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Review Commission Final Report Tasneem Noorani (Chairman) Ahmed Awais (Member) Yacoob Izhar (Member) 1
Review Commission Final Report
Tasneem Noorani (Chairman)
Ahmed Awais (Member) Yacoob Izhar (Member)
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Table of Contents.
Chapter -1: Introduction ....................................................................... 4
Chapter -2: Intra Party Elections ........................................................ 10 2.1 Electoral Lists ................................................................................ 11 2.2 Elections managed by aspiring candidates for party tickets. ......... 14 2.3 Compromise Maneuvered ............................................................. 15 2.4 Cell based voting not effective ...................................................... 15 2.5 The Electoral Process .................................................................... 16 2.6 Politicians dominated the Nazariati members ............................... 17 2.7 Implications of the IPE .................................................................. 17
Recommendations: 19
Chapter -3: Distribution of Tickets 21
3.1 Role of Parliamentary Board. ........................................................ 23 3.2 Role of Central Parliamentary Board ............................................ 24 3.3 Lack of credible input from the Gross roots .................................. 25 3.4 Serious Issues with Ticket Distribution: Other than Corruption ... 26
Recommendations: 28
Chapter-4:Mal-administration/Corruption and its impact on election results .................................................................................................. 31 Recommendations: .............................................................................. 33
Chapter-5: Candidate performance and evaluation ............................. 35 5.1 Exercise 1- Averages ..................................................................... 35 5.2 Exercise 2-District trend analysis .................................................. 37
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5.3 Exercise 3-Statistical evaluation comparing PTI candidates with opponents............................................................................................. 38 5.4 Exercise 4-Zohair asheer/Jamal Ansari Committee ...................... 38 5.5 Exercise 5- Evaluation of candidate by politically experienced party members ..................................................................................... 39 5.6 Other than corruption .................................................................... 40
Recommendations: 41
Chapter -6: National Campaign-An Analysis .................................... 43 6.1 Tabdeeli Razakar ........................................................................... 43 6.2 Election day ................................................................................... 45
Recommendations: 47
Chapter -7: Issues with Leadership ..................................................... 49 Chapter -8: Women Seats. 51
Recommendations: 53
Annexures ..........................................................................................
Annexure A: Average of Districts .................................................... 55 Annexure B: District Wise Votes ....................................................... 56 Annexure C: List of Punjab MNA who got less than 20% votes 58 Annexure D: Zohair Asheers Exercise 60
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Chapter-1
Introduction
Life of a human being passes through various stages; like infancy,
adulthood, maturity and finally old age; political parties also pass through similar
stages.
While PTI can be said to be going through the stage of “adulthood”,
PML(N) seems to be in a ‘ mature’ stage of organizational development, while the
PPP has passed into ‘old age’. Like in humans, while passing through
puberty/adulthood, PTI is also passing through an awkward stage, where new
experiments have to be undertaken and, where necessary, corrective action has to
be taken, to reach the desired objectives.
Chairman Imran Khan, after having led the party through sixteen years of a
lean period, took the bold decision of having intra party elections in 2012, in order
to base the party on democratic principles and take a quick leap forward, into
converting a political party into an institution. Like a lot of first experiments, the
way the intra party elections were organized, and its timing, left a lot to be desired.
In order to evaluate and understand the dynamics of the way the general
elections were contested by PTI, and setbacks which PTI suffered, despite the
ground swell for PTI prior to the election, the Chairman PTI decided to set up a
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Review Commission comprising of three members. The three members
Commission set up by the Chairman comprised of:
1. Mr. Tasneem Noorani, Chairman.
2. Mr. Ahmad Owais Member.
3. Mr. Yaqoob Izhar Member.
The task assigned to the Review Commission was to:-
a). Conduct a comprehensive enquiry into the allegation of misconduct
and malpractice/corruption during the ticket awarding process.
b). Examine the candidate evaluation procedure for award of party
tickets and suggest ways to improve it.
c). Look into various causes which adversely effected the party
performance during the general election and
d). Make recommendation for the improvement of the past mistakes
and recommend the way forward.
While the Review Commission was formed on 01 July 2013, it held its first
meeting on 06 July 2013. An email was sent to all PTI members through the PTI
website, followed by SMS to all members, to either send their
complaints/advice/suggestion/views, in writing to a specially set up e-mail address
under the title [email protected] , or send it by post to the LSO
Office Lahore.
In the meanwhile the Secretariat of the Commission was set up in the LSO
office on Shami Road, Lahore, and another office in Islamabad. Two young
researchers were hired to man the Secretariat at the two places and assist the
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Commission in its enquiry and deliberations. The Review Commission receives
941 emails/ hand written petitions with the geographical spread given below.
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District Number of EmailsWester Region
Sahiwal 11Faislabad 18Jhang/Chiniot 10Toba Tek Singh 7Pakpattan 2Okara 6Total 54
Central RegionGujranwala 14Hafizabad 2Gujrat 9Mandi Bahuddin 3Sialkot 13Narowal 5Lahore 103Sheikhupura 16Kasur 8Total 173
Northern RegionRawalpindi 21Attock 4Chakwal 2Jhelum 15Sargodha 6Khushab 10Mianwali 12Bhakkar 4Total 74
Southern RegionMultan 16Lodhran 1Khanewal 5Vehari 1D.G Khan 8Rajanpur 4Muzaffargarh 6Layyah 5Bahawalpur 12Bahawalnagar 5Rahimyar Khan 10Total 73Total 374 KPK
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District Number of E-mails
Peshawar 96Nowshera 7Charsadda 13Mardan 28Swabi 15Kohat 8Karak 13Hangu 3Abbottabad 24Haripur 4Manshera 20Battagram 2Kohistan 4D.i.Khan 6Bannu 10Lakki Marwat 5Bunair 1Swat 18Shangla 0Chitral 3Upper Dir 2Lower Dir 2Malakand 6Total 290 Geographical Location Not determinable 277Total 941 After perusal of the e-mails, such persons who had made something
substantive to say were invited in person to appear before the Commission. Those
belonging to Punjab were invited to Lahore and those coming from KPK were
invited to Islamabad. In addition, the RC invited some important members of the
party, to share their views with the Review Commission. The Review Commission
held 20 meetings and heard more than 150 people in person, at length, before
concluding their deliberations.
While the RC(Review Commission) gratefully acknowledges the
cooperation shown by all members and leadership of the party, the area where the
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response could have been better was the provision of data to the RC. Party needs to
improve the record keeping and memory of events and ensure that a parallel record
of all activity done by its own officials or assigned to some members is kept in a
redeemable shape, for further analysis and evaluations, in the party’s central
secretariat. The non availability of data and past record has adversely impacted the
quality of the report.
A number of people raised specific matters, pertaining to their districts or wings
which required separate independent and detailed enquiry before action could be
recommended. The mandate of the RC was only to review matters .It neither had
the time or resources to delve into each complaint separately. Specific complaints
which require independent enquiry have not been discussed in the report and have
been forwarded to the central secretariat for enquiry and action.
The spread of emails received indicates that formation of RC by the party aroused
interest in Punjab and KPK with little response from Sindh and Baluchistan. We
feel this could be due to poor dissemination of information on the formation of RC
or the disincentive of the distance between Quetta/Karachi and Lahore/Islamabad,
where the RC was based. The findings of the RC therefore mainly pertain to
matters of Punjab and KPK.
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Chapter -2
INTRA PARTY ELECTIONS
Even though IPE is not strictly a part of the TOR for RC, an evaluation of
the views given by the deponents, regarding the IPE are given below, since the
complaints of most deponents started from the recently elected office holders of
the party hierarchy.
For the first time in the history of political evolution in Pakistan, a political
party (PTI) held free party elections to elect the party’s office bearers starting from
the grass roots, in the form of counselors at the U.C. level. By free it is meant that
the party leadership neither had any favorites, nor made any efforts knowingly to
help any particular person or group. It genuinely wanted the ordinary members to
elect their organizers. Whether the elections were fair, we will discuss later in the
report.
Intra Party Election (IPE) was conducted by a duly formed Election
Commission headed by Mr. Hamid Khan. Elections to the following tiers of the
hierarchy levels were held on separate days with the final election being on 21
March 2012, a couple of days prior to the ,landmark jalsa of the party on 23 March
in Lahore.
i) UC level elections to elect 13 Counselor each UC
ii) District /Tehsil Election
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iii) Regional Elections
iv) Provincial Elections
v) National Elections
Response of aspirants who wanted to become party Counselor at the grass-
root level was mixed. In some UC or districts there was lively interest and multiple
candidates for each slot contested, while in a significant number, there was only
one panel, which was elected without a contest.
