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t AD * COPY NO. b TECHNICAL REPORT 3485 RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO FRAGMENT IMPACT RICHARD M. RINDNER DECEMBER 1966 PICATINNY ARSENAL DOVER, NEW JERSEY ' CLEARINGHOUSE FOR FEDEUAL SCIENTA IF AND TECHNICAL INFO1RMATION Ha •2- IBcrMofb ?"II L• . . .. ..... . .. . . .. .. . ... ... .. .. . .. . . .. . .... . .. . .. . .. . .. .
Transcript
Page 1: RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO - Defense Technical ... detonation occurrence or risk of propagation of detonation by fragment impact at these distances. For the sake of simplicity and convenience,

t AD

* COPY NO.

b

TECHNICAL REPORT 3485

RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVETO

FRAGMENT IMPACT

RICHARD M. RINDNER

DECEMBER 1966

PICATINNY ARSENAL

DOVER, NEW JERSEY

' CLEARINGHOUSE

FOR FEDEUAL SCIENTA IF AND

TECHNICAL INFO1RMATION

Ha •2- IBcrMofb ?"II

L• . . .. ..... . .. . . .. .. . ... ... .. .. . .. . . .. . .... . .. . .. . .. . .. .

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TECHMICAL REPORT 348.5

RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVETO

FRAGMENT IMPACT

BY

RICHARD M. RINDNER

DECEMBER 1966

AMMUNITi.ON ENGINEERLNG DIRECTORATEPICATINNY ARSENALDOVER, NEW JERSEY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

SUMMARY I

RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO FRAGMENT IMPACT 3

REFER ENCES 13

APPENDIX

A. Figures 15

TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION 33

ABSTRACT DATA 35

(i)

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SUMMARY

This phase of the Safety Design Criteria Programconducted by the Amminition Engineering Directorate' aProcess Engineering Laboratory deals with the analyticaland experimental determination of the sensitivity of highexplosives and high energy propellants to impact by primaryand secondary fragments.

This material was the subject of a presentation madeat the New York Academy of Sciences 'Conference onPrevention of and Protection Against Accidental Explosionof Munitions, Fuels and other Hazardous Mixtures" heldin New York City 10-13 October 1966.

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I

F

RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO FRAGMENT IMPACT

This phase of the overall Safety Design Criteria Programconducted by Picatinny Ai senal deals with the analytical andexperimental determination of the sensitivity of high explosivesand high energy propellants to impact by primary-and secondaryfragments.

By definitiorn, primary fragments are those fragments whichresult from break-up of explosive casing at detonation. Usuallythese fragments are characterized by having high velocity (inthe order of several thousands fps) and being comparativelysmall in size.

The analytical work performed at Picatinny Arsenal resultedin the establishment of:

1. A methcod of predicting the vulnerability to highorder detonation of an explosive system in termsof geometry of the system and explosive properties.

2. A method for calculation of safe distances for anyassumed degree of risk.

These methods are based on a correlation of various relationshipsdeveloped by British and American investigators as a resultof theoretical studies, confirmatory tests and i tual experience(Reference i and 2).

The general relat-ionships are in Figure 1. These equationspermit prediction of the gross mass detonabilitv characteristicsof explosi;-e systems. Shown are the factors which must beconsidered for any explosive system in either donor or acceptorrole. Values of the output constant (E') Equation (1) forseveral explosives are in Reference 3. For other explosivesthe valuaes (EI) could be established experimentally by conductingsmall-scale tests in which cased samples of various explosive-to-casi.ng (E/C) ratios are detonated and corresponding fragmentvelocities measured. The output constant is then obtained froma plot of (Vo) vs. (E/C) in accordance with Equation (1).

3

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Equation (2) was developed for calculation of the number offragments in any particular weight range produced by detonationof a cased charge (Reference 3).

A relationship between fragment weight, the casing thicknessand boundary velocity (the minimum velocity at which a fragmentof a given mass and acceptor casing thickness will cause detonationfor a given explosive) is shown in Equation (3). Sensitivityconstant (Kf) included in this equation must be established for theacceptor explosive. Values of this constant are available for somewell-known explosives such as TNT and Composition B (Reference 4).

