AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP
OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (OPEV)
REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL
DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
REPORT (PPER)
PROJECT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION (OPEV.1)
MAY 2012
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Currency Equivalents and Abbreviations i-ii
Acknowledgements iii
Basic Project Data iv-vi
Executive Summary vii-xi
I. THE PROJECT 1
1.1 Context 1
1.2 Project Formulation 2
1.3 Project Objectives 2
1.4 Project Description 3
II. POST EVALUATION 3
2.1 Evaluation Approach and Methodology 3
2.3 2.2 Availability and Use of Baseline Data and Key Performance Indicators 3
III. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE 4
3.1 Adherence to Implementation Schedule and Costs 4
3.2 Project Management, Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation 4
3.2 Overall Implementation Performance 5
IV. KEY EVALUATION FINDINGS AND PERFORMANCE RATINGS 5
4.1 Key Evaluation Findings 5
(a) Relevance and Quality at Entry Assessment 5
(b) Achievement of Objectives and Outcomes (Efficacy) 7
(c) Efficiency 13
(d) Institutional Development Impact 13
(e) Other Development Impacts 14
(f) Sustainability 14
4.2 Performance Ratings 16
(a) Overall Project Performance and Outcomes 16
(b) Borrower Performance 16
(c) Bank Performance 17
4.3 Factors Affecting Implementation Performance and Outcomes 17
V. CONCLUSION, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17
5.1 Conclusion 17
5.2 Main Lessons 18
5.3 Main Recommendations 18
TECHNICAL ANNEX TABLES Paragr.
Table 1 : Changes in the Design Parameters of the Cambérène Wastewater
Treatment Plant (WWTP)
1
Table 2 : Project Components 2
Table 3 : Rehabilitation and the Second Extension of STEREAU 5
Table 4 : Trends in Pumped Volumes from 2007 to 2010 7
Table 5 : Characterization of the Effluents of Treatment Systems 1 and 2 8
Table 6 : Characterization of the Effluents Discharged into the Sea after Pre-
treatment (35% of daily flow)
8
Table 7 : Current Sludge Output in the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant 10
Table 8 : Percentage of VSS/SM of Sludge Produced by the Cambérène
Wastewater Treatment Plant
10
Table 9 : Trends in Some Cases of Diseases caused by Poor Hygiene and
Sanitation in the Project Area and in Pikine Between 2007 and 2009
12
Table 10 : Level of Cost Reduction of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant
Extension Component
13
ANNEXES Number of
pages
1. Map of Dakar and PAVD Intervention Areas 1
2. Logic Model of the Project 1
3. Socioeconomic and Macroeconomic Data 2
4. Project Technical Aspects 8
5. Rating Tables and Evaluation Criteria 8
6. Borrower Performance 2
7. Bank Performance 2
8. ONAS’ Financial Situation 2
9. Bibliography 3
i
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit Appraisal
(January 2001)
Implementation
(July 2004 – Dec. 2008)
Completion
(2009)
Post Evaluation
(August 2011)
UA 1 CFAF 916.06
2005 : 793.75
2007 : 706.65
2008 : 766.91
CFAF 703.06 CFAF 735.54
UA 1 EUR 1.40
2005 : 1.18
2007 : 1.12
2008 : 1.08
EUR 1.14 EUR 1.12
UA 1 USD 1.30
2005 : 1.48
2007 : 1.53
2008 : 1.59
USD 1.51 USD 1.60
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric System
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADF : African Development Fund
AFD : French Development Agency
ANSD : National Agency for Statistics and Demography
BD : Bidding Documents
BOD : Biological Oxygen Demand
COD : Chemical Oxygen Demand
CSP : Country Strategy Paper
DAC : Development Assistance Committee
DET : Directorate of Studies and Works
DEX : Directorate of Operations
ECD : European Commission Delegation
EIRR : Economic Internal Rate of Return
ESIA : Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESMP : Environmental and Social Management Plan
FAO : Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FIRR : Financial Internal Rate of Return
GVT : Government
ICEA : Associated Consulting Engineers and Economists
IDA : International Development Association
IEC : Information, Education and Communication
IsDB : Islamic Development Bank
LWSP : Long-term Water Sector Programme
MDGs : Millennium Development Goals
LVDP : Low-Voltage Distribution Panel
OM : Oxidizable Material
ONAS : National Sanitation Authority of Senegal
PAVD : Dakar City Sanitation Project
EPIC : Industrial and Commercial Public Establishment
PPER : Project Performance Evaluation Report
PS : Pumping Station
ii
SARAR : Self-Esteem-Associative Strength - Resourcefulness - Action Planning - Responsibility
SDE : Senegal Water Company
SM : Suspended Matter
SONEES : Senegal National Water Exploitation Corporation
SONES : Senegal National Water Corporation
SS : Senegalese Standards
WWTP : Wastewater Treatment Plant
UA : Unit of Account
WSP : Water Sector Project
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This post evaluation report was prepared by a
team of the Operations Evaluation
Department (OPEV) of the African
Development Bank (AfDB) Group led by
Joseph Mouanda, Evaluation Officer (Project
Manager) and Tonssour Clément Bansé,
Research Assistant, under the supervision of
Mohamed Hédi Manaï, Division Manager,
Project and Program Evaluation.
The report is based on technical papers
written by Pierre BELLO, International
Consultant – Water and Sanitation Specialist,
and Ousseynou Guene, Local Consultant –
Sanitation Engineer and Environmentalist, as
well as the findings of the mission to Senegal
from 22 August to 2 September 2011.
The evaluation’s peer reviewers were
Penelope Jackson, Principal Evaluation
Officer, and administrative support was
provided by Myrtha Diop, Ruby Adzobu-
Agyare and Imen Trabelsi.
The evaluation team is grateful to Mahecor
Ndiaye, Senior Water and Sanitation
Engineer (OWAS); Xavier Boulanger, Chief
Irrigation Engineer (SNFO); and to the
colleagues of the Senegal Field
Office (SNFO) for their support and
comments. The team greatly appreciates the
close involvement and significant
contributions of Ousmane DIONE, ONAS’
Director of Studies and Works (former
Project Coordinator), Pèdre SY, Dakar II
(ONAS) Division Manager, who is
responsible for the operation of the serviced
plots (Parcelles Assainies) wastewater
collection network and the Cambérène
Wastewater Treatment Plant. The evaluation
team is also grateful to the populations of the
serviced plots for the time taken by them to
share their everyday experiences.
The evaluation team also expresses its sincere
appreciation to the Senegalese authorities,
particularly the mayors and heads of the
districts and sectors covered by the sub-
programme for their availability and
collaboration, as well as to the development
partners based in Dakar, including JICA, the
French Development Agency, the European
Commission Delegation and the Islamic
Development Bank for sharing their
experiences.
This work would not have been successful
without the enlightened leadership of OPEV
Management.
OPEV Management
Rakesh Nangia, Director, OPEV
Franck Marie Perrault, Acting Director (at the time of evaluation)
Mohamed Hedi Mohamed, Division Manager, Project and Programme Evaluation, OPEV.1
Odile Keller, Division Manager, High Level Evaluations, OPEV.2
iv
BASIC PROJECT DATA
A- Preliminary Data 1. Country : Republic of Senegal
2. Project Name : Dakar City Sanitation Project (PAVD)
3. Project Code : P-SN-E00-002
4. Sector : Water and Sanitation
5. Loan Number : 2100150000855
6. Borrower : Republic of Senegal
7. Project Executing Agency : National Sanitation Authority of Senegal (ONAS)
8. Environmental Category : II
B- Loan Data
Estimated Actual
Loan amount (UA million) : 11.93 11.87
Service charge : 0.75%
Commitment fee : 0.50%
Grace period : 10 years
Appraisal date : February 2001
Loan approval date : 12 July 2001
Loan signature date : 12 October 2001 26 October 2001
Effectiveness date : 12 January 2002 22 August 2002
Date of fulfilment of conditions precedent
to first disbursement
:
January 2002 28 January 2004
Date of first disbursement : 21 September 2004
Date of last disbursement : 31 December 2006 28 August 2009
Closing date : 31 December 2006 30 June 2009
C- Project Data
Financing Plan (in UA million)
Source
Estimates at Appraisal Actual
Foreign
Exchange
Local
Currency Total %
Foreign
Exchange
Local
Currency Total %
ADF loan 9.54 2.39 11.93 89 9.48 2.39 11.87 89
Government 0.00 1.52 1.52 11 0.00 1.52 1.52 11
Total 9.54 3.91 13.45 100 9.48 3.91 13.39 100
Estimated and Final Project Cost (in CFAF billion)
No. Component Estimated Cost Final Cost
ADF Gvt Total ADF Gvt Total
1. Extension of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant
6.952 0.687 7.639 5.685 0.24 5.925
2. Restructuring of Pumping in SP 2.326 0.375 2.701 1.868 0.678 2.546
3. IEC Programme 0.137 0.046 0.183 0.115 0.031 0.146
4. Studies, Supervision and Control 1.120 0.064 1.184 0.551 0 0.551
5. Institutional Support 0.238 0.009 0.247 0.104 0 0.104
6. Project Management 0.155 0.211 0.366 0.174 0.139 0.313
TOTAL (CFAF billion) 10.928 1.392 12.320 8.497 1.088 9.585
UA/CFAF Parity 916.057 in 2001 716 in 2008
Average Brent Price in USD/barrel 24.44 in 2001 54.41 in 2005 - 96.99 in 2008
Total (in UA million) 11.930 1.520 13.450 11.868 1.520 13.388
v
D- Implementation Performance Indicators
Cost Overrun /Underrun (depreciation UA / CFAF) UA – 61.915 (- 0.5%)
(CFAF – 2.73 billion: – 22%)
Time underrun/overrun
- Slippage on loan effectiveness 7 months
- Slippage on fulfilment of conditions precedent to first disbursement 2 years
- Slippage on last disbursement 32 months
- Slippage on completion date at appraisal 20 months
Number of extensions of last disbursement deadline 1
Project implementation status Completed
Rate of Return
Appraisal Completion Post-Evaluation
Economic rate of return
Financial rate of return
E- Performance Rating
Evaluation Criteria PCR PCR Review PPER
1.
Relevance and quality at entry assessment Highly satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
Relevance Highly satisfactory Highly satisfactory Satisfactory
Quality at entry assessment Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
2. Efficacy (achievement of objectives) Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
3. Efficiency Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
4. Sustainability Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
5. Institutional impact Unsatisfactory
Aggregate Performance Rating Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
6. Borrower Performance Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
7. Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
F- Missions
No. Type of Mission Date Number of
Persons Composition
1. Preliminary
Appraisal February 2001 3
1 sanitation engineer, 1 financial
analyst, 1 environmentalist
2. Launching 30 October to 6 November 2001 2 1 financial analyst, 1 engineer
3. Supervision 9 to 17 November 2003 2 1 financial analyst, 1 engineer
4. Supervision 8 to 16 November 2004 2 1 division manager, 1 engineer
5. Supervision 1 to 8 July 2005 1 1 engineer
6. Supervision 19 to 25 December 2005 3 1 engineer, ...
7. Supervision 4 to 8 December 2006 3 2 engineers, 1 operations assistant
8. Supervision 19 June to 5 July 2007 2 2 engineers
9. Supervision 13 to 27 November 2007 4 3 engineers, 1 portfolio data analyst
10. Supervision 11 to 26 June 2008 3 2 engineers, 1 portfolio data analyst
11. Supervision 24 November to 9 December 2008 3 2 engineers, 1 portfolio data analyst
12. PCR 6 December to 14 December 2009 6 1 rural engineer, 2 water and
sanitation engineers, 1 financial
manager, 1 socio-economist
13. PPER 22 August to 2 September 2011 4
1 evaluation officer, 1 evaluation
assistant, 1 water and sanitation
specialist, 1 sanitation engineer and
environmentalist
vi
G - Other Water and Sanitation Sector Projects Financed by the Bank Group in Senegal
No. Project Approval
Date
Approved
Amount
(UA thousand)
Net Amount
(UA
thousand)
Disbursement
Rate (%) Status
1. Water Supply Project- Dakar and
Environs.- 16/12/1975 9 565.00 5 960.50 100.0 Completed
2. Run-off Water Storage Studies 24/4/1980 940.45 938.36 100.0 Completed
3. Dakar City Sanitation Project
(Phase II) 16/12/1982 12 000.00 11 985.56 100.0 Completed
4. Rural DWSS Programme 21/09/2005 29 000.00 24 921.59 100.0 Completed
5. Ziguinchor Sanitation Master Plan 22/12/2006 866.35 712.61 81.14 Ongoing
6. Implementation of the Senegal
PAGIRE 31/8/2007 1 580.00 1 364.01 100.0 Ongoing
7. Second Rural DWSS Sub-
programme 18/2/2009 33 415.00 30 000.00 25.47 Ongoing
TOTAL 87 366.80 56 572.56
vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The Project
1.1 This Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) presents the findings of the post
evaluation of the Dakar City Sanitation Project (PAVD). The project was financed by an
African Development Fund (ADF) UA 11.93 million loan. The loan, which was approved on
12 July 2001 by the Board of Directors of the African Development Bank Group, aimed at
supporting the efforts made by the Government of the Republic of Senegal to address the
renewed outbreak of diseases caused by unsanitary conditions. The project’s goal is to improve
the social, health and environmental conditions of the population in the urban and peri-urban
areas of the city of Dakar targeted by the project.
1.2 In terms of outcomes, the project was expected to: (i) increase the domestic wastewater
treatment capacity of the Cambérène Treatment Plant; (ii) increase the domestic wastewater
pumping capacity in the serviced plots (Parcelles Assainies) neighbourhood; (ii) promote the
adoption of good hygiene and sanitation practices; (iv) build ONAS’ organizational capacity;
(v) enhance wastewater treatment by-products (wastewater, sludge and methane gas); (vi)
improve the quality of water discharged into the sea; (vii) reduce the incidence of diseases
caused by poor hygiene and sanitation; and (viii) build ONAS’ operational capacity.
1.3 The project comprised six components, the two main ones of which were: (i) the
extension of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant and (ii) the restructuring of the
domestic wastewater pumping system in the serviced plots neighbourhood. The total project
cost fell slightly from UA 13.45 million at project appraisal (2001) to UA 13.39 million at
project completion (2008). In addition, due to the depreciation of the UA against the
EUR/CFAF, the initial total project cost denominated in CFAF dropped sharply by nearly 22%,
resulting in a significant reduction in the project’s scope and reach.
2. Methodological Approach
The evaluation process comprised four phases, namely (i) analysis of project documents and
other works and publications; (ii) data collection in Senegal, including interviews and group
discussions with key stakeholders; (iii) field visits to the project area, including the direct
observation of the application of good practices; and (iv) analysis and drafting of the evaluation
report. The analytical method combined the comparison of the situation in the project area
before and after project implementation on the one hand, and the situation with (serviced plots)
and without (Pikine) the project, on the other hand.
3. Key Findings
3.1 The project is considered to be relevant insofar as its objectives and components are
fully in line with Government’s priorities in the drinking water supply and sanitation sector; it
is a continuation of the Long-term Water Sector Programme (which is the cornerstone of the
sector’s long-term strategy. The project addresses a real need of the inhabitants of Dakar and
its environs who are faced with serious sanitation problems. It is also consistent with the Bank’s
strategy for Senegal (1999-2001) which seeks to strengthen social facilities in urban and peri-
urban areas under the “infrastructure” pillar. The city of Dakar has huge constantly changing
sanitation needs.
3.2 On the contrary, quality at entry assessment is deemed to be unsatisfactory owing to:
(i) inadequate consideration of constraints related to the treatment process retained (activated
viii
sludge) in the Dakar context.; (ii) validation by the Bank of a partial and sub-optimal solution
to address financial constraints; and (iii) the failure to consider past lessons on the inclusion of
stormwater and other solid waste.
3.3 In addition, the design eclipsed the problem posed by the existing sewage outfall1 with
substandard hydraulic characteristics and unguaranteed durability. It was also limited to the
restructuring of the existing sanitation network without any extension to facilitate household
connection. Lastly, the ex ante evaluation underestimated the project cost and no genuine
environmental and social impact assessment was carried out.
3.4 Concerning physical outputs, out of the two new units with a wastewater treatment
capacity of 10 000 m3/d each (that is 20 000 m3/d in total), the project was able to build only an
incomplete unit (without a sludge system) with a capacity of 11 300 m3/d. Overall, the project
has helped to increase the secondary treatment capacity of the Cambérène Wastewater
Treatment Plant from 5 700 m3/d to only 17 000 m3/d due to a drastic reduction in the volume
of work initially planned for this component. However, the project has significantly improved
the wastewater pumping system of the serviced plots neighbourhood (comprising 26 units) by
restructuring the network and building the capacity of the pumping system (rehabilitation of
five plants and construction of four others), thus increasing the volume of wastewater
discharged through the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant.
3.5 Concerning functionality, the engineering structures and facilities built in the
Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant under the project are functioning normally. In contrast,
some of the pre-treatment facilities built in 20042 are out of order and are said to be3 under
rehabilitation. At the time of the mission, the plant was temporarily shut down closed due to
heavy rain in Dakar which flooded the plant, particularly the power station which is the heart
of the system.
3.6 All the hydraulic and electromechanical equipment of the wastewater pumping system
in the serviced plots is operational, albeit with a few recurrent breakdowns. The metallic
equipment (composed mainly of generators and surge tanks) has been damaged owing to
exposure to ocean currents. Overall, frequent power cuts impede the smooth functioning of all
project engineering structures, although their negative impact is mitigated by the use of
generators installed in each plant.