While the election were concluded in a tightly telescoped schedule, to
match the general election schedule and in time for the major rally, announced by
the party on 23rd March in Lahore, there were a lot of unexpected issues which
were faced. They were:
1. Electoral lists.
2. Maneuvering of election by aspirant of District Posts.
3. Maneuvered Compromises.
4. Evaluation of cell based voting.
5. Election Review System -ineffective.
6. Political experienced candidates defeated the Nazariati candidates.
2.1 Electoral Lists
Membership drives were conducted by the party at various times and
through various channels. Registration of membership was done telephonically
through 88002. However, the fields required to be registered in that form of
registration was only name and CNIC number Similarly another drive was
launched through 99000, in which the fields of registration were about the same.
When these campaigns were launched; the concept of locating and identifying
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these party members, district and U.C wise, to enable them to vote at a polling
station was not envisaged. With the result it was not possible for voters registered
through these campaigns to cast their vote at polling stations, as their UC could not
be identified from the information available. Thus people, who became members
through telephone help lines, were all disenfranchised during the Intra-Party
Elections.
A massive campaign was launched to physically register members, all over
the country, through the issue of membership card booklets, using the services of
active and prominent members of the party, just prior to the Intra-Party Elections.
Those aspiring for district and other party posts had an interest in having
Counselors of their choice elected. They, therefore, launched massive member’s
registration campaigns, spending money and time, and getting thousands of cards
filled by aspiring members. In their enthusiasm, some members also misused the
system, by filling up membership cards through electoral lists, without physically
involving the persons made members. Others made such people members, mostly
family and acquaintance, who had no real interest in becoming members.
Large number of membership cards were got filled by aspiring candidates
and their supporters and sent to the Central office/Provincial Offices of PTI for
them to enter the data on the computer. In addition under instructions of the party,
the members who lead the membership drive uploaded their membership details
directly onto sites specified by the party.
Before finalization of the electoral lists, they were uploaded on the
PTI website to invite objections. Since only a fraction of the members made during
the memberships campaigns were uploaded, there was an outcry. Members were
then given four days to upload the missing names and correct the lists.
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Members who were resourceful and were computer savvy were able
to correct /enter members made by them, on to the PTI website, and in some cases
upload even details of members made after the cut off date. Majority had no option
but to continue to complain about a faulty electoral list, having only a small
fraction of members actually made. In a number of cases the uploaded electoral list
did not have enough details for candidates to locate them especially where cell
numbers were not given. Even where cell numbers were given, they were incorrect.
So no canvassing could be done with majority of members made, nor could they
cast their vote.
When the electoral lists were supposedly ready, they were uploaded
on to the PTI website for all to see and correct, wherever incorrect. To the chagrin
of a large number of party workers, they were stunned to see that a very small
number of members actually made were uploaded on to the PTI website.
The building block of any electoral process is the voters list. In the
case of PTI, the Intra Party Election was off to a bad start, because of a
horrendously incomplete and inaccurate voter list.
1. Factors of faulty voter list.
i) Millions of voters registered through phone (880022, 99000 )could
not be included in the voter list, because of inadequate information (name and
CNIC number ) obtained at the time of registration.
ii) The entry of data of members made physically by
aspiring candidates, was done centrally by the Central Office and under a tight
time schedule. The in-house entry of data, through a group of temporarily hired
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staff, without professional supervision, close monitoring and quality checks,
resulted in grave inadequacies.
.
iii) There was no time to take corrective action and revise and improve
the lists, in view of the tight election schedule.
2.2 Elections managed by aspiring candidates for party tickets.
While the vision of the Chairman in insisting on Intra Party Elections was
to have a truly democratic sprit seep into the party foundation and have a party
organization at all levels, which is truly representative of the party, in actual fact,
UC level election was manipulated by aspirants of Distt. Posts/Provincial posts,
assisted by aspirants of party tickets for General elections
Rs.500 was fixed as the fees for contesting the elections for a Counselor’s
posts. Because of lack of information at the village level about the IPE and
inability/reluctance to pay fees, there was mixed response of members. Aspiring
candidates for district/provincial posts or their sponsors (the aspiring party ticket
candidates) deposited Rs.6500/- per U.C for the thirteen posts to be contested. In
the process they filled up the names of candidates themselves to make a total of
thirteen. In a large number of cases, family members and servants were shown as
candidates. In other cases names of such persons were included, who had either no
inclination to politics or had not been consulted. That is one of the reasons why
most party candidates complained of there being no UC Counselors, to assist and
work with them, during the General Elections,
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2.3 Compromise Maneuvered
While there was intense rivalry in every district amongst contenders of
party tickets, both for National and Provincial seats, in large number of U.C there
was no contest. This trend was also, seen in a numbers of districts, where there was
a “compromise” in the whole district.
These ‘ compromises’ were managed by aspiring candidates, through
various methods, not all fair, and in some case due to lack of information to the
ordinary members, resulting in a very few candidates for Counselors coming to
contest.
2.4 Cell based voting not effective
While the biggest nightmare of the election organizers was to set up polling
stations physically in every U.C., cell based voting which could be done through
the mobile telephone from anywhere, was perceived to be the easy part. In actual
fact, the setting up polling stations in every U.C, a night mare before the polling,
was achieved effectively through efficient management and an effective Service
Provider. In some cases difficulty was faced, due to tussle at the local level on the
location of the polling station. Specifically designated cell phones, supplied by the
Central Office, were successfully delivered to hundreds of specified polling station
all over Punjab within the stipulated tight schedule, without a hitch.
The actual cell based votes cast was much lower than expected. Voters had
great difficulty in establishing contact with the central exchange, partly due to their
entering wrong /inadequate data and partly due to the inadequacies of the system,
even though it was insisted that the capacity to take number of calls simultaneously
was adequate. This is reflective in the dismally small number of votes, that were 15
actually shown in the election results to have been cast ,as compared to the very
large number of members that the party claimed. The votes actually shown to have
been cast in each UC were dismally low in some cases less then a dozen.The
surprising part was that even votes confirmed to have been cast by candidates
supporters, were not shown in the results.
From KPK there were allegations that the official cell phones found their
way into the hands of interested parties for a consideration. Misuse of these phones
after voting hours was also reported.
2.5 The Electoral Process:
While the electoral process was handled effectively but perhaps too
centrally, by the Election Commission at the Centre, the command and control at
the provincial level was weak.
In Punjab, the Election Commission was weak and indecisive. The command and
control expected from an organization like the ILF was not forthcoming, because
of a lot of inter/intra personal issues. At the district level, there was a perception
of lack of neutrality amongst the staff assigned election duties.. Being a first
experience for all was a factor which was important. Volunteers, as staff who were
not being paid much, also played a significant role in the ineffective management.
An Appellate forum set up in Punjab under a retired judge was a welcome
initiative. However, the Tribunal was unable to implement its decisions and
provide timely relief in a large number of cases, during the elections, where
complainants expected their grievance to be addressed before election date.
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2.6 Politicians dominated the Nazariati members;
While the desired result of the intra-party elections was to provide a formal
network in the form of U.C /Tehsil /District level party organizations, to the old
’nazariati’ members of the party, the pushes and pulls of politics and elections, did
not favor the ideologically motivated old members. In most districts and Tehsils
/Union Councils, members who got elected were recent entrants and person more
adapt at playing politics rather than having ideological commitment to the party.
The other expected outcomes of the intra party election, which came home
with bigger force than expected, was the establishment of firm groupings at every
level, specially at District and Provincial level .This , amongst other things
,demoralized the old worker, who could not succeed in the intense rigmarole of
elections.
The award of the party ticket was influenced also by the intense lobbying
by the newly elected bodies for persons who supported them in IPE, rather than in
the best interest of the party.
2.7 Implications of the IPE;
Based on the number of people we interviewed, the losses to the party due
to IPE were far more than the gains. The down side was:-
a) The ‘ faux pas’ of the voter lists and the arbitrary manner in which
election issues and complaints were handled by the Election Commission, (who
were pressed for time) left a poor impression of the party’s organizational state and
ability with the party workers.