For other explosives this constant could be established froma plot of Vb vs •5. 37ta/m 1/3 in accordance with Equation (3).

m-? 7 3(l+3.3ta/m 1/3)

Once the sensitivity of an explosive to fragment impact isestablished, the next step is the establishment of relationshipsfor calculation of safe distance in terms c' probability of highorder detonation occurrence or risk of propagation of detonationby fragment impact at these distances. For the sake ofsimplicity and convenience, a graphical representation ofthese relationships is in Figures 2-5.

The plot in Figure 2 (based on Equation (4)) relates fragmentstriking velocity (Vs) with fragment mass at any distance fromthe detonation source (d) for a single value of initial velocity (Vo).

Constant (k) which is a part of Equation (4) is a function of thepresented are, to fragment mass ratio, density of air and airdrag coefficient (Reference 5 and 6). The plot shown in Figure

3 (for CompositioaB I -- a typical representation of E iuation (3) --relates the boundary velocity (Vb) with fragment mass (in) andacceptor casing thickness (ta).

When the plots from Figure 2 and 3 are combined as in Figure4, a relationship is obtained for the striking velocity (or boundaryvelocity) of a fragment with fragment mass at various distances (d)and acceptor casing thicknesses (ta). If boundary velocity of afragment is now equated to its striking velocity, it becomespossible to find the minimum effective mass of a fragunentproduced by the donor explosive causing a high order detonationin the acceptor under the prevailing conditions. The number of sucheffective fragments produced at any distance from the donorcharge can then be calculated from Equation (2) in Figure 1.

4

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As expressed by Equation (5), Figure 5 is a plot relatingthe probability of detonation occurrence as a function of distance(between donor and acceptor charges) or shielding.

This plot relates the distance between the donor andacceptcr charges (d), shielding (ta) and probability of highorder detonation occurrence (E). The zero probabilitycurve (Po) indicates a relationship between the distance (d)and shielding (ta) beyond which no high order detonation ispossible.

The higher the probability level tolerated, the lower thedistance /shielding combination necessary. This relationshippermits a prediction of the necessary separation or shieldingbetween two explosive systems at any degree of probabilityof high order detonation occurrence. To compose such arelationship for a specific situation all that is necessaryis knowledge of the geometry of the system and the explosiveproperties relating the sensitivity and output.

A limited test program for experimental determination of theboundary velocities for bare pentolite and cyclotol charges wasconducted at the A.D. Little Test Facility in Hinsdale, NewHampshire (Reference 7).

The experimental work in this program utilized an explosivetechnique for projecting rectangular.fragment against explosivecharges. Non-spinning rectangular fragments of 0.2 to 3.0 ozs.were projected at the acceptor charges at velocities both above andbelow required for detonation. Fragment velocities weremeasured by screens and high-speed photography.

The explosive launching technique consists of the placementof a fragment, its metallic surround and an attenuating or buffersheet of lucite on the forward flat face of cylindrical explosivedonor. The lucite spacer or buffer plate provides the means forcontrolling the launch velocity. The fragment is surrounded byfour pieces of steel of equal thickness that prevent deformationat the edges of the fragment during the early stages of launch

(Figure 6).

5

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The cylindrical charge is initiated on the rear flat face of theexplosive donor. On detonation, the fragment is propelled alongpredictable path and impacts the target (acceptor charge) at adistance of about six feet. The velocity 'of the impactingfragments is measured by accurately positioned timing sensorsand in most cases confirmed by high-speed photographs of itsflight. Fragment velocity is controlled by the size and compositionof the donor charge and the buffer plate thickness. Themaximum velocities attained in these tests with fragmentsintact were 5,200, 3,500 and 2, 500 fps for 0.2, 0.9 and 2.85 oz.fragments, respectively.

The instrumentation consisted of time-measuring devices(recorded on Model 7260 Beckman Time Interval Meters)and Dynafax Drum Cameras with a framing rate to 25,000frames per second which photographed the fragment in flight.A typical film series is in Figure 7. The timing devices werean ionization probe taped to the donor charge and a pair of thinaluminum screens separated by a thin piece of polyethylene film.Two of these screens -- one located on the forward face of theacceptor charge and the other located at a specified distanceabove the acceptor charge -- were used in most firings. Fragmenttravel time between each of these sensors was recorded in microseconds.The Dynafax camera (located about 20 feet from the flight path)viewed about the last four feet of travel including target impact.Figure 8 shows schematically the camera layout.