3.7 Due to the inadequate treatment capacity of the plant in relation to the volume of
wastewater entering it, part of the pre-treated effluent (by-pass) is rerouted. The excess sludge
and purified effluent, which cannot be treated, is eliminated. This is a result of failure to
construct a third treatment system which seriously undermines the plant’s efficiency. . Given
the mixture of treated water with by-passed water, the level of raw wastewater discharged
directly into the sea and the lack of enhancement of wastewater treatment by-products, the
project falls within a system whose existing discharge does meet environmental quality
standards. The situation is exacerbated by failure to resolve the problem of the sea outfall as the
existing discharge is much too close to the shore to protect the coastline from pollution. Given
the technical and energy requirements of activated sludge systems and their extreme sensitivity
to variations in the flow rate and load as well as the low level of investment in relation to the
scope of needs, this poor performance was more or less predictable.
1 Not mentioned in the evaluation report. 2 Through International Development Association (IDA) financing. 3 According to the DET of ONAS.
ix
3.8 Beneficiaries’ behaviour and attitude towards infrastructure, which have not changed
significantly despite the implementation of various IEC activities which are still ephemeral,
also hamper project efficacy. Consequently, the project’s contribution to the improvement of
the social, sanitary and environmental conditions of the target population remains limited. On
the whole, the achievement of project objectives and outcomes (efficacy) is deemed to be
unsatisfactory.
3.9 As regards efficiency, the project’s economic benefits have been limited by: (i) the
reduction in the anticipated physical outputs; (ii) the poor performance of the biological
treatment of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant 4; and (iii) inadequate enhancement of
treatment by-products. The sub-sector’s incapacity to generate sufficient resources to refinance
its activities has adversely affected the project’s financial viability. Indeed, the fees collected
through users’ water bills and government subsidies are not enough to cover ONAS’ operating
expenses which increase in tandem with investments made. Like the plant, the project is
considered to be inefficient.
3.10 The project has helped to initiate the building of organizational, technical and financial
capacity and strengthening of internal communication. However, the government has not
fulfilled the condition of the loan agreement regarding the increase of the sanitation levy, as
ONAS continues to depend mainly on operating subsidies to maintain a fragile balance of
annual income statements. At sector level, the project had no major impact on planning,
implementation and monitoring capacity. On the whole, the project’s impact on institutional
development is deemed to be unsatisfactory.
3.11 The sustainability of project outcomes cannot be guaranteed for several reasons,
namely: (i) ONAS’ weak financial and material capacity given that the government has not met
its commitments contained in the performance contract concluded with ONAS; (ii)
unpredictable power cuts which oblige ONAS to use emergency power generators which are
costly but essential; (iii) difficulties in supplying fuel due to ONAS’ financial problems; and
(iv) the project’s negative environmental impact. For the moment, the Government does not
seem to show a genuine commitment to improve ONAS’ worrisome situation, although
discussions are ongoing to find lasting solutions. The political agenda (2012 presidential
election) was likely to prolong the situation.
3.12 The overall project performance is deemed to be unsatisfactory.
4. Main Lessons
The emergence of a public-private partnership in the sanitation sector requires
an institutional framework that promotes: (i) the financial equilibrium of the
entity responsible for the technical, commercial and financial management of
sanitation services; (ii) the existence of a State-owned company that helps to
mobilize the funds needed to develop the sector and manage investment
contracts.
The adoption of a strategy for the development and efficient reuse of sanitation
by-products (treated wastewater, sludge and biogas) which is effectively
implemented is necessary for ensuring the efficiency of a treatment plant.
4 ONAS, EUROPEAID, 2009, “Details on the Capacity, Flow Rate and Level of Treatment of the Cambérène Treatment Plant”: Interim
Report of 30 November 2009.
x
The adoption of a holistic approach through the inclusion of stormwater and
solid waste in a wastewater treatment project will provide more comprehensive
solutions to problems of liquid sanitation and insalubrity.
The systematic mainstreaming of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
(ESIAs) in sanitation projects, particularly those concerning wastewater
treatment plants is more useful than an inefficient environmental categorization
strategy.
The uncontrolled profound modification of a project’s scope may result in the
use of sub-optimal solutions that adversely affect its efficiency.
5. Main Recommendations
To the Senegalese Government:
Adopt a programme approach: the Government should, on the basis of the new
Dakar Master Plan which is being finalized, go beyond an ad hoc management
of sanitation projects by adopting a coordinated multi-donor programme
approach in order to find solutions to Dakar’s chronic solid and liquid waste
management problems.
Build ONAS’ financial capacity: the Government should build ONAS’ financial
capacity by: (i) increasing the sanitation levy based on a new tariff schedule that
is effectively applied; (ii) ensuring the rigorous management of unpaid bills,
particularly those of government services; and (iii) looking for other sustainable
sources of funding to improve ONAS’ self-financing capacity.
Strengthen the sanitation sector in Senegal: the Government should envisage the
institutional restructuring of ONAS into: (i) a State-owned company responsible
for the direct mobilization of funds needed to develop the sub-sector and manage
investment contracts; and (ii) an operating company responsible solely for
technical, commercial and financial management of sanitation services.
Revise regulations: the Government should ensure compliance with the
regulations applicable to the operation of wastewater treatment plants (quality of
treated wastewater) for discharge on land and river environments and amend the
regulations on the discharge of treated wastewater into the sea by setting a
quality target for the natural environment that would guide the choice of
technical treatment arrangements.
To ONAS:
Formulate a strategy for the development and reuse of by-products: ONAS
should define a genuine strategy for the development and efficient reuse of
wastewater treatment by-products.
xi
Improve the efficiency of the Cambérène wastewater treatment plant: ONAS
should: (i) upgrade the sludge system to limit the discharge of sludge with treated
effluent; (ii) protect the plant against the risk of flooding5; (iii) restore existing
pre-treatment equipment; (iv) carry on construction work to install the new sea
outfall as the existing one is too close to the beaches; and (iv) secure funding to
install the third treatment system within the framework of a comprehensive
Dakar City Sanitation Programme.
Ensure environmental protection: ONAS should systematically conduct, in
parallel with technical studies, ESIAs and ensure the holding of public
consultations to present projects as well as their environmental impacts and
mitigation measures (environmental management plans).
To the Bank:
Ensure quality at entry assessment: during project preparation, the Bank should
ensure the availability of key design studies and the technological options
retained for better cost estimation and reduction of implementation time frames
that undermine the outcomes of infrastructure projects. Exhaustive and quality
feasibility studies could necessitate funding by trust funds and should include
monitoring and evaluation, gender and environmental aspects as well as the
participation of beneficiaries. Furthermore, past lessons should be effectively
considered.
Modify the project: where financing is inadequate, the Bank should allow major
project modification only after assessing the impact of such modification with
respect to initial project objectives; otherwise, the Bank should ensure the
availability of additional financing to fill the gap.
Adopt the programme approach: the Bank should orient any new action related
to the sanitation of Dakar City within the framework of a comprehensive
programme that includes wastewater, stormwater and solid waste, in conjunction
with other financial partners.
Mainstream the conduct of environmental and social impact assessments in
sanitation projects: given the intrinsic nature of sanitation projects, particularly
those concerning wastewater treatment plants, the Bank should systematically
demand the conduct of environmental and social impact assessments with
environmental management plans including the resources needed for their
implementation.
5 Using the resources provided by the State.
I. THE PROJECT
1.1 Context
1.1.1 Senegal is situated in the far-west of Africa. It covers a surface area of 196 722 square
kilometres. It is widely open to the Atlantic Ocean and has a 500-kilometre coastline which is
generally flat and sandy, with great tourism potential. Administratively, the country is divided
into 14 regions and 45 Departments sub-divided into districts, municipalities, villages and rural
communities. The village or neighbourhood is the basic administrative unit. Senegal’s
population increased significantly from 5.1 million in 19756 to 12.5 million in 2009, with an
average annual growth rate of 2.5%. It could reach 14.5 million in 2015. The urban population
was estimated at 5.1 million in 2009, representing an urbanization rate of about 42%.
1.1.2 From the macroeconomic perspective, since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994,
Senegal’s economy has been relatively dynamic with annual average growth rates of about 5%
(until 2001). In real terms, growth remained strong until 2005 (5.3%) before beginning to slow
down from 2006 when it stood at 2.3% due mainly to external shocks (rise in oil prices) and a
decline in agricultural production. After two years marked by the effects of the global financial
crisis, the Senegalese economy regained its dynamism, posting real GDP growth rates of 4.2%
and 4.1% in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Energy sector problems remain one of the main
obstacles to economic recovery7. However, the sound macro-economic performance recorded
during the 1997-2001 period was not enough to significantly reduce poverty. In fact, the
proportion of the population living below the poverty line dropped from 57.9% in 1994/1995
to 53.9% in 2000/2001, a decrease of 4 percentage points. During the 2005-2009 period, the
incidence of poverty stood at around 51%. Furthermore, Senegal, whose gross national income
per capita was estimated at USD 770 in 2010 (compared to USD 509 in 2001), is ranked among
the least developed countries and 144th out of 169 countries according to the 2010 Human
Development Report.
1.1.3 The Dakar region, which is located in the Cape Verde Peninsula, covers a surface area
of 550 square kilometres. Its population, which was estimated at 2.4 million in 20078, represents
nearly a quarter (22%) of the country’s total population. Another distinctive feature of the
region is its level of urbanization, with about half of the country’s urban population (53%) and
most of its population (97%) living in towns. The city of Dakar is a conurbation occupying
almost the whole available area. Its geographical expansion is now limited by the sea, with the
Atlantic Ocean to the north, south and west and Hann Bay to the east. It has a high population
density (822 400 inhabitants on 82 square kilometres) with an annual population growth rate of
between 4.5% and 5%. The high population density of Dakar exerts considerable pressure on
urban water and sanitation sector strategies and performance. In addition, the city is also an
industrial and commercial centre and most of the wastewater collected by the existing sanitation
network is discharged directly into the sea without any prior treatment9. In some areas, the
capacity of existing sewer facilities is low or they are poorly connected to drainage systems,
thus causing the spillage and stagnation of wastewater in open sumps, deterioration of the
quality of surface and ground water as well as coastal water resources, which degrades the
quality of the urban and marine environment.
6 1996 General Population Census (GPC). 7 AfDB-OECD-UNDP-ECA, Senegal 2010, Economic Outlook. 8 ANSDA “Economic and Social Situation of the Dakar Region in 2007 (Final Report)”, August 2008. 9 A survey carried out in 2004 by the Department of Sanitation shows that only 13% of households have access to the sanitation network
and only 14% of wastewater is treated in a wastewater treatment plant, while the remaining 86% is discharged into the sea without treatment (UN-HABITAT, Senegal – Dakar Urban Profile, 2004).
2
1.1.4 This situation had led to the implementation of a water and sanitation sector reform as
well as sector projects10 in Senegal in the 1990s with the support of donors, including the
African Development Bank. However, concerning water and sanitation sector equilibrium,
successive Senegalese Governments have not adequately taken the sanitation issue into
account. Consequently, although Senegal is one of the few countries that are capable of
achieving the MDG target on access to safe drinking water, sanitation remains a major issue.
In fact, despite the significant mobilization of resources in the DWSS sector (CFAF 412 billion
between 2005 and 2008), the sanitation access rate remains relatively low and below forecasts.
The urban sanitation access rate rose from 57% in 2004 to 63% in 2008 and that of wastewater
treatment from 19% to 37% over the same period. In both cases, the prospects are not bright
and will very soon lead to a reversed trend if the mobilization of funds needed to continue to
subsidize access to sanitation and to build the capacity of wastewater treatment plants is not
guaranteed11.
1.2 Project Formulation
1.2.1 Project identification fell within the framework of Senegal’s Ninth Economic and
Social Development Plan (1996-2001) whose strategic thrusts include the improvement of the
quality of central government interventions in the provision of services and basic infrastructure.
The Water Sector Project (WSP) implemented by the Government with the support of its key
sector development partners (World Bank, AFD, CIDA and KfW) combines institutional
reforms and major investments for the construction of urban drinking water supply and
sanitation infrastructure.
1.2.2 Despite the strong performance of the WSP, significant needs remained to be met in
the sector, and new strategic approaches had to be envisaged in the medium and long term. This
assessment led to the implementation, in 1999, of a Long-term Water Sector Programme
(LWP), which includes “Drinking Water” and “Sanitation” components and is the cornerstone
of the Long-term Sector Strategy. The PAVD is part of this framework and reflects the Bank’s
commitment to carry on its sector operations by financing the extension of the Cambérène
wastewater treatment plant whose construction it had financed in 1982. The World Bank
provided support for its rehabilitation under the LWP. Bank missions were fielded to Senegal
in December 2000 and February 2001 to prepare and appraise the project.
1.3 Project Objectives
The project goal is to improve the socio-sanitary and environmental conditions of the urban and
peri-urban areas of the city of Dakar. Regarding impacts, the project was expected to: (i)
increase the domestic wastewater treatment capacity of the Cambérène Treatment Plant; (ii)
increase domestic wastewater pumping capacity in the serviced plots neighbourhood; (ii)
promote the adoption of good hygiene and sanitation practices; (iv) build ONAS’ organizational
capacity; (v) enhance treatment by-products (wastewater, sludge and methane gas); (vi)
improve the quality of water discharged into the sea; (vii) reduce the incidence of diseases
caused by poor hygiene and sanitation; and (viii) build ONAS’ operational capacity (see logic
model in Annex 2).
10 WSP (1995-2004), LWP (2001-2007) and PEPAM (2005-2015). 11 PEPAM, Joint Annual Review 2009.
3
1.4 Project Description
1.4.1 The situation of wastewater treatment facilities in the project target area was mainly
characterized by: (i) sewer systems some of which had inadequate discharge capacity; (ii)
pumping stations situated in the serviced plots and their environs; (iii) a gravity collecting sewer
channelling wastewater to the treatment plant; and (iv) a domestic wastewater treatment plant
(WWTP). The main aim of the project was to address the weaknesses of the existing
infrastructure, particularly in the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant and the wastewater
pumping system in the serviced plots area (see §1 of Annex 4).
1.4.2 The project comprises six components, namely: (i) extension of the Cambérène
Wastewater Treatment Plant; (ii) restructuring of the domestic wastewater pumping system of
the serviced plots neighbourhood; (iii) the Information, Education and Communication (IEC)
Programme; (iv) works studies, supervision and control; (v) institutional support; and (vi)
project management (see §2 of Annex 4).
II. POST- EVALUATION
2.1 Evaluation Approach and Methodology
2.1.1 The aim of this evaluation is to contribute to improving the Bank’s on-going or future
operations, policies and strategies by building knowledge and formulating relevant
recommendations to enhance the Bank’s efficiency. The outcomes of this evaluation will also
be used within the framework of a more comprehensive study on the Bank’s efficiency in the
water and sanitation sector. The study is based on the criteria adopted by DAC12 to evaluate
development assistance activities, namely relevance, efficiency, efficacy, impact and
sustainability. To these main criteria should be added Borrower performance and Bank
performance. It is also based on Good Practice Standards for the Evaluation of Public Sector
Operations developed by the Evaluation Cooperation Group13.
2.1.2 The evaluation was carried out in four phases, namely (i) the analysis of project
documents and other works and publications; (ii) data collection in Senegal, including
interviews and group discussions with key stakeholders; (iii) field visits to the project area,
including the direct observation of the application of good practices; and (iv) the analysis and
drafting of the evaluation report. The analytical method combined a comparison of the situation
in the project area before and after project implementation, on the one hand, and the situation
with (serviced plots) and without (Pikine) the project, on the other hand.
2.2 Availability and Use of Baseline Data and Key Performance Indicators
2.2.1 Available baseline data and key outcome indicators relate to the physical outputs,
water and pollution balances presented in ONAS’ annual and monthly operating reports, in
accordance with the provisions of the performance contract concluded in August 2008 between
the government and ONAS. Other studies on the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant
helped to complement the data on biological treatment performance, the level of discharge into
the sea as well as sludge production and sale.
2.2.2 The key indicators of outcomes relating to the improvement of health status and level
of education present the health (MSP-SNIS) and school (Departmental Inspectorate of
Education) statistics of the project area. These quantitative data were supplemented by
12 Development Assistance Committee. 13 Good Practices Standards for Evaluation of Public Sector Operations, 2001 Revised Edition, Third Draft of 22 May 2011.
4
qualitative data obtained before or during the OPEV evaluation mission carried out in August
2011. On the other hand, data on the environmental monitoring of the receiving environment
were not available.
III. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE
3.1 Adherence to Implementation Schedule and Costs
3.1.1 The project was implemented with a 24-month delay due, in particular, to problems
faced by the Borrower in fulfilling the conditions precedent to first disbursement (17 months
after the effectiveness date). Furthermore, it was only in early May 2004 (nearly two and a half
years after the signature of the loan) that a coordination unit was established at the ONAS
Directorate of Studies and Works, marking the effective start-up of the project, particularly the
updating of existing bidding documents, the conduct of studies to determine technical
specifications for a turnkey solution to the extension of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment
Plant.
3.1.2 As regards adherence to costs, there was a huge funding gap at project implementation
(see §3 of Annex 4). The basic data on estimated and final costs show that, although the total
project cost (-0.5%) was maintained in UA, it dropped from CFAF 12.32 billion to CFAF 9.58
billion, that is a decrease of about CFAF 2.74 billion (representing nearly 22% of the total cost).
Several factors account for the cost overrun of the “Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant
Extension” component, namely: (i) initial cost underestimation; (ii) foreign exchange losses
incurred between project approval (2001) and the effective start-up of works (2007) due to the
depreciation of the UA against the EUR and the CFAF; and (iii) the increase in the prices of
raw materials owing to an escalation of oil prices, the crude oil price having increased on
average from USD 24 per barrel in 2001 to USD 72 in 2007.