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b) The rivalries, groupings and personal animosity generated by the
electoral process, did not end with elections. Due to the very short time between
the IPE and General Elections, it very seriously affected the unity and enthusiasm
of PTI, in the party ranks, during the general election.
c) The non-participation at the U.C level by the genuine party
members/voter (inadequate voter list) and the maneuvering done by aspirants of
District and Provincial post, left a serious question mark about the legitimacy of
the elected bodies.
d) The expected utility of having a proper screening process of the
prospective candidates by the District. /Reg. / Provincial body through unbiased
selection, and better local knowledge of the candidates, did not play out as
envisaged .Resultantly their recommendations were perceived to be biased, based
on personal likes and dislikes which lead to ad-hoc decision making.
Recommendations of groups/party member, who lost the IPE, did not find
prominence in the decision making process.
e) There is a perception that the office bearers, especially at the
Provincial level, who have been thrown up by the electoral process, are stronger
than the party leadership, as they can not easily be disciplined or removed, due to
their electoral rights having gotten the position through an election. The party
constitution also safeguards their incumbency.
The plus side of the IPE was:-
a) Party has made a breakthrough in organizing itself and
has provided a lead to the other parties in institutionalizing the political parties.
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Recommendations 1) IPE should never be planned near the General Elections. IPE should be at
least one year before the General Election.
2) The party constitution should be suitably amended to take care of the
following issues:
i) The eligibility criteria of becoming a party member. Having a large
number of uninterested members is not necessarily a good option. Only a voting
member should be eligible to context election.
ii) Only residents of the U.C should be eligible for contesting in that
U.C.
iii) The issue of having to cast dozens of votes in the U.C elections,
should be sorted out, to bring it to manageable level, perhaps through
acknowledging the reality of panels i.e. panels should be allowed for U.C level
elections.
3. Rs. 500/-fees for U.C level election should be withdrawn
4.. Voter list should be reconstructed within a reasonable time frame and be
available on the web, to be challenged and corrected, as an on going process .
Confidentiality of member details has not paid off. PTI members should be
known and be proned of their association with the party. Fence sitter will in any
case join and leave according to their advantage.
5. Electronic voting, though attractive on paper, did not deliver effectively. A
third party evaluation of the last experience should be done and a critical
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evaluation of the shortcomings be undertaken. Since PTI is a share holder in the
cell voting hardware, it’s evaluation is necessary to use the asset effectively in the
future. Passing all the blame on the election staff and EC, will be brushing the
matter under the carpet. After third party evaluation, its performance be tested in a
Pilot Project before using it again in the next IPE.
6. For the reason that it was the first experience of the kind by any political
party and for reasons highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs, the IPE was not
perceived to be a fair exercise. There is continuing resentment and disenchantment
with the elected bodies. Setting the tenures run to the full may not be
recommended. Party should deliberate re election at an appropriate time,in the not
too distant a future.
7. An innovative system should be introduced to improve on the current system
of “winner take all” to reduce the intense grouping that is sure to develop after
every IPE. One idea would be to have a Panel System and giving the loosing panel
share in the U.C office bearers proportionate to their votes.
International experience needs to be evaluated. Human nature being similar,
more developed democracies must have developed different systems to take care
of the problem of intense groupings after party elections.
8. Party Office bearers should not be allowed to contest the General Elections.
Members should decide whether they want to be part of party bureaucracy or be
part of the government. This will throw up the enthusiastic and “ nazariati” cadre
of the party to run the party.
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Chapter-3
Distribution of Tickets
Distribution of party tickets was always perceived to be crucial and at the
same time most contentious exercise, in the run up to general elections. Formation
of the Central Parliamentary Board and Provincial/Regional Parliamentary Boards,
along with candidate assessment exercises, was being talked about since a year
prior to elections but actually the Central Parliamentary Board was never actually
set up until 25 March – 24 days before the final submission of nomination for
General Elections. Candidate assessment was done by a couple of groups, in a very
“hush hush” manner. There was never any seal of ownership of the party
leadership with these groups/individuals set up for candidate assessment. They had
only been informally requested by the party high ups to undertake the exercises
while all along publicly it was being said that recommendations of the elected
hierarchy of the party will be given the main weight..
Chairman’s decision, to hold IPEs before General Elections, even though
there was overwhelming recommendation against it, was perceived to be motivated
by the desire to avoid the hassle of taking responsibilities and pressure of taking
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decision for each constituency. The District “tanzeem” was to send a list of three
suitable candidates for each NA / PA seat through the Regional `Tanzeem`, while
Provincial “tanzeem” could add a name. On this basis the Provincial Parliamentary
Board was to send its recommendations to the Center Parliamentary Board which,
was to provide the legitimate forum to make decision of tickets, even though the
discretion of the top leadership, was always announced to be retained.
In order to implement the ‘ground up’ approach, a very rational system was
devised by Mr. Zohair Asheer, who also briefed us on the details. This rational
system was never adopted by the Central Parliamentary Board (CPB) due to the
resistance by the CPB members with political background, who wanted to go by
their political assessment/suitability.
What finally transpired was a free of all lobbying by all NA/PA candidates.
The CPB, also had, in any case, called for the candidates to apply directly to them,
in contradiction to their own instructions of having recommendation sent from
UC/Districts/Regions/Province upwards. Provincial Chiefs were therefore not
bound by any formal recommendations of the lower PB. Their recommendations
were given due credence by CPB, being elected representatives of the Party
provincial body. They not only enjoyed unfettered powers in their
recommendations before the CPB but also exercised it.
So while the effort of Chairman to hold early IPE was to have a
rational/defendable system of selection, it became the worst ad-hoc exercise with
Provincial Chiefs wielding disproportioned influence, followed by influence of
members of CPB with political backgrounds.
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The uncertainty of getting party tickets right until the end, kept most
candidates away from their constituency and in Islamabad during the crucial period
of the campaign, as they had to ‘ward off’ attacks from rivals in Islamabad to get
their tickets changed. In a number of cases party ticket was taken away even after
weeks of campaigning by a candidate and given to someone else. Most of such
candidates having already invested in the elections and in order to save their and
their supporters honor went ahead with the election as independents, damaging the
chances of the PTI candidates.
3.1 Role of Parliamentary Boards:
According to the PTI Constitution, Regional, Provincial and Central
Parliamentary Board were supposed to be set up to process and decide the names
of party’s nominees for ticket for the general elections. The Regional
Parliamentary Board was supposed to recommend three names per constituency,
after give “due” considerations to the recommendation of the District/City
Organization, and the Provincial Parliamentary Board was supposed to recommend
one name per constituency to the Central Parliamentary Board along with a
covering candidate.
The party central command for their own reasons set a different path when
they asked all party ticket aspirants to file their nominations with the Central
Office directly. The parallel system of seeking recommendations of provinces, as
laid down in the constitution was also allowed to operate.
The whole concept of holding Intra Party Elections, at the peril of dividing
the party and consuming valuable days immediately before the general election,
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was to have the input from the elected representatives of the district/tehsil.This
wish never materialized effectively. Further, the formation of the parliamentary
board and the candidate selection process was delayed inordinately.
As mentioned earlier the extent to which the input of the grass root party
representative was taken, we tried to obtain names of the candidates, recommended
by the District Organization to the Region; the names recommended by the
Regional Parliamentary Board to the Provincial parliamentary and then to the
Central parliamentary Board. The purpose was to assess the extent of the influence
District/Regional/Provincial Board, actually exerted in the final selection of
candidates.
Unfortunately despite repeated efforts, the Provincial President of Punjab
was unable to provide the lists. His plea was that all he has was names listed on his
personal scrap book, which are not worth showing.
From this response, we are forced to deduce that no formal method, as laid
down, in the constitution was followed, with the result that rather than working
under a framework, the system was made flexible to ensure recommendations
based on personal likes and dislikes.
3.2 Role of Central Parliamentary Board:
The CPB got itself under excessive pressure, by allowing itself only three
weeks to take decision on 849 Seats (272 NA 577 P.A seats) in the country. The
task was made difficult and confusing, in an effort to achieve perfection, by
depending on multiple sources of recommendation.