The fragment aiming procedure is depicted in Figure 9 whichassured that the fragment would impact the center of the acceptorcharge. The donor charge assembly was placed at the top of theseven-foot-high stand and the acceptor charge was centered verticallybelow. The telescope and 450 angle mirror assembly were thenlocated with the mirror over the desired impact point and the brassplate perpendicular to the axis of the acceptor charge. While sightingthrough the scope, the donor charge assembly was positioned so thatthe fragment could be clearly seen. Another mirrbr was thenplaced on the fragment (held by a magnet) parallel to the surfaceof the fragment. While sighting through the scope, the donorcharge was shimmed until the reflected image of the telescope endwas centered in the eyepiece.

6

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It was demonstrated in subsequt .tests that this aimingprocedure is reliable tnJ.d can be car "4i out in a relativelyshort time. Once the aiming was com,_'. ed, the mirror andscope assembly were removed, velocivy screens locited and allfinal electrical connections made, the teti set-up was readyto fire. Figure 10 shows the test set-up assembly beforefiring.

Results of the firings against the bare cyclotol andpentolite clta.rges are presented graphically in Figures 11and 12. Predicted boundary, velocity curves developedanalytically (ar.d discussed previously) also are shown for bothexplosives.

.Lr, general. the data conforms to relat .onships develepedanalytically for small and intermediate fragments while thedetonatiorn velocity for heavy fragments fired into the barecyclotol charges was higher than predicted. This would indicatethat the massvelocity relationship may have to be adjustedfor a more accurate prediction of sensitivity to impact byheavy fragments, However, the current predicted valuesfor the boundary velocity tend to be c:onservative and henceare satisfactory for design purposes where safety is theprime consideration.

More tests must be conducted to establish a definite trendwitk, increase it: fragment size as well as to irvestigate theeffect cf otl-er variables (such as degree of casing, sensitivityof explosives) orL i;he detonation velocity.

As i.oted, the large-scale cubicle tests conducted underthe auspices of the Armed Services Explosive Safety Boardclearly ir.aicate -- after careful investigation of the high speedfilm records -- that the secondary fragments are the maincause of propagar.c.rt of explosior. into the acceptor charge(Reference 8). By definit-.on, secondary fragments are thosefragments otLer titan primary fragments which result from thedetor.aion cf explosive charges, such as wall break-ip, piecesof equipment, etc. These secondary fragments are usuallycharacterized by ha-ing lower velocity than the primary fragments(seldom exceedirng 1,000 fps) and being fairly large.

7

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Since there was no analytical data on the quantitativebehavior of these fragments, an extensive experimental programwas initiated to determine threshold velocity of fragment (orfragments) that would cause detonation in the explosive charge.

Two experimental methods were chosen among severalinvestigated. The first method consisted of a rocket-poweredsled (track method) designed to throw a collection of concreteand aggregate fragments (usually produced from concretewall break-u p caused by a detonation) at an explosive chargeat velocities within the range of those occurring in full-scale

cubicle tests (Reference 9 and 10).

The main feature of the rocket-powered sled was a testvehicle and fragment container attached to the top of the motor(Figure 13). Water-breaking action was supplied by partiallyfilled polyethylene water bags fastened to the last 10 to 15feet of track. Sled deceleration was accomplished when thewedge on the front of the sled hit the water-filled bagsfastened to the track. A standard two-inch steel deflectorplate placed six feet from the end of the track at a 50 anglefrom the track center line was used to deflect the test vehicleto keep it from striking the target (Figure 14). Fragmentspecimens used weighed a total of about 70 lbs. and containedabout 50 lbs. of broken-up concrete and 20 lbs of aggregate.

The target, placed on a wooden stand about 30 teet fromthe track, consisted of 100 lbs. Composition B charge in lightaluminum casing.