3.1.3 To close this gap, the Bank recommended that the Senegalese Government seek
additional funds from the European Union from its financial envelope to support the sanitation
sector in Senegal (CFAF 7.87 billion). The failure of this initiative resulted in profound changes
including: (i) the moderation of initial objectives relating to the extension of the Cambérène
Wastewater Treatment Plant which was the main financial item of the project (62% of the initial
cost), thus modifying the nature of the project; (ii) the financing of the Djily Mbaye Pumping
Station by the Government due to the urgent need to upgrade it; and (iii) the financing of ONAS’
organizational study by the European Union.
3.2 Project Management, Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation
3.2.1 Overall, the performance of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) is considered to be
satisfactory while that of the executing agency (ONAS) is unsatisfactory due mainly to delays
in operationalizing the PIU and lifting of conditions precedent, resulting in the consequences
mentioned above. The executing agency submitted the required works status and audit reports
on a regular basis despite the lack of coordination14 between ONAS and the Bank regretted at
project start-up. The audit reports were sometimes submitted behind schedule15 and the quality
of the 2008 report was deemed to be unsatisfactory16.
14 AfDB, “Senegal: Portfolio Review Report 2003, ADB/BD/WP/2004/109 – ADF/BD/WP/2004/133. 15 June 2009 for that of 2007, contrary to the Bank’s guidelines (maximum period of six months, with effect from the closing date of the
financial year). 16 ORPF (Reference: ORPF.2/RPT/2010/029/ANE of 4 June 2010).
5
3.2.2 Strictly speaking, the project had no monitoring and evaluation system to help ensure
the systematic collection of relevant data with clear responsibilities and a well-defined
frequency of data collection. The few monitoring actions carried out focused only on physical
outputs, eclipsing project outcomes and impacts. However, improvements have been made
following the signing of a performance contract between the Senegalese Government and
ONAS in 2008 defining a series of performance indicators, among other things. These
indicators are presented in the reports on the operation of facilities and annual progress reports
prepared by ONAS’ Management.
3.3 Overall Implementation Performance
3.3.1 In short, there were significant project implementation delays. In addition, though the
total project cost was still denominated in UA, the depreciation of the Unit of Account coupled
with rising oil prices and the underestimation of some costs necessitated the moderation of
physical output targets which significantly modified the project with respect to its initial
objectives. The engineering structures built meet required quality standards. The few anomalies
identified in pumping stations would be the result of design errors, particularly the calculation
of backflows, since piping is not commensurate with the capacity of these pumping stations.
On the whole, the overall implementation performance is considered to be unsatisfactory.
IV. KEY EVALUATION FINDINGS AND PERFORMANCE RATINGS
4.1 Key Evaluation Findings
(a) Relevance and Quality at Entry Assessment
Relevance
4.1.1 The rationale underpinning the Dakar City Sanitation Project (PAVD) is a concern to
support the Government’s efforts to address the renewed outbreak of diseases caused by
unsanitary conditions. By limiting itself to restructuring the existing network and failing to
extend it, the project did not adequately address the needs of a large number of households that
are not covered by the urban sanitation network because their connection was difficult and
costly.
4.1.2 The project is in keeping with the Government’s strategy outlined in Senegal’s Ninth
Economic and Social Development Plan (1996-2001). The plan’s major thrusts include: (i)
improving central government interventions in the provision of basic services and
infrastructure, and (ii) ensuring sound water resource management. The project objectives are
a continuation of those of the Long-term Water Sector Programme (LWSP) considered as the
cornerstone of the long-term sector strategy.
4.1.3 The PAVD is also consistent with the Bank’s strategy for Senegal ( 1999-2001 CSP)
which seeks primarily to promote robust and sustained economic growth within the framework
of sector investment programmes in order to reduce poverty. In the water and sanitation sector,
the strategy takes into account the Bank’s Integrated Water Resource Management Policy and
seeks to support actions aimed at improving the living environment of the population,
particularly through the development of social infrastructure in urban and peri-urban areas. The
project is also in line with the Bank’s general priority actions to reduce and achieve MDG
targets related to water and sanitation. The project objectives remain relevant insofar as the
constantly changing city of Dakar always has huge sanitation needs.
6
Quality at Entry
4.1.4 Basic Technical Designs and Choice of Wastewater Treatment Processes: the PAVD
opted to extend the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant whose basic technological options
were adopted during its initial construction17. The activated sludge process, which is based on
aerobic biological treatment, is the technical solution adopted for domestic wastewater
treatment. This process is widely used in West and Central Africa and Europe18. Although the
treatment performance and reliability of activated sludge systems are well-tested, particularly
in France, their operation has little flexibility and they are not easily adaptable to the context of
African countries (especially in terms of energy consumption) as they do not tolerate significant
flow changes. They are also too costly in terms of investment, operation and management and
are dependent on spare parts which are sometimes unavailable on the local market19. Although
the specific situation of Dakar (land constraints) limited the choice of alternative solutions20,
the PAVD did not adequately taken into account the technical and energy requirements of the
process retained and local (environmental, financial, economic and socio-political) and climatic
factors.
4.1.5 The initial project to build the plant and its different rehabilitation and extension
phases did not take the flood-prone nature of the site into account. This sometimes causes long
periods of malfunction21 because not all the interventions ensured the protection of electrical
equipment. This situation is currently exacerbated by the construction of the Rufisque highway,
especially as no drainage culvert to the south of the site to drain run-off water now trapped in a
basin. In fact, when selecting the site for the construction of the Cambérène Treatment Plant22,
land morphology (dunal landform with many basins) and the consequences of rainwater runoff
from the northern landforms were not adequately assessed.
4.1.6 The financial gap noted during bid evaluation suggests that the cost was
underestimated during project appraisal, although this is not the only cause. Lastly, the project
was not the subject of an in-depth environmental and social impact assessment23 leading to the
formulation of an environmental and social management plan (ESMP) and environmental
monitoring, which itself is a problem with this type of operations as they generally produce
major positive or negative environmental impacts.
4.1.7 Optimality of the Final Solution Approved by the Borrower and Validated by the Bank:
in reviewing the services to be provided by the successful bidder due to a financial gap that
could not be closed, the Borrower and the Bank retained a sub-optimal alternative solution
characterized by drastic reductions in the water and sludge systems that make up the core of the
project in favour of studies, general services and common works. The primary thickener, whose
installation could have contributed to ensuring the smooth operation of the existing facility and
prevent the direct discharge of sludge from the new biological treatment system was abandoned.
17 Financed by an African Development Bank loan approved on 30 April 1975. 18 Seventy-five per cent of the 155 wastewater treatment plants identified in 1993 (see op. cit). 19 Doulaye Koné, “Wastewater Treatment through Macrophyte Lagooning or Macrophytes (Pistia Stratiotes) in West and Central Africa:
Review, Treatment Performance and Design Criteria” Thesis No. 2653 (2000), Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne. 20 With respect to other extensive processes which are natural (or artificial wetlands) wastewater treatment systems the best known of
which is macrophyte lagooning. Natural lagooning is the system most widely used in Morocco (99% of treatment plants) but only for small towns (<30 000 inhabitants)
21 The heavy rain of 19 and 20 August 2011 (50 mm of water in 24 hours), for example, damaged the retaining wall designed to protect the site which unfortunately gave way, resulting in the severe flooding of the entire treatment plant and many buildings (including the laboratory and electrical centre) and the shutdown of the plant for a prolonged period.
22 Retained following the recommendations of the first Sanitation Master Plan (SMP) prepared by NEDECO in 1973. 23 In light of those conducted by the European Union within the framework of its operations on the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment
Plant.
7
In addition, the project did not adequately take into account the limitations of the existing land
and marine outfall 24 (see §4 of Annex 4) with substandard hydraulic characteristics,
unguaranteed robustness25 and zero utility in terms of the protection of the natural environment
(the maritime domain used purely for recreational purposes – swimming area), which is a source
of conflicts with the local population.
4.1.8 Consideration of Past Lessons: the project design did not take into account one of the
lessons learned from the evaluation of a previous Bank-funded project for wastewater treatment
in Dakar and its environs, namely the need to adopt a more integrated approach which includes
the management of stormwater and solid waste in sanitation projects. Although this lesson was
underscored in the ex ante evaluation report, stormwater and solid waste drainage systems were
not taken into account during PAVD design. In fact, during the rainy season26, part of the urban
run-off water enters the sanitation network due to lack of a genuine stormwater drainage system
in the connected urban areas (including the serviced plots). However, the network of serviced
plots, which has a separate wastewater treatment system, is not designed to handle the rainwater
channelled into it by the population, although this is prohibited27. This rainwater intake dilutes
the suspended matter load, disrupting the management base of the Cambérène Wastewater
Treatment Plant and the smooth operation of pumping stations. Overall, the project is
considered relevant, although its quality at entry is considered to be unsatisfactory.
(b) Achievement of Objectives and Outcomes (Efficacy)
Level of Achievement and Quality of Outputs
4.1.9 Wastewater Treatment Infrastructure (61% of total project cost at completion): out of
the two new wastewater treatment units each with a capacity of 10 000 m3/day, the project has
built only one incomplete unit (biological system) with a capacity of 11 300 m3/day (see §5 of
Annex 4) comprising an aeration tank and a final sedimentation tank. It has also helped to
upgrade the primary sedimentation tank of the old system 1 to an anoxic basin and provide the
treatment plant with electromechanical equipment (one low-voltage distribution panel, one
900-kVA power generator and three transformers). The project has not equipped the plant with
treatment and sludge recycling facilities28, as no thickener or mechanical sludge dehydration
mechanism has been installed under the project. The existing structures (digesters) do not have
the capacity to absorb sludge from the new system. Consequently, the sludge produced in the
new biological system is not treated and is discharged into the environment together with the
treated effluent.
4.1.10 Qualitatively, the structures built and the equipment supplied by the project are highly
satisfactory. However, the installation of the low voltage distribution panel (LVDP) re-
equipped by the project in an area that is frequently flooded due to the rising water table and
resumption of rainfall cycles, among other things, causing the shutdown of the entire plant for
safety reasons 29 , is regrettable. Plant operating reports show that, in recent years, the
operationality of structures has been affected by increased flow, resulting in the overflow of 24 This has been taken into account in an EU-funded project which is expected to raise its peak flow to about 52 000 m3/day and extend
the discharge from 200 metres to 1 700 metres at sea. Part of this outfall is mounted offshore pending its connection to the onshore part as this connection cannot be made without the consent of the local population.
25 Scientific Note on the Cambérène Outfall Project, ONAS, November 2010. 26 Which may represent up to 10 times the volume of wastewater discharged during rainfall of 20 millimetres per day. 27 The serviced plots only have an embryonic network that drains part of the rainwater from urban roads and some low sections and a
pumping station which discharges treated wastewater into the Niayes and other offshore gravity outfalls. 28 The temporary solution recommended (left to the initiative of the Implementation Unit and STEREAU), which consists in evacuating
biological sludge from wastewater treatment ponds to the digestion station, did not function properly as it caused thermal imbalance due to the abundant hydric flux used.
29 It is said that the State allocated resources for its relocation to the non-flooded parts of the treatment plant (ONAS / DET).
8
wastewater entering the station, excessive silting of grit chambers, instability of pre-treatment
due to very advanced wear and tear and the flooding of the digester. In addition, the prolonged
shutdown of the 800-kVA generator and frequent power cuts, coupled with the problem of
sludge evaluation, do not allow for proper wastewater treatment.
4.1.11 Wastewater Pumping Infrastructure (28% of total project cost at completion): to
address the before-project situation, the Bank’s operation consisted mainly in: (i) optimizing
the system by enabling pumping stations to operate independently of each other; (ii) building
the capacity of the pumping system by rehabilitating30 and building new stations31 with new
equipment; (iii) securing the pumping system by installing new power generators in each
station; and (iv) rehabilitating backflow and defective gravity discharge networks that
frequently breakdown.
4.1.12 In terms of operationality, the data provided by the pumping station section of the
Cambérène Treatment Plant shows the recurrent breakdown of the hydraulic32 and electronic33
equipment procured. According to one of ONAS’ technicians, such breakdowns stem primarily
from design errors, particularly backflow calculations due to a mismatch between piping and
pump capacity 34 . Unpredictable power cuts on the entire SENELEC network require the
continuous use of power generators resulting in a significant increase in the use of fuel oil,
engine oil and spare parts for preventive maintenance.
4.1.13 Improving Knowledge of Good Health Practices and Sanitation Issues: through its IEC
component which targets the population of the serviced plots (about 250 00035 inhabitants in
20 units), the project has helped to implement a programme on health education and information
on the restructuring of the sanitation system in order to convince the population to accept the
inconveniences caused by such restructuring works. In addition, IEC campaigns have helped to
sensitize the population concerned on the mode of operation of community sanitation and to
encourage them to adopt facility-friendly behaviour. To this end, the project notably: (i)
organized an information meeting with 75 community leaders; (ii) trained 60 workers or
outreach officers on the use of the SARAR36 method and tools; (iii) established 25 health
committees; (iv) organized 103 neighbourhood meetings; and (v) informed and sensitized 1 542
households. In total, 15 549 people participated in an information/education session. A social
worker supervised the outreach officers and health committees at least once a week37.
4.1.14 Consequently, measures and initiatives were adopted, in accordance with SARAR tool
guidelines, to institute the systematic washing of hands with soap before meals, regular cleaning
of the surroundings of homes and the protection of food and drinking water. The conditioning
of solid waste which is a major concern for households in the project area was also instituted
and, with the influence of neighbourhood committees, measures were taken to prevent the
transformation of the wastewater network into a rubbish dump. Similarly, it was recommended
that syphon and sifter devices be installed at the outlets of pipes connected to the sanitation
network to separate solid waste from liquid waste.
30 SP7, SP23 and SP17 31 SP2, SP9, SP13, SP15, SP22 and the rehabilitation of the Djili Mbaye Station which was financed by national counterpart contributions. 32 These include the loss of sludge from ball check valves (SP15 and SP23); failure to replace the screen belt (SP23); leaks from surge
control valves (SP13, SP17, SP07 and SP22) and the failure to replace inverter cards and contactors (SP23, SP22 and SP07). 33 Electronic inverters often breakdown due to the unreliability of the electricity network (voltage variation). 34 Viewpoint that differs from that of DET, revealing some tension with DEX. 35 According to the municipal authorities, this population is currently estimated at 400 000. 36 This is a method based on the assumption that a population whose confidence is built is capable of using its own resources to improve
their living conditions, particularly sanitary conditions. 37 Moussa Seck and Francoise TOURE-KNOBEL, PAV - Mission Report 3: IEC Programme Evaluation, December 2008.
9
4.1.15 ONAS’ Organizational Study and Information and Archiving System: to support
ONAS, which urgently needs to improve its operation and productivity, the recommended
review of positions under the institutional support component within the framework of the
project was replaced by a broader organizational study financed by the European Union and
conducted by the ICEA consulting firm. The main recommendations of the study resulted in
the implementation of a project with European Union assistance. This project, which is being
implemented, seeks to train ONAS staff in, and provide it with equipment for the remote
management of pumping stations, remote monitoring and a geographic information system
(GIS).
4.1.16 The PAVD was therefore limited to supporting ONAS’ Documentation Centre by
putting a relational information and archiving system and a functional database at its disposal.
The document scanning and electronic archiving system (in addition to a paper format
document archiving system) is now operational. In particular, it allowed the evaluation mission
to easily access project documents.
Achievement of Direct Outcomes
4.1.17 Improvement of Domestic Wastewater Treatment Capacity: the project, as planned and
appraised in 2001, intended to triple the capacity of the treatment plant to 30 000 m3/day (or
about 300 000 users). However, due to the drastic reduction in the volume of works included
initially in this component, the project was able to build only one biological treatment system
with a treatment capacity of 11 300 m3/day, or about 38% of the initial target. In addition, the
capacity of the first (before-project) system was reduced to 5 700 m3/day to adapt it to tertiary
treatment purposes carried out on-site. The Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant, therefore,
can currently handle only 17 000 m3/day for biological treatment38, whereas it receives an
annual average of 26 500 m3/day and much more during the rainy season.
4.1.18 In terms of performance, the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant has the worst
water balance assessment39 of all treatment plants in Senegal. In fact, data on treatment and
operation monitoring shows that, in 2010, existing biological systems treated only 64% of the
total flow that entered the plant (9 653 955 m3)40. In other words, 36% of raw effluents were
bypassed41 and discharged as such into the natural environment, representing about 9 500 m3
of raw water per day. During the rainy season, the quantity of bypass increases and can attain
13 000 m3/day. Part of this quantity flows into the plant because the two biological systems can
handle at most 17 000 m3/day. The treated wastewater balance therefore has an influx of 30 000
m3/day of which 5 700 m3/day are fully treated (19%), but end up being mixed with
insufficiently treated wastewater and discharged into the sea (see §6 of Annex 4).
4.1.19 Increase in Domestic Wastewater Pumping Capacity: the restructuring of the pumping
station has helped to increase the quantity of residual effluents collected in the networks and
channelled to the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant. Concerning the pumping capacity,
the volume of wastewater pumped by the pumping stations (excluding the Djili Mbaye station)
rose from 3 628 279 m3 in 2007 to 4 255 378 m3 in 2009, that is a 17% increase (see §7 of
38 Discharge standards relate to the quality of biologically (or secondary) treated wastewater discharge. 39 ONAS/EAWAG, “Faecal Sludge Management: Optimizing the System”, Proceedings of the International Symposium on Faecal Sludge
Management, Dakar, Senegal, 30 June - 1 July 2009. 40 The exact quantity of inflows is unknown as the available flow meters are out of order. Consequently, flows are measured depending on
pump operating times and lifting screws whose calibration is very old. It is also difficult to determine the flow distribution between biological systems 1 and 2 as the flow meters at the outlet of the sedimentation tank are out of order.