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In addition to the constitutionally laid down route of Provincial/Regional
Parliamentary Board, a committee comprising Mr. Zohair Asheer and Mr. Jamal
Ansari was asked to undertake a mathematical review of all applicants based on
their education, past experience etc. So the CPB had to listen to the advise of
multiple sources; the Provincial Chiefs; the Zohair Committee, other informal
evaluation committees like the one lead by Ch. Afzal Hayat/ Jahania; views of
individual members of the Central Parliamentary Board, some of whom were
promoting their own groups.
In the presence of ‘excessive ‘advise, and limited time, the Central
Parliamentary Board did not have the time to invite candidates for interview, an
exercise usually followed by Political Parties in selecting their ticket holders. This
deficiency alone was a major factor in the dissatisfaction of the party
members/workers. They perceived that since decisions were taken behind closed
doors and the transparent process of inviting them for an interview was not
followed, there must have been malpractices. The complaint most often made
before the RC was that even-though the party had charged a heavy amount for
ticket applications, they did not even show us the respect of inviting us for an
interview.
3.3 Lack of credible input from the Gross roots:
District is the most important unit for determining the dynamics of politics
in Pakistan. Delimitation of constituency is based on this unit. Groupings, rivalries,
past history, strengths and weaknesses, are all know to the district political pundits.
The importance of IPE was also based on the real input from districts.
Unfortunately two factors mitigated this input. One the IPE divided the
party so badly that the recommendations from district, became suspect, as it was
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based on group loyalty, rather than merit. Even where it was based on merit, the
perception of the general member was to the contrary. Secondly district
representative were not present before the CPB, with the result decisions were
based on who ever was able to present some one’s case more eloquently. Often
misstatements of facts were resorted to, to obtain a decision of choice.
3.4 Serious Issues with Ticket Distribution: Other than Corruption:
The confusion, pressure for time and a fluid changing process of arriving at
decisions resulted in a number of issues, most of which adversely effected the
party’s performance in the general election. Some of these are:
1. In a predominant number of constituency, not even the strongest of
candidates was sure of getting the ticket until the last moment, compromising his
position and reputation in the constituency. Some obvious and closely associated
(with PTI) candidates felt ridiculed and belittled at the hands of rivals, with poor
reputation, at being equated with them and having to run about until the end. Party
was being fair and not committing to any one , however politically important.
2. The uncertainty, apart from belittling them, sapped the enthusiasm/energy
of those candidates, who eventually got the ticket.
3. False allotment of tickets, which were withdrawn, in the middle of the
campaign and in some cases re-allotted, spread widespread confusion and belittled
the party’s management capabilities.
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4. In a number of cases, candidates were given their ‘word’ by person in
position about ticket allotment; They spent money on printing posters etc and
started campaigning, only to be told that their ticket had been withdrawn. A
number of such people left the party and continued their campaign as
independent candidates. This divided the party supporters and badly affected
party’s performance. Most of such persons would neither have contested against
the party nor would have sat home, if the process of selection was better and they
had been told in time that they will not get the ticket.
5. Due to a haphazard method, each candidate, whether for MPA or MNA,
fought his own battle; with the result the final decision had no relevance to having
MPA candidates compatible to the MNA of the constituency. Resultantly the
synergy so essential in the campaign of the MNA candidates who is in harmony
with the MPA “under him” was lacking. In most cases rather than supporting each
other, they even opposed each other, resulting in the loss of both.
6. Senior office bearers of other parties, who had a clean reputation and were
welcomed into PTI, and who had staked their political reputation to join a party
more in line with their moral values, were not given the respect they felt they
deserved. This apart from disheartening them, worked as a double whammy; the
loss of political respect at leaving an old party (lota) and not being given respect in
their new party. Due to this and other factors, most of them performed very badly.
7. While the perception of party ticket being sold was predominant with
groups, who were denied ticket, the unruly process of decision making and conduct
of the Central P.B. which some deponents compared to a fish market, in our view,
is even more to blame than allegation of corruption.
27
8. The performance of CPB was further brought into question, when the list of
‘invited” members became unwieldy with a host of unconcerned participants.
Aggressive debate was undertaken by group leaders, who supported their
respective groups rather than merit. Due to constraint of time and irrevocable
differences, in the end party leaders were handed over blank tickets to dish out, as
they wished, which brought the performance of the apex body to an unacceptable
low.
9. The decision to allot 25 % seats to youth was generally considered
counterproductive, as most you candidates lacked experience, resources,
knowledge of their constituency. In most cases they did not even make this up,
with running an aggressive campaign, expected from youth.
Blame for bad distribution of tickets to candidates with poor reputation or
candidates who did not have the motivation to work hard, may be cast on party
leaders, who were responsible for their recommendations but has to be squarely
shared by the members of the CPB, as ultimately it was their decision.
Recommendations:
1. Last time hardly three weeks were allowed for the party to decide party
tickets for 272 NA and 577 PA seats. To decide, input was taken from (a) an in
house committee lead by Mr. Asheer Zohair (b) input of Provincial
Presidents/Provincial Parliamentary Board (c) input of members of the CPB and
(d) input received by Chairman directly. Synthesizing the many inputs takes time
and because of shortage of time, CPB took incorrect decisions. .
28
This mistake should not be repeated. The question now is how soon should
the party decide the tickets. Party often like to hold their cards near their chest, till
the end, to have the option for the best. This has not worked for PTI.
The hunt for good candidates should start Now, based on (a) performance in
2008 )b) enthusiasm for party (e) elect ability.
2. To strengthen the party at the district level there is no alternative to the
Chairman himself visiting districts, as frequently as possible, but not less than once
in six months. In these meetings, as different from jalsas, Chairman should meet
50/100 people in an enclosed space and listen to the problems of the local leaders
and works. There is no requirement for the Chairman to make any formal speech;
listing is more important for party strengthening. The local squabbles will
inevitably be aired in such gatherings; they have to be heard and coordinated as
best as possible, by second tier national leadership, who should assist the Chairman
in these meetings.
3. A confidential hunt for potential candidates in each constituency should be
undertaken through various means as soon as possible, one of them could be hiring
a specialized private company. Contact with the identified candidates should be
maintained by party leadership (who ever is assigned the task) to both monitor and
groom the potential candidates. A strategy district wise should also be devised to
attract good candidates from other parties who fit the PTI profile.
4. The process of party tickets allotment should start at least six months before
the elections and tickets should be finalized not later than three months before
election date.
29
5. National Assembly candidates should be selected first and their input taken
for selecting the Provincial Assembly candidates under him.
6. Policy for tickets for youth should be reviewed. No minimum limit of tickets
to any category be announced. Merit in each case should be determining factor for
each constituency, while best effort should be made to encourage young people.
7. A PTI lead person be appointed, at least one for each civil division, to
handle the political fall out of ticket awarding and damage control, to minimize the
number of opponents, specially those who turn hostile at not being given the ticket.
This should be done near the elections, before the start of ticket distribution
process.
8. Elected President of District should be co-opted in the CPB for selection of
candidates of his district .
30
Chapter- 4
Mal-administration/Corruption and its impact on election results
Even-though the RC was set up to look into the candidate’s evaluation
procedure for award of tickets and look into causes that adversely affected the
performance of the party, apart from enquiring into allegations of corruption and
misconduct, most people who contacted us or appeared before the Review
Commission had only corruption on their minds. They thought that was the biggest
factor which harmed the party
There was one common factor amongst people who alleged corruption;
they were preponderantly those who had been denied tickets. Allegation of
wrongdoings for pecuniary considerations was concentrated in Punjab, followed by
KPK. Surprisingly not many complaints were received from Sindh and
Baluchistan. The larger numbers of complaints in Punjab can also be related to the
larger number of seats up for decision in the province.
A number of complainants, who specifically requested to be heard, and
some whose mails seemed to have a substantive content, were heard in person by
the Review Commission and their deposition minutes. Despite repeated request to
provide the RC irrefutable evidence, none of the deponents, could produce any
evidence except one, which will be discussed later. In some cases deponents gave 31
the Review Commission affidavits of their allegations, while others offered to
bring witnesses.
Review Commission told them that if witnesses are to be examined, then it
will have to be done in the presence of the accused, who will have the right to
cross examine the witness and proper legal form will have to followed, which is a
time consuming process and not possible for the Review Commission to do and not
part of its mandate. It is for the party, if it deems necessary, to set up Special
Committees, province-wise, to undertake the task.