The operation of the test vehicle consisted of accelerationof the rocket-propelled vehicle to a predicted velocity followedby release of the fragments through the frangible cover of thecontainer by water-brake deceleration of the vehicle. Thevelocity of the vehicle was controlled by the number of rocketmotors used by changing the distance of the ignition point fromthe poi: t of water-brake activation and by varying the weightof the sled. The track method -- although reliable for generatingand measuring fragment velocities -- proved to be expensive.Its velocity range could be extended above 1, 000 fps but as thetest results indicated (at least for Composition B) this wasunnecessary in most cases.

8

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Trie second method, the ground mortar facility, was developedto provide a less expensive and less complex test set-up toproduce a large quantity of fragment data (Reference 11).

The fragment mortar was a muzzle loading shotgun developedby the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California,and manufactured from standard thick-walled seamless steeltubing 'Figure 15). A thick breech plate was welded to thetube at the breech sealing that end. A saucer-shaped steelrecoil plate was fastened near the muzzle to transfer recoilenergy to the ground. Running down the length of the tubewas an air hose that ported air (or nitrogen) through theplate to the bottom side of a breech cup. The elevatormechanism or breech cup was a heavy steel cup containingpropellant. It is raised by air pressure for loading and thenlowered into firing position by bleeding air from under it. Thefast-burning 4.2-inch mortar shell double-base propellant wasstocked in 20-sheet packs and was suited for variation of loeding toprovide desired velocities. The follower and sabot were designed toride down on top of the elevator. The follower, an invertedcup-shaped unitrrnade of vermiculite-filled resin-epo:cy foroptimum strength and flexibility, carried the ignition charge.The flexible skirt of the cup acted as a chamber sealant atthe instant of propellant ignition. The sabot was a bucketmade of cardboard or polyurethane foam and contained thepayload (rubble) that was propelled from the mortar (Figure16). After tMe propellant, followerarnd sabot were lowered tothe bottom of the mc r,:ar tube, firing was ir.ii.lated from arerrc'te firi.rg poin•t by ar. electrical squib in thF ignition charge.

The fragmerts used in this te-; series, i:. addition to the 70 lbs.rubble used in tfe track tests, consisted of dry plastersand and gra-vel (aggregate) of the same weight. This was doneto compare tfe detoraticr± velocities using di.fferert fragmentsagainst identical explosive charges.

The iti. procedure cor:.sisted of suspe.d":•g ttie acceptorcharge above ihe mr, r•,ar muzzle ard firing the fragment atselected velocities -vertically at tEe charge by varying the amountof the propellant in the steel cup at the brercit end of mortar(Figure 1 i.

9

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To measure fragment velocities (in both the track andground mortar method) high-speed cameras as well ascarbon rods were used. Using the camera technique,velocity measurements were made by counts of time offrames and reference distances of mass travel.

The carbon rod technique used two sets of carbon rods placedfive feet apart above the muzzle of the ground mortar. Theprojected fragment broke both sets of carbon rods giving ameasurement of its velocity (Figure 18).

For the track method, the rods were installed across thetrack 30 feet apart. A bolt projecting down from the centerof water-brake edge on the steel broke the rods when thesled passed. The pulse was then transmitted to thetelemetering station and recorded on calibration tape --providing a record of sled travel time between the two points.

The two systems (camera and rod technic'ue) provided acheck and back-up for each other.

More than 100 tests were performed using both methods.All track tests were conducted using 70 lbs. concreterubble as an impacting fragment. The ground mortar,in addition to the 70 lbs. rubble, used 70 lbs. of gravel(concrete aggregate), 70 lbs. dry plaster sand and 35 lbs.rubble. The fragment velocities chosen for investigationcorresponded to those that were recorded during the destructionof walls in full-scale propagation tests.

A tabulation of selected test results is in Table 1. Thefragment velocities indicate the highest velocities at whichdetonation did not occur and the lowest velocities at whichdetonation occurred for both track and ground mortar testsand for different types of fragments. In the tests conductedby track method, the spread amounted to only 44 fps (Tablel).In the tests conducted with the ground mortar the spread betweenthe highest and lowest velocities of occurrence and non-occurrence of detonation was appreciably greater. Thedifference in this spread can be attributed to such factors asgreater variety of acceptor types used, larger number of testsconducted by ground mortar, different methods of firingfragment. Included in the table are selected velocities from

10

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0

• XOXOXXOOXO

u u

cc000

in v v

INI

C,

coe I

C V~ v v * oQu

M v00N k_____k__kkks1

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the film records of large-scale cubicle tests for the purposeof comparing the fragment detonation velocities recorded inlarge-scale tests. The lowest recorded velocity in thosetests was 430 fps which compares favorably with the thresholdvelocities in the track and ground mortar tests.