41 The share of bypass wastewater is crude because the wastewater reading is simply taken and then sent back to the onshore and offshore outfall. No pre-treatment is carried out as the wastewater screens and grit removers are not operating due to very advanced wear and tear (according to the 2010 operating report).
10
Annex 4). This increase in the effluent collection capacity of pumping stations was expected to
help prevent the runoff and dispersal of effluents on public thoroughfares. However, despite the
quality of construction and finishings of pumping stations, the mission noted that this
requirement is often undermined by operating problems, because frequent power cuts and fuel
shortages result in the shutdown of stations, causing serious inconvenience to beneficiaries.
4.1.20 According to operating reports, many fairly serious breakdowns and shutdowns occur
after less than three years of operation of facilities. Similarly, the mission noted signs of rust on
the metallic parts of some equipment (valves, pressure tank balloons and standby generator
covers), suggesting that a coating adapted to the ambient hot and humid marine climate was not
applied on equipment. Overall, the restructuring of the pumping system is considered to be
efficient. However, operational weaknesses (preventive and corrective maintenance and the
operation of standby power generators) as well as the habits of the population (particularly
regarding the disposal of household refuse), contribute to the rapid degradation of facilities.
4.1.21 Application of Good Health and Hygiene Practices: the different IEC activities carried
out have helped to improve the behaviour of the beneficiary population in some areas. In fact,
direct observation in homes and the surroundings of sites visited confirm the results of group
interviews and discussions regarding progress in terms of: (i) cleaning homes and their
immediate surroundings; (ii) the actual existence of a wastewater treatment system; (iii) the
presence of refuse bins; and (iv) the absence of wastewater discharged onto the street.
4.1.22 Conversely, claims by women interviewed individually or in groups that wastewater
is screened before it is discharged into the network are contradicted by direct observations in
pumping stations. In fact, in all the stations visited, there are sizeable quantities of waste from
the screenings. This finding corroborates the view of some stakeholders42 that the population is
reluctant to change its behaviour and habits towards infrastructure to the point of asking project
promoters to adapt technologies to their behaviour. The initiatives and measures taken
following the implementation of IEC actions are transient and too limited in time to produce
the expected changes.
4.1.23 Building ONAS’ Organizational Capacity: the conduct of ONAS’ organizational study
helped to: (i) develop an action plan; (ii) design a three-year training plan; (iii) establish cost
accounting; (iv) develop an information system master plan; (v) propose agreements with local
governments for stormwater management; (vi) propose performance-based service contracts
with subcontractors; (vii) implement a priority training plan; (viii) carry out an inventory of
ONAS’ fixed assets; and (ix) update the urban sanitation financial model. The functioning of
the document management system and implementation of the findings and recommendations
of ONAS’ organizational study have not been sufficiently developed to significantly strengthen
ONAS’ organizational capacity.
42 Notables, local elected officials and municipal engineers in serviced plots met during a group discussion held at the municipality’s
headquarters.
11
Achievement of Intermediate Outcomes
4.1.24 Improvement of the Quality of Wastewater Discharged into the Sea: since 2009, the
performance of the biological treatment system of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant
is poor. Wastewater from the two treatment systems is no longer compliant with Senegalese
environmental standards. Furthermore, the discharge of wastewater into the sea is no longer in
conformity with standards (SS, BOD5 and COD) given that treated wastewater mixes with
bypasses. In addition, given the absence of an adequate sludge treatment mechanism, the excess
sludge from the new system cannot be sent for digestion and is released into the natural
environment together with treated wastewater and bypasses, further deteriorating the quality of
discharges43 (see §8 Annex 4).
4.1.25 ONAS’ sea discharge objective for 2009 was 85%, which it failed to achieve. In fact,
specific average treatment output (sea discharge) for the last year of operation with data
(2009)44 is about 75% with a minimum of 56% and a maximum of 81%. To scale down their
output objectives, in May 2009, treatment plant operators introduced the concept of degraded
mode output. Set at 50%, this output enables operators to attain this arbitrarily set threshold45.
In addition, the installation of a new outfall which enables the discharge of treated wastewater
further out into sea (1 700 metres) to facilitate its dispersion in the ocean has met with resistance
from the local population (see §11 of Annex 4). In short, environmentally, the project does not
protect the natural environment it is expected to preserve.
4.1.26 Enhancement of Wastewater Treatment By-products: the project has helped to increase
the quantity of reusable water. However, due to lack of funding of tertiary treatment, it had no
effect on the safe reuse of treated water (irrigation agriculture, etc.) – (see §9 of Annex 4). The
old system 1 still has a potential for the reuse of 5 700 m3/day which cannot be absorbed by
potential customers such as the golf course and building and public works (BPW) companies.
The volume of purified water sold dropped from 3 000 m3/month in 2010 to 574 m3/month in
2011 due to the suspension of distribution to the Dakar-Technopole Golf Club in 2010, the only
remaining consumers being market gardeners46.
4.1.27 The Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant is currently facing a serious problem of
sludge management exacerbated by the PAVD due to the suppression of the sludge treatment
mechanism initially provided for (38 additional drying beds and a sludge dehydration unit),
clogging the existing sludge system. The Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant produces
about 20.2 tons of sludge per day (see §10 of Annex 4) and the project contributes about 42%
to the amount of sludge produced by the plant. In addition, the sludge produced has a very high
amount of organic matter with respect to design standards, suggesting poor performance. In
terms of sales, about 2 900 m3 of dehydrated sludge was sold in 2010 (barely 250 m3/month on
average).
43 The summary balance sheet in terms of discharge into the sea is as follows: Total pollution discharged = Residual pollution on system
1 and 2 + Pollution of bypass treated wastewater + Pollution of sludge in the biological system 2. 44 Since July 2011, the purification rate is no longer determined due to lack of a flow meter. 45 “Details on the Capacity, Flow Rate and Level of Treatment of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant”: Interim Report of 30
November 2009 – Directorate of Sanitation and Public Hygiene, ONAS (European Union Financing). 46 It should, however, be noted that, due to the importance of the issue of wastewater usage in market gardening, ONAS has established
partnerships with the Spanish Cooperation Agency through the FAO to promote market gardeners’ access to quality water in peri-urban areas (Greater Niayes). In addition, other research programmes on the safe reuse of wastewater for agriculture are ongoing (WHO/FAO/CREDI Project).
12
4.1.28 Biogas production enabled ONAS to reduce its operating expenses, especially
electricity bills, by about 30% to 35% in the treatment plant47. Only two-thirds out of a total of
3 000 m3 of biogas (65% of methane) produced every day is used by a methane power generator.
The remaining one third, which cannot be used due to lack of means of generating electricity,
is flared. Worse still, after the shutdown of the gas power generator and suspension of flaring
since July 2010, methane gas production is continuing with part of the gas produced being
discharged into the atmosphere.
4.1.29 Reducing the Incidence of Disease caused by Poor Hygiene and Sanitation: the
population surveyed in six of the nine areas equipped with pumping stations has mixed views
about the project’s contribution to improving beneficiaries’ health.. The analysis of the health
statistics of the serviced plots area (North Dakar area, according to the division of the Dakar
Health District) seems to show a reduction in the prevalence and number of cases of diseases
caused by insalubrity (malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery) of about 75% (50% for diarrhoea). The
reduction of the incidence of uncomplicated malaria in absolute terms is more visible and
sensitive. A comparison with another Dakar district, that is Pikine which is situated less than 5
kilometres from the project area but has not been serviced to date, is enlightening: the incidence
of diarrhoea, amoebic dysentery and helminthiasis was higher in 2009 compared to 2007, unlike
in the project area. Conversely, the reduction in the incidence rate of uncomplicated malaria in
the project area is not better than in Pikine (reduction of 78% against 80% for Pikine) - (see §12
of Annex 4).
4.1.30 Level of Improvement of ONAS’ Operational Capacity: since ONAS is undergoing
wide-ranging reforms, the project is yet to have a major impact on the improvement of its
operational capacity. Great challenges remain: (i) the efficacy of the decision-making process,
particularly in the processing of requests by the technicians of the Cambérène Wastewater
Treatment Plant, internal communication and the capitalization of experiences acquired in
project management and (ii) the level of expertise of management, technical services and
service providers48.
The Project’s Contribution to the Improvement of the Social, Health and
Environmental Conditions of Households in the Project Area
4.1.31 Opinion of Beneficiaries on the Improvement of their Living Environment through the
Implementation of the Project: people living around pumping stations (accept those around Unit
15) unanimously acknowledge the improvement of their living environment with the
construction of the facilities. According to them, such improvements are reflected in: (i) the
ease of movement in the immediate vicinity, whereas before people would not go to these areas
for more than a week due to stagnant wastewater; (ii) time saved in the daily maintenance of
the front of houses; (iii) the reduction of bad odours in homes resulting in the reduction of
expenses related to the purchase of perfumes, generally by women in order to reduce such
odours; (iv) the reduction of disease vectors (flies, mosquitoes and vermin) in the dry season;
and (v) the possibility of using areas freed of stagnant wastewater for social and/or recreational
activities throughout the dry season.
4.1.32 However, for the residents of Units 13 and 15 of the serviced plots, the project leaves
a feeling of unfinished business as its positive outcomes are offset by the backflow of treated
wastewater into residential areas and places of worship in the rainy season or during extended
47 The electricity bill of the treatment plant in 2009 totalled CFAF six hundred and thirty million (630 000 000). 48 However, ONAS has some technical competencies as it has acquired more than 20 years experience in the management of wastewater
collection, transportation and treatment facilities, enabling its technicians to occasionally devise ingenious solutions to operational problems, despite limited resources.
13
power outages. During such periods, the population are faced with serious environmental
problems likely to cause major health risks. The same applies to local residents in the area of
the Djily Mbaye pumping station (which had not yet been equipped with a standby generator)
as well as the beach users met who said that wastewater discharged from the pumping station
pollutes the beach, thus disrupting their activities (swimming, jogging, walking, etc.).
4.1.33 Impact on the Reduction of Health Expenditure: women mention some savings on the
expenditure they usually make in the dry season to deodorize their homes with incense or sprays
and combat bad odours from ambient air pollution caused by stagnant wastewater. Moreover,
a qualitative assessment could be made of the increases in incomes derived from small-scale
economic activities such as petty trading which can now be carried out during the dry season in
previous flood areas. The reduction in the prevalence of diseases caused by poor hygiene and
sanitation in the project area implies a reduction in health expenditure. However, in the environs
of the Djily Mbaye residential area pumping station, the two lessors of resting huts met on the
shore said that they have difficulty finding customers near the flow bed of the station’s tank
overflows.
4.1.34 Improvement in School Attendance due to the Implementation of the Project: the
analysis of the statistical data collected from the Departmental Inspectorate of Education in
charge of the serviced plots area does not indicate any project contribution to increased school
enrolment (the enrolment of girls and boys in Units 7, 22, 13, 15 and 9 has been declining since
2007/2008). On the contrary, study conditions in schools in the immediate vicinity of pumping
stations have improved significantly and there is less wastewater to pollute the atmosphere and
impede access.
4.1.35 On the whole, project efficacy (achievement of outcomes) is considered to be
unsatisfactory.
(c) Efficiency
4.1.36 Economic and Financial Analysis: during the ex ante evaluation, the project’s
economic internal rate of return (EIRR) was estimated at 23.26% (on the assumption of a 10%
increase in investment cost), at 25% (on the assumption of a 10% decrease in revenue) and at
21.22% (by combining both scenarios). This rate was not computed in the completion report.
Considering that the project does not generate own resources and mainly depends on the
sanitation tax levied on water consumption (whether or not the consumer is connected to the
sanitation network), the computing of the financial rate of return is not very expedient.
However, due to its heavy dependence on subsidies and the levy, ONAS has huge subsidy and
balancing tariff requirements to close its financing gap (see Annex 8)
4.1.37 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: the comparative detailed review of cost and service
reductions related to the extension of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant (see §13 of
Annex 4) shows that cost effectiveness is unsatisfactory. The project could have performed
better using the same resources, particularly by achieving the minimum sludge treatment
envisaged (primary thickener). On the whole, project efficiency is deemed to be unsatisfactory.
(d) Institutional Development Impact
4.1.38 The project has helped to start building ONAS’ organizational, technical and financial
capacity. Organizational and technical capacity was built by developing technical tools which
are vital for the fulfilment of its mission (electronic archiving, GIS, outline maps, remote
monitoring, etc.) together with training and monitoring programmes. Concerning human and
material resources, ONAS is still under-staffed and under-equipped and must call on huge
14
external resources and services the lack of which impedes the implementation of its activities
and, therefore, its financial outcomes. Nevertheless, through the training of the operators of the
treatment plant and pumping stations, the project has strengthened their technical skills.
However, this institutional impact remains limited, especially as ONAS has no genuine
infrastructure maintenance and development plan.
4.1.39 The project has helped to strengthen internal communication by establishing a
coordination unit including a representative from each of the two technical directorates, namely
DET and DEX. Although this mechanism has had positive impacts on the project, it is not
sufficient to resolve personal disputes or anticipate operation-related problems; the design and
construction of treatment plants is impeded by disagreements between the two directorates,
particularly regarding technical options.
4.1.40 ONAS’ financial capacity has partly been built through the performance contract
concluded between the government and ONAS in August 2008 which includes, among other
things, the design, by the operator, of a short- and medium-term forward-looking investment
programme and the obligation to carry out a time-bound sanitation pricing study. . The limited
pricing study carried out by ICEA meets this requirement. However, the prices fixed in 2003,
except for those applied to government services, were not reviewed in 2008. Consequently, the
Borrower has not fulfilled one of the conditions of the loan agreement concerning the increase
of the sanitation levy. At sector level, the project had no major impact on the planning,
implementation and monitoring capacity. Overall, the project’s institutional development
impact is considered to be unsatisfactory.
(e) Other Development Impacts (gender)
4.1.41 The project’s IEC component is the one that most successfully mainstreamed the
gender dimension given the key role played by women in running their families in Senegal. In
addition, their hygiene habits are critical in reducing diseases caused by poor sanitation.
Accordingly, IEC actions particularly targeted this group of beneficiaries. However, because
women lack financial resources, they generally depend heavily on their husbands for money to
buy the tools (sieves, refuse bins, etc.) needed to carry out appropriate sanitation actions. As a
result, the IEC component of the project has not sufficiently taken men into account, despite
the fact that they can limit access to and the application of the knowledge acquired to promote
the adoption of good health and hygiene practices.
(f) Sustainability
4.1.42 Technical Sustainability: the project’s technical sustainability is negatively affected
by: (i) the technical options adopted due to the poor quality of designs; (ii) ONAS’ weak
financial, material and human capacity due particularly to the State’s failure to honour its
commitments specified in the performance contract concluded with ONAS; (iii) frequent power
outages and fuel shortages which impede network and equipment maintenance operations; and
(iv) very difficult operating conditions, particularly regarding the management of floating
materials in degreasing lines and in the primary sedimentation tank (thick and compact layers
of fats which are very difficult to remove). The intensive activated sludge treatment system
adopted is costly.
4.1.43 Sustained Borrower Commitment (including the legal/regulatory frameworks): this
commitment is mainly reflected in the sector reform introduced in 1995 with the splitting of the
former Senegal National Water Exploitation Corporation (SONEES) into three separate
entities, namely: (i) the Senegal National Water Corporation (SONES) which is a State-owned
and investment company; (ii) the Senegal Water Company (SDE) which is a private company
15
linked to the State by an affermage contract; and (iii) the Senegal National Sanitation Authority
(ONAS) which enjoys some autonomy over the implementation of sanitation activities in the
country. The reform has helped to raise the sanitation sub-sector to a higher priority level. The
Borrower’s commitment was also reflected in the establishment of a policy, legal and
administrative framework through the adoption of several legal documents 49 . Lastly,
modification of the institutional and contractual architecture of the urban water sector which
includes the wastewater and, where appropriate, the stormwater treatment sub-sectors – in a
concession contract, is being examined50.
4.1.44 Socio-political Support: the Government does not seem to be determined to improve
ONAS’ very worrisome situation, although discussions are ongoing to find lasting solutions. In
fact, according to technical partners51, “the State has not honoured its commitment to guarantee
ONAS’ financial equilibrium as specified in the performance contract concluded with ONAS.
Consequently, the Government’s debt owed to ONAS as at 31 March 2011 stood at CFAF 5.14
billion, obliging ONAS to frequently resort to bank overdrafts to meet its working capital
needs.” This situation has been exacerbated for several years now by the drinking water price
freeze for individuals and the low rate of sanitation tax applied to drinking water bills. For their
part, users’ attitude towards sanitation facilities reflects the lack of a sanitation culture. This
situation is said to be due, among other things, to the inadequate involvement of the population
in the construction of treatment stations – only limited sociological studies are carried out and
the technological option retained is not the subject of consultation with beneficiaries.
4.1.45 Economic Viability: the economic benefits of the project are limited by: (i) the drastic
scaling down of its physical output objectives; (ii) the low technical performance of the
Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant; and (iii) the lack of enhancement of by-products
capable of boosting the development of urban and peri-urban agriculture, especially in a context
of food crisis.
4.1.46 Financial Viability: the project’s financial viability is negatively affected by the sub-
sector’s incapacity to generate sufficient resources for its own refinancing. The levy collected
through users’ water bills and government subsidies cannot cover ONAS’ operating costs which
are increasing owing to the investments initiated. ONAS still depends heavily on operating
subsidies to ensure a fragile annual income statement balance.