Since no substantive evidence of financial corruption was produced, the
Review .Commission did not deem it necessary to call the persons complained
against to answer charges. While it can be said that where there is smoke there is
bound to be fire, it can also be said the people in our country, are prone to
exaggerating, especially against those who have hurt them. In some case the hurt is
particularly nasty; especially where it happens after intense friendship, hurting the
other party then becomes a matter of honor.
While the leadership of the party is within its right to form any opinion on
the matter, the Review Commission does not feel competent to pass judgment on
anyone without credible evidence.
In the case of District President of Faisalabad Mr. Raheel a deponent
produced a phone with a SIM, in which messages, exchanges pertaining to
negotiation of bribe, were saved. These messages emanated from the cell number,
owned by the District President Faisalabad. He was summoned to explain the
evidence produced against him. While he admitted that the telephone number
32
mentioned was his, he completely denied the contents and called it a cyber crime.
He was confident enough to give us an authorization for the Telco to verify the
contents of the SMS. While the reply of the Telco is overdue, informal enquiry
reveals that they as a policy do not share this information with a third party.
The President Faisalabad has also in the meanwhile produced counter
evidence, and has demonstrated how fake messages can be generated from any
telephone number through a special software. He has also produced a copy of SMS
bill purporting to show details, which do not carry the details of the message
alleged to have been sent from his phone.
Since there was a cacophony of complaints against the gentleman, and
documentary evidence was produced, it is recommended that party assign this case
to a Special Committee, which should seek confirmation from the cell company
about the veracity of the sms in addition to hearing witnesses.
Recommendations:
1. A Standing Committee on Disciplinary Matters should be set up to consider
cases of corruption, discipline etc. The SG should be the authorized person to send
such cases, which he feels require adjudication, to the Standing Committee. The
Standing Committee should record evidence, in the presence of the accused, who
should have right to cross examine, before sending their verdict to the SG, who
should then decide the punishment. Depending on the work load, there can be more
than one Standing Committee.
2. The case of President Faisalabad be put up before the Standing Committee
on Disciplinary Matters for deliberation.
33
3. Although there was a lot of commotion in the party on corruption after the
IPE, almost no one brought forward any concrete evidence. This is also because
most corrupt persons are careful not to leave any trail. It is ,therefore,
recommended that the general reputation of the members should be given due
importance in future decision making.
4. Action should also be take against persons who are found making false
allegations.
Chapter-5 :
34
Candidate performance and evaluation
We feel that while money may have change hands in different cases to
influence the allotment of tickets no irrefutable evidence was produced before us
except one case. We, however, researched and collected data of the elections and
analyzed it, with the aim to see where the results were not in line with the general
trend and to attempt to find reason for unusual performances. We feel that these
results can also lead us to the area of malpractice/corruption to point towards other
factors that the party did not take into reckoning while deciding on candidates.
Five different exercises are discussed below.
5.1 Exercise 1- Averages
In this Exercise we have examined the averages of votes polled by the party in various regions/ district to see how the trend went and whether the trend is explainable.
Votes obtained in the General Elections 2013 both for MNA and MPA region wise
in Punjab are as follows:-
35
The interesting thing, these figures reveal is while the average votes obtained by a
PTI National Assembly candidate in Punjab are only 36888, the average votes per
MNA in the Northern Region comprising of Rawalpindi, Attock, Chakwal,
Jehlum, Sargodha, Khushab and Mianwali districts is 55081 i.e. 18193 more than
the average of the rest of the province.
This average is not based on a small number of National Assembly seats in the
Northern Region but 25 of them. Out of these two seats even if we discount for the
high votes of 133224 and 80577 polled by Chairman PTI in Mianwali and
Rawalpindi , the average of the remaining 23 districts was way above the
performance of PTI in other Regions.
The party need to evaluate and identify the factors that lead to much better
performance in the Northern Region, then in the rest of Punjab.On the face of it the
footprints of the party were not particularly stronger in these districts.
36
5.2 Exercise 2-District trend analysis:
Detailing the performance district wise the figures are in Annexure B
1. It is interesting to see while the average votes obtained by the NA candidate
in the Western Region was 31107, average votes obtained by PTI NA
candidates in Jhang/Chiniot and Okara districts was only 11708 and 12834
respectively. This needs an explanation as Okara where the average votes
were 12834 is contiguous to Sahiwal, where of the average of their four
seats contested was as high as 46416. Similarly performance in
Jhang/Chiniot next to Faisalabad, where the average was not good but still
more than double at 29737 (on eleven NA seats contested). These results
need explanation because the general factors of PTI’s popularity or
otherwise cannot change within a few kilometers.
2. In the Central Region two MNAs contesting from Hafiz Abad got only an
average of 5355 votes. Similarly in Kasur, the five MNAs got an average of
19075 against the average of 34410 of 41 NA candidates contesting in the
rest of the Central Region.
3. In the Northern Region against the average of 55081 for the whole Region,
two MNA candidates from Bhakkar got a dismal average of 6078 average
votes and those from Sargodha (5 MNAs) got only 21836 votes. So the
award of tickets of Sargodha and Bakkar needs to be looked into.
4. In the Southern Region while the 43 MNA candidates got an average of
33185 votes, those from Rajanpur got only 10305 and from Muzaffarghar
only 12292. Obviously the selection of candidates in these districts needs to
be questioned.
37
5.3 Exercise 3-Statistical evaluation comparing PTI candidates with opponents
A credible selected candidate is that who either wins for the party or puts up a
good/close fight. In the case of PTI, this was expected considering the profile
the party had achieved immediately prior to the elections. However, questions
need to be asked where PTI candidates failed to get even less than 1/5th or 20%
votes compared to the winner. This very low threshold was fixed so that when
we examine the methodology adopted for awarding tickets, we only look at
those candidates whose performance was pathetic
The exercise, which can be seen at Annexure C, reveals that 42 MNA
candidates from Punjab alone fall in this category and could not even obtain
20% of the winners vote. Names are indicated in the Annexure. We need to
examine, who nominated these candidates and under what circumstances were
they awarded tickets by CPB.
In KPK only 2 MNA candidates did so poorly as to score less than 20% of the
winner’s votes. Details are in Annexure D
5.4 Exercise 4-Zohair Asheer/Jamal Ansari Committee:
The party had asked Mr Zohair Asheer and Mr Jamal Ansari to undertake an
evaluation of all candidates who had applied for a ticket. The CPB had, contrary
to what is laid down in the constitution, directed members to send in their
applications directly to the central office. All those directly received applicants
for the ticket had to be evaluated
38
Asheer/Ansari Committee was assigned the task to evaluate the candidates on
the basis of education, tax history, election history and work history. The
committee marked each candidate on the basis of these four criteria. The top
three in the list were recommended to the Central Parliamentary Board. We
have made a comparison of the scores given by the Committee to the candidate
with the votes he was able to manage in the general election as given at
Annexure E.A glance at the score sheet indicates that there is little relationship
between the evaluation score and votes obtained. A person who may be paying
taxes and may have worked in a structured organization and gained valuable
work history may not be popular amongst voters.
From the results it seems that such scientific and rational exercise should be
done by the party to the extent of short listing eligibility, based on rules made
by CEC, to ensure that candidate given ticket by the party, should not be
disqualified by CEC. These include the qualification of candidates under article
62-63 of the constitution of Pakistan
5.5 Exercise 5- Evaluation of candidate by politically astute party members:
Is it better to take the advice of politically astute party members to select
candidates rather than base it on the recommendation of the inexperienced
provincial elected bodies? To answer the question Review Commission probed
a study done by Hussain Jhania and Mian Afzal Hayyat, with a tacit support of
the party leadership, to see how the person nominated by this Committee which
has rich political experience performed in the elections. The Review
Commission found that;
1. 58 candidates for as many constituencies were recommended by this
committee, out of which 33 (57%) were accepted by the Central
Parliamentary Board and given tickets.
39
2. The 33 PTI candidates that were selected on Jahania/Afzal
recommendations obtained an average of 58883 votes against an overall
average of 36888 votes secured by PTI candidates from entire Punjab i.e
21995 more or 59.6% more than the average of Punjab
3. Out of the 25 recommended candidates that were not given PTI ticket, 11
chose to contest the elections either independently or from some other
political party. Out of the 11 candidates that participated in the elections
7 got more votes than PTI candidates.