The tests to date positively point to secondary fragmentsas the main cause of detonation propagation. The thresholddetonation velocity for conditions investigated was approximately400 fps. Because of insufficient number of rounds fired, theeffect of varying fragment mass and shape on thresholddetonation velocity has not yet been established.

Tests conducted to date have been limited in scope sincetheir purpose was to develop a useful and inexpensive methodof firing fragments at velocities that could cause detonation inthe acceptor and to establish the threshold detonation velocityfor standard explosive for both primary and secondaryfragments. This has been to a large extent accomplished.

An extensive experimental program for a quantitativedetermination of various parameters (such as acceptorsensitivity, casing and size, rigidity of support, fragmentsize and shape) on the threshold detonation velocity will bethe next step in our overall program of establishment ofSafety Design Criteria for storage and processing ofexplosive materials.

lZ

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REFERENCES

1. R.M. Rindner, Establishment of Safety Design Criteria for Usein Engineering of Explosive Facilities and Operations, ReportNo. 2, Detonation by Fragment Impact, Applications EngineeringLaboratory Report DB-6-59, Picatinny Arsenal, 1959.

2. R.M. Rindner, S. Wachtell, Establishment of Safety DesignCriteria for Use in Engineering of Explosive Facilities andOperations, Re port No. 3, Safe Distances and Shielding forPrevention of Propagation of Detonation by FragmentImpact, Applications Engineering Laboratory Report DB-6-60,Picatinny Arsenal, 1960.

3. R.I. Mott, A Theory of Fragmentation, Army OperationalResearch Group Memo 113-AC-6427, Great Britain, 1943.

4. A.V. Feist, The Sensitivity of High Explosives to Attack bySteel Fragments, AED Technical Note T/2/L9/AVF, GreatBritain.

5. Explosion Effects Data Sheets, U.S. Naval Ordnance LaboratoryReport 2986, White Oalt, Silver Spring., Maryland, 1955.

6. L.H. Thomas, Computing the Effects of Distance on Damageby Fragments, Ballistics Research Laboratories Report468, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 1946.

7. D.G. McLean, D.S. Allan, Ar Experimental Program toDetermine the Sensitivity of Explosive Materials to Impactby Regular Fragments, Contract DA-19-020-ORD-5617,A.D. Little Co. Hinsdale, New Hampshire, 1965.

8. R.M. Rindner et al, Summary Armed Services ExplosivesSafety Board Dividing Wall Cubicle Tests, April 1960-1962,Picatinny Arsenal Technical Report 3292, October 1965.

9. L.M. Patton, Investigation of Explosive Sensitivity toMultiple Fragrm nt Impact, (Track Tests E-7101), U. S.Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, 1962.

13

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10. L. M. Patton, Investigation of Explosive. Sensitivity toMultiple Fragment Impact, (Track Tests 7380). U. S.Naval Ordnance Test St ation, China Lake, California,1963.

11. C. M. Reinholt, Dividing Wall Acceptor Sensitivity Tests,(MDP 1975), U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, ChinaLake, California, 1963

14

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APPENDDX

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APPENDIX A

Figures

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Donor Acceptor

(I) Vo,•l +E_I+ E/ZC1

Where Vo - Initial Fragment Velocity

f2"E'-Gurney's Energy Constant

E/C-Explosive To Casing Weight Ratio

(2)%)N al In (C'M,,)a

Where Nwx-Number Of Fragment Greater Than (m)

C'-Fragment Distribution Constant a 2 MC3

C -Total Weight Of Metal Casing In oz.rn-Fragment Weight (oz.)

Mo-Fragmnent Distribution Parameter a Btd5/Sd 1/3(1.

dt-Averoge Inside Diameter Of The Casing (in.)

td-Donor Casing Thickness (in.)

B-Constant Depending On Donor Explosive And Casing Material(3) A (5.37to/m 1/3) ,"1/2

m 2L/3 (1 t&3,o/q/m1_7.