4.1.47 Institutional, Organizational and Management Efficiency: although ONAS’
institutional autonomy is real, it is incomplete. As an industrial and commercial public
establishment, it is not shielded from political pressures which may affect the management of
human resources, decision-making procedures and technical options. Furthermore, it cannot
prepare its own budget and freely mobilize funds commensurate with its real needs. The new
organizational chart prepared in 2011, which particularly provides for the position of Secretary-
General, is expected to improve ONAS’ organizational efficiency.
4.1.48 Environmental Sustainability: due to the unsatisfactory performance of biological
treatment, non-compliance with marine discharge standards and failure to take stormwater into
account in the serviced plots area, the project has a significant negative impact on the
49 Including: (i) an urban and rural water and sanitation sector policy paper, June 2005; (ii) a law governing public drinking water supply
and sanitation – Law No. 2008-59 of 24/9/2008; (iii) 8 July 2009 Sanitation Code; (iv) a performance contract concluded between the State and ONAS in August 2008.
50 Paper on the Urban Sanitation Situation presented by TFPs, European Union, 19 July 2011. 51 AFD, EIB, WB, EU Delegation.
16
environment. Its categorization deprived it of an environmental impact assessment and an
environmental management plan which are essential for this type of project.
4.1.49 Resistance to Exogenous Factors: variations in the prices of raw materials, particularly
oil, and exchange rate fluctuations negatively impact project outcomes owing to the wastewater
treatment process used in the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant52. The inappropriate
behaviour of users – the change of which takes a long time – also affects project performance.
Lastly, the sector’s heavy dependence on external financing, in a context of severe economic
crisis in developed countries, will likely affect project outcomes.
4.1.50 On the whole, the sustainability of project impacts is unsatisfactory.
4.2 Performance Ratings
(a) Overall Project Performance and Outcomes
4.2.1 Though the project is relevant, its quality at entry assessment is unsatisfactory. This is
due to the technical options adopted, the non-consideration of lessons learned from the inclusion
of stormwater and other solid waste, the outfall problem and its limitation to the restructuring
of the existing network, excluding extension. The achievement of objectives and outcomes is
also considered to be unsatisfactory. In fact, the physical situation of outputs worsened,
particularly the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant extension component which is not
efficient and is part of a system (the entire plant) that is not at all compliant with environmental
standards of quality wastewater discharge.
4.2.2 ONAS’ weak financial, material and human capacity negatively affects the
sustainability of project impacts. This is due mainly to Government’s non-compliance with the
commitments contained in the performance contract concluded with ONAS, frequent power
outages and fuel shortages, which impede network and equipment maintenance operations. The
Government does not appear to display any real commitment to improving ONAS’ very
worrisome situation, although discussions are ongoing to find lasting solutions. The project’s
impact on institutional development is also considered to be unsatisfactory. On the whole, the
overall project performance is deemed to be unsatisfactory.
(b) Borrower Performance
4.2.3 Poor quality at entry assessment led to unsatisfactory Borrower performance at the
design stage owing to the insufficient assessment of the quality of designs (which are sometimes
not updated). In addition, the choice of the scaled down alternative of the “Cambérène
Treatment Plant extension” component constitutes, on account of its composition, capacity and
final cost, poor performance by ONAS which was unable to anticipate the poor performance of
the operation. Project implementation was characterized by: (i) the late appointment and
installation of the project coordinator; (ii) delay in project start-up, resulting in a rise in costs
and the scaling down of the initial objectives of the Cambérène Treatment Plant extension
component; (iii) failure to follow up the monitoring indicators contained in the appraisal report
until the end of the project and the signature of the performance contract between the
government and ONAS for a series of relevant performance indicators to be defined and
implemented; and (iii) non-compliance with the condition on the review of the price schedule.
52 Which affects energy expenditure and the importation of spare parts and, due to frequent power outages, requires the use of diesel-fired
generators.
17
4.2.4 Although the PIU’s implementation performance is deemed to be satisfactory, that of
ONAS, the project executing agency, is considered unsatisfactory due particularly to its weak
technical, financial and human capacity, resulting in maintenance problems as it seemed that
the government of Senegal had miscalculated the challenges to be addressed and failed to
mobilize enough resources for sanitation, focusing instead on the drinking water component of
the DWSS sector programmes. Overall, Borrower performance is considered to be
unsatisfactory.
(c) Bank Performance
4.2.5 Regarding project design, the Bank validated technical options that were not the best
adapted to the Senegalese context. The Bank further validated the scaled down solution
presented by the Contractor without making any specific remarks on its cost (reduction of
services provided with respect to the new budget), its capacity (11 300 m3/day) and/or its
composition (simple biological system whereas the Contractor had drawn the project owner’s
attention to the need to strengthen the sludge system with at least one primary sludge thickener).
Consequently, it failed to anticipate the actual impacts of this reduction (in case of lack of
additional funding) on project performance.
4.2.6 The possible risks, particularly ONAS’ weak (especially financial) capacity and
inadequate IEC Programme scope, likely to impact project performance – in terms of outcomes
and sustainability – also became much more prominent than envisaged during project design
and preparation phases. The Bank fielded one launching mission in November 2001 and nine
supervision missions between November 2003 and November 2008. The composition of these
missions was satisfactory. However, the Bank did not at any moment realize the consequences
of the errors of the technical options retained and the lack of additional funding. On the whole,
Bank performance is deemed unsatisfactory.
4.3 Factors Affecting Implementation Performance and Outcomes
4.3.1 Factors under the Borrower’s Control: the direct consequence of the housing typology
is the dumping of household refuse in sanitation networks and various types of waste in drains
and private connections, clogging pipes and causing the backflow of wastewater into some
plots. Also, ONAS’ poor financial and human resources situation is one of the key factors that
negatively affect implementation performance and outcomes. Furthermore, sand and
stormwater infiltration causes unnecessary and excessive costs (removal and treatment costs).
Frequent power cuts trigger standby generators, provided they have fuel, which is not always
the case. Consequently, the suspension of pumping in some systems has often had serious
consequences such as wastewater overflow and flooding. Finally, the attitude of households
towards infrastructure negatively affects outcomes.
4.3.2 Factors Beyond the Borrower’s Control: rising oil prices and exchange rate
fluctuations negatively impact implementation performance and outcomes.
V. CONCLUSION, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Conclusion
5.1.1 In order to address the renewed outbreak of diseases caused by poor sanitation and
hygiene in the city of Dakar and its environs, the PAVD, particularly through the extension of
the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant and the restructuring of the sanitation network of
the serviced plots area, took timely action to strengthen the outcomes of the Long-term Water
and Sanitation Programme, which is the cornerstone of Senegal’s long-term sector strategy.
18
5.1.2 The project failed to adequately address the chronic liquid and solid sanitation
problems faced by the targeted areas. This is due mainly to poor quality at entry, the profound
transformation of the city of Dakar and ONAS’ persistent lack of financial resources as a result
of a lack of sanitation service taxation mechanisms as well as the non-implementation of the
provisions of the performance contract concluded between the government and ONAS in terms
of operating subsidies to cover ONAS’ cash deficit.
5.2 Main Lessons
The emergence of a public-private partnership in the sanitation sector requires
an institutional framework that promotes: (i) the financial equilibrium of the
entity responsible for the technical, commercial and financial management of
sanitation services; (ii) the existence of a State-owned company that helps to
mobilize the funds needed to develop the sector and manage investment
contracts.
The adoption of a strategy for the development and efficient reuse of sanitation
by-products (treated wastewater, sludge and biogas) which is effectively
implemented is necessary for ensuring the efficiency of a treatment plant.
The adoption of a holistic approach through the inclusion of stormwater and
solid waste in a wastewater treatment project will provide more comprehensive
solutions to problems of liquid sanitation and insalubrity.
The systematic mainstreaming of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
(ESIAs) in sanitation projects, particularly those concerning wastewater
treatment plants is more useful than an inefficient environmental categorization
strategy.
The uncontrolled profound modification of a project’s scope may result in the
use of sub-optimal solutions that adversely affect its efficiency.
5.3 Main Recommendations
To the Senegalese Government:
Adopt a programme approach: the Government should, on the basis of the new
Dakar Master Plan which is being finalized, go beyond an ad hoc management
of sanitation projects by adopting a multi-donor coordinated programme
approach in order to find solutions to Dakar’s chronic solid and liquid waste
management problems.
Build ONAS’ financial capacity: the Government should build ONAS’ financial
capacity by: (i) increasing the sanitation levy based on a new tariff schedule that
is effectively applied; (ii) ensuring the rigorous management of unpaid bills,
particularly those of government services; and (iii) looking for other sustainable
sources of funding to improve ONAS’ self-financing capacity.
Strengthen the sanitation sector in Senegal: the Government should envisage the
institutional restructuring of ONAS into: (i) a State-owned company responsible
for the direct mobilization of funds needed to develop the sub-sector and manage
investment contracts; and (ii) into an operating company responsible solely for
technical, commercial and financial management of sanitation services.
19
Revise regulations: the Government should ensure compliance with the
regulations applicable to the operation of wastewater treatment plants (quality of
treated wastewater) for discharge on land and river environments and amend the
regulation on the discharge of treated wastewater into the sea by setting a quality
target for the natural environment that would guide the choice of technical
treatment arrangements.
To ONAS:
Formulate a strategy for the development and reuse of by-products: ONAS
should define a genuine strategy for the development and efficient reuse of
wastewater treatment by-products.
Improve the efficiency of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant: ONAS
should: (i) upgrade the sludge system to limit the discharge of sludge and treated
effluent; (ii) protect the plant against the risk of flooding53; (iii) restore existing
pre-treatment facilities; (iv) carry on construction work to install the new sea
outfall as the existing one is too close to the beaches; and (iv) secure funding to
install the third treatment system within the framework of a comprehensive
Dakar City Sanitation Programme.
Ensure environmental protection: ONAS should systematically conduct, in
parallel with technical studies, ESIAs and ensure the holding of public
consultations to present projects as well as their environmental impacts and
mitigation measures (environmental management plans).
To the Bank:
Ensure quality at entry assessment: during project preparation, the Bank should
ensure the availability of key design studies and the technological options
retained for better cost estimation and reduction of implementation time frames
that undermine the outcomes of infrastructure projects. Exhaustive and quality
feasibility studies could necessitate funding by trust funds and should include
monitoring and evaluation, gender and environmental aspects as well as the
participation of beneficiaries. Furthermore, past lessons should be effectively
considered.
Modify the project: where financing is inadequate, the Bank should allow major
project modification only after assessing the impact of such modification with
respect to initial project objectives; otherwise, the Bank should ensure the
availability of additional financing to fill the gap.
Adopt the programme approach: the Bank should orient any new action related
to the sanitation of the Dakar City within the framework of a comprehensive
programme that includes wastewater, stormwater and solid waste, in conjunction
with other financial partners.
Mainstream the conduct of environmental and social impact assessments in
sanitation projects: given the intrinsic nature of sanitation projects, particularly
those concerning wastewater treatment plants, the Bank should systematically
demand the conduct of environmental and social impact assessments with
53 Using the resources provided by the government.
20
environmental management plans including the resources needed for their
implementation.
21
ANNEXES
Annex 1
Map of Dakar and P roject Area
Source: PAVD Senegal Project Appraisal Report (ADF/BD/WP/2001/72)
ANNEX 2 – LOGIC MODEL OF THE PROJECT
Development of Treatment By-
products.
Improved social, health
and environmental
conditions in the project
area
Do the people feel that the quality of their living environment has improved?
Improved health status
Increased disposable income
Improved school attendance (among girls in particular)
Activities
Extension of the treatment
plant through the
construction and
equipping of treatment
units
Outputs Short-term Outcomes Intermediate Outcomes
Impacts
IEC campaigns on
sanitation and health
Treatment infrastructure
improved and functional
Knowledge of health
practices and sanitation
problems improved
Wastewater pumping
infrastructure improved and
functional
Domestic wastewater
treatment capacity has
increased
ONAS Institutional
Support:
- Organizational study - Study on and
implementation of a relational database and an information and archiving system
Good health and hygiene
practices are applied
ONAS’ organizational study
adopted and Information and
archiving system functional. ONAS’ organizational
capacity has increased
Quantity of reusable water
produced has increased
Restructuring of the
wastewater pumping
system through the
construction and
rehabilitation of
pumping stations
Wastewater pumping
capacity has increased
Reduced incidence of
diseases caused by poor
hygiene and sanitation
Quantity of sludge reused
as fertilizer has increased
Improved quality of water
discharged into the sea
improved
ONAS’ additional
resources
Methane gas production has
increased
ONAS’ operational
capacity has
improved
Annex 3
1/2
Indicators Unit 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 (e)
National Accounts
GNI at Current Prices Million US $ 5 038 12 023 12 954 13 428 13 661 ... ...
GNI per Capita US$ 530 1 020 1 070 1 080 1 070 ... ...
GDP at Current Prices Million US $ 4 693 13 414 12 807 12 901 14 355 12 613 13 425
GDP at 2000 Constant prices Million US $ 4 693 6 571 6 728 7 018 7 165 7 431 7 748
Real GDP Growth Rate % 3,2 3,7 2,4 4,3 2,1 3,7 4,3
Real per Capita GDP Growth Rate % 0,6 1,0 -0,3 1,6 -0,5 1,1 1,6
Gross Domestic Investment % GDP 20,4 31,3 22,1 22,6 25,3 25,8 27,0
Public Investment % GDP 4,5 6,2 6,3 6,4 6,6 7,6 8,8
Private Investment % GDP 15,9 25,1 15,7 16,2 18,7 18,2 18,2
Gross National Savings % GDP 14,6 19,7 22,6 25,3 22,3 22,5 22,9
Prices and Money
Inflation (CPI) % 0,7 5,7 -2,2 1,2 3,4 2,5 1,6
Exchange Rate (Annual Average) local currency/US$ 712,0 447,8 472,2 495,3 471,9 510,5 ...
Monetary Growth (M2) % 10,7 1,8 11,4 13,7 6,8 ... ...
Money and Quasi Money as % of GDP % 23,6 33,4 36,9 39,8 40,0 ... ...
Government Finance
Total Revenue and Grants % GDP 18,7 21,5 21,6 21,9 22,5 23,1 23,0
Total Expenditure and Net Lending % GDP 18,2 26,3 26,8 27,3 29,1 30,1 30,9
Overall Deficit (-) / Surplus (+) % GDP 0,5 -4,8 -5,2 -5,4 -6,6 -7,0 -7,9
External Sector
Exports Volume Growth (Goods) % -12,1 -8,3 26,3 0,8 2,7 -8,6 3,7
Imports Volume Growth (Goods) % -4,5 27,5 -7,8 -5,6 8,3 -4,7 0,1
Terms of Trade Growth % -1,4 35,9 -5,7 -2,4 1,5 1,2 -4,8
Current Account Balance Million US $ -328 -1 888 -856 -584 -1 103 -1 086 -1 251
Current Account Balance % GDP -7,0 -14,1 -6,7 -4,5 -7,7 -8,6 -9,3
External Reserves months of imports 2,7 2,7 4,8 4,7 3,9 3,5 ...
Debt and Financial Flows
Debt Service % exports 15,4 4,2 5,5 5,8 13,7 7,9 7,9
External Debt % GDP 81,0 43,7 51,9 53,2 48,5 59,7 60,2
Net Total Financial Flows Million US $ 482 1 361 1 396 924 1 255 ... ...
Net Official Development Assistance Million US $ 431 1 069 1 016 928 1 052 ... ...
Net Foreign Direct Investment Million US $ 63 398 320 266 286 ... ...
Source : AfDB Statistics Department; IMF: World Economic Outlook, October 2012 and International Financial Statistics, October 2012;
AfDB Statistics Department: Development Data Portal Database, March 2013. United Nations: OECD, Reporting System Division.
Notes: … Data Not Available ( e ) Estimations Last Update: May 2013
SenegalSelected Macroeconomic Indicators
0,0
1,0
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
8,0
200
0
200
1
200
2
200
3
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
%
Real GDP Growth Rate, 2000-2013
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Inflation (CPI),
2000-2013
-16,0
-14,0
-12,0
-10,0
-8,0
-6,0
-4,0
-2,0
0,0
2 000
2 001
2 002
2 003
2 004
2 005
2 006
2 007
2 008
2 009
2 010
2 011
2 012
2 013
Current Account Balance as % of GDP,
2000-2013
Annex 3
2/2
Year Senegal Africa
Develo-
ping
Countries
Develo-
ped
Countries
Basic Indicators
Area ( '000 Km²) 2011 197 30 323 98 458 35 811Total Population (millions) 2012 13,7 1 070,1 0,0 0,0Urban Population (% of Total) 2012 42,8 40,8 47,1 78,0Population Density (per Km²) 2012 64,9 34,5 69,8 23,5GNI per Capita (US $) 2012 1 040 1 604 3 795 37 653Labor Force Participation - Total (%) 2012 40,5 37,8 68,7 72,0Labor Force Participation - Female (%) 2012 43,9 42,5 38,9 44,5Gender -Related Dev elopment Index Value 2007-2011 0,457 0,525 0,694 0,911Human Dev elop. Index (Rank among 187 countries)2008-2012 154 ... ... ...Popul. Liv ing Below $ 1.25 a Day (% of Population)2009-2011 29,6 40,0 20,6 ...