This exercise seems to indicate that nominations based on a political
criterion rather than on other factors, like past loyalty to the party, will
get the party better results, although, it may be in conflict with the party
ethos/Ideology.
5.6 Other than corruption:
Corruption has been made out the main reason for wrong distribution
of tickets which in turn affected the performance of the party. There are a
number of other factors, which are responsible for less than expected
performance. Some of these are as follows:
1. Because of inordinate delay in finalizing tickets a number of good
candidates left and joined other parties or preferred to contest as
independents to obviate the insult of being refused the tickets on the last
moment.
40
2. Some good candidates played one party against the other in giving them
the ticket and left PTI in a lurch leaving PTI with very few options.
3. All candidates had to wait before being awarded the ticket, right at the
last moment, leaving the minimum time to canvas for their candidature.
4. The youth were also given a high % of tickets, were not known in their
constituencies and also did not have their resources to spend on publicity
or area to mobilize the volunteers.
5. Selection of ticket holders was made on individual bases and very rarely
as a team, in which MNA and MPA candidates were not on the same
wavelength. This deprived the party of the synergy that candidates of
other parties normally pay attention to.
Recommendations:
1. An exercise for pre-qualification of candidates for party ticket should be
done to assess whether their past record is in line with the qualification acceptable
in the Constitution of Pakistan e.g. Article 62-63.The other information like
education, work history etc should only be for information of the CPB .It should
not be quantified or given grading.
2. Advisory Group compromising experienced politicians of the party be set
up formaly, either Region wise or for more than one Region, to make their
recommendations, based on the winning potential of candidates in each
41
constituency. This Advisory Group would be in addition to the recommendations
of the elected party hierarchy.
3. An assessment of financial resources of the candidate should be made to
see his resourcefulness, specially where party will be unable to make a significant
contribution to the candidate’s campaign fund.
42
Chapter-6
National Campaign-An Analysis 6.1 Tabdeeli Razakar: The performance of the Tabdeeli Razakr (TR) was criticized by most
complainants who appeared before is. Their main complaint was that TRs were
nowhere to be seen on the election day. It was a project with a lot of hype but
performance on the ground was poor. A perception existed that huge amounts were
spent and some people made profound gains out of it.
The Review Commission invited the persons who managed the scheme and
discussed the issue at length.
The idea was conceived two years prior to the General Elections, but the actual
registration drive of the TR`s was only started only on March 15 2013 i.e seven
weeks before the elections. The delay in launching was necessitated because of the
decision not to have an organization parallel to the `tanzeems` which were to come
on the ground through the IPE, which finished on March 22,2013. The launch of
TR, like other things, was also put on hold due to the IPE.
Registration of TR was done through telephone ,based on interest generated by TV
ads, text messages and advertisement on the social media. The prime task assigned
to them was
1) Delivering letter of IK to 20 voters at least
2) Checking and verification of the voter list
3) Assisting the candidates on the election day
43
A total of 175000 TR`s were registered. They were all volunteers, who were also
involved in their own jobs/businesses ,so could not be expected to give full time to
PTI. The only physical thing they got out of the party were the printed letters of IK
to be delivered to the voters. A proposal to provide them party caps, to give them a
sense of belonging was not accepted due to financial constraints.
The RC was informed that only RS2.7 Crore was spent on the whole scheme,
which includes cost of advertisement, providing of 6 million letters of IK, holding
of conventions and gathering for training and motivation and vans with LCD`s for
video broadcasting etc
To us it appears that a good idea was poorly executed, due to an unrealistically
unworkable time frame of seven weeks, to recruit, train and provide a huge force
of volunteers, at not only the village level but also the polling station level. It was
to say the least an over optimistic exercise, which had raised people’s expectation
due to hype created through the media.
There was no way the candidates and `tanzeems` could be expected to coordinate
with the TR`s as no effort seems to have been made to educate the tanzeems or
candidates about what was being made available to them through providing TR`s.
Also with the hectic running about to be done by the candidate until 17 April 2013
and even thereafter, to get tickets and the uncertainty with which `tanzeems` came
into being due to the controversy faced in the IPE, most candidates and tanzeem
were least bothered about a fancy scheme like TR.
It was only when the elections were over and candidates realized that their
management of the election day was poor that most people had to find escape goats
and thought of the non-performance of the TR. Notwithstanding other reasons, to
expect complete volunteers, who have not been provided even a cap to identify
them with the party, and not paid even their actual expense for the election day, to
44
perform with discipline and diligence over eighteen hours,(minimum required to
see an election day through) is to expect the unrealistic. The Tabdeeli Razakar
could be the building block of the activity in the party, provided the scheme is
refined and implemented with improvements and adequate resources
While no defalcation of funds was found, we found that it was a good idea badly
implemented. Next time around, it should be launched in good time, with the
proper training of both TR`s and candidates/tanzeems and adequate funds should
be provided to pay the “volunteers”,at least his opportunity cost, to bind him down
to the assigned tasks
6.2 Election day:
The complaint received by us regarding the party’s election campaign planning,
strategy and the organizational support on Election Day were as follow:
1) The campaign ignored the poor and the rural segment as there was no catchy
slogan or appeal pertaining to them
2) Party leadership like Vice chairmen, President and other recently elected
official bearer like ‘Provincial Presidents had no role in the general election
campaign and had no contact with the worker
3) The national campaign was limited to TV ads and there was no contact with
the rank and file of the party.
4) The TV campaign did cause an impact but the hype created a lull amongst
the candidates into believing that they will win due a `wave` and need not
work
5) Party and candidates made inadequate arrangements for polling agents and
`tanzeems` did not help in this regard either
45
6) Contrary to PTI`s ideological thinking, `biradri` still plays an important role
in the election results
7) This election was different from 1970 election; there was no `Khambha`
factor, in rural areas
When the RC discussed the role of party leadership on the campaign and
Election Day, we were told that the national campaign comprised of a)
Marketing through electronic, prints plus social media and was based on
advertisement and SMS`s b) organizing the campaign of Chairmen/V.C c) New
concepts like `Tabdeeli Razakar`, `Awami Rabta Mohem`, were launched and
d) Arranging Chairmen`s air transport .
After hearing both sides, RC is of the view that there is no doubt that our
candidates were not adequately prepared for the Election Day. 25% or so were
youth, most of whom had neither election experience, nor the funds to launch
an effective campaign. Further, three weeks that most candidates got to fight the
election were totally inadequate, especially for the first time `youth` candidates
Our candidates were exhausted by the time they got their tickets and had
precisely three weeks to do everything. So they made halfhearted attempts to
organize polling agents or protest the wrong posting of polling staff. While the
TR`s role may not have included becoming polling agents but the expectation
of the party that they should have assisted in managing election, appears
reasonable. Proper coordination between the candidate and the TR could not be
achieved, so this resource of dedicated volunteers could not be used.
The lack of harmony between the NA and PA candidates also acted as a
major setback in the face of cooperation between the candidates of the opposing
parties
46
Recommendations:
1. The TR scheme should be reviewed and re-launched after studying the
shortcomings of the past.
2. T.R should be the party’s foot soldiers positioned to help the party’s
candidates during the general elections. For this, special effort and planning
should go in to ensure coordination between the candidates and the TR, lacking
last time
3. Funds should be allocated to provide party symbols to the TR “ like “caps
etc” and also per-diem for the election day. Amount should be enough to add to
their existing motivation and subject them to discipline, receive training and
ensure continued presence until counting is finished, on the election day. These
funds could be provided by the candidate, but the party should ensure that they
are actually disbursed .
4. Party top leadership including U.C, President, Provincial Presidents should
be allocated geographical areas, to ensure that they campaign effectively to
support party candidates, in area allocated to them. Campaign Office should
coordinate the political activity between the leaders and candidates.
5. Party should devise a system to ensure that each candidates has done
adequate work on his own, to recruit, train and motivate Polling Agents and this
facet is not being neglected.
47
6. TR’s numbers and capability needs to be specially assessed to ensure no
confusion occurs between what the TR’s are able to do and what the candidates
will do.
48
Chapter-7.
