘South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy: Unravelling the contradictions’, Journal of

Contemporary African Studies,23,2,2005,pp.148–170.

56 MarquesdeMoraisR,‘TheAngolanpresidency:Theepicentreofcorruption’,Pambazuka News,

493,August2010,p.1.

57 TheJOCwasformedaround2000alongsidethesettingupofwhatMugabetermedthe‘War

Cabinet.’Itisaformationofhardlinersopposedtotransitionandmeetsinsecret.TheJOCis

saidtooperateasasecretadvisorybodytoMugabeifnothis‘kitchencabinet’.Itsoperations

arebankrolledby theReserveBankofZimbabweunder its governor,GideonGono.The

election-relatedviolenceafter29March2008issaidtohavebeenplannedandexecutedby

theJOC.

58 MalaquiasA,‘Angola’sforeignpolicysinceindependence:Thesearchfordomesticsecurity’,

Africa Security Review,9,3,2000,p.9,http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/9no3/Angola.html.

59 Malaquias,op. cit.,p.7.

60 Ibid.

61 Rupiya MR, ‘Eight years of tension, misperception and dependence from April 1994 to

December 2002: Zimbabwe–South Africa foreign relations: A Zimbabwean perspective’,

Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Affairs,1,4,2002,p.156-170.

62 ChanS&HPatel, ‘Zimbabwe’sforeignpolicy:Aconversation’,The Round Table, 95,384,

pp.175–190–seep.177and180whereStephenChandisagreedwithHasuPatelstatingthat

hewaswrongincharacterisingtheinterventionofZimbabweasacontributiontothedefence

oftheDRCagainstUgandanandRwandaninvasion.HearguedthatZimbabwe’sintervention

wasmotivatedbyinterestsinmineraldepositsthatMugabeusedtobuythesupportofsenior

militaryleaders.

63 Personalinterview,HonourableMinisterGordenMoyo,MeiklesHotel,Harare,Zimbabwe,

11March2010.

64 BadzaS, ‘Zimbabwe’s2008harmonizedelections:Regionalandinternationalreaction’, in

MasunungureEV(ed.),Defying the Winds of Change.Harare:WeaverPress,2009,p.155.

65 PatelH, ‘Zimbabwe’sMediation inAngolaandMozambique’, inChanS&VJabri(eds),

Mediation in Southern Africa.Basingstoke:Macmillan,1993.

66 PhimisterI&BRaftopoulos,op. cit.

67 Theso-called‘imperialistsanctions’havedividedtheinclusivegovernmentinHarare,with

ZANU–PFaccusingtheMDC–Tofhavinginvitedthesanctions;theyalsoseemtohaveunited

theSADCregionoftheneedtoremovethesesanctions.


21


68 Forinstance,theswearinginofgovernorshasbeenlinkedtosanctionsremovalbyZANU–PF.

ZANU–PFblamestheMDCforinvitingsanctions.TheMDCinturnarguesthatZANU–PF

invitedsanctionsonitselfthroughitsviolationofhumanrights.

69 Julius Malema’s utterances and behaviour while in Zimbabwe seemed to confirm these

suspicions.HeopenlyidentifiedtheMPLA,ZANU–PF,SWAPO,FRELIMO,andtheANCas

partiesoftherevolution,anddisparagedtheMDCasa‘MickeyMouse’politicalformation.His

utterancescomplicatedthemediationeffortsbyPresidentJacobZuma.ThattheANCissetto

disciplineMalemamustmeanthathewasnotrepresentingtheANCpositiononZimbabwe.

70 ANC,‘52ndNationalConference:Resolutions’,20December2007.http://www.anc.org.za/show.

php?id=2536,accessed3April2011.

71 TheTanzaniameetingof former liberationmovementswasattendedbyZANU–PF,ANC,

MPLA,FRELIMO,SWAPOandtheCCMofTanzania.

72 RaftopoulosB,op. cit.,p.707.

73 Ibid.,p.708.

74 Ibid.,p.157.

75 Letter from President Thabo Mbeki to Tsvangirai and Mutambara, copied to Mugabe,

4April2007.

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