Demographic Indicators
Population Grow th Rate - Total (%) 2012 2,9 2,3 1,3 0,3Population Grow th Rate - Urban (%) 2012 3,6 3,4 2,6 0,7Population < 15 y ears (%) 2012 43,5 40,0 28,5 16,4Population >= 65 y ears (%) 2012 3,0 3,6 6,0 16,6Dependency Ratio (%) 2012 84,3 77,3 52,6 49,2Sex Ratio (per 100 female) 2012 96,1 100,0 103,3 94,3Female Population 15-49 y ears (% of total population) 2012 24,4 49,8 53,3 45,6Life Ex pectancy at Birth - Total (y ears) 2012 63,3 58,1 68,2 77,7Life Ex pectancy at Birth - Female (y ears) 2012 64,7 59,1 70,1 81,1Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000) 2012 38,1 33,3 21,4 11,3Crude Death Rate (per 1,000) 2012 7,7 10,9 7,6 10,3Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 2012 49,6 71,4 40,9 5,6Child Mortality Rate (per 1,000) 2012 74,3 111,3 57,7 6,7Total Fertility Rate (per w oman) 2012 5,0 4,2 2,6 1,7Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000) 2006-2010 370,0 415,3 240,0 16,0Women Using Contraception (%) 2012 13,9 34,5 62,4 71,4
Health & Nutrition Indicators
Phy sicians (per 100,000 people) 2004-2010 5,9 49,2 103,7 291,9Nurses (per 100,000 people)* 2004-2009 42,0 133,0 168,7 734,3Births attended by Trained Health Personnel (%) 2006-2010 65,1 53,7 64,3 ...Access to Safe Water (% of Population) 2011 73,4 67,8 86,5 99,1Access to Health Serv ices (% of Population) 2000 90,0 65,2 80,0 100,0Access to Sanitation (% of Population) 2011 51,4 40,2 56,8 96,1Percent. of Adults (aged 15-49) Liv ing w ith HIV/AIDS 2011 0,7 4,6 0,9 0,5Incidence of Tuberculosis (per 100,000) 2011 136,0 234,6 146,0 23,0Child Immunization Against Tuberculosis (%) 2011 95,0 81,6 83,9 95,4Child Immunization Against Measles (%) 2011 82,0 76,5 83,7 93,5Underw eight Children (% of children under 5 y ears) 2006-2011 19,2 19,8 17,0 1,4Daily Calorie Supply per Capita 2009 2 479 2 481 2 675 3 285Public Ex penditure on Health (as % of GDP) 2010-2011 3,5 5,9 2,9 7,4
Education Indicators
Gross Enrolment Ratio (%)
Primary School - Total 2009-2012 86,2 107,0 107,8 102,7 Primary School - Female 2009-2012 89,0 103,1 106,2 102,3 Secondary School - Total 2009-2012 42,1 46,3 66,4 100,4 Secondary School - Female 2009-2012 40,3 41,9 65,1 100,0Primary School Female Teaching Staff (% of Total) 2009-2012 30,6 39,2 58,6 81,3Adult literacy Rate - Total (%) 2009 49,7 71,5 80,2 …Adult literacy Rate - Male (%) 2009 61,8 78,4 85,9 …Adult literacy Rate - Female (%) 2009 38,7 64,9 74,8 …Percentage of GDP Spent on Education 2008-2010 5,6 5,3 4,5 5,5
Environmental Indicators
Land Use (Arable Land as % of Total Land Area) 2011 20,0 7,6 10,7 10,8Annual Rate of Deforestation (%) 2000-2009 0,7 0,6 0,4 -0,2Forest (As % of Land Area) 2011 43,8 23,0 28,7 40,4Per Capita CO2 Emissions (metric tons) 2009 0,4 1,2 3,0 11,6
Sources : AfDB Statistics Department Databases; World Bank: World Development Indicators; last update :
UNAIDS; UNSD; WHO, UNICEF, WRI, UNDP; Country Reports.
Note : n.a. : Not Applicable ; … : Data Not Available.
COMPARATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Senegal
october 2013
0102030405060708090
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Infant Mortality Rate( Per 1000 )
Senegal Africa
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
GNI Per Capita US $
Senegal Africa
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Population Growth Rate (%)
Senegal Africa
111213141516171
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)
Senegal Africa
Annex 4
Page 1/8
PROJECT TECHNICAL ASPECTS
1. Shortcomings of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant (TP) and the Wastewater
Pumping System (Preliminary Design)
Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant (TP): the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant,
commissioned in 1989 to serve 100 000 people, was designed to operate on the activated sludge
treatment system, with an excess sludge treatment unit, among others (digester and drying beds).
Treated water was pumped into a 600 mm diameter and 900 m-long pipe before gravitationally passing
through a 600 mm diameter and 1800 m-long pipe, these two pipes being the land section of the outfall.
Once on the seashore, water passed through a 400 mm pipe and was discharged about 200 m offshore;
it is the marine section of the outfall destroyed by storms shortly after construction at the end of the
1980s which thus caused the discharge of water onto the beach for a long period. To address this
situation, a temporary flexible 400 mm diameter and about 200 m long pipe was laid in 2001. As a result,
discharge was too close to the bank to protect the coastline from pollution. In addition, the bursting of
the pipe in Cambérène village in 2002 caused the flooding of many houses by the plant effluents.
With the extension of Dakar’s sewer system, coverage increased almost four-fold in ten years, leading
to high demand on the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant. Its rehabilitation and extension in 2004
notwithstanding, the overworked plant could no longer meet the ever-increasing treatment demands.
Table 1 below presents the trends in the design parameters of the Cambérène Wastewater Plant.
Table 1: Changes in the Design Parameters of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant
DEGREMONT
1988-1989
1st Reinforcement
Biwater (2002-2003)
Parameters Units Quantity Quantity
Population Eq.Inhab. 100 000 200 000
Average flow rate m3/d 9600 19200
m3/d 400 800
Peak flow factor 1.75 1.75
Peak flow rate per second m3/h 700 1400
BOD5 Kg/d 6 000 14 976
mg/l 625 780
Suspended matter (SM) kg/d 9000 18 000
mg/l 937 938
Maximum temperature of effluents °C 30 30
Quality of Treated Water*
BOD5 at 20°C at full load for 2hrs mg/l ≤ 30 ≤ 30
BOD5 at 20°C at full load for 24hrs mg/l ≤ 20 ≤ 20
SM at average load for 24hrs mg/l ≤ 30 ≤ 30
COD at full load for 2hrs mg/l ≤ 120 ≤ 120
COD at full load for 24hrs mg/l ≤ 90 ≤ 90
Putrescibility test Negative Negative
* Senegalese standards are 50mg/l for SM, 40 mg/l for BOD5 and 100 mg/l for COD.
Annex 4
Page 2/8
Domestic Wastewater Pumping System in the serviced plots area (Parcelles Assainies): The serviced
plots area is a densely populated residential neighbourhood in the northern suburbs of Dakar. It
developed in an area originally made up of niayes, backwater, dunes and wasteland characterized by a
very marked micro-relief in a mostly flat environment. It is Dakar’s most densely populated sub-district
(arrondissement). It comprises 26 units, each made up of about 500 concessions, and has the lowest
community sanitation coverage rate (17% against 34% in Pikine, 40% in Greater Dakar, 58% in
Colobane).
The existing pumping system was made up of 9 (nine) pumping stations (including that of DjilyMbaye)
in which wastewater generated in a given sub-zone could be pumped several times before being
discharged into the collector. This system caused overloading in many pumping stations, leading to
energy wastage. It also led to the appearance of effluent overflow and spreading areas on roads owing
to the relay functioning of the pumping stations, the outdated facilities as well as the under-sizing of
equipment. This situation posed hazards to the health of the neighbouring population and public
sanitation. As a result, it became necessary to restructure the existing pumping system for greater
efficiency. Moreover, the serviced plots area had virtually no stormwater collection and drainage
infrastructure.
2. Project Components
Table 2 : Project Components
No. Component Description
Amount in UA
Million
(percentage)
1 Extension of the
Cambérène
Wastewater Treatment
Plant
Construct two treatment units, each designed to treat 10 000 cubic metres
of domestic wastewater per day (that is about 100 000 inhabitants-
equivalent) and 9 000 kilogrammes of sludge per day from wastewater
treatment. The two new units would treat a daily average flow of 20 000
m3/d, thereby increasing the total capacity of the Cambérène Treatment
Plant from 10 000 m3/d to 30 000 m3/d
8.34 (62%)
2 Restructuring of the
Domestic Wastewater
Pumping System of
the serviced plots area
Restructure the sanitation system and upgrade the 9 pumping stations
which pump wastewater from the various areas (units) of the serviced plots
area neighbourhood to the Cambérène Treatment Plant.
Works to upgrade the pumping capacity comprise the rehabilitation of 3
out of the 9 existing pumping stations (units 7, 9 and 23) and the
construction of 6 new stations (for units 2, 13, 15, 22, DjilyMbaye and
Nord Stade) whose proposed design flow rates vary from 21 to 170 l/s.
2.95 (22%)
3 IEC Programme Carry out awareness-raising actions on sanitation and health education
issues among the beneficiary populations in the project area, especially to
ensure the success of project implementation.
0.20 (1%)
4 Studies, Works
Supervision and
Control
This component is expected to help to: (i) update studies and technical
specifications of supplies and works and readjust the existing bidding
documents (BDs), (ii) participate in the preparation, publication,
examination and analysis of tenders, and (iii) supervise and control works
executed by contractors.
0.40 (3%)
5 Institutional Support Set up a unit within ONAS’ Directorate of Studies and Works to
coordinate project implementation and, especially : (i) issue invitations to
bid; (ii) supervise the provision of services by consulting firms; (iii) ensure
coordination between the various project stakeholders, especially with
ADF; (iv) ensure project administrative and financial monitoring and
inform ADF accordingly in periodic reports; and (v) prepare and submit
to ADF the Borrower’s project completion report within the six months
following project completion.
0.27 (2%)
6 Project Management
This component was intended to help to conduct for ONAS: (i) an
organizational study with a view to proposing an organizational chart
that is more closely adapted to its mission; and (ii) the study for
establishing a relational database as well as a computerized archiving
system.
1.29 (10%)
Annex 4
Page 3/8
3. Financial Bids for the Extension of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant: owing to
the increase in market prices, the financial bids received were too high in relation to the estimated budget.
The lowest bidder (STEREAU) made a CFAF 9.62 billion54 proposal for the firm tranche and CFAF
11.84 billion for all the extension works, including the optional tranche, as initially provided for at
project appraisal. However, the budget set aside for this component in the ADF financing was 6.8
billion55, showing a CFAF 3.04 billion financing gap in relation to the firm tranche and a CFAF 5.26
billion gap for the complete tranche. The search for additional financing from the European Union’s
financing line for support to Senegal’s sanitation sector (CFAF 7.87 billion) to cover the shortfall was
recommended to the Government by the Bank, but the procedure finally did not go through.
4. Existing Land and Marine Outfall: located in a basin, the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment
Plant has a pumping system which pumps water from the basin (from the TP, treated water and from the
By-pass) to a high point from where it flows gravitationally towards the ocean through a land, then
marine, outfall whose capacity is an important and limiting factor, but not sufficiently taken into account
by the project. In fact, the pumping capacity is insufficient during the rainy season when, not
hydraulically accepted for treatment (partial – primary – or complete) wastewater from the plant
overflows the networks and spreads out around the plant, while waiting to be drained.
5. Extension of the Cambérène Plant: as part of the extension of the wastewater treatment plant,
and based on the guidelines contained in the BD, TEREAU (lowest bidder) proposed a consistent plant
for both water and sludge systems by tripling the treatment capacity of the Cambérène TP. This objective
was supposed to be achieved in two phases. The first phase basically had to do with: (i) improving the
biological treatment of the existing “activated sludge” through biological denitrification, and (ii)
implementing a second activated sludge biological treatment process. The second phase to be carried
out later was expected to complete the treatment facility by: (i) implementing a third “activated sludge”
biological treatment process and, at the same time, (ii) increasing the treatment capacity (daily volume
of the treated effluents). In order to address the above-mentioned financial constraint, the Bank requested
ONAS to see what could be done technically with the ADF financing available for the treatment plant
extension works. This recommendation thus paved the way for a sub-optimal solution, with a CFAF
5.68 billion contract for the firm tranche, excluding its sludge treatment component. Table 3 below
summarizes the implemented project.
Table 3: Rehabilitation and Second Extension by STEREAU
STEREAU’s Proposal 56 Project Implementation (after scale down)
1. For the firm tranche (partially implemented)
carry out pre-treatment (screening and grit and grease removal)
for a 40 000 m3/d flow rate Not implemented
carry out primary treatment for a flow rate of 30 000 m3/d Not implemented
carry out secondary (biological) treatment for a 20 000 m3/d
flow rate
Secondary treatment with a 11300 m3/d flow
rate (System 2)
Transformation of System 1 primary
sedimentation tank into an anoxic tank
equip the Treatment Plant with a sludge dewatering unit Not implemented
2. For the conditional tranche (not implemented)
Upgrade the plant for secondary treatment with a 30 000 m3/d
flow rate Not implemented
54At the UA exchange rate of December 2005. 55Idem 13. 56Successful bidder.
Annex 4
Page 4/8
6. Schematic Representation of the Water Balance of the Cambérène TP
Source : Post-evaluation Team, August 2011
Annex 4
Page 5/8
7. Trends in the Volume of Wastewater Pumped by Station from 2007 to 20100 (in m3/year)
8. Improvement of the Quality of Water Discharged into the Sea: the quality of water
discharged is assessed by ONAS, in accordance with
Senegalese environmental standards, following the SM,
COD and BOD concentration and faecal coliforms57.
The analysis of these parameters of the level of pollution
of the Cambérène plant effluents shows that, since 2009,
the biological treatment output of the Cambérène TP is
low and that the effluents from the two treatment
systems no longer comply with the Senegalese standards
(SS) for these indicators. Data for 2009 show that treated
water complies with SS for SM with an average 29 mg/l
(for SS of SM, the concentration must be below 50
mg/l), but the situation deteriorated from 2010 (see
Table 5, Annex 13). Conversely, for BOD5 and COD,
the standards were never complied with before and after
project implementation.
Regarding sea discharge output, standards (SM, BOD5
and COD) are not also complied with, given the mixture
of treated water and by-passed water (see Table 6). In
addition, owing to lack of an appropriate treatment
mechanism, excess sludge from the new treatment system
cannot be sent for digestion and is discharged directly,
together with treated and by-passed water, thereby further
deteriorating the quality of discharges into the sea58. ONAS’ sea discharge objective for 2009 was 85%,
which it failed to achieve. In fact, specific average treatment output results (sea discharge) for the last
year of operation with data (2009)59 is about 75%, with the lowest being 56% and the highest 81%. To
scale down their output objectives, the TP operators in May 2009 introduced the concept of degraded
mode output. Set at 50%, this output enables the operators to attain this arbitrarily set threshold60. In
short, the project does not protect the natural environment it is expected to preserve.
57 Data on faecal coliforms are not available. 58 The sea discharge balance sheet is summarized as follows: Total pollution discharged = Residual pollution on systems 1 and 2 + By-
pass treated water pollution + Sludge pollution of biological system 2. 59 Since July 2011, treatment outputs are no longer determined owing to lack of flow meters. 60 «Details on the Capacity, Flow Rate and Level of Treatment of the Cambérène Treatment Plant », Interim Report of 30 November 2009
– Directorate of Sanitation and Public Hygiene, ONAS (European Union Funding)
Table 4: Trends in Pumped Volume from 2007 to 2010
(m3/year)
STATIONS 2007 2009 2010
PS 02 779 592 1 212 112 1 341 363
PS 07 464 843 495 170 554 480
PS 09 63 300 155 150 204 448
PS 13 1 405 544 535 294 600 144
PS 15 657 219 1 031 880 981 175
PS 17 10 715 34 174 26 784
PS 22 139 438 140 877 166 562
PS 23 107 628 650 721 785 575
TOTAL 3 628 279 4 255 378 4 660 531
Variation + 17.28% +9.52%
Source : Operations Reports, ONAS
Table 5: Characterization of the Effluents of Treatment
Systems 1 and 2
Parameter System 2008 2009 2010 2011* Standard
SM (mg/l) 1 25 29 68 70 50
2 53 55
BOD5
(mg/l) 1 45 59 99 78
40
2 102 52
COD (mg/l) 1 109 157 193 218 100
2 161 213
Source : DEX ONAS Annual Reports 2008, 2009, 2010 and
June 2011.- * June 2011
Table 6: Characterization of Effluents Discharged
into the Sea after Pre-treatment (35% of daily flow)
Parameter 2008 2009 2010 2011*
By-pass volume (m3/d) 9400 8500
SM (mg/l) 424 613 691 691
BOD5 (mg/l) 728 1 026 937 937
COD (mg/l) 1 286 1 910 1708 1708
Source : DEX ONAS Annual Reports 2008, 2009, 2010 and
June 2011.- * June 2011
Annex 4
Page 6/8
9. Reuse of Water Treated by the Cambérène Treatment Plant: in terms of reuse of treated water,
the effluents of treatment system 2 financed under this project had a potential of 6 347 600 m3 in 2009
(12 800 m3/d against 2 659 000 m3 in 2008). In other words, the quantity of potentially reusable water61
was multiplied by 2.4 between 2008 and 2009. However, this potential is still untapped. Furthermore,
the project has not had any impact on the healthy reuse of treated water (agricultural irrigation, etc.)
owing to lack of financing for tertiary treatment. The old system 1 still has its 5 700 m3/d reuse potential
which is yet to be absorbed by potential clients made up of the golf course and public works and civil
engineering (BTP) companies. Thus, the average volume of filtered water was only 12 000 m3/month in
2010 and 4 700 m3/month during the first half of 2011. The volume of treated wastewater sold dropped
from 3 000 m3/month in 2010 to 574 m3/month in 2011, as a result of the suspension of distribution to
Dakar-Technopol Golf Club in 2010, the only remaining consumers being market gardeners.