Where Vb-Boundary Velocity (ft/sec.)

Kf -Explosive Sensitivity Constant

to-Acceptor Casing Thickness (in.)

Figure 1. Donor-Acceptor Relations:i:,-)s Governing , .

By Fragment Impact. 15

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4C 0

a* 2

I.N

'Ora

-. 1)

0 00in I

($A I,006 5u44 -o~j'Ip

16-

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5.0"'

0.4

0. 0 1 .3 .Casing

Thickness Vin)0.1

•p0 2.000 &000 4j0OO 10,000 20,C.Boundary Velocity Vb (ft./sec)

(3) Vb a

Vb- Boundary Velocity (ft./ee.)

Kf-. Sensitivity Constant for 60/40 Cyclotol

m-- Fragment Weight (oz.)

to.-Acceptor Casing Thickness (in.)

Figure 3. Boundary Velocity as a Function of Fragment Weightand Acceptor Shielding for S0140 Cyclotol.

17

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4.2

(Jb

4L6

.~IV

C6

10 do

o0 C o

.00

it4

- ~Z0

12

18 t~s/*4; A S

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___ (N)E I-e'

E - PROBABILITY OF A DETONATION OCCURRANCE.

1 -PROBABLE No. OF EFFECTIVE HITS/UNIT AREA125 A

N -TOTAL No. OF EFFECTIVE HITS.

9 -FACTOR GOVERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF"FRAGMENTS.

100- d- DISTANCE FROM THE DONOR CH4ARGE 00ik ta-ACCEPTOR CASING THICKNESS (In.)

4-l

S\~% °

25-:

0-0 ,I .2 •.3

ACCEPTOR SHIELDING to (in)

-:4,4we 5. ?lobcbility of Detonation Occurrance os o FunctIon of Distanceand Shie;ding for 4.5in Rocket Heod M32.

19

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L

Meta Surrounmd-(4 Pieces)

Frafmem of Inerems

Luc it e Buffer - I -" I- •'

Explosive Charge-----

FIGURN 6 MOAQMENT ARRANGRMENT WITH METAL SURROUND

zo

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I-

* I�4

8

'a..

=

'a.

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t 0

'U t10

4 \

8U) I)U)U

w• ,

Ulu

i5if.a

cc

Z2

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Surface of ChargeESurface of Fragment

7'-- Surface of Mirror

Reflected Image Line B Reflected Image Line AAfter Shimming Donor Charge I Indicates that Donor ChargeIndicates Proper Alignment - Surfaces Not Parallel toFragment will Impact Beneath Receiver Charge Surface.450 Mirror Point X

B

Ij-A

1'.Mirror Surface Line

4 •- Line of Sight

x Surface of Receiver Charge

FIGURE 9 SCHEMATIC: FRAGMENT AIMING TECHNIQUE

23

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Auk].

*--aloft

bk

Ar-

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3400a Indicates High Order Detonation

o 0 Indicates No Detonmi ion

Estimated from Experlment,-,o l From Picatinny Arsenal Relationship

3000 -o

2600

,2200"

1800 _ _

1400

1000

0

600 10 0.2 0.9 1.0 2.0 2.85 3.0

Fragment Weight Oz.

FIGURE 11 BOUNDARY VELOCITY CURVE OF PENTOLITE. SHOWINGFRAGMENT IMPACT VELOCITY VERSUS FRAGMENTWEIGHT

25

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* I4000

Indicates High Order Detonation0 Indicates No Detonation

o-Estimated from Experiments0 From Picatinny Arsenal Relationship

3600 p ....

3200

2800

U.~2400

2000

0

0

IWOD

1200 -2.

0 0.2 0.9 1.0 2.0 2.85 3.0

Fragment Weight Oz.