Issues with Leadership
While majority of complaints were against the conduct of IPE, distribution
of tickets, TR, Election Day arrangements, there were also complaints against the
performance of party leadership both at Central and the Provincial level. Some of
the complaints expressed before us are as follow;
1) Chairman PTI listens to complaints of members, and wings etc and
empathizes with the complaining party, but takes no firm action. It was
observed that status quo will not do and firm decisions will have to be taken
2) The SG`s office and his unit in the party has been non-existent. Blatant
violations of party discipline go unnoticed. One instance quoted was
members who have sided with opponents of PTI during election are still in
the party and no action has been initiated against them. Further no system in
the party has been developed to punish and reward members based on their
performance
3) Other than the Chairmen, other party leadership including Vice chairman,
President, President of provinces were busy with their own campaigns
during the General Elections and did not campaign in those constituencies
where the Chairman could not go.
49
4) A few members had the grievance with the Chairman that sometimes he
does not recognize important workers of the party while on tour,
disappointing them and also causing embarrassment before their supporters.
The form of complaining against the Chairman `however` was like with a
family member ,and most of them said that despite their issues and
disappointments, they still look up to Imran Khan and felt he is the only one
who can deliver the nation from its problems
5) Deponents also held the party leadership responsible including the
Chairman for the mess in ticket distribution, since the Central Parliamentary
Board took all the decisions for ticket awarding.
50
Chapter: 8
Women Seats
The issue of women seat allocation has generated a lot of heat and bad blood
amongst prominent female members of the party. It was an issue regarding which a
number deponents, mainly concerning Punjab, appeared before the RC and pleaded
their case passionately.
The women representatives who complained of injustice did so pertaining to
allocation of women sets of Punjab P.A only. No one complained about injustice in
allocation of women’s seats of KPK .For the NA seats, of Punjab (we were
informed that last minute changes were made- the list having been withdrawn once
after submission by the President National Women Wing was then resubmitted to
the E.C at the last moment with changes), but surprisingly there does not seem to
much hue and cry about it. The reasons seems to be that the first four names in the
NA women list were approved by the Chairman himself and these were the only
four who got into the NA.
In the case of Punjab PA women seats there was a lot of Confusion. Its
formulation was left to party leadership of
51
Lahore and Punjab. If these very decisions had been made by the Chairman or the
Central Parliamentary Board, which made decisions about PA tickets also, the uproar
would have been much less.
It appears to us that there are a few factors which fuelled the issue of women
reserve seats of Punjab.
(a) No one in the party took the issues of women seats seriously, as there were
far more pressing issues, likely ticket distribution for regular seats, national
campaign, etc. in the month of March 2013.
(b) The Central Parliamentary Board, which had given itself the task of
deciding candidates for 849 NA & PA seats in the country, did not itself find time
and priority to decide the precedence order of women reserve seats
(c) Neither women candidates nor the party leadership knew the rules and
regulations about these seats.
(d) Women who were down in the pecking order in the lists submitted, did not
react violently before the election , as most of them were expecting more seats than
the party ultimately got and their disappointment set in when they realized they had
missed the opportunity because they were lower in the list.
The list of Punjab PA reserve seats is the most controversial. It is obvious
that some names were “slipped” in at the last moment, taking advantages of the
52
confusion caused by shortage of time. Some old and reputable women workers were
ignored at the cost of new but better connected entrants.
Numerous personalities of the party leadership have been mentioned
before us, who were allegedly responsible for “ tweaking” the list. It has not possible
for us to get everyone’s version. Since it is basically a collapse of a proper decision
making process, we feel that giving a ruling on “who did what” at this stage would
not serve any purpose. We feel that the injustice done should be rectified by the
party nevertheless.
Recommendations:
1. A high powered Committee be set up by the Party, from amongst the member of the
CPB, who should review the list of Punjab PA women seats and give their ruling,
since the RC is no position to determine the priority of candidates, depending on
their worth to the party. The party should than direct the person, who is to relinquish
her seat to resign. In case such a person defies the party’s decision, the party should
ask the party member, on whose recommendations she got her seat to prevail upon
her. In case she still does not comply, she should be black listed from all party
activity and not invited to any function and not be eligible for any party office. If
she is related to any office bearer of the party, on whose recommendation she got her
name the list, that office bearer should be relieved of the office in the party.
2. In future elections the priority of women list should be decided by the Parliamentary
Board, which is deciding the ticket distribution.
53
Mr. Tasneem Noorani (Chairman) _________________
Mr. Ahmed Awais (Member) __________________
Mr. Yacoob Izhar (Member) ___________________
54
Annexure A: Average of Districts.
55
Annexure-B:
District Wise Votes
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57
Annexure C. List of Punjab MNA/MPA who got less than 20% Votes of the winner.
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59
Annexure -D Zohair Asheers Excercise
Constituency Name Percentage Votes
NA 50 SADAQAT ALI KHAN 78.18% 46810
NA 51 FARHAT FAHEEM 63.64% 39842
NA 52 AJMAL SABIR RAJA 41.82% 69769
NA 53 GHULAM SARWAR
KHAN 63.64%
110308
NA 54 HINA MANZOOR - 68473
NA 55 OPEN -