10. Sludge Production in the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant:
Table 7: Current Sludge Production in the Cambérène Treatment Plant
Sludge Quantity
(tons/day)
Sludge Volume
(m3/day)
20g/l
primary
sludge
20 g/l fresh sludge 10.2 510
20 g/l excess sludge from system 1 2.0 100
Excess sludge from system 2 8.0 1 000
TOTAL 20.2 1 610 Source: Upgrading of the sludge and energy production system in the Cambérène treatment plant – Final Design, ONAS – European Union,
June 2010.
The above table shows high sludge production. However, in the absence of a sludge thickener, such high
sludge production is characterized by: (i) the sending of high water content sludge into the digesters; (ii)
short duration of sludge in the digesters; (iii) low biogas production by the digesters; and (iv) the sending
of considerable volumes of thin sludge to the drying beds62. This clogging also reduces the natural
dehydration of sludge. In addition, the under-sizing of the overflow evacuation pipe in relation to the
volumes of sludge received by the digester cause permanent flooding around the digesters.
Excess secondary sludge produced by the second treatment system built by the project is drained during
the off-peak period (night) through the Cambérène outfall. In contrast, primary sludge from the primary
sedimentation tank effectively contributes to supplying the sludge treatment system of treatment system
1. However, 42% of the effluents of the primary sedimentation tank is made up of wastewater from the
pumping stations of the serviced plots area (12 800 m3/d of
which 13% is discharged around the plant, while 87 %
undergoes primary treatment – screening, grit removal and
primary sedimentation). Consequently, the project
accounts for about 42% of the quantity of sludge generated
by the plant. Between 2008 and 2009, secondary sludge
generated increased from 19 930 mg VSS/l to 29 650 mg
VSS/l from treatment system 1, with the project
contributing from 8 370 mg VSS/l to 11 190 mg VSS/l.
The increase thus generated between 2008 and 2009 stood at 34%.
61 Water resulting from the secondary system installed by the project can be reused with less risk only for bee keeping, watering of fruit
trees, recharging water tables (under certain conditions) and supplying water for some public works. 62 Upgrading of the sludge and energy production system in the Cambérène Treatment Plant – Final Design, ONAS – European Union,
June 2010.
Table 8 : Percentage of VSS/SM of
Sludge Produced by the Cambérène
Treatment Plant
Type of Sludge VSS/SM (%)
Fresh primary sludge 70
Primary digested
sludge 64
Secondary digested
sludge 60
Source : Operations Progress Report Dakar 2, DEX ONAS, 2010
Annex 4
Page 7/8
Regarding the quantity of sludge produced, Table 8 (see Annex 13) shows the VSS/SM percentages,
indicating the proportion of organic matter in the sludge. It shows that after digestion, the percentage is
too high in relation to the design standards (0.65 for fresh sludge), suggesting a low output. Concerning
the sale of sludge, about 2 900 m3 of dehydrated sludge were sold in 2010 (that is 250 m3/month on
average).
11. New Cambérène Sea Outfall: the project for the construction of a new Cambérène sea outfall is
financed by the European Union to the tune of about CFAF 12.8 billion. It comprises two phases, namely a
land phase and a maritime phase. The land phase covers 2400 metres, from the seashore treatment plant
to Cambérène. The maritime phase consists in building an off-shore outfall whose normal outlet will be
located 1700 metres from the bank and 40 metres below water. In addition to this, its pumping capacity
will be increased (its peak flow rate will be increased to about 52 000 m3/day) through the extension of
the tank of the discharge station and the installation of a fourth pump. The implementation of this project
is expected to relatively deactivate the existing 200 m sea outfall. By enabling the discharge of treated
water far out in the sea (1 700 metres), thereby encouraging its dispersal in the ocean, the new outfall is
supposed to allay the concerns of the Cambérène population about the risks of polluting their beach. For
various reasons, however, the construction of this new outfall has been opposed by the neighbouring
population. In the absence of support from the main beneficiaries, the European Union was therefore
planning to suspend the project.
12. Trends in some Cases of Diseases caused by Poor Hygiene and Sanitation
13. Reduction of the Cost of the Cambérène Treatment Plant Extension Component
Table 10: Level of Reduction of the Cost of the Cambérène Treatment Plant Extension Component
No. Item
INITIAL
PROJECT
ACTUAL COST REDUCTION
(in CFAF) (in CFAF) (in CFAF) (%)
1 Overheads 952 059 715 832 831 587 119 228 128 13%
2 Studies 1 636 160 696 1 353 940 353 282 220 343 17%
3 Water treatment
system 2 538 904 333 1 156 171 503 1 382 732 830 54%
4 Sludge treatment
system 1 633 877 998 135 738 522 1 498 139 476 92%
Table 9: Trends in Some Cases of Diseases caused by Poor Hygiene and Sanitation in the Project Area
and in Pikine Between 2007 and 2009 (in %)
2007 2009
ParcellesAssainies Pikine Parcelles Assainies Pikine
Uncomplicated malaria 20.0% 8.4% 4.3% 1.7%
Diarrhoea 2.6% 2.0% 1.2% 2.7%
Amoebic dysentery 0.8% 0.4% 0.2% 0.5%
Helminthiasis 1.7% 2.7% 0.4% 3.8%
Population 360 847 582 654 376 397 656 362
Source: MSP-SNIS/Health Statistics 2007 Volume II 841 pages and Health Statistics 2009. 255 pages
Annex 4
Page 8/8
No. Item
INITIAL
PROJECT
ACTUAL COST REDUCTION
(in CFAF) (in CFAF) (in CFAF) (%)
5 Common works 2 252 873 778 1 924 918 176 327 955 602 15%
6 Miscellaneous 535 667 100 294 418 000 241 249 100 45%
TOTAL (ET) 9 549 543 620 5 698 018 141 3 851 525 479 40%
Water + sludge treatment system 4 172 782 331 1 291 910 025 2 880 872 306
69%
Others 970 653 173 18%
% Water + sludge treatment system 44% 23%
Annex 4
Page 9/8
In other words, with the same amount, the project could have done better, especially regarding the
implementation of the minimum envisaged for sludge treatment (primary thickener). In fact, the project
was adapted to the available budget to the detriment of the water and sludge treatment system which are
the substance of the project, and to the advantage of the other more general items. In fact, whereas the
two treatment systems which accounted for 44% of the total project cost experienced a cost reduction of
about 69%, the other items (overheads, studies, common works and miscellaneous), which initially
accounted for 56%, were reduced by only 18% while the final project adopted was reduced to a mere
biological line (aeration tank, final sedimentation tank and recirculation, since pre-treatments, primary
sedimentation tanks and the 2nd treatment system and sludge treatment/dewatering were abandoned).
Moreover, the weight of overheads (site facilities mostly) and studies are 2 or 3 times higher than the
standards.
Annex 5
1/8
Rating Tables – Evaluation Criteria
DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT
INDICATORS
Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
1 Relevance and Quality at
Entry Assessment
2 Unsatisfactory
1.1 Relevance 3 Satisfactory
1.1.1 Consistency with the needs of
the population
3 The project provides support to efforts made by the
Government to address the renewed outbreak of diseases
due to the unsanitary conditions under which the
populations of the city of Dakar and its environs live.
1.1.2 Consistency with overall
country development strategy
3 The project is aligned with Senegal’s Ninth Economic and
Social Development Plan (1996-2001), in particular, with
one of its key strategic thrusts, namely: the improvement
of government involvement in the provision of services
and basic infrastructure and ensuring sound water
resource management. The project’s objectives are also an
extension of those of the Long-term Water Sector
Programme (LWSP) considered as the cornerstone of the
long-term sector strategy.
Consistency with Bank
assistance strategy
3 The project is also in line with the Bank’s strategy for
Senegal (1999-2001) which, under the “infrastructure”
pillar, seeks to strengthen social facilities in urban and
peri-urban areas. Moreover, it is consistent with the
Bank’s general priorities which are poverty reduction and
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) in the area of water supply and sanitation.
1.2
1.2
Quality at Entry
Assessment
2 Unsatisfactory
1.2.1 Baseline technical studies and
choice of treatment
technologies
2 The project opted for an extension of the Cambérène
Wastewater Treatment Plant whose core technological
options (activated sludge treatment process) were adopted
at the time of its initial construction. The pre-feasibility
studies show weaknesses in the determination of the costs
of treatment and ensuring proper project integration.
Moreover, classified under Environmental Category II,
the project was not subject to an in-depth environmental
and social impact assessment, which did not allow for
measures to be taken to reduce the significant negative
environmental impacts. Owing to a shortcoming resulting
from the flood-prone nature of the plant site, long-lasting
malfunctions have been noticed.
Annex 5
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DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT
INDICATORS
Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
1.2.2 Optimality of the final
solution approved by the
Bank and the Borrower
2 In downscaling the volume of works because of the
financing gap, the Borrower and the Bank adopted a non
optimal alternative solution. The project did not also
sufficiently take into account the limits of the existing land
and marine outfall whose low capacity is an important and
limiting factor during the rainy season. In addition, this
outfall, which is an important protection for the natural
environment, has poor hydraulic characteristics and
coupled with an uncertain sustainability, its usefulness is
reduced.
1.2.3 Reflection of Bank Group
experience and lessons
learned in sub-programme
design
2 The design did not take into consideration one of the
lessons learned from an observation made on a previous
wastewater treatment project in the city of Dakar and its
environs: namely the need to include stormwater.
Moreover, the project was limited to restructuring the
existing network without extending it further, which
makes it more difficult and more costly to connect
households located far from the system, thus maintaining
the level of household connection to the community
system low.
2 Achievement of Objectives
and Outputs (“Efficacy”)
2 Unsatisfactory
2.1 Achievement and quality of
physical outputs
2 Unsatisfactory
2.1.1 Improved and operational
treatment facilities
2 Out of the two new treatment units with a 10 000 m3/d
treatment capacity each, the project constructed one
incomplete unit (biological system) with an 11 300 m3
capacity, excluding residual sludge treatment/conversion.
The infrastructure adopted was professionally
constructed.. However, the location of the Low-Voltage
Distribution Panel (LVDP) at a regularly flooded area is
unfortunate as it causes the deactivation of the entire plant
for safety reasons. Moreover, the facilities have, for some
years now, been affected by the increased flow rate,
excessive silting of the grit chambers and pre-treatment
instability owing to very advanced wear and tear and
flooding of the digester.
2.1.2 Improved and operational
wastewater pumping
facilities
3 The PAVD mainly consisted in optimizing the system by
enabling the pumping stations to operate independently of
each other. As planned, it helped to rehabilitate 3 stations
and create 6 new ones in addition to that of Djily Mbaye
financed with Government funds. Concerning the state of
the facilities, data supplied by the pumping stations section
show that the hydraulic and electronic equipment procured
breaks down from time to time.
Annex 5
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DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT
INDICATORS
Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
2.1.3 Improvement of
knowledge of good health
practices and sanitation
problems
3 In all, 15 549 people participated in information/education
sessions. Hygiene outreach workers and committees were
supervised through social work at least once a week.
Measures and initiatives were thus adopted to encourage
behaviour change.
2.1.4 ONAS’ organizational
studies adopted and
information and archiving
system operational
3 PAVD was limited to supporting the documentation
centre because of the conduct of a more comprehensive
organizational study financed by the European Union.
The major recommendations of this study were used to
prepare a project being implemented.
2.2 Short-term (Direct)
Impacts 2 Unsatisfactory
2.2.1 Improvement of domestic
wastewater treatment
capacity
2 The project was able to construct only one biological unit
with an 11 300 m3/d treatment capacity, that is about 38%
of the initial target. The capacity of the first treatment
system (existing system before the project) had to be
scaled down to meet the goal of tertiary treatment
implemented on the site and reduced to 5 700 m3/d. It is
therefore only a total of 17 000 m3/d that the Cambérène
Treatment Plant can currently biologically treat, whereas
it treats an annual average of 26 500 m3/d and much more
in the rainy season. The treated wastewater balance is
summarized in a 30 000 m3/d intake of which 5 700 m3/d
are completely treated (that is 19%) but are later mixed with
insufficiently treated water and discharged into the sea.
2.2.2 Increasing domestic
wastewater pumping
capacity
3 The restructuring of the pumping system helped to lift the
residual effluents collected in the systems towards the
Cambérène Treatment Plant. The volume of wastewater
pumped by the pumping stations (excluding Djili Mbaye
station) increased from 3 628 279 m3 in 2007 to 4 255 378
m3 in 2009, representing a 17% increase. This increase in
the wastewater lifting capacity was expected to prevent any
overflow or direct discharge into the sea. However, as a
result of operational problems, frequent power cuts and fuel
shortages leading to the shutdown of the pumping stations,
wastewater overflow and spreading areas reappear on
roads.
2.2.3. Level of application of
good health and hygiene
practices
2 Despite the positive change in mentality following the
various IEC actions, there is still some resistance to
behaviour and habit change with respect to infrastructure.
For example, considerable quantities of screening waste can
be seen in the pumping stations, which points to failure to
screen wastewater before its discharge into the system.
Annex 5
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DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT
INDICATORS
Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
2.2.4. Improvement of ONAS’
organizational capacity
2 The functioning of the document management system and
the implementation of the outcomes of ONAS’
organizational study have not yet reached the level where
they can significantly improve ONAS’ organizational
capacity.
2.3 Intermediate Outcomes 2 Unsatisfactory
2.3.1 Improvement of the quality
of wastewater discharged
into the sea
1 Since 2009, the biological treatment outputs of the
Cambérène Treatment Plant are low and wastewater from
the two treatment systems no longer complies with
Senegal’s environmental standards. Moreover, sea
discharge outputs no longer comply with environmental
standards given the mixture of treated water and by-
passed water. Owing to the lack of appropriate treatment
mechanisms, excess sludge from the new treatment
system which cannot be sent for digestion is discharged
into the natural environment just like treated and by-
passed water, thereby further deteriorating the quality of
sea discharges.
2.3.2 Development of treatment
by-products
1 Highly unsatisfactory
- Wastewater reuse 1 Despite a 2.4 times increase in the quantity of potentially
usable water to about 6 347 600 m3in 2009 (12 800 m3/d),
it is still not used. In addition, the project has not had any
impact on the safe reuse of treated water (agricultural
irrigation, etc.) due to the lack of financing for tertiary
treatment. The old system 1 still has a 5 700 m3/d reuse
potential which cannot be absorbed by potential
customers made up of the golf course and building and
public works companies. The volume of treated
wastewater sold dropped from 3 000 m3/month in 2010 to
574 m3/month in 2011 as a result of the suspension of
distribution to Dakar-Technopole Golf Club in 2010, the
only remaining consumers being market gardeners.
- Sludge treatment and
conversion
1 The high sludge production – estimated at 20.2 tons/d –
coupled with the lack of a thickener, has led to the
clogging of the existing sludge treatment system. Such
clogging reduces the natural dewatering of sludge whose
quality shows the presence of a high proportion of organic
matter in sludge (VSS/SM percentages) in relation to the
design standards. Concerning sludge sale, about 2 900
m3of dewatered sludge were sold in 2010 (that is 250
m3/month on average).
Annex 5
5/8
DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT
INDICATORS
Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
- Methane gas production 1 Methane gas production enabled ONAS to reduce its
energy consumption costs by about 30% to 35% at the
treatment plant. Only two-thirds of the 3 000 m3 of the
65% methane content biogas produced daily is used by a
methane gas generator. The remaining one third, which
cannot be used for lack of means of electric power
generation, was flared. However, following the shutdown
of the gas generator and the suspension of flaring since
July 2010, methane gas production has continued with
part of the gas produced (which cannot even be flared)
being discharged into the atmosphere. The project has not
had any impact on biogas production.
2.3.3 Reduction of the incidence
of diseases caused by poor
hygiene and sanitation
3 Despite the low level of beneficiaries’ appreciation of the
project’s contribution to improving their health, the
analysis of health statistics in the serviced plots area
shows a reduction in the cases of diseases caused by
insalubrity (malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery) by about
75% (50% for diarrhoea and uncomplicated malaria)
following the elimination of bodies of stagnant
wastewater during the dry season (more than 9 months
out of 12). Comparison with Pikine, located less than 5
km away from the project, but still unserviced to date,
seems to confirm this fact.
2.3.4 Level of improvement of
ONAS’ operational
capacity
2 Given that ONAS is undergoing reform at several levels,
the project has not yet had any significant impact on the
improvement of its operational capacity. There are still
serious challenges, namely: (i) the efficacy of the
decision-making process, particularly in the processing of
requests from technicians working in the Cambérène TP,
internal communication and capitalization on the
experiences acquired in project management; (ii) human
resource management; and (iii) the quality of expertise of
Project Management and technical services, and service
provision by private players.
Annex 5
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DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT
INDICATORS
Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
2.4 Project’s contribution to
improving domestic
living conditions
2 Unsatisfactory
2.4.1 Beneficiaries’ appreciation
of the
project’s improvement of
their quality of life
2 The beneficiaries appreciate the improvements brought
about by the project and reflected, among other things, in:
(i) the ease of movement in the immediate vicinity,
whereas before, people would not go to these areas for
more than a week due to stagnant wastewater; (ii) the
reduction of bad odours in homes; and (iii) the reduction
of disease vectors (flies, mosquitoes and vermin) in the
dry season. However, they also think that the project
leaves one with a sense of uncompleted work in that the
positive outcomes are offset by the backflow of the
system right into residential areas during the rainy season
or during prolonged power outages.
2.4.2
2.3.2
Impact on the reduction of
heath expenditure
2 Women mention some savings on expenditure they
usually make during the dry season to deodorize their
homes with incense or sprays or eliminate bad odours
resulting from air pollution by stagnant wastewater.