FIGURE 12 - BOUNDARY VELOCITY CURVE OF CYCLOTOL. SHOWINGFRAOGMENT IMPACT VELOCITY VERSUS FRAGMENT WEIGHT

26

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-z

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-I* -%Ott

rU

Ar

04I

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H4EX HEAD MAWH StEW(I EQD)RECOIL PLATE

I/t-413 UNC -3A X 3"' LG. DIVIDED OUPPORT RING

HEX SOCKET HEAD :-MACH SCREW (2 REQO

3/4 -IOUNC - X 4 1/4" LeHEX HEAD MACH SCREWWITH LOCKWASHER (8 REQ'O)

-SADOT

10" FOLLOWER

* 4480-RING (2 REQ'D)

.__. /-BREECH CUP

TO FLEX HOSE (AIR)BREECH "'OCONNECTIONBREECH PLATE P 12-S FBTX-SS STAINLESS

STEEL MALE CONNECTOR,

'1/2 SQ ND PIPE PLUG

FIGURE 15 - GROUND MORTAR DEVICE ASSEMBLY

29

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IVIL

~ do

'. a.f*

-~ '-I1_

Page 35: RESPONSE OF EXPLOSIVE TO - Defense Technical ... detonation occurrence or risk of propagation of detonation by fragment impact at these distances. For the sake of simplicity and convenience,

'4-

3,31

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CARBON ROAS

CARSON ROD

CARBON SAKTRODS

FRAGMENT MORTAR

FIGURE 18 - GROUND MORTAR TEST SET UP WITH CARB•N RODSIN POSITION

32

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DovrNewJesn

DiatnER Arichardl

6. REPORT TITLE 7.TtLN.O AE O FRP

DECEMBER 1966 36 11Be. CONdTRACT oft GRANT too. 114. ORI*IN1ATORS1 KEPORT NumSEO(I)

b.PROJECT NO. Technical Report 3485

c.~~~~* Sb. PICS~JO O() (Amy off,., numin 0141 MAY my b assived

10. AVAILABILITY/LIMITATION NOTICES Statement 1.Distribution of this document is unlimited.

I I. SUPPL tMEN TARY NOTES It SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

Picatinny ArsenalU. S. Army Munitions Command

___________________________ Dover, New Jersey13. ABSTRACT

This phase of the Safety Design Criteria Program conducted by theAmmunition Engineering Directorate's Process Engineering Laboratorydeals with the analytical and experimental determination of the sensitivityof high explosives and high energy propellants to impact by primaryand secondary fragments.

This material was the subject of a presentation made at the NewYork Academy of Sciences' Conference on Prevention of and ProtectionAgainst Accidential Explosion of Munitions, Fuels and other HazardousMixtures held in New York City 10- 13 October 1966.

D D I JW41473 UNCLASS-1 F-1 EDSecurity Classification 35

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S UNCL ASS I F lED-,- Seurity Classificaion

LINK A LINK 9 LINK CKEY VW01OS

nOLE It W o fQLK WY ROLE WY

Safety Design Criteria ProgramFragment Impact StudySensitivity of high explosive and high energy 1 ropel antsPrimary fragmentSecondary fragmentNew York Academy of Science

Explosive Prevention and Protection Se ninar

INSTRUJCTI0N 5

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2b. GROUP. Automatic downgrading is specified in DoD Di- report by DDC is not authorived."

rective S200.10 and Armed Forces Industrial Manual. Enter (3) "U. S. Government agencies may obtain copies of

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Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period iscovered. If the repor has been furnished to the Office of Technical

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Phould follow normal pagination procedures, i.e., enter the 13. ABSTRACT: Enter an abstract giving a brief and factual

number of pages containing information. I summary of the document indicative of the report, even thoughi it may also appear elsewhere in the body of the technical re-

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the report was written. end witl- an indication of the military security classification

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subproject number, system numbers, task number, etc. There is no limitation on the length of the abstract. How-

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coal report number by which the document will be identified 14. KEY WiORDS: Key words are technically meaningful termsand controlled by the originating activity. This number must or short phrases that characterize a report and may be used asbe unique to this report. index entries for cataloging the report. Key words must be

b. OTHER REPORT NUMBER(S): If the reporn has been selected so that no . ecurity classification is required. Iden-assgOned any other report numbers (eirher by the oribenaor 'ierq. such as equipment model designation, trade name, mill-or by the sponsor), also enter this number(s). tary project code name. gepnraphic location. may be used as

key words but will be followed by an indication of technical

,-nntext The assignment of links. rules, and weights is

.)ptional

36 UNCLASSI FI EDSecurity Classification


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