NA 56 IMRAN AHMED KHAN
NIAZI -
80577
NA 57 MALIK AMIN ASLAM
KHAN 54.55%
55515
NA 58 MALIK SOHAIL
KAMRIYAL -
73935
NA 59 SARDAR MUHAMMAD
ALI KHAN -
33721
NA 60 YASIR HUMAYUN 60% 47546
NA 61 MANSOOR HAYAT
TUMAN -
45343
NA 62
CHAUDHRY MUHAMMAD
SAQLAIN
45.45%
62572
NA 63
MIRZA SAEED MEHMOOD BAIG
JHELMI
81.82%
42573
NA 64 WASEEM ABBAS - 11783
NA 65 EJAZ HUSSAIN
MINHAS 60%
8835
NA 66 ABDULLAH KAHLOON - 36138
NA 67 SARDAR AHSAN RAZA 32.73% 6964
NA 68 NOOR HAYAT
KALYAR 67.27%
45463
60
NA 69 MALIK UMAR ASLAM
KHAN -
79855
NA 70 GUL ASGHAR KHAN 36.36% 37828
NA 71 IMRAN AHMED KHAN
NIAZI -
132283
NA 72 AMJAD KHAN - 124668
NA 73 NAJEEB ULLAH KHAN
NIAZI 63.64%
NA 74 RAFIQUE KHAN NIAZI - 6078
NA 75 FAWAD AHMED
CHEEMA 50.91%
49021
NA 76 M. WAQAR WASI CH 54.55% 17490
NA 77 RAI NASEEM ASAD
KHARAL 23.64%
10148
NA 78 MUHAMMAD YASIR
BALOCH 0%
11227
NA 79 KHALID ABDULLAH 60% 22007
NA 80 MUHAMMAD NAEEM 50.91% 24977
NA 81 JAHANZEB IMTIAZ
GILL -
28578
NA 82 NISAR AKBAR KHAN 72.73% 36373
NA 83 FAIZULLAH KAMOKA 90.91%
NA 84 FARRUKH HABIB - 42336
NA 85 BRIG(R)MUMTAZ IQBAL KAHLOON
43.64% 55215
NA 86 SYED INAYAT ALI
SHAH -
24998
NA 87 RAI SARFRAZ BHATTI --
NA 88 - -
NA 89 - - 8236
NA 90 SALIM MAHMOOD
KAMLANA -
1890
NA 91 SARDAR AZHAR ALI
MAKEEN 0%
NA 92 HAJI KHALID
MAHMOOD CHATTHA -
12183
61
NA 93 MUHAMMAD ASHFAQ 63.64% 95372
NA 94 - -
NA 95 ALI ASHRAF MOUGHAL
- 27799
NA 96 S.A HAMEED 63.64% 29942
NA 97 RANA NAEEM UR REHMAN KHAN
81.82% 30946
NA 98 SHAHZAD HAFEEZ
RAJPUT 72.73%
20717
NA 99 SAJID ALI 40% 20015
NA 100 ABID JAVED VIRK -
6475
NA 101 CH. SHAH NAWAZ
CHEEMA -
11704
NA 102 RIAZ AHMED TARAR -
5355
NA 103 AKHTAR HUSSAIN 62.27%
NA 104 CHAUDHRY USMAN
ALI TARIQ 30.91%
19246
NA 105 MUHAMMAD AFZAL
GONDAL 27.27%
39931
NA 106 MUHAMMAD AFZAL
HAYAT 90.91%
31109
NA 107 MUHAMMAD ILYAS
CHAUDHRY 72.73%
60962
NA 108 ZAFAR ULLAH TARAR
ADV. 78.18%
25359
NA 109 MUHAMMAD NAWAZ
GONDAL -
13597
NA 110 USMAN DAR -
71525
NA 111 MUHAMMAD AJMAL
CHEEMA 72.73%
31099
NA 112 SALMAN SAIF
CHEEMA 54.55%
36632
62
NA 113 ABDUL QUYYUM -
52341
NA 114 AKHTAR HUSSAIN
RIZVI -
18447
NA 115 MANSOOR SARWAR -
13369
NA 116 WAJIHA AKRAM -
9108
NA 117 ABRAR-UL-HAQ 72.73%
51838
NA 118 HAMMAD ZAMAN -
43570
NA 119 MUHAMMAD KHAN
MADNI 41.82%
40797
NA 120 DR. YASMIN RASHID -
52321
NA 121 MUHAMMAD
HAMMAD AZHAR -
68227
NA 122 IMRAN AHMAD KHAN
NIAZI -
84417
NA 123 ATIF CHOUDHRY 49.09%
40617
NA 124 WALID IQBAL 78.18%
42119
NA 125 HAMID KHAN -
83190
NA 126 SHAFQAT MEHMOOD 100%
96666
NA 127 NASRULLAH MUGHAL 54.55%
45927
NA 128 MALIK KARAMAT ALI
KHOKHAR 36.36%
78295
NA 129 CH MUHAMMAD MANSHA SINDHO
45.45% 36044
NA 130 TALIB HUSSAIN
SIDHU 72.73%
21746
63
NA 131 RAHAT AMANULLAH
BHATTI 50.91%
21250
NA 132 AYAZ SARFRAZ -
16453
NA 133 ABUBAKAR VIRK 63.64%
25842
NA 134 CH. SHAFQAT ALI 62.27%
14109
NA 135 MUHAMMAD ARSHAD
SAHI 63.64%
40537
NA 136 CH. MUHAMMAD
YAQOOB 23.64%
33387
NA 137 RAI MUHAMMAD
AKRAM KHAN 45.45%
8895
NA 138 HASSAN ALI KHAN -
13076
NA 139 SARDAR MUHAMMAD
HUSSAIN DOGAR -
21628
NA 140 KHURSHID
MAHMOOD KASURI 78.18%
30414
NA 141 AKEEL ASLAM 45.45%
11935
NA 142 RANA NAEEM RIAZ
AHMAD 43.64%
18325
NA 143 SHAHID MEHMOOD
CHAUDHRY 54.55%
NA 144 RAO KHALID -
18933
NA 145 SYED ALI HUSSAIN
SHAH NAQVI 18.18%
12283
NA 146 PROF ABDUL RAUF
DOULLA -
11927
NA 147 MALIK WAQAR
AHMAD 54.55%
8195
NA 148 MAKHDOOM SHAH
MEHMOOD QURESHI 63.64%
64719
64
NA 149 MAKHDOOM JAVED
HASHMI
83569
NA 150 MAKHDOOM SHAH
MEHMOOD QURESHI 63.64%
92726
NA 151 MIAN MUHAMMAD
SULEMAN ALI 67.27%
39604
NA 152 MUHAMMAD
IBRAHIM KHAN 32.73%
64395
NA 153 SYED KHURSHID
PANHUAN -
17931
NA 154 JAHANGEER KHAN
TAREEN 72.73%
75814
NA 155 NAWAB AMANULLAH
KHAN 27.27%
42186
NA 156 DR. KHAWAR ALI
SHAH -
20670
NA 157 ABID MEHMOOD
KHAGGA 25.45%
27840
NA 158 ZAHOOR HUSSAIN
QURESHI 81.82%
71807
NA 159 GHULAM MURTAZA
MAITLA -
68078
NA 160 MUHAMMAD ALI
SHAKOOR 45.45%
37846
NA 161 MALIK MUHAMMAD
YAR DHAKKU 41.82%
43540
NA 162 RAI MURATAZA
IQBAL -
88004
NA 163 AFTAB IRSHAD
CHEEMA 58.18%
16276
NA 164 RAO NASEEM HASHIM -
27781
NA 165 AHMED RAZA
MANIKA -
55043
NA 166 MIAN MUHAMMAD
AMJAD JOIYA 23.64%
48928
65
NA 167 RIASAT ALI BHATTI 36.36%
35322
NA 168 ISHAQ KHAN KHAKWANI
63.64% 54263
NA 169 AFTAB AHMED KHAN
KHICHI -
27160
NA 170 AURANGZEB KHAN
KHICHI -
80971
NA 171
KHUWAJA MUDDASAR MEHMOOD
30.91%
17514
NA 172 ZARTAJ GUL 40%
38393
NA 173 SAJJAD HUSSAIN
MAHAR -
24837
NA 174 ABDUL RAZZAQ 40%
6825
NA 175 AMIR KOREJA -
13785
NA 176 NAVEED AHMED
KHERRA -
2637
NA 177 ZULFIQAR ALI
QURESHI 49.90%
13702
NA 178 MIAN SAJID NAEEM
QURESHI -
33144
NA 179 JAMIL AHMAD
HUSSAIN KHAN 40%
9442
NA 180 JAMIL AHMAD
HUSSAIN KHAN 40%
2536
NA 181 NIAZ MUHAMMAD
GUJJAR 63.64%
20699
NA 182 IFTIKHAR AHMAD
KHITRAN 30.91%
32036
NA 183 - -
197
66
NA 184 - -
NA 185 - -
NA 186 CH NAEEM UD DIN
WARRAICH 30.91%
52811
NA 187 IRSHAD GULAB -
360
NA 188 MUHAMMAD SAEED
WATTOO -
1895
NA 189 MUMTAZ MUTIYANA -
46795
NA 190 MALIK MOHAMMAD
MUZAFFAR KHAN 72.73%
40328
NA 191 MUHAMMAD AFZAL
SINDHU 90.91%
8622
NA 192 MIAN MJUHAMMAD
ASIF -
16426
NA 193 MIAN GHOUS MUHAMMAD
- 17130
NA 194 MAKHDOOM
EMMADUDDIN -
15837
NA 195 MARIUM BATOOL -
18339
NA 196 SHAHID TALIB -
27865
NA 197 RAFIQ HAIDER
LAGHARI 58.18%
31393
Constituency Name Percentage Votes
NA 1 IMRAN AHMED KHAN NIAZI - 90500 NA 2 ENGR. HAMID UL HAQ 67% 79125 NA 3 SAJID NAWAZ 47% 66528 NA 4 ASAD GULZAR KHAN - 55134 NA 5 PERVEZ KHATTAK 55% 70053 67
NA 6 SIRAJ MOHAMMAD KHAN 73% 54266 NA 7 FAZAL MUHAMMAD KHAN 27% 40254 NA 8 JHANZEB KHAN DHAKKI 55% 30089 NA 9 NASIR KHAN - 42068 NA 10 ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN 69% 46531 NA 11 MUJAHID ALI 27% 38233 NA 12 ANWAR HAQ DAD 49% 19611 NA 13 ASAD QAISAR 71% 48576 NA 14 SHEHRYAR AFRIDI 60% 68129 NA 15 NASIR KHATTAK 76% 51481 NA 16 KHIAL ZAMAN 64% 24067
NA 17 MUHAMMAD AZHAR KHAN JADUN 64% 96549
NA 18 SARDAR YAQOOB 73% 41391 NA 19 RAJA AAMER ZAMAN 64% 116979 NA 20 MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN 82% 75197 NA 21 NAWABZADA SALAHUDDIN - 25615 NA 22 NIAZ MUHAMMAD KHAN 42% 2370 NA 23 - - NA 24 MUSTAFA KUNDI 42% 21394 NA 25 DAWAR KHAN KUNDI - 47543 NA 26 MATIULLAH KHAN 24% 25392 NA 27 COL. AMIRULLAH MARWAT 45% 18405 NA 28 MIAN MOINUDDIN 69% 23336 NA 29 MURAD SAEED 24% 88513 NA 30 SALEEM UR REHMAN - 49976 NA 31 NAWAZ KHAN 32% 6120 NA 32 ABDUL LATEEF 40% 24182 NA 33 MOHAMMAD NAWAZ - 15397 NA 34 MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN - 45066 NA 35 JUNAID AKBAR KHAN 49% 51312
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