Moreover, a qualitative assessment could be made of the
increase in incomes derived from the development of
economic activities, such as petty trading, now possible
on a permanent basis in the dry season in these former
flood areas. The project’s contribution to reducing health
expenditure is however minimal.
2.4.3 Assessment of the level of
improvement in education
by the project
2 The analysis of statistical data collected from the
Departmental Inspectorate of Education in charge of the
serviced plots area does not indicate any project
contribution to increased school enrolment. On the
contrary, study conditions in schools in the immediate
vicinity of the pumping stations have improved
significantly, and there is less stagnant wastewater to
pollute the atmosphere and impede access.
3 Efficiency 2 Unsatisfactory
3.1 EIRR
Appraisal: 21.22% - 25%
Completion:
PPER:
3.2 FIRR
Appraisal:
Completion:
PPER:
3.3 Cost-effectiveness 2 Unsatisfactory
Annex 5
7/8
DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT INDICATORS Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
4 Institutional Development 2 Unsatisfactory
4.1 Sector 2 The project did not have any significant impact on the
sector’s planning, implementation and monitoring capacity.
4.2 Executing Agency 2 The project helped to start building ONAS’ organizational,
technical and financial capacity. However, the institutional
impact is still limited, especially as ONAS does not have a
genuine infrastructure maintenance and development plan
and real financial autonomy.
5
5
Sustainability 2 Unsatisfactory
5.1 Technical sustainability 2 The project’s technical sustainability is negatively affected by
maintenance difficulties resulting from: (i) the technical
choices made due to the poor quality of design studies; (ii)
ONAS’ low financial material and human capacity; (iii)
recurrent power outages and fuel shortages; and (iv)
extremely difficult operating conditions.
5.2 Sustained commitment by the
Borrower (including
legal/regulatory frameworks)
3 It is mainly reflected in the sector reform introduced in 1995
with the splitting of the former Senegal National Water
Exploitation Corporation (SONEES) into three separate
entities, namely: (i) a State-owned company; (ii) SDE, a
private company linked to the State by an affermage contract;
and (iii) ONAS. The reform thus helped to raise the sanitation
sub-sector to a higher priority level.
5.3 Socio-political support
(including participation by
beneficiaries, vulnerable group
protection and political
stability)
1 The Government has so far not shown any real commitment
to improving ONAS’ very worrisome situation, although
discussions are ongoing to find lasting solutions. Users’
attitude towards sanitation facilities reflects the lack of a
sanitation culture.
5.4 Economic viability 2 The project’s economic benefits are limited by : (i) the drastic
scaling down of its physical output objectives; (ii) the low
technical performance of the Cambérène Treatment Plant;
and (iii) lack of enhancement of by-products capable of
boosting the development of urban and peri-urban
agriculture, especially in a context of food crisis.
5.5 Financial viability 2 The project’s financial viability is negatively affected by the
sub-sector’s inability to generate sufficient resources for its
own refinancing. The levy collected through users’ water
bills and government subsidies cannot cover ONAS’
operating costs which are increasing owing to the investments
initiated.
Annex 5
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DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
No. COMPONENT INDICATORS Score
(1 to 4) REMARKS
5.6 Institutional arrangements
(Institutional, organizational
and management efficacy)
2 ONAS’ institutional autonomy is not yet complete. As an
industrial and commercial public establishment, it is not
shielded from political pressure and it cannot prepare its
own budget and freely mobilize funds commensurate with
its actual needs.
5.7 Environmental sustainability 1 Due to the unsatisfactory performance of biological
treatment, non-compliance with marine discharge
standards and failure to take rainwater into account in the
serviced plots area, the project has a negative impact on
the environment.
Resistance to external factors 1 Variations in the prices of raw materials, especially oil,
and exchange rate fluctuations have a negative impact on
the project owing to the Cambérène Wastewater
Treatment Plant’s technical options, which have a great
impact on spending on energy and the import of spare
parts, and owing to unpredictable power cuts leading to
use of the diesel-fired generators,. The improper
behaviour of users, which requires a long-term change
process, is likely to affect project performance. Lastly, the
sector’s heavy dependence on external financing, within a
context of severe economic crisis in countries of the
North, will probably have spinoff on the project.
6 Overall Performance
Indicator
2 Unsatisfactory
Annex 6
1/2
Borrower Performance
DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
Component Indicators Score
(1 to 4) Remarks
1. Quality at Preparation Stage 2 Unsatisfactory
- Control and participation by beneficiaries 2 Poor quality at entry assessment led to unsatisfactory
Borrower performance at the design stage, owing to
the insufficient assessment of the quality of designs.
In addition, the population’s involvement in the
building of the treatment plants was low – only
limited sociological studies were conducted and the
population was not consulted in the selection of
technologies.
- Government’s commitment 2 The Government of Senegal appears to have
underestimated the challenges to be met and was
unable to mobilize sufficient financing for
sanitation. It prioritized drinking water in DWSS
sector programmes.
- Macroeconomic and sector policies 1 At sector level, sanitation is considered as the poor
relation of Senegal’s DWSS policies.
- Institutional arrangements 3 There is an arrangement comprising the Project
Implementation Unit established within ONAS to
serve as interface between the various parties
involved in project implementation. Placed under
the supervision of the Director of Studies and
Works, this unit is supposed to work in close
collaboration with the World Bank-established
Coordination Unit which has a good administrative
organization and competent staff and is placed under
the responsibility of the Director of Water Resources
and Sanitation to monitor and implement all the
components of the Long-term Water Sector
Programme (LWSP). This Unit was supposed to
benefit from the technical assistance services of a
consulting engineer.
2. Quality at Implementation Stage 2 Unsatisfactory
- Posting of key staff 1 The establishment of the Project Coordination Unit
within ONAS’ Directorate of Studies and Works
was only effective in early May 2004 (that is almost
two and a half years after loan signature).
Annex 6
2/2
DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
Component Indicators Score
(1 to 4) Remarks
- Executing Agency’s management
performance 2 The performance of the Project Implementation
Unit (PIU) is deemed satisfactory, and that of the
Executing Agency (ONAS) unsatisfactory, because
PIU’s operationalization was delayed and because
conditions precedent were not fully fulfilled
resulting in the above-mentioned consequences
- Mid-term adjustments 2 The Borrower and ONAS did not anticipate the
operation’s poor outcomes.
- Adherence to time schedule and costs 2 The project was implemented 24 months behind
schedule mainly because the Borrower had
difficulties in fulfilling the conditions precedent to
first disbursement. Moreover, the total project cost
(-0.5%), expressed in units of account, fell
significantly in CFAF, from CFAF 12.32 billion to
CFAF 9.58 billion, that is a decrease of CFAF 2.74
billion (nearly 22% of the total cost).
3. Compliance with covenants 2 Non-compliance with the condition related to the
review of the tariff schedule.
4. Adequacy of monitoring and
evaluation, and reporting
2 The project did not have an efficient monitoring and
evaluation system. The few monitoring actions
undertaken focused only on physical outputs and
disregarded project outcomes and impacts.
Furthermore, because the monitoring indicators
contained in the appraisal report were not
monitored, it was necessary to wait for the end of
the project and the signature of the performance
contract between the Government and ONAS to
define and implement a series of relevant
performance indicators.
5. Satisfactory operations (where
applicable)
2 The current situation of the Cambérène Wastewater
Treatment Plant, in particular, its hydraulic
performances and the quality of water discharged into
the sea, shows that the operation is not satisfactory.
Overall Borrower Performance 2 Unsatisfactory
Annex 7
1/2
Bank Performance
DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
Component Indicators Score
(1 to 4) Remarks
At identification stage 2 Unsatisfactory
- Project compliance with
Government’s development
strategy
3 The project is in line with the Government’s development
strategy outlined in Senegal’s Ninth Economic and Social
Development Plan (1996-2001).
- Project consistency with the
Bank’s country strategy
3 The project is also in line with the Bank’s strategy for Senegal
(1999-2001).
- Participation by
Government/beneficiaries
2 While the Government was able to mobilize the national
financial contribution, the beneficiaries’ level of participation
was not satisfactory.
- Project’s innovative nature 1 The Bank validated a common technological option which was
not adapted to some of Senegal’s specificities.
At project preparation stage 3 Satisfactory
- Rationale for Bank’s support 3 The rationale for the Dakar City Sanitation Project (PAVD)
stems from the fact that it is a backup to the Government’s
efforts to address the renewed outbreak of diseases due to
unsanitary conditions. - Bank’s timely support 3
- Quality of technical, economic,
financial, institutional and
environmental analyses
2 The Bank validated technical options which were not the most
appropriate for Senegal. The Bank also validated the scaled
down solution presented by the Contractor without making any
special remarks on its cost and/or composition (simple
biological system whereas the Contractor had drawn the
project owner’s attention to the need to strengthen the sludge
treatment system with at least a primary sludge thickener),
without anticipating the actual impacts of such down scaling
on project performance.
- Relevance of conditions and
covenants 3 The conditions and covenants were relevant.
- Adequacy of lending instrument 3 The loan was the most appropriate instrument for this
operation on account of its cost.
- Quality of coordination with
other donors/partners 3 Among other things, the Bank held meetings with the
European Union as part of the search for financing for the
extension and rehabilitation of the Cambérène TP.
- Implementation and supervision
plans (including performance
indicators, criteria)
1 No indicator monitoring plan was available.
- M&E 2 The Bank limited itself to monitoring physical and financial
implementation.
Annex 7
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DAKAR CITY SANITATION PROJECT (PAVD)
Component Indicators Score
(1 to 4) Remarks
At the appraisal stage 2 Unsatisfactory
At the supervision stage 2 Unsatisfactory
- Adequacy of Bank staff (skills,
time & continuity)
3 The Bank fielded a launching mission in November
2001 and 9 field supervision missions between
November 2003 and November 2008, with an
appropriate mission composition.
- Problem solving 1 The problems of additional financing were not solved.
No plans were made for the adaptation of the project’s
environmental category despite the scaling down of the
physical objectives of the Cambérène TP, which
modified the substance of the project.
- Adequacy
recommendation/decision
monitoring
2 Aide-mémoires did not provide updates on the
implementation of the recommendations of previous
missions.
- Realistic ratings at CPPR/APPR 3 The unsatisfactory rating by the Country Portfolio
Review Report 2003 is realistic since it takes into
account the bottlenecks recorded in project
implementation.
- Attention to probable impact on
social development
2 At no time did the Bank realize the errors of the
technical options and/or the lack of additional
financing. The Bank’s experts focused on the outputs
of the new biological treatment system while
disregarding all the existing facilities.
- Attention to sustainability
problems
3 Like all the development partners, the Bank drew the
Government’s attention to the sub-sector’s situation,
particularly the difficulties faced by ONAS.
Overall evaluation of Bank
performance
2 Unsatisfactory
Annex 8
Page 1/2
ONAS’ FINANCIAL SITUATION63
Sanitation rates have not changed since 2003. The average sanitation rate stood at CFAF 41.5/m3 in
2007, and has remained relatively constant since 2003. Financially, ONAS posted a net loss in the 2005
and 2006 fiscal years: proceeds from the operation of ONAS covered only 87% of its operating costs,
excluding depreciation expenditure. ONAS depends largely on operating subsidies to ensure a fragile
annual income statement balance. The performance contract between the Government and ONAS was
expected to improve the situation. However, as underscored by development partners, the Government
has not honoured its commitment to ensure ONAS’ financial equilibrium for the past financial years; as
a result, ONAS is compelled to resort to standing bank overdrafts to meet its working capital needs.
Based on a so-called “high” scenario, the investment programme to achieve the sector’s objectives by
2015 stands at CFAF 279 billion including 244 billion for wastewater treatment. The amount of the
2008-2012 programme is CFAF 236 billion. It will help, among other things, to make 51 600
connections, build 91 000 individual facilities, increase the treatment capacity by 72 300 m3/d and lay
500 km of wastewater pipes and 65 km of stormwater pipes. The coverage rate resulting from these
investments stood at 83% in 2012, that is 10% above the MDG, and the treatment rate at 55%, that is
6% above the MDGs. Seven new centres will be covered by the community sanitation system.
Operating costs will be CFAF 74.3 billion for the period (see Table 1 below) 91% of which concerns
sanitation operating costs. The service will cost CFAF 118 /m3 in constant terms (CFAF 128 /m3 in
current terms, including a 2% annual inflation rate).
Table 1: Operating Costs and Depreciation Expenditure
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total
2008-
2012
Operating Costs 7 726 8 090 9 910 11 208 13 477 16 601 19 354 70 549
of which
sanitation 7 698 7 751 9 485 10 686 12 896 15 969 18 701 67 737
rainwater management 28 339 425 522 581 632 652 2 813
Depreciation expenditure (asset< 15 years) 272 503 588 498 619 883 1 131 3 720
Total Costs (CFAF M) (A) 7 998 8 593 10 498 11 706 14 096 17 484 20 485 74 269
The three sanitation sector financing options studied, namely sanitation levy, Government subsidies and
a combination of these two sources of financial resources, indicate that:
Ruling out any increase in levy for the period, official assistance to ONAS for the operation of
infrastructure was expected to stand at CFAF 2.7 billion in 2008 (of which CFAF 1.2 billion
already pledged), and up to CFAF 6.9 billion in 2012, that is 22.6 billion accumulated for the
period. Added to these subsidies is contribution for rainwater management, that is a total of
CFAF 25.4 billion (see Table 2 below).
Table 2: Government Subsidy Needs Without Levy Increase
63Excerpt from the Limited Tariff Study Conducted as Part of Negotiations for the Performance Contract to be Signed Between the State of Senegal and ONAS.
Annex 8
Page 2/2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total
2008-12
Total Costs (CFAF M) (A) 7 998 8 593 10 498 11 706 14 096 17 484 20 485 74 269
Sanitation Levy (CFAF/m3) 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 Total Proceeds (CFAF M) (B) 6 655 7 563 8 562 8 138 9 321 11 139 12 889 50 049
Financing Gap (CFAF M) (A B) 1 344 1 052 1 936 3 568 4 775 6 345 7 596 24 220
Government Contributions (CFAF M) 0 1 000 3 136 3 568 4 775 6 345 7 596 25 420
of which
operating subsidy (CFAF M) 0 1 000 2 711* 3 046 4 194 5 713 6 944 22 608
contribution for stormwater management (CFA M)
0 0 425 522 581 632 652 2 813
* Of which CFAF 1.2 billion as operating subsidies already committed.
Assuming total collection of operating costs through sanitation levy, such a levy should increase
from CFAF 41 /m3 in 2007 to constant CFAF 105 /m3 in 2012, that is CFAF 113 /m3 taking into
account a possible 2% annual inflation rate.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total
2008-
12
Total Costs (CFAF M) (A) 7 998 8 593 10 498 11 706 14 096 17 484 20 485 74 269
Sanitation Levy (CFAF/m3) 41 41 60 78 90 106 113 Total Proceeds (CFAF M) (B) 6 655 7 563 10 073 11 184 13 515 16 852 19 833 71 457
Financing Gap (CFAF M) (A B) 1 344 1 052 425 522 581 632 652 2 813
Government Contributions (CFAF M) 0 1 000 1 625 522 581 632 652 4 013
of which
operating subsidy (CFAF M) 0 1 000 1 200* 0 0 0 0 1 200
contribution for stormwater management (CFAF
M) 0 0 425 522 581 632 652 2 813
* : operating subsidy already committed
In the event of a partial levy increase, Table 3 below shows the results of three different scenarii:
25%/50%/75% financing of the service through the sanitation levy and 75%/50%/25% financing
through Government subsidies. The sanitation levy in 2012 would therefore stand at CFAF
67/m3 (in current terms, including a 2% inflation rate) in the first case, CFAF 82 /m3 in the le
second case and CFAF 98/m3 in the last case.
Table 3: Financing Gap Coverage Scenario
Total for the Period 2008 - 2012 25% Levy –
75% Government
Subsidies
50% Levy –
50% Government
Subsidies
75% Levy –
25% Government
Subsidies
Total Costs (CFAF M) (A)
Sanitation Levy 2012 (CFAF/m3)
Total Proceeds (CFAF M) (B)
Financing Gap (CFAF M) (A - B)
Government Contributions (CFAF M)
of which
operating subsidy (CFAF M)* contribution for rainwater management (CFAF M)
74 269
67
55 790
18 479
19 679
16 866
2 813
74 269
82
60 616
13 653
14 853
12 040
2 813
74 269
98
65 998
8 271
9 471
6 658
2 813
* Including operating subsidies for 2008 to the tune of CFAF 1.2 billion already committed .
Annex 9
Page 1/3
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Project Documents and Strategies
1. AfDB, 2001, Senegal, Dakar City Sanitation Project (PAVD), Appraisal Report.
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10 ONAS-DEC, 2010, “Upgrading the Sludge Treatment Method and Energy Production in the Cambérène
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29 World Bank, 2009, Senegal Long-Term Water Sector Programme, Implementation Completion Report.
30 SeydouNiang, 2009, Domestic Wastewater Treatment, prepared for the Workshop « Cities Feeding
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Annex 9
Page 2/3
31 Senegal -JICA, 1994, “The Study on Sanitation in Dakar and its Surrounding Areas”, Main Report –
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Initiative Sub-programme, Dakar Supervision Mission, from 11 to 25 June 2008.
9. Back-to-Office Report, Senegal – Dakar City Sanitation Project (PAVD) and the First Rural DWSS
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Department (OPEV).
4. AfDB, 2000, Review of the Bank’s Experience in Rural Water Project Financing. Presentation Note –
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5. AfDB, 2000, Study on the Bank’s Experience in Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project Financing –
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Annex 9
Page 3/3
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EDE & Phenix.
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for Monitoring the Cotonou Agreement in Senegal, June 2010.
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